RICHARD BAXTER'S

Catholick Theologie:

PLAIN, PURE, PEACEABLE:

FOR

PACIFICATION

Of the DOGMATICAL

WORD-WARRIOURS,

Who, 1. By contending about *things unrevealed* or *not understood*, 2. And by taking VERBAL differences for REAL, and their *arbitrary Notions* for *necessary Sacred Truths*, deceived and deceiving by *Ambiguous unexplained* WORDS, have long been the *Shame* of the *Christian Religion*, a *Scandal* and *hardning* to *unbelievers*, the Incendiaries, Dividers and Distracters of the Church, the occasion of State Discords and Wars, the Corrupters of the Christian Faith, and the Subverters of their own Souls; and their followers, calling them to a blind Zeal, and Wrathful Warfare, against true Piety, Love and Peace, and teaching them to censure, backbite, slander, and prate against each other, for things which they never understood.

In Three BOOKS.

I. PACIFYING PRINCIPLES, about Gods Decrees, Fore-Knowledge, Providence, Operations, Redemption, Grace, Mans Power, Free-will, Justification, Merits, Certainty of Salvation, Perseverance, *&c.*

II. A PACIFYING PRAXIS or Dialogue, about the Five Articles, Justification, *&c.* Proving that men here contend almost only about *Ambiguous words*, and *unrevealed things.*

III. PACIFYING DISPUTATIONS against some *Real Errors* which hinder Reconciliation, *viz.* About Physical Predetermination, Original Sin, the extent of Redemption, Sufficient Grace, Imputation of Righteousness, *&c.*

Written chiefly for Posterity, when sad Experience hath taught men to hate Theological Logical Wars, and to love, and seek, and call for Peace. (*Ex Bello Pax.*)

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BRITISH MUSEUM

I intreat the WRATHFUL, CONTENTIOUS, ZEALOUS DOGMATISTS conſcientiouſly to ſtudy theſe Texts of Scripture:

MATTH. 28. 19, 20. Go, Teach *all Nations, Baptizing them into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt; Teaching them to obſerve all things whatſoever I have commanded you.* Mar. 16. 16. *He that believeth and is Baptized ſhall be ſaved.* Acts 11. 26. *The Diſciples were called Chriſtians.*

1 Cor. 15. 1, 2, 3, 4. *I declare to you the Goſpel which I preached to you, which alſo you have received, and wherein ye ſtand, by which alſo ye are ſaved, if ye keep in memory what I preached to you, unleſs ye have believed in vain——That Chriſt dyed for our ſins,—— and that he was buryed, and that he roſe again the third day——*

2 Tim. 1. 13. *Hold faſt the FORM of ſound words, which thou haſt heard of me, in FAITH and LOVE which is in Chriſt Jeſus.*

1 John 4. 15. *Whoſoever ſhall confeſs that Jeſus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God.*

Rom. 10. 9, 10. *If thou confeſs with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and believe in thy Heart that God hath raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved: For with the Heart man believeth unto Righteouſneſs, and with the Mouth confeſſion is made to ſalvation.*

Acts 8. 37. *If thou believeſt with all thy heart thou maiſt (be baptized) And he ſaid*——I believe that Jeſus Chriſt is the Son of God.

Rom. 14. 1. 17, 18, 19. *Him that is weak in the Faith receive, but not to doubtful diſputations——For the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but Righteouſneſs, Peace and Joy in the Holy Ghoſt: For he that in theſe things* ſerveth Chriſt, *is acceptable to God, and approved of men: Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edifie another.* Rom. 15. 5, 6, 7. *Now the God of patience and conſolation grant you to be like minded one towards another (or, mind the ſame thing one with another) according to Chriſt Jeſus; That ye may with one mind and one mouth glorifie God—Wherefore Receive ye one another as Chriſt alſo received us, to the glory of God.*

1 Tim. 1. 3, 4, 5. *Charge ſome that they teach NO OTHER doctrine, nor give heed to fables and endleſs Genealogies, which miniſter* Queſtions, *rather than* godly edifying, which is in faith: *Now the End of the Commandment is Charity, out of a pure heart and of a good conſcience, and of faith unfeigned: From which ſome having ſwerved, have turned aſide to vain janglings.*

1 Tim. 6. 3, 4, 5, 6. *If any man teach* OTHERWISE, *and consent not to wholsome words, the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to Godliness, he is* PROUD, KNOWING NOTHING, *but* DOTING *about Questions, and* STRIFES *of* WORDS, *whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness, (or thinking that godliness is advantage;) from such turn away.*

2 Tim. 2. 22, 23, 24. *Follow* righteousness, faith, charity, peace, *with them that call on the Lord out of a pure heart: But foolish and unlearned Questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes: and the servant of the Lord must not strive.* V. 15, 16, 17. *Study to shew thy self approved unto God, a workman that needeth not be ashamed,* RIGHTLY DIVIDING *the word of truth: But shun profane and vain bablings: for they will increase to more ungodliness, and their word will eat as doth a canker.*

2 Tim. 2. 14. *Charging them before the Lord, that they* STRIVE *not about* WORDS, *to no profit, to the subverting of the hearers.*

1 Cor. 8. 2, 3. *If any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing as he ought to know: But if any man* LOVE GOD, *the same is* KNOWN OF HIM.

Jam. 3. 1, 13, &c. *My Brethren, Be not Many Masters, knowing that we shall receive the greater condemnation——who is a wise man, and indued with knowledge among you? Let him shew out of a good conversation his* WORKS *with meekness of wisdom. But if ye have bitter zeal (or envying) and strife in your hearts, Glory not, and Lye not against the truth. This* WISDOM *descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish: For where envying and strife is, there is confusion and every evil work: But the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easie to be intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisie: And the fruit of Righteousness is sown in Peace of them that make Peace.*

* But not to Church-Tyrants, Dogmatists or superstitious ones.

Acts 15. 28. *It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us * to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things——*

Phil. 3. 15, 16, 17. *Let us as many as be perfect be thus minded: and if in any thing ye be otherwise (or diversly, or contrarily) minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.*

Phil. 2. 1, 2, 3, 4. *If there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfil ye my joy that ye be* like minded, *having the same Love, being of one accord, of one mind: Let nothing be done through strife, or vain glory; but in lowliness of mind, let each esteem other better than themselves: Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others: Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus——who——made himself of no reputation.*

1 Cor. 1. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. *Now I beseech you brethren by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that ye speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you: but that ye be perfectly joyned together in the same mind, and in the same judgement: For it hath been declared to me of you brethren——that there are contentions among you——that every one of you saith, I am of* Paul, *and I of* Apollos, *and I of* Cephas, *and I of Christ: Is Christ divided? Was* Paul *crucified for you? or were you baptized into the name of* Paul? *I thank God, that I baptized none of you,* &c.

1 Cor. 3. 1, 2, 3, 4. *I could not ſpeak to you as unto ſpiritual, but as unto carnal, as to babes in Chriſt———For whereas there is among you envying, and ſtrife, and diviſions, are ye not carnal and walk as men?* See Eph. 4. 1, &c. after.

John 17. 20, 21, 22, 23. *I pray———for them which ſhall believe on me——that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in Thee, that they alſo may be One in us, that the world may believe that thou haſt ſent me. And the glory which thou gaveſt me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou haſt ſent me, and haſt loved them as thou haſt loved me.*

Matth. 5. 9. *Bleſſed are the Peace-makers, for they ſhall be called the children of God.*

Rom. 12. 18. *If it be poſſible, as much as in you lyeth, live peaceably with all men.*

2 Cor. 12. 20, 21. *I fear leſt when I come I ſhall not find you ſuch as I would——leſt there be debates, envyings, wraths, ſtrifes, backbitings, whiſperings, ſwellings, tumults———Leſt God will humble me among you, and I ſhall bewail many,* &c.

Gal. 5. 19, 20. *The works of the fleſh are manifeſt——hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, ſtrife, ſeditions, hereſies, envyings——*

1 Cor. 14. 33. *God is not the Author of Confuſion, but of Peace, as in all Churches of the Saints.*

Acts 20. 30. *Of your own ſelves ſhall men ariſe, ſpeaking perverſe things to draw away diſciples after them.*

Phil. 1. 15, 16. *Some indeed preach Chriſt even of envy and ſtrife, and ſome alſo of good will: The one preach Chriſt of contention, not ſincerely——*

Rom. 16. 17, 18. *Now I beſeech you brethren, Mark them which cauſe diviſions and offences contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and avoid them: For they that are ſuch, ſerve not our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but their own bellies: and by good words and fair ſpeeches, deceive the hearts of the ſimple.*

Luke 9. 55. *Ye know not what manner of Spirit ye are of——.*

The Angelical Goſpel of the Ends of Chriſts Incarnation, *Luke* 2. 19. *GLORY TO GOD IN THE HIGHEST: ON EARTH PEACE, GOOD WILL TO MEN* (or *WELL-PLEASEDNESS IN MEN.*)

John 20. 26. *Peace be unto you. Grace, Mercy and Peace, with all that are in Chriſt———and Love———*Gal. 6. 16. Eph. 6. 23. 1 Pet. 1. 2. & 5. 14. 2 Pet. 1. 2. 1 Theſſ. 5. 13.

2 Cor. 13. 11. *Finally, brethren, farewell: be perfect, be of good comfort, be of one mind: Live in Peace; and the God of Love and Peace ſhall be with you.* Amen.

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1. *Aſſert.* THE BAPTISMAL COVENANT expounded in the antient CREED is the *ſumm* and *Symbol* of *Chriſtianity*, by which Believers were to be diſtinguiſhed from unbelievers, and the outward Profeſſion of it was mens Title to Church-communion, and the Heart-conſent was their Title-condition of Pardon and Salvation; And to theſe ends it was made by Chriſt himſelf. *Matth.* 28. 19, 20. *Mark* 16. 16.

2. All

2. All that were baptized did profeſs to *Believe* in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, and devoted themſelves to him, with profeſſion of Repentance for former ſins, and renouncing the Luſts of the Fleſh, the World and the Devil, profeſſing to begin a new and holy life, in hope of everlaſting glory.

3. This form of Baptiſmal Covenanting and Profeſſion begun with Chriſtianity (and called our Chriſtening, or making us Chriſtians) hath been propagated and delivered down to us to this day, by a full and certain tradition and teſtimony and leſs alterations than the holy Scriptures.

4. The Apoſtles were never ſuch formaliſts and friends to ignorance and hypocriſie, as to encourage the baptized to take up with the ſaying [*I believe in the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*] without teaching them to underſtand what they ſaid. Therefore undoubtedly they expounded thoſe three Articles: And that expoſition could be no other in ſenſe than the Creed is. And when *Paul* reciteth the Articles of Chriſt, 1 *Cor.* 15. and mentioneth the *Form* of *ſound words*, we may be ſure that they all gave the people *one unchanged expoſition as to the ſenſe:* Chriſtianity was one unchanged thing.

5. Though I am not of their mind, that think the twelve Apoſtles each one made an Article of the Creed, or that they formed and tyed men to juſt the very ſame ſyllables, and every word that is now in the Creed; yet that they ſtill kept to the ſame *ſenſe*, and words ſo expreſſing it, as by their variation might not endanger the corrupting of the faith by a new ſenſe, is certain from the nature of the caſe, and from the Agreement of all the antient Creeds, which were ever profeſſed at baptiſm, from their dayes; that cited by me (*Append.* to the *Reformed Paſtor*) out of *Irenæus*, two out of *Tertullian*, that of *Marcellus* in *Epiphanius*, that expounded by *Cyril*, that in *Ruffinus*, the *Nicene*, and all mentioned by *Uſher* and *Voſſius* agreeing thus far in ſenſe; And no one was baptized without the Creed profeſſed.

6. As Chriſt himſelf was the Author of the Baptiſmal Creed and Covenant, ſo the Apoſtles were the Authors of that Expoſition which they then uſed and taught the Church to uſe: And they did that by the Holy Ghoſt as much as their inditing of the Scripture.

7. Therefore the Church had a Summary and Symbol of Chriſtianity (as I ſaid before) about twelve years before any Book of the New Teſtament was written, and about ſixty ſix years before the whole was written: And this of Gods own making: which was ever agreed on, when many Books of the New Teſtament were not yet agreed on.

8. Therefore men were then to prove the *truth of the Chriſtian Religion*, by its proper Evidences and Miracles, long before they were to prove that *every word* (or *any Book*) of the New Teſtament was the infallible perfect Word of God.

9. Therefore we muſt ſtill follow the ſame Method, and take Chriſts Miracles to be primarily the proof of the Chriſtian Religion, long before the New Teſtament Books were written.

10. Therefore if a man ſhould be tempted to doubt of the certainty of this or that Book, words or reading, it followeth not that he muſt therefore doubt of the Chriſtian Faith.

11. A thouſand Texts of Scripture may be not known and underſtood, by one that is Juſtified: but all the Baptiſmal Articles and Covenant muſt be underſtood competently by all that will be ſaved.

12. Thoſe *Church-Tyrants*, *Dogmatiſts* or *ſuperſtitious ones*, who deny the ſufficiency of this Teſt and Symbol (made by Chriſt and his Spirit)

to

to its proper uſe, (to be the Symbol of ſuch as in *Love* and *Communion* we are to take for *Chriſtians*) do ſubvert the ſumm of Chriſts Goſpel and Law, and do worſe than they that add to, or alter the leſſer parts of the Word of God.

13. Therefore our further *Additional Confeſſions* muſt be only to *other ſubordinate ends*; As 1. To *ſatisfie other Churches* that doubt of our *right underſtanding the faith*: 2. To be an *enumeration of Verities* which Preachers ſhall not *have leave to preach againſt* (though they ſubſcribe them not.)

14. Object. *Hereticks may profeſs the Baptiſmal Creed. Anſw.* 1. And Hereticks may profeſs any words that you can impoſe on them, taking them in their own ſenſe. All the Councils are not large enough to keep out ſubſcribing Hereticks. We muſt not make new Symbols, Rules and Laws as oft as Knaves will falſly profeſs, or break the old ones: there being none that may not be falſly profeſſed and violated. 2. Many ſubſcribe to the whole Scriptures, that yet are Hereticks. 3. Church Governours are for this, to caſt out thoſe or puniſh them, who preach, teach and live contrary to the certain and ſufficient Rule which they profeſs. Judicatures are not to make new Laws, but to puniſh men for breaking Laws. A *heart-Heretick-only is no Heretick in foro Eccleſiæ.* He that *teacheth Hereſie* muſt be *proved* ſo to do, and *judged* upon proof: which may be done without new additional Symbols, Rules or Laws of faith. So that all this contradicts not the ſufficiency of the Baptiſmal Creed as the Symbol of Chriſtian Love, Communion and Concord. I thought meet to add this more fully to what I ſaid in the Epiſtle, to convince men of the true terms of Union, and of the heinous ſin of all the ſorts of *Adding and Corrupting overdoers*, that divide us.

THE

THE PREFACE, AGAINST CLERGIE MENS Contentions, AND Church-diſtracting Controverſies.

THAT the Churches of Chriſt are dolefully tempted and diſtracted by Diviſions, no man will deny that knoweth them: That the Clergie is not only greatly culpable herein, but the *chief cauſe*, cannot be hid. But which part of the Clergie it is, and what be their dividing Errors and Crimes, and how they ſhould be cured, is indeed eaſie for the truly faithful and impartial Spectators to perceive, but exceeding hard (as experience tells us) to make the Guilty throughly know, and harder to do much effectually for the cure. For the *error* and *ſin* which is the true cauſe, is its own defence, and repelleth and fruſtrateth the Remedies. And ſo each party layeth it from themſelves, on others, and hate all that accuſe them, while they are the ſharpeſt (and perhaps moſt unjuſt) accuſers of the reſt.

I ſhall here freely tell the Reader the Hiſtory of my own Conceptions of theſe matters, and then my preſent

thoughts of the *Cauſes* of all theſe Calamities, and the Cure.

I. I was born and bred of Parents piouſly affected, but of no ſuch knowledge or acquaintance as might engage them in any Controverſies, or diſaffect them to the preſent Government of the Church, or cauſe them to ſcruple Conformity to its Doctrine, Worſhip or Diſcipline: In this way I was bred my ſelf, but taught by my Parents and God himſelf, to make conſcience of ſin, and to fear God, and to diſcern between the Godly and the notoriouſly wicked: For which my Parents and I were commonly derided as Puritans, the Spirit of the Vulgar being commonly then fired with hatred and ſcorn of ſerious godlineſs, and uſing that name as their inſtrument of reproach, which was firſt forged againſt the Nonconformiſts only; And the Clergie where I lived, being moſtly only Readers of the Liturgie, and ſome others that rather countenanced than reproved this courſe, I ſoon confined my Reverence to a very few among them that were Learned and Godly (but Conformiſts) and for going out of my Pariſh to hear them, my reproach increaſed: About eighteen or nineteen years of age I fell acquainted with ſome perſons, half Conformiſts and half Non-conformiſts, who for fear of ſeverities againſt private Meetings, met with great ſecreſie only to repeat the publick Sermons, and Pray, and by Pious Conference edifie each other. Their Spirits and Practice was ſo ſavoury to me, that it kindled in me a diſtaſte of the Prelates as Perſecutors, who troubled and ruined ſuch perſons, while ignorant Drunkards and Worldlings were tolerated in ſo many Churches, yea, and countenanced for crying down ſuch perſons, and crying up Biſhops, Liturgie and Conformity: Before I was aware, my affections began to ſolicite my underſtanding, to judge of the *Things* and *Cauſes* by the *Perſons* (where the difference was very great). But yet my firſt Teachers kept my judgement for *Conformity* as *Lawful*, though not *Deſirable had we Liberty*, till I was ordained. But ſoon after a new acquaintance provoked me to a deeper ſtudy of the whole Controverſie than I had undertaken before; which left me perſwaded, that the uſe of *Liturgie and Ceremonies was lawful* in that *caſe of neceſſity*, except the *Baptiſmal uſe of the Croſs*, and the *ſubſcription to all things*, &c. But in 1640. the *Oath* called [*Et Cætera*] being offered the Miniſtry, forced me to a yet more *ſearching Study* of the caſe of our

Dioceſane

Dioceſane Prelacie (which elſe I had never been like to have gainſaid.) At a meeting of Miniſters to debate the caſe, it fell to Mr. *Chriſtopher Cartwrights* lot and mine to be the Diſputers; and the iſſue of all (that and my ſtudies) was, that I ſetled in the approbation of the Epiſcopacy aſſerted by *Ignatius*, yea, and *Cyprian*, but ſuch a diſſent from the *Engliſh* frame, as I have given account of in my *Diſputations* of *Church Government*.

My *genius* was inquiſitive, and earneſtly deſirous to know the truth: my *helps* for *Piety* were greater than my *helps* for *Learning*, of which I had not much beſides *Books*: ſickneſs helpt my ſeriouſneſs, keeping me ſtill in expectation of death. All my reverenced acquaintance (ſave one) cryed down *Arminianiſm* as the *Pelagian* Hereſie, and the Enemy of Grace: I quickly plunged my ſelf into the ſtudy of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and *Ameſius*, and *Camero*, and *Pemble*, and others on that ſubject: By which my mind was ſetled in prejudice againſt *Arminianiſm*, without a clear underſtanding of the caſe: whereupon I felt preſently in my mind, a *judgement* of thoſe that were for *Arminianiſm*; as *bad* or *dangerous adverſaries* to the Church; and ſpecially of the then ruling Biſhops: which yet I think I had not entertained, had I not taken them withal for the great Perſecutors of Godly able Miniſters, and ſerious Chriſtians, not only for Ceremonies, but for holy practices of life.

Being under theſe apprehenſions, when the Wars began, though the *Cauſe* it ſelf lay in Civil Controverſies, between King and Parliament, yet the thoughts that the Church and Godlineſs it ſelf was deeply in danger by *Perſecution* and *Arminianiſm*, did much more to byaſs me to the Parliaments ſide, than the Civil intereſt (which at the heart I little regarded): At laſt (after two years abode in a quiet Garriſon) upon the Invitation of ſome Orthodox Commanders in *Fairfax*'s Army, and by the Miſſion of an Aſſembly of Divines, I went (after *Naſeby* Fight) into that Army as the profeſt Antagoniſt of the *Sectaries* and *Innovators*, who we all then (too late) ſaw deſigned thoſe changes in the *Church and State* which they after made. I there met with ſome *Arminians*, and more *Antinomians*: Theſe printed and preached as the Doctrine of *Free Grace*, that all men muſt preſently believe that they are Elect and Juſtified, and that Chriſt *Repented* and *Believed* for them (as *Saltmarſh* writeth). I had a little before engaged my ſelf as a Diſputer againſt *Univerſal Re-*

thoughts of the *Cauſes* of all theſe Calamities, and the Cure.

I. I was born and bred of Parents piouſly affected, but of no ſuch knowledge or acquaintance as might engage them in any Controverſies, or diſaffect them to the preſent Government of the Church, or cauſe them to ſcruple Conformity to its Doctrine, Worſhip or Diſcipline: In this way I was bred my ſelf, but taught by my Parents and God himſelf, to make conſcience of ſin, and to fear God, and to diſcern between the Godly and the notoriouſly wicked: For which my Parents and I were commonly derided as Puritans, the Spirit of the Vulgar being commonly then fired with hatred and ſcorn of ſerious godlineſs, and uſing that name as their inſtrument of reproach, which was firſt forged againſt the Nonconformiſts only; And the Clergie where I lived, being moſtly only Readers of the Liturgie, and ſome others that rather countenanced than reproved this courſe, I ſoon confined my Reverence to a very few among them that were Learned and Godly (but Conformiſts) and for going out of my Pariſh to hear them, my reproach increaſed: About eighteen or nineteen years of age I fell acquainted with ſome perſons, half Conformiſts and half Non-conformiſts, who for fear of ſeverities againſt private Meetings, met with great ſecreſie only to repeat the publick Sermons, and Pray, and by Pious Conference edifie each other. Their Spirits and Practice was ſo ſavoury to me, that it kindled in me a diſtaſte of the Prelates as Perſecutors, who troubled and ruined ſuch perſons, while ignorant Drunkards and Worldlings were tolerated in ſo many Churches, yea, and countenanced for crying down ſuch perſons, and crying up Biſhops, Liturgie and Conformity: Before I was aware, my affections began to ſolicite my underſtanding, to judge of the *Things* and *Cauſes* by the *Perſons* (where the difference was very great). But yet my firſt Teachers kept my judgement for *Conformity* as *Lawful*, though not *Deſirable had we Liberty*, till I was ordained. But ſoon after a new acquaintance provoked me to a deeper ſtudy of the whole Controverſie than I had undertaken before; which left me perſwaded, that the uſe of *Liturgie and Ceremonies was lawful* in that *caſe of neceſſity*, except the *Baptiſmal uſe of the Croſs*, and the *Subſcription to all things*, &c. But in 1640. the *Oath* called [*Et Cætera*] being offered the Miniſtry, forced me to a yet more *ſearching Study* of the caſe of our

Dioceſane

Dioceſane Prelacie (which elſe I had never been like to have gainſaid.) At a meeting of Miniſters to debate the caſe, it fell to Mr. *Chriſtopher Cartwrights* lot and mine to be the Diſputers; and the iſſue of all (that and my ſtudies) was, that I ſetled in the approbation of the Epiſcopacy aſſerted by *Ignatius*, yea, and *Cyprian*, but ſuch a diſſent from the *Engliſh* frame, as I have given account of in my *Diſputations* of *Church Government*.

My *genius* was inquiſitive, and earneſtly deſirous to know the truth: my *helps* for *Piety* were greater than my *helps* for *Learning*, of which I had not much beſides *Books*: ſickneſs helpt my ſeriouſneſs, keeping me ſtill in expectation of death. All my reverenced acquaintance (ſave one) cryed down *Arminianiſm* as the *Pelagian* Hereſie, and the Enemy of Grace: I quickly plunged my ſelf into the ſtudy of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and *Ameſius*, and *Camero*, and *Pemble*, and others on that ſubject: By which my mind was ſetled in prejudice againſt *Arminianiſm*, without a clear underſtanding of the caſe: whereupon I felt preſently in my mind, a *judgement* of thoſe that were for *Arminianiſm*, as *bad* or *dangerous adverſaries* to the Church; and ſpecially of the then ruling Biſhops: which yet I think I had not entertained, had I not taken them withal for the great Perſecutors of Godly able Miniſters, and ſerious Chriſtians, not only for Ceremonies, but for holy practices of life.

Being under theſe apprehenſions, when the Wars began, though the *Cauſe* it ſelf lay in Civil Controverſies, between King and Parliament, yet the thoughts that the Church and Godlineſs it ſelf was deeply in danger by *Perſecution* and *Arminianiſm*, did much more to byaſs me to the Parliaments ſide, than the Civil intereſt (which at the heart I little regarded): At laſt (after two years abode in a quiet Garriſon) upon the Invitation of ſome Orthodox Commanders in *Fairfax's* Army, and by the Miſſion of an Aſſembly of Divines, I went (after *Naſeby* Fight) into that Army as the profeſt Antagoniſt of the *Sectaries* and *Innovators*, who we all then (too late) ſaw deſigned thoſe changes in the *Church and State* which they after made. I there met with ſome *Arminians*, and more *Antinomians*: Theſe printed and preached as the Doctrine of *Free Grace*, that all men muſt preſently believe that they are Elect and Juſtified, and that Chriſt *Repented* and *Believed* for them (as *Saltmarſh* writeth). I had a little before engaged my ſelf as a Diſputer againſt *Univerſal Re-*

demption, againſt two antient Miniſters in *Coventry* (Mr. *Cradock* and Mr. *Diamond*) that were for it. But theſe new notions called me to new thoughts: which clearly ſhewed me the difference between *Chriſts* part and *Mans*, the Covenant of *Innocency* with its *required Righteouſneſs*, and the *Covenant of Grace* with its *required* and *imputed righteouſneſs*: I had never read one *Socinian*, nor much of any *Arminians*; but I laid by prejudice, and I went to the Scripture, where its whole current, but eſpecially *Matth.* 25. did quickly ſatisfie me in the Doctrine of *Juſtification*: and I remembred two or three things in Dr. *Twiſſe* (whom I moſt eſteemed) which inclined me to moderation in the five Articles: 1. That he every where profeſſeth, that Chriſt ſo far dyed for all, as to purchaſe them Juſtification and Salvation conditionally to be given them, if they believe. 2. That he reduceth all the Decrees to two, *de fine & de mediis*, as the healing way. 3. That he profeſſeth, that *Arminius* and we and all the Schoolmen are agreed, that there is no *neceſsity conſequentis* laid on us by God in Predeſtination, but only *neceſsity conſequentiæ* or *Logical* (but in Election I ſhall here ſuſpend.) 4. That the *Ratio Reatus* in our Original Sin, is firſt founded in our Natural propagation from *Adam*, and but ſecondarily from the poſitive Covenant of God. 5. That *Faith* is but *Cauſa diſpoſitiva Juſtificationis*, and ſo is Repentance. Theſe and ſuch things more I eaſilier received from him, than I could have done from another: But his Doctrine of *Permiſsion* and *Predetermination*, and *Cauſa Mali*, quickly frightned me from aſſent. And though *Camero*'s moderation and great clearneſs took much with me, I ſoon perceived that his Reſolving the cauſe of ſin into neceſſitating objects and temptations, laid it as much on God (in another way) as the Predeterminants do. And I found all godly mens Prayers and Sermons run quite in another ſtrain, when they choſe not the Controverſie as pre-engaged.

In this caſe I wrote my firſt Book called *Aphoriſms of Juſtification and the Covenants*, &c. And being young, and unexerciſed in writing, and my thoughts yet undigeſted, I put into it many uncautelous words (as young Writers uſe to do,) though I think the main doctrine of it ſound. I intended it only againſt the *Antinomians*; But it ſounded as new and ſtrange to many. Upon whoſe diſſent or doubtings, I printed my deſire of my friends Animadverſions, and my *ſuſpenſion* of the Book, as not owned by me, nor any more to be printed,

printed, till further conſidered and corrected: Hereupon I had the great benefit of Animadverſions from many, whom I accounted the moſt judicious and worthy perſons that I had heard of: Firſt my friend Mr. *John Warren* began: next came Mr. *G. Lawſon*'s, (the moſt judicious Divine that ever I was acquainted with, in my judgement, (yet living), and from whom I learned more than from any man): next came Mr. *Chriſtopher Cartwright*'s (then of *York*; the Author of the *Rabbinical Comment.* on *Gen. chap.* 1, 2, 3. and of the *Defence* of King *Charles* againſt the Marqueſs of *Worceſter*). Anſwers and Rejoinders to theſe took me up much time: next came a moſt judicious and friendly MS. from Dr. *John Wallis*; and another from Mr. *Tombes*; and ſomewhat I extorted from Mr. *Burges*: the anſwers to which two laſt are publiſhed. To all theſe Learned men I owe very great thanks: and I never more owned or publiſhed my *Aphoriſms* (but the *Cambridge* Printer ſtole an Impreſſion without my knowledge). And though moſt of theſe differed as much from one another (at leaſt) as from me; yet the great Learning of their various Writings, and the long Study which I was thereby engaged in, in anſwering and rejoyning to the moſt, was a greater advantage to me, to receive accurate and digeſted conceptions on theſe ſubjects, than private Students can expect.

My mind being thus many years immerſt in ſtudies of this nature, and I having alſo long wearied my ſelf in ſearching what Fathers and Schoolmen have ſaid of ſuch things before us, and my Genius abhorring *Confuſion* and *Equivocals*, I came by many years longer ſtudy to perceive, that moſt of the *Doctrinal* Controverſies among Proteſtants (that I ſay not in the *Chriſtian World*) are far more about *equivocal words*, than *matter*; and it wounded my ſoul to perceive what work both *Tyrannical*, and *unskilful Diſputing* Clergie-men had made theſe thirteen hundred years in the world! And experience ſince the year 1643. till this year 1675. hath loudly called to me to Repent of my own *prejudices*, *ſidings* and *cenſurings* of *cauſes* and *perſons* not underſtood, and of all the miſcarriages of my Miniſtry and life, which have been thereby cauſed; and to make it my chief work to call men that are within my hearing to more peaceable *thoughts*, *affections* and *practices*: And my endeavours have not been in vain, in that the Miniſters of the Countrey where I lived, were very many of ſuch a peaceable tempet (though ſince caſt out), (and a great

great number more through the Land by Gods Grace (rather than any endeavours of mine) are ſo minded.) But the Sons of the Coal were exaſperated the more againſt me, and accounted him to be againſt *every man*, that called all men to Love and Peace, and was for no man as in a contrary way.

And now looking daily in this poſture, when God calleth me hence, (ſummoned by an incurable Diſeaſe to haſten all that ever I will do in this World,) being uncapable of prevailing with the preſent Church diſturbers, I do apply my ſelf to poſterity, leaving them the ſad warning of their Anceſtors diſtractions, as a Pillar of Salt, and acquainting them what I have found to be the cauſe of our Calamities, and therein they will find the Cure themſelves.

II. I Have oft taken the boldneſs (conſtrainedly) to ſay, that I doubt not but the *Contentions* of the Clergie have done far more hurt to the Chriſtian World, than the moſt bloody Wars of Princes. And I muſt reduce the Cauſes to theſe three Heads:

I. The Abuſe of *POWER*, II. Of *WISDOM*, III. Of *GOODNESS*; or of the *Names* of theſe: the three great Principles of *Humanity*.

That is, I. By Clergie *TYRANNY*, II. By *OPINIONISTS* or Dogmatiſts, III. By *SUPERSTITION* and *HYPOCRISIE*, or *PRACTICAL BLIND ZEAL*.

But among all theſe ſorts, ſelfiſh *PRIDE*, *IGNORANCE* and *UNCHARITABLENESS* or want of *LOVE* are the great effectual Cauſes. And departing from *CHRISTIAN SIMPLICITY*, in Doctrine, Worſhip, Church-government, and Converſation, is the grand *inſtrumental means* of moſt of our *Schiſms*, Diſtractions and Calamities.

I. *Only by Pride cometh Contention*, Prov. 13. 10. The *Church-TYRANT* is Proud of his Superiority and Wealth: The *OPINIONIST* is Proud of his ſuppoſed Knowledge and Theological Wiſdom; on which account the *Gnoſticks* troubled the Church of old. The *HYPOCRITE* and the (honeſter) ignorant Zealot, is Proud of his ſuppoſed *Holineſs* or *Goodneſs*: And for an eminency and precedency and praiſe in each of theſe, they all conſpire (while they diſ-

agree

agree among themſelves) to trouble the Church of Chriſt: In a word, *Selfiſhneſs*, *Ignorance* and *want of Love*, are the Cauſes of mens *perſonal ruine* and *damnation*, and the ſame are the Cauſes of the Churches *diviſions*, and all the miſeries of the World.

II. And that *IGNORANCE* is a *Common cauſe* even in the *Gnoſtick Dogmatiſts* that *cry down* Ignorance, Error and Hereſie, needs no other proof, than the diverſity of *Opinions* which ſuch contend for: Every ſide pretend, that it is *ORTHODOXNESS*, *FAITH* or the Great Truths of God, which they defend; And in one Countrey or with one Party, one thing is *Orthodoxneſs* and the *Truth*, and another thing in another Countrey or Party, and another thing with a third, *&c.* And did they all but *know* what is *Truth* and the *Will* of God indeed, they would ceaſe their Contentions, and all the Sects would meet in Unity.

III. And did men but *LOVE* their neighbours *as themſelves*, and were as eaſily perſwaded to think well of, and deal gently with their neighbours as themſelves, and as hardly drawn to condemn, hate, hurt or injure them, I need not tell you how eaſily, quickly and univerſally we ſhould be healed.

But before I ſpeak of the *Inſtrumental Means*, I will fullier open the three forementioned Cauſes.

I. Religious *Clergie-TYRANNY* hath ſo notoriouſly, ſo *long*, and ſo *greatly* made havock both of *Piety*, and *Peace*, that he that is not an utter ſtranger to Church-Hiſtory cannot be ignorant of it. I need not tell any Learned man, how many even moderate Papiſts, much more Proteſtants have thought, that *Conſtantine* and other Emperours that over-exalted the Clergie, *poured out Poyſon into the Church*: making great preferments a bait to invite all the worſt of men, to be ſeekers and invaders of Church Offices and Power, and to corrupt thoſe that otherwiſe would have been uſeful men: eſpecially when (Chriſtians having firſt made them their *Arbitrators*, in obedience to St. *Pauls* counſel) they were made the *Legal Judges of the Cauſes of all contentious Chriſtians*, and ſo ſet up Secular *Magiſtratical Courts*. I need not tell them what work almoſt every General Council (as thoſe of one Empire were called) did make! what work even the firſt at *Nice* had made, had not *Conſtantine* burnt their Bills of accuſation againſt each other, and perſonally lamented their diviſions, and driven them on to *peace*! what work was made in

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that at *Chalcedon*, and that at *Epheſus*, and ſo of others! what a horrid ſcandal the caſe of *John* and *Dioſcorus* was, and the murder of *Flavianus*, and many others! nor yet how the controverſies againſt the *Neſtorians*, *Eutychians*, and *Monothelites* were managed! I need not tell them, how ſoon *Victor* began at *Rome*, nor what *Socrates* and others ſay of *Cyril* and *Theophilus* at *Alexandria*; nor yet how *Nazianzene* was uſed at *Conſtantinople*; nor how copiouſly and vehemently he accuſeth the Biſhops, and wiſheth that there were no ſuch inequalities among them, as gave them advantage to do hurt; nor what he ſaith againſt their Councils: nor yet of the quarrels of *Baſil* and *Anthymius*, nor of *Baſils* ſharp complaints of the *Roman* and other *Weſtern* Prelates: I need not tell them of the Uſage of *Chryſoſtome*, even by ſuch men as *Theophilus*, *Epiphanius* and their partakers; nor of the dividing of the *Conſtantinopolitan* Chriſtians thereupon; nor how the violent Prelates made Separatiſts and Non-conformiſts of *Chryſoſtoms* adherents, by the name of *Joannites*; and how unlikely that Schiſm was to have been healed, had not wiſer Biſhops ſucceeded, who reſtored Concord by honouring *Chryſoſtoms* Name and Bones, and dealing kindly with his followers: I need not tell them of the ſad work made at *Ariminum* and *Syrmium*, and oft at *Rome*, *Conſtantinople* and every great Epiſcopal Seat: nor of the bloodſhed between Competitors, at the Election of *Damaſus*; nor of the ſeparation of St. *Martin* from the Synod of Biſhops led by *Ithacius* and *Idacius*; nor of the difference of him and *Ambroſe* from the reſt about the complyances with *Maximus*. The World knoweth of the doleful Rupture that hath continued between the *Roman* and the *Greek* Church about a thouſand years; And of the many Schiſms at *Rome* by various Anti-Popes, even at once above forty years together; And of the reaſon of the calling of the Councils of *Conſtance* and *Baſil* to end them; And how the King of *Rome* keeps up his Kingdom to this day; what work he hath made with *Frederick*, the *Henries*, and other *German* Emperours; what diviſions this cauſed among the Clergie; what blood he cauſed to be ſhed for *Jeruſalem*, and how many thouſands of the *Waldenſes* have at divers times been ſlaughtered; what work the Inquiſition hath made in *Spain* and *Belgia* and elſewhere; and the flames of Perſecution in *England*, and almoſt in all Chriſtian Lands; what work the Holy League did make in *France*, and the *Engliſh* Biſhops in many a War with their Kings;

Kings; beſides the caſe of *Becket* and ſuch others; By whoſe inſtigation two hundred thouſand Proteſtants were lately murdered in *Ireland*, and many again in *Piedmont*; I ſay to tell ſuch things as theſe to thoſe that are acquainted with Church Hiſtory, is vain. And I would thoſe that yet think cruelty the beſt way to ſet up themſelves (or *Religion*, if that muſt bear the name) and to repreſs their adverſaries (or Schiſms,) would but (among many others) read the Epiſtle of great *Thuanus* before his Works to *Henry* King of *France*.

But is it only the old Biſhops, *Greeks* and *Papiſts*, that have made ſuch havock in the Churches? Even thoſe that pretended to moderation did by the *German Interim* make many hundred Churches deſolate. And the ten years impriſonment of *Caſpar Peucer* (*vid. Hiſtor. Carcer.*) and the ſilencing of many and many faithful Miniſters, and the baniſhment of many, doth ſhew with what Spirit, many of the *Lutherans* carryed on their work. And doubtleſs, had the *Calviniſts* in *Belgia* been as *wiſe* and *peaceable* as the *Engliſh* Delegates were at the Synod of *Dort*, and been as far from Tyranny as they ſhould have been, matters had never come ſo oft to Blood or Tumult among them as they have done, nor *Grotius* and the *Arminians* had ſo much to ſay againſt them. I will not meddle with the matters of this Iſland in our times, ſeeing they ſufficiently ſpeak themſelves.

But how cometh this *Clergie Tyranny* to be ſo *common*, ſo *long* and ſo *powerful* in the World, to make Parties, and draw Princes into Wars?

1. It muſt be remembred, that true *Godlineſs* is not common in the World: Too many take up Chriſtianity, as in the Eaſtern parts the poſterity of the old famous Chriſtians are now Mahometans.

2. The *Goſpel* and true Spirit of Chriſtianity is contrary to the minds and worldly intereſts of carnal, ambitious, covetous, voluptuous men. So that they profeſs a Religion which their own hearts abhorr as to its ſerious practice.

3. Every unrenewed man hath ſuch a worldly fleſhly nature, and is voluptuous, proud and covetous: And none of them love to be reproved or croſſed in their way.

4. Church Honours, Dignities and great Revenues, and Clergie-eaſe in an idle life, are a great bait or temptation to a carnal mind: And the worſe men are, the more they will *deſire* and *ſeek* Church preferments, and make all the

friends they can to get them; And the more ſelf-denying men will not do ſo, (but perhaps avoid them.)

5. The diligent ſeekers are liker to obtain and find, than the neglecters and avoiders: And ſo the Churches to be uſually in the power of the worſer ſort of men, and Religion to be under the Government of its enemies.

6. *Men in power*, and the *Major Vote*, have great advantage to execute their own wills, and to put Laws on others, and bring them under what Characters they pleaſe; and ſo to affix the names of Hereticks or Schiſmaticks on them, if they fulfil not all their wills: yea, to ſilence them, and ſuppreſs their Writings, and make them to be little underſtood in the World, yea, or by their neighbours round about them.

7. The Vulgar (as they are for the Conquerour in the Wars, ſo) uſually are for the upper and ſtronger ſide in peace, that have Power to hurt them, and have the Major Vote; And alſo eaſily believe them, and think men that ſuffer, are like to be guilty of what they are accuſed.

8. Godlineſs being againſt a worldly mind and intereſt, and the Rabble uſually for it, hence ariſeth a Conſpiracy of carnal Clergie-men, and the Rabble, againſt thoſe that are moſt ſeriouſly Godly, as if they were their enemies, and a ſurly, proud, intractable ſort of people. As *Sulpitius Severus* deſcribeth *Ithacius* and his followers, (and even Mr. *Hooker* out of him *Eccl. Pol. Præfat.*)

9. Such men in Power never want flatterers at their ears, to praiſe all that they do, and to exaſperate them by ſlandering and reviling ſufferers.

10. The long poſſeſſion (ſince the dayes of *Conſtantine*) of Great Places and Power by the Clergie, within the *Roman* Empire (now the *Greek* and *Latine* Churches,) doth ſeem to juſtifie mens Uſurpations and Tyranny, and make all diſſenters ſeem ſingular and Schiſmatical, (which was and is the Papal ſtrength againſt the Reformed.)

11. Too many of the Secular Rulers of the World, have much of the ſame Spirit; And find alſo their intereſts ſo twiſted in ſhew with the Papal Clergies, that they dare not croſs them.

12. The faults of thoſe that ſuffer by them (in doctrine and imprudent carriages) uſe to give them great advantage, and make all their odious characters and names of them believed and received, (as the caſe of the *Waldenſes* and of the *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts* in *Germany* too fully prove.)

II. The

II. The ſecond Rank of Church-diſturbers are *DOGMATISTS* or men that profeſs exceeding zeal for *ORTHODOX* Opinions, or Theological Knowledge. And thus three inſtances tell us of the Cauſe of our Calamities,

1. That of *Gnoſtick* and *Heretical* perſons, who account every *new Conceit* of *theirs*, to be worthy the propagating, even at the rate of Theological Wars and Church Confuſions; and cry out [*Buy the Truth, and ſell it not*], when it is ſome *error* of their own, or ſome unprofitable or unneceſſary notion.

2. The caſe of the *Romaniſts* (to ſay nothing of all the old contentious Biſhops and Councils, and the controverſies about *Perſona* and *Hypoſtaſis*; and about many words and forms of ſpeech). What do the *Roman* Councils for many hundred years laſt, but on pretence of preſerving the *faith* uncorrupted, multiply diviſions and new Articles of faith (*quoad nos*)? And while they cry down moſt of Chriſts Church as Heretical or greatly erroneous, they have run themſelves into the groſſeſt errors almoſt that humane nature is capable of, (even to the making it neceſſary to ſalvation, to deny our own and all the ſound mens ſenſes in the World in the caſe of Tranſubſtantiation).

3. The caſe of the *Schoolmen*, and ſuch other *Diſputing Militant Theologues*: who have ſpun out the Doctrine of Chriſtianity into ſo many Spiders Webs; and filled the World with ſo many Volumes of Controverſies, as are ſo many Engines of contention, hatred and diviſion: And I would our Proteſtant Churches, *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts*, had not too great a number of ſuch men, as are far ſhort of the Schoolmens ſubtilty, but much exceed them in the *enviouſneſs* of their *zeal*, and the *bitterneſs* and *revilings* of their diſputes, more openly ſerving the Prince of hatred againſt the Cauſe of Love and Peace. O how many famous Diſputers, in Schools, Pulpit and Preſs, do little know what Spirit they are of, and what reward they muſt expect of Chriſt, for making odious his Servants, deſtroying Love, and dividing his Kingdom? How many ſuch have their renown as little to their true comfort, as *Alexanders* and *Cæſars* for their bloody Wars?

But how cometh this *Dogmatical Zeal* ſo to prevail? Conſider,

1. *Nature* it ſelf is *Delighted* in *Knowing* much: Elſe Satan had not made it *Eves* temptation. Without Grace, even Theological Speculations may be very pleaſing to mens minds. Morality and Holineſs is principally ſeated in the Will.

2. Satan hath here a far fairer bait, than worldly Wealth and Pleaſures and Honours, to tempt men, and ſteal away their hearts, from that Love and Practice which is Holineſs indeed. All men are bound to Love Gods Word, and his Truth muſt be precious to us all: and now it is eaſie for the hypocritical Dogmatiſt to take up here, and make himſelf a Religion of *Zeal* for thoſe opinions, which he entitleth God to. And O that I could ſpeak this loud enough to awaken the Learned World of Diſputers, to ſo much jealouſie of their own hearts, as is neceſſary to their own ſafety, as well as to the Churches peace! This thing called *Orthodoxneſs*, *Truth* and *Right-believing* (precious in it ſelf, if it be what it is called,) is made by Satan an ordinary means to deceive Learned men, and keep them from a holy and heavenly mind and life, when groſſer cheats would be leſs effectual: Theologie is valued by many as the Mathematicks are, as a pleaſant ſort of knowledge; and by others as the *Jews* were zealous of their Law, by a formal ſort of Religiouſneſs; one ſort being zealous for their *Opinions*, and another for their *Ceremonies* from the like principle of formality.

3. Yet Nature that would *know much*, is *dull* and *ſlothful*, and loth to be at that great and long ſtudy and labour neceſſary to obtain it.

4. And it is but few that are born with a quick natural capacity.

5. And it is not the moſt that have the happineſs of very wiſe, experienced and throughly Learned Teachers: but moſt are inſtructed by half witted men. And young perſons know not how to chooſe the beſt for themſelves, nor their Parents neither ordinarily.

6. Eaſe and Intereſt, or the Veneration of certain perſons, maketh men fall in with thoſe Opinions that are in beſt eſteem in the places where they live, and among the perſons whom they moſt value.

7. Reaſon is mans noble faculty, and therefore that which man is apteſt to be Proud of: And though few have much knowledge and wiſdom, almoſt all would be thought to have it, and are too proud to endure to be accounted ignorant or erroneous.

8. The Dignity of the Paſtoral Office, and Academical Degrees, maketh men think that the Honour of knowledge is their due, and neceſſary to their work. And therefore they will expect and claim it that deſerve it not: and it ſhall be

be taken for Pride and Singularity for any man to convince them of ignorance or error.

9. Many of them are godly men and excellent Preachers, and cryed up (deservedly) by good people: And therefore they take the reputation of more knowledge than they have, to be their due; and the people are ready to joyn with them in reproaching all that differ from them.

10. Great knowledge being rare, the half-knowing men are still the major part by far (alas how far!) And so if Synods be called, or most Voices heard, these will still pass for the Orthodox men, and a more judicious man will scarce be heard among them.

11. Learning is of many ages got into certain *forms* of *words*; and he that hath got some organical arbitrary Notions, passeth for a Learned man; or he that can speak many Languages: while true real wisdom (which consisteth 1. In knowing the Greatest Things, and 2. In fitting *words* to *things*) is much neglected: whereby as hypocrites deceive themselves and others with *forms of piety*, so do Scholars with *forms* and *notions* instead of knowledge.

12. These humane formalities of wisdom have prevailed to bring the Scripture, and the best part of wisdom, into disesteem, as a dull and low kind of knowledge; as if Logical, Physical and Metaphysical trifling, were a higher matter.

13. No man is sufficiently apprehensive of the greatness of the Curse in the confusion of Tongues: whereby as we can preach but to few Nations in the World, so we cannot intelligibly converse with one another. All *words* (being *arbitrary signs*) are *Ambiguous*; And few *Disputers* have the *jealousie* and *skill* which is necessary to discuss *equivocations*, and to agree of the meaning of all their terms before they use them in disputing: And so taking *Verbal* differences for *Material*, doth keep up most of the wretched Academical and Theological Wars of the World.

14. And nothing here undoeth all the World in point of wisdom, so much as over-hasty judging or presidence: It is natural to almost all to fasten presently upon the first appearances, and to be confident before they have half tryed: In cases where seven and seven years serious study is necessary to a through digested knowledge, every Novice will presently conclude as if he were sure. And then

as

as every one is apt to be *confident*, ſo to be *tenacious*; every error leading on more, and the reputation of the perſon being concerned in it, mutability being a ſhame: And ſo it becometh a very difficult thing to *unlearn* the errors once learned; as white Paper is eaſier written on than that which is written on before.

15. And then no man *knoweth his own error* (elſe it were no error), nor knoweth what another mans perceptions are, nor what any other man knoweth more than he.

16. And laſtly, the odious names of diſſenters (the common uſage) doth quickly affright even beginners from thinking well of their Opinions, (yea, or of their perſons and piety uſually). And by all theſe means almoſt all are of the opinion of the Countrey where they live, or of thoſe that they moſt reverence, or which are moſt for their intereſt; and boldly condemn the reſt not underſtood.

III. And the pretence of HOLINESS or a *blind practical Zeal*, and *Superſtitious Religion*, both in *Hypocrites* and many honeſt ignorant people, hath not a little hand in the diſtractions of Chriſts Church.

It was the appearance of more *Spirituality* and *Strictneſs* which drew *Tertullian* to the *Montaniſts*, and which promoted a great part of the Hereſies which have torn the Churches. This bore up the Cauſe of the *Priſcillianiſts*, and of thoſe that *Bernard* and *Cluniacenſis* ſo much inveigh againſt, (I ſuppoſe *Manichees* with ſome better perſons mixt:) This kept up the *Donatiſts*; but above all the *Novatians* long in great reputation: This was the ſtrength of the *Anabaptiſts* in *Germany* and the *Low Countreys*, as their adverſaries confeſs. Saith *G. Wicelius Meth. Concord. c.* 12. *p.* 42. [*Retinctores hac una parte duntaxat ſapiunt, tenentes doctrinam Eccleſiæ Catholicæ*] ſpeaking of the neceſſity of a holy life: This is the ſtrength of the *Quakers* among us now, and of almoſt all the ſeparating and Cenſorious Sects: And were not ſo excellent a thing as *Godlineſs* the Motive, abundance of good people durſt never have done the great evils which we have ſeen done in this age, to the great ſhame of our profeſſion, and the ſad calamities of Church and State. (And if I my ſelf have formerly in my unexperienced youth, promoted any dividing or unwarrantable wayes, it was upon this and the former miſtake; which I beg daily of God to diſcover to me to the full, and beg the pardon of the miſcarriages which I know, and which yet I know not of.)

And

And if you Conſider theſe things following, you will not wonder that miſtaken *Godlineſs* ſhould cauſe diviſions:

1. *Holineſs* and Gods Love or well-pleaſedneſs with man, is the *beſt* thing in this world, or that man is capable of. And therefore is moſt *Deſireable*, and moſt *Honourable*.

2. Therefore all good men prefer it before all other things; And are juſtly more averſe to any thing that is againſt it, than to any worldly loſs or ſuffering.

3. Yea it is *Gods Intereſt* more than their own: And all good men are againſt all that diſpleaſeth God, ſo far as it is known.

4. We all know but *in part*, and as in a glaſs and darkly: Even the moſt of Teachers take abundance of things for *True* and *Good* that are *Falſe* and *Evil*, and for *Falſe* and *Bad* which are *True* and *Good*; Much more are Godly vulgar people ignorant, and conſequently erre in many things. Even they that cry out againſt the vulgar Ignorance, and inſufficient Teachers, know far leſs than they are Ignorant of themſelves.

5. He that miſtakingly thinks any thing is *Good* or *Bad*, *Duty* or *Sin*, which is not ſo, will be zealous in purſuit of his miſtake, if he be ſerious for God: A good principle will haſten him on in a wrong way, whatever it coſt him.

6. Ignorance and timerouſneſs cauſe *Superſtition*, which is a conceit that God is pleaſed by overdoing in external things, and obſervances and laws of their own making, and ſo they that make part of their own Religion ſuperſtitiouſly (as moſt good people do in ſome things through ignorance,) will cenſure all others as *Good* or *Bad*, by the meaſure of their own miſtakes.

7. He that thus miſtakingly thinks that men *ſin* when they do not, will have a proportionable diſlike of them, and averſation from them: And will be ready to ſpeak as he thinks of them, and ſo will be guilty of calumny, and calling Evil Good, and Good Evil.

8. The World will abound ſtill with real evil and ſcandals; And all parties will be faulty: And uſually the greater part of the Clergie in the Chriſtian World will be guilty of ſo much Ignorance, pride, contentiouſneſs, worldlineſs and ſenſuality, as will greatly grieve and offend good people. And this will occaſion alienation and ſeparations even with Godly perſons: The ſacrifice of the Lord was abhorred through the ſins of *Eli*'s ſons: The caſe of the

Clergie

Clergie at this day in the Greek Church in *Moscovie*, *Armenia*, *Syria*, *Abassia*, &c. yea among too many of the German Churches, is very lamentable, by Ignorance and scandal: And the corruption of the Roman Clergie was it that facilitated the revolt from the Papacy, at *Luther's* reformation. He that readeth *Cornel. Mus*, *Ferus*, *Espencæus*, *Erasmus*, *Alvan Pelagius*, *Clemangis* and such others describing their own Clergie, and *Jos. Acosta* of them in *India*, &c. will see much of the Cause of the Divisions in the World: And all the old Writers that write against the *Waldenses*, do make us understand that the ignorance and wickedness of the Clergie then, was it that drove them from the Roman Church. Saith *Wicelius* Meth. Concord. c. 11. p. 39. *Quum tales ad nullum honestius vitæ institutum idonei sunt, mirum sit si bonos sacerdotes præstabunt: sic itaque procedente tempore regetur Ecclesia ab asinis, & prædicabunt imperitissimi misero populo, quod nunquam didicerunt ipsi. Adolescentes optimi quique abhorrent propterea ab instituto illo, quod nolint suam libertatem sibi eripi,* &c. I have oft said, what caused St. *Martin* to separate during life from the Synodical Bishops about him: And what *Gildas* saith of such, that *no excellent Christian will call them Ministers*: And it's very observable not only as Dr. *James* in the Margin of *Wicelius* hath cited, that there are many Canons against wicked Priests celebrating and Massing, but *Wicelius* himself saith (p. 17.) *Non admittantur sacra concubinariorum, quos Deus pejus odit, atq; manifestarios incestus: Meminerimus in Decretis Pontificum piè caveri, Ne quis Missam ejus Presbyteri audiat quem scit indubitanter concubinam habere, aut subintroductam mulierem.* (And yet there are now men pretending to piety among Protestants, that speak of, and use those Godly persons more hatefully who refuse to hear such wicked Priests, than they do those Priests themselves.) Light and Darkness have no Communion: And the Church will alwayes have bad Ministers and Members: And many good people through Ignorance will think that they should go further from them than they ought: And will not distinguish between that private familiarity which is in their own power, and that publick Church Communion which the Church Pastors are the guides and judges of. And so the *honesty* and the *ignorance* of these good men, meeting with the *vulgar wickedness*, will be as the congress of fire and water, and will occasion ruptures and parties in the Churches.

9. The

9. The carnal Clergie will usually hate and persecute Godly zealous Preachers: (As even the case of *Ph. Nerius* and *Baronius* at *Rome* sheweth, which had almost made disturbance:) And then *sufferings* will be a stronger temptation to hard thoughts and too much alienation than most are able well to overcome.

10. And the *Godly people* will adhere to their *Godly suffering Teachers*, and run further in bitterness against the carnal and persecuting party, than their suffering Leaders do desire.

11. Yet *interest and temptations* will prevail with too many of the sufferers to *connive* at the bitterness and alienation of the people, (if not to *countenance* it,) which they do not *justifie*: And so the rupture will grow still greater.

12. And all men have some Pride: And *Godliness* being the *best thing* may become the object of Pride as well as *Knowledge* and *Power*. And so many will affect to have their *Piety Conspicuous*, and therefore to be *singular* or of some *small party* that is *eminent*; and so by *separation* to stand at a more *conspicuous distance* from the vulgar sort of Christians, than Christ would have them: And so many a good man hath more of *Pride* in his profession and separation than he is aware of.

13. And because Gods word, and his last judgement, and Heaven and Hell, do make so great a difference between the *Godly* and *ungodly*, it occasioneth many to think that they must difference men by their own censures and separations farther than indeed they ought.

14. And it greatly promoteth Schisms that good people are *unacquainted with Church-history*, and know not how just *such Opinions and Schisms* as *their own* have in former ages *risen*, and how they have *miscarryed* and *dyed*, and what have been their *fruits*.

15. And few men have that humble sense as they ought, of their own *Ignorance* and *badness*, which would keep their suspicions and Censures more at home, and make them more compassionate to others.

16. And few love their Neighbours as themselves, nor consider while they hate mens sin, what is lovely in their *Natures* and *Capacities* of grace.

17. And the Piety of almost *all Sects* of Christians on Earth is *already corrupted* with so many *humane superstitious additions*, that few can escape the temptation of *Censuring* accordingly.

18. And the Church will alwayes have *many hypocrites*, who quiet their Conſciences by adhering to the *ſtricteſt Miniſters* and *Churches*, inſtead of a mortified, holy and heavenly heart and converſation.

19. And laſtly, Perſecution and hatred from others, and the due Love of Godly perſons, tempteth too many Miniſters to over-run their own judgements, and follow the more cenſorious ſort of perſons further than they ought (at leaſt by connivence,) and to be ruled by thoſe whom they ſhould rule. And thus *Diviſions* are occaſioned even by *Piety* it ſelf.

II. But yet were the *Principles* of Diviſion never ſo many and pernicious, Intereſt might have led more of the world to Quietneſs and Concord, had not Satan, the great enemy of *Love* and *Peace*, ſeduced them to that *Inſtrumental Means* and *way*, which will never conſiſt with Concord. It is that which *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles* have done very much to *prevent*, but the Devil (even with all the ſorts fore-mentioned) hath much prevailed againſt their precepts.

The Grand caſe of the Chriſtian World is, *WHAT IS THE TRUE CENTER* and *RULE OF CONCORD*? Could they find out this, it would hold men of various tempers to it.

I. Chriſt firſt laid down the *Deſcription* and *Meaſure* of *Chriſtianity*, in the *Baptiſmal Covenant*; and ordained that all ſhould be accounted *Chriſtians in foro Eccleſiæ* who by Baptiſm were ſolemnly devoted to him, in a profeſſed Belief and Covenant, Dedication and Vow to God the *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*: Theſe he would have called *Chriſtians* or his *Diſciples*, and this is their *Chriſtening*, and ſo ever called in the Church. 2. And next he made it his new (that is *Laſt*) and *Great Command*, that *All his Diſciples ſhould Love each other*, and live in eminent *Unity and Peace*: which he accordingly wrought them to by the firſt pouring out of his Spirit, *Act.* 2. & 3. & 4.

II. The Apoſtles founding the Church in this *Baptiſmal Vow* or *Covenant*, and mutual *Love*, exhorted accordingly all the *Baptized* to *Love* each other, and to Receive even the *weak in faith*, but not to *doubtful diſputations*, Rom. 14. & 15. Oft vehemently charging them to be of *one mind* and live in *Love* and *peace*, and to beware of them as not ſerving Chriſt but their own bellies, who were for *Diviſions*, 1 *Cor.* 1. 10, 11. *Rom.* 16. 17. And though they came with pretences of *ORDER*, *WISDOM* or *PIETY*, ſuch *Good words*, and *fair*

ſpeeches

ſpeeches were noted to be *engines* to *deceive* the *hearts* of the *ſimple*, Rom. 16. 17.

And whereas the objection ſeemed unanſwerable, *How can they ſo agree, who are of ſeveral judgements about Good and Evil?* *Paul* often warneth them to *hold faſt* the *form* of *ſound words*, and ſummeth up (as 1 *Cor.* 15. 1, 2, 3, 4.) the *Articles of their faith*, and chargeth them that ſo far as *they had attained, they ſhould walk by the ſame rule, and mind the ſame things*, and *if in any thing they were otherwiſe minded*, ſtay till God revealed the matter to them, *Phil.* 3. He oft chargeth them to be of one *mind* and *judgement* (thus far) and to live in Love and *Peace*, and to do nothing by *ſtrife and vain glory*, but in honour to preferr others to themſelves; and not to ſtrive *about words* that profit not, nor about unneceſſary Queſtions, ſeeing ſuch diſputings and ſtrivings gender to ungodlineſs, and fret like a Canker, and pervert the hearers minds: Yea he directeth the Paſtors to edifie ſouls, rather by a *Teaching* than a *diſputing* way, and to convince gainſayers, by *meek inſtructing oppoſers*, to ſee if thus *God will give them repentance to the acknowledgement of the truth*: for the Miniſter or *ſervant of the Lord muſt not ſtrive*; *Love* is their *work* to be effected in others, and *Love* muſt be their *Principle*, and *Love* muſt be their *mode and means*, even Loving others as themſelves: Oft are they called by Chriſt and his Apoſtles from *maſterly opinions*, *aſpirings* and endeavours, and to be as *little Children*, and the *ſervants of all*, and as *ſtewards of Gods myſteries* and *helpers, not Lords* of the *Churches faith*, and not to *domineer over the flock of Chriſt*, but to *overſee them* not by *conſtraint but voluntarily*: And what cannot be *done* by *Light* and *Love*, is not to be done by them at all: The Magiſtrate and not they, muſt uſe the Sword; but not to make men *believers* (for he cannot.)

And though *Voſſius* and others have rendred Reaſons enough to perſwade us that the ſtory of the twelve Apoſtles making each one an Article of the Creed, is not credible, nor that they ſhaped it in every word to the preſent form, yet it is to me a certainty, that the Apoſtles made and uſed the Creed for ſenſe and ſubſtance as the very ſummary and teſt of Chriſtianity, long before any Book of the New Teſtament was written (about twelve years, and almoſt ſixty ſix before the whole.) For 1. It is certain that all Chriſtians were Baptized: 2. It is certain that they then profeſſed to *Believe* in God the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, and to Covenant accordingly, renouncing the *fleſh*, the *world* and the *Devil*.

3. It is certain that the Apoſtles and Paſtors laboured to make men underſtand what they *did*, and would not delude them by taking the bare *ſaying* of theſe three words. 4. And it is certain that the Paſtors altered not the Chriſtian faith, but taught the ſame for ſubſtance to all that were baptized. 5. And it is certain that ſhould men have taken much liberty to uſe new *words* or forms at Baptiſm, in opening the faith, it might eaſily have corrupted the faith and introduced a new doctrine. 6. And it is certain by Church Hiſtory that (though ſome variety of little words was uſed, yet) *this ſame Creed for ſubſtance* (except the two or three clauſes mentioned by *Uſher* and *Voſſius*) was commonly uſed at Baptiſm from the dayes of the Apoſtles. 7. And we find yet that this Creed is nothing elſe but the explication of the three Baptiſmal Articles; of which ſee *Sandford* and *Parker* (two Learned Non-conformiſts) in their very Learned Treat. *de Deſcenſu Chriſti* at large. 8. And it is certain that if the Apoſtles did take this courſe ſo many years before they wrote any of the New Teſtament, they did this (as well as that) by the *Holy Ghoſt*: and ſo that the *Holy Ghoſt* ſeconding *Chriſts* own Baptiſmal Law, or Inſtituted teſt, did *make the Creed to be the ſummary* of the *Chriſtian Belief*, twelve years before we had any Book of the New Teſtament, and about ſixty ſix as is ſaid before we had them all. And then it will appear what is Gods appointed teſt of *Chriſtianity*, *Communion* and *ſpecial Love*.

All which conſidered, though I think it is the truth which I long ago wrote againſt a Treatiſe of a Learned man (Mr. *Aſhwell*) in the *Append.* to the ſecond Edition of my *Reformed Paſtor*, yet I publiſh my Repentance that ever I wrote it, as fearing leſt it occaſioned the turning of mens minds from this great truth which he and I agreed in, and which I find few conſider as it deſerveth.

But the *Gnoſticks* began the *corrupting game*, and by pretences of *higher knowledge*, ſpoiled men by vain Philoſophy, which engaged the Apoſtles to cry them down, and to warn all Chriſtians to take heed of being ſo ſpoiled, and to vilifie arbitrary Philoſophical notions, tricks and vain janglings, as likely to draw them from the ſimplicity of Chriſtianity.

And the certain truth is, that he *knoweth* neither the *Intereſt* nor the *Ignorance* and *weakneſs* of man, nor the *nature* of Knowledge, who doth not know, that the *frailty* and *employ-*

ments

ments of mankind are ſuch as that *there never will be an univerſal Concord* in very *MANY*, or *UNCERTAIN*, *UNNECESSARY* things; And O that I could write it on all mens hearts, or doors at leaſt, that *The Chriſtian world will never have Concord, but in a FEW, CERTAIN, NECESSARY things.*

Therefore *Paul* ſaid to the *Corinthians*, 2 Cor. 11. 2, 3. *I am jealous of you with Godly jealouſie: For I have eſpouſed you to one husband*, &c. *But I fear leſt by any means, as the Serpent beguiled* Eve *through his ſubtilty, ſo your minds ſhould be corrupted from the ſimplicity that is in* (or towards) *Chriſt.*

O mark theſe words all ye contentious Church-*TYRANTS*, *DOGMATISTS* and *SUPERSTITIOUS* ones. Read and ſtudy them well.

God laid down the terms of the Churches Concord in ſeven *Unities*. 1. *One Body* or *Church* Catholick; 2. One *Spirit* or *Holy Ghoſt*, as the ſoul of that Church; 3. One *Hope*, or *Heavenly felicity* hoped for; 4. One *Lord* of the *Church*, our Head and Saviour; 5. One *Faith*, or *Creed*, or Symbol of our belief, and Belief thereof; 6. One *Baptiſmal Covenant*; 7. And one God and Father of us all, who is above all, through all and in us all. *Eph.* 4. 3, 4, 5, 6. And it is the *unity* of the *ſpirit in the bond of peace*, that on theſe terms we are charged to keep, v. 2, 3. *with all lowlineſs and meekneſs, with long-ſuffering, forbearing one another in love.*

But now cometh the *Serpent* (note 1. The author,) and by *ſubtilty* (2. Note the means,) even as he beguiled *Eve* (3. Note the precedent) which was by promiſing her *more knowledge* and *exaltation* to be as *God*; and he *corrupteth mens minds*, (4. Mark the *effect*) though it is *knowledge* and *advancement* of *mind* that he promiſeth and pretendeth: Even by drawing them (as to higher *POWER*, *KNOWLEDGE* or *HOLINESS*) from the *Chriſtian ſimplicity*, (5. Mark what the Corruption of Religion is.)

And what is this Chriſtian *SIMPLICITY* which they forſake, and how are they thus Corrupted from it?

I. The Church-*TYRANT* departeth from the *SIMPLICITY* of *Church Government* firſt, and will not hear Chriſts vehement charge, Luk. 22. *With you it ſhall not be ſo*: He *cannot underſtand* ſuch Texts becauſe he *would not*. Hence how unlike is the *Secular-Papal* and *Patriarchal ſtate* to the Miniſtry appointed and deſcribed by Chriſt! To reduce them ſo that, they think is to be enemies to the Church;

And do they not then take *Christ* for their Capital enemy? becauſe they are enemies to humility, mortification and the Croſs, *Phil.* 3. 18. (To *croſs bearing* not to *croſs making.*) The Papiſts think that *Greg.* the ſeventh that took down Princes was the moſt glorious inſtrument of the Churches exaltation: And by turning all to corporeal Glory, they loſe hearts, and deſtroy the ſouls whom they profeſs to ſave.

And having firſt corrupted *GOVERNMENT* from the *Primitive ſimplicity*, and made Princes their *Lictors* (as *Grotius* ſpeaks in that excellent Epiſtle newly tranſlated by Mr. *Barkſdale*,) they next corrupt *DOCTRINE*, and *WORSHIP* conſequently. For *TYRANTS* muſt have their *Wills* in every thing: and numerous and needleſs Laws and Canons muſt be made to ſhew their power and fulfil their wills, that they may be Law-givers and a Rule to all the World. And when they have *made* a ſeeming *Neceſſity* of doing things unneceſſary, then to plead the *Neceſſity* which they have made, is the ſumm of all their arguments.

And they that are againſt *ſtrict* and preciſe adhering to the Scriptures, or obſervance of Gods own commands, are yet ſo ſtrict for obedience to their proud imperious wills, that they perſwade themſelves and others, that without it there can be no *order*, no *unity*, no *peace*, but rebellion and confuſion: And ſo they cry up *Obedience, Obedience*, that their Idol wills may be bowed to by all without controul; And when they are meer *Uſurpers*, and uſe no Power given them by God, they yet get the advantage of making all odious that obey them not in the leaſt and greateſt matters, by the names of *ſchiſm*, *turbulineſs* or ſuch like. O ſay the Papal Uſurpers, [*The Church muſt be obeyed, or there will be no order; Diſobedience in ſmall matters is no ſmall ſin*] when they have ſet up an Idol power againſt Chriſt; as if to *diſobey him*, whoſe Laws they make void by their Traditions and Uſurpations, were a leſſer fault. And when they have departed as far from the Chriſtian ſimplicity, in *Doctrine*, *Government* and *Worſhip*, as their voluminous Councils and Decretals, and Miſſals differ from the ancient ſimple Chriſtianity, and have made as many ſnares and engines to *divide* and *tear* the Church of Chriſt as there are *noxious* (that I ſay not *Needleſs*) *Laws*, *Canons*, and *Decrees* impoſed as neceſſary to peace and concord, then no mens mouths are moſt opened againſt *ſchiſm*, when they have unavoidably cauſed it, yea are the greateſt ſchiſmaticks; And no

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men call ſo loud for *Unity* and *Concord*, as they that have firſt made it a thing impoſſible.

Let none think that I am ſpeaking againſt any true Church-Government, or faithful Paſtors: But I appeal to the Conſciences of theſe *Papal Tyrants*, 1. Whether it would not be far eaſier for Chriſtians to Agree, in *A FEW, PLAIN* and *NECESSARY* things, of Chriſts own Inſtitution, than in a *multitude* of *humane decrees* and *articles*, compoſed in words more lyable to Controverſie? Will not more ſubſcribe to the *Creed*, than to all the Councils? 2. Have they not room enough to ſhew their *Power*, and work enough to do, in ſeeing to the *execution* of *Chriſts own Univerſal Laws*, and preſerving meer *Order* and *Decency* in undetermined circumſtances, that all may be done to edification? 3. Doth not every needleſs Oath and Subſcription by which they would tye men faſter to themſelves in controvertible caſes, plainly tend to undermine themſelves, and keep up ſtill a conſcientious party againſt them? For while men have nothing to do but live quietly under a Government, they will be glad of peace: But when they are put to *Subſcribe*, *Declare*, *Covenant* and *Swear* that all this is good or lawful, or that they will never be *againſt* it, it ſets men unavoidably on the deepeſt ſtudies of the caſe, and ſo all the people are ſet on trying and judging of that, which elſe they would never have meddled with: For what honeſt man will *ſay*, *ſwear* or *promiſe* he knoweth not what? Even as ſome crafty Rebels would undermine Princes, by drawing them to put the controverted parts of their Prerogative into the Subjects Oaths, that ſo they may make all the people Students and Judges of the cauſe, and unavoidably make factions and diſſenters, that elſe would have lived quietly if they might: ſo do the Papal Clergie ruine themſelves by ſuch over-doing impoſitions.

I remember *Lampridius* tells us that *Alexander Severus* (that great enemy of injuſtice) was ſo ſevere, that he would have made a Law to regulate mens Apparel: But *Ulpian* changed his mind by telling him, that *Many Laws* cauſe *Diviſions*, and make occaſions of diſobedience.

They cry out, *There will be no order if Miniſters and people be left to their own diſcretion* in *ſuch* and *ſuch* circumſtantials; But do they dream of *Perfect Concord* on earth? and that

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men of ſuch various Intereſts, tempers, educations, converſe and degrees of knowledge ſhould not differ in a *word*, or *geſture*? Our Engliſh Rulers make no Laws, what Geſture ſhall be uſed in *ſinging Pſalms*, or in Hearing Sermons, and there is no *diviſion* or great diſorder in them: But if on pretence of nearer Concord, they ſhould tye all to one Geſture, this or that, we ſhould preſently find it an engine of diviſion. And O how many ſuch Engines have the Papal Clergie made and uſed long! and to what purpoſe? To ſilence faithful Miniſters, to torment faithful Chriſtians in the Inquiſitions, to brand the beſt men with the names of Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, to gratifie all profaneneſs and malignity, to quench brotherly love, and to tear the Church into pieces; And no experience will make them wiſer.

II. And the *DOGMATISTS* alſo have done their part, by *departing* from the *Simplicity* of the *Chriſtian Doctrine*, to ſet the Chriſtian world together by the ears. Of which *Hilary* hath written ſharply againſt the Making of new Creeds, not ſparing to tell them that even the *Nicene* Fathers, led others the way: And *Hierome* wonders that they that were for the word *hypoſtaſis* queſtioned his *Faith*, as if he that had been *Baptized* had been without a *Faith* or *Creed* which all at Baptiſm do profeſs. But this will not ſerve turn to theſe *Corrupters*. *Councils*, *Doctors* and *Schoolmen* have been led by the temptation of more *ſubtle knowledge*, to be *Wiſe* and *Orthodox over-much*, till the Churches Faith is as large as all the Decrees of General Councils *de fide* at the leaſt, and the Churches Laws a great deal larger! And what abundance of dubious *Confeſſions*, *Declarations* or *Decrees* are now to be ſubſcribed or believed and juſtified, before a man can have his Baptiſmal birthright, even the Love, peace and Church-Communion bequeathed to him as a Chriſtian by Chriſt!

And now controverſal writings fill our Libraries by Cart-loads: And *a Uſe of Confutation* is a great part of moſt Sermons among the *Papiſts*, *Lutherans* and many others; And men are bred up in the Univerſities to a *Militant ſtriving* kind of life, that their work may be to make *Plain Chriſtians* ſeem unlearned dolts, and *diſſenters* ſeem *odious* or ſuſpected men, and themſelves to be the *wiſe* and *Orthodox perſons*, and triumphant over all the erroneous, that were it not for theſe Contenders would deſtroy the faith.

And ſo Miniſters are armed againſt Miniſters, Churches againſt Churches, Chriſtians againſt Chriſtians, yea Princes againſt Princes, and Countreys againſt Countreys, by wrangling contentious Clergie men. And (O what an injury is it!) Young Students are almoſt neceſſitated to waſte much of their lives (which ſhould be ſpent in preparing them to promote faith, holineſs and Love) in reading over multitudes of theſe wrangling writers, to know which of them is in the right: And moſt readers catch the diſeaſe hereby themſelves; And thoſe few that at great coſt and labour come to the bottom of the differences do perceive, that the *Proud Opiniators* have ſtriven partly about *unrevealed* or *unneceſſary* things, but chiefly about *meer ambiguous words* and *arbitrary humane notions*; and multitudes condemn and revile each other, while they mean the ſame things, and do not know it. One writeth a Learned Book againſt ſuch a party, and another confuteth ſuch an Adverſary (eſpecially about Predeſtination, Redemption, Free-will, Humane Power, Grace, Merit, Juſtification, Pardon, Imputation, *&c.*) and then many read and applaud all as excellently done; (Alas, for the low eſtate of the Clergie that while!) when a truly diſcerning man perceiveth that it is but a ſtriving about unexplained words, for the moſt part: And thus being *Over-wiſe* in pretences of Zeal for *Truth*, and *under-wiſe* in underſtanding it, and *departing from Chriſtian ſimplicity of doctrine*, and even *deriding the Chriſtian Creed*, hath made even ſome honeſt men become *dividing Engineers*, and their Articles, and Controverſies the Churches calamity.

III. And what *Practical miſguided zeal* about *worſhip* hath done, almoſt all Sects, *Novatians*, *Anabaptiſts*, in *Germany* and here, and the various ſort of Churches that refuſe Communion with one another, and that condemn, or caſt out diſſenters from them, and preach and talk and backbite their brethren into the *odium* or diſtaſte of their ſeduced auditors; the bitter invectives in Pulpit, talk and preſs of the ſeveral Paſtors and people againſt each other (and worſe than *words* where they have power:) all theſe ſpeak ſo loud, as may ſpare me the labour of any further diſcovery; and calls us all to make it the matter of our lamentation.

And what ſhall I ſay in the concluſion, now I am near to my departure from this contentious world? but found a Retreat to all theſe unhappy militants, that will not let Holineſs proſper by the neceſſary advantage of *Peace*. Ceaſe your Proud contendings,

contendings, O vain-glorious Militant Clergie! Learn of the Prince of peace and the holy Angels that preached him, to give *Glory to God in the higheſt*, who *giveth Peace on Earth*, and *well-pleaſedneſs* in (or towards) *men*. Did Chriſt or his Apoſtles make ſuch work for Chriſtians as you do? The great Shepherd of the flock will take your pretences of ORDER, ORTHODOXNESS (or Truth) and PIETY, for no excuſe, for your corrupting ORDER, FAITH and PRACTICE by your TYRANNY, SELF-CONCEITEDNESS and blind ZEAL and SUPERSTITION; and for uſing his *name* againſt himſelf, to the deſtroying of that *Love*, and *Concord* and *Unity* which he hath bequeathed to his Church; and for ſerving his enemy, and dividing his people, and hardning Infidels and ungodly ones by theſe ſcandals. Return to the primitive ſimplicity, that we may return to *unity*, *Love* and *peace*. Dream not of them upon your own corrupting terms. And read and read over again and again *Jam.* 3. which doth deſcribe you, condemn you, and inſtruct you.

If you ſay, *Phyſician heal thy ſelf*: Who *hath wrote* more of Controverſies? I anſwer, peruſe what I have written, and you will ſee, it is *of Controverſies*, but *againſt Controverſies*, tending to End and reconcile. If any thing be otherwiſe (except neceſſary defence of certain neceſſary faith or duty) I retract it, and condemn it: Let it be as not written. I have meddled much with Controverſies in this Book: but it is to end them. The God of Peace give Wiſdom and peaceable principles, *minds* and *hearts* to his ſervants, that (though I ſhall not live to ſee it) true *Love* and *Piety* may revive in the Chriſtian world, by the endeavours of a *healing Miniſtry*, and the ſhaming, reſtraint and reformation of the CONTENTIOUS CLERGIE, whether TYRANNICAL, DOGMATICAL, or SUPERSTITIOUS. Amen.

Jan. 25.
1673.

Of

Of DIVISIONS and CONTENTIONS among Christians, Consider

- I. The EFFICIENT,
  - I. PERSONS:
    1. The Devils.
    2. Men:
       1. A Contentious Clergie.
       2. Unwise and wicked Rulers instigated by them.
       3. The deceived people that follow them.
  - II. QUALITIES, *viz.*
    - I. Remotely:
      1. Selfishness in Carnal hypocrites, who prefer worldly interest.
      2. Slothfulness in Students, in seeking truth.
      3. Hastiness in Judging, before digested conceptions and proof.
    - II. Nearly: Want of
      1. Humility and self-acquaintance: Pride.
      2. Knowledge: Ignorance and Error.
      3. Love to others: Envy, Malice and Bitterness.
  - III. Instruments, or Engines,
    1. In General: Corrupt departing from Christian Simplicity.
    2. Particularly,
       1. From Simplicity of Doctrine, by DOGMATISTS *Words & Notions*:
       2. From Simplicity of Practice, by SUPERSTITIOUS additions.
       3. From Simplicity of Discipline by CHURCH-TYRANNY.
- II. CONSTITUTIVE Causes, *viz.*
  - DISCORD, [1. In JUDGMENT of things necessary,
  - ALIENATION, [2. In WILL and AFFECTION,
  - DIVISION, [3. In Necessary PRACTICE,

  viz.
  - 1. Privative, by denying due Communion.
  - 2. Positive,
    1. By Contention.
    2. Malice.
    3. Hurtfulness to each other.
- III. The EFFECTS, *viz.*
  - I. On THINGS, *viz.* on Church-
    1. Doctrine & Preaching, and Writing, turning it into vain and hurtful wrangling.
    2. Worship, Prayer, Sacraments, corrupting them by faction, partiality and wrath.
    3. Discipline, corrupting it into Secular or factious Tyranny, or a dead Image.
  - II. On PERSONS, *viz.*
    - I. Particular,
      1. Themselves,
         1. The *Guilt* and *Deceit* of false Religious zeal.
         2. The Death of true Holiness and Heavenly Conversation.
         3. The Death of Love, and Life of Wrath and injuries.
      2. Their followers:
      3. Rulers, *viz.*
         1. Corrupting them by factious clamours against their Subjects.
         2. Tempting them unto persecuting Laws and Executions.
         3. Engaging them in bloody Wars abroad.
      4. The Innocent, *viz.* Injuries to
         1. Private persons,
            1. By censures, slanders, backbitings, making them hated.
            2. Denying them due Love, Communion and help.
            3. Persecution, silencing, and other mischiefs.
         2. Princes,
            1. Weakning and grieving them by the Subjects discords.
            2. Dishonouring them by defaming Excommunications.
            3. Urging them to be the *Clergies Lictors* or Executioners.
      5. Enemies and Strangers, scandalizing and hardning them in Infidelity & sin.
    - II. Societies,
      - I. Churches:
        1. Corrupting them in Doctrine, Worship and Order.
        2. Weakning them by discord and division.
        3. Shaming them before the World.
        4. Making them less fit for Gods Love and Communion.
      - II. Kingdoms: Weakning them, dishonouring them, and drawing them into the Guilt of Feuds, Wars and Persecutions.
- IV. The REMEDIES.
  - I. Persons,
    1. Christ the Prince of Peace, and the Churches Head and Center.
    2. Wise Princes, who understand the Interest of 1. Christ, 2. Their people, 3. Themselves.
    3. Able, Wise, Holy and Peaceable Pastors.
    4. The Mature, Experienced, Mellow, Peaceable sort of the people.
  - II. Qualities,
    1. Diligent Study under wise Teachers. ——
    2. Sincere Holiness: A dying life: ——
    3. Deliberate Judging upon tryal. ——
    1. Humility.
    2. Knowledge.
    3. Love, to others as our selves.
  - III. Means,
    1. Returning to Christian Simplicity
       1. In Doctrine: The antient Creed, *&c.*
       2. In Worship.
       3. In Discipline.
    2. Magistrates forcing the Clergie to keep the peace, and forbear strife.
    3. Subjects obedience in all lawful things required by Authority.
- V. HEALTH or Cure.
  1. Rulers, Pastors and people of one MIND, 2. One HEART in Love, 3. One MOUTH and practice, in things *Necessary*, in *Communion* and mutual help: And mutual loving forbearance in Infirmities and things unnecessary; edified in Love.
- VI. The EFFECTS hereof.
  - I. GLORY to God,
    1. In the Hallowing of his Name, and Honour of Religion.
    2. In the increase of his Kingdom, and Conversion of the World.
    3. In the Doing of his Will on Earth, as it is done in Heaven.
  - II. Peace on Earth.
    1. Increase of Holiness, Heavenliness and Love.
    2. Mutual Delight herein: The Joy of Health and Concord.
    3. The Churches Strength and Glory.
  - III. Gods WELLPLEASEDNESS in MEN: His Church will be meet for his Love, Delight and Communion, and be liker to Heaven, and enjoy its foretastes.

An Appendix to this Premonition.

SInce the Printing of this, the World hath ſeen a ſpecimen of ſuch contention, as I lament, in a conteſt between a young inſulting Aſſailant, and a jocular contemptuous Defendant; in my judgment both running into extreams; whether verbal or real, their own explications muſt further tell us: The extreams of the former are reprehended by many: By the later, (a perſon of great wit and piety,) I perceive that ſome men have ſuch conceptions of the Covenants of God, as will give occaſion to ſome Readers to think, that by miſ-deſcribing them, I have erred and miſled men, through this and many other Writings. And men that are not able to conquer the obſcuring and tempting notions of their Authors, are ſtill calling for *Anſwers* to every inconſiderable objection, or contradicting word that is ſuggeſted to them; and little things puzzle and ſtop ſuch Readers (though otherwiſe pious and worthy perſons) who have not by long and accurate ſtudies methodized and digeſted the matter that is diſputed of: Not therefore to offend any man by oppoſition, or to defend other mens extreams; but to prevent the fruſtration of ſome of theſe Writings, and the ſcandal or trouble of my Reader, I muſt take notice;

"I. That ſome think that [*the Covenant of Grace muſt be conſidered, 1. in its Conſtitution; and* "*2. in its Execution: The Conſtitution of the Covenant is God's firm and unchangeable purpoſe of* "*ſaving his Elect, to the praiſe of his glorious Grace.*] For the word ſignifieth a diſpoſition, ap- "pointment, or ordering of matters, whether there be a reſtipulation or no; (the Engliſh word, "Covenant, ſeduceth our underſtandings): The fixed purpoſe and determinate counſel of God, "in Scripture, is called a Covenant, *Jer.* 33. 20. II. The execution of this fixed Conſtitution is "God's wiſe and gracious managing of all things for the accompliſhment of that glorious deſign "which he had in the proſpect of his eternal counſel, which he ſteadily and regularly purſueth "through all the viciſſitudes that his mutable creatures are obnoxious to, *&c. pag.* 718, 719. "1. On God's part; whatever grace and mercy was in his eternal purpoſe, that is given out to us "by Chriſt, *&c.* III. 1. Chriſt cannot be the foundation of the Covenant, becauſe Chriſt himſelf "is promiſed in the Covenant as the great comprehenſive bleſſing, *Iſa.* 49. 8, 9. 2. Free Grace is "given as the true reaſon of the Covenant, *Heb.* 8. 8. IV. The Conſtitution of the Covenant in "God's purpoſe and counſel, hath no condition at all: nor is that the Condition of the Covenant "required of us on our part, which God promiſeth to work in us on his part; nor that which "God in Covenant beſtoweth; nor that which preſuppoſeth other Covenant mercies antecedent, "*&c.* V. A promiſe of pardon and life on condition of believing and obeying, is no Covenant of "Grace at all, and neither better nor worſe than a threatning of condemnation, *&c.* It's no more "a Covenant of Grace than a Covenant of Wrath.-- It's no great matter where it is founded. "p. 584, 586. VI. God hath not diſpenſed with one jot or title of the moral Law, but, *Do this* "*and live*, is as ſtrictly exacted as ever: ſo that unleſs a Surety be admitted, and the righteouſneſs "of another owned, the caſe of all the ſons of *Adam* is deplorable and deſperate. To deny the "righteouſneſs wherein the believing ſinner may ſtand before this righteous and holy God, is to "affirm the eternal damnation of all the World. VII. The Covenant mentioned juſtifieth not, "but declareth our Juſtification, which is the immediate proper effect of Chriſt's righteouſneſs. "VIII. Never any man in his wits affirmed that the righteouſneſs of Chriſt is the formal cauſe of "our Juſtification: Give us but leave to call it the material cauſe, or the meritorious cauſe im- "mediately and properly of Juſtification, *&c.*

Some will think that they are great and heinous errors, which either theſe words, or ſome of mine that ſeem contrary, import: But I muſt crave leave here to follow my uſual method, in ſeparating the Controverſies *de re & de nomine*; and then I think that even theſe ſtrange words prove not him and me at ſo great a diſtance as they ſeem to intimate. For I grant him as followeth *de re.*

1. That God hath ſuch a decree of Election or eternal purpoſe as he deſcribeth, and calleth the Conſtitution of the Covenant. 2. That God doth wiſely and graciouſly execute this Decree. 3. That all Grace and Mercy is given by Chriſt: (And therefore ſo far as Mercy is common, Chriſt is the common cauſe of it.) 4. That Chriſt himſelf is a bleſſing or gift decreed, and alſo freely given by God, even from his love to the World, *Joh.* 3. 16. 5. That God's electing Act, or Decree, as in him, hath no condition: nor his purpoſe to give Chriſt as a Saviour to mankind. 6. On our part no condition is required, either that God may elect us, or that the firſt promiſe of a Saviour be made, or that Chriſt come into the World, or that he fulfil all righteouſneſs, or that he obey, or die, or riſe, or be glorified, or come to judgment, or raiſe the dead, or that he enact it as his Law of Grace, that [*he that believeth and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved; and he that believeth not ſhall be damned.*] 7. Nor is any condition on our part neceſſary (abſolutely, *neceſſitate medii*)

that the *Goſpel*, or the *firſt Grace*, yea the firſt *ſpecial Grace* be given us. 8. That Chriſt by his ſuffering and merits hath procured to his elect, not only pardon and life if they *believe* and *obey* him, but Grace to cauſe them effectually and infallibly to *believe*, *repent*, *obey*, and *perſevere*. 9. That no man *can* or *will believe* and *repent*, but by his Grace. 10. That to give men a promiſe of pardon and life if they will believe, repent, and obey the Goſpel, is not the whole of Chriſt's Grace to any: but where-ever he giveth this, he giveth alſo much means, and gracious help, by which men may do better than they do, and ſo be more prepared for his further Grace. 11. That if God only gave men a promiſe of pardon if they believe, and gave them no Grace to enable or help them to believe, it would be no ſaving Covenant. 12. God did not repeal his Law of Innocency, (or as he had rather call it, of *Perfection*); nor did properly diſpenſe with, or relax the preceptive part of it: Nor is it abſolutely ceaſed, as to a capable ſubject: And therefore Chriſt was bound to perfection. 13. God would not have his Law to be without the honour of the perfect performance of mans Mediator, though it be violated by us all. 14. No man is ſaved or juſtified but by the *proper merit* of Chriſt's *perfect obedience*; yea, and his *habitual holineſs* and *ſatisfactory ſufferings*, advanced in dignity by his *divine perfection*. 15. This merit, as related to us, ſuppoſeth that Chriſt, as a *Sponſor*, was the ſecond *Adam*, the Root of the juſtified, the reconciling Mediator, who obeyed perfectly with that intent, that by his obedience we might be juſtified; and who ſuffered for our ſins, in our room and ſtead; and ſo was *in tantum* our *Vicarius pœnæ*, as ſome phraſe it, or *ſubſtitute*; and was made a curſe for us, that we might be healed by his ſtripes; as he was obedient, that his righteouſneſs might be the reaſon as a meritorious cauſe of our Juſtification: which ſuppoſeth the relation of an *undertaking Redeemer*, *in our nature* doing this, and *in our ſtead* ſo far forth, as that therefore *perfect obedience* ſhould not be neceſſary to be performed by our ſelves: And righteouſneſs therefore is imputed to us, that is, we are truly reputed righteous, becauſe we, as believing members of Chriſt, have right to impunity and life, as merited by his righteouſneſs, and freely given to all penitent believers. And Chriſt's own righteouſneſs may be ſaid ſo far to be imputed to us, as to be reckoned or reputed the meritorious cauſe of our right or juſtification, as aforeſaid.

Thus far we are agreed *de re*: And then *de nomine* I willingly leave men to their way of ſpeech. 1. If he will call *God's Decree*, *his Covenant* in Conſtitution. 2. If he will call the execution of his Decree, his Covenant in execution. 3. If he will call *nothing elſe* the Covenant of Grace, or at leaſt nothing of narrower extent, but what comprehendeth God's eternal Decrees, and the promiſe and gift of a Redeemer, (and ſo of the reſt,) I cannot help it; his language is his own. But I ſhall tell you further my thoughts *de re & de nomine*.

1. *De re*: 1. God's eternal decrees, purpoſes, or election, give no one right to Chriſt, Pardon or Life; and ſo juſtifie no man.

2. The execution of God's Decrees, yea, of Election, hath many Acts beſides Juſtification.

3. It muſt therefore be ſome tranſient Act done in time, *& ad extra*, by which God juſtifieth men.

4. There are divers ſuch acts concurring in ſeveral ſorts of cauſality, or reſpect.

5. Chriſt's meritorious righteouſneſs and ſatisfaction are the ſole, proper, immediate cauſe-meritorious of all the Grace or Mercy procured and given by him, there being no other meritorious cauſe of the ſame kind either more immediate, or at all co-ordinate, and copartner with him.

6. As Chriſt giveth us Holineſs qualitative and active by the real operation of his Spirit, (though he *merited* it immediately himſelf;) ſo doth he give us *right to impunity*, to the *further Grace* of the *Spirit*, *and to Glory*, by the inſtrumentality of his Covenant, as by a Teſtament, Deed of Gift, or Law of Grace. Which by *ſignifying* God's *donative will*, doth not *firſt declare us juſtified*, or to have the foreſaid right to *Chriſt and Life*, but doth *firſt give us inſtrumentally that right*; and ſo *immediately juſtify us*. (And God's will giveth us not *right* as ſecret, or of it ſelf, but by ſuch inſtrumental ſignification.)

7. God hath ſignified his will to us, partly by abſolute gifts and promiſes, and partly by conditional: that *ſuch there are*, he that denieth, muſt deny much of the Scripture. Chriſt was *abſolutely* given to fallen mankind for a Redeemer; and ſo was the *Conditional Law*, or *Covenant of Grace*; and many other mercies But he hath made and recorded a conditional Gift of Chriſt, as in ſpecial Union, (to be our Head,) and of Pardon and Salvation.

8. It is Chriſt's ſtated Conſtitution, that [*he that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved; and he that believeth not ſhall be damned*, Mar. 16.16. That *if thou confeſs with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and believe in thy heart that God raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved: for with the heart man believeth* (Chriſt's reſurrection) *unto righteouſneſs, and with the mouth confeſſion is made unto Salvation*, Rom, 10. *That except you repent you ſhall all periſh*, Luke 13.3, 5. *That men muſt repent, and be baptized, for the remiſſion of ſins*, Acts 2.38. And *repent and be converted*,

that

that their ſins may be blotted out, Acts 3. 19. So, Rev. 22. 14. Matt. 6. 14, 15. Ezek. 33. 14, 16. 1 Tim. 4. 8. *Godlineſs is profitable to all things, having the promiſe of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.*] Call theſe *Laws*, or *Covenants*, or what you will, we are agreed that all this is the *word of God.*

9. Theſe *terms of life and death* are the *rule* of our *practices*, and our *expectations*, by which we muſt *live*, and by which we ſhall be *judged*: and therefore we may truly ſay that they are *Chriſt's Law.* And they are God's ſignified determination of the *conditions of life and death*, and his *donation* of our *right to Chriſt, Pardon and Life*, is contained herein; and therefore this may truly be called *Chriſt's Teſtament and Covenant*, in ſeveral reſpects.

10. Though all duties be preſcribed by *God's Law*, and ſo each *Precept* is a *material* part; yet *formally* or *ſpecifically* the Laws to which theſe material parts belong, muſt be diſtinguiſhed by the *diſtinct conditions of life and death.*

11. God hath made more *Promiſes, Donations and Covenants*, than *one* or *two*; which muſt not be confounded: 1. His Law and Covenant made to and with man in *innocency* is one. 2. And his Law and Covenant made to and with Chriſt, as *Mediator*, is another. 3. And his abſolute promiſe of a Saviour to the World, with the conditional promiſe or Law of Grace conjunct, was the firſt edition of another. And the Goſpel, as after the incarnation promulgate, was a more perfect edition of it: (to paſs by *Abraham's* Covenant of Peculiarity, and the *Moſaical* Law, as ſuch.)

12. Though *Chriſt be promiſed in one of theſe*, and be God's antecedent gift, he may nevertheleſs be the *Author of another*, (and ſo far the foundation,) as well as the *meritorious cauſe.*

13. That may be of *free Grace* which is merited by *Chriſt*; yea, and that which is annexed to the Evangelical *worthineſs* of a believer.

14. That may be a *condition* required of *us, to be done* by the help of Grace, which yet is the *effect of that Grace*, and given us by God.

15. It is a *true Covenant* between God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and *man*, which is ſolemnly entred into *in Baptiſm*: And this is a *Covenant of Grace*, even that proceedeth purely *from Grace*; and *of Grace, as given by God*, and *by us accepted.* He that will confound theſe various Covenants, Promiſes, and Laws, on pretence of *their unity*, (though there is doubtleſs a wonderful *unity of* all the parts both of God's *moral* (ſignal) means, and his *phyſical* works) ſhall confound much of Theology.

16. The Law made to *Adam* never ſaid [*either thou or another for thee ſhall obey*,] but it bound man to *perfect, perpetual, perſonal obedience.*

17. Therefore *that Law, as it obliged us*, is not *fulfilled* by the *obedience of Chriſt*, but only as far as *it obliged him*; nor can any man be *juſtified by it*, as a *fulfiller of it*, by *himſelf*, or by *another*: nor did Chriſt fulfil it in any other *mans perſon*, though *in his ſtead*, ſo far as is aforeſaid.

18. The Law doth not command any man ſince *Adam, perfect, perſonal obedience*, as the *means or condition of life*; nor promiſe any life on ſuch a condition as is now naturally impoſſible: but though it be not repealed by God, is ſo far ceaſed, by the ceſſation of the ſubjects capacity to be ſo obliged.

19. The Laws *obligation of us to puniſhment is diſpenced with*, and diſſolved by a pardon purchaſed by our Mediator.

20. Chriſt's righteouſneſs is nevertheleſs the *meritorious cauſe of our righteouſneſs* or juſtification, though he juſtify us by the inſtrumentality of his *donative Covenant*, as giving us right to our *Union, and Juſtification and Life*; and though our Faith and Repentance be the condition of our Title.

21. We accept two Conceſſions as containiug that truth, which ſheweth that we do not much differ *de re*, could we more happily order our organical conceptions: "1. That Chriſt's righteouſ-"neſs is not the formal cauſe of our Juſtification: 2. *p.* 596. [Seeing the ſatisfaction was not made "*IN THE PERSON* of the offender, but his ſubſtitute; it was neceſſary that *THE* "*BENEFIT* of *ANOTHERS* ſatisfaction ſhould be communicated in ſuch a way as might "beſt pleaſe that God whoſe Grace was the only motive to his acceptation of a ſubſtitute: It is "the undoubted priviledge of the Giver, to diſpoſe of his own gifts in his own way: And it "was abſolutely and indiſpenſibly neceſſary that the ſinner ſhould be duly qualified to receive "ſuch tranſcendent favours, purchaſed at ſo dear a rate, and fitted to return the glory to a Re-"deemer; which an unhumbled, unbelieving, unconverted and unſanctified ſinner could not poſ-"ſibly be.] He that writeth this, cannot ſure much differ from me hereabouts.

But he is charitably uncharitable, when he ſaith, [*Never any man in his wits affirmed it ſo*, (that the righteouſneſs of Chriſt is the formal cauſe of our Juſtification.) It's too charitable to hide that which cannot be hid, of ſo great a number; whom it ſeems he never read (for all his Commiſſion from all the Syſtematical Divines of *Germany*, &c. *p.* 696.) And it's too *uncharitable* to judge

ſo

ſo many excellent men *out of their wits*. The truth is, ſo many ſpeak ſo, that I have been doubtful I ſhould be ſmartly cenſured for ſaying otherwiſe.]

Forma qua juſtificamur eſt miſericordia Patris & perfecta Juſtitia filii, ſaith *Ant. Fayus* in his *Accurate Theſes*, *Th.* 60. *p.* 280. (And by *miſericordia Patris* being the form, you may ſee how he underſtood Imputation.)

The number that thus ſpeak, are too great here to be recited: ſo that even the moſt judicious *Davenant*, leſt he ſhould go out of the road, was fain to make this the *Theſes* to be proved by him; *Imputatam Chriſti obedientiam eſſe cauſam formalem juſtificationis noſtræ, probatur*; Cap. 28. p. 362. &c. *de Inſiit. habit.* But let none turn this to our reproach, nor take all theſe for mad; for it is but an *unapt name*, and by him and many others ſoundly meant: for the greater part of theſe Divines ſay but that *Imputatio Juſtitiæ Chriſti & Remiſſio peccatorum* are the form, not of Juſtification, *as in us*, but as it is *Actus Juſtificantis*, (as *Altingius*, *Mareſius*, *Sharpius*, *Bucanus*, *Spanhemius*, *Nigrinus*, *Sohnius*, *Beumler*, and many others: And *Paræus*, *Joh. Crocius de Juſtif.* and many more expreſly deny Chriſt's righteouſneſs to be the *formal cauſe*: And I believe that all they that aſſert it, mean as the reſt, though they ſpeak incautelouſly and unaptly.

And what they mean by [*Imputation*,] let *Davenant* ſpeak, *ib. c.* 27. *p.* 359. [*Imputantur quando illorum intuitus & reſpectus valent nobis ad aliquem effectum, æque ac ſi a nobis, aut in nobis eſſent, -- ſiquis indignus aut ignavus ob paternam virtutem & merita erga rempublicam, in gratiam regis admittatur, -- gratum & nobilitatum dicamus per & propter Imputationem virtutis paternæ.*] This is *Bradſhaw*'s ſenſe, but yet the ſimilitude falls ſhort.

So *Altingius* ſtates the Queſtion; *Loc. Com. part.* 2. *p.* 679. [*An juſtificatio conſiſtat in Imputatione Juſtitiæ Chriſti, hoc eſt in Imputationæ Juſtitiæ per Chriſtum acquiſitæ?*] And what Proteſtant will deny this?

And *Mareſius* (with him) ſaith, [*Cum* Paulo *juſtitiæ Imputatio & peccatorum remiſſio idem ſint, prout nullum eſt diſcrimen inter ſatisfactionem Chriſti & illius meritum, non eſt neceſſe ſubtilius inter hæc duo ſcrupuloſe diſtinguere, cum remiſſio ſit peccatorum tum commiſſionis, tum omiſſionis & per illam jus plenum ad vitam æternam habeamus.*] (But this needeth ſomewhat more I think,) *Loc.* 11. *p.* 284.

And the deſcription of the *effecti* ſheweth what the *Imputation* is, which *Mareſius* truly thus deſcribeth, *Exeg. Art.* 23. *p.* 326, 327. *Tranſit reatu (peccatum orig.) ut non amplius imputetur; adhæret quidem ei inſeparabiliter Reatus potentialis ſive in actu primo; ut ſonat intrinſecum meritum pœnæ; ſed ablatus eſt Actualis, ſive quoad actum ſecundum, ut ſonat jus & voluntatem Dei de pœna illa adhuc exigenda:* N. B.

Thyſius in ſynopſi Leidenſ. Diſp. 33. *p.* 413. ſaith, [*Mirum hic videri non debet Chriſti juſtitiam, non meritoriæ ſolum & materialis, imo & Formalis cauſæ rationem habere, cum id fiat diverſi mode, nempe qua illa eſt, propter quod, in quo, ſeu ex quo, & per quod juſtificamur.*] So he taketh Chriſt's righteouſneſs to be all three, (the *meritorious*, *material*, *and formal cauſe* of our Juſtification.)

De nomine, I add as to our Author: 1. I hope few will follow him, in calling the *Decrees* of God, the *Covenant*, and confounding *Election and the Covenant in Conſtitution*. For my part, I will not.

2. *Conſtitution* ſignifieth, 1. *actum Conſtituentis*; 2. more uſually paſſively, *ſtatum ſeu rem conſtitutam*: God's Eternal Purpoſe is not properly the Covenant in Conſtitution in either ſenſe.

3. God's Eternal Decree is nothing but his Eſſence (for there is nothing in God but God, and nothing but God eternal) denominated, as related to its connoted object, (which from eternity was nothing.) And the Covenant in Conſtitution is not God, nor ſhall be by me ſo called.

4. Nor will I call the whole execution of God's Election by Chriſt, the Covenant in Execution; nor any part of it but that which Scripture ſo calleth.

5. I grant him that διαθηκη is uſually taken for a divine diſpoſition and conſtitution: but that is not meerly in God's *Decree*, but (as *Grotius* hath at large opened,) (*Præf. ad Annot. in Evang.*) as it is God's ſignal revealed determination of the terms of life and death; or as it is a Law and a Covenant on God's part impoſed on us, before we conſent. And *Jer.* 33. 20. doth not call God's *meer Decree*, his Covenant; (but his created courſe and law of nature.)

6. He that will but try the Texts which his Concordance referreth him to, and cannot find a multitude of places where the word [*Covenant*] is taken for ſomewhat elſe than God's Decrees, and their general Execution, even for *a Law with its premiant and penal ſanction*, *and for a free donation or promiſe*, which yet hath its proper conditions, as the *moralis diſpoſitio recipientium*; and that cannot find divers ſuch Covenants made, by God, with Chriſt and us, that are really diſtinct, and not to be confounded, muſt not expect that I here trouble other Readers with ſuch a task as his conviction.

7. I fully agree, that Chriſt's righteouſneſs is fitly called, both the *meritorious* and *material* cauſe of our Righteouſneſs or paſſive Juſtification: (Though I lately read one contending that it cannot be both.) For we mean but that it is that *Matter* or *Thing* which meriteth it.

The First Part:

OF THE
Nature, Relations, Knowledge
AND
DECREES
OF
GOD;
AND OF
FREE-WILL
AND
PROVIDENCE,
As the Objects thereof.

Such selected Verities as are needful to reconcile the common Differences about Predestination, Providence, Grace and Free-will, between the *Synodists* and *Arminians*, *Calvinists* and *Lutherans*, *Dominicans* and *Jesuits*, &c.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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ERRATA.

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Reader, Pain and Greater buſineſs forbad me to gather the *Errata*: ſome are gathered by a Friend out of the firſt Book; many more I muſt leave to your ingenuity: I ſee in the *Premonition* p. 4. l. 22. for [Mr. *W.* [Mr. *D.*] l. 47. for [*Armatus*] [*Annatus*]. Alſo *Dial.* 11. p. 231. l. 30. r. [*refuſe*]: *Dial.* 13. p. 291. l. 13. for [*not*] r. [*done*].

The

Catholick Theologie:

The First BOOK.

PACIFYING
PRINCIPLES

Collected from the common Notices of Nature, the certain Oracles of GOD in the Holy Scriptures, and the common Consent of Christians.

For the RECONCILING OF THE CHURCH-DIVIDING and DESTROYING CONTROVERSIES, especially about PREDESTINATION, PROVIDENCE, GRACE and FREE-WILL, REDEMPTION, JUSTIFICATION, FAITH, MERIT, WORKS, CERTAINTY OF SALVATION, PERSEVERANCE, and many others.

In Three Parts.

I. Of Gods Nature, Knowledge, Decrees (and Providence about Sin, with Mans Free-will, as the Objects of the former.)
II. Of Gods GOVERNMENT and MORAL Works.
III. Of Gods Operations on Mans Soul.

By RICHARD BAXTER,

An earneſt Deſirer of the UNITY, LOVE and PEACE of Chriſtians; For endeavouring of which, he expecteth with reſolved Patience, ſtill to undergo the Cenſures, Slanders and Cruelties, of IGNORANCE, PRIDE and MALICE from all that are poſſeſſed by the Wiſdom and Zeal, which are from beneath, Earthly, Senſual and Deviliſh, the Cauſes of Confuſion, and every evil work, *James* 3. 14, 15, 16.

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The First Part:

OF THE NATURE, KNOWLEDGE, WILL AND DECREES of GOD,

As far as is needful to the intended CONCILIATION and CONCORD.

SECT. I.

Of our Knowledge of God, *as here attainable.*

THough it be about the Knowledge, Will and Decrees of God, that our Controverſies are agitated, yet becauſe the conſequent Verities are ſcarce ever well underſtood, without the underſtanding of the Antecedents, out of which the Conſequents ariſe, and without the juſt order, place and reſpect which the later have unto the former, and unleſs things be underſtood in their true Method; I will therefore expoſe my ſelf to the obloquy of thoſe, who will call it *Over-doing*, ſo far as to premiſe ſomewhat of the Deity it ſelf; But not what is neceſſary to the full explication of the Divine Attributes (as we are capable) as muſt be in a Method of Theologie (which I have attempted elſewhere); but only ſo much as lyeth under our Controverted Subject: And when I have done that, I ſhall leave the reſt.

Theſ. 1. To Know the only true God and Jeſus Chriſt whom he hath ſent, is Life Eternal.*

2. To† know GOD is to know his Being, Nature, and Relations: For though thoſe Relations that are to Man be not eſſential to his *Divine Nature*, yet are they eſſentially contained in the ſignification of the name

* John 17. 3. *Bradward. l.* 1. *c.* 11. *p.* 198. The firſt neceſſary incomplex Principle is God, and the firſt complex ſimply is of God, *Deus eſt*, &c. But yet it is not to us the *primum cognitum.*

† Exodus 20.

[GOD] as he is the object of our *Faith*, and *Religion*. For to be OUR GOD doth ſpeak his Relations to us, as well as his *Nature*; As the name KING and FATHER doth among men.

3. We neither have, nor can have here in fleſh any one proper *formal Conception* of the *Divine Nature*, that is formally ſuited to the truth in the object: But only Metaphorical or Analogical Conceptions; borrowed from things better known.

4. Yet nothing beyond ſenſe (at leaſt) is *ſo certainly* known as GOD, ſo far as we can reach, though nothing be *leſs perfectly* or more *defectively* known, or *leſs comprehended*. Even as we know nothing Viſible more *certainly* than the *Sun*, and yet comprehend nothing Viſible leſs.

5. It is not true which many great Metaphyſicians aſſert, that the *Quiddity* of God is totally unknown to us: For then it could not be *life eternal* to know him; nor would a meer *Negative knowledge* cauſe in us a *ſufficient Poſitive Love*, or *Joy* or *Truſt*, &c. But to *know* that we *cannot know him*, would but inferr that *we cannot Love him*: For we Love not *an unknown Good*.

6. Nor is it true that *Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza* (*in fine Diſput.*) and ſome others ſay, that the Notions of *Life* and *Intellect* are all that we have of the *Quiddity* of God, and that the *Divine Will* is not a *Quidditative* notion.

7. God is here ſeen in the *Glaſs* of his *works*, with the *Revelation of his Word* and *Spirit*. And from theſe *works* we muſt borrow our conceptions. *

8. Therefore though the *Thing intended* when we ſpeak of God, be *tranſcendently* and only in *Him*, and not in the *Creature*, yet the firſt *uſe of the words* is to ſignifie ſomething in the *Creature*. And therefore the Creature is the *famoſius analogatum*, though *Nothing* to God.

9. In the uſe of theſe notions we muſt ſtill profeſs that we apply them to God no farther than to ſignifie his perfections: And all words muſt be as little as may be uſed of him in ſtrict diſputes, which imply *imperfection*, when better may be had; But the higheſt are to be preferred.

10. And we muſt ſtill profeſs, that we take none of theſe words to be *formal proper univocal* terms, leſt the concealed Metaphor or impropriety occaſion falſe conceptions of God, and unworthy of Him; and alſo tempt men to run them further by falſe inferences.

11. Gods Nature is moſt *ſimple*, *undivided*: And ſo muſt an *adequate conception* of Him be: But Man can have no ſuch conception of Him; but muſt know what he can know of this One GOD by *many partial inadequate* conceptions.

12. Yet muſt we be very careful that theſe *inadequate* analogical Conceptions be *Orderly*, and not as (I will not ſay how commonly) it is done by ſome, a *confuſed heap*: For the Mind that ſo *conceiveth* of Him, greatly injureth *it ſelf* and *Him*, and the Tongue and Pen that ſo *deſcribeth* Him, diſhonoureth Him: And though the Ignorant, for whom *Catechiſms* are written, cannot lay together a *full Scheme* of the Divine Attributes in juſt method; yet thoſe *few* which they can underſtand and remember, they would as well and better underſtand and remember in the true *method*, were they taught it, than in an heap. For *Method* is a great help to underſtanding and memory. We would not give a Prince his Titles ſo confuſedly; nor draw his Picture monſtrouſly, with the arms where the feet ſhould be, and the feet where the arms, or the back before, and the face behind, unleſs we expoſed him purpoſely to ſcorn. Every man knoweth the difference between a Clock or Watch in order, and the ſame in confuſed parcels on a heap;

* The doubt is, How Imperfect works can notifie the perfect God: And the Schoolmen manage it as an inſuperable difficulty, *whether God could have made the World, or any thing better than it is?* If you will pardon me for making that caſie, which they make ineffable, I anſwer, Goodneſs is *Primitive* (that is, God) or *Derivative*, which only is in Creatures: This laſt is *formally Good*, as it is Related as *Conform* to *Gods Will*, the Prime Good, as its Rule: To be *à Deo Volitum* is the formal notion of Created Good. And ſo the world is perfect, and can be no better, becauſe it is as God willeth it: And yet God can make particular creatures better to themſelves, and to one another; He can make any man more wiſe, more holy, &c. But *bonum ſibi* is no further properly *bonum*, than it is *Volitum à Deo*: Therefore God can make the world far otherwiſe than it is; and yet then it would be no better. For ſtill it would be but as God willed it to be: So that the matter and private Goodneſs might alter, but the true form of Goodneſs would be ſtill juſt the ſame as now.

heap; and between an Army and a Rout, &c. Shall *Order* be the beauty of the World and every Creature in it; and shall we deny it only to the God of Order? I crave the pardon of Divines for intreating them to amend this in their *Doctrine*, but especially in their *Catechisms*, yea, in their *Understandings* first.

SECT. II.

Of mans Soul as the Glass in which we must see God.

13. THe principal Glass in which we must *see God*, in his *Nature*; among all his Creatures here, is the *Soul of man*; which is said to be made after the *Image of God*; And which being *our selves*, we can best perceive.

14. The Soul of Man beareth *Gods Image* in three parts of it, or respects: 1. In its *Nature* it is the Image of the *Divine Nature*: 2. In its *Rectitude* it is the Image of the Divine *Holiness* and perfection: 3. In our *Dominion* over the inferiour Creatures, and eminently, in *Superiours* over *Subjects*, it hath the Image of his *Majesty* and *Supereminence*.

15. I. We have no one adequate Conception of the *Nature* of our *own souls*; but must think of them by partial inadequate Conceptions. And that by many (not feigned or forced, but) real and necessary Trinaries in Unity.

16. And first the Three Inadequate Conceptions of its *Being* are the *Generical*, the *Differencial*, and the *Proper-inseparable Accidental*, *viz.* that it is,* οὐσία, *Vita, Proprietatibus suis prædita.* The first notion is *substantia abstractè à forma concepta*: The second is the *Conceptus formalis*: The third its *Accidents*, not acquired, but natural. By LIFE I understand not *Relatively* only, that it is the *Life* of the *body* or *Compositum*; But *essentially* as in its *nature* it is *Life it self*, or a *Living substance formally*, as well as the *Living Principle* in the man. The word [*Spirit*] as commonly used by us, comprehendeth all this; but what a *Spirit* is, we know but by these partial Conceptions.

17. To pass by the Three Vital Faculties, *Vegetative*, *Sensitive* and *Intellective*, (because I describe it but as the *Speculum Deitatis*). 2. This One *Formal Principle*, LIFE, as it is *mans soul*, must be it self known by us by these Three *inadequate Conceptions*, as making up the *Form* of the soul, 1. Vital Activity (or Power), 2. An Intellect, 3. A Will. †

18. 3. And the EXISTENCE of these *Formal Principles* cannot justly be understood by us, but in these three gradual inadequate or partial Conceptions, 1. As *in Potentia-activa* seu *Virtute*: 2. As *in Actu immanente*: 3. As *in Actione transeunte*: (Not as it is in *Passo*, but as it is *Status* vel *Modus Agentis*.)

19. II. The *Moral* or *Holy* Image of God on the soul, is the *Holy* Perfection or Qualification of these Faculties, as they are *In Virtute* by Holy *Dispositions*; As in *Actu immanente*, by *Holy* Intrinsick *Acts* and *Habits*; And as to *Action ad extra*, by a *Holy Rectitude*: And this Image consisteth in the souls *Holy Vivacity* or *Activity*, and its *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, or its Holy *Liveliness*, *Light* and *Love*.

20. III. The Image of Gods Majesty or Supereminence consisteth in 1. The *Sub-propriety* which we have in Inferiour Creatures; 2. The *Sub-government*; 3. That we are under God Their *End* (and Benefactors).

* 1. *Substantialitas Generica*, is *loco materiæ*: Ægid. Rom. *saith* Quodl. 1. q. 9. p. 18. *Non est materia in Angelis: bene tamen est aliquid loco materiæ: quia non sunt Actus puri, sed habent aliquam potentialitatem admixtam: unde in li. de Causis scribitur, quod Intelligentiæ habeant suam ὑλαιαν, i. e. suum materiale. Et hoc forte volunt illi qui in Angelis Materiam ponunt; Cum ipsi dicant materiam illam non esse ejusdem rationis cum materia corporalium: Solum ergo in verbis videntur discordare à nobis: Quia & nos ibi aliquod materiale ponimus.* (N. B.)

† See *Aureolus in* 2. *d.* 9. that in separated substances (Angels) there is a Motive power beside the Intellect and Will; with whom *Suarez* and many others do agree.

SECT. III.

The ſeveral inadequate Conceptions which in order make up our Knowledge of God.

21. BY the Knowledge of our own *Acts* we know our *Powers* and the *Nature* of our *own ſouls* (though imperfectly); And by the Knowledge of our *ſouls*, we know the *nature* of other *Intellectual Spirits*; And by the Knowledge of *our ſelves* and *them*, and the *Scripture* expreſſions of his Attributes, we *know* ſo much of *God* as we can here know. And accordingly muſt ſpeak of Him, or be ſilent: For we have no higher notions, than ſuch as are thus Analogical; expreſſing that which is in God in an *unconceivable eminency* and *tranſcendency*, by words which firſt ſignifie that which is formally in the ſoul (as is ſaid).

22. And ſo we muſt conceive of God by all theſe following inadequate Conceptions, confeſſing the impropriety, but having no better. I. The *Eſſence* of God, who in Scripture is called in two words [An *Infinite Spirit*] is neceſſarily conceived of by theſe Three Conceptions: 1. *Ousia*, 2. *Vita*, 3. *Perfectio*. The two firſt being the *ſubſtantial Conceptus* of a *Spirit*, and the third that which anſwereth to all *perfective degrees*, *properties* and accidents in Creatures, and comprehendeth a multitude of *Perfective Attributes*: which I expreſs in the *Abſtract*, being loth much to uſe *Concretes* or *Adjectives of God*. Of theſe as the firſt anſwereth to *Matter* in *Materials*, and to the *Genus* and *ſubſtantia abſtractè ſumpta* in *Spirits*, ſo doth the ſecond to the *Form* and *Difference*; when yet in God there is no Compoſition, or Matter.

23. II. And the *Formal Conceptus* [VITA] muſt it ſelf be conceived of in this Threefold *inadequate Conception*; 1.* *Potentia-Actus*, 2. *Intellectus*, 3. *Voluntas*. I call the firſt *Potentia-Actus*, to avoid Concretes, and to ſignifie, that as God hath no *Potentia Paſſiva*, ſo his *Potentia-Activa* is not an *idle ceſſant Power*, but in perpetual perfect Act; and that Act is a moſt *Powerful-Act*: ſo that neither *Potentia* alone, nor *Actus* alone, but both together, are our beſt Conception of this firſt Principle in the Deity. And I take it for granted, that even in *Mans ſoul*, the *Potentia-Vitalis Activa*, the *Intellect* and *Will*, are not as *Thomas* thought Accidents, but the *formal eſſence* of the ſoul, as the *Scotiſts* and *Nominals* better ſay; And I have largely elſewhere proved, and therefore ſtand not here upon it.

24. III. And the *Exiſtence* of this Divine *Eſſence*, muſt be known by us in this *Gradual Threefold Conception*: 1. As in *Virtute* (vel *Potentia*) 2. *In Actu Immanente*, 3. *In Actione Tranſeunte*: Of the firſt I ſhall ſay no more, but what is ſaid before. By the ſecond I mean Gods own moſt perfect Eſſence as *Active in it ſelf*, without extrinſick *effect* or *object*. By the third, I mean not the Creature or the Divine Action *ut recipitur in paſſo*, or the effect: But the Divine Eſſence it ſelf in the *ſtate* of *Agency ad extra*; which the Schools conclude to be *Eternal*, though the *effect* be but in *Time*. Yet if any will call this *a free*, and not a *neceſſary ſtate* of the *Divine Eſſence*, I contend not.

25. IV. The *Eſſential Immanent Acts* of God are *Three*: 1. *SIBI VIVERE*, or to be *Eſſential* Active *Life* in Himſelf; 2. *SE INTELLIGERE*, to know Himſelf; 3. *SE AMARE*, or to be *Amor ſui*.

26. V. The Trinity of Divine *Subſiſtences* or *Perſons* alſo muſt be here acknowledged; 1. The FATHER; 2. The WORD or SON; 3. The

* It is a great diſpute with the *Schoolmen*, Whether Gods Power be any thing but his *Intellect* and *will*: that is, a neceſſary diſtinct *conceptus inadæquatus* of God? (For he is one ſimple eſſence.) *Durand.* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 1. juſtly affirmeth it: *Vaſqu. in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *d.* 102. *c.* 2. ſaith, *Hæc ſententia nonnullis recentioribus mirum in modum probatur*: yet he is againſt it; (though *Suarez* be for it). But it is partly by miſconceiving of the *Potentia Vitalis* in man, as if it were only *Executive ad extra*, or in the inferior faculties; and partly on ſuch frivolous reaſons as tend alſo to a denyal of his Intellection and Volition. Methinks, they that acknowledge Gods Underſtanding and Will to be analogically ſo called (mans being the firſt which the word ſignifieth, though Gods infinitely more excellent) ſhould on the ſame reaſon grant, that *Vita & Potentia activa* are terms as applicable to God: For which denomination many reaſons and cogent may be given: And I am ſure the language of the Scripture and our Creed will warrant this conception.

3. The HOLY SPIRIT: Of which the School-men have ſaid ſo much, (if not far too much) as that I may turn the Reader to them.

27. I have elſewhere ſhewed that many of them, and other Divines, do take the Three laſt named *Immanent Acts* in God, to be the ſame with the *Three Perſons* or *Subſiſtences*; Even the *Three Divine Principles* (*Potentia-Actus, Intellectus & Voluntas*) as in *Act* thus *Immanently*; But of theſe great Myſteries elſewhere. All that I ſay here is, that ſeeing the Trinity of *Divine Principles* (or formal Eſſentialities) and the *Threefold Act*, are ſo certainly evident to Natural Reaſon it ſelf, that no underſtanding perſon can deny them, we have no Reaſon to think the *Trinity* of *Eternal Subſiſtences* incredible, and a thing that the Chriſtian faith is to be ſuſpected for, but the quite contrary; though they are myſteries above our reach, (as all of God is, as to a full or formal apprehenſion).

28. Though God have no *Real Accidents*, we are fain to conceive of Him with ſome Analogie to Accidents: where, 1. The Univerſal Conception is PERFECTION, which comprehendeth all. 2. The *Divine Principles* conſidered in PERFECTION denominate God, 1. *Potentiſſimus*, 2. *Sapientiſſimus*, 3. *Optimus*.

29. The Attributes of the Divine Perſons are, 1. *Diſtinguiſhing*; *viz.* 1. *GENERANS, Patris*: 2. *GENITUS, Filii*: 3. *PROCEDENS, Spiritus Sancti*. 2. *Common* to all, ſuch as Ἑνίσ, Ὁμοίσ, Ἐοικῶς, Συνάναρχ, Ἴσ, Σωαΐδ, &c.

30. The particular Attributes, analogical as to Creatures, Comparate, Relative and Negative, are very many: But yet *in Order* to be conceived of, and not confuſedly; which elſewhere I offer to the Readers view.

31. VI. Gods Cauſal Relations to his Creatures, are in General thoſe named by S. *Paul*, *Rom.* 11. 36. OF HIM and THROUGH HIM and TO HIM are all things. And he is, 1. The firſt EFFICIENT, 2. The ſupream DIRIGENT, 3. The Ultimate FINAL Cauſe of all things.

32. Gods EFFICIENCY is terminated, 1. On the *Things* in their Being, 2. In their *Action* and *Operation*. 1. And in the firſt reſpect he is the Cauſe, 1. Of their *Exiſting Eſſence*, 2. Of their *Order*, 3. Of their *Goodneſs* or *Perfection*: And ſo he is, 1. The CREATOR, and Conſerver, 2. The ORDINATOR, 3. The BENEFACTOR of all the world.

And in the ſecond reſpect, (as to Action) he is, 1. The *Actor* or *Motor* of all things (by his Active Power) 2. The *Governor* of all (according to their ſeveral Natures) (by his *wiſdom*). 3. The *Perfecter* of all things in their attingency or fruition of their proper *End*, (by his *Goodneſs*.)

33. VII. As to MAN in ſpecial God is now Fundamentally Related to him as his CREATOR, his REDEEMER and his REGENERATER or SANCTIFIER; eminently aſcribed diſtinctly to the FATHER, SON and HOLY SPIRIT: From whence flowcth, *NATURA, MEDELA, SALUS*, or NATURE, REDEEMING GRACE, and RENEWING GRACE (HOLINESS and GLORY) (that is, LOVE begun here and perfected in Heaven.)

34. VIII. From CREATION there reſulteth a Threefold Moral Right and Relation of God to Man: 1. He is our Abſolute OWNER or LORD to *diſpoſe* of us, and *Act* us by his *Power*. 2. He is our *Supream* RECTOR, Morally to *Rule us* as Intellectual free-agents, eminently by his *Wiſdom*. 3. He is our LOVER and *Ultimate* END;

as

as he is Goodneſs and Love it ſelf; To *Love Him* and be Loved by him perfectly for ever, being *Amantiſſimus & Amabiliſſimus* in his *Goodneſs*.

35. He that leaveth out any one of theſe Relations of God to man, (to be *Our Owner*, *Ruler* and *Lover* and *End*) leaveth out that which is Eſſential to *Our God*, as the word is *Relatively* uſed in the *Precepts* and *Promiſes* of the Holy Scripture.

SECT. IV.

Of Gods Relations to the Creature and denominations (thereupon) in his Power, Knowledge and Will.

36. THe Three Divine Eſſential *Principles*, Related to the Creature, *ad extra* are denominated, 1. His *Omnipotence*, 2. His *Omniſcience* or *Knowledge* of them, 3. His *Volition* and *Love* of them. He who is *Potentiſſimus, perfectly Powerful in Act, in Himſelf*, is denominated *Omnipotent*, becauſe he *can* do all things *ad extra* which belong to *Power*: 2. And he who is *Intellectus ſe Intelligens ad intra*, is denominated *Omniſcient* or *Knowing* all *Creatures*, from the *exterior objects*: 3. And he who is *Voluntas ſe Volens*, or *Amor ſe Amans ad intra*, is alſo denominated *willing* of *exterior things*.

That Gods Power is Infinite, *quia eſt ipſa Infinita Eſſentia*, is paſt doubt: But whether it may be called Infinite, as reſpecting outward objects, is diſputed: And ſome prove the affirmative, by aſſerting Infinite Objects: But *Gregor. Ar. n. 1. d. 43. q. 2.* hath reaſons too ſubtile to be here recited: One of them *Vaſq.* uſeth *in 1. Tho. q. 25. d. 103. c. 2. & diſp. 104.* Vid. opiniones *Gabriel. Scoti & Thomæ* de ratione nominis Omnipotentia Divina.

37. But (by the way) how the Creature is called *exterior* to God who is Eſſentially every where and in all, and how God is not a *Part* of *Univerſal Being*, and how *God and the Creature* are *no more* than *God alone*, is elſewhere ſomewhat explained, but tranſcendeth mans Underſtanding to comprehend.

38. Gods Tranſient Acts are of two ſorts: 1. *Effectively Tranſient* (as *Creation, Regeneration, &c.*) Which do *cauſe* ſomewhat without. 2. *Objectively* only *Tranſient*; which *cauſe nothing*, but ſuppoſe the Object.

39. It is a dreadful thing to be over-bold, raſh and preſumptuous, in ſpeaking and aſſerting any thing without clear proof, of Gods *Knowledge* and *Will*; eſpecially to reduce them to all the Modes and Methods of a man, even as to the *order* of his Acts: ſeeing we are forced to confeſs, that even *Intellection* and *Volition* are ſpoken of God with exceeding great impropriety, and mans Acts which are the *prius ſignificatum*, are further below Gods, than a Worm is below a Man. Therefore were it not that the preſumption of the *Schools* and *Polemical Writers*, hath made that *Neceſſary* as *Defenſive*, which elſe would not be ſo, I ſhould ſcarce dare to ſay this little following:

D'Orbellis 1. d. 40. inquit [*Licet in Deo non ſit proprie Habitus, eſt tamen ibi aliquid intellectum à nobis per modum habitus, ſiquidem ſcientia in nobis eſt Habitus ad cognoſcendum, ſicut Virtus eſt habitus ad operandum. Cognitio Divina cum ſemper maneat, congrue ſignatur per modum habitus.*]

40. I. The *Power* of God is denominated Relatively *Omni-potency* in three inſtants to Three ſeveral Objects: 1. In the firſt inſtant, as to *All things which belong to Power*: And ſo God *can do all things*, which are hence called *Poſſible*. 2. In the ſecond inſtant, to *All things meet* or *Congruous* to the *Divine Intellect* to be *willed and done*: And ſo we ſay, that God can do *All* that is *meet* to be done, and nothing that is *unmeet*. 3. In the third inſtant (of reaſon) as to *All things* which he *willeth to do*: And ſo we ſay, that *God can do* whatſoever *he Will do*. And ſo *Poſſibility* hath various ſenſes.

Aegid. Rom. quodl. 3. q. 3. ſaith, That Gods ſpeculative knowledge is before his *Velle*; but his Practical determined *ad opus* is after, as we muſt conceive of it.

41. II. Gods Intellect is Relatively denominated *Omniſcient*, in reſpect to three ſorts of Objects alſo in three inſtants: 1. In the firſt inſtant he knoweth all *Poſſibles*, in his own *Omnipotence*: For to know things to be *Poſſible*, is but to know *what He can do*.

2. In the ſecond Inſtant he Knoweth all things, as *Congruous*, *eligible* and

and *Volenda*, fit to be *Willed*: And this out of the perfection of his *own wisdom*: which is but to be *perfectly Wise*, and to know what *perfect wisdom* should offer as eligible to the *will*.

3. In the third instant he knoweth *All things willed* by him as such (as *Volita*): which is but to know his *own will*, and so that they *will* be.

42. In all these instances we suppose the Things themselves not to have yet *any Being*: But speak of God as related to Imaginary beings, according to the common speech of men.

43. These therefore are not properly Transient Acts of God; because it is but *Himself* that is the object indeed, *viz.* His own *Power*, *Wisdom and will*, though it be *de creaturis* in that which is called his *Idea's*.

44. It is usual with Divines to ascribe *Idea's* to the Divine Intellect, after the manner of men, against which I quarrel not, but am my self afraid of presumption.

45. From what is said, you may see, that the Common School distinction of all Gods Knowledge, into *scientia simplicis Intelligentiæ, & puræ Visionis*, is not accurate, and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notifie the thing intended; and that the *scientia media* added doth not mend the matter: And that a fitter distinction is plain and obvious.

46. III. Also the *will* of God as *Related* to things not yet existent, hath in several instants a threefold object, (as we may conceive of God after the manner of men.)

1. The *Possibility* of things, which God is said *to Will*, in *willing his own Power* as respecting them.

2. The *Congruity*, *Goodness* and *Eligibility* of things, as in his own *Knowledge*; which is but to *will* the perfection of his *own Understanding*.

3. The *Future existence* of things *Good* and *Eligible*, to be produced in their fittest season.

47. They that say *God can do no more than he doth*, must mean only in the second and third instants or sense; or speak very presumptuously, if not blasphemously.

48. That God doth not all that he *Can* do, is no note of imperfection in his *wisdom* or *will*, but is from the perfection of both.

49. Nor doth it hence follow that he hath either a *Vain* or an *Unactive Power*. For his Power is his perfection, and therefore not *Vain*: And it is ever essentially Active in himself, as he is the *Living God*: And was neither *Vain* nor *Unactive* when there was yet no Creature.

50. Gods *Power* doth not therefore *Create* or operate *ad extra* meerly as *Power*; For then it should do so *ad ultimum posse*, and from *Eternity*: But as it *Voluntarily* puts forth the *effect*.

51. Gods *Knowledge* meerly as Knowledge, or as the *Knowledge* of Congruities, Future things, yea, or things Existent, is not Efficient, nor yet as it concurreth with his *will ut finis* (or his Will of Complacency;) But only as it concurreth with his *Efficient Will*.

52. Gods *Knowledge and will* effect nothing *ad extra*, but by and with his *Active Power*, as *efficient*.

53. Therefore *Bradwardine* and many other Schoolmen, do not congruously say, that Gods meer *Volition* without any *Effective Power* is all his *Causing Influx*: Unless they thrust two Conceptions into one word, and mean a *powerful active Volition*. For, 1. By the same reason that we must ascribe to God *Intellection* and *Volition*, we must also ascribe *Active Power*; These being three principles in his Image. 2. And in Man *Meer willing* effects not. 3. And they that say God *willeth ut eveniat peccatum ipso non efficiente, sed permittente*, suppose that he *willeth* something which

which he effecteth not. But againſt them in this *Suarez* and others have ſaid enough.

54. Though Gods *Nature* have no *Real Accidents*, but ſimple eſſential perfection, yet *Relations*, or Relative Accidents are not to be denyed of him. For indeed (as *Ockam* hath copiouſly proved) * Relations have no real Entity, or are nothing beſides the *Abſoluta* and the Act of *Reaſon* about them. † Relation is but *rerum Comparabilitas*, which Reaſon uſeth by actual comparing-conceptions of them.

55. Though the *Thomiſts* ſay, that man only is Related to God, * *relatione rationis*, and not God to man, yet *Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza* and others ſtrongly aſſert, that God himſelf hath not only *Relationes rationis* and *Tranſcendental*, but *predicamental Relations* alſo; as *Creator*, *Dominus*, *Rector*, *&c.* which the Scriptures conſtantly aſcribe to him; And which indeed are no way notes of Imperfection. For if it be no Imperfection in God to Create, Redeem, Sanctifie, Rule, *&c.* it can be none to be related to us as a Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, Ruler, *&c.* For it is nothing more.

56. As Gods *Immanent Acts* are his *Eſſence*, but not *ſimply as Eſſence*; but as *Eſſence in the diſtinct Acts* of *ſelf-living*, *ſelf-knowing*, *ſelf-loving*, related to *Himſelf*: ſo his *Actions ad extra* are his *Eſſence* as Related to the *Creature*, but not ſimply as *Eſſence*, but as *Eſſence-Acting*.

57. Gods *Will* as meerly *Ordinant* or *Dirigent* effecteth only *Order* and *Direction*, but not the *Subſtances* ordered.

58. His *Will quà Finis* is not *Efficient*. †

59. His *Will quà Finis* is his *Will* as *Pleaſed* by being *Fulfilled*.

60. All that is *Good* is *Pleaſing* to God, and ſo is the final fulfilling of his *Will*.

61. God *willeth efficiently* all that *is Good*, which *cometh to paſs*; For all Good that is ever done, is done *by him*, though not by *him only*.

62. But he willeth the various production of things, as they are *variouſly produced*; ſome ſolely by Himſelf, and ſome by Creatures and means; ſome neceſſarily by neceſſitated agents, and ſome freely by free agents.

63. As Gods *Efficient Will cauſeth* the thing willed (whether ſubſtance, accidents, rule, order, *&c.*) ſo his *Final Will* or *Complacence* ſuppoſeth the Pleaſing thing in Being: That is, If it be the *Thing it ſelf*, that he is Pleaſed in, it is ſuppoſed *Exiſtent*; If the thing as *Paſt*, it is ſuppoſed *Paſt*, or that it *was* exiſtent; If the *thing* as *future*, or fore-known, or fore-willed, it is not the thing it ſelf that is in that inſtant properly ſaid to Pleaſe him, but his own *Knowledge* and *Will* concerning it: Though we uſe to call this, The Thing *in eſſe Cognito aut Volito*.

* That Relations have no entity *extra intellectum praeter abſolutum*, *Ockam* in many diſputes in his *Quo lib.* ſheweth. † Relation is but *Comparabilitas*.

* An Relationis reales ſint in Deo ad Creaturas, e. g. *Creator*, *Dominus*, &c. *Affirmatur ab* Ockam & Gabr. 1. d. 30. q. 5. Durand. q. 3. Marſil. 1. q. 32. a. 1. Greg. Ar. 1. d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. Pet. Hurtad. *Negatur à* Thomiſtis: *ſed eſt Lis de nomine ut notat* Vaſquez in 1 Tho. q. 13. a. 7. *Nulla quippe fundamentum datur eſt ex parte Dei, ſed creaturæ: Ideo* Thomiſtæ *dicunt* Relationē *rationis*.

† Bonavent. in 1. d. 45. q. 2. Reſol. *Deus non dicitur Omni-volens, ſicut Omnipotens & Omniſciens, cum Voluntas abſtrahat & à ratione actualitatis, & à ratione cauſæ*. See his plain explication of it. Vide *Alliac.* in princip. 1. At è contrà *Bradward.* l. 1. c. 10. cor. pag. 197. But not accurately enough; though it ſeems but *Lis de nomine*.

SECT. V.

Of Futurity and its pretended Cauſes.

64. THe *Poſſibility* and *Futurity* of things, are not accidental notions, or relations of the things themſelves; but are *termini diminuentes*, as to the *Things*, and are ſpoken of *Nothing*. To ſay that a *Thing May be*, or *Will be*, which now is not, is to ſay that *now* it *is nothing*.

65. *Nothing* is no *Effect*; and therefore hath *no Cauſe*: Therefore things *Poſſible* and *Future* as ſuch, have no Cauſe.

66. Therefore *Poſſibility* and *Futurity* as they are taken for any attribute or

Of Futurity, ſee *Bonaventures* diſtinction of futur. *quoad ſucceſſionem temporis, & quoad ordinem temporalis ad æternum ſecundum conſecutionem* with the application, *in* 1. *diſt.* 38. *dub.* 2. Vid. *Blank de Concord. lib. & decret.* 1. *n.* 54. that futurity is nothing but *reſpectus rationis*, and needs no cauſe, but that of the thing future.

or accident or mode of Creatures, as objects, are miſtaken; Though they may be *Conceptions* in the mind of Creatures, concerning that which is not.

67. Therefore alſo God is no Cauſe of any Eternal Poſſibility or futurity.

68. Therefore the *Poſſibility* and *futurity* of things (conceived as an effect) hath no *Eternal Cauſe:* For there is nothing Eternal but God.

69. Though man *Imagine Things* which are not, and then think that they *Can be*, and *Will be*, becauſe *that Is*, which *Can* or *Will Cauſe* them, and thence frame notions and names of *Nothing*, and call it *Poſſible* and *Future*; we muſt be very fearful and not unreverent and raſh, in aſcribing ſuch a *dance* or *luſus* of notions to God, unleſs as uſed with great impropriety after the manner of weak man.

70. God knoweth his own *Power*, *Knowledge* and *Will*; And ſo knoweth what he *can* do, what he *knoweth* to *be eligible*, and what he *will* do. And if any will call *this knowledge* of God, by the name of the *Poſſibility* or *Futurity* of the thing *known*, or will denominate, *Nothing*, (as an Imaginary ſomething) as *Poſſible* and *Future*, relatively from Gods *Power*, *Will* or *Knowledge*, Let them remember, 1. That *Nothing* hath *no relation*. 2. That *properly* they ſhould but give the denomination to that *which is*, that is, to *Gods Power*, *Will* and *Knowledge*, and ſay *God Can*, *e. g.* make a World, or *Will* do it; and not to that which *is not:* And when they ſay that *e. g.* the *world* is *eternally poſſible* or *future*, they can juſtly mean no more, but that God *can* and *will* make it. 3. And that this is but *lis de nomine*, and not a real difference (whether *futurition* be *thus* from Eternity).

71. And eſpecially let them remember that nothing in God is *Cauſed:* There are no effects in God: Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God, and therefore *poſſibility* and *futurition* muſt needs be names of God himſelf, or ſome Divine perfection or conception (which is himſelf) if they be ſaid to be eternal; ſo ſuch Poſſibility and *futurity* can have no eternal cauſe. For God hath no Cauſe, nor any thing in God.

72. If the *Futurity* of ſin muſt have an *eternal Cauſe*, then God *cauſeth the futurity* of all ſin: But that is not ſo. For none is the Cauſe that *ſin will be*, but he that (mediately or immediately) cauſeth the being of it when it is.

73. Imagine (*per poſſibile vel impoſſibile*) that a thouſand years hence a free created agent (that can do otherwiſe) will cauſe ſuch an act; It may be denominated *Future* without the taking in of any antecedent cauſe into the notion. It is called *Future* becauſe it *will be*; and not becauſe there is at preſent exiſtent any cauſe from whence it will be mediately or immediately.

74. Though *Futurity* be *Nothing*, yet this Propoſition is ſomething, [*This or that Will be.*] And to know the *futurity* of a thing, is moſt properly to know the truth of that propoſition [*It will be.*]

75. God knoweth not *by Propoſitions* (for that is the imperfect mode of man) But he *knoweth Propoſitions* when they are exiſtent, as humane inſtruments or conceptions: And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propoſitions of *futurity*.

76. What man knoweth by Propoſitions, God knoweth otherwiſe by a more tranſcendent perfect, but incomprehenſible way; Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be, which will be.

77. There were no Propoſitions from Eternity: (For man that uſeth them, was not: And God uſeth them not, though he know them as uſed by

Pennot. l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers ſaying, that things are not future becauſe fore-known, but fore-known becauſe future: And *Auguſtine*, *Greg. M. Boetius*, *Anſelm*, *Lomb. & Aquin.* ſaying the contrary. And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them, and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being, the firſt is true; and in regard of free acts, the ſecond. I think that in regard of ſin neither is true. Unleſs [Becauſe] ſignifie only *rationum denominationis objectivam*; And even if ſo it is dubious, whether they be not ſimultaneous as Relations are.

by man): Therefore this propoſition [*Hoc futurum eſt*] was not from Eternity; Becauſe *non entis non ſunt affectiones.*

78. But if there *had been* ſuch Propoſitions from Eternity, as, [*The world will be made, Chriſt will be incarnate,* &c.] they would have been true: And ſo the eternal *Futurity* of things, as commonly diſputed of, can be nothing but the *Eternal Verity* of a *Propoſition de futuritione*, which was no propoſition (becauſe then there was none); only *in time* mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there *might have* been *Creatures*, who might have uſed propoſitions *de futuritione rerum*, which if they had, they *would* have been *true.*

79. All Verity is either, 1. *Rei*, 2. *Conceptus*, 3. *Expreſſionis*; And 1. *Ubi non eſt Res, ibi non eſt Veritas Rei*: The thing which *was not* from Eternity, was not a *True Thing* from Eternity. 2. The *Divine knowledge* that ſuch and ſuch things *will be*, was *True* from Eternity, by an incomprehenſible way above propoſitions. 3. If there had been any *Propoſitions Mental* or *Verbal de rerum futuritione*, they would have been true. And this is all that can truly be ſaid of the *Eternity of futurition.*

80. Only this being added, that ſo far as Gods will was the firſt Cauſe determining of any thing that will be, ſo far he was eternally the Cauſe of the truth of this propoſition, *Hoc erit*, when ſuch a propoſition ſhall be.

81. But where Gods Will is not the firſt cauſe of *the Thing which will be*, there it is not his cauſing the truth of the propoſition that is the cauſe that *it will be*; (Though his *Knowledge* be a *medium* from whence it may Logically be inferred that it *will be.*)

82. Moreover, whatever is from eternity, muſt be *Res*, or *modus rei*, or *Relatio.* But from Eternity, there is no *Res futura*, no *modus rei futuræ*, no *Relatio rei futuræ.* *For *non entis non eſt Modus, vel Relatio.* If you add that it is *Denominatio extrinſeca*, I anſwer it muſt be then *God himſelf* only, as *denominated Knowing*, or *willing* that This or that *ſhall be*, (which is not properly the *futurity of the thing*). For otherwiſe it muſt be a denomination of *Nothing.*

83. Obj. *The Object is before the Act of Knowledge. Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future.*

Anſw. 1. To *be future* is a word whoſe ſound deceiveth men, as if it ſignified *ſome being*; which is not ſo. 2. God cannot know that a thing *will be*, unleſs it *will be*; But this ſignifieth no more but that he cannot know this propoſition to be true [*This or that will be*] unleſs it be true: But 1. there were from eternity no propoſitions. 2. And the propoſition is not *true* before it is a propoſition. 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind, whence it hath its firſt being. 4. But if you might ſuppoſe God to have eternal propoſitions, their *Being* is conſiderable before their *Verity*; and the *Verity* hath its Cauſe. But that cauſe is nothing but what is in God himſelf, which is either his Decree of what he will Cauſe, or his *foreknowledge* of what will be cauſed by a ſinning Creature: And neither of them as a cauſe of the *truth* of the *propoſition*, cauſeth that the *Thing will be*: nor yet is any other exiſtent Cauſe ſuppoſed; but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent, knoweth alſo that this agent *will freely* ſin: In all which the *futurity* is Nothing, nor is any exiſtent cauſe of it neceſſary: But only the truth of the propoſition would reſult from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge.

84. Obj. *The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not.* Anſw. 1. *Futurity* being *Nothing* is neither true nor

* I know that the Judicious *Greg. Arim.* 1. *d.* 28. *q.* 3. *pag.* 122, *&c.* aſſerteth theſe four things: 1. That *aliquid poteſt referri realiter ad non ens*: 2. *Non ens poteſt realiter referri ad ens*: 3. *Quod Deus æternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quæ non erat*: 4. *Quod Deus realiter refertur ad creaturam ex tempore.* And his reaſons are very conſiderable for three of them: But as to the ſecond which concerneth our caſe he faileth. For 1. his firſt reaſon, that relations are ever mutual or convertible, I deny his proof as vain, as to the *reality* of the relation. 2. And that *res non exiſtens is cauſa* I deny: *Fait cauſa, non eſt.* 2. And remember that he inſtanceth only in things as cauſed or foreknown: Sin therefore can be called *future* but as *fore-known.* 3. Remember that his Maſter *Ockam* hath oft (in *Quodl.*) proved that Relations are Nothing, beſides the *quid abſolutum*, and Reaſon Being nothing but *Comparabilitas*, all is but to ſay, that God fore-knew what would be, and therefore had there been ſuch a propoſition from Eternity as [This will be] it had been true.
Vid. Aquin. 1. *p. d.* 38. *q.* 1. *a.* 1. *Bonav. ib. a.* 1. *q.* 1. *&* 2. *Durand.* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 1. *Scot. ib. q.* 1. *Cajet. Bannes, Rip. Zumel. Nazar. Molin. Vaſqu. Arrub. &c.* 1. *p. q.* 14. *a.* 8. *Greg. Valent.* 1. *p. d.* 1. *q.* 14. *punc.* 5. *ſ.* 3. *Alvar. de Auxil. diſp.* 16. *Suarez de Auxil. l.* 1. *c.* 13. *Ledeſm. de Auxil. diſ.* 2. *Ruiz de ſcient. d.* 15, 16, 33, 36, *&c.*

nor false. * 2. But all that you can truly mean is but this, that whether it be thought on or not, this is *a true proposition, Hoc vel illud futurum est.* Which is true when there are propositions, extrinsecal, which no man thinketh of. But 1. God hath no propositions; 2. Much less extrinsecal from Eternity. But if he had any, they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge. 3. And they have no Cause. 4. If they had been uttered by words, they needed no Cause but his perfect knowledge.

85. Obj. *Futurity* is the *Object* of Gods *knowledge*; and the *object is a* † *cause of the act. God knoweth things to be future, because they are future; as he knoweth existents, because they exist.*

Answ. Still I say, 1. Futurity is Nothing; and Nothing hath no Cause. 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God: and God hath no *Cause* nor is an Effect. 3. At least that which is *Nothing* cannot be the Cause of God. 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things, *because* they *will be*; but only that he fore-knoweth *that* they will be.

86. Gods meer *fore-knowledge*, nor his *meer Will* without *efficient Power* or *Action*, causeth not the thing future, and therefore is not the Cause that *It will be*. But where *Knowledge* and *Will* with *Active Power* cooperate, they are true Causes of the thing. And nothing is a proper Cause that *It will be*, but what *will Cause* its being.

87. By all this it is evinced that God Causeth not the *futurity of sin*; And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin pass *è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum*; And consequently that the Learned and pious Dr. *Twisse* his Achillean argument, which is the strength of his Book *de Scientia Media* is but delusory: As the excellent *Strangius* also hath fully manifested. And his admired *Bradwardine* is as weak in his attempts on the same subject, and proveth God the Cause of all futurition by no better reasons than he proveth, that *without him* there would *be no impossibles*; yea that *non posset esse impossibile*: When it were *impossible any thing should be*, were there no God; and yet that impossibility is *nothing* and needeth no cause. It's strange how some Learned men confound *Things and Nothings*, and the *Notions* and *Names* of *Nothings* with the *Nothings* named. So *Bradwardine l.* 1. *c.* 18. *p.* 221, will tell us how God knoweth *complex objects*, and distinguisheth those that are *antecedent* to *Gods Intellection* from those that are *consequent*: The former sort are such as these [*God* is *God*, is *eternal*, *omnipotent*, &c.] These he saith are the *Causes* that *God knoweth them*, being *before* his *knowledge* of them: The other *about Creatures* are *after* it and *caused* by it. Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface [*Non proprie & distincte sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio, ignarus homuncio, excelsa scientiæ Dei mirabilis resonare.*] But see how the world is troubled with this prophane * presumption, and how justly *Paul* cautioned us against seduction by vain Philosophy: and what danger the Church is in of losing Faith, Religion and Charity, and peace in a game at words. What is this *Complexe object* [*Deus est*]? Is it any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is not *before Gods knowledge* and the *Cause of it.* If any thing, *Is it God* or a *Creature?* A *Creature* is not *before* God, nor a *cause* of his *knowledge*, which is *God himself.* If it be *God* is it his *Essence as such*, or his *Essential properties*, or *the Persons?* None of these: For Gods essence is the *prime Incomplexe Being*, and not a *Complexe proposition*, [*Deus est*]: His *Properties*, *primary*, are *Omnipotent-vital-power*, *Intellect and will*; But these also are the same *Incomplexe essence*, and not *propositions*: And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself, nor the cause of it: All the

* According to *Greg.* and the Nominals sence of Relations before cited, two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other, One as a future Cause, and another as a future effect: And if there were now no Being, but hereafter (*per impossibile*) a Being would arise of it self, it is future though there be none to know it. But this futurity hath no Cause: And it is no more, but that this Proposition, *Hoc erit*, would be True if there were any to conceive it.

† To the Question, *An præscientia Dei sit Causata à rebus? Bonavent.* answereth (*in* 1. *dist.* 38. *q.* 1. *a.* 1.) *Præscita Causa sunt præscientiæ Divinæ, non essendi, sed aut Inferendi, aut Dicendi* —— *Secundum rationem essendi Præscientia potest esse Causa aliquorum præscitorum, licet non omnino: sed nullo modo è converso. Secundum rationem Inferendi sunt mutuo causæ, quia mutuo antecedunt & consequuntur: & antecedens est causa consequentis. Secundum rationem Dicendi, futurum est causa præscientiæ, & non è converso: Nam præscientia, dicitur scientia ante rem: constat ergo quod importat ordinem ad posterius: & si scitum esset semper præsens, esset scientia, sed non præscientia.*

Bonavent. 1. *dist.* 38. *dub.* 3. saith, Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth *& effectum & bonitatem*: but when it is called *simplex Notitia*, it connoteth only the event, but in it self is one. Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diversified, both of Knowledge and Will.

* *Hervæus* in his *Quodlib.* puts the question, Whether it be not a Mortal sin in a Divine to omit things necessary, and to treat of curiosities? But he was too guilty himself to answer it as plainly as he ought.

ſenſe he can make of it is, that this propoſition [*Deus eſt, & eſt Æternus*, &c.] if it *had had an eternal being*, would in order of nature have been conceivable *to us* before this [*Deus ſcit ſe eſſe*] or before *his knowledge* it ſelf: or that if man had been the Knower, it had been firſt a true propoſition that *He is*, before he *knoweth that he is*. But *God knoweth not* himſelf by propoſitions. Words (*in mente vel ore*) are but *artificial organs* for blind creatures to know by. And doth God need ſuch to *know himſelf?* Doth he know by *Thinking* and by *Artificial means*, as we do? Hath he *Entia rationis* in his Intellect, as man? (as Propoſitions are). And *had* he an *Intellect* and theſe *Entia rationis* or propoſitions in his Intellect (*Deus eſt*, &c.) before he *knew them?* yea, and his *ſelf-knowledge* (which in Act is his pure, eternal, neceſſary Eſſence) *cauſed* by theſe? All that you can ſay is, that poor creatures know by Propoſitions, and phantaſms, and diverſe thoughts; and that God knoweth *man*, and therefore knoweth all *our propoſitions* and *thoughts* as *ours*: but not that he had the like eternally in himſelf, and knoweth them in himſelf; and that Himſelf as a *propoſition*, is the Cauſe of himſelf (or ſelf-intellection) as in Act. He can know that you ſee by Spectacles, and yet not eternally uſe Spectacles himſelf as the Cauſe of his ſight.

But *Bradwardine* ſaith, that *God knoweth illa vera complexa quæ voluntatem divinam præcedunt, per ſolam ſuam eſſentiam, ſicut alia vera incomplexa; Illa vero quæ voluntatem ejus ſequuntur, non ſcit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus ſemota, ſed per ſuam voluntatem, vel per ſuam ſubſtantiam cum voluntate*, &c. More preſumption ſtill! He ſaith God knoweth *complexa ſed non complexe*; And who knoweth what ſenſe thoſe words have? What meaneth he by *complexa* but *Notions*, that is, *names and propoſitions*, as diſtinct from the *Things?* And what is it to know *propoſitions complexe*, but to know them *as they are?* And what is it to know them *incomplexe*, unleſs it be to know *quid phyſicum* a propoſition is, or to know that it is no propoſition, that is, *to err?* If God know a *Complexum* or a propoſition, that *Propoſition* is in being: And where was it in being *before* God knew it? If in God (or no where) 1. God then *is a propoſition*; 2. And God is *before* he knoweth *himſelf*; 3. And a propoſition being *in intellectu* an act of knowledge, it is to ſay, that [God *knoweth* that he is, before he knoweth that he is: and his knowing that he is, cauſeth him to know that he is].

If it be ſaid, that by *complexa* he meaneth not *organical notions*, *words* nor *propoſitions*, but the *Verity* of Gods Being, Eternity, *&c.* I anſwer; *To know things*, is ſaid to be [*to know ſome Truth*] becauſe by knowing the *thing*, we can make this propoſition [*This is*] or [*This truly is.*] But Gods knowledge of *Things* is not as ours, but by *pure perfect intuition*, and ſo maketh not propoſitions in himſelf by *knowing* things: But if it be the *Truth* of this propoſition [*Deus eſt*] that you mean, it ſuppoſeth that propoſition to exiſt (for, *quod non eſt, non verum eſt*); and ſo to exiſt in God; which is denyed: And it is that propoſition that *Bradwardine* ſpeaketh of.

But if by *Truth*, you mean nothing but *Gods Eſſence*; that is not a *Complex object*, which he ſpeaketh of: And he ſaith not, that God knoweth *ſuam eſſentiam, & creata vel futura*, but that he knoweth *per ſuam eſſentiam quod Deus eſt, & eſt Omnipotens, Æternus*, &c. *& per ſuam eſſentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus eſt.* So that it's a propoſition that he calleth *complexum incomplexè cognitum* by contradiction; when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propoſitions in it ſelf, and that antecedently to *themſelves*, and the *Cauſes* of themſelves.

And

And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-ſenſe, to trouble themſelves and the world with, on falſe ſuppoſitions that Gods knowledge is ſuch as ours, or that we can have formal conceptions and deſcriptions of it: when we ſhould tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain, and pry into unrevealed things.

I have purpoſely been the larger on this inſtance, to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholaſtick Word-mongers, who would obtrude on us humane *entia rationis*, or *Thoughts*, as real *Divine entities*, and would perſwade us that every *nothing* which they make a *name* for, is therefore *ſomething*, yea, ſome of them *God himſelf*.

What I have ſaid of Divine *Intellection*, I ſay of his Volitions, of which *cap.* 20, 21. *Bradwardine* ſaith, that *Voluta priora*, viz. *Deum eſſe, omnipotentem eſſe, bonum, cognoſcentem*, &c. *ſunt Cauſa.* But, 1. It is too bold to ſay, that Gods Will is an Effect. 2. If it were ſo, it muſt be his *Eſſence, Omnipotency* and *Intellect* that is the *Cauſe* of his *Will*, and not a Complex verity, as [*Deus eſt, omnipotens, bonus eſt*, &c.] For Gods Will is not cauſed by Propoſitions. 3. If you ſay that his *Volition* as terminated objectively on his *Eſſence, Goodneſs*, &c. is his *will in act* (*ſe Velle*; which ſome call the third Perſon) yet here would be no *Cauſe* and *Effect*, but our diſtinct partial conceptions of that incomprehenſible ſimplicity, which hath no real diverſity or priority.

SECT. VI.

Of Gods Knowledge, and the Co-exiſtence of the Creature.

88. *Auguſtine* well and truly ſaith, that fore-knowledge in God, is the ſame with the Knowledge of things preſent: Paſt, preſent and future, through his Infiniteneſs and Eternity, being alike to him, even all as preſent.

89. But this dependeth upon the Indiviſibility of Eternity: in which all the things of time are included, and co-exiſt.

90. Thus ſaith *Auguſtine li.* 2. *ad Simplic. q.* 2. *Quid eſt præſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum eſt Deo qui omnia ſupergreditur tempora? Si enim in ſcientia res ipſas habet, non ſunt ei futuræ, ſed præſentes: ac per hoc non jam præſcientia ſed tantum ſcientia dici poteſt——Si autem ſicut in ordine temporalium creaturarum, ita & apud Deum, nondum ſunt quæ futura ſunt, ſed ea prævenit ſciendo, bis ergo ea ſentit; uno quidem modo ſecundum futurorum præſcientiam, altero verò modo ſecundum præſentium ſcientiam: Aliquid ergo temporaliter accedit ſcientiæ Dei. quod abſurdiſſimum atque falſiſſimum eſt.*

Thus with *Auguſtine* Nothing is future to God, leſt the after-knowledge of things as preſent, ſeem an addition to the firſt. And if this be true, then *futurity* had no eternal Cauſe.

91. See more *ibid. in Auguſt.* to the ſame purpoſe. And *li.* 15. *de Trinit. cap.* 7. *Et in Pſal.* 101. And *Gregor. Moral. li.* 20. *cap.* 23. that *Preſcience* is not properly in God, nor any thing *future to him.* So *Anſelm. opuſc. de Concord. cap.* 1. See alſo *Arriba Concil. li.* 3. *c.* 11, 12, 13, 14. and *Boetius* and *Aquinas* there cited. And *à cap.* 16. *ad cap.* 26. the whole Controverſie handled of the co-exiſtence of all things with God in eternity. *

92. But becauſe *Scotus, Durand. Gabriel. Greg. Molina* and many others digeſt not this notion, I ſhall open it to you in a moderate and undenyable ſenſe, how things may be ſaid to co-exiſt with God in eternity.

When

* Vid. Bonav. 1. d. 36. ar. 1. & plurimos Scholaſt. in 1. d. 8. *viz.* Tho. q. 2. Cajet. Zumel. Bannez, Nazar. Gonzal. Arrubal. q. 14. hac lin. Vaſquez. Faſol. & Alvarez. de Auxil. l. 2. diſp. 8. & 9. Navarret. Cent. 52. Suar. l. 1. de Scient. c. 7. & 8. Ruiz. de Scient. diſp. 28. Albert. To. 3. Princip. 4. Corol. 2. q. 2. Valent. 1. p. diſp. 2. q. 14. punct. 5. ſect. 1. Alarcon. 1. p. tract. 2. d. 2. c. 8. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 6. Gillius l. 2. de Eſſent. Dei, tract. 10. c. 15, &c. Arriba in Concil. per plura cap. cum multis aliis. Lychet. in 1. p. d. 39. q. 1. Tuiſſ. de Scient. Med. Bradward. l. 3. c. 51. p. 828. & corol. p. 830.

When temporary Creatures are the *ſubjects* of *Relation to God*, then God is denominated by *extrinſecal denomination* as the *terminus* of that *Relation*: But when *God* or *Eternity* is the *ſubject* of *Relation* to Creatures, then *temporary creatures* are denominated as the *termini* of the Divine relation. And ſo Eternity (being as Divines conclude indiviſible and *tota ſimul quia ſine partibus*) being one and the ſame, communicateth ſomewhat of its *Name* to the multifarious fluid creature, as its *terminus*: And as the *Mutations* of creatures in exiſtence and operation thus communicate various denominations to the actions (knowledge and will) of God; ſo *Gods Unity* and *Conſtancy* giveth various denominations to the creatures. * And ſo, becauſe things *when* they *exiſt*, do *co-exiſt* with *eternity*, and eternity hath no *prius & poſterius*, and the Prepoſitions [*ab*] & [*ad*] & [*ante*] & [*poſt*] have there no true ſignification, therefore it may be ſaid, that as *Indiviſible Eternity co-exiſteth with the creature*, ſo the creature co-exiſteth with and in *indiviſible eternity*, and ſo with *All eternity*, and not with a part.

93. Hence you may ſee how both ſayings may be true; both that *Eternity* (or *God* and his *Knowledge*) *ever co-exiſteth* with *creatures*, and alſo that it doth *de novo begin* to *co-exiſt*; *viz.* As God is *extrinſecally* denominated from the *real mutation* of the creature related to him; or as the *creature* is denominated *extrinſecally* as related to the *indiviſible God and Eternity*: even as God and the creature are variouſly conſidered towards each other, as the *Relate*, or as the *Terminus*.

94. To clear it by a low ſimilitude; When a Rock in the Sea is the *Relatum*, and the Sea the *Terminus*, it may be ſaid, [*This Rock is the conſtant Companion of the Sea*]: And alſo thence, that [*The Sea is the conſtant companion of the Rock*] the title of *Conſtancy* being thus mutually uſed, but in a various ſenſe. So when the *Sea* is the *Relatum*, and the *Rock* is the *Terminus*, it may be ſaid, that [*The rolling Waves paſs by the Rock as its unconſtant companions*] And conſequently, that [*The Rock is an unconſtant Companion of the Waves.*] So you may ſay, that [the *Eternal God* or *Eternity* doth *indiviſibly co-exiſt* with the temporary creature, or with *time*;] and thence that [the temporary creature or Time doth co-exiſt with *indiviſible eternity.*] And yet that [the *tranſient creature doth tranſitorily co-exiſt with God*] and ſo that [*God doth but temporarily co-exiſt with the tranſitory creature*]; as the reaſon of the denomination is variouſly fetcht in.

95. In like manner *quoad locum* it may be ſaid, that [*the finite creature doth limitedly* co-exiſt with God] and ſo, that [God as the *Terminus* of the creatures exiſtence, doth *limitedly* co-exiſt with the creature]. But alſo that [the Infinite God doth immenſely co-exiſt with the finite creature] and [the finite creature doth co-exiſt with Immenſity.]

96. † But note 1. That as the denominations of a univerſal may be better diſtributed and reſtrained by its relation to particulars, than particulars can be denominated like the univerſal; ſo it is here unfitter to give the attribute of God relatively to the creature, than to ſpeak of God as Relatively limited to the creature. And therefore it is more unfit to ſay that the creature co-exiſteth [*eternally* and *immenſely*] with God, than that God co-exiſteth [*temporarily* and *limitedly*] with the creature in relation. 2. That the moſt proper expreſſion is to fetch the attribute from the Nature of the ſubject, rather than borrowedly from the correlate: And ſo it is fitteſt to ſay, that [The Eternal and Immenſe God doth co-exiſt Eternally and Immenſely with the *Tranſitory, finite creature*]; And that [the creature doth *Tranſitorily* and *finitely* co-exiſt with the *Eternal Immenſe God*].

97. As

* Card. Sarnan. Concil. Th. & Scoti, p. 22. inquit, *Deus per ſuam æternitatem ſine aliqua ſucceſſione ſui eſt omnibus præſens: ſed non ſine ſucceſſione rerum. Ideoque omnia quæ ſunt, fuerunt & erunt, coexiſtunt in æternitate, & habent etiam eſſe cognitum in mente divina. Et ideo bene dicunt* & Thomas & Scotus.

† This ſuppoſeth (with *Vict. Hurtad.* and other Nominals,) that God is Related to the creature, and that *Scotus* his anſwer to *Aquinas* reſting on the contrary ſuppoſition, that only the creature is Related, is therefore vain.

Ægid. Roman. Quodl. 3. q. 3. pag. 135. *Totus decurſus rerum eſt Deo præſens: Ideo circa hoc non fallitur; ſive ſit neceſſarium ſive contingens: cum infallibilitas divinæ cognitionis non det rebus neceſſitatem, nec tollat à contingentibus contingentiam: Futura ſunt præſentia præſcientiæ Divinæ*, &c.

For this co-exiſtence, ſee *Ricard. in* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 3. & *d.* 39. *q.* 1. *a.* 1. *Capreol.* 1. *d.* 36. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. & *d.* 38. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Ferrar. cont. Gent.* 1. *c.* 66. *Cajet.* 1. *q.* 14. *a.* 13. On the contrary, ſee *Alenſ.* 1. *p. q.* 23. *in* 4. *a.* 3. *Bonavent.* 1. *d.* 39. *a.* 2. *q.* 3. *Scot. ib. q.* 1. *Diſt. q.* 3. *n.* 12. *Greg. q.* 2. *a.* 2. *Gabr.* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Marſil. in Thom. Vaſqu. in* 1. *Th. q.* 14. *a.* 3. *d.* 64. *c.* 2. 4.

97. As *Time* is no *Real being*, but the *Duration* of *Beings*, which is nothing but their *Exiſtence* not ceaſing; ſo *Eternity* is *nothing really diſtinct from God himſelf*; but it is Gods exiſtence conſidered as having no meaſure of duration, no beginning, no middle, no parts of duration and no End.

98. *Eternity* therefore is a Notion which may be called *Indiviſible* and *Diviſible* in ſeveral reſpects. It is *Indiviſible* properly and in it ſelf conſidered; for it is nothing but God himſelf as exiſting *ſine menſura temporis* perfectly and indiviſibly: But it may be called *Diviſible Intellectually* (by humane, partial or inadequate conception; not by partition), as it is compared to tranſitory time; and becauſe as mans narrow head muſt know one God *ſuo modo* by many inadequate conceptions, or not at all, ſo muſt he know Eternity *ſuo modo*, by conceptions drawn from partible Time.

99. By this much the great Objections of the *Scotiſts* may be ſatisfied by a Conciliation: They ſay, 1. That which exiſteth not, doth not co-exiſt; nor God with it. 2. That Eternity indeed includeth all Time ſucceſſively as preſent in it; but not future Time. To the firſt I anſwer, 1. That it is granted that Time hath ſucceſſions, and only the preſent Inſtant is: And that which *Is not*, co-exiſteth not with Eternity: But yet ſeeing Eternity is Indiviſible, it is not part of it that co-exiſteth with one of our Inſtants and part with another; but All indiviſibly with each inſtant. 2. And when it is ſaid, That the Creature exiſted not *ab æterno*, if you intellectually divide Eternity into *paſt* and *preſent* and *future*, like Time, it's true: But ſpeaking properly, it is fallacious: For [*Ab*] *æterno* implyeth a diviſion of Eternity, and a preterition of one part, which is commonly ſuppoſed falſe. But if the denomination be fetcht from *Eternity*, ſeeing it is Indiviſible, you cannot ſay that to day it co-exiſteth with this day, and not with to morrow, for if ever it co-exiſteth, it alwayes co-exiſteth: For, *ab & ad, & ante & poſt, & fuit & erit*, are words of falſhood ſpoken properly of Eternity (according to the commoneſt doctrine.)

100. And to the ſecond the ſame anſwer ſerveth; Denominating Time in it ſelf, you may ſay that ſome is *future*, that is, *Is not*, but *will be*, and ſo that it is not In Eternity till it come. But fetching the *Name* from Indiviſible Eternity, *Future* there is a word of falſe importance: There is no *Futurity* in *Eternity*. And it Indiviſibly includeth all ſucceſſions of our Time.

101. Yet we lay no ſtreſs on any of this as neceſſary to reconcile our Controverſies: And we readily acknowledge and maintain, that by *Extrinſick denomination* from its *Relation* to our *ſucceſſive Inſtants*, *Eternity* and *God* himſelf may have *new* and *various* denominations (of which more anon).

SECT. VII.

Of School Curioſities and Uncertainties about Gods Knowledge.

102. ABout *Gods Knowledge* Scholaſtical preſumption hath gone ſo far, as that I ſhould rather with trembling fly from their queſtions, than ſeek to ſolve them, if the oppoſition of their curioſity and the defence of truth, were not by them made neceſſary to others, and conſequently ſome conſideration of the thing.

103. Some preſume to tell us, that God knoweth Creatures only in his own

Arriaga in Capitol. 1. art. 35.

own Eſſence, and not in themſelves, which muſt needs be falſe, if the Creatures are in themſelves Intelligible: Becauſe Gods perfection importeth the knowledge of all that is intelligible.

Vid. *Rad. tr. 1. Com. 23. ar. 1. p. 452.* Vid. *Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. p. 1. d. 1. q. 14. p. 3. Suar. de attrib. l. 3. c. 2. & 3. Rad. ib. p. 453, 454. Vet. Aquil. 1. diſ. 35. Lombard. 1. d. 36. Henr. 1. d. 5. Agid. 1. q. 3. Greg. Arim. 1. q. 1. Gabr. 1. q. 3. a. 3. Ruiz. 1. d. 10. Aluiz. Pr. 1. d. 5. & 6. Alarcon. 1. p. diſp. 2. c. 3. &c. Granad. 1. p. contr. 2. tr. 3, 4.*

104. Others tell us on the contrary, that God knoweth the Creatures only in *themſelves*, and not in his own Eſſence: But doubtleſs ſo far as they may be ſaid to *be* in his Eſſence, (which is at leaſt Virtually) they are there intelligible.

105. *Scotus* with his followers hold that Gods Intellect hath two Objects, one *Primary, immediate*, and *motive*, by virtue of which all other things are known; and this is Gods Eſſence. The other *ſecondary, mediate*, and *not motive, but terminative*, and ſuch is the Creature; known only in Gods Eſſence, as *per aliud prius cognitum in quo continetur, & non per propriam ſpeciem.* But here they are at the greateſt loſs.

106. For to the Queſtion, *How the Creature is in God*, their neceſſary Ignorance bewrayeth it ſelf by their diviſions. It is agreed that all things were eternally in God as in the firſt cauſe *virtually* and *eminently*. But ſay ſome, The ſame numerical perfections are in God, as in the Creatures, *viz.* Infinitely in God, and finitely in the Creatures: But this maketh God and the Creature to be One, and deifieth Creatures.

107. This they are put to, for the ſolving of that great difficulty, *Whether God and the Univerſe conjunct contain more Entity* or *perfection intenſively* or *extenſively than God alone, and the Worlds* Being add *any Entity beſides Deity?*

108. They that are for the Negative, judge it blaſphemy to ſay, that God alone is *Leſs* than God and the World; For he ſeemeth not to be of Infinite Entity to whom any thing can be added. The queſtion is not Whether the World add any Divine Being to God, but any *Being* at all be ſo ſuperadded, as that God is made a *Part* of the Univerſe. And I confeſs that *Pars*, and *toto minor*, are words that I dare not apply to God.

ubi ſupr. p. 454, 455. So Bradwardine is hard put to anſwer his *Seminator verborum, li. 1. c. 7. p. 184.* that ſaith, The number of things to God is finite: and to finite ſomewhat may be added: *Ergo* to Gods knowledge ſomewhat may be added (which drove *Vaſquez* to aſſert Infinite intelligibles.) But plainly Gods knowledge is Infinite in knowing himſelf: But not as terminated on finite creatures.

109. On the other ſide, ſaith *Rada*, Though Intenſively nothing is added to God, yet *Extenſively* we muſt ſay, that *entity* and *perfection* in the Creature is ſo added, as that God and the Creature are *More* than God alone; *becauſe elſe we muſt ſay, either that God and the World are one*, or *elſe that the World is Nothing, or hath no Being:* which is falſe.

110. Who dare venture on either of theſe dangerous conſequences; either that God is but a *Part* of *Entity* and *Leſs than All*, and ſo not Infinite; or that the World is *God* or *Nothing?* If we ſhould ſay, that the *Entity* of the Creature being but *Analogical Entity*, is *no Addition* to Gods being, *Ens non dicitur Univoce de Deo & Creaturis*; as the *Scotiſts* deny the antecedent, ſo it hardly ſatisfieth the mind: Becauſe even this *Analogical Entity* is real poſitive *Entity*, and not *nothing*: And therefore though it add not *Deity*, it ſeemeth to add *Entity*; and both ſorts to be more than *One alone.*

The witty Dr. *Fairfax* in his Book of the *Bulke of the world*, ſaith It is *aliquid Dei*; and ſo do all men that confeſs a God: and *Pet. Hurtado* and many others prove that it is no diſhonor to God to have Real Relations, which we call Accidents, as is afore noted.

111. And if we ſhould ſay, that the *World* is an *Accident of God*, (as *a mans* hair is of a man, ſuppoſing it were voluntarily Cauſed by him); And that it is no imperfection in God to have *Accidents*, as long as his *Eſſence* is no *Accident*, nor *Compounded*; And ſo that the World is *no part of God, Eſſential* or *Integral*; but being an *Accident* it is no Addition of *Entity to God*; Becauſe as the word [*Man*] or [*Peter*] includeth not only his *Parts*, but his *hair* as an *Accident*, ſo the word [*God*] may include the *World* as an Accident: This would be judged novel, bold, preſumptuous, and is not fully ſatisfactory, had it no ill conſequents.

112. The only way therefore is to confeſs our Ignorance, and that it muſt needs be that the mind which cannot comprehend Gods Immenſe

Eternal

Eternal Eſſence, muſt be unable to ſolve ſuch queſtions as imply ſuch a comprehenſion: And it were well if mens experience of their utter incapacity to underſtand ſome ſuch Caſes, would warn them more cautelouſly to meddle with others.

113. The *Scotiſts* doctrine is laid down by *Rada* in theſe Concluſions; 1. *Deus cognoſcit alia à ſe.* 2. *Cognoſcit omnia perfectiſſime.* 3. *Non cognoſcit alia à ſe per repræſentationem & motionem quam ipſa de ſe faciunt.* 4. *Creatura non eſt objectum primarium & immediatum Divinæ cognitionis.* 5. *Sed tale eſt Divina eſſentia.* 6. *Diſtinctam tamen aliorum habet Cognitionem.* 7. *Deus cognoſcit creaturas in ſua eſſentia.* 8. *Cognoſcit res in ſe ipſis & propriis earum naturis, ſi fiat determinatio cognitionis ex parte rei cognitæ.* In all this it ſeemeth to me to be overbold preſumption to conclude, 1. That God knoweth not the Creature *immediately*: And the reaſon he giveth is as bold, *quia tunc vileſceret Divinus intellectus.* None of this can be proved, though I preſume not to aſſert the contrary. Yet it ſeemeth to us that the Creature is *Quid intelligibile in ſe immediate*, and that it is the perfection of God to know all that is intelligible, and not a vilifving of him. As it is no vilifying of his Power to *make* every thing as it is. The Creature no doubt is not the *Primary* intelligible object: But whether it be not *Immediately Intelligible in ſe* is the doubt.

Vaſquez in 1. Thom. q. 14. diſp. 80. *Præſcientia eſt ipſa ſubſtantia Dei, quæ aliàs Cognitio eſt creaturarum poſſibilium, addito reſpectu ſolum rationis ad res futuras; quarum dicitur ſcientia: Ita ut ſi res futuræ non eſſent, Deo quidem deeſſet præſcientia, ſed non ſcientia: & ſi res futuræ non eſſent, non eſſet in Deo libera Voluntas, quæ ſignificatur cum illo reſpectu libero: eſſet tamen Voluntas Complacentiæ, ipſa viz. eſſentia divina cum reſpectu rationis neceſſario ad res poſſibiles.* Ita & Ferrarienſ. c. 75.

2. And it ſeemeth to me a preſumption to ſay, that elſe the *Creature would move* the *Divine Intellect*, and that God as the *object* moveth his own Intellect as agent; For *Moving* ſignifieth *Cauſing*, and there is in God (ſay all Divines) no *Effects*, and therefore no Cauſing of them; and ſo no ſuch *moving*.

114. It is alſo an agitated Controverſie with them, Whether it be Gods *Eſſence as ſuch* which the Creatures are Repreſented and known in, or in his *Knowledge* it ſelf as ſuch? They that are for the former ſay, that the Creature is repreſented in the Divine Eſſence before it is known (as in a glaſs) becauſe the object is preſuppoſed to the act: ſaith *Cajetan*, the Ruder ignorant ſort thus imagine. The ſecond opinion is thus delivered by *Rada*, *Res non continentur in Divina Eſſentia ut prior eſt cognitione actu & formaliter; nec ibi repræſentantur actu & diſtincte.* 2. *Creaturæ in Divina Eſſentia non prius habent eſſe repræſentatum actu & formaliter, quam intelliguntur.* 3. *Creatura (formaliter loquendo ſecundum quod aliquid dicitur formaliter intelligibile) non prius habet intelligibile quam intelligatur; ſed per intellectionem habet primum eſſe actuale & formale, & proprium expreſſum & repræſentatum.* And their ſimilitude is, that as mans mind doth not preſuppoſe *ſecond notions* (*Genus, ſpecies, &c.*) but *make* them, ſo doth God the Creature as *intelligible intelligendo*.

Cajet. 1. *p. q.* 14. *art.* 5.

Rad. li. 1. *contr.* 29. *art.* 2. *pag.* 460.

Scot. in 2. *d.* 1. *q.* 1. *lit. H.*

115. This leadeth them to another doubt, Whether the Creatures have from Eternity an *eſſe reale* diſtinct from Gods Eſſence? Where *Henric.* ſaith that they have a true *eſſe reale eſſentiæ, at non exiſtentiæ*, becauſe *omne poſſibile eſt ens reale*; & eſt in *genere, &c.* Thus do men play with the notions of their own brains. *Scotus* confuteth this by ſeven arguments, which is eaſily done.

Henr. (*refer. Scoto. in* 1. *d.* 36.) *quodlib.* 8. *q.* 9. & *q.* 4. 1 & 2.

Scot. 1. *d.* 36.

Vid. *Th. Waldenſ. de antiq. fid. l.* 1. *c.* 8. *cont. Wiclef.*

116. But their next doubt is greater, *Whether the Creatures have from eternity an* eſſe intelligibile & cognitum *diſtinct from Gods eſſence?* What the *eſſe Cognitum* is, whether it be *ens reale* or *rationis* or *quid medium? Scotus* is the Author of this notion of *eſſe cognitum* as an *eſſe formale & proprium quod creatura habet diſtinctum ab eſſe ſuæ Cauſæ; in quo in Divino intellectu creaturæ ipſæ per intellectionem producuntur*; e.g. *Lapidem in eſſe cognito producit, ſicut intellectus noſter ſecundas intenti-*

tiones facit, & ita rebus ipſis eſſe cognitum tribuit : nam ſicut lapis viſus per viſionem habet eſſe viſum, ita lapis cognitus per cognitionem eſſe cognitum habet —— ſed ut primum ejus eſſe, per quod eſſe formale habent —— Imo eſſe rerum Poſſibile in eſſe cognito fundatur. Who can read ſuch preſumptuous aſſertions of the unknown mode of Divine Intellection without dread? And what a *dance* and *ſhew* is here made of meer *words*, while a Creature that is no Creature, is ſaid to have an *eſſe* which is no *eſſe* (of them) and ſo confeſſed? For (though *Cajetan* and others miſtook him,) *Scotus* confeſſeth that this *eſſe cognitum non eſt ens reale, nec medium inter ens reale & rationis, ſed eſt ens rationis purum, & omnino nihil, contra ens reale diſtinctum, ita, quod nullatenus aliquid realitatis habet.* And is not here then a preſumptuous play with words? *Scotus* thus explaineth it. If *Cæſar* were annihilated, and the ſtatue of him remained, *Cæſar* would have an *Eſſe repræſentatum* in the ſtatue, which is neither an *eſſe eſſentiæ vel exiſtentiæ* total or partial. And ſaith *Rada, Ex his manifeſte colligitur eſſe cognitum Creaturæ in Deo ſecundum Scotum eſſe omnino nihil, prout nihil opponitur enti reali ſive eſſentiæ ſive exiſtentiæ, —— & non magis eſſe nihil Chimæram quam hominem in eſſe cognito, quia utriq; ineſt negatio totius entis.* And indeed the *eſſe repræſentatum Cæſaris* is nothing but the *modus ſtatuæ*, which *per modum ſigni* is apt to bring the ſhape of *Cæſar* to the beholders imagination. And 1. Can they prove any ſuch Modifications of God? 2. And if they can, ſhould they ſo abuſe words as to call that *modus Intellectus Divini*, an *eſſe primum formale creaturæ* diſtinct from God? The ſum of the Scotiſts opinion is thus expreſſed by *Rada Eſſe cognitum creaturæ eſt ens Rationis, ſolum habens eſſe in intellectu Divino objectivè, ſicut ſecundæ intentiones in intellectu creato —— ſed res in eſſe cognito non eſt objectum motivum ſed terminativum ſecundarium.* 1. As if God had any *objectum motivum!* 2. Or as if we poor mortals knew that God hath *entia Rationis!* Though we confeſs that we may ſo ſpeak of him after the manner of men; if we confeſs the great impropriety of the ſpeech.

Scot. 1. *d.* 43. *l. D. & d.* 36. *l. M. Rada l.* 1. *Cont.* 29. *art.* 3. *p.* 466.

Vid. *Rad.* ib.

Scot. 1. *d.* 36. *q. unic. lit. G.*

Rad. ubi ſup. pag. 467.

Ib. p. 468.

117. From hence ariſeth another Controverſie, Whether to Gods underſtanding the Creatures, there be neceſſarily pre-required in him diſtinct relations to the objects? which I will not trouble you with their agitation of.

118. But the great Controverſie is of the Divine Idea's; eſpecially *Whether the Creature as in* Eſſe cognito *be a Divine Idea? Aquinas* denyeth it, * and ſaith that an *Idea* is *the Divine Eſſence as imitable by the Creature. Scotus, Gabr. Ockam, Gerſon, &c.* affirm it. *Aquinas* his opinion is thus opened by *Cajetan, Rada* and others, 1. *Idea non ſignificat ſolum fundamentum imitabilitatis.* 2. *Nec tantum reſpectum imitabilitatis.* 3. *Sed utrumque.* 4. *Eſſentia Divina cognita ut imitabilis à Creatura per modum exemplaris eſt Idea.* 5. *In Deo eſt idearum multitudo.* 6. *Multitudo idearum in Deo non eſt multitudo rerum reipſa inter ſe, & ab eſſentia diſtinctarum.* 7. *Nec multitudo rationum formalium, ſive rerum formaliter diſtinctarum.* 8. *Sed eſt multitudo rationum intellectarum.* 9. *Non diſtinguuntur ratione per actum intellectus creati. Idearum multitudo eſt multitudo rationum à Deo intellectarum.*

* *Aq.* 1. *p. q.* 15. *art.* 1.
† *Scot.* 1. *d.* 35. *q. unica. &* 36. *Gabr.* 1. *d.* 35. *q.* 5. *Gerſon l. vit. ſpir. animæ. Left.* 2. *Corol.* 12.
See in *Pennot. l.* 3. *c.* 9. *p.* 114. *&c.* the four different opinions about Idea's, and the doubtfulneſs of them.

119. The Scotiſts think *Auguſtine* of their mind, and give us their ſence in theſe concluſions, of *Rada*, 1. *Ideas, hoc eſt, rationes in mente Divina collocatas tam Græci quam Latini tradiderunt.* 2. *Idea non eſt Divina eſſentia ſecundum ſe & abſolute ſumpta.* 3. *Non eſt quid aggregatum ex eſſentia & reſpectu imitabilitatis.* 4. *Non includit in ſua ratione reſpectum rationis nec tanquam aliquid ſibi eſſentiale, nec tanquam*

Auguſt. Queſt. l. 83. *q.* 46. *Scot.* 1. *d.* 35. *q. unica. Rada l.* 1. *cont.* 29. *art.* 5. *p.* 497, 498, *&c.*

modum

modum intrinſecum. 5. *Idea in mente Divina eſt ipſamet creatura cognita.* And *Scotus* his definition is, *Idea eſt ratio æterna & incommutabilis in mente Divina, ſecundum quam aliquid eſt formabile extra tanquam ſecundum propriam rationem ejus.*

Vid. *Durand. in* 1. *d.* 36. *q.* 2, 3. *De Ideis* vid. *Itiam Bonav.* 1. *d.* 36. *q.* 1. *Richad. m.* 1. *d.* 35. *q.* 4. *Aquil. Scotel. in.* 1. *d.* 36. *q.* 1. (who ſeemeth dubious of his Maſters doctrine.) *pag.* 240. *&* *q.* 2. *Vide diverſitatem opinionum de qu. Quorum ſunt Ideæ.*

120. By this you ſee how widely they are diſagreed what an Idea is in God: And yet they conclude (as *Rada ib. p.* 480.) *neminem niſi his intellectis ſapientem eſſe: Nam quamvis Deus* Opt. Max. *ex cognitione ſuæ eſſentiæ ſit Infinite ſapiens, ac proinde ex cognitione Idearum non efficiatur ſapientior intenſive, attamen ſi Ideas, quarum ratio incommutabilis eſt, ignoraret, non eſſet Omniſcius. Et Art.* 3. *p.* 470. he ſaith, [*Deus eſſe nequit ſine Ideis.*] We all grant that *without* the *Knowledge* of all things Intelligible, God cannot be, nor *be Omniſcient.* But the name of *Idea's* is fetcht from mans mode of Intellection, which is ever conjunct with ſomewhat of Imagination or ſenſe; which alſo ſeemeth included in our notion of Ideas, which therefore are uſually called *Images* or *Species.* And as we are moſt certain that Intellection in God both in the *form* and *mode* doth ſo Infinitely tranſcend and differ from humane Intellection, as that it is not the ſame thing; ſo we are very unfit in this woful darkneſs to talk ſo peremptorily of things unknown, and to conclude that God hath not a more perfect knowledge of things, than by Idea's, or any thing fitly ſo called. The world therefore ſhould not be troubled with ſuch preſumptions.

121. The next doubt among them is of *Future Contingents, Whether* and *how they are known* of God. That they are known of him is paſt doubt: But *how* is the great difficulty. *Aquinas* his mind is thus expreſſed by *Rada, Concl.* 1. *Futura Contingentia prout ſunt in ſuis cauſis indeterminatis, ſolum conjecturali cognitione cognoſci poſſunt.* 2. *Futura contingentia in ſeipſis poſſunt certa & infallibili cognitione cognoſci.* 3. *Deus non cognoſcit præciſe futurum contingens, prout eſt in ſuis cauſis indeterminatis.* 4. *Deus cognoſcit futura contingentia ut præſentia in ſua reali & actuali exiſtentia, quæ eis convenit extra ſuas cauſas.* 5. *Deus certa & infallibili cognitione præſcit futura contingentia.* *Rad. ibid. art.* 3. *p.* 494.

122. The mind of *Scotus* he thus expreſſeth, after many notes and diſtinctions. 1. *Deus cognoſcit omnia futura contingentia quoad omnes conditiones exiſtentiæ eorum, ſic, quod quæcunque eis in tempore contingenter inſunt, perfecte ab æterno attingit.* 2. *Deus non cognoſcit certò & determinatè futura contingentia per hoc quod ſunt ſibi in æternitate præſentia.* (Should I here recite you the reaſons by which he and other *Scotiſts* and Dr. *Twiſſe* do propugn this aſſertion, and thoſe by which *Cajetan* and many *Thomiſts* do oppugn it, I ſhould tire you. It ſhall ſuffice to ſay that both ſides talk in the dark of that which is utterly above mans reach). 3. *Certitudo Divinæ eſſentiæ reſpectu omnium quantum ad omnes conditiones exiſtentiæ, non habetur per ideas.* (This alſo is on both ſides tediouſly diſputed in the dark). 4. *Qui noſſet cauſas naturales futurorum, etiam eorum quæ neceſſarias cauſas habent, ut Solis, Lunæq; defectiones, non proinde infallibilem eorum notitiam aſſequeretur, niſi determinationem divinæ voluntatis circa hujuſmodi eventus cognoſceret.* (That's true, becauſe they are all but dependent ſecond Cauſes). 5. *Deus cognoſcit futura contingentia certo & infallibiliter; quia Divina eſſentia ut ratio cognoſcendi repræſentat divino intellectui rem determinate futuram ex determinatione divinæ voluntatis.* And this is *Scotus* his way, which Dr. *Twiſſe* propugneth. *Id. ib. ad. pag.* 504.

123. Here *Scotus* ſuppoſeth things to lye in this order in the Divine Intellect, [1. The *Divine Eſſence* moveth the Divine *intellect* to *know it* *Scot. Quodlib. q.* 14. *Litter. S. & T.*

ſelf, and all that is *formally* in it. 2. To the ſimple Intellection of all that is *Intelligible*, as abſtracting from exiſtence, or any order to it. 3. To the knowledge of all neceſſary copulations, which are known by connexion of terms, and this naturally and neceſſarily before the wills determination: becauſe they are not True becauſe God willeth it, but antecedently formally of themſelves. But not ſo to the Knowledge of contingent copulations, *&c.*] How eaſie were it to open much uncertainty and figment in theſe bold aſſertions?

Vid. *Rad. ib. p.* 497, 496. Vid. *Ruiz de Vol. Dei diſp.* 16. *ſect.* 5. *p.* 173. Citing abundance of Schoolmen as holding *etiam nunc poſſe Deum efficere ut non voluerit aut prædeſtinaverit nec præſcierit*; and ſome ſaying yet more, *nunc eſſe poſſibile per potentiam abſolutam, ut non fuerit facta revelatio de futuris Dei operibus.* Is not this profane boldneſs with the moſt holy God?

124. And here a great deal of diſpute there is about the *Liberty* of *Gods will*, and the *nature* of *contingency*. Some *Thomiſts*, (whom our *weſtminſter* Aſſembly follow, but it ſhould not have been put into a Confeſſion of faith) ſay that nothing is to be called *Contingent* in reſpect of God. But the *Scotiſts* contrarily ſay that there could be no contingency if it were not firſt from Gods free will: and that he freely and contingently made all the world: All Actions being either naturally neceſſary or contingent; And if God had made all of natural neceſſity, they had been eternal.

125. And here they ſay that Gods will hath firſt a Liberty of contradiction, (to *will* or not *will.*) 2. And a Liberty *to divers* objects, (which I call of competition or compariſon) yea and to will contrary objects by the ſame act. 3. But not a Liberty to *contrary Acts* (*Velle & nolle*) becauſe that would be mutability.

126. And here many maxims are uſed by them as ſufficient to anſwer all objectors, which yet are ambiguous or uncertain themſelves. 1. One is, that *God receiveth not the certainty of his Knowledge from the Creatures: And therefore if their preſent co-exiſtence in eternity were proved*, it would *no whit clear the doubts*, or *help* the *Thomiſts*, who are here at a loſs for a ſufficient anſwer. My buſineſs is to ſide with neither, but to deterr the Reader from the preſumption of both parties; and to that end, to open the uncertainty of what they ſay. And ſo it is enough to anſwer, that As the Creature in being is no addition to Gods being or perfection, ſo to *Know* the *Creature* is not any addition to Gods *Knowledge* or *perfection*; but only the terminative acting of his perfect Knowledge *ad extra*. And that their word [*Receiveth*] hath a falſe ſuppoſition. For God *Receiveth* no Knowledge (though mans knowledge be partly Receiving); but the Infinite Light of his Intellect is emitted knowingly to the Creature. So that Gods knowledge may be terminated on Creatures, and thence denominated This or That knowledge without Reception.

* See the marginal citation, *ſect.* 16. out of *Pet. Alliac. Cam.* who giveth three reaſons againſt *Scotus* his making Gods *Volition* to be the reaſon of his *knowing future contingents*, 1. Becauſe it falſly ſuppoſeth priority and poſteriority in God. 2. Becauſe it maketh Gods intellect *in primo inſtanti* to be neutral *de futuritione*, and ſo in that inſtant *daretur medium in contradictione.* 3. Becauſe it falſly ſuppoſeth one Act of God to be a *medium & ratio* of another. Therefore he concludeth, 1. That the caſe is unſearchable. 2. But moſt probably *Intellectualis & æternus Dei oculus eſt quædam Intuitio quæ immediate ſuper quamlibet rem actualiter vel potentialiter exiſtentem ſimul fertur: Ideo tam circa futura quam præſentia vel præterita omnium contingentium veritatum certum habet judicium: & divina Intuitio eſt talis immutabilem judicium.*

127. Another maxime is that of *Auguſtine*, *Non aliter facta quam fienda novit*, and no *new mode* of *Knowledge is to be imagined in God*: which both ſides make uſe of. To which I ſay, that nothing can be called Gods Knowledge, but either his *Eſſential Intellection*, or the *termination* of it on the Creature. The firſt is never changed: But the ſecond, ſay the Nominals, is but an extrinſick denomination of it from the various terminating objects: And whether you will call them terminations, or Relations, or *denominations*, they may be *New* and *various* (of which more anon) without any change or variety in God: even as the Sun is not changed by the various Receptions or terminations of its influx here below.

128. * Another maxim is, that *God knoweth things* even Intuitively *eternally in himſelf* (*his will*) *when they exiſt not. Anſw.* As Abſtractive and Intuitive are words ſignifying the divers modes of Gods knowing things, they are but preſumptuous figments, for ought I ſee; It being paſt

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mans reach to know the mode of Divine intellection, more than above the reach of a bird or beaſt to know the mode of ours. But as we may more eaſily and ſafely diſtinguiſh and denominate Gods Knowledge from the objects, ſo we may well ſay, 1. That he knoweth not that Creature to exiſt in *nunc temporis* which doth not ſo exiſt. 2. And that *eſſe Volitum* is not *eſſe exiſtens*. And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter.

129. Yea it is here diſputed Whether there be indeed any contingency or not (which the Doctrine of *Hobs* and the Dominican Predeterminants muſt needs exclude, which make all events to be neceſſitated by God). The Reaſons againſt it are, 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth muſt neceſſarily be: but he fore-knoweth all that will be: *ergo*——— 2. All things future are from eternity determined in Gods will to one part of the contradiction: *ergo neceſſario erunt*. 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done, by the phyſical efficient neceſſitating inſuperable predetermination of God the firſt cauſe: *ergo*, there is no place in ſuch neceſſity for contingency (which is a *poſſe tendere ad eſſe vel non eſſe*.)

Read the diſpute of *Pet. Alliac. Cameracen. m.* 1. *q.* 11. *ar.* 3. *R. S.* and *Gregorius* and *Okams* and his own opinion, about the poſſibility of Gods not knowing what he knoweth, and that it is in the power of the Creature to make God not to have known them, and much more ſuch like. I confeſs I tremble to read (not the *falſhood* but) the *boldneſs* and preſumption of ſuch diſputes, as fearing they are prophane.

130. Many and different anſwers are given to theſe, and thoſe of the *Thomiſts* and *Dominicans* are moſtly ſhuffling and vain: But plainly and briefly, 1. Gods fore-knowledge, 2. And his meer *will*, when they are not joyned efficiently with *power*, or a *will de efficiendo*, do no whit at all Cauſe or neceſſitate the effect or event, or *ponere aliquid in objecto*. It is only a *Logical neceſſitas conſequentiæ in ordine probandi* that ariſeth from them, which conſiſteth with contingency, and not a *phyſical* neceſſity *in ordine eſſendi* as from a *Cauſe*, called *conſequentis*, or *effecti*. And, 2. Gods *Knowledge* and *Will* rather *prove contingency*; For he doth not only *know* and *will hoc futurum*, but *hoc contingenter futurum*: Therefore it will be. 3. And the laſt argument from *neceſſitating predetermination* I ſhall elſewhere confute, and ſhew their contradiction who ſay that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to paſs.

Vid. *D'Orbellis in* 1. *d.* 38. *dub.* 1. *Bonaventur.* and (ſaith Dr. *Twiß*) all the Schoolmen ſay the ſame.

131. But it cannot be denyed but that Gods will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event: And therefore that *Neceſſitate exiſtentiæ* the determination of it is eternally neceſſary: And therefore that which we call *Its Liberty* is but the *perfect manner* of its determination, as *Bradwardine* confeſſeth.

132. But what is all this ſtir about? The great buſineſs of all is to ſhew how God *fore-knoweth ſin*. For ſaith *Rada*, *It's eaſie* (from Gods Volition) to ſhew how he knoweth things that are *not ſin*: *but how knoweth he ſin from eternity, ſeeing this was never in eſſe volito?* And here the way of the Scotiſts proveth utterly inſufficient. Dr. *Twiſſe* and *Rutherford* and ſome Dominicans ſay, that God fore-knoweth it, becauſe he *Decreed to Cauſe* all the *Entity* of the Act with all its circumſtances from which the form of ſin is but a reſulting relation. But this ſubverteth Religion. *Rada ibid.* and *Twiſs* oft ſay, he Decreeth to *permit it*, (and that *it ſhall come to paſs ipſo permittente*, ſaith *Twiß*:) *Qua permiſſio* (ſaith *Rada*) *non accipitur in communi, ſed pro eo quod eſt permittere de facto deficere & in peccatum ruere ſubtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus poſitis non foret peccatum. Quare hæc eſt bona conſequentia quantum ad illationem præciſe; Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic & nunc de facto*: ergo, *peccat*: ergo, *valet conſequentia, Deus voluit ab æterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali & tali occaſione oblata: ergo peccabit: Dixi quantum ad Illationem præciſe. Quia quantum ad Cauſalitatem non eſt bona illa conſequentia**. But to paſs by their ſuppoſition of Gods knowing conſequences by argumentation, I ſhall confute all this anon.

Ibid. ar. 3. *p.* 503.

Vid. 1. *d.* 36. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Bonav. ib. q.* 1. *a.* 3. *Durand. ib. q.* 1. *Cajet. Banez, Zumel. Ripa, Gonçal. Molin. Vaſquez, Arrub. Faſol. Aluiz* 1. *p. q.* 14. *a.* 10. *Tannr.* 1. *p. diſp.* 2. *q.* 8. *dub.* 8. *Granad.* 1. *p. Cont.* 2. *d.* 5.

Ibid. art. 3. *p.* 503.

* Vid. *Ruiz de ſcient. d.* 17. *Gr. Valent. p.* 1. *diſp.* 1. *q.* 14. *punct.* 7. *Alarcon.* 1. *p. tr.* 2. *diſp.* 3 & 4.

133. And

Vid. *Aquin.* 1. *p. q.* 14. *art.* 13. *ad secundum. Scot. in* 1. *d.* 39. *q.* 4. *Rad. li.* 1. *Cont.* 30. *art.* 5. *pag.* 310, 311, *&c.* See *Lychet.* Confutation of *Cajetan* and *Ockam* at large in 1. *p. d.* 39. *q.* 1. *fol.* 254. *ad* 258. *Leg. Pennot. li.* 3. *c.* 11 & 12. *p.* 118, 119, *&c.*

133. And here the *Thomists* and *Scotists* have another skuffle, on the question, Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of existency in God, be *Necessary* in him, or free and contingent? The *Thomists* thus conclude, 1. *Si futurum contingens secundum se, & suam propriam naturam consideretur, necessitas nullatenus ei convenire potest, sed sola contingentia.* 2. *Si futurum contingens consideretur secundum quod subest Divinæ scientiæ, est necessarium absolute.* 3. *Hæc propositio, Deus scivit Antichristum futurum, est simpliciter & absolute necessaria: sed hæc consequens,* [Ergo Antichristus erit] *non est absolute necessarium sed contingens, si secundum se consideretur: At ut divinæ scientiæ subest, est absolute necessarium.* 4. *Scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium prout jam ad ipsa est terminata, est simpliciter necessaria.* And they prove the affirmative thus, 1. Gods knowledge is Immutable: therefore necessary. 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection: therefore necessary in God. 3. This *Can* be in God: therefore it necessarily is in him.

134. The *Scotists* thus express their sense, (after much explication), 1. *Futuro contingenti secundum suam propriam naturam considerato nulla necessitas convenire potest.* 2. *Futura contingentia, etiam ut subsunt Divinæ scientiæ, non sunt necessaria.* 3. *Futurum contingens, etiam ut subest Divinæ scientiæ, est quoad esse simpliciter contingens, & secundum quid necessarium.* 4. *Propositio hæc* [Deus scivit Petrum futurum] *sive sit de præsenti, vel de præterito, non est simpliciter necessaria, sed ex suppositione.* 5. *Præfata propositio & omnia futura contingentia, sunt necessaria necessitate immutabilitatis.* 6. *Scientia Dei respectu omnium creaturarum quoad esse existentiæ earum est contingens, & ex suppositione necessaria.* I recite the words of *Rada* only, that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruse too many Authors, and because no man better discusseth the differences. See also his answers to the *Thomists* arguments, *pag.* 514. He that would peruse more, may see them named in *Ripalda lib.* 1. *d.* 38. *&* 37. and may read *Aquin.* 1. *p. d.* 38. *q.* 1. *ar.* 5. *Aureol.* 1. *d.* 38. *ar.* 1. *Ockam & Gabri. ib. q. unic. ar.* 2 *&* 3. *Greg. ib. q.* 2. *Durand. ib. q.* 3. *Fab. d.* 54. *Cajet. Naz. Bannez, Zumel, Gonzal. Arrub. Molin. Vasq. Fasol. m.* 1. *p. q.* 14. *ar.* 3. *Tanner.* 1. *p. d.* 2. *q.* 8. *dub.* 3. *Valent.* 1. *p. d.* 1. *a.* 14. *p.* 3. *Suarez li.* 3. *de Attribut. c.* 2. *Ruiz d.* 10. *Bonavent.* 1. *d.* 39. *Aquil. Scotell. in* 1. *d.* 39. *q.* 2. And on the same a multitude of other known *Scotists*, &c.

Alex. Alens. 1. *p. q.* 23. *memb.* 3. *ar.* 4. *Thom. cont. Gent. c.* 66. *Francis. Mayro.* 1. *p. d.* 38 *&* 39. *Lychet.* 1. *d.* 39. *q.* 1.

135. Should I proceed to open to you all or half the questions about which the *Schoolmens* acutest wits do but dream, concerning the Knowledge and Decrees of God, I should weary my self and the Reader to little purpose; such as, *An scientia actualis aliorum sit de Essentia Dei? An Essentia Dei sit Motivum adæquatum ejus scientiæ? An Deus cognoscat creaturas ex seipso, aut ex alio per discursum? An & quomodo scientia Dei possit dividi in plures? An & quomodo Deus cognoscat Mala? An & quomodo Deus cognoscat negationes & privationes? An Deus cognoscat Entia rationis? An habeat in se Entia Rationis? De scientia Media. An scientia Visionis sit causa futurorum? An futura causa scientiæ? An scientia simplicis intelligentiæ sit causa futurorum & practica? An Deus cognoscat futura componendo & dividendo? An Deus cognoscat præsentia eadem indivisibili cognitione, qua ipsa prænovit futura? An Deus noverit Infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiæ? An eadem cognitione se & creaturas cognoscat? An existente objecto pro solo imperio Voluntatis Divinæ possit non esse in Deo aliquis actus scientiæ divino intellectui possibilis? &c.* with a multitude of lesser questions which arise in the handling of these; And with as many more about Predestination, Gods Decrees or Volitions, Predetermination,

If you would see what the *Thomists* say of these, *Ripalda* will direct you where to find them. And the *Scotists* and *Nominals* being fewer are soon found.

determination, &c. I think rather your patience is put to it ſufficiently already.

136. If you ſay that by reciting theſe difficulties, I do but confound mens underſtandings, rather than elucidate the things in hand, I anſwer, If you are *loſt in them*, I have my end, which is to make you ſenſible how unmeet it is, that the Peace of the Church, and the Concord and Communion of Brethren ſhould at all be laid on ſuch multitudes of difficult and unſearchable things which are many vain, and others paſt mans underſtanding. Shall we call one another by the names of Sects, and reproach our brethren, as for the truth of God, and as if it were for his Glory, till all theſe Controverſies are cleared to us all? I who profeſs them to be beyond my reach, and profeſs my Ignorance of very many of them, am yet cenſured by my Brethren as too Scholaſtically curious for ſo much as naming them, or medling with them; yea, and for deciding caſes which may and muſt be decided: And of all our preſent Miniſters, I am confident there is not one of fifty (if of a hundred) that hath either throughly ſtudied them, or ever will do. Now if the Church muſt have Love and Concord, how will it be had? Of thoſe few (one of a hundred that ſtudy them throughly) ſix men it's like are of three opinions. And what ſhall the ninety nine do that never ſo ſtudied them? Either they muſt know what they never ſtudied, and be in the *Right* where they underſtand not what they ſay: Or elſe they muſt unite by an Implicit faith. And in whom ſhall that be? If the Church, what Church is it? Are not many Churches of many minds? If of the Papal Church, it hath more wit than to decide ſuch Controverſies, ſo that their Doctors are almoſt Sectaries by diviſions to this day.

137. And if any will dream that the Controverſies between the *Calviniſts* and *Lutherans* (or *Arminians*) and the *Dominicans* and *Jeſuits* can be reſolved for either ſide without medling with theſe queſtions, he is a perſon too ignorant to be fit to ſpeak confidently in the Cauſe. Let him but try a diſpute with any able adverſary, and he ſhall be carried to theſe whether he will or not.

138. But if it be one that is ſo confident on either part, as to think that his ſide or opinions are ſo great and clear, as that the contrary are unfit for our toleration, and communion, I muſt be ſo free with him as to ſay, that he bewrayeth ſo great *Ignorance* and *Pride*, as make his own fitneſs for communion much more queſtionable. For is it not moſt odious *Ignorance*, for a man not to know his *own Ignorance* of ſo many myſteries which no mortals know? And is it not loathſome Pride, for men to be ſo confident of theſe falſe conceits, and arrogate to themſelves a knowledge which mans earthly ſtate is uncapable of?

139. And it filleth me with ſhame to find, that (though ſome ſtir hath been lately made againſt the *Janſeniſts*) yet all theſe Sects (*Dominicans*, *Jeſuits*, *Scotiſts*, *Nominals*, &c.) can live in communion notwithſtanding their differences, when yet the Proteſtants have proſecuted the ſame differences with all that bitterneſs, which you may find in the *Germans* Hiſtorians and Divines, (ſuch as *Schluſſelburgius*, *Calovius*, and many more) and in the ſad Hiſtory of the *Low Countreys*, and in *Heylin*'s Life of Archbiſhop *Laud*, and which you may ſtill hear in all parties, in their ignorant cenſures of one another, by the names of *Calviniſts* and *Arminians*. And yet the Church of *Rome* is juſtly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty againſt Diſſenters, when thus we thereby condemn our ſelves.

Nic. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. a. 2. *Poſſet dari una reſponſio generalis ad quæſtiones conſimiles; quod debilitas noſtri intellectus non ſufficit ad indagandum abyſſum judiciorum Divinorum. Nec mirum: cum ad plenum non valeamus cognoſcere modicæ herbæ ſeu minimi vermiculi proprietatem.*

The very ſame hath *Bradwardine*, though a preſumptuous School-man.

See alſo *Vaſquez in* 1. *Thom. q.* 19. *diſp. &c. c.* 2. *pag.* 503, 504. where he fully and freely confeſſeth that our underſtandings are utterly ſtalled about Gods Liberty of Will as related to things future. *Nodus hic mea quidem ſententia inſolubilis eſt; vix enim vitare poſſumus circulum in reddenda ratione: Certiſſima ratione inveſtigare poſſumus quid in hac re non ſit: Quid vero ſit, verbo explicari difficillimum, aut pro hoc ſtatu impoſſibile eſt. Qui autem videt Deum, de ejus Voluntate Liberâ quatenus principium liberum eſt futurorum, longe aliter ſentiet, & unico verbo exprimet ſine hiſce relationibus rationis.* See the reſt there to the ſame purpoſe. And this is the confeſſion of them all: of which more after.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

More of Gods Fore-knowledge, and of Permiſſion of Sin.

140. BUt to leave this Wilderneſs, and ſpeak more of things certain, or ſuch as belong to us in our meaſure to know: It is certainly unknown to mortals, formally, what knowledge is in God (as is aforeſaid), and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents, or any Creatures, *ex parte ſcientis.*

141. If any particular manner therefore offer it ſelf to your minds, as that which probably ſeemeth to be the right, it may afford you reaſon therefore to ſuſpect that it is not the right: Becauſe it is certain that the Manner is paſt our reach. And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God.

142. If the Caſe of *Aarons* Sons, the *Bethſhemites*, *Uzzah*, *Uzziah*, and others that preſumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was ſo dreadful; what is theirs that profanely toſs Gods own Name, and pretend to know that of himſelf, which they know not, and turn his ſecrets profanely into matter of Contention againſt the Churches of Chriſt?

143. Either *Futurity* as ſuch, is Intelligible in it ſelf to God, or elſe the *things future* are Intelligible as in Eternity; or elſe futurity is intelligible only in its Cauſes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in it ſelf, or as things are *In Eternity*, the Controverſie is moſtly ended: The perfection of Gods underſtanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Cauſes, it is either as thoſe Caſes *neceſſarily* will Cauſe, or elſe as freely and contingently. The firſt Cauſe reacheth not our Controverſie: For ſin hath no *neceſſitating* Cauſe, but free. The ſecond is the ſame difficulty with that in queſtion, *viz.* How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cauſe (mans Will) will this or that way determine it ſelf? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cauſe; which hath no antecedent reaſon to prove its future ſelf-determination to this more than to that.

Pennatus propugn. l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth, that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-ſcience with contingency, was quite paſt the power of mans underſtanding in this life, in the opinion of theſe ſubtile Schoolmen, *Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ockam ibid. q. 1. Marſil. 1. q. ac.* How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods Decrees, and moſt of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency?

144. If we go to the *Jeſuites Scientia Media* (as it deſerveth not that name, ſo) it is inſufficient to this uſe. For all thoſe circumſtances in which God fore-knoweth that the will ſhall determine it ſelf, are ſuch as neceſſitate the will ſo to do, or not: If they ſay the firſt, they give away their own cauſe, and the cauſe of Religion (ſpeaking of ſinful Volitions). If the latter, the caſe is ſtill as difficult (and the ſame) as if they had never mentioned thoſe circumſtances or conditional knowledge: *viz.* How God knoweth that a will ſtill free and not neceſſitated will chooſe ſin rather than duty? For from non-neceſſitating circumſtances it followeth not.

Plainly and honeſtly ſaith *Bonaventure*, in few words, in 1. d. 37. q. 2. *Divina Cognitio quia à re non Cauſatur, nec dependet, ideo poteſt eſſe certa de re contingenti.*

145. If we go the way of *Scotus*, and ſay that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his *own will de rerum futuritione*, either that *will* is ſuppoſed to be a *Cauſing efficient will*; or not? If it be, it reacheth not the caſe of ſin, ſeeing Gods will doth cauſe no ſin. But if not, then ſtill the difficulty is the ſame as before, How God that willeth the Event, but cauſeth it not, doth know that his Will ſhall be done? For it is not from the Cauſe to the Effect. To ſay that his own *Immutability* proveth it, is no proof: For if his *Immutability* Cauſe not, the Effect ariſeth not from it: And to ſay that his Omnipotency or Abſolutenes inferreth it, is no proof,

proof, unleſs his Omnipotency Cauſe it. And to ſay that it followeth Logically *Neceſſitate Conſequentiæ*, though not *Cauſally neceſſitate effecti vel conſequentis*, that what *God willeth to be, ſhall be*, is moſt certain: And ſo is it from his fore-knowledge (which *medium* yet the *Scotiſts* ſay is here inſufficient.) But that is becauſe it is here ſuppoſed that what God ſo knoweth or willeth to be future, he willeth to be future by the cauſation of ſome Cauſe: for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cauſe. Beſides that ſtill ſin is not willed by him to be future at all.*

146. And here I am to confute the foreſaid reaſon of *Rada* (recited *Theſ.* 130.) *God*, ſaith he, fore-knoweth ſin, in that he knoweth that he decreeth to *permit it*. And Dr. *Twiſs* often ſaith, that all confeſs, that *Permiſſion certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted*. I anſwer; † There is not ſo much as any great appearance of the Truth of the conſequence unleſs limited. To Permit is nothing but *non-impedire*, not to hinder. And if a thing will come to paſs becauſe it is not hindered, then the world would have been made without God, and man ſaved without God, if he would not hinder it. Try if your work will be done meerly by your not hindering it.

147. Indeed the word *Permiſſion* is oft uſed as a complicate notion, ſignifying both the *permiſſion* and the *event permitted*: But that's nothing to the nature of proper permiſſion it ſelf.

148. A man may be hindered, 1. Morally; and that 1. By Commands, 2. By Threats, 3. By Promiſe and perſwaſion; 4. By Gifts; 5. By terrifying ſtripes on himſelf or others. In all theſe reſpects God *permitteth not* ſin, but hindereth it by them all.

149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Phyſically. And that 1. *By total reſtraint* and *diſabling*, 2. Or by leſſer impediments which make not the act impoſſible, but difficult. God doth not alwayes thus hinder ſin, and therefore thus he *permitteth* it. He doth not *diſable* the ſinner, *e. g.* to lie: And he doth not alwayes render it *difficult* to him. But it followeth not neceſſarily, that this will be done, becauſe it's *poſſible*; no nor becauſe it is *eaſie* or not *difficult* to be *done*.

150. * But the Caſe differeth as to permitting of a *propenſe agent*, and an indifferent *agent*, and a *contrarily diſpoſed* agent. To permit a ſtone to aſcend, will not make it aſcend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a ſtone in the Air to fall, I think with *Durandus*, is enough to make it fall, ſuppoſing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumſtances. And ſo is it in permitting ſome ſinners to ſin.

151. But yet here we muſt diſtinguiſh, 1. Between a neceſſary and a free agent, 2. Between *Adams* ſinning and ours; 3. And between the ſin of a man ſtrongly inclined or but weakly, or that hath many diſſwaſions or but few. 1. Though a bad man be under a moral neceſſity of ſinning in the general, that is, of not living innocently, yet he is not under a neceſſity of committing every ſin that he committeth: nor is it a valid conſequence, He is a bad man: *Ergo* he will do this, and that, and the other Sin: Becauſe a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits. 2. And ſome Sinners have ſo great impediments in ſinning, that they ſtand long in *æquilibrio* before the act. 3. And *Adam* had no more propenſity to his firſt ſin, than to the contrary: So that bare *permiſſion* will not inferr the Certainty of all ſin, at leaſt; and therefore will not here ſerve turn.

152. But ſaith *Rada*, it is not common permiſſion, but alſo *a withdrawing of effectual helps againſt ſin. Anſw.* 1. God did not ſo by *Adam* at firſt. 2. But are *ſufficient* or *neceſſary helps* alſo withdrawn, as well as *effectual*? If ſo, then *Adam* was as much neceſſitated to ſin by God, as he was to dye

*See in *Alliaco* after cited the notable reaſons by which the *Nominals* confute *Scotus* in this opinion (which yet Dr. *Twiſſe Præf. ad l. de ſcient. Med.* ſaith did firſt invite him to School-divinity.)

†This alſo *Annatus de Scient. Media cont. Twiſſ.* granteth him *cap.* 5. §. 1. But not as *ex ratione permiſſionis*, but by hypothetical Connotation, Becauſe we uſe the word Permiſſion about that which *aliunde* will be if permitted. So that it is a Compound notion, when thus uſed.

*Ruiz. *de prædet. Tr.* 2. *diſp.* 12. §. 1, 2. *p.* 172. ſo defineth Permiſſion as I conſeſs ſo it is poſitively decreed: viz. (*Increatam permiſſionem Deus non prædefinit*) *Creata permiſſio ſimul complectitur quarundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus poſitis peccatum permittitur*. And if by permiſſion they will mean *quid poſitivum*, it muſt have a poſitive Will and Cauſe; but what's that to the Negative, or meer *non impedire*? (Thus ſtill all our wranglings ſhall be but about ambiguous words.) His reaſon §. 2. is, Permiſſion of ſin is good: 1. *Negatio Volitionis efficacis qua Deus impediret peccatum*. (And he ſaid that *permiſſio increata* is not decreed.) 2. *Negatio motivorum, &c.* 3. *Productio & conſtitutio circumſtantiarum.* 4. *Generalis concurſus. Anſ.* 1. Nothing is not Good: meer Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denyal and reſtraints) are ſomething, and have a Cauſe. 3. Production and *Concurſus* are ſomething and have a Cauſe; but ſo is not a meer non-impedition, which is proper permiſſion.

by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or ſuſtentation, and it would have been as naturally Impoſſible for him not to ſin, as to live without God. But if not ſo, then while *Neceſſary Grace*, called *ſufficient*, is continued, the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a neceſſity of ſinning. But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction, that God withdrew from *Adam* any Grace which he had given him, till *Adam* caſt it away.

It is therefore no good Illation, *Deus permittit aliquem peccare: ergo peccat:* unleſs by *permitting* you mean *withholding neceſſary help*; which is more than proper permiſſion.

153. And it muſt be remembred that God is far from a *total permiſſion* or *non-impedition* of ſin: He alwayes *hindereth* it ſo far as to *forbid* it, to *threaten* damnation to affright men from it, to *promiſe* ſalvation and all felicity to draw men from it: He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it; And his daily mercies, and corrections ſhould withhold men from it. Only by doing *no more*, nor *effectually changing* or *reſtraining* ſinners, but leaving them to their own choice under all theſe moral reſtraining means, he *permitteth* ſin.

154. But it is alſo confeſſed, that when by great ſin theſe means themſelves are forfeited, ſome of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given: And ſo ſome are without that Teaching, thoſe mercies or thoſe corrections which others have: But yet they are ſtill under a Law of Grace.

155. And it is ſtill ſuppoſed that God as the firſt Cauſe of Nature, upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him; and concurreth with it as the firſt Mover and Univerſal Cauſe: And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity, Truth and Goodneſs which is Natural, doth continue. Otherwiſe it is confeſſed, that Permiſſion would inferr ſin materially, but no ſin formally, if by permiſſion be meant Gods withdrawing Reaſon, Free-will, or executive power.

* Or *Bradwardines Effective Volition* as neceſſary and productive of all that cometh to paſs.

156. But I eaſily confeſs, that if the *Dominicans* predetermining Premotion * in ſinful actions could be proved, that would certainly inferr the event of ſin; And if God decreed ſo to pre-determine the will, ſin may be fore-known in that decree. And if *Scotus* or the reſt had been of that mind, they had never omitted that eaſie ſolution of the Caſe, How God fore-knoweth ſin? But this I have elſewhere confuted, and ſhall add a little here.

157. But firſt (having diſproved all theſe preſumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future ſin) I ſhall in a word tell you the anſwer which may and muſt ſatisfie us; which is, [*That Gods Underſtanding is Infinite, and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible; But How his underſtanding reacheth them, what Idea's he hath of them, how they are Intelligible to him, with ſuch like, are ſinful preſumptuous queſtions of blind men, who know not their own ignorance.* And no *manner* of underſtanding is properly Divine, which mortals can comprehend.]

SECT.

SECT. IX.

Of Predeſtination and Free-will (*of which ſee more* Sect. 20. *againſt Mr.* Rutherford.)

158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods *Execution*, and be *after* his *Volitions* in order, yet becauſe I am now only to ſpeak of it, as a pretended *medium* of his *knowledge* of ſin, and as *quid decretum*, I ſhall touch it here. It is confeſſed that there is no ſubſtance which God is not the Maker of (beſides himſelf); Nor any *Action* of which he is not the *firſt Cauſe*.

159. God may well be called the perfect firſt Cauſe of humane Actions, in that he giveth man all his *Natural faculties*, and a *Power to Act* or *not act* at this time, or to chooſe this or that, and as the *Fountain* of *Nature* and *Life* and *Motion*, doth afford his *Influx neceſſary* to this free agency. So that when ever any Act is done, as an *Act in genere*, God is the firſt Cauſe of it: For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth, and by his *Vital Influx*; And there is no *Power* uſed to produce it which is not given by God.

160. An Act as ſuch, hath no Morality in it, but is *quid naturale*; And ſo it is from God as he is *fons naturæ*. But the *Morality* of an Act is formally the *Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it, referred to Gods Governing Will or Law, and to his amiable Goodneſs or Will as it is mans End.* And *Materially* it is (not the Act as ſuch, but) the Act as exerciſed on *an unmeet object rather than on a meet one*, or to an *undue* End rather *than a due End*, or elſe the *Omiſſion* of the Act as to the *due End and Object*, which is the *ſin*, and the *fundamentum* of the *ſinfulneſs*; and ſo *è contra*.

161. This *Comparative mode* of exerciſe addeth no proper *Phyſical Entity* at all to the *General nature* of the Act as ſuch. In *Omiſſions* (of Loving, Truſting, Fearing, Serving God) there is no *Natural Act*, but a *privation* of it. In *committed* ſins, to Love this Object rather than that, hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this; and no more than is in the general nature of Love as ſuch. A *modus Entis* is not *Ens:* But this Comparative choice, is but the *Modus Modi entis:* For an *Action* is but *Modus Entis*, and this is but a *modus actionis*.

162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the *Dominicans*, that Man ſhould be a *Cauſa prima*, and ſo be *God*, if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion; and there ſhould be ſome being in the world which God is not the Cauſe of: For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as ſuch.

163. If any will litigate *de nomine entis*, let them call it *Being* or *no-being* as they pleaſe; but it is ſuch as God can make a Creature able to do. And he that dare ſay that God Almighty who made all the World, is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that, under Divine Univerſal Influx, without Divine pre-determining pre-motion, on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it, is bolder againſt God, than I ſhall be. And if God *can do it*, we have no reaſon to doubt whether it be done.

164. Men ſeem not in denying this, to conſider the ſignification of the word* [POWER] when they confeſs that God giveth man the *Power* to chooſe or refuſe, and yet ſay that it is Impoſſible for him to Act by it, without the ſaid pre-motion. If ſo, It was only a *Power* to *Chooſe* when pre-

* It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. *Twiſſe* who oft ſaith, that God denyed to *Adam* no grace *ad poſſe*, but he denyed him grace neceſſary *ad agere*: For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is neceſſary to the act. Vid. *Rad. li.* 1. *Con.* 29. *art.* 1. *pag.* 457.

predetermined to it. He that hath a proper *Power* to *Chooſe*, is *Able* to *Chooſe*, and *Can Chooſe*, by that Power.

165. God therefore is truly the firſt Cauſe of the Act by Giving the Power, and doing all that belongeth to the *fons naturæ* to the exerciſe. And he is the firſt Cauſe of our Liberty in making us free-agents; and he is the firſt Cauſe of the Moral Goodneſs of our actions, by all that he doth by his Laws, Providence and Grace to make them good. But he is no way the firſt Cauſe of them as evil.

166. When we ſay that God cauſeth the Act of ſin as *Cauſa univerſalis*, the ſenſe of this word muſt needs be opened by this diſtinction. A Cauſe is called *Univerſal*, 1. *In prædicando*, Logically; And ſo *Artifex* is *cauſa univerſalis rei artificialis*, & *Statuarius eſt Cauſa particularis*, & *Polycletus eſt cauſa ſingularis hujus ſtatuæ*. 2. *In cauſando*, as to the effect. And ſo that is an *Univerſal Cauſe*, whoſe cauſality extendeth to *many effects*. And this is two-fold: 1. When it is the cauſe of ſomewhat *common to all thoſe effects*, but not of *all that is proper to each*, unleſs its cauſality be otherwiſe (as by the *diſpoſitio recipientis*) determined. And ſo the Sun is *cauſa univerſalis* of the ſweetneſs of the Roſe, and the ſtink of the Dunghill, &c. And ſo God is the *Cauſa univerſalis ut fons naturæ*, by his common ſuſtaining and moving Influx, of all ſinful actions. 2. When it is the Cauſe of thoſe actions, not only as to that which is *common to them all*, but as to that which is *proper to each* by which they differ from one another, and that of it ſelf, and *not* as determined by the *diſpoſitio recipientis*, or by any other cauſe. And ſo *God* is the *Univerſal Cauſe* of all that is *meerly phyſical* in all *beings and actions*; As in *Generation*, &c. which is properly to ſay that he is at once, both *Cauſa univerſalis*, *particularis* & *ſingularis*. And how far he is thus alſo the Cauſe of all the *moral Good* of all Actions I muſt open to you more diſtinctly in the third part. But of the *ſinful morality* of Actions he is not ſuch a Cauſe; but only a meer *Univerſal* as aforeſaid.

167. They that denying our ſelf-determining power, do make *Volition*, and *free-Volition* to ſignifie the ſame, and *Cogency* to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the ſame act, do ſeem rather to jeaſt, than ſeriouſly diſpute. And to define *Free-will*, to be only *Lubentia vel Volitio ſecundum rationem*, is no other. For *Velle juxta rationem*, is no more than *Velle*; the *Will* being the *Rational* Appetite diſtinct from the ſenſitive. And if *Velle* and *Libere Velle* be all one, why do we blind the World with *words*, and do not plainly put the *caſe* whether man *hath any will*, and not whether his Will *be free?* And if to take away its Liberty or conſtrain it, be nothing elſe but to make the ſame numerical act which is a Volition ſimultaneouſly to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the queſtion whether the will may be conſtrained is ridiculous. If the will be not *forced* as long as it *willeth*, or *willeth juxta rationem*, then to queſtion whether it can *will by conſtraint*, is to queſtion whether it can at once *will* and *not will*; † yet is this deſcription only of Liberty and conſtraint too common with ſome.

168. But if this were ſo, then ☞ 1. The *ſuſpenſion of the will* might be neverthleſs by *force* or *reſtraint:* which is a *non velle*; And ſo when they ſay *Voluntatem ab ipſo Deo non cogi poſſe*, becauſe when it acteth it acteth *willingly*, (that is, when it *willeth*, it *willeth*) the conſequence holdeth not, becauſe it may be *forced from all action*: (unleſs they mean that it cannot *nolle & non agere* at once). 2. And if this were ſo, then either they mean that God cannot *naturally neceſſitate* the will to act, or that ſuch a *natural neceſſitation* conſiſteth with its Liberty. If the

* *Bellarmin's* Univerſal Cauſe, ſeemeth the ſame with what *Durandus* meaneth. And *Pennotus* denying *Durandus's* opinion, ſaith, l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. *Non quod evidenter ſequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia: Multi enim Philoſophi, ut Plato, Ariſtot. agnoverunt unum primum principium omnium, & tamen non agnoverunt iſtud primum principium eſſe cauſam immediatam omnium effectuum Cauſarum ſecundarum.*

† Of this ſee *Le Blanks* excellent Theſes *de Lib. arbitrio abſolut.*
The definition of *Alvarez* of Free-will is [*Lib. arbitrium eſt facultas voluntatis & rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & agendum unum vel alterum*] which *Rivet* reſteth in, and fitteth the doctrine of neceſſitation; but I think expreſſeth not Liberty ſtrictly taken: It may be *ad utrumlibet* if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen.
Bellarmine's is [*Lib. arb. eſt libera poteſtas ex his quæ ad finem aliquem conducunt unum præ alio eligendi, aut unum & idem recipiendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio noſtro ad magnam Dei gloriam conceſſa*] which *Paræus* diſſenteth not from. But all defining is vain, till the ambiguous word [*Freedom*] be diſtinguiſhed, and the ſenſe accordingly variouſly ſtated.

the first, they destroy their doctrine of Predetermination: For what is that but Gods Physical irresistible efficacious premotion, determining the will to act? And what is natural necessitation if this be not? If the latter, then they contradict their own definition of Liberty, which they oft give us, that it is *Liberty from natural necessity* (which *Twiss* calleth *Libertas naturæ* distinct from *Libertas conditionis, vel civilis.*) And what more natural necessity than that which resulteth from that premotion of God as the first cause of all action, without which no agent natural or free can act, and which none can resist?

169. Their opinion of *Liberty* also leaveth no difference between *bruitish appetite* or *spontaneity*, and *free-will*, save only that *this* doth follow *reason*: which indeed is a difference of *Guides*, but not of *Liberty*.

170. And according to this opinion, if God gave *Satan* power to *move* any mans will *to sin* by as true a physical motion and as unresistible as I move my pen, it were no *constraint*, nor loss of *natural Liberty*, because it is moved to be *Willing*.

171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination, then if *Satan* could *infuse* unresistibly into the *Will*, an *Inclination* to hate God or to any sin, and then physically determine it according to that inclination, it were no force, or loss of natural liberty.

172. But I think he that by *irresistible efficiency makes a mans will wicked* both in its *Inclination* and *Acts*, doth incomparably more against him and his *liberty*, than he that could force his *tongue* or *hand against his will*, or he that only *tempted* and *perswaded* him.

173. The grand Reasons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion, are elsewhere given; I now name but these three, 1. Because (whatever vain talk is used to blind men) it maketh God the sole-total-first-necessitating cause of all the sin that is committed in the world, or can be. 2. It unavoidably destroyeth the Christian faith: For if God be really the said determining Cause of all lyes and other sins in the world, then his *Veracity* which is the formal object of faith, is gone: And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apostles are predetermined to speak true or false, nor when God moveth them to the one or the other: For to Call *their motion* by the name of *Inspiration*, will satisfie no man, that Gods *Inspiration* can do any more (at least to interest himself in the act) than his *necessary physical premoving determination*. 3. Because it feigneth God to damn most of the world for *not-conquering God*, who insuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act; that is, for not being Gods, or greater than God: And that he sent Christ to die only for those sins which *he* thus *pre-moved* us to irresistibly, and it was as impossible to forbear, as to touch the Moon.

174. In the issue of all these Controversies, the sharpest contenders seem agreed, whether they will or no: *Arminius* granteth that all events of sin or damnation are from eternity necessary *necessitate consequentiæ*, * which is (as is said) but a *Logical necessity in ordine probandi*: that is, It is a good consequence, [*This God fore-knoweth*, ergo *it will come to pass*:] And it is only the *necessitas consequentis* which he denyeth; (which *Rob. Baronius Metaph.* calleth *necessitas causata*, and I had rather call *necessitas effecti*) which is *in ordine productionis*. And Dr. *Twiss* doth sharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do assert any more than *necessitas consequentiæ*: And bringeth in the testimony of many Schoolmen professing concordantly that there is no more than this, which also fore-knowledge it self will inferr; It's worth the

* *Bonavent. in* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 1. *Resol. Præscientia Dei rebus præscitis necessitatem non imponit cum eo modo res cognoscat quo futuræ sunt —— Duplex est necessitas: Absoluta quæ opponitur Contingentiæ, dicitur necessitas consequentis: Respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiæ: & hæc non opponitur contingentiæ— ut si ambulat, movetur —— In præscito non est necessitas absoluta, sed solum consequentiæ.*

Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub. 1. *Duplex est necessitas, Consequentiæ & consequentis: Bene sequitur necessitate consiquentiæ, Deus novit me cras sessurum, ergo sedebo: consequens tamen est contingens —— ut homo currit, ergo movetur.*

Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in eo quod agit, liberum esse ab omni necessitate, *ut proprie non possit* necessario *agere quoad exercitium sui actus; quamvis respectu Divinæ ordinationis certo & infallibiliter agat. Ames. Bellarm. Enervat. To.* 4. *l.* 4. *c.* 1. He meaneth it of a caused physical necessity, no doubt.

the reciting: Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digreſ. 5. [*Quid quod ab eruditis eadem ſtatuitur neceſſitas ab utraq; profluens, tam à præſcientia Dei quam ab ipſius Voluntate. Nam licet Arminius voluerit neceſſitatem à Dei voluntate profectam eſſe neceſſitatem* Conſequentis, *à præſcientia verò promanantem duntaxat Conſequentiæ; aliter tamen viſum eſt magnis Theologis. Sic enim Durandus* [*Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de neceſſitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam; quia omnia reſpectu Voluntatis Divinæ eveniunt libere; & ideo abſolute loquendo poſſunt non evenire.*] *Expreſſius Bonaventura* [*Dei voluntatem abſolutam neceſſe eſt impleri; conditionalem verò minime: ſed advertendum quod eſt neceſſitas conſequentiæ, ſicut prædictum eſt de præſcientia: Ipſa enim non habet neceſſitatem conſequentis ſed conſequentiæ; Quia neceſſario infertur & ſequitur, Deus præſcivit hoc; Ergo hoc erit: Sed tamen non neceſſario præſcit: quia in actu præſciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. Sic intelligendum eſt quod Voluntas Dei abſoluta connotat eventum rei, & ideo eſt ibi neceſſitas conſequentiæ: ſed non conſequentis; quia non mutat eventum rei —— unde ſicut præſcientia quia neceſſario infert effectum, non poteſt falli: ſic voluntas abſoluta quia neceſſario infert* (that is, in arguing) *non poteſt impediri.*]

Ita Trigoſius in ſum. Theol. Bonav. [*Effectus contingentes & liberi ſi comparentur ad ſcientiam, providentiam, & Voluntatem Dei dicuntur neceſſarii ſecundum quid, ſive ex ſuppoſitione, quæ neceſſitas vocatur conditionalis & conſequentiæ, non tamen abſoluta & conſequentis. —— Quoniam iſtæ conſequentiæ ſunt optimæ* [*Deus præſcivit hoc futurum, Ergo erit: Deus vult aliquid fieri; Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit, & quando voluerit; Quia non ſtat dari antecedens verum & conſequens falſum.*]

Iſtis ad amuſſim congruentia ſunt Aquinatis illa [*Quamvis Voluntas Dei ſit immutabilis & invincibilis, non tamen ſequitur quod etiam effectus ſit neceſſarius neceſſitate abſoluta —— ſed ſolum conditionata, ſicut & de præſcientia dictum eſt.*] But the word [*effectus*] here is more than the reſt ſay.

And more fully ibid. ſect. 18. pag. (Vol. min.) 230. [*Quid quod Scholaſtici, nominatim vero Aquinas & Durandus* (*nec quenquam novi aliter ſentientem,* N. B.) *non aliam agnoſcunt neceſſitatem rerum, ratione Voluntatis Dei, quam quæ dici poteſt neceſſitas conſequentiæ.*]

And yet plainer ibid. ſect. 18. pag. 332. c. 2. [*At ea neceſſitas quam juxta noſtram ſententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei, revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit, (quod monuit Perkinſius, & vere,) quam ex* ſuppoſitione decreti divini, in Argumentatione ſcilicet: *quoties ſcilicet poſito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura, legitime infertur neceſſe eſſe ut ſuo tempore futura ſit. At hujuſmodi neceſſitas nihilo minus evincitur ex ſuppoſitione actus liberi cujuſcunque quam ex ſuppoſitione decreti Divini: etenim poſito quod exiſtat actus liber, neceſſe eſt ut exiſtat.*]

175. We are all agreed then what Neceſſity it is that fore-knowledge, decree, and providence inferr as to the acts of ſin: *viz.* of Logical conſequence. Let them now but make it good that their Phyſical efficient predetermining premotion cauſeth no other, and I will contradict it no more.

176. But whereas they conſtantly ſay that God predetermineth mans will to the *mode* as well as to the act, that it be done *freely* as well as that it be *done*; if *Willingneſs* and *freedom* were all one, I would grant it, on their grounds. But if an Immediate-Phyſical-predetermining-*efficient premotion*, and an invincible cauſation of Habit and Act by the firſt Cauſe, bring

Amatus de ſcient. Med. cont. Twiß de Libertate cap. 6. ſeemeth not to underſtand him, as to this Neceſſity *conſequentiæ*, which is not at all Cauſal of the event, but of the Concluſion in arguing; Leaving it out, from whence the event is.

bring no other neceſſity but of *Logical ſequel*, and be no *real cauſe* of the *thing it ſelf*, I confeſs I underſtand not what they mean, nor know what Liberty is, if the will have not a Power to act without ſuch a Predetermination.

177. The ſame I ſay of *Camero*'s and others way of predetermining by a *chain* of *neceſſitating Cauſes, viz.* that God by the *object neceſſitateth* the *act* of the *Intellect in ſpecie*. 2. And that the *Intellect neceſſitateth* the *will*. For all cometh to one, if all ſinful Volitions be *neceſſitated*. Nor will it ſatisfie any man well that *Camero* doth reſolve all mans ſin into the Devils temptation as a *neceſſitating cauſe*, till he know into what to reſolve the Devils ſin: And he may turn *Manichee* in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to neceſſitate innocent man to ſin, and bring all ſin and miſery on the world; much more he that ſaith, that God did all this himſelf.

Vid. *Bellar. de lib. arbitr. l.* 3. *c.* 8. *prop.* 6. *Pennot. propug. li.* 1. *c.*23. *p.* 46, 47, *&c. Scot.* 2. *d.* 25. *Henric. quodlib.* 1. *q.* 16. *Bannes* 1. *p. q.* 83. *a* 1. *dub.* 2. *Cont.* 2. *Suar. Met. q.* 19. *ſect.* 6. *Vaſquez* 1. *p. d.* 67. *n.* 14.

178. As there is *Libera Voluntas*, and *Liberum arbitrium*, or *Libertas Voluntatis, & Libertas hominis*, ſo there is a *coaction* or conſtraint of the *will* and of the *Man*. I ſhould take *my will* to be *conſtrained*, if by an unreſiſtible power it were ſuddenly *made impious* in *act and habit*, or either. But the *man* is not ſaid to be conſtrained, ſo long as he hath his *will*.

Co-action in *ſenſu compoſito* is a contradiction and impoſſible: but not in *ſenſu diviſo*; to be forcibly or by unreſiſtible power made willing of unwilling.

179. The unhappy deſcriptions of free-will, which I mentioned, *Janſenius* hath *To.* 3. *li.* 6. *de Grat. Salvat. cap.* 5. *&* 6. And *Annatus de Incoacta Libertate* conſuteth them at large: As [*Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas ſeu Volitio non ſit libera, ſicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus. Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem, id eſt, Volitionem eſſe poſſe quæ non ſit libera. Apud Auguſtinum eſſe liberam, & eſſe aliquam hominis & Angeli Voluntatem ſeu Volitionem pro iiſdem prorſus uſurpantur. Voluntas ſeu Volitio, & libera Voluntas idem eſt, ſicut & Velle & libere Velle: & Impoſſibile eſt ut Velle non ſit liberum*———] Lege etiam *Annatum & Petavium Cont. Vincent. Lerinenſ.*; & *Pennoti propugnacul. hæc plenius tractans.*

Yet in a large ſenſe I confeſs that *Voluntarium quà tale eſt liberum.*

180. The Liberty of the will conſiſteth not in ſuch an Indifferency as leaveth it *in æquilibrio* equally inclined to this or that (As *Macedo* againſt *Tho. White* confeſſeth with others;) For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that, deſtroyed Liberty: But in an Indetermination with a Power of ſelf-determining: which *power* is called *Indifferent*, becauſe it is a Power to *this or that*, and not becauſe it is *equally inclined*, no nor *equally* a *Power* to either. For there may be *inequality*.

Leg. Guil. Camrar. Scot. Diſp. Philoſ. Moral. qu. 4. for *Gibieufs* ſence of Liberty as not involving defectibility.

181. When Dr.† *Twiſſe* with *Bradwardine* * about the definition of *free-will*, (which *poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis poteſt agere vel non agere*) limiteth [*omnibus*] to ſecond cauſes, *Annatus* playeth upon his overſight, as if he ſaid that [*Agere poſſet voluntas ſine requiſitis ex parte cauſæ primæ.*] But no doubt Dr. *Twiſſe* meant the limitation as to the *non-agere* only: and that with the explication [*non quaſi motio Divina ſit inter ejuſmodi præ-requiſita quæ voluntatem creatam indifferentem relinquat.*] Though indeed we cannot imagine that the *cauſæ ſecundæ* ſhould operate and *ponere omnia ad agendum requiſita ſine prima*. And we may well ſay indeed that *Voluntas poteſt non agere*, if the *ſecond cauſe* only do its part, when *non poteſt omnino agere*. This therefore ſhould be better opened.

† *Twiſs. de Scient. Mid. l.* 2. *c.* 3. *p.* 265. *Annat. de Scient. Mid. Diſp.* 1. *c.* 6. §. 3. *p.* 135. * Vid. *Bradward. l.* 3. *c.* 10, 11. *& paſſim.*

182. If by [*omnibus requiſitis*] be meant only [*merè neceſſariis ſine quibus agere non poteſt Voluntas*] this taketh not away the *Moral* (much leſs the *Natural*) *Power ad agendum vel non-agendum*, nor neceſſarily

necessarily determineth it. But there may be such an effectual or * potent operation on the will, as shall *Certainly* and *Constantly* determine it, by causing it to determine it self: and antecedently take away its *Moral power ad contrarium*, though not *its Natural*. Of the difference between the *Natural* and *Moral* power, I shall somewhat insist, and elsewhere more at large.

183. The *Natural* Liberty of the Will must be distinguished from its *Moral Liberty* (from evil dispositions) and its Political Liberty (from restraining Laws.)

184. The Natural Liberty seemeth to † consist in these three things; 1. That the Will as a finite dependent Creature, be a Power given and upheld by God of *self-determining* or *morally specifying its own acts*, without any *necessitating Pre-determiner* (Divine or humane.) Where note that all *Divine Predetermination* taketh not away that Liberty: But *not to be able to determine it self without* Divine Physical Efficient Predetermination, is inconsistent with its Natural Power and Liberty. 2. Liberty containeth the Wills Empire over the inferiour faculties (respectively with variety, Despotical or Political.) 3. To be from under the power of any creature; as to *necessitation*.

185. As the *Posse Velle hoc vel illud, velle aut non velle* (*in quibusdam*) *sine divina vel alia extrinsica prædeterminatione*, is the Wills *Natural Liberty*, so *not to be pre-determined to sin*, (in *act* or *habit*) by *God* or *creatures*, is the *Wills Political Freedom*, or *Libertas Conditionis*, as Dr. *Twisse* calleth it: which God himself hath given it, and never taketh away from it.

186. And to be *Habitually* and *Actually Holy*, is the *Wills Ethical Liberty*; which all men have *lost* so far as they are *corrupted by sin*: and all men have *recovered*, so far as they are *sanctified* by Grace. This is the *Free-will* which *Grace* restoreth to us.

187. *Habits* do not determine the Will *infallibly per modum naturæ*, or *necessitate* its act. Because a man oft acteth contrary to habits.

188. There are some things which *Natural Inclination* infallibly causeth the Will to *determine* it self to, without the loss of its *primary natural Liberty*.

189. For all Liberty lyeth not in such an Indifferency as *Morally may* fall either way: But a certain *Natural Liberty* is consistent with a *constant certainty* of *self-determination ex Inclinatione Naturali*, as 1. To a *simple* * *Volition* of our *own felicity*; 2. As to a *simple Volition Boni sensibilis quà talis*. 3. As to a *Volition medii unici, noti, ubi nihil repugnat*.

190. And yet here, I mean but *quoad specificationem actus*: For *quoad exercitium* it may be omitted. 2. I confine it to *simple Volition*, which may consist with † *Comparate Nolition* of the same thing.

191. Some Habits are so strong, that (with the Concurrence of convenient objects and circumstances,) the Will doth never act against them; and though they do not *absolutely necessitate*, nor take away the *Natural power ad contrarium*, yet do they constantly procure that power to determine it self well or ill according to them, as resembling a *Natural Inclination* in some degree.

192. That which is *commonly* called *Liberty* is not *the* greatest *excellency* of the *will* or *felicity* of man; An indifferent and undetermined state, is a *middle state* between that of *Brutes* and *Angels*, and is fitted to a *Viators* condition. But so far as Grace and Holy Habits fix the will to a constant certain self-determination to Good, so far is it set in such a *Liberty* of *excellency* as *Gibieuf* describeth, above our state of loose indifferency.

193. Because

* That *August. Anselm*, *Lombard*, *Aquin. Scotus*, hold some Liberty consistent with necessity, see their words cited by *Petavius li.* 1. *c.* 15. *p.* 32. And so doth *Alph. a Castr. adver. Hæres. in verb. Liber.* for which see *Bafil Vol.* 1. most accurately.

† *Quoad 1st Libertas, vide* Ockam Quodl. 1. q. 16. & Soncin. Meta. l. 9. q. 17. & Scot. 1. d. 39. lit. F. & Waldens. Doct. fid. antiq. li. 1. c. 25. & Medin. 1. 2. q. 6. art. 2. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. art. 1. dub. 2. concl. 2. prob. 4. *and many desint. cited by* Pennottus *l.* 1. *c.* 33. *p.* 63. *Vid. Pennot. l.* 1. *c.* 3. five senses of Liberty: But it is no perfect distribution. And whereas *cap.* 14. he maketh only Election as distinct from Volition (in four respects) to be the formal act of the Will as free, it is true as freedom is taken in the narrowest sense, as above-cited: But there is a freedom also of all Volitions: And there is One common Notion of Liberty which is a genus to both. And he confesseth that the will *ad finem* is free *quoad exercitium actus*.

* Aug. de Nat. & Grat. cap. 46. *Perquam absurdum est ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad Voluntatem nostram quod beati esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus*: —— *nec dicere audimus ideo Deum non Voluntatem, sed necessitatem habere justitiæ, quia non potest Velle peccare.* He that would fully see the sense of *Augustin*, *Prosper* and *Fulgentius de Libert.* with least labour, let him read all their own words in *Paul. Iren.* his *Trias Patrum*.

† The common doctrine that Election or comparate Volition is only *de Mediis*, is false: No one thing is necessarily our end. God is refused by the wicked: Felicity may be refused if put in competition with publick good or Gods will. He is a Beast that would not choose to be annihilated, rather than the World or Kingdoms should be annihilated. But the simple Volition here is necessary.

193. Becauſe Order is neceſſary to a clear and full underſtanding, and all our controverſies are indeed reſolved into this of Free-will, I will here delineate it, as I underſtand it.

I. *FREE-WILL* as to the *Quid nominis* is ambiguous as to the Object, and is

I. *Libertas proprie dicta* : *Quæ ſemper eſt Libertas ab aliquo Malo,*

viz.

- I. *A malo Effecto* viz.
  - 1. *A Peccato* 1. *Actuali* 2. *Habituali.*
  - 2. *A Miſeria* 1. *Privativa* 2. *Poſitiva.*
- II. *A Mali Efficiente*
  - I. *Phyſice.*
    - I. *Supra nos* : (*Deus Optimus Malum peccati non efficit.*)
    - II. *Intra nos: Ab inclinatione Naturali determinante ad malum.*
    - III. *Extra nos*, viz. *à*
      - 1. *Perſonis.*
        - 1. *Angelis*
          - 1. *Bonis, qui nec volunt nec poſſunt.*
          - 2. *Malis: qui non poſſunt.*
        - 2. *Hominibus: qui non poſſunt.*
      - 2. *Rebus: Objectis, &c. quæ non neceſſitant.*
  - II. *Moraliter.*
    - I. *Supra nos* : (*Deus peccatum non Cauſat moraliter.*)
    - II. *Intra nos*
      - 1. *Ab ipſius Voluntatis*
        - 1. *Prava Inclinatione.*
        - 2. *Malis Habitibus.*
        - 3. *Actibus, (ad pejus ducentibus.)*
      - 2. *Ab ignorantia & errore Intellectus.*
      - 3. *Ab inferiorum facultatum (ſenſus, phantaſiæ, &c.) tentatione.*
    - III. *Extra nos*, viz. *ab*
      - 1. *Angelis*
        - 1. *Bonis: Qui neminem ad malum alliciunt.*
        - 2. *Malis:* 1. *Quoad tentationum ſpecies:* 2. *Gradus.*
      - 2. *Hominibus*, viz.
        - 1. *Ne Tyrannide* 1. *Bona vetent,* 2. *Mala præcipiant.*
        - 2. *Ne falsâ doctrinâ Intellectum corrumpant.*
        - 3. *Ne practicè nos tentent* 1. *Illecebris* 2. *Nocumentis.*
      - 3. *A Rebus* 1. *Terrorem incutientibus, &c.* 2. *Allicientibus.*
- III. *A Cauſa Mali Deficiente*, viz.
  - 1. *Deficientia Phyſicâ:*
  - 2. *Deficientia Morali*

  } *diſtinguendâ, ut antè de Cauſa efficiente videre eſt.*

II. *Libertas Improprie dicta: cum illud dicitur Libertas*
1. *Quod Majus quid est, ut* Dominatio.
2. *Quod Minus: utpote Boni nihil continens:*

viz.
I. *Ad supra, Libertas* viz.
1. *A Dei Gubernatione, per Leges & judicium.*
2. *A Dei Attractione & Determinatione Gratiosa & finali.*
3. *A Dei Dominio & dispositione arbitraria.*

II. *Ad Intra, Libertas*
1. *A Voluntatis Inclinatione naturali ad Bonum naturale.*
2. *A Voluntatis Habitu Confirmato, & Perfectione, Inclinante ad bonum spirituale, Deum scilicet, sanctitatem, caelestia.*
3. *Ab Intellectus Lumine, specificante actum per Boni intuitum.*

III. *Ad Extra,* viz.
1. *Libertas ab Angelorum Gubernatione & Auxiliis.*
2. *Ab Hominum*
1. *Instructione per doctrinam.*
2. *Regimine necessario per Leges.*
3. *Auxiliis amicis (in spiritualibus,* &c.)
3. *A Bonitatis Objectivæ determinante attractione.*

I mention all these Objective Distinctions, as about the Common use and abuse of the *Name* of LIBERTY or *Free-will*, that you may be able to examine mens words that shall mention it.

194. II. As to the *thing it ſelf*: paſſing by our, 1. *Moral Liberty* from *Sin*. 2. Our *Political Liberty* from *reſtraints of Rulers*. 3. I ſhall ſpeak only of the *Natural Liberty* in hand: And there ſhew

I. *Quid ſit*, viz.
- I. *Eſſentialiter.*
  1. *Voluntatem eſſe ſub Deo principium propriæ determinationis, & actuum ſuorum Dominam, potentem ſe prædeterminare ſine neceſſitante prædeterminatione, Divinâ vel extrinſecâ.*
  2. *Imperare cæteris facultatibus (ſed diverſè.)*
  3. *Abſolute, directe & proprie, nulli ſubjici præter Deum,*
- II. *Conſequenter.*
  - viz. I. *Ab extra.*
    1. *Non Angelis vel Dæmonibus.*
    2. *Non Hominibus, imperantibus, ſuadentibus, &c.*
    3. *Non Objectis, (ſicut eſt appetitus brutorum.)*
  - viz. II. *Ab intra.*
    1. *Non ſenſibus vel phantaſiæ, dum objecta præſentant.*
    2. *Non Paſſionibus; (tametſi moleſtiam ei faceſſant.)*
    3. *Non Intellectui: Qui dirigit; non imperat.*
  - I. *In voluntate: Hinc nihil poteſt*
    1. *Imprimere ei malas Inclinationes, nec auferre bonas.*
    2. *Efficere malos Habitus, aut auferre bonos (neceſſario.)*
    3. *Determinare eam ad Actus malos neceſſario.*
  - II. *In Perſona: Et ita Perſonæ Liberum Arbitrium eſt, Me*
    1. *Bonum vel Malum morale poſſe agere, ſi velim.*
    2. *Poſſe Mereri ſi velim, & malum non commereri poſſe invitum.*
    3. *Poſſe fælicem eſſe ſi velim, & non Infælicem niſi Voluntario peccantem.*

II. *Qualis ſit: Eſtq;* Libertas Voluntatis,
- I. *Conjuncta cum neceſſitate convenìente naturali,*
  - 1. *In Volitione ſimplici ſeu Amore propriæ fælicitatis,*
  - 2. *In Volitione ſimplici ſeu Amore Boni ſenſibilis,*
  - 3. *In Volitione Medii unici fælicitatis, omnimode boni,*

  } *Quoad Actus ſpecificationem.*
- II. *Separata à neceſſitate naturali*, viz.
  1. *In Subjectione & Amore erga Cauſam primam (Creatorem.)*
  2. *In Volitione ſimplici Dei ut Finis, & Boni ſpiritualis.*
  3. *In Electione Finis ubi plures præſentantur.*
  4. *In Electione Mediorum ubi diverſa offeruntur.*
  5. *In Actu Intendendi finem electum, quoad Exercitium.*
  6. *In Uſu Mediorum, & facultatibus ſubditis imperandis.*

III. *Quotuplex ſit Libertas Voluntatis;*

Eſtq;
1. *Libertas Contradictionis, vel Exercitii,* viz. *Velle aut Non-velle; Nolle aut Non-nolle.*
2. *Contrarietatis, ſeu ſpecificationis quoad Actum,* viz. *Velle aut Nolle.*
3. *Competitionis, Comparationis, vel Contrarietatis, vel ſpecificationis, quoad Objecta:* viz. *Velle aut Hoc aut Illud; Nolle Hoc vel Illud.*

Vid. Durandus. v. 2. d. 25. dub. 2. & distinct. 38. dub. 2. & distinct. 40. quæst. unic.

195. If any man will dispute about *Free-will* named and not defined or distinguished, nor tell us in what sense he taketh it; or if Divines will tediously and fiercely dispute *An sit*, before they *Agree* or prove, *Quid sit*, they are fitter to be pitied, than to be read or heard.

SECT. X.

Of Natural and Moral Power as fore-seen.

196. AND having here anticipated the Doctrine of Free-will, I will (as fittest for the Readers use) connex the Difference of the Natural and Moral Power of the *will* or *Man*, as it cometh under *Prescience and Decree.**

* If you will put the question, Whether *homo lapsus sine auxilio gratiæ possit resistere gravi tentationi? Vel An possit efficaciter diligere Deum sine gratiæ speciali auxilio*, &c. The Schoolmen will ordinarily say, No, as well as Protestants. Vid. *Cavetes Sum. Theol. a. cap. 1. p. 11, 12, &c.*

Power is called *Natural* in all these respects: 1. Because it is in *our Natures* and we have it *from our birth.* 2. Because it is *essential* to the soul. 3. Because it operateth *per modum meræ naturæ, quantum in se*, and not freely. Mans soul hath three *Powers* called *Faculties*, The *Vital-Active*, The *Intellective*, and The *Volitive Power:* Of which the *two first* are *natural* in all these three respects, in themselves considered: But the *will* is *natural* only in the *two* first respects; And so are the other two so far as they are imperate by the Will, being, as imperate, participatively Free.

197. Power is called *Moral*, 1. Because it is *it self Morally Good or Evil*, as a *Disposition* of the soul. 2. Because it is a *Power to Moral Actions.* 3. Because it is not called A POWER in the strict physical sense, but *Morally*, that is, *Reputatively*, called *Quasi Potentia.*

198. Two things are called a *Moral Power:* 1. The *Natural* Powers themselves, not simply as Natural, but as thus *Morally* qualified. 2. The *Moral disposition* of the *Natural powers.*†

† *Naturales vires, easque gratiæ Naturales, quamvis mere naturales sint, tunc tamen proferunt potentiam receptivam gratiæ, imo activam potentiam actiam ex se aptam ut simul cum divino auxilio vitaliter producat supernaturalem actum fidei, charitatis*, &c. Ruiz.

199. *Morality* is *first* seated in *the will*, and *from it* our *Power* is *first* called *Moral:* But yet it is *secondarily* in the other two faculties.

200. As to Dr. *Twisse* his saying, that *Potentia non fundatur in Potentia*, (*Moralis scilicet in Naturali*, and as others say, *Accidens non fundatur in accidente:*) I answer 1. *Potentia univocè sic dicta non fundatur in potentia:* But *this* is not such. 2. It is false that *accidens non fundatur in accidente*, as the instance of *Relation* proveth: The term [*Accident*] is indeed so ambiguous, as proveth that the distribution of all things first into *Substance* and *Accidents* is not genuine and congruous, but inept. If you will call *Calor, Lumen*, or *Motus Accidents*, and call *Gradus* also an Accident, and then say, that *Caloris, Luminis, Motus, non dantur diversi gradus*, because *Accidentis non est accidens*, you are not to be believed. And if you will say that *Ordo* is an *Accident*, and that *Qualitatum, Actionum*, &c. *non datur ordo*, it is false. 3. But the worst of the error is, that the *Natural Powers are called Accidents*, which is a falshood of very ill tendency in many respects: They are the very *formal Essence* of the soul. And surely the soul may have its Good or Evil Dispositions.

201. There is in the very Essence of the *Natural Power* or faculty, besides the *Vis vel Virtus agendi*, a certain *Natural Inclination* to some things, which is Inseparable from it, from which the Schoolmen say even of the *will* that it is *quædam Natura, & pondus animæ.* So the soul is *Inclined* or *propense* (and not only *Able*) to *Activity* as such, to *Intellection* as such, to *Volition* as such; and objectively to *Truth* as such, and to *Natural Good* and *felicity* as such. And there is an *Inclination* of the soul,

ſoul, which is *not eſſential* and inſeparable, but is much under the power of the Will, and may be *got* and *loſt*.

202. This *adventitious Diſpoſition*, is found in the ſoul in various Degrees: 1. When it is in ſuch a *Degree only*, as that immediately and properly without any other power added, the will may be ſaid to be *Able* to *Act* thus or thus, then it is called a *Moral Power*: But when it is in ſuch a degree, as that we are *Diſpoſed* to Act *promptly* and *eaſily*, it is called a *Habit*.

203. He therefore that is ſo far *diſpoſed* to any Good act, and whoſe *Indiſpoſition*, or *diſpoſition to the contrary*, is but ſuch, as that in his preſent ſtate, without any more help than * he hath, he *can move his own will* to the ſaid act, and the difficulty is not ſo great, but that ſuch *Power ſometime doth* overcome it, is ſaid to have a *Moral Power*. But he that wanteth not *Natural force* or *power*, but only a right *Diſpoſition* of his *Will*, and *ſo far* wanteth it, as that none in his caſe *do ever* change their own acts to good, without more help and power than he hath, is ſaid to be *Morally unable* or *impotent*: and not only to want the *Habit*.

204. Whether the *Natural Powers* be properly called *A Power to Believe, Repent, Love God, &c.* without the *Moral Power* or right diſpoſition? though it be a queſtion of ſome uſe among the Contenders about theſe matters, yet it is chiefly *de nomine*, and therefore of the leſs moment. This is to be granted of all *de re*, † that *Unbelievers* want not that *Natural Power* or *faculty*, which *can Believe* and *Repent* if duly *ſuſcitated* and *diſpoſed*: But through an *Ill Diſpoſition* and contrary courſe of *action*, and want of due excitation, that Power *will not Act*, without Gods ſpecial Grace. Which [*will not*] ſignifieth, 1. The *Undiſpoſedneſs*, 2. The *Non-agency*: And in ſtricteſt ſpeech, the former is beſt expreſſed by [*The will is undiſpoſed and averſe to Believe, &c.*] and the latter by [*The will doth not conſent.*] But the firſt may be expreſſed by [*It cannot*] becauſe it will not come to paſs: Though it is no ſuch [*Cannot*] as is diſtinct from [*will not*] but the very ſame. And as [*Power*] is diſtinct fom [*will*] and a man is ſaid to be *Able* to do that which [*he can do if he will*], ſo no doubt but he that *will Believe and Repent, can do it, ſo far as he is willing*. And this is it that *Auguſtine* ſo much pleadeth for, when he would have us diſtinguiſh [*Cannot*] and [*will not*], and when he ſaith, that *Poſſe Credere eſt Omnium; Credere autem fidelium.*

205. To the fuller opening of this, note the following Concluſions.

No man *doth* that which he *cannot* do, at that inſtant.

206. Humane (and all created) Power is dependent, and is not properly a Power to do any thing, but on ſuppoſition of Gods Emanant ſupport and concurſe, as he is the firſt Cauſe of Nature.

207. Humane Power is *finite*, and is not a *Power ad omnia*, but *ad hæc*: which therefore are called *Poſſible to us*.

208. *Power* being a Relative word, it may be ſaid to be nullified *ad hoc* by an alteration of the Object only: As if you double the weight, that man may be *Unable* to bear it, who *Could* bear it when it was leſs: when the object is changed, and not the power indeed.

209. *Power* ſuppoſeth the due object and its due propoſal or ſtate. We have *no Power to ſee inviſibles*, to underſtand things not intelligible, to will things not apprehended to be good, and not ſo revealed, *&c.*

210. The three Conjunct *Powers* of the ſoul ſuppoſe each other, though they are not formally the ſame: We have no Power to *will* objects not *underſtood*, nor to *underſtand*, *will* or *execute* without *Vital-activity*; nor to *underſtand* moſt things without the *Wills determination ad exercitium.*

211. The

* Yet the *Jeſuits* themſelves (as *Ruiz ubi ſup.*) are not ſo much for the neceſſity of prediſpoſition, but that they confeſs that Grace oft taketh occaſion of things natural, or indifferent, yea, of heinous ſins themſelves. And that the beginning of Juſtification (Sanctification) is not from the ſtrength or endeavours of nature, but from Grace he largely proveth in the whole *diſp.* 17,18. as *Vaſquez* and *Suarez* and other *Jeſuits* alſo do.

† Of this ſee Mr. *Truman*'s Treatiſe of Natural and Moral Impotency, and Mr. *William Fenners* notable though popular Tractate of Wilful Impenitency.

211. The due qualification alſo of the *Inferiour faculties* (the Senſes, and Phantaſie, and Organs) is ſuppoſed to the being of *true Power*. We never had Power to *ſee* without *eyes*, no more than without *Light*. This Power of the Inferiour faculties ſome call *Potentia ſecunda*, as to the acts of the Superiour.

212. It is *no true Power ad hoc*, which is put to overcome a Greater *oppoſing Power*. We never had *Power* to overcome God, or to act againſt his pre-moving pre-determination (as *Bradwardine* truly ſaith.)

213. A man may be *Able mediately* to do that which he is not *Able Immediately* to do: I mean he that can *write with a Pen*, or move things with an Engine, and ſo act but as a *partial*, though *Principal Cauſe*, may not be Able to write *without a Pen*, nor to do the ſame *alone* as a *Total* Cauſe.

214. And a man may have Power to do that *Mediately* and *Hypothetically* hereafter, which he *Cannot* do *Immediately*, that is, at the preſent time. He can *learn to write*, and after can *write*, who *cannot write* till he hath learnt. Thus Infants have a *remote Power* of *ſpeaking*, and *Infidels* of *believing*.

215. No man *Doth* all that he is truly and properly *Able* to do.

216. No man doth all that he is Diſpoſed and Habited to. Sudden objects oft carry us againſt ſtrong Habits.

217. A man *ordinarily willeth* and *Acteth* according to the predominant *Habits* of his ſoul, if he have *objects* and *means*.

218. A man alwayes *willeth* that which he is *ſolely diſpoſed* to *will*, or *moſt diſpoſed* to will, at that moment; and which he apprehendeth *ſub omnimoda ratione boni*: Much more if he were *perfectly Habited* to it, in his *Vitality*, *Intellect* and *Will*.

219. No man acteth without the *Eſſential fundamental Inclination* to Good and to Natural felicity: But a man may by ſudden inſtigation and occaſions will that which before he had no *particular diſpoſition* to: A Power may be without a Habit.

220. No *Good mans* Habits *here* are *perfect* in goodneſs.

221. No *Bad man here* is at the *worſt*; nor *deſtitute of all Moral Power* to *all things* commanded him of God.

222. A bare *Moral Power* which cometh not up to be an *Inclination* or *Habit*, determineth not the *Will* of it ſelf.

223. Habits tend to the *Wills* determination *per modum naturæ*, *ut appetitus*; But they are not *ſufficient* to it, or *neceſſary determiners de eventu*.

224. *Weak Habits* are *oft* born down: *Strong* ones *rarely*, yet *ſometimes*.

225. An unholy ſoul is much more *Impotent* as to the great Internal Acts of *Loving God*, *delighting in him*, &c. than to any meer external Act which the Natural Power extendeth to: And ſo are the regenerate in that meaſure as they are unrenewed.

226. But we are more *able* to *Love* or *Will* aright, than to *Work* and *Do* aright; becauſe here *both muſt concurr*, which requireth more Power than *one alone*. *E. g.* to Rule the Thoughts aright requireth more Power than to be *willing* to rule them.

227. Yet in that meaſure that a man is *willing to do Good*, he is *Morally able*, (and more than able) Becauſe *Morality* being firſt ſeated in the *will*, it is no farther *Morally Good* or *Bad*, than it is *Poſitively* or *Privatively* Voluntary. He that is *ſincerely willing*, is *ſincerely Able*, and he that is *Perfectly willing*, is *perfectly able* (and more.)

228. Every

228. Every mans *Natural faculties* may be called *Moral Powers* as to the *Obligation*, as being obliged by God to Moral Good.

229. And becauſe *Obligation* preſuppoſeth ſome *true Power* to obey, mediately or immediately, preſent or former when the Law was made, therefore mans *Natural* faculties, though undiſpoſed, are thus far called a moral power to the commanded act.

SECT. XI.

Whether God bind Men to Impoſſibilities.

230. THis leads us to the queſtion, Whether God bind men to things *Impoſſible*. Where we muſt needs diſtinguiſh 1. Of diſability *Antecedent* to the Law, and Conſequent. 2. Mediate and Immediate. 3. Between Impoſſibles as ſuch, and as *Things Hated* or *Nilled*. 4. Between *Primary* and *Secondary* Moral acts. And ſo I anſwer,

Quando præceptum ſupernaturale obligat, non poteſt vitari peccatum contra illud abſque auxilio gratiæ. Pet. à S. Joſeph. Theſ. Univerſ. Theol. de auxiliis p. 83.

231. 1. No Law of God (or juſt men) bindeth to things *Naturally Impoſſible* before the Law was made and broken, by an *Immediate* obligation.

Alliac. Camerac. 1. *q.* 14. *R.* ſaith, 1. We cannot be bound to a ſimple impoſſibility: 2. We may be bound to Will an Impoſſibility (as that his ſin paſt had not been, though he doubt of this.) 4. He may be bound to that which is not in his power, to do of himſelf: So every one is bound *habere gratiam; & quilibet viator fidem infuſam: & tamen non eſt in creaturæ poteſtate activâ.*

232. A juſt Law may *antecedently* bind us *mediately* to that which is *immediately* impoſſible. So he that cannot *Read*, may be bound to Read mediately; that is, *firſt to Learn*, and *then to Read*. And *Paul* requireth men to *work with their hands, that they may have to give to him that needeth*, (and then to *give*;) which yet before they have *got it*, is impoſſible.

233. The obligation of a Law ceaſeth, when the thing commanded becometh *Impoſſible* without the ſubjects fault.

234. Every ſin is *Voluntarium-prohibitum*: And ſo far as *Impoſſible things* may be *Voluntaria-prohibita* (which is all the doubt) ſo far they may be ſins.

235. Gods Law is Antecedent to our practice, and *mediately ex parte ſui* bindeth us at once to all that we muſt do to the End of our Lives. As if a Maſter in the Morning command his ſervant his work till night. Therefore as if that ſervant purpoſely break his Spade or other Tools that he may not work, he is not therefore ſo diſobliged as to be guiltleſs; even ſo when man by ſin diſableth himſelf to his commanded duty, the Law is not changed, but is ſtill the ſame, nor is he thereby excuſed.

236. Here the *Primary ſin* is that which contracted the Impotency: The *Secondary* ſin is the *Impotency* it ſelf, thus *wilfully* contracted and ſeated in the *will*. The *third* rank is the *not doing* of all that was firſt commanded, and the *doing* of all that was forbidden.

237. But if it be not only a *Moral Vicious Impotency* that is contracted (ſuch as the habitual unwillingneſs in queſtion) but a *Phyſical Impotency* (as if a man drunk himſelf ſtark *mad*, or *blind*, *&c.*) this is a *ſin* (and the conſequent acts and omiſſions) not ſimply in it ſelf conſidered, but *ſecundum quid*, and participatively, as it partaketh of the firſt ſin, which is deſcribed it ſelf to be [*a Voluntary forbidden act diſabling us to future duty, and virtually containing a ſinful life to the end.*]

That a neceſſity contracted by our own fault (as by drunkenneſs) excuſeth not from guilt, ſee *Auguſt. l. de Natur. & Grat. c.* 67. *& Aquin. n.* 4. *d.* 50. *q.* 2. *a.* 1.

238. But if it be this *Phyſical Impoſſibility* that is contracted, then though the Law change not, yet the Subjects capacity being changed, ſtrictly and properly God is not ſaid after to *Oblige him by that Law*, becauſe he is not *Receptive* and *Capable* of ſuch *new obligations*; And yet he is not *diſobliged* as to his *benefit*. For no man getteth a right to any benefit by his

his fault. What then? Why, the *Precept* to that man is paſt into a *Virtual Judiciary Sentence*, condemning him as diſobedient; even as it is with thoſe in Hell.

239. Therefore ſince the fall, the Law of *Innocency* in it ſelf is the ſame, which once ſaid [*Thou ſhalt continue perfectly Innocent*;] but it doth not properly *oblige us as a Law* to that *Innocency* or *perfection* which we were born without, becauſe we are become uncapable ſubjects: Much leſs is that *Innocency* now the *Condition of any Promiſe* or Covenant of God; as if he ſtill ſaid [*Be perſonally and perpetually Innocent, and thou ſhalt live; and that thou maiſt live.*] But the Law being ſtill the ſame, we that are uncapable of the *duty*, are not uncapable of the *guilt* and *condemnation*: And therefore the Law and Covenant are now become a *Virtual Sentence* of *Condemnation* for not obeying *perſonally*, *perfectly* and *perpetually* to the death. For he that hath once made Innocency *Naturally Impoſſible* to him, is Virtually in the caſe of one that hath *perſevered to the death in ſin*

Vid. Bellarmin. de Grat. & lib. arb. li. 5. per totum, & c. 30. de diſt. neceſſitatis.

240. But if the contracted Impoſſibility be not *Phyſical* but *Moral*, the caſe is quite different. For then the thing is a threefold ſin in it ſelf as aforeſaid; 1. The *diſabling ſin*. 2. The *vicious Diſability* or *Malignity* of the *Will*. 3. And the *after ſin* thereby committed, and omiſſion of duty.

More of Phyſical and Moral Impotency.

241. 1. No righteous Law forbiddeth Phyſical Impotency as ſuch, nor commandeth men Phyſical Impoſſibilities, as is ſaid; But Gods Laws *primarily* forbid the *malignity* of the *Will*, which is its *Moral* Impotency.

Bradwardin. plainly ſaith (l. 3. c. 9. p. 675. that [*Nullus actus noſter eſt ſimpliciter in noſtra poteſtate* (we grant not abſolutely and independently) *ſed tantum ſecundum quid, reſpectu Cauſarum ſecundarum. Nihil eſt in noſtra poteſtate, ſubexecutiva, ſubexecutiva & inſuperiente neceſſitate, neceſſitate naturalitatis precedente, reſpectu voluntatis divinæ. Quod ideo in noſtra dicitur poteſtate, quia cum volumus illud facimus voluntarie & non invite.* So that by him no creature was ever able to do more or leſs than it doth, except you call him able to do it, that can do it when God makes him do it: but that is not to be able before, or when he is not cauſed to do it.

242. 2. Rulers uſe not to make *Puniſhments* for Phyſical Impotency; But for the *Wills Malignity* God doth.

243. 3. Rulers uſe not to propound *Rewards* for *Phyſical* Impoſſibilities; But for the fruits of *Moral Sanctity* or *Habits*, and for *themſelves*, God doth.

244. 4. No juſt Judge *condemneth* men for *Phyſical* Impotency; But for *Moral* God and man do.

245. 5. No Good man *hateth* another for *Phyſical* Impotency; But for *Moral* malignity God and man do.

246. 6. An *inlightned Conſcience accuſeth* and *tormenteth* no man for meer *Phyſical* Impotency and Impoſſibilities: But for the *wills Malignity* Conſcience will torment men. So that it is evident that one ſort of Impotency maketh an act no ſin (in its degree) and the other maketh it a *greater* ſin. For Nature and common notices teach men to judge that the *More willingneſs*, the more *culpability*. But he that hath *Actual* and *Habitual wilfulneſs*, and is as ſome *Adulterers*, *drunkards*, *revengeful perſons*, *proud*, *covetous*, *&c.* who are ſo bad that they ſay, *I cannot chooſe*, are the worſt of all the ſorts of ſinners, by ſuch diſability.

247. It is moſt probable that God overcometh *Moral Impotency*, and giveth *Moral Power*, by *Moral Means*, and *Operations*: For though God can give it by a proper *Creation* without *Moral Means*, and we cannot ſay that he never doth ſo, nor how oft he doth or doth not; yet it is moſt probable that his ſpecial Grace, doth by his Trine Influx of *Power*, *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*, *Life*, *Light* and *Love*, ſuſcitate the natural faculties of the ſoul to the firſt ſpecial Act, and by it cauſe a holy Habit, which he radicateth by degrees; And this is Metaphorically a Creation.

248. This is certain, that ſince the fall we have the ſame eſſential faculties; that Original ſin is not as *Illyricus* ſo long and obſtinately maintained (though an excellently good and Learned man) a Subſtance, though it be the Pravity of a ſubſtance: And that ſin changed not the humane ſpecies; Nor doth Grace change our ſpecies. It is certain that the Acts of

theſe

theſe ſame *natural faculties* are commanded to all men, even the unregenerate, under the names of *Faith* and *Repentance*; And ſo theſe are their duties. And it is certain, that a Courſe of Moral means (preaching, reading, meditating, conference, threatnings, promiſes, mercies, afflictions) are appointed and uſed to the procuring the ſaid faculties to perform theſe commanded acts: It is certain that theſe Means have an Aptitude to their end: And that God worketh by his own means: And appointeth not man to uſe them in vain; And that in working Grace, God preſerveth and reformeth Nature, and worketh on Man as Man: and according to the Nature of his means.

249. And I think none dare deny, but that God is Able by his Spirits powerful operation, without any Antecedent new Habit or diſpoſition, to ſet home theſe ſame means ſo effectually on the Natural powers of the ſoul, as ſhall excite them to the firſt Acts of Faith and Repentance: And by them *imprint* a Habit, as is ſaid, and ſhall be ſaid again in *Part* 3. And if he *Can* do ſo, and *Can* do otherwiſe, which then is likeſt to be his ordinary way, I leave to the obſervers of Scripture and Experience.

450. This is the Common ſenſe of Divines, who place Vocation, exciting the firſt act of Faith and Repentance, before Union with Chriſt, and before Sanctification, which giveth the habit, till Mr. *Pemble Vind. Grat.* taught otherwiſe, whom Biſhop *G. Downame* confuted in the Appendix to his Treatiſe of Perſeverance.

251. As to the queſtion, *How this Grace is called Infuſed, and not Natural?* I anſwer, It is called *Infuſed* and *Supernatural*, becauſe, 1. It is not wrought by any *Natural-moral means only*, but by *Supernatural-moral means*, *viz.* Revelation, in and by the Goſpel of Chriſt. 2. And this ſupernatural Revelation cannot work it, without the *ſpecial extraordinary operation* and *impreſſion* by the *Holy Ghoſt*, above the common concurſe of God with all his Creatures, as he is *fons naturæ*. This the Schools have Metaphorically called *Infuſion*.

252. But it may be called *Natural*, 1. In that mans *Natural faculties* receive Gods Influx, 2. And *perform* the act: 3. And are *perfected* by it as the Natural body is by Health.

253. And what the difference is *ex parte Dei agentis* (*& ex parte effectus*) between Gods Natural and Gracious operations, I ſhall after open in the *third Part*.

254. The Schoolmen, eſpecially the *Scotiſts* and *Ockam*, and many *Franciſcans*, *Benedictines*, and other *Fryers*, (yea, ſuch *Oratorians* as *Gibieuf*) have fled ſo high in making Grace *ſupernatural*, (feigning a ſtate of *pure Naturals* that had none) and talk ſo phanatically of the *Deification* of the ſoul, as I think hath enſnared ſome Sectaries among us to imitate them, feigning that the firſt Covenant is *Moral* as a *Law*, and the ſecond Covenant is the very *in-being of a Divine Nature*, which they (though obſcurely) ſeem to deſcribe as ſomewhat above all *Habits* and *Inclinations*, put into our own nature, like another *form* or *ſoul*: Which over-doing tendeth to tempt men to Infidelity, by doubting whether mans Nature was made by the Creator to enjoy God in Heaven or not, when it muſt be made another thing to attain it.

SECT. XII.

Of Scientia Media.

255. AFter this Digreſſion about our Will and Powers as the objects of Gods Knowledge and Decrees, I return to the Doctrine *de Scientia Media.* And that God knoweth from Eternity the *truth* of all *conditional propoſitions that are true*, is paſt all doubt, If we may ſuppoſe that God had eternal propoſitions. No doubt but he knoweth now that ſuch propoſitions are true [*If ſuch Cauſes be put, they will or will not produce this or that as the effect.*]

256. But if it be an *Imperfection* to have *mental propoſitions* to know by, and God knoweth not *by them*, but only *knoweth them* as the inſtruments and way of *humane knowledge*, (For no doubt but he knoweth all that's ours,) Then it muſt be ſaid that he had from eternity, but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propoſitions. And who can well determine this?

257. And this will lead the arrogant diſputers to other enquiries no leſs difficult, Whether it be only or primarily the Propoſition it ſelf as *ens rationis humanæ* or as the *Thought* of *mans mind* which God knoweth, or the *res ab homine cognita*, that is, *futurition* it ſelf? And if the former, How God knoweth them to be *True?* If the latter, How he knoweth *futurition?*

258. And here inextricable difficulties will ſtill ariſe before them, Whether to have the *notion* of *futurity*, be not a part of the Creatures imperfection? Whether God know not all things *as preſent?* Whether [*Nothing*] be properly Intelligible in it ſelf? Whether it be not only *Propoſitions de nihilo* that are known, and not the *ipſum nihil*, (ſuch as *futurition is?*) Whether to aſcribe ſuch knowledge of [*Nothing*] and ſuch *notions* or *propoſitions* to God, be to aſcribe *perfection* or *Imperfection* to him?

259. If we may or muſt ſay that God from eternity *fore-knew our Propoſitions* of *future contingents*, which are Conditional, yet we muſt not ſay or think that his *knowledge quoad actum* is *conditional*, ſo as that the Creatures ſtate is the condition of Gods Knowledge in it ſelf: But only that the *object* is a *conditional propoſition*, ſpeaking the Condition of the event fore-known: From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only *denominatione extrinſecâ*, not as *an Act*, but as *This act*.

260. We deny not but God may be ſaid as truly to know the *truth* of *hypothetical* as of *abſolute propoſitions*; If one be the object of his Knowledge, the *other* is: Which proveth the *hypothetical* propoſition to be *leſs perfect* than an *abſolute*, but not *Gods knowledge* of it to be *leſs perfect.*

261. Nor doth Gods fore-knowledge that *Adam will ſin in ſuch circumſtances*, make his underſtanding depend on the Creature, but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object: And ſo it doth in *all Acts* where the Creature is the object: This objection therefore belongeth alſo to the diſpute, Whether God know any thing but himſelf? or out of himſelf?

262. The feigning God to have *in himſelf* ſo many acts of knowledge, *really diſtinct*, and to lye in *ſuch an order*, is intolerable, ſeeing God is moſt ſimple. But by extrinſecal denomination, his Knowledge may

* *Nic. D'Orbellis* ſaith, *Communiter diſtinguitur triplex cognitio Dei*, viz. *approbationis, viſionis & intelligentiæ. Cognitio approbationis eſt tantum Bonorum: Cognitio Viſionis eſt eorum quæ ſunt, fuerunt, vel erunt: Cognitio intelligentiæ ſeu ſimplicis notitiæ, eſt omnium quæ poſſunt eſſe. Hujuſmodi autem cognitiones non differunt ſecundum ſe; ſed ſecundum diſtinctionem connotatorum.* Et Bonavent. 1. d. 38. dub. 3. *Dicendum quod in nobis notitia ſimplex & notitia beneplaciti dicunt diverſas cognitiones; & diverſos modos cognoſcendi—— A Deo autem una tantum cognitio eſt. Sed illa una facit Deus, quod homines multis. Et ideo illa una dupliciter ſignificat—*

may by us, through our weakneſs and neceſſity, be diſtinguiſhed according to its reſpect to diverſity of objects, by inadequate conceptions: But on that pretence to feign many *needleſs diſtributions*, is profane,

263. They that think it a good confutation of *ſcientia media* that *Non decreta non ſunt futura*; therefore no futurition can be known but as *Decreed*, do err much in the antecedent, (For it is falſe that *ſin* is *Decreed*) and are either erroneous or uncertain in the concluſion, (For God fore-knoweth ſin ſo far as it is intelligible.)

264. The ſenſe of the queſtion *de Scientia Media*, is not *de conditionatis neceſſarius*, as [If the Sun ſet, it will be night] Nor yet of ſuch *conditionals* as *are* meerly *diſparate*, and have no kind of dependence or connexion, as [*If* Peter *dye quickly*, John *will live long*:] But of ſuch conditionals, as have *ſome reaſon* of the *Connexion*, and yet leave the will in an *undetermined power* to act or not. But we know no difference between theſe *ex parte Dei Scientis*, but only *denominatione extrinſeca ex parte objecti*.

Vide *Pet. à Sanct. Joſ. Diſp.* 4. *Sect.* 1. *p.* 465. *de Scient. Med.*

265. Much leſs dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge of Conditionals is in God before his *will* to concurr, or that they exiſt; For we are not acquainted with ſuch priorities and poſteriorities in God, except by ſuch denomination.

See all this modeſtly and judiciouſly handled by *Fr. Zumel Diſput. in Tho. p.* 1. eſpecially his *Concluſ.* 6. *p.* 127. And *Ockam* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 1. *Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q.* 2. *a.* 2. *Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu.* 1. *a.* 1. *Et Ant. Cordub. quæſt. q.* 55. *dub.* 10.

266. Methinks it is but fumbling to ſay with *Pet. à S. Joſeph Suav. Concord. Diſp.* 4. *p.* 484. *A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum ſub conditione, neceſſarium ſit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum nihil poſſit eſſe futurum ſive abſolute ſive ſub conditione, niſi Deus ut prima Cauſa aut abſolute, aut ſub conditione velit ad iſta concurrere.* At the firſt look this ſeemeth to be ſpoken of the *cauſe* of *futurition*, or of the *knowledge of it*: And if not, the Decree ſeemeth mentioned to no purpoſe: For *futurum tantum ſub conditione*, is not as ſuch *futurum*; For the condition ſuſpendeth the *futurition*: A *conditional propoſition de futuro* is as true of that which will never come to paſs as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth *e. g.* that *Judas* ſhall ſin if he be ſo and ſo tempted, it will lay the cauſe of *Judas* ſin more on God in their own apprehenſion, than their Cauſe or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that *unneceſſary Cauſes* ſhall *certainly* effect the thing (ſin) let them take heed of the conſequence.

See the ſhort anſwer in *Pet. à S. Joſeph. Suav. Concord. p.* 576.

267. I could never ſee how the Doctrine *de ſcientia media* doth at all ſerve their turn: ſeeing they uſe it to ſhew how God *knoweth that Determinately*, which he foreſeeth but *in Conditionibus ſine quibus non*, or in *unneceſſary* and not *determining* cauſes. And their own anſwer ſignifieth nothing more to the purpoſe, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his underſtanding, which is moſt true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the *ſuppoſition of circumſtances*, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of ſuch *Conditional propoſitions*, and *contingents* as ſo circumſtantiated, ſeemeth *True materially*, (that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge;) but *falſe efficiently* as if they were *any Cauſes* of his knowledge, (which hath no Cauſe;) but only extrinſecal denominaters of it in that act: And it ſeemeth *uſeleſs* and *needleſs* to their purpoſe.

Pennot. l. 4. *c.* 23. ſaith, 1. *Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi poſſe.* 2. *Hunc modum reconciliationis (decretorum cum Libertate) principaliter & immediate non inniti Scientiæ mediæ, ſed ſolum remote: quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb. libertatem cum Div. decretis: ſed ut Deus provide & ſapientiſſime omnes actus, maxime liberos diſponere poſſit; & dirigere ad opt. fines.*

268. For I confeſs I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to ſatisfie us, how God knoweth any thing Intelligible, than to ſay, *By his Infinite perfection.* Man knoweth by *Reception ab extra*, but ſo doth not God. And if the Queſt. *How doth God know this*, ſuppoſe *extrinſick efficiency or reception*, it is blaſphemous! And I confeſs I hear men diſpute *How God knoweth?* with horrour as I hear men curſe and

swear and blaspheme: knowing how uncapable such Moles as we Mortals are of understanding the intrinsick manner of Gods knowledge; And I detest the very question, and am but perswading others to detest it thus understood.

269. Much more do I think it arrogant presumption in those that dispute *pro scientia media* to say that God *Can no otherwise know future contingents.* As Annatus de scient. med. p. 85. contr. Twiss. D. 1. c. *Secluſa Scientia Mediâ non remanere in Deo præſcientiam abſolutam futurorum contingentium. Et* cap. 6. *Secluſa Scientia Media non poſſe prædefiniri à Deo liberas creatæ voluntatis actiones.* O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in cases so unsearchable darest assert a *non posse* upon the Almighty God thus in the dark!

Absurdum concessum est, nisi in veritatem fugere intellectum. Divinum est prorsus propositiones de futuris contingentibus, &c. Blank. de Concord. lib. cum Decretis. 1. Thes. 48, 50, 51.

270. And it is no less arrogant in the adversaries of *Scientia Media*, such as some of our own, and the *Scotists* who dare say that God *cannot know future contingents, but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will.* As if we had seen into all his *Powers* and *Acts*, who dwelleth in the unaccessible light. Whereas we know little of the smallest of his works.

Rada ubi Capr. (who was one of the Congregation where it was disputed before *P. Clem. 8.* and was against it as *Pet. à S. Joseph* and others tell us.)

271. And as audaciously do the Dominicans plead that *God cannot* otherwise know our future free acts, but by *decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total first efficient cause.* Nothing can be more certain than that *we know not How God knoweth*, who scarce know How we know our selves.

272. He that hath read but one half what is said upon this subject by *Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Fasol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navar. Curiel. Cabrera, Mascaren. Verdu, Fonseca, Mendoz. Lessius, Diotalev. Moncæus, Theophil. in Theolog. Natur. Ægidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joseph, Annatus, Twisse*, &c. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk presumptuously of things which are unknown above their reach, doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which *Durandus* his third opinion casteth in the way, and doth but try to solve well all *Lud. à Dola's Questions, Part* 1. *cap. 9. p. 96, 97*, &c. and to answer well all his arguments against the *usefulness* of *Scientia Media, Part* 2. and against the *truth* of *immediate physical Predetermination, Part.* 3. and against *Identificate Concurse* (as to *evil actions*) *Part* 4. may soon find that much of these matters are so far above us as to be *nothing* to us, and unfit to be thought necessary to our Peace and Concord.

Sed dicat ex nostris qui Deum in media abjicientes Semipelagianis, anguilli similis, &c. Sylvius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even *Gomarus, Walæus*, and *Lud. Crocius*, as also *Jacob. Martinius* and other *Lutherans*: and are we further from *Arminius* than *Gomarus* was?

273. The old doctrine of Gods *Prevision*, and this *de Scientia Media*, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they erre that hold it to run *pari passu*, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not *evil Acts* because he *willeth them*, or the *futurity* of them, nor because he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act *in specie* which is sin: But he *willeth* to effect that which is Good, and may so far know it.

SECT.

SECT. XIII.

Of Gods Will and Decrees in General.

274. GOds Decrees *de futuris* and his *will de præſentibus* are in themſelves the ſame, ſave as to the extrinſick denomination from the divers ſtate of the connoted objects.

275. Gods *Decrees* are not *his works in themſelves* conſidered, but only when with his *executive power*, they *operate ad extra*: and then his *knowledge and will* are his *working*, being productive of the effects.

That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing paſt and ceaſed, but as a thing ſtill doing, *Pennot. li. 4. c. 24.* thinketh is the beſt notion to reconcile them with liberty. But *ab extrinſeco & Connotative* they muſt be denominated paſt; though without change in God. Of this Dr. *Twiſſe* hath animadverted.

276. As in point of *ſimplicity* Gods Acts are *all One* and *yet many*, that is, *One ex parte agentis* as his *Acts* are but his *Eſſence*; and yet *many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinſeca*; ſo alſo as to their *Eternity Gods Acts are all Eternal* as they are his *Eſſence, ex parte agentis*; and yet ſome of them *new* and *temporary*, ſome paſt, ſome preſent, ſome future, *ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinſeca*.

277. Yet I confeſs that it paſſeth my underſtanding to conceive *how* it is, that the ſame Act is Eternal *ex parte agentis*, and yet but temporary *ex parte patientis & effecti*: that God ſhould from eternity do all that ever he doth *ex parte ſui* to *create* the world, to redeem, ſanctifie, juſtifie, *&c.* and yet that nothing ſhould be done by it till lately. Which drew *Ludov. à Dola* (*de modo conjunct. Concurſ. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.*) to ſay, [*Probatur Actionem Dei externam ſeu Concurſum in actu ſecundo eſſe actum ab ipſo Deo diſtinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non ſolum poterat nihil agere ad extra, ſed de facto per æternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei eſt omnino diſtincta ab ipſo Deo: Neque dici poteſt actionem quidem Dei fuiſſe ab æterno, ſed effectum non fuiſſe niſi in tempore; Quia tametſi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, eſſe poſſit antequam Cauſa actu agat; tamen Actio eſſe non poteſt quin Cauſa verè agat & producat. Ac impoſſibile eſt Cauſam vere Agere & producere, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab æterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab æterno* (*loquimur de productione ad extra & tranſeunte.*) *Sane non poteſt Actio eſſe ſine termino & effectu ſuo. Sed Actio eſſentialiter eſt ſui termini productio aut conſervatio, & ne concipi quidem poteſt ſine illo: Eſtq; prorſus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conſervationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipſam rem; Eſtq; Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipſam formaliter producitur, aut conſervatur; nec ſejungi ab illa poteſt.*] And ſo *Aureolus*.

278. In this alſo we we muſt confeſs that the matter quite tranſcendeth our capacity: And as this is raſh in *à Dola*, to affirm ſo confidently a thing above him, ſo we muſt not be raſh to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But ſo far as we may venture, the common way ſeemeth the far ſafer: Becauſe God is *unchangeable* not only *Morally*, but *Naturally*. And this Action as diſtinct from the Effect, is made by *him*, to be neither the *Creator* nor a *Creature*, but a *Creating*, or *moving Act*, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can *Velle* or *Decree ab æterno, mundum fieri, Petrum juſtificari*, &c. *in hoc tempore*; ſo we are not ſure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which ſhall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his *will*. Though I confeſs that the caſe much differeth, between an * *Immanent Act*, (ſuch as *nuda Volitio*,) which doth *nihil efficere*, and an *Effecting*

* *Ego quidem fator noſtram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum ſententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non eſſe operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipſi eſſentiæ; quam ſi dicamus eſſe actum quendam liberum elicitum: utroque tamen modo conandum.* Vaſqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it eaſie, eaſie it muſt be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinſick are commonly ſaid to be no real additions to his eſſence, but *dum unus, ſimplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia ſcit, vult, facit*, his will and underſtanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.

Effecting Act. But many conceive that God cauſeth all things *meerly by willing* them. (Though I ſee not but that *will* muſt be a *Powerful* emanant operative *will*, which is more than *meer will.*) And we are ſo unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot ſay that *Action ex parte agentis* may not be *ſine termino, objecto & effectis.* And all Philoſophical Divines agree that God hath no *Power out of Act*; but an *Active power* alwayes equally in act, *ex parte ſui*, and ſo is a *pure act.* Let us (*per poſſibile vel impoſſibile*) ſuppoſe the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in *vacuo* emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive *radios* by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no *Terminus*, and no *effect.* And ſuppoſe afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers *Termini* and *Recipients* would make a diverſity of effects, and the various *diſpoſition* of the *Recipients* would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce *motion* in one, *light* in another, *heat* in another, *ſweetneſs* from the *Roſe*, and ſtink from Weeds, and ſo of other effects. I do but tell you why we muſt not peremptorily deny much more of God.

That the *Potentia executiva in Deo* is *principium proximum agendi ad extra*, See *Tennot. l.* 3. *c.* 13. *n.* 2. & *Again.* 1. *d.* 45. *a.* 3. *ad.* 2.

279. Preſcience with Predefinition or Decree do not inferr cauſally that neceſſity of the event as predetermining premotion doth: Becauſe they do (alone) *nihil ponere in objecto.* So that if it could be proved that God doth eternally Decree or will the event of ſin, and mens damnation abſolutely, it would not prove (alone) that he is therefore the cauſe of them. It is not therefore the Predetermination of bare Decree which we lay thoſe conſequences on, but *efficient predetermination.*

Ludwardine l. 2. *c.* 55. *p.* 699. argueth that Gods will *de creandis*, was antecedently free; and yet concomitantly and conſequently neceſſary, and both immutably from Eternity.

280. *Lombard, d.* 45. well concludeth That even that free-will of God by which he willeth, decreeth, and loveth the Creature, is his eſſence: But yet the Name [*Amor Petri, odium peccati*, &c.] ſignifieth not his *Eſſence as ſuch*, but his Eſſential will as denominated from the created or humane object.

281. Therefore it cannot be inferred hence, that *God is a Creature, becauſe he willeth or Loveth* the Creature: Becauſe his Loving it denominateth his Eſſence as terminated on or connoting the object, and not as in it ſelf ſimply.

282. It is not fit or lawful to ask after any *Cauſe* of the Will of God; Becauſe it is the *firſt cauſe* of all things elſe, and hath nothing Superiour or antecedent to Cauſe it; And God is abſolutely independent, and is not to be called the *Cauſe of himſelf.*

Ruiz who ſaith that Gods will hath a final cauſe, meaneth but a final object, as he confeſſeth. A Tree is a paſſive recipient cauſe of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the effect as received: but not of the act *ex parte ſolis.*

283. Even the Acts of Gods *free-will* or *Decrees*, have no Cauſe even in God himſelf; no more than thoſe called *Neceſſary.* For we muſt not ſay that any thing in God is an *effect.*

284. Yet as Gods Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object, (which in man is a conſtitutive Cauſe of the Act, *loco materiæ,*) ſo extrinſick objects may be called *The Cauſes* (but rather the Objects) of God *will*, *Love* or *Knowledge*, not as his *Eſſence*, but only as ſo *denominated* by that Connotation of the object.

285. Theſe diſtributions of Gods Volitions in *Number*, and by *ſpecifying objects*, and *individuating objects*, which are called *material conſtitutive cauſes* of the act, are all according to humane weakneſs; in us who know God but enigmatically, and in a glaſs: But yet if any man uſe ſuch words in a broader manner than we think fit, before we cenſure and condemn him we muſt hear his ſence explained. For all that ever we can ſay of God is *improper*, analogical, yea metaphorical; And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about Gods attributes

and

and actions differ; For (as is oft said) no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God. If God should not speak to us in this improper language of our own, he must not speak intelligibly to us, unless he create another understanding in us. And he himself in Scripture using such language of himself, alloweth us to use it, while we profess to disclaim ascribing to God any of the imperfection which it seemeth to import.

286. On these terms not only Various Volitions are ascribed to God in Scripture, and exteriour causes of them, (as John 16.27. the *Father Loveth you, because ye have loved me, and believed*, &c.) * But also *Fear, Affliction, Grief, Hatred, Repenting, Rejoycing*, &c. *Deut.* 32.27. *Isa.* 63.9. *Gen.* 6.6. *Psal.* 5.5. *Gen.* 6.7. 1 *Sam.* 15.11. *Joel* 2.13. *Jer.* 15.6. *Hos.* 11.8. *Zeph.* 3.17. *Jer.* 32.41, *&c.* and exteriour causes of them.

287. That which is to be understood by all these, is 1. That man is so far the Cause of the *Effects* of Divine Volitions, as the *Dispositio receptiva*, may be called a *Cause*. And I before shewed in the instance of the effects of the Suns Influx, how great a hand the various *Dispositiones materiæ receptivæ* have in the diversifications of effects. 2. And that Gods Volitions themselves are hence relatively denominated.

288. Therefore we must say, that Gods electing *Peter* and his rejecting *Judas*, his Love to *Peter* and his hatred of *Judas*, are not in *specie* the same act of his will; nor his Loving *Peter*, and his Loving *Paul* the same *Numerically*; As his knowing of *Peter* to be a Saint, and his knowing *Judas* to be a Saint, is not the same *numerical* act of *knowledge*; Though as they are Gods *Essence*, all are but one. And we must say that he Loveth one because he is good, and hateth another because he is evil; and he justifieth men because they believe, and condemneth men because they believe not; that he forgiveth a sinner because he repenteth, *&c.* Though Gods Will have no *efficient* Cause.

289. Those Volitions of God which are but *Immanent* as to *Efficiency*, but *Transient Objectively*, are some of them to be *denominated* as *before* the *thing willed*, and some *as after*. The Will *of effecting* is before the thing willed: The Will *ut finis*, or *Complacency* and *Displicency* (as also *Intuitive Knowledge* of the thing as *Existent*, estimation, approbation, reprobation of it) the Will of Continuing, modifying, altering, perfecting, destroying, suppose the existence of the thing willed *in esse objectivo*. And so many Volitions may be denominated as *beginning* in time, as connoting the objects.† And it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability so to name them, than to his simplicity to name them *many* and *divers*.

290. And in this sense it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability, to speak of Him as being before *in Potentia* only as to such *Relative denominations*. As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it, and yet is not therefore mutable: Or as you are yet but *in potentia* to the termination of his Relations who will pass about you, before and behind, on the right hand and on the left. So God was but *Potentially* the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity. Though as to any real passion God hath no passive power.

291. In this sense of relation to the objects and effects, it is that we conceive of Gods acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature, as one being before and one after another; Though not as they are Gods Essence.

292. Yet because the *use and truth* of *words* or *names*, is their signification of *Things* as indeed they are, and we should put no name on any creature,

* So Gen. 22.16. & 26.5. Prov. 1.24. Luke 11.8. & 19.17. Gal. 4.6. Eph. 5.6. 1 Sam. 28.18. 1 King. 9.9. & 11.34. & 20.42. 2 King. 10.30. 2 Chron. 34.27. Psal. 91.14.

† *Pennottus li.* 4. *c.* 24. *p.* 235. confidently argueth, that because God can Love him that he hated or Loved not, he can therefore Predestinate him whom he reprobated, or change his decrees without any change in himself. I answer, 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a sinner before, and cease hating him without any change save relative and by extrinsecal denomination. 2. But his inference seemeth to me false and dangerous, unless he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not. For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as existent, and by such connotation are named: And his fourth supposition is false, that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal. For the formal Act of Love is Complacency: And the *Velle Bonum* is another thing, as I think an effect of Love; or at the most another act of Love. And we deny that any absolute *Velle bonum alicui* is ever changed, though displicence be changed: Because it is the same with Decree. 2. And the reason why the said Decree or Volition (if absolute and proper) may not be denominated changed is, because it maketh its own object, and so supposeth it not pre-existent, and dependeth not on it denominatively: And therefore it would inferr God to be mutable, to change it; But it is not so in the other, which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature; as doth Gods Knowledge of present existents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation.

creature, but what is adapted to notifie it aright to mans understanding; we must much more be afraid of putting any cau eleſs, unmeet, unneceſſary names of reality or diſtinction on the *will* or Acts of God.

293. Gods *Will* is not *Appetitus rei deſideratæ*; for he wanteth nothing.

294. God willeth *efficiently all that he effecteth*; and *finally* by *complacence*, all that is *Good*.

295. Gods *Willing* or *Loving Himſelf*, is *Himſelf*; or an *inadequate Conception* of *Himſelf* as he is. But his *Willing* or *Loving* Creatures, is (as is oft ſaid) a relative connotative Conception of Himſelf as extrinſecally denominated, and not as he *is himſelf*.

296. Gods Will *ad extra* is *Free*; And therefore it cannot be ſaid that he *willeth* or *Loveth ad ultimum potentiæ*, all that by *Power* he is Able to *Will*, or *Love*, or do: or that he *doth* all that he is *Able* to do.

297. Therefore it cannot be denyed that there is in God a Negation of Volition: that is, that he willeth not ſome things which he *Could Will*. As to have made the World ſooner, greater, with other ſorts of creatures: to have made ſome men better, wiſer, richer, *&c.* The exterior objects of Gods Will are finite, and contingent beings.

298. Therefore to aſcribe to God a *Negation of ſome Poſſible Volition* cannot be charged as making Gods Will to be Idle, or Neutral, or as any Imperfection: ſeeing it is but his *free-negation* of his own Act, through his perfection.

299. Nor can it be ſaid, that hereby we make God Finite in that his *Will* is made Finite in Act, which is *Himſelf*. For his *Will* is Infinite as it is his *Eſſence*, and as it *Acteth upon Himſelf*; though as it *acteth ad extra* on *finite* temporary Creatures, it muſt needs be relatively, and connotatively as to the *terminus* denominated finite: which all muſt hold *de re*, that think not the World is Infinite. If the Sun were alone in *Vacuo*, it would be as Great as now it is, and as perfect: And yet as its beams are terminated on this or that recipient Creature, they are more limited.

300. We cannot prove that really God hath any Poſitive Decrees or Volitions of Nothings as ſuch.

301. Therefore none ſuch ſhould be aſſerted by Divines, much leſs pretended neceſſary to be believed, to our Concord.

302. It ſeemeth more allowable to hold the Negative, that God hath no ſuch Decrees; becauſe *Nothing* is not a capable *terminus* of a *Divine act*: And therefore it is a fiction of *Scaliger*, that [*Omnipotentia agit in non ens, ut fiat ens,*] *Exercit. 365. n. 9. pag. 1074.* And *ſi entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate*, much leſs *Divine acts*. Alſo *Non-volition* is enough to a *non-exiſtence* or a *Nothing*; Therefore a *Nolition* need not be feigned to it: *& fruſtra fit per plura, quod*, &c.

303. Yet knowing ſo little of God as we do, I dare not boldly aſſert the contrary: But it's enough to know that *this* muſt not be aſſerted, and built on in our diſputes.

304. How God *Willeth* future *Contingents* troubleth the Schools with many needleſs difficulties as well as *how* he *knoweth* them. About his *knowledge* of them, before treated of, there are beſides the *Dominicans* that lay it on *Pre-determination* as *decreed*, and the *Scotiſts* that lay it on *Decree or Will alone*, ſeveral other opinions: One is of *Ambr. Catharinus de Præd. Sanct.* who holdeth that God *knoweth not* future Contingents, *certo ſub conditione cauſali*, but only by *conjecture*: Becauſe the object is not otherwiſe *ſcibile*. 2. *Vaſquez* ſaith, that God cannot know a *future contingent* meerly *contingent*, as being *not determinate*: And that the Propoſition

poſition hereof is ever falſe, becauſe it is ſpoken by way of Cauſality and Conſequence, when there is none. 3. *Suarez* and others ſay, that God knoweth *future contingents*, even when the Condition is *diſparate* or of *no Cauſality*, a true Connexion of the terms ſufficing. *Albertinus Princ.* 4. *To.* 1. *qu.* 4. *dub.* 1. *p.* 292. pretendeth to a middle way, *viz.* 1. That future contingents *ſub conditione* are certainly known of God, whether the condition be *Cauſal* or *meerly Conditional*. 2. But *quando Conditio eſt diſparata, non poteſt futurum Contingens ſub illa Conditione cognoſci à Deo.* 3. But becauſe there is a *Concomitancy* between the terms of the propoſitions, ſuch a *diſparate Propoſition* may be known of God, *ſub ratione Concomitantiæ.*

And accordingly they diverſifie Gods *Decrees*. To the queſtion, Whether conditional future contingents may be known of God in his *Decree*, he firſt telleth us of a threefold Decree, 1. *Conditional quoad Actum & Objectum, ut* [*ſi diſcernerem concurſurum cum voluntate creata, ſi talis occaſio occurreret, hoc futurum eſſet.*] 2. *Ex parte objecti* only, (being abſolute *ex parte actus.*) 3. Abſolute on both parts; I refer you to him *p.* 206, 297. if you will ſee the deciſion, leſt I perplex and weary you: And for the ſame reaſon paſs by a multitude of other controverſies of theſe men.

SECT. XIV.

Of ſeveral Diſtinctions of Gods Will.

305. MAny diſtinctions of *Gods will* are uſed about theſe Controverſies: As, 1. The *Poſitive* Acts of Gods Will are diſtinguiſhed from his *not-acting* (or not-willing.) 2. The *Poſitive objectively*, from the *Negative-quoad objectum.* 3. The *Poſitive* from the *oppoſitive.* 4. The *Immanent* and the *Tranſient acts.* 5. The *Tranſient efficienter*, and the *Tranſient* only *objectively.* 6. The *Natural* and the *Free.* 7. The *Efficient* and *Permiſſive* acts. 8. *Beneplaciti & ſigni.* 9. *Abſolute* and *Conditional.* 10. *Effectual and uneffectual.* 11. The *Decreeing Will* and the *Preceptive Will.* 12. *Antecedent* and *Conſequent.* And becauſe you will meet with all theſe, I ſhall tell you in what ſenſe only they muſt be received.

306. I. Of the firſt I have ſaid enough before. Gods *free-will* hath its free-not-willings, that are no nolitions.

307. II. The meaning of the ſecond is, that God *doth poſitively will* ſome *Beings*, and ſome *Negatives.* If they mean *Negative Propoſitions*, it's true, but inept; Becauſe thoſe are Poſitive Beings. If they mean in the ſecond branch [*Nothings*] they cannot prove that God Poſitively at all *willeth them.* But he oft willeth their Antecedents and conſequents, and occaſions, and he willeth all creatures to be *Limited* and Imperfect, and ſo Negations muſt needs conſequently paſs upon them: And in that he willeth *not-more*, and willeth *cauſes* which may be deficient, men improperly and conſequently ſay he willeth negatively, *ne ſint Plura*, and the defects. But this is not ſtrict ſpeech.

308. Yet in a *Moral ſenſe* God is oft ſaid to will *Nothings* (or Negatives *quoad eſſe*:) (As that men ſhall not have grace, that they ſhall not live, or not be pardoned, or ſaved, *&c.*) 1. Becauſe he doth properly and poſitively *will* and make that Law which condemneth them to theſe penalties; 2. Becauſe he will have Chriſt poſitively Condemn them to Privative puniſhments; 3. Becauſe he doth poſitively take away ſome of the mercies which

tend to ſave them; 4. And he doth freely and penally not-give them that which they are deprived of. So that this Language is not unfit while we ſpeak of Moral Subjects, and of God after our manner. But in ſtrict ſpeech it cannot be proved that any [Nothing] is the proper object of a Volition of God.

309. The opinion of *Scotus* and his followers is known this way. And *ſubtile Albertine To. 1. princ. 4. qu. 4. p. 297.* ſaith, that *Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Poſitivo velle negationes,——& Reſp. Deum non habere actum poſitivum non concurrendi, ſed negationem actus Volendi dare concurſum efficacem: & juxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo ſe habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum. Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu poſitivo, ſed tantum negative ſe habet circa concurſum efficacem dando remedia illa per quæ efficaciter impediretur peccatum*——Vid. cæt.

See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions.

310. III. The third diſtinction is between Gods *Love* and *Hatred*, his *Volitions* and *Nolitions*; And this muſt be uſed. But *Hatred* and *Nolition* in man have more of imperfection, than Love and Volition, importing ſomewhat contrary to us, and either hurtful, troubleſome, feared, or that poſſibly may be ſo. Therefore we muſt confeſs here, that we ſpeak of God with greater impropriety, and muſt diſclaim the imperfection in the ſenſe.

311. But if you would not be abuſed into many errors, ſwallow not the name [*Love*] and [*Hatred*] without diſtinction; Leſt the fore-cited reaſon of *Pennottus* cheat you; *viz.* [God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked: *Ergo* he can decree or predeſtinate a man to ſalvation, whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation.] And all roſe from this falſhood, that [*Love is nothing but the willing of ſalvation to us*] and ſo the ſame with *Decree:* Whereas Love is alſo, yea, moſt properly a *Complacency in Good as Good*, and Hatred a *Diſplicency* in Evil as Evil. *Benevolence* is ſometime Antecedent and ſometime an effect of this in man.

312. IV. The Immanent and Tranſient acts, I need ſay no more of.

D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. *Quando quæritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam, aut ejus actum, qui eſt Deus: ſed quantum ad tranſitum ejus ſuper objectum, ſeu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipſam Voluntatem.*

313. V. But Divines uſe to omit the next diſtinction (of *Tranſient acts*) ſo much, that few of them let you know, whether that which is but *Objectively Tranſient*, be numbred by them with *Immanent* or with *Tranſient* acts. Briefly, 1. As *Gods Will* is the *firſt efficient*, and with his *Wiſdom* and *Executive Power* doth *effect ad extra*, it is *effectively Tranſient*, (though *Eſſentially Immanent* in it ſelf.) 2. But as *Gods Will* is (as aforeſaid) the *Final Cauſe or End* of all things, and *willeth* things only *Complacentially*, ſuppoſing all that is *Complacent* to be *Exiſtent* (*in eſſe reali, vel in eſſe cognito*) ſo is it only *Objectively Tranſient*, and not *effectively*; and therefore by many is numbred with *Immanent* acts. And as God may be ſaid to *know* and *will* the creature *in himſelf*, and to *Love* the *Idea* of it *in himſelf*, the phraſe is not to be blamed: But as the Creature in it ſelf conſidered by fore-knowledge or preſent knowledge (if we may ſo diſtinguiſh) is the object, it ſeemeth unfit to call the act Immanent, though it do *nihil ponere* (*vel efficere*) *in objecto.*

* How far Gods Volitions of creatures are free, the ſubtileſt confeſs to be unſearchable. *Vaſquez* (*ut ſupra*) *in 1. Thom. q. 19. diſp. 80. p. 504.* [*Licet aſſignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione factæ cum objectis & rebus creatis, tamen non aſſignamus ſufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci referatur ad has potius quam ad illas; Siquidem Idem omnino manens in ſe, poterat eas non velle quas vult: Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus, difficultatem prædicam evadere non poſſumus.*] See more of him before.

314. But Gods *Will* as it effecteth *Relations ad extra*, is even *effectively Tranſient*, as well as that which altereth *qualities*: *e.g.* his *Pardoning*, *Juſtifying*, *Adopting* acts of *Will.*

315. VI. * Gods *Natural Volitions* are thoſe which *ex natura rei*, could not be otherwiſe; that is, All his Volitions of his own being and perfections; To which ſome number natural neceſſary objects, in the creatures: As his Volition that Contradictions ſhall not be true; that two and two ſhall be four, or two more than one, *&c.* His *Free* Volitions are thoſe which might have been otherwiſe as to the nature of the thing, and as to the power

power of the Divine will. Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures.

316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten, and the Holy Ghoſt freely proceed, ariſeth from the ambiguity of the word [*free*;] which I will not trouble you with.

317. Yet all agree that Gods Volitions are all *eternall*, and therefore *eternally neceſſary neceſſitate exiſtentiæ*.

318. And ſome think it beſt to ſay that they are reſpectively to be called both *Neceſſary* and *Free*; Becauſe Gods *will choſe* that which his *wiſdom* ſaw was *Beſt*, and he muſt neceſſarily *chooſe* the *Beſt*. But we muſt not be here too bold in our Concluſions.

319. VII. The diſtinction of an *efficient* and *permiſſive will* is no better, nor other, than that of a *Volition* and no *Volition*. But to diſtinguiſh the *Efficient* and *Permiſſive* Act, implyeth a falſhood, That *Permiſſion* as ſuch is an *Act*.

320. Yet Gods *Law* may be ſaid to have a *permiſſive Act*, that is, He may declare [*This I permit you to do, or leave indifferent*] as to *political permiſſion*. And as to *Phyſical permiſſion*, I have ſhewed before, that ſome poſitive removal of Impediments, are ſometimes called *non impedire*, or permiſſion: But *permiſſion* it ſelf as ſuch is *no act*.

321. VIII. The diſtinction of *Vol. Beneplaciti & ſigni* is old and common: But not a diſtinguiſhing the *Acts* of Gods will, but rather his *Volitions* from the *ſigns* of them. For it is his *Voluntas beneplaciti* that there *ſhall be ſuch ſigns*.

322. The five ſigns commonly named by the Schoolmen are *Præcipit ac prohibet, permittit, conſulit, implet*. And the older Schoolmen ſay that theſe are called Gods Will Metaphorically only, yea by a remote ſort of Metaphor, they being not *mans will* properly but *metaphorically* only when applyed to man, and accordingly called Gods will. But ſome of the latter ſay that they are proper ſigns of Gods real will. The truth is, they that firſt uſed this diſtinction ſeem to have intended only Gods Government, if not his *word* alone with the performance of it, by *Voluntas ſigni*, (of which next.) Indeed the whole ſenſible world and all things in it, is ſome way or other a ſign of Gods will: eſpecially the nature of man himſelf, with the nature of all creatures about him, and the order in which he ſtandeth to them; which is therefore called, The Law of Nature.

Aqu. 1. *q.* 19. *art.* 11,12. *Pet. de Alliaco* 1. *q.*14. *A. Voluntas Dei ſumitur Propriè; & tunc ſignat divinum beneplacitum, quod non eſt aliud quam ipſe Deus volens.* 2. *Impropriè & metaphoricè pro aliquo ſigno ejus, &c.*

323. *Phyſical Permiſſion* is no poſitive ſign, nor of a poſitive will (as afore opened:) But *Legal permiſſion* may be.

For this read *Alliaco ib.* further after cited: And his citation of *Gregor.* that *Voluntas beneplaciti* is *reſpectu complexi Volitio, proſecutio aut fuga, Aut ſimplex complacentia & diſplicentia, & eſt ipſe Deus præter connotationem.*

324. The diſtinction between *præcipit* and *conſulit* would be vain, but that *Aqu.* and ſome others expound *conſulit* by *Perſwading*. For God counſelleth to nothing but what is Beſt; and that which is Beſt, *precept* (even *natural*) maketh it our *Duty* to chooſe: But *Precept* going before and *Making Duty*, *Perſwading-counſel* may come after and urge us to perform it.

325. Gods *Voluntas ſigni & Bene-placiti* are never contrary properly taken: Nor doth he give us any *falſe ſigns* of his *Will*; And therefore his word is alwayes true: But there are many things which ignorance miſ-judgeth to be a ſign of ſome Divine Volition, which they ſignifie not; and ſome dark ſignes which are not eaſily underſtood. If men miſtake Gods *works* or *word*, the *ſign* was not falſe, but their *expoſition* of it. But of this next.

326. IX. Dr. *Twiſſe* uſeth inſtead of this the diſtinction of *Voluntas Beneplaciti & Præcepti*. His ſence is *Right*, but the terms are too *narrow*. The true Diſtinction is of Gods *Will* of *Natural Things* and *Events as ſuch*, and his *will de Debito vel Jure as ſuch*: His *will* as it is the Fountain of *Nature*, and as it is the *fountain* of *Morality* or *Right*: Or his *will* of *Natural* Events and his *Law*.

... Dei ... praecepta ... dupliciter ... 1. quod ita ... 2. ... Et ... Nam ... praecepta ... ſignificat aliquid ... eſſe: ... Aut ... eſſe ... ſed ... praecepta ... eſſe: ... implentur. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. F.

327. This diſtinction is of Greater and more Neceſſary uſe to us than any of the reſt; yea ſo great that it is included in the firſt principle of Religion and morality; and is underſtood (diſtinctly or more darkly, but really) by all Chriſtians and moral agents.

328. The diſtinction is fetcht from the *objects*: The common object of the one being *Nature* as ſuch, and of the other *Debitum* or *Jus* as ſuch.

329. As Gods *will de Naturalibus* is his *Bene placitum*; and the *effects* of it are the *ſigna ſubſequentia*, and *propheſie* a *prognoſtick* of the effect; ſo Gods will *de Debito* is his *Beneplacitum*, ſignified by his *Law* and *Judgement*.

330. Though the word [*Law*] be uſually taken more narrowly for only [*Statute eminent Laws*] yet I here take it generally; And it is [*The Governing will of a Rector ſignified, conſtituting or confirming Right* (or *Duenеſs*) *from and to the Subject*; or *A Rectors conſtitutive Determination of Right*; or, *The ſign of a Rectors Will conſtituting Right.*]

1. *Sicut Divina voluntas ... causa efficiens ... prima efficiens causa, ... ipſa in genere ... legis obligantis eſt prima Lex ſeu ... regula.* 2. *Sicut divina voluntas eſt efficiens cauſa ... vult aliquid eſſe vel fieri: ... ipſa eſt Lex obligatoria: ... vult aliquid ... fieri, ... eſſe vel non ... eſſe.* 3. *Sicut divina ... eſt Lex ... perfectiſſimæ rationalis creaturæ, ... Lex Chriſti vel doctrina eſt ſignum perfectiſſimum voluntatis divinæ.* Pet. Alliac. Cancer. in 1. ſent. Concip.

1. *Voluntas Dei ſigni non ſemper impletur.* 2. *Voluntas beneplaciti antecedens, non ſemper impletur.* 3. *Voluntas beneplaciti conſequens ſemper impletur. Prohibitio Legis non ſignat Deum Nolle efficaciter illud fieri quod prohibet fieri.* Idem 1. q. 44. F.

De præcepto & prohibitione ſatis patet quod quilibet tenetur ſe conformare univerſaliter tali Voluntati... Implere obligationem, non eſt ponere loquendo effectus obligationis activæ; ſed facere ad implendum eſt ejus effectus. Idem ib. G. H.

331. God being moſt Great and Wiſe and Good, and mans Creator, and thence our Abſolute ſupream Rector, his Will muſt needs be the fountain of all Morality and Right.

332. It is not the *will in it ſelf* that is a *Law*, nor doth any *Immanent act oblige us*, or *conſtitute Duty*: But it is *Gods Will as ſignified*. And therefore *Lex æterna* is an improper ſpeech.

333. *Tilenus* and others who think it fitter only to diſtinguiſh *Quid Deus ipſe vult facere*, and *Quid à nobis vult fieri*, do but hide and not open the truth: For the terms ſeem to expreſs the *Event* in both, and diſtinguiſh not of *Event* and *Duty*. Whereas if God *Willed* the *Event* of what he *commandeth us*, as he doth of what he *effecteth*, it would be *done*. And he doth alſo by his Abſolute *Decree*, Will many things *to be done by us*, which his *Law commandeth* not. Such as are many *meer Natural actions*, *quas à nobis vult fieri*.

334. *Morality* being but *Modality* and *Relation* of *Natural Entities*, the *Acts* or *Habits* themſelves commanded and forbidden are *quid Naturale* in *themſelves* conſidered, and ſo far are under Gods will *de naturalibus*; But it is only the *Debitum* or *Jus* that is conſtituted by his *Legiſlative will*.

335. Though Gods will *de Naturalibus* muſt operate by *real efficient efflux*, yet his *will de Debito effecteth* by meer *ſignification* or *notification* to the ſubject.

336. *Legem facere vel ſignum dare* is an act of Gods will *de quadam naturali vel eventu*: (For the *ſignum* is *aliquid naturale*.) But *per ſignum facere Jus* is that which is proper to the *Governing* or *Legal will*.

337. If we will denominate Gods will here *ab origine*, It is, 1. *Antecedent* to the *Creature*, (ſuppoſed;) And that is his *Creating will*. 2. *Suppoſing* the *Creature* in *Being*; and that is, 1. His will as *Proprietary* and *Actor* of all things; And that is his *Moving* and *Diſpoſing will*, of

of *Events*. 2. His *will* as *Governour* (*Morally*); And that is his *Morally Ruling will*. 3. His *will ut Amator & Finis*; And that is his *Beneficent* and *felicitating* will. And among these it is his *Regent will* which I am treating of. And though his *Law* as making *Jus*, be the first and chief part, yet his *Judgement* as it *decideth*, and his *Execution* as it *giveth* every *Man his Right* and *Due*, is included.

338. It is not *Gods will* without the *sign* (as is said) nor the *sign* without *his will*, but the *sign* as *notifying*, and his *will as notified* that is a *Law*, and *Jus* the *Effect*: *Gods will* is the *principal Cause*, and *quasi Anima Legis*; and the *sign* is the *instrumental Cause*, and *quasi Corpus*.

339. The *Sign* respecteth these things, 1. The *matter due*. 2. The *dueness or right*. 3. The *will of God concerning* or *constituting* it. 4. The *mind and will of man* to *whom* this is *signified*.

Or, 1. *Gods will* as the *Efficient* of *Right*. 2. The *matter* and *form of Right* as *Constituted*. 3. The *mind and will* of *man* as the *terminus*.

340. These *signs* of Gods will are, 1. *Natural*, called the *Law of Nature*: which is the *Natura & ordo rerum*, especially *ipsius hominis* as before described. 2. By *extraordinary Revelation*. The latter have the great advantage of plainness, *significandi rem præceptam*. The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God. Both are his Laws to man.

341. Law, Judgement and execution (the three parts of Government) differ in that, 1. *Law maketh* the *Debitum* or *Jus*; 2. *Judgement determineth* of it by *decisive* application; 3. *Execution distributeth* according to it.

It is of great use for a Divine who handleth Gods Laws to understand the nature of Laws in *genere* (as *Suarez in præf. de Legib.* sheweth; which Book is one of the best on that Subject that is extant among us.)

342. The *Jus vel Debitum*, *instituted* by the *Law*, is twofold. 1. *A Subditus*: What shall be *Due from the Subjects*: the *Debitum Officii*. 2. *Subditis*: what shall be *Due to the Subjects*: viz. 1. *Antecedently* to their *merits* (which is 1. The act of our *Governing Benefactor*. 2. Or a *Divider*: such was the Law for dividing the Israelites inheritances.) 2. *Consequently*; which is by the *Retributive* part of the Law (commonly called the *Sanction*,) which is 1. By the *Premiant part*, what *Reward* shall be due: 2. By the *Penal*, what *Punishment*.

343. Accordingly Laws have several parts: 1. *Precept and Prohibition*, making *Duty*: 2. *Retributive*, 1. *Premiant*, 2. *Penal*; called Gods *Promises and Threats*: 3. And *subservient* or *accidental*; 1. *Narratives Historical, Chronological*, &c. 2. *Pure Donations*: 3. *Propheſies*; 4. *Doctrinal*, 5. *Exhortatory*, 6. *Reprehensive*, &c.

344. Though *Debitum vel Jus facere*, be the *formal* operation of a Law; (which is to be *Fundamentum Relationis*) yet the *Act* of the chief parts (*preceptive* or *penal*) is commonly called *Obligation*: And so many say that *obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad pœnam* is all the *action* of a Law. But *Obligare* is a *Metaphor*, and therefore in dispute to be laid by, or to give place to the proper terms: And the *Premiant* act is not properly called *obligation*; nor the *penal* act, save in a secondary notion, as he is *obligatus ad pœnam ferendam*, if *judged*, who is first *Reus pœnæ*, or to whom it is *made Due* by the Law.

345. The *obligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad pœnam* is not of equality in the *disjunctive*. As if God were indifferent which we chose: But it is *primarily ad obedientiam*, and but *subserviently ad pœnam* as a means against *future disobedience*, and a securing the ends of Government, in case of sin.

346. But the *Preceptive* and the *Premiant parts*, are *each chief* or *final* in several respects: God *Commandeth* us a Course of *Duty* or *Right*

action

action to this end, that we may be *Happy* in his *Love*. And he *promiseth* us first, and giveth us after in foretaste, this *Happiness*, to draw us to *Duty*.

347. But here is a wonderful inseparable twist; and in the main an Identity. God *Ruleth* us as a *Father*, or *Regent Benefactor*: All his *Benefits* are *Free-gifts*, as to the *Thing* and *Value*; But given 1. In an *Order*. 2. And the *rest* as *means* to the ultimate. In which respects they are a *Reward*, or *means* to it. His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit. Duty is the means to keep his first Gifts and to receive more. The very *doing* of the *duty* is a *receiving* of the *Reward*; the *object* of *duty* being *felicitating*. (As if *feasting* or *accepting offered wealth* or *honour* were our *work*.) *Holiness* is happiness, in a great part. And in our *End* or state of *perfection* all will be one: To Love God, Rejoice in Him and praise him, will be both our duty and felicity, means and end, as it were, in one.

348. Whereas some say, that if there were *no Law*, sin would deserve punishment, it is an errour: For it is due only by Law. But it's true that it's due by the meer Law of Nature, without any superadded Positive Laws.

349. Gods *will* called *Legislative*, or *Governing* is ever fulfilled in strict sence, that is, So much as is *Gods part* and the *Laws* part to do, is *ever done*: *e.g.* God saith [*Perfect obedience*, &c. *shall be Adams duty*] and it is *done*: *It is his Duty* whether he *will* or not. He saith [*To steal shall be sin*] and it is *sin*. He saith [*He that believeth shall have right to Justification and Glory*, and he that *believeth not shall be Filius mortis*, that is, *Death and Hell shall be his Due*] and so it is. Thus strictly all Gods Will is done.

350. But in the secondary remote sence every sin violateth the Will of God, by breaking his Law: For when he saith [*Obedience shall be thy duty*;] we use to say, *It is Gods will that we should obey him*: And so when we *do not* obey him, we are said to *Violate* his will. But this is but metonymically: For that which is *Gods will* indeed is but that we *shall be bound to obey* (whether we do or not:) And the *event*, whether we shall or not *de facto*, is not at all determined by the Law.

351. Therefore if it were proved that God did *Decree one thing*, and *command the contrary*, it would not prove *two contrary wills* in God; nor is there any great shew of a contradiction in it. For to say [*I forbid* Judas *to hang himself*] and [*I decree that he shall hang himself*] are no contradictions; It is but to say, [*It shall be his Duty to preserve his life*] and [*Eventually he shall not preserve it.*] All that is a mans *Duty* doth not come to pass: And to determine of *Duty*, is not to say, *It shall come to pass*. Otherwise Gods word were false whenever man sinned. Nay in reality, *Augustine* (truly) judged that by Gods Law *Hell was Due to* Paul *unconverted*, and yet then he was a chosen Vessel, and God Decreed to save him. He thought that *Perseverance* was the Duty of some that after fell away, and that *Heaven* was their Due on condition of perseverance till they fell away, (though not presently to be possessed;) and yet that God decreed that *ipso permittente eventually* they should fall away and perish.

352. If a King made a Law that no man shall murder another, and yet knoweth that a certain Traytor that hath broken Prison, is like to fall into the hands of some Thieves or Enemies that will kill him, If he be secretly willing that he be killed by them, it is no contradiction: The Law maketh it their *duty* not to Kill; But it saith not, that *they shall not de eventu*, by way of Prognostication.

353. But

Of all the following distinctions, note these words of *Bonavent. in* 1. *d.* 47. *a.* 1. *p.* 1. *Voluntas vera Dei Antecedens seu Conditionalis, possibile est non implevi: — at consequens & absoluta vera quæ pura. Secundum Dabale. Voluntas beneplaciti est dupl. Antecedens seu conditionalis & consequens, quæ valet quantum in se est omnium salutem; & absoluta sive consequens, quæ determinate vult aliquid quod novit certitudinaliter evenire. Intelligendum est sic dum Dei Voluntas (nunquam fuerit aut cassari; [illegible] tamen posse non implevi non contradictionem) [illegible] consequentem [illegible] possibile effectum implevi, vel impedivi: — Non [illegible] possibile est Voluntatem Dei cassari: Nam [illegible] dicitur aliquid [illegible] effectu [illegible] quod [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri quantum in se est, hæc Voluntas non connotat salutem, nec proprie est ad effectum salutis: sed connotat ordinationem naturæ, sive naturam ordinabilem ad salutem. Unde nihil plus est dicere Deus vult illum salvum fieri quantum in se est, quam Deus placuit dare illi naturam per quam posset pervenire ad salutem; & quod Deus paratus esset juvare, ita quod salus non deficit propter defectum a parte Dei.* Therefore it connoteth also all the helps which God affordeth men.

353. But yet indeed God never doth *command an act* or *forbid an act*, and yet *Decree* that the ſame Act immediately commanded ſhall not be done, or that the act directly forbidden ſhall be done. Becauſe ſin is a thing that God cannot *decree* or *will*, (of which anon.)

354. But the *effect* of the commanded or forbidden act is ſometimes ſaid to be *commanded* or *forbidden*: And this may be contrarily decreed of God. And men that think not truly of the matter, think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden, and ſo they err by ſuch confuſed thoughts. *E.G.* Gods command is that I ſhall *relieve a poor man, and not let him famiſh*; and that I ſhall *heal the ſick, &c.* and yet God may decree that this poor man ſhall be *famiſhed*, and this ſick man *dye*; And yet no contradiction. For indeed [*Relieving*] in effect, is but the *End* of the Act which is commanded me, and not the act it ſelf: I am bound to *offer him* relief: But if one *cannot* take it, and another *will not*, yet I have done my duty: And ſo in the other inſtance. So God commanded *Abraham* to ſacrifice his Son, and yet decreed that he ſhould not be ſacrificed; And this without any contradiction. For the act that under that name was commanded *Abraham*, and made his duty, was not actual *eventual ſacrificing*. (For then it had been a duty to reſiſt the Angel and do a thing *impoſſible*.) But to *conſent* and *endeavour* on his part to ſacrifice his Son: which he did. So the *preſervation* of our own and *others lives* is commanded us by God, and yet at the ſame time mens death decreed: Becauſe the thing indeed commanded, is not *Preſervation* as it ſignifieth the *effect* and *ſucceſs*, but only *Preſervation* as it ſignifieth our *true endeavour*. So the *Jews* were forbidden to *kill Chriſt*, and yet God decreed that Chriſt ſhould be killed: For the thing forbidden them was their own *Conſent* and *wicked act*: But the *thing* that God *willed and decreed* was only *the effect*, without any Will of their Act that cauſed it (unleſs *in genere actus*,) but only a *permiſſion* of it. Men of groſs brains that cannot diſtinguiſh and judge accurately, may blaſpheme God in their ignorance, in a caſe that to a diſcerning judgement is very plain.

355. *The next diſtinction of *Gods Will*, is into *Abſolute* and *Conditional*; which ſome Divines uſe and others condemn, and ſay that God hath no Conditional Will. The common anſwer which moſt Schoolmen and other Papiſts agree with the Proteſtants in, is, that there are *Conditions rei volitæ* of the event of the thing Willed, but no Conditions of the act of *Volition* in God. As *Aquinas* ſaith of Cauſes, † *Deus vult hoc eſſe propter hoc; non autem propter hoc vult hoc.* 1. There are both *Cauſes* and *Conditions* of the event willed of God. 2. *Denominatione extrinſeca ex connotatione objecti* his Will is hence called *Conditional*; meaning but a *Volition* of *Conditionals*.

356. That God willeth *Conditions*, and *Conditional Propoſitions*, and *Grants*, is paſt all controverſies. For he *willeth* his own *word*, which is his *work*: But his *word* hath *conditional promiſes* and *threats*: And as his *word* alſo may be called his *will*, he hath a *Conditional will*, becauſe a *Conditional word*.

357. Gods eternal *Omniſcience* proveth, that at no inſtant he had a will properly *Conditional quoad actum*: Becauſe he that at the ſame inſtant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not, muſt needs have his will to be thereby abſolute. But yet if it had pleaſed God to ſuſpend the Act of his own Volition, upon a *humane Condition*, it would not have expoſed him at all to the charge either of *mutability* or *dependence*: which is very clear. For 1. It is preſuppoſed his Will as *Voluntas & Eſſentia* is *unalterable*, and is not that of which we ſpeak. 2. But only his *Volition*

* Of which ſee *Amyraldus* againſt *Spanhem. de Grat. univerſali.*

† *De Vol. Conditionali, & authoritatibus & rationibus pro eadem Vide* Ruiz. de Vol. Dei, diſp. 20. But his aſſertion that [*una creatura eſt Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale (ſecundario) ut Deus velit aliam producere*] is a fiction, though he lay his ſtreſs on it about the *ordo decretorum*. For *movere* is *cauſare*, and nothing doth cauſe or move God to act. There are *Rationes effectuum & eorum ordinis*: but none of the efficient Acts of God in him: If you ſay, It is abſurd to ſay, that God had no Reaſon to will the creation of this world rather than another: I anſwer, That is an Act of efficient Wiſdom, above all Reaſon: But to fetch Reaſons from the object, and thereby to be moved to Act, is the part of the imperfect creature. Reaſoning properly is below God: much more to be moved by extrinſick objective reaſons: Yet on this *Ruiz diſp.* 24. layeth a great fabrick; and ſo men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reaſonings as they variouſly fancy.

Volition as terminated on this or that object, and ſo as *hæc volitio ab objecto denominata.* 3. And his *efficient Volition*, and *Power* is terminated on objects in time, without mutation in God. 4. And *N. B.* that God doth ſuſpend his own *Poſſible Volitions* in many caſes; As he doth *Not will to make* more Worlds, more Men, more Suns, more Laws, *&c.* than *de facto* he will make. 5. And it is no more defectiveneſs in God to ſuſpend a *Volition* for *a time*, than thus to do it *for ever.* 6. And it is no more *Dependence* on the Creature to *Terminate* his *Volition* only on a *qualified ſubject* (performing the Condition) than to terminate his *Efficient Power* and *will* on ſuch or ſuch a qualified ſubject. As *e. g.* He terminateth his Omnipotent Concurſe for *Generation* only on the *materia ſeminalis rectè diſpoſita*; He concurreth to *burn* by *fire*, *&c.* And if his Acts effectively Tranſient may be terminated only and temporarily on diſpoſed objects, If he did ſo in acts *Objectively Tranſient*, and did freely *not-will* the damnation of man till he had actually ſinned, but ſuſpended his will freely till then, and then *de novo terminated* it on the ſaid qualified object, I ſee no ſhew of *Dependence* or *Mutability.* For I oft cleared it before, that the termination of Gods Knowledge, Will or Power on any particular Object, is in him no addition to its eſſence; And doing it *de novo*, is no change in him but in the Creature only; no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations, if a thouſand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variouſly according to their ſeveral Conditions. Yet I have before given reaſons why *incipere jam prædeſtinare* is more incongruous language.

358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable cenſures of diſſenters in this point, who think that Gods Volitions are New and Conditional and ſuſpended, *quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum*; and cry out, It is blaſphemy, and maketh God mutable and dependent. I am againſt their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts: But falſe charges prove you not to have more truth, but leſs love and ſobriety than others.

359. XI. The next diſtinction of Gods Will is into *Effectual* and *Uneffectual.* And here he that would ſee a great deal ſaid on the queſtion, Whether God have any uneffectual Will, and whether mans will can fruſtrate it, may ſee too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 *Sent. q.* 45. *&* 46. Some anſwer (as *D'Orbellis*, *&c.*) that the *Voluntas Beneplaciti* is ever effectual, but not the *Vol. ſigni*; which yet ſeeing he well explaineth to be only the *making* of Duty, he might well have ſaid is ſtill effectual to its proper primary effect. *Greg. Arimin.* (and many others) diſtinguiſh of the *Will* of *Complacency* and *Diſplicency*, and that *Proſecutionis & fugæ*; and ſay the *latter* is effectual, and not the *former:* which others ſay of the Abſolute Will as diſtinct from the Conditional. The plain truth I have oft opened before: Gods Will is the *firſt Efficient*, the *chief Dirigent*, and the *Final Cauſe*; (in which the three Principles, Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs are eminent.) 1. His *efficient Will* is *ever effectual*, and never fruſtrate. Whatſoever pleaſed the Lord (to do) that he did, in Heaven and in Earth, in the Sea and in the depths, *Pſal.* 135. 6. And who hath reſiſted (this) his will? *Rom.* 9. 19. 2. His *Directing* will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule, and of Due or Right thereby: For ſo far it is efficient of that effect: But it is too oft violated by our ſin. 3. His *final Will* or *Complacency* is Gods being *pleaſed* with the Being, or Action, or relation of the Creature, and ſuppoſing it, is not *efficient*, and therefore not effectual. And I know no need of more upon this queſtion.

Aſ. a. 1. *Scot. q. un. Durand. q.* 1. *Bonav. art.* 1. *Greg. Arim. q. un. ar.* 3. *Pennot. l.* 4. *c.* 22. *Alvar. de Aux. diſp.* 32. *Ruiz de Volunt. diſp.* 18. *Gran. de Vol. Dei. Tract.* 4. *diſp.* 3. *Suar. l.* 4. *de Prædeſt. c.* 8. *Gr. Val. diſp.* 1. *q.* 19. *p.* 6. *Cajet. Nazar. Ban. Zum. Nazar. Gonzal. Molin. Vaſqu. &c. in* 1. *p. q.* 19. *ar.* 6. *Ripa. Arrub. Faſol. ibid. Nic. D'Orbel.* 1. *d.* 46. and many other *Scotiſts*, *&c.*

360. XII. The laſt now to be named is, The *Antecedent* and *Conſequent Will.*

Will. This alſo is handled by many Schoolmen, and much uſed by the *Jeſuits* and *Arminians.* To paſs by others, *Pennottus* handleth it *propugn. l.* 4. *c.* 21. having firſt ſhewed, *c.* 20. *p.* 225. that *Chryſoſtom* and *Damaſcene* firſt uſed it. His explicatory Propoſitions are, 1. *Vol. Antec. & Conſ. non eſt in Deo reſpectu omnium Volitorum, ſed ſolum reſpectu eorum quæ aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturæ.* 2. *Voluntas antecedens eſt illa qua Deus vult hominis ſalutem quantum in ipſo eſt, & qua illum ad ſalutem ordinat, & media ad ſalutem neceſſaria præparat, quibus niſi per ipſum hominem ſteterit, ſalutem aſſequatur.* 3. *Non ſemper Voluntas antecedens & Conſequens circa objecta contraria verſantur, ſed poteſt idem objectum eſſe Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum conſequente.* 4. *Voluntas antecedens in Deo eſt Voluntas beneplaciti, & non ſolum voluntas ſigni.* 5. *Voluntas antecedens eſt formaliter & proprie in Deo exiſtens, & non ſolum per metaphoram ad eum modum, quo Voluntas ſigni.*

Chryſ. in Eph. Hom. 1. *Damaſc. fid. Orthod. l.* 2. *c.* 29. *& cont. Manich. ad finem.*

361. I tell you their ſenſe, that I may the better open the plain truth to you, which is as followeth. 1. This diſtinction of *Vol. antec. & conſ.* is not applyed to God as he is our *Creator*, or *End*, nor as he is meer *Proprietor* or *Benefactor*; but only as he is *Rector*, or *Moral Ruler* of man. 2. As Government hath an *Antecedent* and *Conſequent* part, *viz. Legiſlation* and *Judgement* (with *Execution*) ſo Gods *Antecedent Will* is nothing but his *Legal will*, or his Will as *Rector* ſignified by his *Laws:* And his *Conſequent Will*, is his *Judicial Will*, or expreſſed in *Judgement*; One Antecedent to *Mans part* (obedience or diſobedience) and the other Conſequent to it. 3. It is moſt certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his *Law*, that is, that all that believe and repent ſhall be ſaved: And that he willeth *Conſequently* that *Judas e. g.* and every finally impenitent unbeliever ſhall be damned. For what God *doth*, that he *willeth* to do: But God doth himſelf make ſuch a Law, and paſs ſuch a judgement: *Ergo* he is willing of it.

Alliaco Camerac. 1. *q.* 14. *D. E.* tells you the ſenſe of *Thom. Scotus, Ockam, & Gregor.* of this diſtinction: and that of *Scotus* and *Ockam* is to the ſame purpoſe with what I here ſay of it; including that antecedent Grace which they call ſufficient, which God giveth to perſwade men to conſent.

The Schoolmen are diſagreed of the ſenſe of this diſtinction: and not underſtanding it, contend about it. See *Ruiz de Vol. Dei, diſp.* 19. §. 2, 3, 4, 5. *p.* 195, 196, *&c.*

SECT. XV.

Of the Order of Gods Decrees by way of Intention and Execution.

362. THere is no part of this Controverſie more contentiouſly and I fear preſumptuouſly and too audaciouſly handled, than this of the *Intentional order* of Gods Decrees. Of which many have ſaid much, but no man hath laid ſo great a ſtreſs on it as thoſe two very good men Dr. *Twiſſe* and his follower *Samuel Rutherford.* * But on this ſuppoſition we have had many very bold Schemes of Gods Intentional Decrees given us; of which you may ſee ſome in worthy Mr. *Perkins* Golden Chain, and in *Beza*, and out of him in *Engliſh* his Tractate publiſhed with Mr. *Gilbies* of Predeſtination, and in *Piſcator*, and others.

* *Scotus*'s order is elſewhere recited: Take *Vaſquez*'s as in 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *a.* 3. *d.* 95. *c.* 6. Both of the adult and infants: [1. *Præviderit Deus omnes in Maſſa perditionis peccato obnoxios propter tranſgreſſionem Adami:* 2. *Hoc non obſtante, voluit primaria voluntate ex ſeipſo quoſdam parvulos & omnes adultos ad beatitudinem pervenire, & ad hoc media ſufficientia conceſſerit, quamvis efficacia & congrua negaverit; non intentione excludendi eos à regno, ſed oſtendendi divitias ſuas in vaſa miſericordiæ.* 3. *ut viderit eos in peccat. orig. aut actuali decedere,* & 4. *Ob id efficaciter decreverit ipſos expellere à beatitudine, & adultos ad pœnam ignis deſtinaverit, ex quo quarto inſtanti incipit Reprobatio eorum à gloria. Circa alios vero parvulos quibus non conceſſit poſſe applicari remedia, Ordo in divina præſcientia & eorum reprobatio à negatione gratiæ incipit.*] Would you not think that he took all theſe for diſtinct thoughts in God? when he meaneth no real diverſity at all.

363. By this way the *Anti-arminians* are fallen into the diſtinct parties, of *Sublapſarians*, and *Supralapſarians*; And theſe into *two parties*; one making man as *not exiſtent in eſſe cognito*, the other man *in innocency*, the object of Predeſtination.

364. 1. The common way is to diſtribute the Means among themſelves, as any of them are ſubſervient to others, as their end, and ſo to make a great many of Decrees or parts of the Decree, firſt of the ultimate end, and then of the next, and the next to that, and ſo on, till you come to the firſt means which is no end; as the Writer imagineth them to lye.

365. 2. The ſecond way is invented as Conciliatory by Dr. *Twiſſe* (and ſo it is) *viz.* that God hath but two Decrees, one *de fine*, and the other *de mediis*, and that all the *media* are the objects but of one Decree, and ſo that we need not trouble the Church with diſputing which of them is firſt or laſt.

366. 3. A third opinion I have long ago read in a MS. of Animadverſions on Dr. *Twiſſe* by a Learned Judicious and Godly Doctor (yet living) who proveth that God hath but one Decree *de fine & de mediis*, which caſteth away all the matter of the Controverſies about the priority and poſteriority. And it were well if the Controverſie were ſo ended.

367. 4. Many *Arminians* write as if the order of Intention and of Execution were the ſame, and ſo begin at the other end, and give us a Scheme juſt contrary to the firſt ſort, (*Beza, Perkins, &c.*)

368. 5. Some hold that *Intendere finem* is proper to the imperfect creature, and not belonging to God; and therefore that he hath no order of Intention in his decrees at all, becauſe no proper end.

369. 6. Some hold that the whole buſineſs of the order of Intention is utterly beyond our reach: And therefore that we ſhould meddle only with the order of Execution: Thus ſaith the moſt judicious Biſhop *Davenant* ſoundly, *Diſſert. de Prædeſt. & Reprob. cap. 9. pag. 209. Hæc argumentatio (Corvini) vocat nos ad ſpeculationem valde difficilem & dogmatica Theologiæ fundandæ minime accommodatam. Nititur enim conſideratione Prioritatis & Poſterioritatis in illis duobus Voluntatis Divinæ decretis de dando Mediatore & de Electis ſervandis, quæ utraque ab æterno fuere concepta & conſtituta. Ad me quod attinet, ſcio ordinem Executionis, ſecundum quem Deus voluit beneficia ad homines pervenire, nullo negotio poſſe delineari: At quo ordine Deus conſignata ea tenuit ab æterno in mente ac voluntate ſua, is ſolus enarrare præſumat, qui ſe Deo ab arcanis & æternis conſiliis etiam aſſirmare audeat. Fatemur Deum ab æterno conſtituiſſe, ut omnibus ſalvandis Chriſtus primo in loco proponeretur, dein per fidem apprehenderetur, hinc ut eorundem juſtificatio ſequeretur, tum ſanctificatio, & demum Glorificatio. Sed ſiquis minime contentus hoc ordine exequutionis velit etiam nobis deſcribere ſeriem Decretorum Divinorum ordine conceptionis in mente & Voluntate Dei quaſi diſtinctam, atque urgeat cum Arminio Divinam juſtitiam impugnari niſi hoc conſideretur ut illo prius, is mihi videtur nimium ingenio ſuo fidere.*

And he citeth *Gabr. Biel in* 3. *d.* 2. *q. dub.* 3. ſaying *Prioritates illæ in Divinis hiſce decretis non eſſe ponendas, ſicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum. Ac proinde ſiquis conſiderare velit talem ordinem horum decretorum ut ponat Chriſti incarnationem electione priorem, vel è contra, hanc conſiderationem eſſe falſam ſpeculationem.*

Twiſs. in Vindic. Grat. ll. 3. Digreſ. 3. pag. Vol. minoris 52, 53.

370. Dr. *Twiſſe* who reduceth them to two, excludeth mans ſalvation from the Decree *de fine*, and thus enumerateth the decreed Means: [1. The Permiſſion of ſin (of which more anon.) 2. The gift of a Saviour. 3. The grace of Vocation, Faith, Repentance and Perſeverance. 4. The Salvation of perſevering penitent believers.] And ſo as to the ultimate end only [*quod Prius eſt intentione, poſterius eſt executione.*] But that the order of *execution only* is to be obſerved among the *Means*.

371. The matter it ſelf (or at leaſt my thoughts of it) I ſhall open as plainly as I can with brevity. Firſt premiſing that their own doctrine ſhould take them off their confidence and contention about this order of intention. For, 1. They oft tell us that all Gods Decrees are eternal without any order of *Time*. And ſhould we not then be afraid of boldneſs about any other order?

372. 2. They

372. 2. They oft tell us, that Preſcience and Science, Predeſtination and Deſtination are all one in God, and not to be thought of as acts paſt and ceaſed.

373. 3. They oft tell us, that God is one, and his Will is himſelf; and his Decrees are his *Will*, and therefore are all but one.

Prædeſtinatio Dei eſt ipſa Dei eſſentia quæ eſt neceſſaria. Alliac. Camer. in 1. q. 12. D.

374. 4. They cannot deny but that all our conceptions of God are improper, and analogical or metaphorical more or leſs; and that what Knowledge and Will in God is formally, no mortal knoweth. And ſhould we diſpute then audaciouſly about this Order?

See in *Ruiz de Vol. Dei, diſp.* 24. how they are confounded about the ordering of Gods decrees as to the order of Intention and Execution: His Solution ſuppoſeth that *unius objecti Volitio eſt ratio determinans ad aliorum volitionem:* When as *ex parte Dei* there is but One Volition, and that hath no cauſe; and the *Ratio* is a deceiving ambiguous word.

375. 5. None can deny, but that theſe Myſteries require the higheſt reverence, and that it's dreadful to take Gods Name in vain, and dally with the Conſuming fire. And yet ſhall we preſume?

376. 6. They all confeſs that our Lord Jeſus, his Prophets, Apoſtles, or Scriptures, lead them not this way, and decide not theſe Controverſies, ſo as that they can ſtand to their deciſion alone.

377. 7. They cannot deny, but that deſiring arrogantly to be as Gods in Knowledge, was our firſt Parents ſin, that ruined them and us, and that this was Satans firſt ſucceſsful game. And that our diſeaſe is like to be ſuch as its original.

378. 8. Laſtly, They cannot chooſe but know, that it is the troubling of the Church with new Articles, and new practices, and leading them from the ſimplicity that is in Chriſt, even as the Serpent beguiled *Eve*, (with the promiſe of more knowledge,) which hath been the great plague and divider of the Churches in all Ages; though the Apoſtle foretold them that It was this that he feared of them. And are we not ſelf-condemned, if after all this, we will cenſure and reproach one another, and foment diviſions for that which moſt certainly no mortal underſtandeth?

379. I. And firſt your very foundation is uncertain, that God doth properly *Intendere finem.* Nay, it is *certain* that (as *Aquinas* afore-cited ſaith) though *Vult hoc eſſe propter hoc, non tamen propter hoc vult hoc.* He preſcribeth *Ends* to *Man*, and ſetteth *Ends* to *Means* which are *fines operis*; But that he Intendeth an End Himſelf, muſt be ſaid very improperly, or very uncertainly, or not at all. The truth is, that we muſt ſay that God doth *finem intendere*, becauſe we muſt ſpeak of him after the manner of men, or not at all. But it is not true in the ſame ſenſe as we ſpeak it of man, and as the word properly ſignifieth; but equivocally.

Vaſquez ſaith, that Gods own Goodneſs is not a final Cauſe of his Volition; ſuppoſing that *movere ad Electionem medii* is final Cauſality. *Ruiz* aſſerteth the contrary; taking final Cauſality to be firſt *eſſe primum objectum*: And thus men ſtrive about artificial notions.

380. For, 1. To Intend an End, is to make that End a Cauſe why we chooſe the means (as moſt ſay:) But Gods Election or Actions have no Cauſe. All deny that there is in God *Cauſe* and *Effects*; or that *propter hoc vult hoc.*

Vaſq. 1. *d.* 82. *c.* 1. *Ruiz de Vol. Dei, d.* 15. §. 1. *p.* 159. But that nothing is the *Ratio Volendi* but his own Goodneſs, ſee *Albert.* 1. *p. tr.* 20. *q.* 19. *m.* 1. *a.* 1. *Alex.* 1. *p. q.* 35. *m.* 3. *Henric. quodl.* 4. *q.* 19. *Gabr.* 1. *d.* 14. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Dried. de Concord. p.* 1. *c.* 3. *Vaſq. diſp.* 82. *Scotus* 1. *d.* 44. *Molin.* 1. *q.* 19. *a.* 5.

381. 2. In man to *Intend an End*, doth imply that a man yet *wanteth* his end; and that it is ſomewhat that he needeth, or at leaſt doth not yet obtain. But God needeth nothing, and hath no end that is deſired or wanting, nor but what he continually poſſeſſeth or enjoyeth, as well now as hereafter.

382. 3. We know no ſuch thing as *Intendere finem* where the *Act* and the *End* are the ſame. *Intendere* is not the ſame with *Finis.* But in God they are the ſame: He that is moſt ſimple hath no *Intention*, which is not *Himſelf*, and no *End* which is not *Himſelf*, and ſo both are one.

383. 4. Our *Intendere finem* is not the ſame *really* with *Electio mediorum.* But God hath no *Intention* but what is *really* the ſame with *Election*, though not denominatively, connotatively and relatively.

384. 5. Divines uſually ſay, that Nothing below *God himſelf* can be his End. But where there is no *means*, there is no *End* or intention of it.

But to *God* there is no *Means*. He is not a Means of himself; And no creature can be a means of him: If we say, that any thing can be a means *ut Deus sit, vel ut sit Maximus, Sapientissimus, Optimus*, it were no better than Blasphemy. God then hath not an End like man.

385. Yet necessity constraineth us to use the phrase, but these things must still be understood when we use it. 1. That no *creature* can be *Gods End*; unless you will call an object as terminative, an End; or else an *Effect*.

386. 2. That it is not Gods Essence and perfections that is an end as to any medium; But it is his *will*: For his *Free will* is the Beginning, and the *Complacency* of that *will* is the End of all things. But if you call God his *own Object*, and so call the *final Object an End*, so we must consider *God as Loving Himself*; and Himself is the End or final object of his own Love or Complacency; and he himself as Loving himself, is said to Act on that End or Object. And indeed eternal *self-knowledge* and *self-love* (which some of old ventured to call the second and third Persons) are the Great Immanent Acts of the Divine Essence, (with the *sibi vivere.*) And it seemeth the chief Notion of *Holiness* in God, that he Loveth Himself *in primo instanti*, and that he is most *Amiable* to his Creatures *in secundo instanti*, and that he is the *Cause* and *End* of all that is good in them. Thus a final object of his own and our Love or Complacency, God is past all doubt. And secondarily his Will is pleased and fulfilled in all his works.

387. 3. Yet by that *Complacency* we mean not that God is *passive*, or *receiveth* any *Delight* from the Creature, or hath any addition by it to his felicity: But as he is a *Communicative Good* by way of *Efficiency* as the *first efficient Cause*, so is he a *felicitating Good* to the Creature *as its End*, and he is *Love taking the creature into its neareſt Communion with him*: which is his *Complacency*, and the End of all things. And hence it is that God is said when he had finished his works, to Rest complacentially in all as very Good.

388. 4. As the Complacency of Gods Will is his End, in the *formal* notion (so far as it may be said of God) so his *Glory* is his End in the *Material notion*.

389. That his *Glory* is not *Formally* his End, is confessed by all Divines who say that nothing below God can be his End. But by his *Glory* is meant something below himself; some creature, or action of the creature. *Ergo, &c.* For if by his Glory be meant *Himself*, there is no *Means* to such an end.

390. Therefore by *Gods Glory* is meant the *shining lustre* of his *Image*; or the *Appearance of God in his Works*: And not only mans *Praising* and *Glorifying thoughts* and *words* of him: which though they are our highest duty, are unfit to be *Gods End*, alone. Yet are they part of that Glory which is *materially* his End, though not the whole.

391. This *Glory* or Appearance of God, which is *materially* his End, is, 1. The *perfection of the whole Creation*. 2. Next that the Glory of the *Celestial Kingdom*, containing *Christ* and all the holy ones. 3. Next that the *Glory of Christs own person alone*. 4. Next that the *Glory of the Holy ones alone*, &c.

392. Because this perfection of the Universe is not yet accomplished, but shall be, *improperly* we may say that God *hath not yet attained his End*, that is, his *Material End*.

393. 5. But properly and formally Gods End is never unattained: Because his *will* is never unfulfilled, though the things *willed* be not yet perfected.

fected. For when *e. g.* the first dayes work was made, all was done which he then willed to be done, and so for the second day, *&c.* And now all is done which he would have now done: And his Will is ever perfectly pleased; And he wanteth nothing. So that an End not attained, is not to be ascribed to God, except materially.

394. Thus God is said to have *made all things for himself*, Prov. 16.4. Because for *His Pleasure they are, and were created*, Rev. 4. 11.

395. For his Decreeing disposing Will is fulfilled by all, even the wicked that are for the day of Evil: Though his Commanding Will being not fulfilled by sinners, according to that he is said to have no pleasure in them, but to hate them, *Psal.* 5.5. *Heb.* 10.38. *Mal.* 1. 10. *Ezek.* 18.32. 23. *&* 33. 11. *Jer.* 22.28. *&* 48.38. *Eccles.* 5.4. *Psal.* 5.4, *&c.*

396. And lest any think that thus God misseth of his End, let it be well noted, 1. That this phrase of *Gods taking no pleasure*, is *objectively* both *Positive*, *Privative* and *Oppositive*, that is, It signifieth that God will *deprive* the *wicked* of *felicity*, or the Communion of his Love, and will load them with sorrows, and will set himself against their Comforts. But 2. As to Gods own Complacency of will, it is but equal to a negative: His felicity lyeth not in theirs: And so as Gods will hath no actual Complacency in *Nothings* (as in more Worlds, or Creatures, than ever will be) and yet his Complacency is perfect; so though he have no Complacency in the Holiness or Salvation of those that are never Holy or Saved, yet his Complacency is perfect.

397. There is no doubt but Man hath Ends and Means, because God hath so appointed it, and made him not in a state of perfection, but *in via:* Yea, Angels have an End and every creature, because defective dependent beings; even in a formal sense.

398. God is this Ultimate End of man, as he is to be perfectly Loved and Pleased; to which all are means: And the means are ordered as Ends to one another.

399. Usually where the Scriptures and Preachers do speak of God as the End, and of Intention of Ends, they mean *Mans Intention* and *End*, prescribed him by God. But if they speak of *Gods*, they mean only, *formally* the *fulfilling of his will*, and *materially* his *Glory*, or the *perfecting of his works.*

400. The *finis operis* as distinct from the *finis operantis* is nothing but the aptitude and tendency of the work to the Authors *Intended End*, or to some effect: Not that the *opus quà opus finem intendit.*

401. If all these difficulties lye in the way, Whether and how far God intend an End at all, judge how far it is fit to contend about the Mental Order of his Intentions, and whether Judicious *Davenant* was not in the right.

402. II. If it were granted, that *Quod prius est Intentione, posterius est executione*, nothing would follow to gratifie either party in these Controversies. For all would be but this, that [*God Intended Himself*, and the *Fulfilling or Complacency of his own Will, before he willed any thing else that ever cometh to pass.*] And what's this to the business?

403. But they say, *It is his Glory that he first intended:* I answered before, His *Glory* is, 1. *Himself* (and then it's the same which I asserted:) or 2. a Creature (and then it is not formally his End.) 2. His Glory as it is his Compleat Image on the whole perfected World, is his End indeed *Materially:* But that is but to be the *Compleat Means:* The perfected means may improperly be called his End: But *forma denominat.*

404. When they say, that it is the Glory of his Mercy and Justice, 1. They

Hence they dispute, Whether Gods Providence alwayes attain his Ends: and *Ruiz* citeth for the affirmative, *Cajet. Naz. Alvar.* and *Scot. Marsil. Okam, Gabriel, Hervæus, Driedo*; and for the negative, *Alex. Aquin. Durand. Marsil. Capreol. Ferrar. & communiter recentiores, Molina, Zumel, Vasq. Suarez, Valent. Becanus, Sirenus, Fonnottus, Arrubal*, &c. And all this difference is about names and words. And *Ruiz* is for the Negative, sect. 3. pag. 56. *quia aliquos fines Deus intendit voliti-one conditionata, & non totaliter efficaci.* So that the question is, *An Volitio conditionata & ineficax sit Deo ascribenda quando vult ea auxilia quæ consensum hominis reddunt possibilem, vel hominem faciunt potentem? Et an volitio hæc dicenda sit Intentio finis?* For he concludeth as agreed on by all, that Gods Providence is never frustrate, hindred, deceived, or fluctuating, nor any thing done against it absolutely, or against its total adequate End.

1. They say but the same and need no other answer. 2. They speak very defectively: For it is to ascribe to God a defective Decree or Intention, which is not for the glory of all his revealed perfections: Doubtless whatever is materially the *perfect means* of glorifying God, must glorifie his *Greatness* and *Active Power* or *Life*, his *Wisdom* and his *Goodness*, and therein *his Veracity* or *fidelity*, his *Justice* and his *Holiness*, his *Benignity* and *mercy*, his *Immutability*, *Independency*, &c. All this must be in the means it self.

405. If Mr. *Perkins*, *Beza*, *Gilbie* and many other good men had well considered this, they had never made the glorifying of Gods Mercy and Justice in the salvation of some and the damnation of others, Gods ultimate end; Thereby committing many palpable errours. 1. Making *quid Creatum vel Creaturæ* to be formally or properly Gods end, which is but a *Means*. 2. Making one *little parcel* of that *means*, to be the end. 3. *Inserting* two acts or parts only of that which they *themselves confess* to be but *Means*. For what should the names of *Salvation* and *Damnation* do in the description of the end? Are they any part of the end? Why is not Redemption, Justification, Sanctification, Preservation, Resurrection, *&c.* as well put in? Is he not Glorified *in them* as well as in *final salvation* or *damnation*? Yea and in *Creation* and the frame of nature too? Yea why is not the glory of *Angels*, and all the world put in, as part of the same means to his end?

406. If it be said that it is only Gods Glory of *Mercy* and *Justice* in mens *salvation* and *damnation* which is the end of *Redemption*, *Conversion*, *Preaching*, *Ordinances*, *Sanctification*, *Adoption*, &c. 1. I deny it: His *Power*, *Wisdom and Goodness*, and his forementioned subordinate attributes are thereby Glorified also. 2. It is an injury to God unworthy of a Divine, to make God to have as many distinct ultimate ends, as they think there are particular aptitudes or tendencies in the means.

407. For undoubtedly we must feign in God no more ultimate *ends than one*. And undoubtedly the *means* consisting of innumerable parts, make up one perfect *whole*, in which Gods Glory shineth so, as it doth not in any part alone. And he that will cut Gods frame into scraps and shreds, and set up the *parts* as so many *wholes*, will more dishonour him than he that would so mangle a Picture, or a Watch, or Clock, or House, or the pipes of an Organ, or the strings of a Lute, and tell you of their beauty and Harmony only distinctly. Well therefore did Dr. *Twisse* reduce all the *Decrees de mediis* to one: But they are one in their *apt composition* for *one end*: And the Glory of Sun, and Stars, and Angels, and the whole Creation is a part, and the Glory of our salvation and damnation is but another part.

408. The order therefore of Gods Decrees in respect of the *Execution* is only fit for our debate: (Any farther than that we may moreover say that Gods will or Himself is all his ultimate end, and his Glory shining in the perfection of his intire works is the perfect means.) And there is nothing else that we can reasonably controvert. And about this our Controversie is next to none at all. Here we may well enquire what is *prius vel posterius*, *quid superius*, *quid inferius*, &c. and that to our edification.

409. Seeing then that we are agreed (as is said) with *Aquinas* that **Deus non propter hoc vult hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc*, that which we

* *Deus non propter hoc vult hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc.* 1. S. 19. a. 5. ad 3. 1. S. 44. a. 3. ad 1. S. 5. 4. 3. ad 3. pretily argueth that *Scibile praecedit &c.* The consequent is true. They are vain indeed, though he deny it.

And all his reasons p. 161, 162, *&c.* to prove that *dantur in creatura rationis finales movente divinam voluntatem*, are but triflings with the ambiguities of the word *Ratio* and abuses of the word *Causa*, having before confessed that there is no Real Cause. And are there *Causes* that are not Real?

1. We grant the Creature is an Object of Gods will: and the object is by some called the material cause of the act in *genere vel numero*. 2. It is the *terminus* and Recipient of the divine influx. 3. It may therefore be *causa materialis* of the diversity of the effects of Gods influx as Received in *patiente ex diversitate dispositionis*. 4. Our acts may be the effects of Gods Volition. 5. And may be Second Causes of other effects. 6. Those other effects may be said to be Gods nearer ends, speaking of him after the manner of imperfect man. 7. Where our acts are not causes, they may be conditions *sine quibus non*, of many of Gods acts *quoad effectus*, (as sin is of punishment at least.) 8. In all these respects Gods Volition which is One in itself, may and must be denominated divers from the diversity of these effects and objects, which therefore are the *Ratio nominis*. And he that would prove any other *Ratio* or Cause of the first Cause, the will of God or any of his acts as in himself, must first renounce all natural and Scholastical Theologie at least. He citeth *Durand. Major*, *Richardus*, &c. But *Durandus* 1. *d.* 41. *q.* 1. doth but say that Gods Acts are thus to be reckoned *secundum rationem*, as likening Gods reasoning or thoughts to ours, (*ut n.* 7.) and not

not *juxta rei veritatem*. *Richard.* is full for what I say; 1. d. 45. *Voluntas sive volens de Deo secundam essentiam dicitur: non est aliud Velle, aliud Esse*: But yet his *Velle hoc* speaketh not his *esse quà esse*; and therefore he addeth that when God is said *scire aut velle*, it is his Essence; but to say, *Hoc aut illud scit aut vult* is but to say, *Hoc aut illud est subjectum scientiæ vel voluntatis quæ ipse Deus est. Et Voluntas Dei est prima & summa Causa omnium; cujus Causa non est quærenda; & non est diversa Voluntas, sed diversa locutio de ea in Scripturis.* And *Richardus in loc. p.* 141. saith but this, that *ipsius divini Velle nulla est ratio motiva, cum realiter idem sit quod Deus: Tamen Ordinationis quæ est inter divinum velle & ipsum volitum hanc est ratio aliqua respectu alicujus voliti.* Which is no more than I have said. And as to *Major*, *Ruiz* did ill to cite him, who there professeth that Predestination and Volition is but *Relatio rationis & denominatio extrinseca* as to God. And his *ordo signorum in mente divina* is but the *Scotists* assimilating Gods acts to mans.

we have to do is but to enquire, 1. *De re*, how one thing is a *Cause* or other *means* of another; 2. And so how God Decreed it to work and be.

410. And 1. It is agreed that the *Creation* was Gods first work (that we know of or have any thing to do with:) This had (as to the first part) no Antecedent Object, but produceth its *effect*, which some call its object. But the latter dayes works had an antecedent object, and also a produced effect. And accordingly God Decreed from Eternity that this should be his first work. From whence by connotation that may be called, his first Decree.

411. That *sin* or the *Permission* of *sin*, or other meer *Negatives*, are not to have place among the asserted Means and Decrees, I am anon in due place to manifest.

412. 2. God having made man, did give him a Law both Natural and Positive: This was next done, and therefore decreed to be next done.

413. 3. Man having broke this Law, God judged him, and laid on him some indispensible penalties. This was decreed to be done in the third place.

414. 4. At the same time God promised Man the victory by the Womans Seed, and giving him pardon of the destructive penalty, became his Redeemer, and put him under a Covenant of Grace; first given to mankind in *Adam*, and afterwards in *Noah*. And this was decreed to be so done.

415. 5. Though all were thus put under this Covenant, and God forsook none that first forsook not him, yet did he give more Grace to some, than to others, to *Abel*, *e. g.* than to *Cain*, so that those that did actually repent and believe and live to God, were justified and adopted and made heirs of life. And thus he decreed to do.

416. 6. Perseverance also was the effect of his special Grace, which accordingly is Decreed to be given.

417. 7. The *Cainites*, *Canaanites* and others that were the wicked Seed of wicked Parents, who forsook him and his Grace, he accordingly judged, punished and forsook: And so decreed.

418. 8. The Seed of the faithful he eminently blessed, especially of *Abraham*; whom he took (by reward) into a further special Covenant, superadded to the common Covenant of Grace, taking his Seed into a peculiar political and gracious relation to him, promising the multiplication and prosperity of them, and that the Saviour should come out of them: All which was so decreed to be done.

419. 9. The Messiah came in the fulness of time, and did and suffered all that is mentioned in the Gospel: And gave us a more perfect Edition of the Covenant of Grace, and greater grace with it, even more of the Spirit, with a better Ministry, Ordinances and Church-state: Which were so decreed to be done.

420.

420. 10. To ſome Nations of the Earth this ſecond Edition of the Covenant of Grace, (that is, the Goſpel) is freely promulgate or Preached, who deſerved it no more than others, while others for ſin are left under the firſt darker Edition, and under deſertions and grievous puniſhments, for their fore-fathers and their own violation of it.

421. 11. Where the Goſpel cometh among many that all deſerve rejection for the reſiſting of grace, God giveth to *ſome* that grace which infallibly Converteth them, and conſequently juſtifieth, adopteth and ſanctifieth them. All which he decreed.

422. 12. Giving alſo Perſeverance as aforeſaid, he finally juſtifieth all ſuch in Judgement, and Glorifieth (Chriſt firſt, and) them with Chriſt: ſingly and conjunctly at the final conſummation. And he Decreed to do all this accordingly.

423. If the Decree of God be called but One, for the Reaſons before given, the Controverſie is then at an end: But if it muſt be diſtinguiſhed and called *Many* Decrees or parts, it muſt be either from the *Effects* or from the *ſuppoſed* objects.

424. 1. If from the Effects, there will be no Controverſie about the Decrees but what is firſt about the Effects themſelves. And moſt of them now named are uncontroverted.

425. 2. And we cannot well denominate and diſtinguiſh the Decrees from any thing elſe but the Effects, (even as we do his operations, as Creation, Redemption, *&c.*) But the objects then are paſt doubt ſuch as follow.

426. *Viz.* 1. The object of the Decree of Creation as ſuch (diſtinct from the Effect) is Nothing: that is, There is no object.

427. 2. The object of the Decree of Legiſlation is man conſidered meerly in his Being and Naturals as ſuch.

428. 3. The object of the Decree of the firſt Judgement, was man newly faln.

429. 4. The object of the Decree of the giving of the Promiſe of Chriſt, the New Covenant in the firſt Edition and pardon and grace by it, was faln man firſt judged.

430. 5. The object of the Common grace of that Covenant from firſt to laſt, is faln judged man brought under that Covenant of grace (*ut norma officii, judicii & beneficii.*)

431. 6. The object of the *Special* grace of God (at firſt) *viz.* for effectual Converſion, to men under that Covenant, was the ſame as laſt mentioned, Man brought under the Covenant of grace; of whom 1. Some were prepared and diſpoſed by Common grace for Special. 2. And it's like ſome not, but ſuddenly ſurprized by mercy.

432. 7. The object of *Abrahams* ſpecial promiſe, (beſides the Common Covenant of grace) was *Abraham* eminent in faith and ſelf-denying obedience to God: And afterward his Seed for his ſake.

433. 8. The Object of the actual gift of Chriſt incarnate, and the perfect Edition of the New Covenant by him, was the ſinful world that had tranſgreſſed both the Law of Innocency and the firſt Edition of the Covenant of grace, and the Jews that had broken *Moſes*'s Law.

434. 9. The object of the gift of the Goſpel as promulgate or publiſhed is the ſame, adding, the world as now Redeemed by the Actual ſacrifice, Merits and Reſurrection of Chriſt incarnate.

435. 10. The object of the Commoneſt grace of the Goſpel Covenant, is Redeemed man brought under this Covenant as the *Norma officii, judicii & beneficiorum* (*quoad jus*;) or, *ſubditi obligati.*

436.

436. 11. The object of the grace of this Covenant proper to the *Visible Church*, and *common to its members*, are *Visible Christians*, or *Baptized Professours*.

437. 12. The object of the first effectual grace of saving Conversion (faith and repentance) is certain persons Redeemed and brought under the obligation of this new Covenant; Of whom some are prepared by common grace, and (it's like) some are not.

438. 13. The object of the gift of pardon, justification, adoption, the spirit of sanctification and right to life, (and all this in Christ by union) is a *Penitent Believer*, and the *seed of such dedicated in Covenant to God*.

439. 14. The object of many acts of auxiliary grace, and of higher degrees of grace is (ordinarily) such as have well used former degrees of special grace: But also, who God is freely pleased to give it to.

440. 15. The object of the grace of Perseverance is the same last mentioned: If not all the Justified; which I reserve as almost our only real Controversie to handle in its proper place in the next Chapter.

441. 16. The object of the Act of Raising the dead is all the world, as appeareth in *Joh.* 5. 22. to 32.

442. 17. The object of the Justification of the soul alone at the first appearance is, the soul of a member of Christ, or one faithful and persevering in his Covenant: or a Saint.

Augusti. ad Simplic. li. 1. qu. 2. *Quia non invenit Deus opera in hominibus quæ eligat, ideo manet propositum justificationis ipsius: sed quia illud manet, ut justificet credentes, ideo invenit opera quæ jam eligat ad regnum cœlorum.*

443. 18. The object of the final justifieation of the whole man, is a Saint risen from the dead.

444. 19. The object of Glorifying Grace, is a member of Christ, or a Saint thus finally Justified (either in soul first, or in soul and body after as is said.)

445. 20. The object of Gods greatest *felicitating complacency* is the *Glorified* Church of all the holy ones: And the object of his utmost universal complacency in the Creature, is the *Glory of his image* shining on the whole Universe in perfection: (As the object (as we may call it) of his Essential Volition, Love or Complacency, is Himself.)

And as these are the objects of the grace thus distinguished by the effects, so are they of the *will* or Decree of giving it, as denominated according to the order of Execution. Besides which *Davenant* on one account, and *Twisse* on another grant that *quoad media* there is no other for man to *know*.

446. By this it appeareth that the *Corrupted Mass* simply considered was the object of no one of all these graces. But the Corrupted Mass as Judged first, and after as Redeemed, and after as under Covenant, *&c.* Much less was it any *effect* of God, as *corrupt*.

447. The *corrupted Mass judged*, was not as such the object of Gods discrimination by Election of some, and rejection of others: For they were *commonly* brought all under the Covenant of Grace, and had a common sort of grace, before the discrimination.

SECT. XVI.

Of the Order of the Decrees called Reprobation. And of Election and Reprobation in themselves.

448. ACcordingly in the order of *execution* we must reckon the objects of that which some call Reprobation, answerable to what is before said of Election: But order requireth that I first speak of Election and Reprobation as in themselves, what they are.

449. *Election* as to the etymologie I need not explain. It is taken 1. For a *Temporary actual Taking* one rather than another by way of *Choice*. Which is 1. By meer Volition, or Election of the will. 2. Or also by manual Apprehension or Executive Election (As a man taketh a woman to wife.) 2. Or it is taken for An *Eternal Electing Decree* of God.

450. Gods *Executive Election* in Time is twofold 1. By giving one man *converting effectual Grace* which he giveth not to another. 2. By taking consequently that Converted person to be one of his Adopted and Justified ones, as his choice peculiar treasure.

451. Gods *Mental Election* being an Act of his *will*, is either his meer Decree of the Event, 2. Or his Decree as *efficient*, 3. Or else his *complacency*. The first is eternal. The second is eternal *ex parte Dei*, but not *ex parte effectus*. The third is eternal as it is Gods essence, but is denominated Temporary by connotation of the object; as also may the second be: About these there needs no quarrel.

452. All the special grace which God giveth in Time, he decreed from Eternity to give: And though some decrees have special *objects in esse cognito supposed*, none of them have a proper *exterior cause*.

453. It is not possible that any Creature can have any good which is not a pure gift of God, however he may require of man Conditions of Reception, in the order of Collation. Therefore the Decree must needs be free.

454. As to the question whether God elect men upon foresight of any good in them, enough is said before to answer it. If the question mean whether Gods *Knowledge* or *Volition* be first in themselves? I answer, *neither*; For nothing in him is before or after other. But if God might be spoken of as man, we must say that his *Understanding* is the first *specifying* principle, and the *will* the first *quoad exercitium actus*. And therefore that the Divine understanding represented to his will, the object in its Eligibility. If the question be what is the objects represented eligibility in *esse cognito vel Ideali*, it is answered, 1. We must distinguish of the Divine Volitions called Elections by the divers effects: 1. (To pass by the rest) It is one thing to Elect to *Glory*, or *Velle Glorificare*; And here the object of Actual Glorification, is a persevering Saint: And you must distinguish Gods Volitions by his executions, or not at all (which you had rather.) 2. It is another thing to *choose* one to the first grace of faith or true Conversion. And here the object of the execution is, as is aforesaid, sometime one prepared by common grace (though without merit,) sometime one extraordinarily wicked: Look over what I said of the objects, and the question of *foresight* is answered, as far as it belongeth to our enquiry.

455. Those that deny all special arbitrary Election, must deny all special arbitrary effectual differing grace: which I shall prove elsewhere by it

D'Orbellis in 1. d. 40. [*Distinguuntur, Scientia, Præscientia, Providentia, propositum, electio, dispositio, prædestinatio & reprobatio. Hæc differunt secundum rationem, licet sint idem realiter in Deo. 1. Scientia Dei est certa Cognitio omnium præteritorum, præsentium, futurorum, fieriq; possibilium tam bonorum quam malorum. 2. Præscientia est futurorum præcognitio— Reprobati vero appropriate dicuntur Præsciti—— Providentia est præscientia futurorum in quantum sunt à præsciente in finem ordinabilia—— 3. Propositum est actus Voluntatis Divinæ tam respectu futurorum agendorum, quam permittendorum. 4. Electio supra Propositum addit discretionem electi à suo contrario, scil. boni à malo. 5. Dispositio est præscientia faciendorum, respiciens fieri rei, & cognitionem; sicut provientia respicit esse rei postquam facta est—— 6. Prædestinatio est propositum divinæ voluntatis, conferendi gratiam & gloriam prædestinatis. 7. Reprobatio est propositum permittendi reprobatos permanere in obdurationè finali, & retribuendi eis interminabilem pœnam, propter eorum iniquitatem.*]

it ſelf; And now referr ſuch to *Davenants* Diſſertation *de prædeſt.* where it is fully proved, and defended.

456. One thing which deceiveth ſuch men is, that they forget that God ſtandeth to man, not only in the Relation of a Rector *per Leges*, (for ſo he dealeth equally with all that make not the inequality themſelves:) But alſo as a *Proprietor* and a *Benefactor*, in both which Relations he is free to do with his own as he pleaſeth. And free *Lords* and *Benefactors* uſe not to diſtribute equally their gifts. Nor do they conſider that *de facto* God viſibly maketh wonderful inequalities; He maketh not men as great or good as Angels, nor Stars as glorious as the Sun: The whole ſheweth us admirable variety, arbitrarily made by the great Benefactor, who giveth not to us a Reaſon of his will.

457. The word [ἀδόκιμος] *Reprobus*, in Scripture is uſed no where that I remember, but *Rom.* 1. 28. 1 *Cor.* 9. 27. 2 *Cor.* 13. 5, 6, 7. 2 *Tim.* 3. 8. *Tit.* 1. 16. *Heb.* 6. And the word [*Reprobation*] is not uſed at all, as any act of God. But *predeſtination* and election are oft uſed on the better ſide, and *rejecting*, *hating*, *forſaking* on the other ſide. And *electing* implyeth that ſome are not elect. Jer. 6. 30.

458. About the object of that which many call *Reprobation*, be ſure to diſtinguiſh, between a true *object* of any *Act*, *circa quod verſatur*, and which is *ſubjectum inhæſionis*, and a meer *object of ſpeech*, or *ſubjectum prædicationis*: Elſe you will with many be enſnared to think that every ſubject or object of a *predication* which in the ſeries of Gods judgements you meet with, is the object of ſome poſitive act of God.

459. And though we would quarrel with no man about meer words, yet leſt words deceive you I add, that as the word *Reprobation* ſeemeth to ſignifie a poſitive Act, and yet a great part of the deſertion of the Reprobates is by Gods preteritions and *not-acting* and privations; therefore it is not the whole *ſeries* that the word *Reprobation* aptly expreſſeth, but only ſome particular Acts.

460. The word *Predeſtinate* uſed *Rom.* 8. 29, 30. and *Epheſ.* 1. 5. 1 *Cor.* 2. 5. (it's προώρισεν though not ſpoken of perſons) *Act.* 4. 28. (tranſlated [*fore-determined*]) when applyed to perſons is ever taken in Scripture as an act of mercy: And the ancients *Auguſtine*, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius* uſe the words [*Prædeſtinati & Præſciti*, the *predeſtinate* and the *fore-known*] as of late men uſe among us the words *Elect* and *Reprobate*.

461. Though men differ as their opinions lead them in the expoſition of ſuch texts as * *Rom.* 8. 28, 29, 30. *Epheſ.* 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. and ſome take them to ſpeak of predeſtinating Individuals, and others only of *ſpecies*, that is, of believers, ſufferers, Lovers of God, *&c.* yet as to the *matter* it ſelf none that is judicious can or doth deny but that God eternally Predeſtinateth *Individuals*; The Jeſuits commonly confeſs it, though they differ on the queſtion, how far it is on fore-ſight of faith: But that foreſeen Believers individually are eternally elected to ſalvation, they cannot deny. And the Learneſt Jeſuits maintain that God giveth *faith* in time, and electeth Individuals to faith it ſelf from eternity: That is, eternally decreed to give them faith, or to give them that Grace by which he fore-knew that in the advantagious circumſtances in which he decreed to put them, they *would freely*, and he *decreed ſhould infallibly*, *believe*.

The preſumption of the Schoolmen in defining the Act of predeſtination is tremendous: See *Ruiz de provid. diſp.* 3. *ſect.* 9. *ad* 11. who concludeth that Predeſtination is an Act of Gods Intellect, and a Practical act, and is *Actus affirmans Dei volitionem libere decernentem de finibus rerum & mediis*, &c. q. d. *Volo Petrum beatificare & per talia media*, &c. It is not this will, but the knowledge of it.

* Vid. *Beram in* Rom. 8. 28. *de propoſito.*

462. The conceit and ſuppoſition of many, that Election and Reprobation are ſuch perfect contraries, as that they run *pari paſſu*, and that God *willeth* in the one juſt as he doth in the other, End and means, for matter and order, is a groſs miſtake. *Auguſtine*, *Proſper*, *Fulgentius*

and *Davenant* of late, with many more have ſhewed, that God predeſtinateth men to *Faith*, and perſeverance, and to *Glory*, and not only to Glory upon the foreſight of faith and perſeverance: But that he predeſtinateth or decreeth men to damnation, only on the *foreſight* of final impenitence and infidelity, but not to Impenitence or Infidelity it ſelf.

Leg. *Daun. Diſſert. de Prædt. & Reprobat. copioſe hæc probantur. Et Zumel Diſput. 5. §. 5. p. 335. & ſeq. & objecto tacti. pag. 347, &c.*

463. The Grand difficulty that occaſioneth all our Controverſies herein is, How to diſcern that God is the Author of all our Good, and yet not the Author of Sin, nor of Damnation ſaving *for ſin*. And both parties are very deſirous to hold and ſee that both theſe are true: Nay, both believe them: But they differ only in the way and method of manifeſting it.

464. There are three opinions about Reprobation: 1. One is, that God Poſitively decreed from eternity to glorifie his Juſtice in the damnation of the moſt, and to that end to occaſion and permit their hardning and unbelief: ſo that Reprobation is Poſitive both as to the *Act and Object*. 2. The other is the opinion of the Synod of *Dort* (as expreſſed) defended at large by *Davenant* and many others, that Reprobation is Gods Poſitive Decree not to give faith and and repentance to the ſame men, and to damn them for impenitence and infidelity: and ſo is Poſitive *quad Actum*, but *Negative quoad Objectum*, (as to the firſt part, *not giving faith.*) 3. The third is the Opinion of ſubtile *Scotus* and his followers, that *in primo inſtanti Reprobation* is *Negative quoad Actum & Objectum*; that is, It is no Act of God at all, but only a *Non-election* or *preteritio*: which is I ſuppoſe the meaning of Dr. *Sterne* of *Dublin* College, who hath written a *Latin* Tractate maintaining that God Reprobateth none, that is, by any Act.

So *Aluentus* before cited.

465. The method laid down by *Scotus* is this, [*Offertur Voluntati ſuæ hunc peccaturum vel peccare: Primo voluntas ejus circa hunc non habet Velle: Velle enim ipſum habere peccatum non poteſt. 2. Poteſt intelligere Voluntatem ſuam non volentem hoc: & tunc poteſt velle Voluntatem ſuam non velle hoc: & ita dicitur Volens ſinere, & voluntarie permittere: ſicut ex alia parte præſentato ſibi Juda, primo Deus habet non Velle ſibi Gloriam, & non primo Nolle——& poteſt tunc ſecundo reflectere ſuper iſtam negationem actus & Velle eam: & ita Volens ſive voluntarie non eligit Judam finaliter peccaturum, & non nolitionem gloriæ, ſed non-volitionem gloriæ.*

Scot. 1. *d.* 47.
Vid. *Signa Mayronis in fine.*
Againſt *Scotus* his foundation, that God knoweth future contingents only *ut Volita*, ſaith *Aliac.* in 1. *q.* 11. N. [*Sed iſta propoſitio non eſt intelligibilis.* 1. *Quia talia inſtantia & prioritatem & poſterioritatem eſſe in Deo non eſt verum.* 2. *Quia impoſſibile eſt quod pro aliquo inſtanti talis complexio de futuro ſit neutra: Alias pro tunc daretur medium in contradictione.* 3. *Quia ponit aliquid eſſe medium & rationem cognoſcendi in Divino intellectu.*]

466. It is notable that both Dr. *Twiſſe* and Biſhop *Davenant*, do diſclaim this opinion of *Scotus* without offering us any one argument againſt it; which is ſo unuſual a courſe with one of them, as would perſwade one to think that they had not much to ſay againſt it, but (what they intimate) the harſh ſound of the words, that God ſhould be here a non-agent.

467. The truth ſeemeth to me, that as *Davenant* ſaith, *Scotus* was the firſt *artifex* of this ordering of various Acts in the mind of God: So here he ſaith *too much*, and is *too bold*, and feigneth a *ſubſequent Volition* of a *former non-volition* without cauſe or proof, meerly to ſcape the cenſure which yet he now incurreth, of making God too little active.

Lombard. 1. *d.* 47.

468. So far was *Scotus* from being the firſt Author of this Opinion, of a *Negatio volendi peccatum* in God, that their common Maſter *Lombard* moſt expreſly aſſerteth it, and that more plainly and ſoundly than theſe over-ſubtile men. Upon which his Commentators copiouſly diſpute *An in Deo poſſit eſſe pura omiſſio abſque volitione & nolitione poſitiva?* of which beſides the *Scotiſts* and *Nominals*, you may ſee *Aquin.* 16. *a.* 2. *Durand.* 1. *d.* 47. *q.* 1. *Ruiz de Volunt. diſp.* 8. *ſect.* 3. *concl.* 2. *Albertin. To.* 1. *princip.* 4. *q.* 4. *dub.* 2. *Vaſquez* 2. *p.* 1. *diſp.* 79. *num.* 17, &c.

Suarez

Suarez Metaph. disp. 30. *sect.* 9. *n.* 59. *Fonsec. Metap. li.* 7. *c.* 8. *q.* 5. *sect.* 3. *Aluiz Tract.* 2. *disp.* 6. *sect.* 3. *Montepil.* 1. *p. disp.* 33. *a.* 8. *c.* 1. *&* 3. *Durandus* distinguisheth of *contra & præter Voluntatem*, and saith that *Voluntas etiam beneplaciti antecedens, quæ est solum quædam Velleitas*, may be such as many things are *præter & contra eam.* But *Voluntas beneplaciti consequens* is such as nothing is *contra eam*, but *sin* is *præter eam*; *etiam mala fieri. Neque enim vult fieri, nec vult non fieri.* I like not what he addeth: *Idem forte diceret aliquis de quibusdam bonis quæ fiunt merè à libero arbitrio, sed non de omnibus*, viz. *quæ fiunt à prædestinatis*, &c.

469. And it is to be noted, that *Durandus* with other Schoolmen argue, that if sin were willed by God, God would be the Author of it: Gods Volition, say they, being efficient. And *Estius* (a yet plainer Schoolman than *Durand*) saith, *Quicquid fit Deo Volente, fit Deo authore:* who also citing *Aquinas*'s consent, saith, *Omnimode tenenda est in hac parte doctrina magistri, mala nec esse nec fieri Deo Volente.* And against the vain distinction of [*Deus non vult malum, sed vult malum fieri seu evenire*] he saith that [*Velle mala, & velle mala esse seu fieri*] *idem est. Voluntas enim ad rem simpliciter, est ad rem ut sit.*——*Qui vult virtutem, vult virtutem esse; Qui vult peccatum, vult peccatum esse*——*neque aliud sit velle mala, & velle mala esse aut fieri.* 1. d. 47. sect. 7. pag. 228. (It seemeth there were some then of Dr. *Twisses* and *Rutherfords* opinion.) *Aquin.* 1. *q.* 19. *ar.* 9. *ad* 1. *&* 3.

470. And that you may see *Estius* mind further in this, and also see all the Objections now used answered, I will here annex (though out of place) his answer to them.

Obj. 1. Sin is not committed *Deo nolente: ergo Deo volente fit.*

Resp. *Neque nolente, neque volente Deo fiunt, sed permittente.* *Aquin.* 1. *q.* 19. *art.* 9. *ad* 3. answereth in the same manner.

471. Obj. 2. *Mala esse aut fieri bonum est* 1. *Ad perfectionem universi*, 2. *Ad decorem*, &c. *Ita* August. Enchir. 10. & 11. *&* c. 96. *Bonum est ut sint mala.*

Resp. *Neg. Major: Et* 1. *Mala sunt Universi non ornatus & perfectiones, sed id deformant*, &c. 2. August. *non aliud vult, quam Bonum esse mala permitti.*

472. Obj. 3. They cannot be, unless God *will* them to be. August. Enchir. 95. *Non fit aliquid nisi Omnipotens fieri velit.*

Resp. The reason assumeth a falshood. And *Augustine* is interpreted as speaking only of the Permission as willed, and not the Event.

473. Obj. 4. *Omne verum est à Deo: esse & fieri malum verum est: Ergo.* Vid. *Aquin.* 1. *d.* 47. *q.* 2. *ad* 1.

Resp. *Non Hugonis sed sophistarum est: Nam verum qua verum est à Deo: De rebus malis sunt conceptus mentis veri.* (Indeed *malum qua objectum scientiæ non est malum.*)

474. Obj. 5. Aug. Enchir. 100. *Peccatum non fit præter Dei voluntatem, quod fit contra.*

Resp. *Loquitur de permissionis voluntate, non ipsius mali.*

Albertinus words *To.* 1. *Princip.* 4. *q.* 4. *dub.* 2. *pag.* 297. I cited before for a Negation of Will.

475. *Suarez* distinguisheth of Gods Will *Voluntarily determining to go no further*, and a will *suspended without such a determination:* And the first he denyeth not, but the latter he denyeth in God as imperfection: But upon reasons so weak, likening God to man, that I think them not worth the reciting. *Metap. disp.* 30. *sect.* 9. *num.* 59.

476. No mortal man can prove, that God *must needs have* actual Volitions

Yet let the Reader note, that though I hold that no man can prove a Positive Volition or Nolition of Nothings (ordinarily at least) and so would shorten the Controversie, yet my Conciliation doth not at all rest on this, but will proceed sufficiently if you say that God Positively willeth his Not-willing and his Permissions.

litions of *Nothings* as such. And consequently that he hath any such: And that his perfection excludeth them not.

477. Yet I grant that he willeth the Truth of humane Negative Propositions: For those are *something*, though about *Nothing*.

478. That such Decrees or Volitions *de nihilo* are not necessary, appeareth, in that 1. Either they are necessary in *All instances de nihilo*, or only in *some*. Not in All: *Ergo*, not *qua tales*: For if only in *some*, it must be from some singular accidental reasons: *A quatenus ad omne valet consequentia.* That they are not necessary in *all*, is granted in that no man (that I know of) ever asserted it. And to assert it, is great presumption: For then there must be infinite Negative-Positive Decrees: As *e.g.* that there shall not be innumerable more Worlds, more Suns, more Atoms, that this and that and every particular atome or sand shall not be a Sun, a Star, an Earth, a Man, a Dog, a Fish, *&c.* And infinite Decrees, about every Stone; as many about every pile of grass, and as many about every creature, what they shall not be. And infinite Decrees about infinite (or innumerable) Possibles, that they shall not be existents, that they shall not be thus or thus named, *&c.* Who can prove or dare affirm, that all these Infinite *Nothings*, have Positive acts of Decretive Nolition from Eternity in God?

Petavius Vol. 1. *li.* 9. *Theol. dogmat. de prædest. cap.* 16. *pag.* 656. thus describeth the old opinion of our Countrey-man *Johan. Erigena Scotus*, *Docuit unicam tantummodo prædestinationem esse in Deo, qua electos ad æternam felicitatem destinat: nullam autem ad æternam esse damnationem.* How near is this to the other *Joh. Scotus Duns.* See what Bishop *Usher* saith of this *Scotus Erigena* and *Gotescalcus*. *Petavius* saith, [*Idem à Cavolo calvo unice dilectus erat.*] See to this sense the Decrees *Synodi Carisiacensis contra Gotescalcum*, *in* 1 *Tom. Concil. Gallic. p.* 66.

479. 2. We must not feign unnecessary Acts in God: But such Positive Nolitions of *Nothings* seem unnecessary: For *Nothing* will be *nothing*, without a Nolition, as well as with it: What need God *Nill* the Being of more Worlds, more Creatures, more Names, *&c.* when it is not possible that ever they should be, unless he positively will and make them? Yea, if (*per impossibile*) there were no God, *Nothing* would be *Nothing* still. To feign or call for a Divine Nolition to keep *Nothing* from becoming *something*, is too presuming.

480. 3. All those Schoolmen and Divines who tell us, that every *will* of God, except his complacency and displicence, is *effective*, must needs be against a Positive Nolition of Nothings: For that effecteth nothing. If they say that they mean it only of *Volitions* and not of *Nolitions*, I answer, 1. Is not Gods Nolition a *Velle non?* What is it, but a *will* that this or that shall not be? 2. And in man as Volitions are for some Good, so *Nolitions* are for the depulsion of some Evil: But Indifferent-Nothings, that are *in esse imaginato* neither *Good* nor *Evil*, have no Volitions or Nolitions even in man.

481. 4. Gods Will is his Essence, variously denominated as variously terminated on the *objects*: But *Nothing* is *no object*, and so no *termination* of Gods Will; and so no object to constitute an act in *specie vel individuo by connotation* or extrinsick denomination: Therefore God is not to be said to Will it, or Decree it. If you say, that it is *something* in the *Idea* of Gods Intellect; I answer, It is presumptuously asserted: Who can prove, or ought to feign that there is in God Idea's or Conceits of such *nothings* as never will be any thing, in the forms of *somethings*? For Nothing as *nothing*, hath no form to be conceived of.

482. Object. *Thus you deny Nothings as such to be known of God.* For if they cannot be the objects of his *Nolitions*, then neither of his *Knowledge*.

Answ. Properly *Nothing* as such, is not an object of Knowledge at all. But a *Proposition de nihilo* is: But of this more anon.

483. 5. Certainly God doth *freely suspend* or *limit* the Acts of his *Power*: Therefore he may for ought we know (that I say not, It is certain

tain that he doth) *ſuſpend or limit* the Acts of *his Will*. God *doth not* make more Worlds, nor more Men, Birds, Beaſts, Fiſhes, Plants, Stones, Sands, Atoms, Names, *&c.* than are and will be: He doth not *ſanctifie* more than *are* and *will be* ſanctified; nor give more grace to the ſanctified than ever they will have: when he *Could* if he *would*. And when the *Principles* of the Divine Nature are *Co-equal*, why ſhould we ſay, that he who undenyably ſuſpendeth the *poſſible* acts of one, freely, ſuſpendeth not the acts of the *Free* Principle (the *will*) it ſelf? or is it like that one ſhould be here *active*, and not the other?

484. 6. *Poſitive Nolitions* of *Evil* do ſeem in man to come from the *Imperfection* of his created nature; As being Paſſive, and Capable of, or obnoxious to *evil*, or in *danger of it*, and ſo needeth *defence* againſt it, and his *Nolitions* are the defenſive and depulſive principle. And though we muſt ſpeak of God according to our mode, we muſt ſay nothing needleſly which importeth *weakneſs* or *paſſiveneſs* or *danger* in him.

485. * They that are againſt this, are moved with a fear, leſt we make God an *Idle Spectator*, and not the Governour of the World. But they conſider not, 1. That the ſuſpenſion of his *Powerful Operation* inferreth no ſuch thing: God is not Idle, becauſe he *Cauſeth* not, or maketh not infinite *Nothings* (or poſſibles to exiſt:) Nor is he the leſs Governour of the World: And yet *Idleneſs* and *Government* are words that more directly ſignifie *non-operation* and *operation*, than any meer *Volitions* or *Nolitions*. Men may thruſt out words, but no rational anſwer againſt this argument.

486. 2. And note well, that Gods not-knowing, or not-nilling nothing is from his *Perfection*; and not any privative *Ignorance* or Negligence: For he *knoweth* all that is an object of Knowledge; and *willeth* all that his Wiſdom judgeth meet to will (or nill reſpectively): So that to tell God that he is *Ignorant* if he know not an unintelligible object, or *Idle* if he *will* or *Nill* not at our direction, is as much blaſphemy, as to tell him

* Again let the Reader note that my Cauſe lyeth not on this, but becauſe I have ſaid ſo much of it, I think meet to take notice of the moſt that is ſaid againſt me: *Vaſquez in* 1. *Tho. qu.* 19. *a.* 3. *diſp.* 79. *c.* 3. doth purpoſely confute *Scotus*, and affirmeth, that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative *quoad actum* about any Negatives; but that he hath a poſitive act of Nolition of every *non-entity* and *non-futurum*, and ſo (*ut alibi*) hath infinite nolitions of infinite *non-futures*. He himſelf confuteth their reaſon that ſay, God is not *in potentia ut velit*, and I need not anſwer it. But he layeth all his cauſe on this as a demonſtration, (and maketh it a very uſeful doctrine for the explication of reprobation) that *Quodcunque non eſſe creaturæ cujuſcunque referri poteſt ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile, quod ipſa velle poſſit: Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non eſſe: deinde ut dicatur negative ſe habere, opus eſt variatio-*

nem aliquam intrinſecam eſſe aut in Deo, aut in rebus non futuris: At non, &c. *Voluntas autem Dei non* neceſſario *negative ſe debet habere, quia illud* non eſſe *eſt appetibile:* The ſumm is, *God can* Poſitive *will non-entity*, ergo *he doth*. And this is his *All*, to which elſewhere he oft referreth us. But let the ſober Reader conſider, 1. He confeſſeth, that Gods Will is his immutable and ſimple Eſſence, and in it ſelf is not at all diverſified to or by objects, but only extrinſecally denominated diverſly: ſo that all this is but *de relatione & nomine*. 2. And is it not preſumption to frame a Logick of ſecond notions, and ſay, This and not that is applicable to God, as if it were to man, when their Logical notions as to man himſelf are ſo arbitrary? 3. He anſwereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I uſe. *Nil fruſtra* muſt be feigned of creatures: much leſs of God. 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right, it inferreth no difference in God, but in our denominations of his Will, the ſeven caſes here granted him; may fully ſatisfie them that will ſo denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Phyſical and proper ſenſe I deny his ſuppoſition. It is no *Non-entity* that is properly *bonum & appetibile*, though it may be *Malum*. *Bonum* as well as *unum & Verum* are *affectionis ſeu modi entis*. *Et ubi non eſt Ens non eſt modus*. That which is not, is not *Good*; or *appetibile*. Morally we ſay improperly, It is good not to be ſick, not to have an enemy, not to dye, *&c.* But we mean but 1. It is Good to live, to be well, to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of, and 2. That it is *Evil* to dye, to be ſick, to have an enemy. We ſay, Its Good not to be erroneous, wicked, deprived of Heaven, *&c.* that is, It is Good to know truly, to be godly, to be glorified, and it is Evil to err, to be wicked, *&c.* 6. Gods Will is conſidered either as 1. Efficient, 2. Or as finally ſulfilled and pleaſed. As *Efficient* it cannot *will* nothing: for nothing is not made or cauſed. And *impeditio ne res fiat*, may be by effecting the hindering Cauſe. And as final, or as fulfilled and pleaſed, Non-entity can properly be ſaid to be but the *not diſpleaſing* of it. Nothing is no object of the Will: though a Propoſition or in men an oppoſitive thought be ſomewhat. It ſeemeth to me a preſumptuous playing with the Majeſty of God to affirm, that we muſt aſcribe to him infinite Poſitive Volitions that infinite Atoms, Names, *&c.* ſhall not be: when even to men we only aſcribe reductively and morally, the nolition of things evil. 7. It is certain that God ſuſpendeth his *Velle & facere* about non-entities? And why not as well his *Nolle*? or *Velle non eſſe*? as aforeſaid. But here after others a late philoſophical Phyſician ſaith, that *Nothings* may be *Bona Moralia*, though not *Naturalia*. I anſwer, It is not true ſave by a reductive improper ſpeech. Morality is Modality. The negative Commandments forbid evil, and command the nolition and reſiſtance of it: To murder, *&c.* is evil: and to *nill* it and poſitively reſiſt and ſubdue all in us that tendeth to it, is good: But the bare *non occidere* is not moral Good. All moral Good is radically in the Will, and no farther in any forbearance of an act, than a poſitive act of the Will makes it Obedience: And yet here I go not ſo far as *Ockam*, as I have ſaid elſewhere. I grant that when the poſitive nolition and reſtraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted, is the good of obedience, the not-doing of the Act is *loco materiæ circa quam*, and ſo muſt go to an adequate conception of the duty, although it be no proper part, nor good in it ſelf: But *Ockam* goeth further, and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodneſs than the Volition alone: But I think that the action is a ſubject (or *loco ſubjecti*) of a derived ſecondary goodneſs, as *Scotus* aſſerteth.

that

that he is Impotent if he *cannot ſin*, or cauſe Contradictions to be true: The caſe is the very ſame.

487. Object. *But Scripture oft aſcribeth both Nolitions of Nothings, and Knowledge of them unto God.*

Anſw. And ſo muſt we in that ſenſe as the Scripture doth: We will ſay, and muſt ſay of ſome *Nothings*, that God Nilleth them. I hope the Learned will not take it amiſs, if I ſpeak where the Schoolmen are too ſilent, as well as deſire ſilence where they unprofitably ſpeak, as long as the caſe is, 1. Weighty, 2. And made plain, 3. And I go the middle healing way.

488. In all theſe caſes and reſpects we aſcribe Nolitions unto God: I. He that by a Poſitive operation cauſeth a limited cauſe, may be ſaid to cauſe the limitation of effects by conſequence. And he that poſitively *willeth realities* with ſuch limitations, from whence the conſequence neceſſarily followeth [*Nothing elſe will ever be*] is ſaid Morally, or reputatively or by Conſequence to *Will* that *Nothing* elſe ſhall be. And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge, is improperly ſaid to know all *Nothings*, in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be. And ſo as *knowing* Beings is by *conſequence* reputatively or morally called the *knowing* of *Nothings* by men, we are fain to uſe ſuch terms of imperfection even of God, leſt we ſeem to make him Idle or Ignorant. When we ſay, that *God is the Cauſe that there is no more creatures*, we mean but that *he cauſeth not more creatures*. And ſo to ſay, that *God willeth* that there ſhall be no more Worlds, meaneth but that God willeth not that there ſhall be more.

489. II. This Interpretative conſequential Act, which is but morally ſo called, is fitlier expreſſed in the groſs of *univerſal Nothings*, than of millions of imaginary *particulars*. It is fitter to ſay, that by *willing* a limited or finite World, God *willed* that there ſhould be *nothing more*, than to ſay, *He willed that there ſhould not be a Sun in every mans pocket*, or *Heaven and Earth in every mans fiſt*, &c. Though as to the *truth* all is one.

490. III. When God *poſitively willeth* the *Poſitive hindering* of a thing, he may morally be ſaid to *Nill the thing*, or to *Will* that it *ſhall* not be. That there are *Poſitive Impeditions* of God (by Dr. *Twiſſes* leave) I have elſewhere proved: But then you muſt ſuppoſe that as the fountain of Nature, as it were by a Decree, he hath reſolved to continue the Nature of things and his natural Concurſe: which ſuppoſed, their *Natures* may *incline* them to ſuch *Action* as needeth *Poſitive Impedition*. So God *hindered* the *fire* from burning, and the Lyons from killing *Daniel* (it's like) *Dan. 3. & 6.* Certainly if a *man* can ſtop a Cart-wheel with a Stone, or bind a man in chains, God can do the ſame. And mens *Inclination* to ſin needeth a *Poſitive Impedition*. Now though *non-agere* is *nothing*, and hath *no cauſe*, yet he that deſtroyeth or hindereth the *Cauſe* of Action, is morally ſaid to be the Cauſe that there is no Action: Though ſtrictly it be but deſtroying the Cauſe of Action, and ſo preventing further action. And this moral language even of God is the fitter, becauſe it is of *Moral things*.

491. IV. And here Gods Law being called his Will, though it be formally but *de debito*, yet being materially *de re ipſa*, a double reaſon will thence ariſe. For when God forbiddeth and condemneth ſin, &c. 1. He doth very much to hinder it, and that poſitively (and ſo he doth by his grace), 2. And his prohibition may be called his Nolition ſignified.

492. V.

492. V. And God *properly willeth* the *Being* and *Truth* of *Negative pr opoſitions*, [viz. *This or that will not be*] and *knoweth* them (as made by man at leaſt). And as I ſaid, *ſin* as the ſubject of a propoſition is *not ſin*, or hath no harm in it. As *ſin repented of*, or the *object of repentance* and *hatred* maketh up a *Virtue*, and is not *ſin* indeed, but the knowledge of it: So here. But yet hence the phraſe may be borrowed, and it may be ſaid, that God *Nilleth* the exiſtence of ſuch *Poſſibles*, becauſe he willeth the truth of the propoſition, *They ſhall not be.*

493. VI. But here note, that when God is *Morally* and moſt fitly ſaid to *Nill* ſuch *Nothings*, it is not *as Nothings*, but as *Poſſible Evils*: For only *Evil* is the proper object of Poſitive Nolition: ſo that it may be ſpoken fullier of ſin, than of other Nothings, even fitly in a Moral ſenſe.

494. VII. Laſtly, Acts of *Will* are ordinarily aſcribed to God, when it is meer *operations* or *privations* that are meant; and ſo the phraſe is as they ſay *ab effectu ad affectum.* When a man 1. Denyeth his aid, 2. And actually hindereth, it is a ſign of nolition. And ſo from Gods 1. Not cauſing, 2. And his hindering, he is ſaid to Nill that *Nothing* (that never ſhall be.) So much of the phraſe.

495. Now for application. 1. *Non-dare fidem, aut gratiam, not to convert*, is *Nothing*; Therefore it is not *Poſitively willed* or *decreed* of of God: or at leaſt no man can prove it ſo to be: So *not-to give the Goſpel, the Spirit*, &c.

496. Yet note, that when *mans ſins* have ſo forfeited ſuch gifts that they are *penally withheld*, this *non-agency* hath the denomination of a *Moral Act.* And alſo that the making of the *Penal Law*, which maketh this *Privation* due as a puniſhment, was a *poſitive act of God*, and had a poſitive Volition. But *Negations not-penal* are not ſo.

497. 2. Not to hinder ſin, or to *Permit ſin* (barely as *permiſſion*) is *Nothing*: (As elſewhere I have proved.) Therefore it hath no Poſitive Decree or Will: ſave that when it is penal, and the execution of a Law, that Law being a real natural being, and the *Jus* thence reſulting a real relation and the executive Privation *quid Morale*, they are Willed and Decreed anſwerably as they are. To permit a man to be ſpiritually Dead is [not-to make him alive:] To permit his Darkneſs or Ignorance, [is not-to give him Light or Knowledge:] To permit his unbelief is [not-to cauſe him to believe.] To permit his want of Love, is [not-to give him Love.] To permit his poſitive ſins of Malignity or Carnality, is but [not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence,] ſuppoſing the Natural ſupport and concurſe, whith the Author of Nature giveth to all things.

498. Therefore when Gods Acts in themſelves are his Eſſence and all one, and are diverſified but by connotation of divers objects, relatively and denominatively, when he knoweth all things *uno intuitu*, and willeth all that he willeth *unica Volitione*; when *nihil phyſicum* is no denominating *terminus*, of a phyſical act, (though ſo far as it may be called *Moraliter*, id eſt, *Reputative aliquid*, as a *Privation*, it may be ſaid to denominate *reputatively*, as a *quaſi aliquid*;) and that which is *moraliter vel imputative nihil*, cannot morally denominate; when both *Non dare ſpiritum, gratiam, fidem, vitam*, &c. and *permittere infidelitatem, peccatum*, &c. are truly *Nothing*, and even in Reputative Moral ſenſe, are *nihil morale*, when they are not penal; (And as antecedent to *ſin*, they are not penal;) Judge now impartially whether 1. Thoſe men deal not preſumptuouſly with God, 2. And troubleſomely with his Church, who aſſert the Being of Poſitive Decrees and Volitions in God about ſuch *Nul-*

lities, and raiſe Controverſies about the Reaſons and the Order of them, yea, unto dangerous inferences; when as 1. They can prove no ſuch thing in God as they aſſert. 2. Nay, when we ſay ſo much to prove the contrary.

499. And here conſider, whether *Scotus* himſelf aſſert not without all need or proof, that God hath a poſitive knowledge and *reflexive Volition* of his own *Non-Volition?* and ſo that a *Nullity* as to his own act, muſt be the *terminus* of a poſitive act? When that Nullity is neither God, nor a Creature, nor *aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturæ*; and ſo ſeemeth to be no denominating *terminus* of a diſtinct act. Yet no doubt, God is not to be called *Ignorant* of ſuch Nullities or *Idle*; for thoſe are terms of *privation*: If God be ſaid either not to *Know nothings* or not to *will* or *Nill* them, it is becauſe it ſignifieth his *Perfection*: And no part of perfection is wanting to him. But we muſt not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing.

500. For we dare not here preſume peremptorily to determine Negatively, that God doth not *poſitively will* his own *non-agency* or *non-volitions*; becauſe we know how dark we are and diſtant from God, and unfit to ſay any thing but certainties of him, as certain truth: But we abſtain from the contrary aſſertion, as utterly unproved, and we will impute no needleſs acts to God as his Perfection: Though we yield to reputative moral denominations.

501. And ſo I contradict not the language of *Aquinas* 1. *q.* 14. 9. who ſaith, that God knoweth ſuch non-entities as never will be, *ut poſſibilia*. And *eſſe in potentia quamvis non in actu* is more than *nothing*. But remember that *eſſe in potentia* ſpeaketh the *eſſe Potentiæ*, but the *poſſible* is a pure *nothing*. So that this is but to know the *Potentia*, and not any *thing* elſe. Yet no doubt but God knoweth all things as they are in himſelf; that is, he knoweth that he can do all things, and knoweth what he knoweth and willeth; but this is no *eſſe creatum* but God himſelf, at leaſt as to that which never will be. But if any will call it a knowing of things poſſible which are nothings, when God knoweth his own Power to make them, we quarrel not with words, while the ſenſe is known.

502. But remember that it is not the *Knowledge*, but *Decrees* and *Volitions* of God that our enquiry now is about: And *Aquinas* and his followers commonly ſay, that *Gods will* goeth not ſo far as his *knowledge*; and that he *knoweth* indeed *mala ex bono* of which they are the privation (as no doubt he doth ſo far as it is not imperfection to be ſaid to know them, or as they are objects of knowledge) but yet that *Mala neque vult, neque nolit, ſed tantum non-vult*, as *Lombard* ſaid.

503. *Ockam Quodlib.* 3. *q.* 6. hath the queſtion, *Utrum Cognitio intuitiva poteſt eſſe de objecto cognito?* And he 1. concludeth that *per potentiam divinam poteſt eſſe de objecto non exiſtente*; but he meaneth only *quod fuit vel fuerit*. 2. That *naturally* it cannot be. And ſaith that *Contradictio eſt quod viſo ſit, & tamen illud quod videtur, non ſit in effectu nec eſſe poſſit: Ideo contradictio eſt quod chimæra videatur intuitive: ſed non eſt contradictio quod illud quod videtur nihil ſit in actu extra cauſam ſuam, dummodo poſſit eſſe in effectu, vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura——Unde Deus ab æterno videt omnes res factibiles, & tamen tunc nulla fuerunt*——By which it is plain, that he meaneth as *Aquinas*, that it is not as *Nothings*, but as *Poſſibles* and *Futures* they are known even by God, ſaving that *Aquinas* and his followers judge that they are from eternity ſore-known in their proper exiſtence, by reaſon that all times and things are preſent in Eternity. Now to know a Poſſibility of a thing, is

not

not to know the *Thing*: But to know the Power. For *Possibile* is *nihil*. And as *Ockam* proveth, that *Universale* is *qualitas mentis*, and is *nothing else*, nor any where else *existent*, so we may much more clearly say *de Possibili* that besides *Potentia* it is nothing but the *Conceptus mentis* what that Power can do.

504. And if an Artificer get the *Idea* of a fabrick or frame which never was in the World, and Resolve to make such a real thing, that which is in his mind, is but his own Thought or Imagination, and nothing else: And to call it *Domus vel Navis Possibilis*, signifieth nothing else, or it is delusory.

505. Holkot Quodlib. li. 2. qu. 2. lit. C. D. E. ad primum *dicit* [*Dico plane quod aliæ res à Deo nullum esse habuerunt ab æterno distinctum à Deo: Neque esse quidditativum, neque esse Potentiale, neque esse repræsentativum, secundum quod diversi antiquitus opinati sunt.*] *Quod probat. Ad art. secundum* he saith, that the *Creatures had no being in God from eternity, but improperly good men have so spoken, because he knoweth them, and can produce them.*

And *ad art. 3. q. whether it be true*, that *Rosa* e. g. *non existens, concipitur aut intelligitur?* he reciteth twelve arguments for the affirmative, and then reciteth the negative as the opinion of others: And though he say not which side he taketh, yet he confuteth the arguments for the affirmative, and bringeth nine arguments for the negative, which he saith nothing against.

Thomas's opinion of the question you may see in his Interpreters in 1. d. 36. & 1. q. 14. ar. 9. *Ruiz de Scient. d.* 17. *Valent.* 1. q. 14. *punct.* 7. *Tanner.* 1. d. 2. qu. 8. *dub.* 8. *Gran.* 1. p. *Cont.* 2. d. 5. *Aluiz. tr.* 2. d. 9.

506. Yet let it be still remembred that all this Controversie is not properly *de re*, but *de modo loquendi*; or of the extrinsick denomination of Gods Will, and not of his Will as in it self, which is his Essence, and but One. But yet here denominations must be carefully used.

507. And by the way, that you may understand what I mean by *denominations, from connotation* and *relation to the terminating object*, note what *Ockam* saith in Quodlib. 5. q. 25. that *Conceptus est vel* 1. *Absolutus* e. g. *hominis*, 2. *Connotativus*, e. g. *albi*, 3. *Relativus, ut patris: & differunt in hoc:* 1. *Conceptus absolutus omnia sua significata significat æque, primo, & uno modo,———in recto———*2. *Nomen Connotativum proprie significat primo unum, & aliud secundario, & unum in recto & aliud in obliquo———*3. *Conceptus relativus maxime concretus habet omnes prædictas conditiones quas habet connotativus: sed differunt in hoc quod quandocunque conceptus connotativus vere prædicatur de aliquo, convenienter potest sibi addi suum absolutum, in aliquo solum: quia nihil est album nisi sit album albedine: sed Relativo potest addi casus obliquus qui non est ejus absolutum——ut servi dominus———Omnis Conceptus Relativus est Connotativus: at non è Converso.*

508. If any shall think that he hath any advantage against what I have said by *Scotus* his opinion, that *Voluntatis objectum non est Bonum tantum, sed & Ens; & Voluntas potest Velle Malum qua Malum*; and that the Will hath other objects, *præter finem & media*, viz. *Entia absoluta* not so related in the apprehension, and consequently that there may be a *Nolition* of *Non Entia*, and not only as *Mala*; And the like of *Ockam in* 3. d. 13. *qu.* 13. *ad dub.* 3. *Gabr. Gregor. &c.* Let him remember that the greater part of the Schoolmen are against this opinion; And that the owners of it, assert not this consequence of Divine Nolitions, commonly, but

say as *Guil. Camerar. ibid. p.* 1. *q.* 2. *pag.* 158. that between Volitions and Nolitions there is this order, that Volitions go first, and we nill things only, because they consist not with what we first Willed. And Gods will need not to rise up with an actual opposition especially against its own acts or suspensions, where a non-agency will do the same thing.

Leg. Guil. Camerar. disp. moral. li. 1. q. 2 & 3. pag. 156. &c. & Phil. Fab. 1. d. 3. qu. 3. cap. 2. & q. 4. c. 7. Scot. 1. d. q. 4. ad 4. & q. 1. a. 2. & 2. d. 3. qu. 10. & d. 6. q. 1. & de Anima q. 19, 20, 21.

An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions.

LEst all this seem not clear enough in so mysterious a business, and because I have oft insisted on it, I will yet add this further explication of my thoughts in these following Theses.

1. *Understanding* and *Will* in God being not the same thing as in man, we must not think that we have any other conceptions or expressions of them than Metaphorical or Analogical.

2. Therefore we must not say, Thus and Thus God understandeth and willeth, but After the manner of men we must thus conceive of it.

3. But there are several degrees of impropriety of speech: and in a greater degree repentings, wrath, hating, grief, &c. are in Scripture spoken of God; but in strict disputes the lesser degree must be chosen, that is, such conceptions as have least of imperfection.

4. In man the *will* is an *Appetite*, and essentially connoteth the want of what we have an appetite to, or a self-insufficiency: but so it doth not in God.

5. And *Nolitions* in man yet signifie greater imperfection, *viz.* that there is some evil or hurtful thing which is at enmity to him, or against his good, and which he would be delivered from, or overcome: and it is in the will the beginning of a war, or resistance: But it is not so in God.

6. That which is Good we *will*, and that which is Evil we *Nill*, and that which is neither, we neither *will* nor *Nill*. Accordingly we must after the manner of men ascribe to God, 1. *Volitions* of *Good*, 2. *Nolitions* of *Evil*, 3. A *Non-velle* and *Non-nolle* of that which is neither.

7. Nothing is Good, but 1. God himself simply and primitively, and 2. The works of God secondarily and derivatively as the glory or splendour of his perfections is found in them, and as they are the products of his will: 3. And the *Acts* or *Works* of his creatures in a third degree.

8. The Goodness of the creature being essentially relative to Gods will, that is, Its conformity to it as its product, the creature is *eo nomine Good* because it is that which God willeth.

9. Hence the grand difficulty is resolved, Whether God could have made the World Better? No: not in the first and propereſt sense of created Goodness, because he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be: But he might make it *otherwise* and might diversifie it, and make particular creatures Better to themselves and one another, which is a lower sense of Goodness: But in all diversifications they would be still perfectly Agreeable to his *will*, and so be still equally Good or Best.

10. The Goodness of the third rank of beings (The Acts of *Free-Agents*) is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will.

11. God hath as *Creator* and *Motor* become the *Voluntary Root* or Spring of Nature and natural motion, and accordingly stablished all second causes as natural agents under him, and doth by them operate in a natural necessitating and constant way: And this is antecedent to his Laws

to

to free agents: And this natural courſe of agency we muſt not expect that he ſhould alter, but rarely by miracles.

12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to Gods natural agency or motion: for elſe there ſhould be ſomething beſides God and his works which he muſt overcome: Though ſome natural motions may oppoſe each other, yet all concurr to one end.

13. Non-entity or *Nothingneſs*, is not contrary to God as an opponent.

14. Therefore ſeeing **Nolle* is not a meer *Non velle*, but a *Velle-non*, which is the *war* of the will againſt an opponent, and the root of oppoſition *ad extra*, it is an unmeet phraſe to ſay that God doth *Nil* any *Non-entity*, or any meer *Natural* oppoſition to him: or that he *Willeth* any *natural entity* or *motion* which he effecteth not.

15. But God being ſecondarily the *Rector* of free-agents, and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions, he doth by thoſe Laws oblige their reaſon and will, to reſtrain and reſiſt ſome natural or ſenſitive appetites and inclinations, and ſo to reſiſt ſome natural motions of God in nature, in which he is pleaſed to operate by ſecond cauſes but *in tantum* and reſiſtibly (as a ſtronger natural motion may reſiſt a weaker.)

16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external, aſſiſt them in that reſiſting agency which he obligeth them to.

17. Therefore God may two wayes be ſaid to reſiſt his own natural motion, by his Laws, and by his aſſiſting grace: (But his Laws contradict not one another.)

18. To God as meer Rector therefore two things may be ſaid to be opponent, 1. Such ſenſitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be reſiſted; 2. And all moral evil.

19. And therefore as God may be ſaid to Reſiſt theſe, ſo alſo firſt to *Nill them*: And ſo to have Decrees againſt them.

20. Gods Volitions and Nolitions here are his eſſential will denominated from the effects and objects. And that effect of God from which he is ſaid to *Nill* both theſe, is as is ſaid, 1. His Laws, 2. His grace or help. And in this we are agreed, 1. That he forbiddeth ſin and commandeth us the reſtraint of appetites and ſenſes, *&c.* 2. And that he helpeth us ſo to do: Therefore the reſt of the School-Controverſies here that trouble the world, are but logomachies, about the Names of *Nolitions* and Nolitive Decrees.

21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law, is but the *debitum*, the duty of the ſubject to do what is commanded, and not to do what is forbidden.

22. It is not a meer *non-agency* that is meant by a *prohibition*, but a *poſitive nolition* of the ſubject, reſtraining him from the forbidden act: And all proper moral obedience or diſobedience, Good or Evil, is primarily in *the will*, and no further ſecondarily in the exteriour act or reſtraint, than as they are Voluntary; and in non-agency but in a third ſenſe or inſtance as the conſequent of nolition and the refraining act.

23. If any therefore will ſay in this ſenſe, that God doth poſitively *Nil* the forbidden Act, and ſo *will* a *non-entity ſub ratione mali moralis* in this remote ſence, we will not contradict him but ſay as he.

24. And accordingly we may ſay that God hath *a poſitive Decree* of *non-entities*, or againſt *moral evil*; where *non-agency* is *loco materiæ*, that is, *in tantum*, ſo far as to do all that he doth againſt it; but not *abſolutè ne eveniat, ubi evenit.*

25. But we may not therefore ſpeak ſo unaptly as to ſay that he *will-eth*

* Saith Alliac. Cameracen. 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. [*Reprobatio ſecundum aliquos eſt non-propoſitum dandi vitam æternam. Et ille dicitur Reprobatus ſecundum aliquos cui Deus non propoſuit dare vitam æternam.*]

Et poſtea [*certum eſt de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perſeverent —— Et non vult quod conditio impleatur; Quia ſi vellet utique impleretur:*] But he ſaith not [*Vult non impleri*, &c.]

Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non miſereri eſt effectus Reprobationis, cum ſit ipſa Reprobatio. Id ibid.

eth positively all or any *non-entity* or *non-futurity* of meer *naturals* that are *non-futura*.

26. Therefore we may much less say it of his own *Natural Impeditions*, that he positively *willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit*: For he is not to be thought of as a restrainer of himself by Law or self-opposition. It is enough to say that *non-vult impedire*.

27. Much less may we say that *positively vult non velle-impedire*, lest we make another *Velle* necessary to that *Velle*, and so *in infinitum*.

28. It is proper to say that *Deus non vult permittere peccatum, ubi id non permittit*; and that *vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem positive permissum est: quia permissio ista est quid positivum*.

29. After the manner of men it may be said that consequentially he willeth or decreeth a thing, when he willeth or decreeth that from which it necessarily followeth, though it could not be proved that the will of God is directly terminated on that consequent thing it self: And so it may be said, that *Qui vult quid majus, consequenter vult minus illud quod in majore includitur*. And so as when God commandeth duty he doth more than *politically permit* it, he may be said *eminenter to permit* it, and so he may be said to *will* or decree his own *permission* of it: But that is not *formaliter* as *permission*, or a negative *non-impedition*, but *eminenter*, because he formally willeth the *quid majus, viz.* the *command*.

30. So God may be said *eminenter* to will his *non dare gratiam, aut Gloriam*, when he penally as a Judge, denyeth it to a sinner. But here the thing formally willed is a *positive judicial denyal, rejection* or *exclusion* of the sinner, which the privation followeth.

And now for the application of all this to our case it may be perceived, 1. That the very Controversie is such, as a sober Christian should be afraid to resolve on either side. † It is a tremendous thing to poor sinful worms, who know not the nature of one *arenula* or pile of grass, or the soul of an insect, nor how the perceptions of a poor Bee is ordered in gathering her Honey and Wax, and making her Combes, *&c.* to determine insolently and contentiously in what order God conceiveth of things, or willeth them? which first and which second, and what reasons move him? and for what use and end each thing is willed? and whether he have positive Volitions of every *non-entity* that it shall not exist then? *&c.* I am afraid lest my very opposing and rebuking of this presumption should be found guilty of bold prophaneness, while I so much meddle with so unsearchable a thing; which I should avoid, had not disputers and railing censurers made it necessary.

2. That though while we talk together familiarly and popularly, men may leave each other to liberty to say that God Decreeth *non-entities*, or willeth that Infinite *species* and individual *nothings* shall never be, yet to make this the matter of a *Church-dispute*, and censure those that say not as they say, and *calumniate* them as favouring some perillous errour, seemeth to me no better than diabolical.

3. All men that have the *brains*, *hearts* and *faces* of Christians who hold that all these distinctions signifie no true diversity in Gods *will ex parte sui*, should openly tell the world in the beginning, middle and end of such disputes, that *It is but about words that we dispute*, even what Logical terms Artists must use in distinguishing of that which hath no real diversity? even about the dreadful Majesty of God and what Names to put on his simple volition?

4. And they should well bethink them how far it is *safe*, to think of that as divers which is not divers; and to multiply conceptions and distinctions

Bannes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 270. confesseth that the sense of all this question is but which way God, who is one pure act, unvaried about all varieties, is most conveniently to be mentioned by us: and that *Deus vi Voluntatis culpæ quæ futura erat in reprobis non habuit actum voluntatis affirmativum quo voluerit esse peccata, aut illos peccatores.* (Whence it followeth that All futures or existents are not positively willed: Even the *formale peccati* is *quid futurum.*) But he thinks it most fit to say that God positively willeth the permission of sin, 1. Because it is Good. *Answ.* Nothing is neither Good nor bad. 2. Because else the difference between the predestinate and reprobate would not fall under providence. *Answ.* As if giving that grace to one which is not given to another, made no difference. 3. Because else sin would come by chance as to Gods foreknowledge. *Answ.* As if nothing would not be nothing without a positive decree that it shall be nothing? or God could not know a *nothing*, or a crime, as such, so far as it is *quid intellectui perfectissimo intelligibile*, without positive willing it: How then knoweth he the *formale peccati*?

† Aristot. ad Nichom. *Expetit, Est hominis modestiæ non majorem in disputando certitudinem aut subtilitatem explicationis exhibere, quam vi ipsius de qua disseritur natura patitur. Hæc studiosis in omni vitæ, ut quæ sit, ratio agentis in disserendo contra Ecclesiæ doctrinam de causa peccati, &c. contagiosa.* Strigelius in Melanct. Loc. pag. 287. *Subtilitas plus justo non satisfacit, &c. sapit.*

ctions of Gods ſimple eſſence beyond true neceſſity : and whether then to contend about the priority of ſuch conceptions be more holy or prophane ?

5. For all the reaſons before given, If they will ſay that God Decreeth penally to deny or *not* to give *Grace* or Glory or any good thing to them that forfeit it, there is reaſon for the expreſſion according to Scripture, after the manner of man : But if they will fly higher and ſay that Gods Simple eſſential will, is to be called A poſitive Decree or Volition that *Judas, e. g.* ſhall not be named *John, Thomas*, &c. that there ſhall be millions of diſtinct non-entities, *&c.* or that any poſitive Volition is of neceſſity to non-futurities or non-exiſtences in meer phyſical reſpects, where no poſitive action is neceſſary, (ſave only that by conſequence he that decreeth and willeth to make ſuch and ſuch finite creatures, may conſequentially and improperly be ſaid to *will* that there ſhall in general be no more, in that he willeth not that there *ſhall be* more, and they cannot be without his will,) I fear ſuch are over-bold with God. And ſo are they that ſay that he hath a Poſitive Decree or Will, *non dare Chriſtum ante lapſum Adami, non dare fidem, non impedire peccatum*, in ſuch inſtances or caſes wherein the [*dare*] is no Act of a *Rector*, nor the [*negare*] the poſitive Law, judgement or penal denyal of a Judge, but only the *dare* belongeth to a free *Dominus-benefactor*.

Penal permiſſion or *non-impedition* of ſin, and *denying* or *not-giving grace*, may be ſaid to be decreed or willed, becauſe God threatned them antecedently by a Poſitive Law, which ſhould make them due, and that Law was the product of Gods will. Though ſtrictly it is but the *Poſitive Law* and the *Debitum pœnæ* here that God *willeth*, which the *non-impedire & non-dare gratiam* follow.

But Gods not making men Angels, or Stars, or Suns, and his making us men, free and defectible, and his permitting the *firſt ſin*, and his giving men no more grace *antecedently* (before forfeiture) as free *benefactor & dominus ſuorum*, none of theſe have the ſame reaſon on which to found ſuch denominations of Gods will and eſſence.

And ſeeing *Nolitions* in man are the reſults of his Inſufficiency and war againſt noxious evils, we muſt not aſcribe ſuch Imperfections to God ; but only ſuch *Nolitions* as his Actions as *Rector per Leges & Judicia* have made to ſignifie no imperfection, as being not *contra nocumenta*, but only *contra injurias* as againſt himſelf, *& contra nocumenta* as againſt his *creatures*, i. e. *contra peccatum*.

And now I may anſwer the ſolitary argument of *Vaſquez*, mentioned in the *Margin* (that *non entia, non dare gratiam, non impedire peccatum*, &c. may have *aliquam rationem boni & amabilitatis*, and ſo may be *Willed, Loved* or *Decreed.*)

Anſw. 1. In meer *Naturals*, *Negations* are not properly any way good or evil ; but *Privations* are *Natural Evils*, and not good.

2. To be *occaſio ſinè qua non* of good, (as ſickneſs is of the Phyſicions honour, and ſin of Gods,) is not any true *ratio boni vel amabilis* : The *bonum & amabile* is only the good that on that occaſion is done : The occaſion is neither *efficient*, *conſtitutive* or *final* cauſe of any good, nor any cauſal *proper medium*.

3. In *Morals*, meer *Negations* are neither good nor evil, nor have any *Morality*, but only *Poſitives* and *Privations*.

4. In *morals* God *judicially* doth that whence *Penal privations* follow, and he may *penally non agere, non dare gratiam*, to *execute* his Law, and *demonſtrate* his truth and Juſtice on ſinners, and occaſion the perception of

Bannes ubi ſup. p. 272. argueth [*Omne ordinabile in bonum finem quod invenitur exiſtens, eſt volitum à Deo : ſed Permiſſio peccati eſt*, &c.] Anſ. *Permiſſio illa quæ nihil eſt, nisi, exiſtens eſt neque ordinabile : De permiſſione autem activa verum eſt.*

So *Ruiz de Prædeſ. Tract.* 2. *diſp.* 12. copiouſly proveth a poſitive will or decree of *Permitting ſin* : But then he defineth Permiſſion ſo as to include both Production of circumſtances and general concurſe ; And who denyeth that ſuch poſitive beings muſt have poſitive Cauſes ? But what's that to meer non-impedition ? (Thus ſtill words are the matter of our quarrels.) Yet *ſect.* 7. he confeſſeth that he findeth none of the ancient Schoolmen that expreſly ſay that the Permiſſion of ſin is fore-decreed, nor that the Latter deliver it *ſub iiſdem verbis*.

Adrian in q. de Clav. fol. 982. [*Retinere nihil poſitivi dicit, ſed ſolum non ſolvere : & ergo non oportet Claves eſſe, ſicut nec Deum cauſam effectivam eſſe.*]

See *Alliaco* before cited ſhewing that *Lombard* took Permiſſion of ſin to be no Act, either *Velle* or *Nolle*, but a *non-velle & non-efficere*, which he himſelf contradicteth not.

of his mercy to others. And here the *non-agere, non-dare, permittere*, being *loco materiæ volitæ*, may after *our mode* be said to be *Volita seu decreta, & bona*. But properly it is not the *non-entity*, that is *bonum* or *Volitum*, but the *positive Law* and *Judgement*, and the *relatio debiti pœnæ*, and the *ratio pœnæ* in the *privation*, and the demonstration of truth, justice, holiness, *&c.* therein.

5. But *sinful privations*, that is, *sinful Volitions*, *nolitions*, or *non-Volitions* of the Creature, are not properly *per se* or *per accidens*, *propter se vel propter aliud good* or *amiable*, or willed or decreed of God. And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of sin, because he cannot be *Causa deficiens*, must mean as much, or speak impertinently and deceitfully.

It is not impertinent which Judicious *Strangius* saith, *Lib.* 3. *c.* 13. *p.* 677, 678. If *Scientia Media* be an useless conceit, how much more *cum extenditur ad ejusmodi infinitas & vanissimas connexiones rerum disparatarum quæ nunquam futuræ sunt?* (He instanceth in many, and addeth [*De hac re Ariaga disp. to.* 1. *d.* 21. *sect.* 7. —— *dicit, non sibi videri in Deo esse scientiam harum, quia talis scientia videtur plane impertinens: Ad quid enim nosceret Deus quid Chimæra esset factura sub tali conditione impossibili*, &c.] *Et ipse D. Twissus de Scient. Med.* p. 472. *Si plures Angelos Deus condidisset certe decrevisset ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei: Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujusmodi Deo decenter tribui potest*, &c.

I know the case is not just the same with that before us: but the reason is the same for both.

But still I profess that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to assign him positive Volitions of every negative, I shall concurr with them that do, and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow; And say of them as Judicious *Blank* doth of Gods knowledge (De Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 64.) [*Saltem ille minus periculose errat qui putat Deum scire ea quæ forte scibilia non sunt, quam qui negat Deum scire quæ revera scit, & quæ intra Divinæ omniscientiæ objectum continentur.*] So here; so be it that God be not feigned to *will sin*, I contend the less against them that say He positively willeth infinite numerical Nothings, and his own non-acting. †

† *Bradwardi. l.* 1. *c.* 13. *Cor.* 10, 11. brings in (too profoundly like one of *Thom. Anglus* his *Ergo's*) that God is the *Causa prima* of every nothing (*non esse*) because he is so of negations: As if *Nothing* could be an effect and have a Cause: or as if a negative conception or proposition were not something, *viz.* a Thought or a Word, as well as an affirmative: Such workmen make the world with words.

509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I pass by other School-controversies here, and only propound to each mans Conscience, whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God, 2. And that about his secret unsearchable Volitions, 3. And of such acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cause of sin, be not on the far unsafer side, than he that only saith, *Quæ supra nos nihil ad nos?* If these be not *certainly false*, they are *certainly unproved*, and therefore not to be here received.

510. And I say here as *Buridane* saith about the forementioned nature of Liberty, *Ethic.* li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. *Simpliciter & firmiter credere volo* —— *quod Voluntas cæteris omnibus eodem modo se habentibus, potest in actus oppositos* —— *Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes sibi insolubiles, specialiter in his quæ fidem tangere possunt aut mores: Qui enim credit se omnia scire, & in nulla opinionum suarum decipi, fatuus est. De festuca enim tibi sensibiliter præsentata, formabuntur centum rationes, vel quæstiones, de quibus contrarii sapientissimi doctores opinabuntur: propter quod in qualibet harum de-*

ceptus

ceptus erit alter ipsorum vel ambo: Ideo non miror si in hac altissima materia non possum per rationes & solutiones satisfacere mihi ipsi.]

511. To proceed in the application, * Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two most notable parts (as called,) 1. Gods *Reprobating* men to *unbelief* and *impenitency*; 2. His *Reprobating* men to *final damnation*. The last of these also is considered in the execution, 1. As *Privative*. 2. As *Positive*, called *Pœna damni & sensus*. And both (especially the *Privative* part) are considerable, 1. As executed by *man himself* on himself *freely*. 2. Or as executed by *God*: Concerning each of these observe,

512. 1. Not to *Believe and Repent* is no *real entity*: And *not to Give faith and Repentance* (as is said) is no *real entity*: And to *Permit Infidelity* and *Impenitency* is no real entity (as is proved:) And *not to Decree* the Giving of faith, and the hindering of unbelief is nothing: And (most clearly) besides these *four nothings*, nothing can be proved either *existent* or *needful*. All that cometh to pass, will come to pass without any more ado. Therefore.

513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no such *Act* of *Reprobation* at all, as is, 1. Either a Decree that a man *shall not* eventually Repent. 2. Or a Decree *not to give* him Repentance. 3. Or a Decree *to Permit his Impenitence*. 4. Nor can we prove an *after Volition* of his own *former non Volition* which is asserted by *Scotus*. But the three first we have great reason to lay by; and so not only to say as *Davenant* that this part of Reprobation is an *Act negative quoad objectum*, but that it is *no Act*, and there is no other Reprobation as to this part save, 1. Gods *not decreeing to give faith*, 2. And *his not giving it*.

514. 2. And as to *Damnation*, so much of it as consisteth in *sin it self*, God no otherwise *causeth* than as he doth *all sin*, which is properly, *not at all*; It being but *the Act as an act* which he causeth as the *Cause of Nature*, and not as sinfully qualified: and so no more decreeth this than other sin.

515. And most men little think how much of damnation lyeth in sin it self, and the privative consequents which need no other cause. 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodness. 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holiness, and Holy persons, and all the Holy employment of Heaven. 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones, which consist in such Knowledge, Love and Employment, Praise, Obedience, and holy Communion. 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency; as he that maketh himself *blind* is uncapable of the *light*, or he that maketh himself *unlovely* is uncapable of immediate Love. 5. To be defiled and diseased with all kind of sinful lusts, and malignity, and made like the Devil. 6. To have all sorts of *Lusts* in *violence* when they can have no fewel or satisfaction, and so to be tormented with these lusts. To have extream *selfishness* and *Pride*, when they have cast themselves into the utmost shame and misery. 7. To see that no Creature can deliver them, and to despair of ever being better, as having no hope from God or any other. 8. To see or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlasting felicity which they have lost. 9. To think how easily once they might have attained it; and how it was offered freely to their choice. 10. To think of all the solicitations of mercy that importuned them, and all the time and means they had. 11. To think for how base a vanity they lost it, and that misery was their wilful choice. 12. To

* Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. *Sunt nonnulli Thomistæ qui tam severe hanc sequuntur opinionem ut affirment, eundem ordinem servasse Deum in reprobatione quem in prædestinatione tenuit; scil. ut ante prævisa peccata sola sua Voluntate decreverit quosdam à regno Cœlorum excludere, licet non ad pœnam sensus destinaverit.—— Deinde quos voluit excludere permiserit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno sicut decreverat.* Et c. 2. *Parum ab hac sententia differt Scotus, qui* qu. 1. d. 41. *asserit in Deo duplicem esse Reprobationem; alteram vocat Punitivam, alteram permissivam —— Et punitivæ dari causam, & ex prævisis peccatis factam fuisse; —— Permissivæ non dari causam, quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum, nulla ex parte illius datur causa: hujus enim solum nititur Scotus causam negare— Hinc ordinem hunc in mente Divina assignat: (&c. ut alibi.) Scotum sequuntur Bassolus, Corduba,&c. Objicit Bradward. Privationes ut eclipses, mors, &c. habent positivas causas.* To which what I have said is a sufficient answer. And 1. Sometimes they have not; but only the cessation of a causation: 2. They never have a positive efficient of themselves, (for *nothing* is not made) but only a positive remover of the cause of that which the subject is deprived of, or an interposer or hinderer of the causation of it, *i. g.* of Light or life; And death hath no cause but that which ceaseth the causes of life.

be tormented with envy and malice against God that forsaketh them, and against his Saints; And to feel conscience awakened setting home all their former folly; All this is nothing but sin and its own effects, which hath no Causation at all from God, but to continue the nature which he gave them, and is not bound to destroy. And how great a part of hell is this?

516. Nay we know not how much *sensible Pain* may be the consequent of their own sin, without any other Act of God, than his common continuation of nature it self: As a man that eateth Arsnick, or unwholsome meat, is tormented by it, without any other act of God, than as the universal Cause of Nature.

517. All this much of Damnation then being meerly the work of the sinner himself, so far as there is no Act of God in the execution, so far no man can prove any Positive Act of Volition or Decree.

518. But 1. As God in these is the *universal cause of Nature*, and so of *natural acts*, 2. And as in *other instances* he *actually further punisheth them*, 3. *And as he actually made that Law* which made these penalties the *sinners due*; so far God hath a *Positive Decree* and *Volition*, that these persons shall be damned: And moreover, as *improperly* or morally his *not sanctifying them*, and *not saving them* is called his Act, and is really *their penalty*, even so may his *not-willing* to save or glorifie them be called his *Decree and will* to damn them, if you will.

519. By this time we are ready to answer our first question, *What are the objects of these several acts of God*, so far as connotatively we must call them several.

And 1. *Gods *not giving the Gospel* to any persons, is no *Act*, and so hath *no object*. But *reductively* or improperly the object is, *Man sinning against the grace of the first edition of the Law of Grace*: that is, These are the subject *de quo*, of which it is truly said, They are without the Gospel.

520. 2. Gods not converting effectually some that have the Gospel, is no Act, and hath no object: But the subject of the Privation, called the Object, is, *Some part of those men who have forfeited the helps of special Grace by their abuse or neglect of the Gospel and the Commoner grace which was given them.*

521. 3. Gods *not Pardoning, Justifying, Adopting* and *Sanctifying* men, is *no Act* and hath *no object*: But the *subject* of the Privation, and object of the Laws contrary sentence, is, *Impenitent, Unbelievers*, or the *non-performers* of the *condition* of *Justification*, &c. *in the Covenant.*

522. 4. Gods *not Glorifying men*, is *no Act*, nor the damnation which consisteth in sin as aforesaid, is none of Gods act: But the *sentence of condemnation* is Gods Act, and no doubt some other *Positive Execution.* And the object of these is, *All finally Impenitent Unbelievers, and unholy ones*, that is, *who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under.*

523. And it being past all denyal that these are the *objects* of the *Executive Acts*, we must say that these also are the objects of the *Decrees* accordingly, where a *Decree* is proved, and when we speak of them only *juxta ordinem executionis*, and not *Intentionis*, which I laid by before.

524.

* Besides all before cited against Volitions *de nihilo*, see *Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp. 6. §. 1. p. 36.* [*Antiquorum gravissimi sentiunt Deum non omnia velle, sed ea duntaxat bona quæ in aliqua differentia temporis existunt: proindè Possibilia quæ nunquam futura sunt non amari à Deo, nec; Mala: & inde Deum non esse omni-volentem: & nullam creaturam à Deo amari necessario: ita Albertus, Alexand. Bonavent. Richard. Gabr. Vasquez, Zumel, Molina, Valentia, Scotus* Against which he bringeth frivolous reasons, and asserteth, that God willeth as a material object, the Goodness which the Creature would have if it were made, and this as to all Creatures which never will be. What putid contradictions are here? to will Goodness which is no Goodness, of all Creatures which are no Creatures, as material objects, which are nothings? God willeth his own Power, whence man calleth that Possible which is nothing. But was there from Eternity any Possibles not-future to be willed? What was there from Eternity but God? And are all these Nothings God himself?

524. And leſt you recurr to it, once more I will recite (more of) *Davenants* words *de ordine Intentionis*. De Præd. & Reprob. cap. 1. p. 107. [1. *Sciendum & tenendum eſt ſi Dei naturam & perfectionem in ſe conſideremus, illum non prius unum videre, deinde aliud, neque prius hoc decernere aut velle, deinde illud; ſed unico & ſimpliciſſimo actu,* &c. ——— 2. *Ex parte tamen Rerum quæ decrevit ſigna quædam prioritatis & poſterioritatis diſtingui poſſunt,* ——— *Hic tamen obſervandum eſt, inter ipſos Scholaſticos non admodum certam & conſtantem eſſe hanc doctrinam de hiſce ſignis ſeu inſtantibus prioritatis* —— *Scotus, qui primarius eſt ad hæc ſigna fabricanda artifex, videtur nonnullis non ſolum eadem poſuiſſe priora & poſteriora ſecundum noſtrum intelligendi modum, ſed etiam ſtatuiſſe unum eſſe in ipſo Deo prius naturâ alio.* (But from this he vindicateth him.) *Ex adverſa parte Occamus noſter hæc ſigna quocunque modo conſiderata negavit,* in 1. d. 9. q. 3. *Et Biel ejus ſententiam amplexus hæc ſigna oppugnavit. in* 3. *d.* 2. *q.* 1. *dub.* 3. [Prioritates, in Divinis non ſunt ponendæ, ſicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum. Unus eſt enim Actus in Divinis, re & ratione indiſtinctus, qui eſt ipſa eſſentia Divina. ——— ne ſecundum noſtram quidem conſiderationem talem ordinem Prioritatis & poſterioritatis concipi poſſe in decretis Divinis, ut talis conſideratio non ſit falſa ſpeculatio.] If this hold, our Controverſie of the order is at an end.

525. And he added the words even of a rigid *Thomiſt* [*Domin. Bannes, quamvis non omnino explodat hæc ſigna cum Biele, perpendens tamen diſcordiam Theologorum in his aſſignandis* [*Animadvertendum eſt, inquit, quam pro libito in negotio prædeſtinationis & reprobationis* multiplicentur *inſtantiæ à Theologis, & quam parum illa conferant ad aſſignandam rationem differentiæ inter prædeſtinatos & reprobos. Liceat itaque hic paucis monere, non eſſe nimis confidendum, aut certo dogmati adhærendum, ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum, ſive à Proteſtantibus, ſive à Pontificiis aſſignato, cum difficile ſit duos reperire, ſive inter noſtros, ſive inter adverſarios, qui ad amuſſim per omnia conſentiant in hac ſerie decretorum divinorum deſcribenda. Caveat itaque unuſquiſque ne talem conſiderationem prædeſtinationis & reprob. inducat quæ vel Divinæ juſtitiæ, vel gratiæ gratuitæ adverſetur, & tum non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis,* &c.]

SECT. XVII.

Of Gods Causing, and Decreeing Sin.

526. BUt because it is the avoiding of Gods *Causing* and *willing sin* which is a great reason of these Controversies, I shall say somewhat more *particularly of that.* About which there are various Opinions.

Of very many such enquirers it may be said with Augustine, *de civit. Dei lib. 12. Dum volunt quærere unde sit malum, non inveniunt unde sit malum.*

Obj. *Quæris fortasse unde sit malum voluntatis: Quæro prius unde sit voluntas: Fuga ne sit bona an mala? Respondet Melanct. Ut non sit malum, sit necessitas, sit fatum. Ita omnes ut dicunt necessitatem, ita tollunt omnia officia: Mala sunt: 1. Deo præscito & non impediente, non autem adjuvante vel impellente: Item, Deo sustentante naturam & suum opus: Item, Deo eventus certos decernente:* Strigel. in Melancth. pag. 296.

Carbo Compend. Thom. 1. q 19. a. 9. *Malum ut malum nullo appetitu potest appeti nisi per accidens. Deus nullo modo vult malum Culpæ--Deus neque vult fieri malum, neque non vult, sed permitti.*

Ruiz de prædefin. Tr. 2. disp. 13. §. 3, 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal sin in the unjust and just *ex destitutione & circumstantiis.* And *d.16. §. 3.* he telleth us of many wayes by which God maketh sin the occasion of his Grace without causing or willing sin, in form or nearest matter.

527. 4. Some think (as *Hobbs*) that no acts of the will are so free as not to be necessitated, as the motions in an Engine, though unobserved by our selves, who see not the Concatenation of Causes.

527. 2. Some *Dominicans*, and our Dr. *Twisse* and *Rutherford* held, that no act natural or free can be done by any creature, without the Predetermination of Gods Physical efficient immediate Premotion, as the first total Cause of that act: But yet that this standeth with Liberty, because God causeth *contingentia contingenter fieri.* And that he so causeth every Act of sin in all its circumstances; and the *totum materiale peccati*; and all that the sinner causeth: But yet that he is not the Author of sin, nor causeth the *form*; Because 1. They say, that *sin hath no efficient cause*, but a deficient, which God is not, being not obliged to act: And sin is nothing, but a privation. 2. Because God is under no Law: and therefore though he do the same things that man doth, it is sin in man, but not in him: And saith *Holkot, he is the cause of sin, but not the Author, because he commandeth it not by his Law.* 3. At other times they say, that sin is formally a Relation of disconformity to the Law of God, and God causeth the whole act as circumstanced, but not the *relation*, which resulteth from it. 4. And God causeth not *sin as sin*, but as a means to his Glory, or as a punishment of former sin.

528. 3. Others say, as *Camero*, that the *Intellect necessitateth the will*, and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect, and God causeth the *Objects* and *Laws*, and permitteth the Tempter.

529. 4. Others say, that God only as the *Cause of Nature*, 1. By *Support* and *Concurse* necessary to *all agents*, causeth the Act as an Act in general, 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely, 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin, 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects, of which mens sins are also a cause, 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil: 6. But as to the *sin it self* he is no cause of it, either as sin or punishment, either of the *form*, or of the *Act as morally specified*, that is, as it is about this Forbidden object (or End) rather than another. And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth.

530. Let it here be noted, 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths, 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part, in respect to the events which we see; And unnecessaries are not to be asserted; 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World, and all therein; 4. And yet to be no Author of sin: Let us consider of the particulars.

531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a *Vital Agent*, and therefore a *self-actor* (under him); and an *Intellectual Agent*, and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone; And a *Free-willing Agent*, and therefore hath a Power to *Act or not Act hic & nunc*, or to choose or refuse, or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his *Necessary Volitions* (which I acknowledged and enu-

merated

merated before: which is part of *Gibieufs* and *Guil. Camerarius Scot.* meaning by their *ſervato ordine finis:* Though I think that *Annatus* doth not unjuſtly accuſe *Gibieuf* of confuſion and unskilfulneſs in the managing of that matter.)

532. II. It is certain that as *Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale*, it is of God as the firſt Cauſe of Nature: *And ſo when a ſinner *acteth*, it is not without this Univerſal firſt Cauſe: Whether God do it only, as *Durandus* thought, by the meer continuation of the nature of all things, Active and Mobile, or by any ſuperadded concurſe beſides, is nothing to our preſent buſineſs; which only ſheweth that God is the Cauſe.

533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth ſet before men that which they make an occaſion of all their evil: Every thing is turned into ſin by ſinners, † and to the unclean all things are unclean, through the uncleanneſs of their own minds and conſciences: As to the pure and holy all things are pure and ſanctified. Bad ſtomachs corrupt the wholſomeſt food. All Gods mercies are abuſed to ſin.

534. It is certain that God fore-knew this: And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life, or take it away, leſt they abuſe it, or deny men all thoſe mercies, or remove them, which he foreſeeth that they will turn to ſin.

535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the cauſing of the very *ſame effect* which ſin alſo cauſeth; and ſo is as a *concauſe* of it with ſin: And this effect is ſo near to the Act of ſin, as that the ſin it ſelf is oft called by its name as if it were its neareſt matter (which it is not.) And this is the occaſion of the Great miſtake of men in this caſe, that cannot diſtinguiſh. Of which more anon in the inſtances.

536. V. And it is certain, that God as the Governour of the World, doth do much good by the occaſion of mens ſin. But this is not to turn the ſin it ſelf into good.

537. VI. And to theſe five *operations* of God, I add, as to his Volitions, that all this which he doth, he *willeth* or decreeth to do. And he hath no contrary will at all.

538. But that which we deny is, that *He is any proper cauſe of the ſin it ſelf*, *efficient* or *deficient*, *culpable* or *not culpable*, *Phyſical* or *Moral*; For the opening of which we muſt enquire what *ſin is*, and what goeth to its *being* or *conſtitution*.

539. All grant that God is our *Ruler* by a *Law*, and alſo our *ultimate End* as he is *Optimus & Amabiliſſimus*, and that he is our abſolute *Owner*: And that as rational free agents we that are *his own*, are alſo his *Subjects* and *Beneficiaries*, and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end, and of obeying his Laws: And that ſin is our Diſobedience to theſe Laws, with our denying God our ſelves as his *Own*, and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End.

540. As Logick hath confounded us in moſt other caſes by arbitrary unſuitable ſecond notions (making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot,) ſo that it's eaſier to *know Things* without thoſe unfit notions than with them; ſo hath it done here. Men may more eaſily know what *ſin is*, and what it is to *diſobey a Law*, and that either by *doing* what we ſhould not, or by *not doing* what we are commanded, than they can know by what Logical or Metaphyſical name it ſhould be called: Whether a *privation*, or a *relation*, an *act* or no *act*, *&c.* But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws; nor is it only a Metaphyſical Conſcience that will accuſe men or condemn them, and torment them for their ſin.

* Vid. *Gregor. Arim. in* 2. *d.* 28. *q.* 1. *a.* 3. *ad arg.* 8. *&* 12. whoſe judgement many Schoolmen follow: *Vaſquez* thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. [*Motionem Dei ordine cauſæ priorem eſſe co-operatione & determinatione noſtra in operibus bonis: at in operibus peccati, etiam ſecundum ſubſtantiam & ſeclusa malitia priorem eſſe noſtram determinationem: & eodem ordine hæc inter ſe comparari in æternitate.* ——*Ex quo inferunt Deum præviſiſſe opera bona ante determinationem noſtram ullo modo præviſam; ſed mala ſecundum ſubſtantiam nequaquam, niſi præcognita determinatione noſtræ voluntatis.* Vid. *Marſil. in* 1. *q.* 45. *ar.* 2. *poſt* 4. *concluſ.*

† Titus 1. 15, 16.

541. No

541. No Act meerly as *an Act in genere* is forbidden of God. For the ſoul is an *Active nature*, and can no more ceaſe all action, than to be: though it can forbear a *particular act* as to this *object*, and at *this time*. And God is the Cauſe of *Acts as ſuch*.

542. I have ſhewed before that as *Action* it ſelf is no *ſubſtance*, but the mode or motion of a ſubſtance, ſo to chooſe this object rather than that, hath no more of Action in it than to have choſen the other, or than the general nature of action when exiſtent hath: So that this Moral ſpecification addeth not to the natural generical entity.

Ex eo modo quod Deus concurrat nobiſcum ad actum peccati, prout facultas liberi arbitrii poſtulat, ſive prius, ſive poſterius, ſive ſimul, non ſequitur malitiam Deo eſſe tribuendam, cum illa ſolum ex modo operandi creaturæ ſequatur. Vaſquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 77. cap. 4.

543. It is therefore 1. Acting, 2. Not acting, 3. Moral diſpoſition, which are Commanded and Forbidden by God: And not any one only: and theſe not in themſelves, but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively, in the *Law*. *To Act* on a forbidden object; *Not to Act* on an object when commanded, and to be *viciouſly diſpoſed* to either, is a ſin.

544. You may ſee then, that *ſin* is a Connotative notion, yea, and a Relative notion; It connoteth a Ruler, a Law, an End, a Subject, and is thus variouſly Related.

545. As *Subjection* is the Root of Obedience, and all obedience Virtually, being *A Conſent to obey*, and *Love* is the Root of benefits; ſo to forſake God ſimply as our *Rector* or our *End*, or our *Owner*, is Atheiſm practical, and all ſin in one: But to violate only a particular precept *de mediis*, is but a particular ſin.

546. God is the Cauſe of the *Law* which commandeth and forbiddeth, and God is the Cauſe of *Nature*, and *Objects*, and *Action* as *Action*: That therefore which he hath made mans part is to Love *God* and *Holineſs*, and not to over-love the creature, nor to love it as our End or in his ſtead: and to do all that he commandeth, and not to do the particular acts about ſuch particular objects as he forbiddeth.

547. The *remote ſubject* or *relatum* then of *ſin*, is the perſon ſinning; But the *neareſt* is the *Act, Omiſſion* or *diſpoſition*; The *fundamentum* or *ratio referendi* is the ſaid *Acts, Omiſſions* or *diſpoſitions*, as *ſuch* or *ſuch*, about *ſuch* or *ſuch* objects, commanded or forbidden; which is a Relation; And the form of ſin is the Moral Relation of Diſobedience, or Diſconformity to the Law. So that if you muſt needs have it in Logical notions, *Sin is a Moral Relation, reſulting from a Phyſical relation of Actions, Omiſſions or diſpoſitions of Gods ſubjects, which are modified contrary to his Law.*

548. It is a *Moral Relation* as it is Diſobedience, found in a Moral agent againſt a Law and Rector as ſuch. It is a *Phyſical Relation* as the Act, *&c.* is *prius naturâ quid naturale*, about an object that is *quid naturale*. Its *fundamentum* (of both relations: And one Relation may be founded in another) is the *Mode* of the Act, Omiſſion or diſpoſition, as to an undue object, *&c.* as it is forbidden by the Law. Of the *ſubjects* and *relatum* I have ſpoken before.

549. So that the form of *ſin* being Relative can have no Cauſe but that which cauſeth its *fundamentum*: and cannot poſſibly but reſult when that is laid.

550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make ſuch a Law as ſhould ſay, [*Though thou hate me, ſee that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law,*] or [*I forbid thee not to commit Adultery, but only forbid that thy Adultery be* quid prohibitum *or a ſin.*] For if God forbid not the act, it cannot be a ſin: and if he forbid it, it muſt needs be ſin; And ſo of omiſſions.

551. They

551. They therefore that tell us, that ſin *is nothing*, but a *Privation*, ſpeak not ſatisfactorily, nor altogether *truly*. It is no ſubſtance indeed; nor any ſuch Reality as Man cannot Cauſe without Gods Cauſing it (ſuppoſing his Univerſal Natural Support and Concurſe.) But the thing forbidden is often *Acts* and *Diſpoſitions* as well as *Omiſſions*: and the form of ſin, is a *Moral Relation*, which hath ſo much reality as a *Relation* hath (if that be any). And that *Relation* hath a *poſitive name*; It is not only a meer *Non-conformity*, but alſo a *Diſconformity*, becauſed founded in *Actual Volitions* and *Nolitions* as forbidden, and not only in Omiſſions.

See Dr. *Wallis* againſt the Lord *Brooke* of this, very well.

552. Subtile *Ockam Quodl.* 3. *q.* 15. diſputing *Utrum rectitudo & deformitas actus differant à ſubſtantia actus?* denyeth it; and after a Confutation of the common ſaying, that *Deformitas eſt carentia rectitudinis debitæ, & diſtinguitur ab actu, quod in peccato Actus eſt materiale, & carentia juſtitiæ debitæ ineſſe eſt formale*, concludeth, [*Quod deformitas non eſt carentia juſtitiæ vel rectitudinis debitæ ineſſe actui, ſed eſt carentia rectitudinis debitæ ineſſe voluntati: Quod non eſt aliud dicere, niſi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere ſecundum præceptum Divinum quem non elicit; & ideo rectitudo actus non eſt aliud quam qui debuit elici ſecundum rectam rationem.*] But I conceive, 1. That the rectitude of the *will* can be nothing elſe but the rectitude of its *acts, ſuſpenſions and diſpoſitions*; 2. That *Ockam* here deſcribeth only ſins of omiſſions, whereas the Rectitude of the *will* is ofren alſo materially in *not doing* or *willing* what is forbidden. And with theſe two animadverſions I am reconciled to *Ockam*: who addeth, [*Ad aliud dico, Quod illud dictum de Materiali & Formali eſt falſum; Quia aut eſt peccatum commiſſionis aut omiſſionis: ſi primo modo, eſt Materiale ſine formali: quia ibi non eſt carentia rectitudinis, debitæ ineſſe actui: ſi ſecundo modo, tunc eſt ibi carentia quæ eſt formale ſine materiali.*] *Reſp.* 1. To the firſt I add, that it had been true, if it had been the *Act as an act that had been forbidden*, or elſe the *ſpecies* of the act as *quid naturale*; But it being the Act not as an act *in genere*, but as *this act thus modified* or ſpecified by an undue object, that Act with its Relation as *quid phyſicum* are preſuppoſed as the *relatum* to the moral relation of Pravity or Diſconformity. And to the ſecond I ſay, that it's true that *Omiſſion* is not *Materia Phyſica*; but it is an inadequate firſt conception of ſin, and ſo is *materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiæ.* And the *Omiſſion* being conſiderable, 1. *Quatenus Non-agere*, 2. *Qua privatio naturalis*, 3. *Qua & Privatio & diſconformitas moralis*, theſe three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the ſins of omiſſion.

553. The ſame *Ockam Quodl.* 1. *qu.* 20. *Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem?* even as dependent on the Will? And he denyeth it againſt *Scotus* who affirmeth it: I will not trouble the Reader with their reaſonings; not doubting but *Ockam* erred, and that it's true, 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily, 2. But that ſecondarily and participatively as it is voluntary, there is a morality in the acts. *Words*, and *deeds*, and *paſsions* are under Law *next* to the *will*, and in dependance on it. As the body conjunct with the ſoul is a ſecondary part of the man, ſo are our exterior acts of ſin.

554. The conceit that making ſin a meer *nothing*, doth ſeem to juſtifie God as not Cauſing it, is a meer vanity. For, 1. It juſtifieth the ſinner more; who no more is the Cauſe of *nothing* than God. 2. Either man is able to do that *Something* or *Act* which ſin is the privation of, without any other Power than he hath, or not. If he be, then even the

Act

Act of sin is not imputable to God: If he be not, then every sin is like our not making of a Sun, or Moon, or World: which if it be a culpable defect, they make God the first deficient.

555. He that would see more of this question of the essence of sin, may read *Rada lib. 2. contr. 16.* (who first ingenuously confesseth that *Th.* and *Scotus* differ but in *words* and not in sense, and then layeth down eleven conclusions of little use.) And *Marius Scribonius Cosmo. disp. 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent. in 2. d. 35. dub. 6. Henric. Quodl. 1. qu. 25. Almain. Moral. tract. 3. cap. 17. Richard. in 2. d. 34. ar. 1. qu. 7. Alex. Alens. 2. q. 94. memb. 2. Durand. 2. dis. 31. q. 2. Medin. 12. q. 71. ar. 6.* Specially *Vasquez 12. disp. 95. cap. 9. Guil. Camerar. Scot. Disput. Philos. Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162, &c. Argent. in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar. 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica. Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3, &c. Suarez 1. 2. tract. de act. hum. d. 2. sect. 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner. 1. 2. disp. 2. q. 5. dub. 2. & 3. & disp. 4. q. 1. dub. 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39. & li. 14. c. 13. Cordub. l. 3. q. 10. & Cajet. Zumel. Curiel, & alios in 1. 2. q. 19. ar. 4. & q. 71. ar. 6.* And, who is usually sounder than most of them, *Lombard* himself *Dist. 35. & Ripalda* opening him and citing others *dist. 34, 35.*

But the ordinary Christian that understandeth but what *Disobedience* signifieth, needeth none of them all.

556. *Though the five acts of God forementioned about sin, are as far as we need to go, to the common Ends which we agree in, yet many objections are made against this much as not sufficient, but God must have a greater hand in sin: And 1. They object, that to make God but an *Universal Cause*, is to put something in being, *viz.* the Act *in specie morali*, which God is not the Cause of; And so, 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that: 2. To deifie man by making him a first Cause of that moral species. To which I shall lay down such answers as I think will satisfie the considerate, to this Objection which is indeed their All: But I am sorry that the subject occasioneth me to repeat what I said before.

557. 1. Remember that even an *Act in genere* is not a *substance*; And that the *moral specification* is *less* as to *natural entity* than *it*; indeed making no addition of *Entity* to it, as was shewed. And Dr. *Twiss* asserteth, that this moral specification is not a *proper specification* of acts.

558. 2. Note that few dare say, that God is *not Able* to make a free agent with Power to choose or refuse without Gods further predetermining premotion. And if God *can do it*, we have no reason to debase his work, and think he did not.

559. 3. Note, that for God to make a *self-determining agent* that shall act without *his predetermination*, is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or suspension, that is, To Will and Act or Operate, so far and no further.

560. 4. And note, that this restriction of the Divine operation is not from any *finiteness* of his *power*, as if he *could* do no more, but from the *freedom* of *his will*, and the Conduct of his *wisdom*, who seeth it good to do no more.

561. 5. Above all note, that as all Divines agree, that God doth not *Act ad ultimum posse*, as *natural agents* do, so the truth is most evident in the *finiteness* of the *world*, and the effects of his Power: For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he *could* do: He doth not make every man as strong, or wise, or good, or long-lived as he *could* do: He doth not make every Stone, or Clod, or Tree as *Active* as he could do, nor move every thing as *swiftly* as he could do. Now all that is *undone* which God *could* do,

* It is not only Dr. *Twisse* (after confuted) that supposeth sin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World, but even *Ruiz* the Jesuite *de Provid. dis. 2. sect. 4. p. 27.* maintaineth that *Minus perfectus evasisset Mundus si nulla permitterentur peccata; nunc autem evasit perfectior occasione peccatorum*: and citeth *Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav. Richard. Ægid. Cajet. Ferrar. Marsil.* for the same. But 1. An occasion is no cause nor medium, as such, and therefore never the more willed, if that were true. 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both sides about this question, *viz.* Particular Creatures would be to themselves better, were there no sin: but whatever possible alterations were made by God, the Universe would be neither worse nor better than it is, as to that proper Goodness which must absolutely denominate it: For the Goodness of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creators Will, which is the denominating measure or *fundamentum*; And so they are, and so they would be, were they altered: But sin is disform to his Commanding Will, and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will. He argueth, Had there been no sin, there had been no such exercise of Liberty, no Saviour, *&c. Answ.* And are the Angels worse than man? And had not all this been as good, if God had willed it?

do, all *poſſibles* which are not *exiſtent* or *future*, do tell us plainly that God doth *freely ſuſpend* the action or operation of his Power, *totally* as *to them*: which is much more than to ſuſpend it but *in part* with *free agents*, and to give them a Natural ſelf-determining power, without further pre-moving predetermination of them. If all the World tell us, that he hath the *far greater* ſuſpenſion, why ſhould we think the *leſs* abſurd?

562. 6. And Reaſon telleth us (what the Schoolmen oft ſay) that God who ſheweth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures, doth very fitly thus beautifie the Univerſe by a *middle rank* of creatures, that ſtand between *Confirmed Angels*, and the *Brutes*, viz. *Intellectual-free-agents*, left to a *natural Power* of free chooſing or refuſing, without neceſſitation, in the midſt of various objects, to prepare them by tryal for a better ſtate.

563. 7. And note too, that we ſay not that *Gods predetermination* of mans will deſtroyeth its *beſt Liberty*: God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels, as a great bleſſing and felicity: To predetermine the will phyſically, is to *end* that Liberty to that *particular act*, which conſiſted partly in being *undetermined*: But that Liberty which conſiſteth in *deliverance* from all *true evil*, is *increaſed* by ſuch a Gracious predetermination: And therefore *Janſenius* pleadeth only for the neceſſity of predetermination to *Good* by *medicinal Grace*, and not to *Evil*, or *meer Natural actions*. Yet we ſay, that even to *Good*, God can procure the will to *determine it ſelf*, by *moral means*, which infinite Wiſdom can ſufficiently improve. But it is only 1. *A natural power to act without predetermination from God or Others*, 2. And a *Liberty* of *Condition*, from all predetermination *ab extra*, *to evil* (from *God or Creatures*) which I here aſſert and plead for in this cauſe.

564. 8. Much leſs do we take the *Will* from under *the Power* and *Government* of *God*: For, 1. It could have no *ſelf-determining Power* but *of God*, one moment. 2. He giveth it this power, to make us capable ſubjects of *Moral Sapiential Government*. 3. He giveth us *Governing Laws* accordingly. 4. And he attaineth all his *Ends* and fulfilleth all *his Will*, as perfectly in conſiſtency with our *power and freedom* as if we had none ſuch at all: ſo that God hath his proper Will, whether men *Will* or not.

565. But the turning point of difficulty here is, Whether God is ever *Cauſa partialis*? and if we ſo make him, is it not injurious to his perfect operations? All our Controverſies turn upon the deciſion of this one queſtion. For if we may conceive of God, as *Scotus* ſpeaketh, like one that draweth at the ſame Ship with another; and the act of both muſt concurr to the effect; then all is eaſie, and we may ſay when men Love not God, repent not, believe not, *&c.* that God did his part, but the ſinner did not his, and ſo the effect failed. As if a Father did reſolve that he will help his little Child to lift up a weight, and will put to nine hundred ninety nine parts of the ſtrength that is neceſſary, but no more, becauſe the Child ſhall do ſomething (one part) to ſhew his *willingneſs* and *obedience*; Here if the thing be done, it is the Father that deſerves nine hundred ninety nine parts of the praiſe: If it be undone, the Child only doth deſerve the blame. But we have more to ſay.

See *the End.*

I remember one derideth *John Goodwin* for this ſimilitude or the like, (Mr. *Roborough.*)

566. Note therefore, 1. That here the Child hath in himſelf a Power *independent* on his *Father*, and therefore the whole effect is not to be aſcribed to the *Father*. But man hath no *Power* but of *God*, and what he *holdeth*, yea, and *uſeth* in dependence on him. And therefore the praiſe

of *all his Power* and *his Acts* as *Acts* are due to God. 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will, and all the Laws, promiſes, perſwaſions, threatnings, mercies, afflictions, examples, convictions, which tend morally to turn his will, are from God; ſo that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both *enable him, command him, perſwade him* and *help him* to do, and ſo procure the actual determination of his will. So that *de re* we ſee how much God doth alwayes (beſides that *Grace* may ſometimes for ought I know *otherwiſe predetermine*:) And we ſee what man doth: And all that you can deſire more is, that no man that doth any good *act*, ſhould be *able* at that inſtant *not to do it*, or to *do otherwiſe*; and then it muſt follow that no man that *omitteth a good act*, or that *ſinneth, could* do otherwiſe: which are falſe. * So that here is only the *lis de nomine* left, *An Deus ſit Cauſa partialis?* I think it fitteſt to ſay, that he is *Cauſa totalis* of his *own Act*, and of *the effect* as it is *an Act*, and of all that is *laudable* in it too, for the reaſons aforeſaid. But yet he is not the *Cauſa ſola*, nor in *that ſenſe totalis* of the Moral ſpecification, as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of chooſing or refuſing freely, it *could not be done*, without his further phyſical predetermination.

567. And (under favour) I take the name *Cauſa partialis*, to be improper, and that it ſhould properly be called *Pars Cauſæ*: For when divers concurr in efficiency, all make but one proper efficient Cauſe. † Now I ſuggeſt to the Learned Reader that is againſt me, *How he will decide* the forementioned hard *queſtion, whether there be more Entity in God and the Creature than in God alone?* It is dangerous ſaying *Yea or Nay*: and we know not well what to ſay: But for my part, as I ſaid, I will not ſay that God is *Pars Entitatis*, nor yet that the Creature *is not Ens*, nor yet that *it is God*: But the ſolution muſt be either from the Equivocation of *Entity*, or from the Creatures *Inexiſtence in God*, or from ſomewhat rather which I know not. And juſt ſo here; the queſtion is, *Whether Gods Cauſation and Mans be more than Gods alone?* And I will not ſay that Gods is a *Part*; nor yet that Mans is *none*, nor that it is the *ſame* with Gods: But that Gods acting and concurſe are quite above the reach of Mortals.

568. But here again note what I ſaid even now, 1. That it is no more ſign of *finiteneſs* in God, nor diſhonour to him, to be a *limited* or *Partial Cauſe*, than to be *no Cauſe*, and *limited totally* by ſuſpenſion of the whole act: And yet ſo he is as to all *Poſſibles* which he doth not *make* or *move*. 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him; As it doth from giving all men more grace, *&c.* So that really here is matter of ſatisfaction.

569. Though he offend me by making God the Cauſe of ſin, I will here cite the words of our Countrey-man, Holkot Quodl. lib. 2. qu. 1. [*Eſt ſententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus eſt Cauſa immediata omnis rei productæ, ſic quod omni creaturæ agenti, ſive ſit Natura ſive Voluntas, Deus coagit: & ſic imaginandum eſt quod in omni actione creatura qua aliquid producit, Deus & Creatura ſunt duæ cauſæ Partiales illius producti: Non ſic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus, & creatura aliam, & ob hoc dicatur Cauſa partialis——ſed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel cauſando——Unde tam cauſa univerſalis quam particularis dicitur communiter cauſa partialis: & ideo etiam Sol & Homo ſunt duæ cauſæ partiales hominis generandi; & ſimiliter Vir & Mulier: Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur cauſa partialis ſufficit quod ſit tale quod propter ipſum & quoddam aliud vel quædam alia res ponatur in eſſe, ſic quod illis poſitis res eſt, & aliquo iſtorum ablato res non fiet.*]

570. Further

* *Molina* maketh God *Cauſam partialem* 1. *p. q.* 14. *a.* 3. *diſp.* 6. *Soto* in. 2. *Phyſ. diſput. de cauſis* denyeth it; And *Zumel* diſputeth againſt it in *Diſp. in* 1, 2. *Tom. p.* 43. *conc.* 2. And ſo do many others; And great diverſity here is among them while ſome affirm and ſome deny, but none of us underſtand the myſterie of divine concurſe.

† So ſay *Ockam* and *Gabriel Biel* though *Zumel* call it a moſt improper mode of ſpeaking, becauſe ſo no one Cauſe could be called Total: And why ſhould it, if it be not? (except that God is above our order, and ſo not a Part.) Bonavent. in 1. diſ. 38. q. 2. *inquit, Futurum triplex eſt: Quoddam eſt cujus Deus eſt tota Cauſa, ut Creata: Quoddam cujus Creatura, aut Voluntas eſt Tota Cauſa, ut ſunt defectus & peccata: Quoddam cujus Deus & Creatura ſimul ſunt Cauſa, ut ſunt opera naturalia & moralia; quia Deus cooperatur creaturæ: Reſpectu primi futuri Divina præſcientia eſt tota cauſa: ſecundi non cauſa: tertii eſt Cauſa ſed non tota.* *Gab. Biel in* 2. *d.* 37. bringeth in *Scotus* ſaying [*Licet Deus Volendo cauſat omnia quæ cauſat, non tamen ideo eſt Cauſa totalis: quia vult etiam ſecum concurrere alias cauſas, & utrumque vult, & alias eſſe, & ſecum concurrere Cauſas ſecundas, non diverſas, ſed una Volitione, nec unam plus alio, ſed æque utrumque & ſimul——Et nulla Creatura eſt Cauſa totalis——Quia ſemper concurrit Deus ut Cauſa partialis——* Et ad dub. 2. ex Greg. Arim. *Nobiſcum tanquam Cauſa partialis producit actum malum.* *Greg. Arim.* his words are (*in* 2. *d.* 34. *a.* 3.) *Actus mali quem efficit Peccator, Deus eſt immediata Cauſa: Partialis tamen, co-efficiens actum eundem.* Of *Greg. Arim.* ſee more in the concluſion of this Chapter.

570. Further I desire that it may be specially noted, that God is our *Creator* in order of Nature *before* he is our *Ruler*; And that *Nature* is before *Morality*, (obedience or sin.) And that God as *Creator* first setled the order of Nature so, as that the Alteration of that Law or setled Order should not be ordinarily expected by us, though he *can* alter it: And therefore that man is man, and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination, and that God upholdeth him, and *concurreth* as an Universal Cause, belongeth to this *fore-setled natural order*, and is *presupposed* to *moral determinations* and *specifications*, either as from *God* or *man*.

571. And note, that to *Good Acts* we have need of *more Help* from God, than this *meer Natural Causality* and *Concurse*. And therefore God affordeth us *more* accordingly; but not to all alike.

572. It is further objected, against this way, that our making *Reprobation* to *Infidelity*, *Permission of sin*, *not-giving faith*, *&c.* to be no *Acts of God*, cometh all to one as to mens *sin* and *damnation*; *because man cannot believe*, *nor avoid sin*, *without those Acts of Grace which God withholdeth?*

Answ. I confess it were all one if the supposition were true, as it is not: For we have proved after, that *man hath power* without those acts of Grace which God suspendeth, by that *Common Grace* which he giveth, to do more good and forbear more evil than they do: Of which in due place.

573. It is objected also, that while we make Gods Providence to fill the World with occasions of sin, which he *fore-knoweth men will* take to their damnation, yea, as long as God *could prevent all sin*, and save all souls, and yet *will not*, it cometh all to one which way soever you go in these Controversies.

I answer, 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unsearchable. But when we come into his Light, we shall be perfectly reconciled to them all. 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatsoever he will, and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will, shall come to pass in despight of sin. 3. And when we have said all, flesh and blood will be unsatisfied, till *faith* and the *will* of God do satisfie us. 4. But yet be it known to you, that there is a great difference between Gods *permitting sin* (after great means against it) and his *causing* it: Between the making of a *free agent*, and putting life or death in his choice; and his causing men unavoidably to sin, and then to damn them for it. The Holiness of Gods Nature will stand with the Being of sin, by mans causing; but not with Gods causing it. And the Truth of Gods Word must be considered.

574. If this were all one (to Damn men unavoidably, and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell, in the means) it is strange that so many Learned men as among the *Jesuits*, *Arminians*, *Lutherans* and *Greeks*, do hold no other Grace at all, but what leaveth man to such a free Choice, could ever be so satisfied: (when others hold that the Elect have more.)

SECT. XVIII.

A Confutation of Dr. Twiſſe's Digr. 5. l. 2. ſect. 1. Vind. Grat.

575. I Come now to conſider of what is ſaid by them that go further about Gods will or Cauſality as to ſin. And becauſe Dr. *Twiſſe* hath a peculiar Digreſſion (*Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr. 4.*) I will ſomewhat animadvert upon it. He beginneth [*Sententia noſtra hæc eſt, Deum hactenus dici poſſe Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum fiat* ——— viz. *ipſo permittente:* And ſo he maketh the queſtion, *An Deus Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipſo permittente? Arminius* thought *God willed only his own Permiſſion* of the ſin: *Twiſſe* ſaith, that he *willed that ſin ſhould come to paſs, God permitting it. Arminius* his conceſſion cannot be proved (as I have ſhewed;) But *Twiſſes* muſt be diſproved. And 1. I will give you our Reaſons againſt it.

Bonavent. in 1. *d.* 46. *q.* 3. reſolveth this queſtion very plainly and truly [*Mala fieri nullatenus bonum eſſe poteſt: ſed bene occaſio boni:* And ſhewing the difference between *Cauſa, Caſus & Occaſio*, he ſaith that *Cauſa eſt procedens & intendens: Caſus privat Intentionem ſed non operationem: Occaſio privat utrumque.* And he diſtinguiſheth *Occaſion* into that which hath *rationem Actici & excitat agentem*; and that which hath but *rationem paſſici*, as one by anothers evil exciteth himſelf to do good. And alſo between the evil and the ordinability to good. And ſaith the evil is but the *occaſio paſſiva* of the good, and the *ratio boni quod ſubſternitur*, is *occaſio aliquo modo activa* ——— Vide locum.

576. Let the Reader remember, that what the Author ſaith of Gods *willing*, he alſo in the point of Predetermination ſaith of his *working*: *viz.* that he *Cauſeth* as much as he *willeth:* But I paſs that by now becauſe I have largely confuted it elſewhere. And to ſpeak to *One* is to ſpeak to both.

577. 1. All ſober Chriſtians are agreed, on what ſide ſoever, that God is not the Cauſe of ſin, except ſome odd preſumers who are condemned by the generality: One or two ſpoke ſome hard words that way in *Belgia*, whom the Synod of *Dort* rejected: Mr. *Archers* Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or *Weſtminſter* Synod. *Beza* himſelf (*in Rom.* 8. 28. *& paſſim*) abhorreth it as intolerable blaſphemy. But this Doctrine in queſtion plainly maketh God the *willer* and *Cauſe of ſin*: Yea more, very much more than wicked men or Devils are: which is not true.

578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a ſecond pre-moved predetermined Cauſe of the Act (of Volition and Execution) whence the formal obliquity neceſſarily reſulteth: But 1. God is certainly the Cauſe of the *Nature* which is the Agent: 2. He is the Cauſe of the *Law* which maketh the act in *ſpecie* to be ſin: His ſaying, Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery or Murder, maketh Adultery and Murder to be ſin, when they are committed, which they would not be without the Law. 3. God cauſeth and ordereth all the *objects* and occaſions. 4. And now they alſo ſay that *God willeth ut peccatum fiat*, (and is the firſt predetermining Cauſe, even the total Cauſe, of all that is in the act and all its circumſtances, without which predetermination it could not be.) So that man doth but will what God firſt willeth, and act what God firſt moveth him unavoidably to act, as the pen in my hand. 5. And the *Law* and the *Act* being put in being, the Relative obliquity is but the neceſſary reſult, and hath no other cauſe.

579. And note here what *Eſtius* before cited (after *Aquinas*) ſaith that to *will* that *peccatum ſit vel fiat*, is all that the Sinner himſelf doth, when he willeth ſin. And therefore it's a vain thing here to diſtinguiſh between *willing ſin*, and *willing* the *event, futurity* and *exiſtence* of it, *ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat:* (Though I confeſs I was long detained in ſuſpenſe if not deceived by that diſtinction.) For he *willeth ſin*, who *willeth* the exiſtence of it, or that it *be* or come to paſs.

580. And

580. And note, that it is both matter and form, Act and obliquity which they say God willeth *ut fiat*: For it is sin: And *forma dat nomen*. It is not *sin*, but by the *form* of sin. But if they had said otherwise, it had been all one: For he that willeth the *fundamentum*, relate and correlate, willeth the *Relation*.

581. There is nothing left to be said then, but that *God willeth* that *sin be* done, but not *as sin*, or *because it is sin*; But this is nothing. For, 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do *will sin because it is Sin*, but because of the *pleasure* of *sense* or imagination, or for seeming good. 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously *will sin* as *sin* because it is against God, so doing is but one of their sins, which they say God willeth *ut fiat* before they willed it (and predetermined them to it:) so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God.

582. If they say that *God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice*, and so do not wicked men, but for *wicked ends* or in enmity to God; I answer, That proveth that *God* hath *a will* which the *wicked* have not, but not that the *wicked* have *any will* which *God* hath not: For that *Will* and that *Enmity* to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth *ut fiat*.

583. *Obj.* But it is only *ut fiat ipso permittente, non faciente*.

Answ. The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors. For 1. They usually make Gods will *effective* of the thing willed. 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of. 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law: And why then do they put in the word [*permittente?*] Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which *God doth not do*, but only *permit*, when they mean no such thing? For that is my second reason against them.

584. 2. By their doctrine God *never permitteth sin* (which is false:) For that which he *Willeth* and *Causeth* as the *first total Cause*, he cannot be said to *Permit*: To *do* a thing, and move another to do it, will not stand with *proper permission*.

585. Obj. *But God preserveth our own Liberty in acting*.

Answ. 1. By *Liberty* you mean nothing but *Willingness* as such, that God doth not make mens *Nilling* to be a *Willing* or *contra* in the same act. Which is but to say that God causeth me to *will sin*, and not to *Will-nill-it*? 2. If you mean more, I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will, to *will* or *Nill* contrary to the Volition and physical premoving predetermination of the first cause. 3. But if all this were so, it's nothing to the present case; and doth not prove that God is not the Cause of the sin, but only that man is a Cause also, caused by the first Cause; and that God Willeth and Causeth us to sin willingly and freely.

586. 3. By this means they make God equally to *Will* and *Cause* our *Holiness* and our *sin*: For they cannot possibly tell us what he doth more to Cause our Holiness, than to *Will* it, and to *predetermine* the will of man to it, (besides *commanding* it, which is a moral act, and we speak

Saith *Twisse Vindic. Grat. li.* 1. *P.* 1. *Sect.* 7. *p.* 137. [*Posito quod velit perfectiones istas manifestare*, necesse est *non impediat ingressum peccati, sed permittat.*] 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws, and Illuminating men to know them, without execution by the occasion of sin? 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would: And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction? 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical, should not give so much to sin, which were it a means (as it is not, but a Passive and opposite occasion) is but a moral means.

And himself saith *page* 136. [*Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi finem à Deo præfixum: At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum, sive manifestandæ Dei misericordiæ, sive justitiæ: Media enim ejus sunt naturæ, ut ad ea facienda, moveatur quis ex intentione finis.*] Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself? But he there addeth that it is *Materia etsi non medium*, as stone and Timber to an House. And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object, but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude. But if it be to the Devils Kingdom *loco materiæ*, it is not so to Christs. Rather, if a beggar *want* a house, is that *want* the *Materia domus?* no nor the *Materia* of his mercy

or bounty that buildeth it. Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church, when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him. So Sect. 9. pag. 137. *Peccatum mihi videtur proprie dicendum esse materiam manifestandæ Dei sive misericordiæ, sive justitiæ potius quam medium: Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandæ proprie dictum.* But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this? 2. Permission it self is nothing (being but *non-impedire.*) And is *nothing*, or *non-agere*, a proper means? But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place *Twisse* and *Arminius* are herein professedly agreed, that it is the Permission of sin, and not the sin, that is the Divine medium (only one saith *Prædestinationis*, and the other *providentiæ*:) And yet they will differ while they agree: And I that differ from both, would agree with both.

only

only of proper efficiency.) He doth but *will* that *Holineſs be*, and cauſe all that hath any entity in it; And ſo they ſay he doth about ſin.

587. Obj. *He loveth our Holineſs for it ſelf, and ſo he doth not ſin.*

Anſw. The firſt is denyed by themſelves, if you ſpeak of Gods end: For they confeſs that God only is his own end, for which he loveth all things: 2. And his Love is either his *efficient* or *complacential* Volition. 1. The *efficient* which is all that is now in queſtion they muſt confeſs is equal to both, if he equally will the exiſtence of both.

Object. *But he hath a Complacence in Good only.*

Anſw. 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own *will* as efficient. Therefore if ſin be the fulfilling of his Will, he hath a complacency in it. The formal reaſon of a pleaſing object to God is, as it is the fulfilling of his own Will; And to break his Law they make to be ſuch: *ergo*, pleaſing. 2. But if it were not ſo, that's nothing to our Caſe, of the efficient Will.

588. 4. To avoid tediouſneſs, in ſum, This opinion ſeemeth to me, to leave very little or no place for the Chriſtian Religion. For 1. It overthroweth the *formale objectum fidei*, which is *Veracitas Divina*, and leaveth no certainty of any word of God: For if he do *will* and predetermine by premotion, *ut fiat omne mendacium, quod fit*, then we have no way to know that he did not ſo by the Prophets and Apoſtles. 2. It maketh the Scripture falſe, which ſaith ſo much of Gods hatred and unwillingneſs of ſin. 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holineſs, which is made the great reaſon of our holineſs. 4. It maketh mans Holineſs to be no Holineſs, but a common or indifferent thing. 5. It maketh ſin ſo little odious (as being a Divine off-ſpring) as will deſtroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it. 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly ſorrow, repenting, confeſſion, and all practice of means againſt any ſin. 7. It will hardly let men believe that Chriſt came into the world, and did and ſuffered ſo much to ſave men from ſin, and to deſtroy it. 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghoſt to ſanctifie ſouls and mortifie ſin. 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell, and that God will damn men for ever, for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination, unavoidably. 10. It ſeemeth to give Satans deſcription to God, and *more*. For *Satan* can but *tempt* us to ſin, but they make God *abſolutely to will* that it be, and phyſically to predetermine us to it. And ſo Chriſt that came to deſtroy the work of the Devil, the father of lies, malice and murder, ſhould come to deſtroy the work of God. 11. It taketh away the reaſon of Church diſcipline, and purity, and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedneſs. 12. It would tempt Magiſtrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue, good and bad in the Common-wealth.

589. Now to their arguments. 1. Rev. 17.17. [*God put it into their hearts to do his will, and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beaſt.*]

Anſw. 1. He that readeth Dr. *Hammonds* expoſition applying this to *Alaricus* ſacking *Rome*, with the effects, will ſee that the very *ſubject* is ſo dubious and dark as not to be fit to found ſuch a doctrine on. 2. It was the *effect of the ſin* that God willed, and not the *ſin*. 3. He is not ſaid to put the ſin into their hearts, whether pride, covetouſneſs, cruelty, *&c.* but only to *do his pleaſure* and agree (or make one decree) to give up *&c.* which he could moſt eaſily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own ſins, would have that effect which he willed: If a thief have a will to rob, God may put it into his heart to go ſuch or ſuch a way, where a wicked man to be puniſhed will be in his way.

590. But

590. But for brevity, beſides what is ſaid, I ſhall farther direct the impartial Reader, how to anſwer all ſuch objections: And withall let the confounding cavillers againſt diſtinguiſhing, ſee, what blaſphemy and ſubverſion of Religion may enter, for want of one or two diſtinctions which confuſed heads regard not.

1. Be ſure to diſtinguiſh the *name* of ſin, from the *nature*. 2. And remember that no outward act is ſin any further than it is *Voluntary* (by privation or poſition of Volitions.) 3. Diſtinguiſh between the *Act* as it is *Agentis*, and as it is *in Paſſo*. 4. And between the *Act* and the *effect*. 5. Between the *effect* of a *ſingle cauſe* and of *divers cauſes*, making a *compound effect*. 6. And between a *forbidden object compared with the contrary*, and *one* forbidden object compared with *another*.

591. And then all this ſatisfying Truth will lye naked before you. 1. That the ſame name uſually ſignifieth the *ſin* and the *effect of ſin*; or the *Act* as *Acted* and as *Received*. Adultery, Murder, Theft, uſually ſignifie the *Acts* of the Adulterer, Murderer, Thief, as done and as *received in Paſſo*, and as *effecting*.

2. That the *former* only is the *ſin*, *viz.* firſt the *Volition*, *Nolition*, or *Non-Volition*, and ſecondarily the imperate act as *animated* by the *will*: And no more. The *reception* of *this* act in *Paſſo* is not ſin (as ſuch;) nor the moſt immediate effect of this act: It is but the *effect of ſin*.

3. And you will ſee that the ſame effect may have ſeveral cauſes: a Good and bad; And ſo God may be a cauſe of that effect, which mans ſin alſo concurreth to cauſe: And God doth not therefore Will or Cauſe the *ſin*.

4. And you will ſee that God may morally cauſe the effect as it is on this object rather than *another* forbidden, though both make the act ſinful, and yet not Cauſe it as it is exerciſed on *either* of thoſe objects compared with ſuch as are *not forbidden*.

592. And you will here plainly ſee that God hath many wayes to *Cauſe* the *effect* without *willing* or Cauſing the ſin. As for inſtance, 1. He can do it by adding (as I ſaid before) a *good act* to the ſinners *bad one*. As when *Caiaphas* is willing to kill Chriſt, God can put into *Caiaphas's* thoughts, the jealouſie of the Romans over the Jews, and the viſible danger they are in if they ſhould be thought to have another King: which thoughts in themſelves are true and good: So he can put into *Pharaoh's* thoughts the loſs of the Iſraelites ſervice, which was not ſinful of it ſelf.

De hoc vid. Ockam ubi ſupra.

593. And 2. God can ſet *that object* before a ſinner which he is moſt inclined to abuſe: Which is not to Will his ſin: But may proceed from Gods Willing the *Effect*. As if *Abſalom* be by Pride and Luſt enclined to Adultery, his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way. And God may will to puniſh *David* by their *paſſive pollution*, without willing his act of ſin at all, interior or exterior.

594. 3. And God can *remove other objects* out of the way, ſo that this object ſhall be ſolitary, or moſt obvious to the ſinner. As if a drunken man were reſolved to kill the next he met, God can keep *Peter*, *John*, *&c.* out of his way, and ſo *Judas* ſhall be the next.

595. 4. Yea God can ſuſpend his own intrinſick concurſe as to ſome one ſinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object. Many other ſuch wayes God hath, which are unknown to us.

596. And if you ſuppoſe a man ſo inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exerciſe it on the next moſt provoking object, if God now did Cauſe the Act, as exerciſed on a forbidden object, compared with another

The wiſe Reader that can impartially receive truth without reſpect of perſons, may find much in *Epiſcopii Inſtitut. Theol. li. 4. ſect. 4. de providnt.* in his anſwering all theſe Texts of Scripture, as miſ-expounded by ſome. And his moderate opinion expreſſed in *Concluſ. 2.* in the end of that Section, how far doctrines are or are not damning which ſubvert the foundation, is laudable, and his reaſon very good and clear, (*viz.* ſo far as they actually prevail with the will and practice: Even as our faith is ſaving as effectual and practical, and not as a dead opinion, ſo is error damning.) I think as he doth.

it were to Cauſe the ſin. But if he only be the moral Cauſe that he *e.g.* kill *Judas* rather than *Peter*, this is not to Cauſe ſin: For to choose *Judas* rather than *Peter* for the object, is no ſin: For, as I ſaid, God can do it only by removing *Peter*, and Willing that he ſhall be preſerved.

597. Suppoſe a King that hath made Laws againſt Murder foreknow that a Robber is waiting in ſuch a Road for a prey, and that a Traytor broke out of Priſon will go that way, and ſo will be rob'd and kill'd, He may *will* or deſire the Death of the Traytor as a puniſhment; He may reſtrain ſome that would travail that way before him; and may reſtrain ſome that would lay hold on the Robber, or drive him away, that ſo this Traytor may be killed: And yet only *Permit*, and not Will at all, the Robbers *will* or Act as it is *Agentis*, but puniſh him for it, and hate it, and *will* only the effect.

598. The next Text cited is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. *whereunto alſo they were appointed* (viz. *to ſtumble on the rock of offence.*) *Reſp.* 1. This hath reſpect to Luke 2. 34. [*he is ſet for the fall of many*, &c.] and of Chriſts own words, that *he that falleth on this ſtone ſhall be broken in pieces*. And no more can hence be gathered, but that God hath decreed that as a Puniſhing Judge, 1. He will leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on in their own ſinful way, 2. And that their oppoſition to him ſhall be their ruine. So that 1. He doth not ſpeak this of any but the rejecters of Chriſt that deſerved it. 2. He ſpeaketh not at all as *willing* their ſin, but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace. 3. But the thing that he is ſaid to Ordain them to, is not *ſin*, but *Ruine* the conſequent of their ſin: The word [*ſtumbling* and *falling*] ſignifying their *deſtruction.*

599. The next Text is, 2 Theſ. 2. *God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſions* (or the *acting of deceit*) that *they ſhould believe a lye.* *Anſw.* Here is nothing ſignified, but 1. That God ſhall permit Magicians and falſe Teachers to vent deceits, 2. And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted conſequent, and not as an end intended by God: And the word *ſending* is uſed becauſe the *permiſſion* was *Penal* for their ſin. And his puniſhing-providence might morally cauſe the deceivers rather to go towards theſe men than towards others.

600. The next is Rom. 1. 24, 26, 28. *God gave them up to uncleanneſs, to vile affections, to a reprobate mind*, &c.

Reſp. Here is nothing at all ſaid but a Penal deſertion and permiſſion, and no Will or Cauſe of ſin in God.

601. The next is Act. 4. 28. *To do whatſoever thy hand and thy counſel determined before to be done.*

Anſw. Here is nothing ſaid of *ſin* at all, but of the *effect* of it: All that was *done* on Chriſt, even all the effect *in paſſo* God fore-determined ſhould be done: But the Act *ut volentis & agentis* he neither *willed* nor cauſed as on this forbidden object. And though elſewhere the Doctor deride this anſwer (that God *decreed* Chriſt ſhould dye, or be ſacrificed, and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one elſe ſhould do it,) It is a great and neceſſary truth: He that willed the effect, and did much himſelf to cauſe it, willed not the murderers ſinful act: And *permitting* and *foreſeeing* it was enough.

602. The next is *Iſa.* 10. 6. and ſo *Amos* 16. 17. *Prov.* 22. 14. 2 *Sam.* 12. 11. 1 *King.* 11. 31. & 12. 24. God ſends the Aſſyrian as his rod. Thy Wife ſhall commit Adultery, and thy Children fall by the ſword.] They that are hated of God ſhall fall therein——] *David* was foretold his Wives ſhould be vitiated: The ten Tribes fell from *Rehoboam*: It was of God that he took not good counſel: *Pharaohs* heart was hardened by God.

Anſw.

Answ. The first is only a *Propheſie*, and a *penal effect* of ſin, and nothing of Gods Willing or Cauſing ſin. And ſo is the ſecond: Though God can *ſend* afflicters by the wayes before mentioned, without willing their ſin. The third ſpeaketh only of a penal permiſſion of ſin. And the reſt all ſpeak only of Gods penal permiſſion of the ſin, and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it, and his occaſioning the ſinner to take one ſinful object (not as ſuch, but) rather than another.

603. As the Wind hath its natural courſe, and ſo hath the Water, and the Miller Cauſeth neither of them, but ſuppoſing them, doth ſo ſet his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient, they ſhall fulfil his will, and he is the Cauſe of the effect, *viz.* that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn: ſo is it eaſie for God to uſe mens ſins (permitted) to his ends without *willing* them *.

604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reaſons: And the firſt is, becauſe † *Permiſſion* is a ſign of *Willingneſs* as well as command: And what is permitted (and that for good) infallibly cometh to paſs.

Answ. All this is before confuted. * It's falſe that *non impedire efficaciter* is a ſign that one *wills* the thing. The King that only forbiddeth drunkenneſs or murder by a Law with penalties, could alſo lock up or guard ſome men, and effectually keep them from the ſin. And doth he *Will* it becauſe he doth not ſo? And it's falſe that *all cometh to paſs*, that is *not hindered*.

605. His ſecond argument is ſpoken very plainly and groſly, viz. [*Both ſides confeſs that the ſubſtrate act is done, God not only willing it, but effecting it*, v. g. Abſalom's *congreſs with his Fathers Concubines: Yea not only the congreſs as an exerciſed imperate act, but that the Volition of congreſs, the internal elicite act, was efficiently and Principally of God: why then ſhould it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done, God willing it, though not effecting it, or any way failing of his duty? Eſpecially when the Malice and Deformity doth neceſſarily follow the ſubſtrate act, in reſpect of the Creature though not of God.*]

Answ. Hobbes could deſire little more. But we vehemently deny that the ſubſtrate act is of God as it is *morally ſpecified*, that is, as it is exerciſed *on this forbidden object* rather than another lawful one *ex parte eligentis*: God did not as a principal efficient cauſe *Abſalom* to *will* that Congreſs with his Fathers Concubines, nor to Act it. The nature of the Wind and Water, and God as the Cauſe of Nature, cauſe the *wind* and *water* to act, and to act as they do, on their own part: But that they turn this wheel and milſtone, and run in this Channel rather than another, is long of the Miller. *Abſalom's Motus qua motus*, and *qua cupido ordinata*, was natural from God: but not as acted *hic & nunc* towards this object: And the *Reception* of the Act by that Object ſuppoſing his luſt and action, might be morally and penally from God.

606. If you here bring forth the common *Meduſa's* head, and tell me, that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature, and ſo dependent; I confidently anſwer you for God, 1. No man is injurious to himſelf: And God did not wrong himſelf, when by making a Creature with free ſelf-determining Power, he reſolved ſo far (partially)

* Even *Vaſq. in* 1 *Tho. q.* 23. *d.* 49. *c.* 8. *pag.* 758. ſaith that Of mens [*non reſpondere vocationi*] God is Cauſa *per* accidens, *ut removens prohibens, dum negat auxilium efficax congruum.* But this is but a Controverſie about a Logical name [*cauſa per accidens*] which *Gibieuf* and many others do with as good reaſon deny to be fitly applicable to God, as to mans ſin.

† Pet. Alliac. Cam. 1. q. 14. A. [*Secundum* Bradward. *& alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpæ, & quod reſpectu cujuſlibet rei habet Velle vel nolle, nec habet ſolum non velle; Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpæ fieri; ſed ideo ſecundum hunc modum dicitur permittere, quia non approbat ea, nec impedit ea fieri cum poſſit* —— *ſed ſecundum Magiſtrum Deus permittit ea, quia nec vult ea fieri, nec vult ea non fieri; quia ſi nollet non fierent, ſed ſolum non vult: & per conſequens non habet actum voluntatis reſpectu hujus quod eſt malum culpæ fieri* ——] Saith *Bonaventure*, (that plain and honeſt Schoolman) *li.* 1. *diſ.* 47. *dub.* 2. *Dicendum quod non eſt ſignum quod Deus velit illud quod permittitur; ſed quod velit illud quod ex eo elicitur.*

Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. 1. *Permittit qui nec præcipit, nec prohibet, nec conſulit, ſed indulgit: & talis Permiſſio eſt ſignum Voluntatis Dei: quia aliquem actum ſignificat in ſic permittente: & ita Deus non permittit mala culpæ* —— 2. *Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle, nec habet nolle, ſed ſolum non Velle ut fiat: Et talis Permiſſio non eſt ſignum Divinæ Voluntatis; quia nullum actum Volendi ſignificat in ſic permittente: & iſto modo ſecundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpæ.*

* If he really hold with *Bradward. li.* 1. *c.* 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth, why is it denyed that he willeth the *formale peccati* as much as the *materiale*, ſeeing he permitteth it? But his citation of *Bradwardine* I think not my ſelf obliged to regard; nor do I conſent any more to that doctrine in *Bradwardine* than in him. See *Alliaco* before of *Bradward.*

ally) to ſuſpend his own operation, ſo as not to neceſſitate the *will*: no more than he wrongeth himſelf by a *Greater ſuſpenſion*, in making no more Worlds or Creatures.

2. You quite miſtake: We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx, nor *determine* it, but *terminate* it, and determine of that *effect* which requireth *both Cauſes, God* and *Man*, and cannot be (ordinarily) by *one alone*, becauſe God hath otherwiſe appointed. And again I beſeech the adverſaries to note, How great and innumerable changes are made in the world, by the various *Diſpoſition* of *Recipients*? The Roſe and Vine and Weed and Dunghill, do not at all Change the Action of the Sun: but their various *Reception* and *co-operation* is the Cauſe, that its Act hath ſuch various *effects*. And it is the Millers work in making a various and ſpecial *Receptivity* in his Channel, Wheels, *&c.* which cauſeth the variety of effects. And God hath enabled men Variouſly and freely to *Receive* his Influx.

607. His third Argument is, God *giveth not that effectual Grace, without which he fore-knoweth ſin will not be avoided*: ergo *he is willing that it be done.*

Anſw. I deny the Conſequent: It only followeth that he doth not Abſolutely and effectually *Will it*, If the King have ſeveral ſubjects inclined to eat a luſcious poyſon; And his Children he effectually keepeth from it; one he locketh up, another he committeth to a Keeper, another he keepeth the poiſon from: But to a Traytor he ſaith, [I once forgave thee, and ſaved thy life, and I now command thee that thou avoid this poiſon, and if thou do not, it will torment and kill thee; but if thou wilt take no warning, take what thou getteſt by it.] Can you prove that it is his *Will* that this man eat the poyſon prohibited?

608. Next he citeth *Auguſtines* thred-bare ſayings, and blameth *Aquinas* and *Arminius* for denying his Authority, and commendeth the greater reverence of *Bellarmine*: And ſo *Anſelm, Hugo*, &c.

Anſw. 1. We ſtick not on one mans Authority; God holdeth not his Holineſs and the Church its Religion on *Auguſtines* authority. 2. *Auguſtine* hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold: See the places cited in *Paul. Eiren. Triad. Patrum.* 3. He knew it's like that *Eſtius* and many more expound *Auguſtines* words as terminating Gods *Volition* on his own *permiſſion*, and not on the *ſin*, or *fieri*. 4. I think plainly that *Auguſtine* there ſpake not of inward *Volitions*, but *outward Acts*, and that not as *Agentis* but in *paſſo* or the effects. And ſo it is true, that no murder, theft, treaſon, or other effect is produced in the world, but what God poſitively decreeth ſhall be produced, either by doing ſome effects himſelf (as drowning the world,) or permitting ſinners to do them, while he cauſeth not their act but the Receptivity of the *Paſſum*, and ſo the effect, *&c.*

609. *Pag.* 194. Retorting on *Aquin.* he thus argueth *Becauſe God doth will his own Goodneſs, therefore it is neceſſary that God will that ſin be done, be permitting it. For it is not to will his eſſential Goodneſs, which needeth no acquiſition, but he willeth to manifeſt his Goodneſs. But the evil of ſin is not oppoſite to the manifeſting of Gods Goodneſs: Yea nothing is more * conducible to it than this; I ſay to the manifeſting of Gods Goodneſs by way of mercy in ſparing or by way of Juſtice in puniſhing.*

Anſw. Horreſco recitans, 1. Gods Volition of his Eſſential Goodneſs is his Neceſſary Volition. 2. God hath no *End* to acquire, but alwayes hath his end, and is never without it. 3. If God had *neceſſarily* willed the

* So *Twiſſ. contr. Armin. pro Junio pag.* 91. diſſenteth from *Junius* that ſaith *peccatum ad rationem univerſi facere per accidens*, and ſaith *Mihi vero dicendum videtur Peccatum conducibile eſſe per ſe ad bonum univerſi quatenus conducit ad illuſtrandos tales divinæ majeſtatis radios*—— And if ſo, it muſt *per ſe* be Loved of God as Good. Yet *contr. Corvin.* he ſaith, that No ſober man ſaith that ſin is a medium of the execution of Reprobation, but only the Permiſſion of ſin. Reconcile them that can.

the particular way of manifesting his Goodness, then he doth all things necessarily, and could do no otherwise, and it seems by you could not manifest it without sin. 4. Doth he not manifest his *Goodness* as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels, who never sinned? And would it not have been as much manifested to us if we had been as they? 5. The very indetermination of the will, and its mediate Liberty, is not the highest excellency of his Creatures: It is better than the sensitive *Necessity* of Bruits, and lower than the confirmed Necessity of the blessed: It is our defectibility. And the excellentest or Best of his works most honour Gods Goodness. 6. Is it not the strongest temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or dishonour the Goodness of God, to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedness, and be so like to hell? 7. Doth not Christ turn the Prayers of all Christians against your doctrine, *viz.* that Gods name may be hallowed, his Kingdom come, and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven (which is not by any sin?) 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to sin, if not to love it, if nothing be more conducible to honour Gods Goodness? 9. Is not that conclusion a great wrong to Christ, Scripture, Ministry and Holiness, as being no more conducible to manifest Gods Goodness than sin is? 10. It is not true that sin is any *Cause*, or true *Means* at all of glorifying God or doing any good. It is but a presupposed *Evil*, by delivering us from which God is glorified. As your eating poyson may occasion the honour of an Antidote and Physicion: It is no Cause or proper *medium* of it, but only an occasion, and mischief *sine quo non*; But if God had not saved us from sin committed, he could have glorified himself in saving us from committing it: God loveth and is glorified most in that which is most like him as his Image, which is, the Holiest sinless soul. To be a *medium* to Gods glory is to be good: To be as conducible to it as any thing, is to be as good as any thing save God and his glory. But *sin* hath no *Good*, much less *such good*. Why else doth not God equally delight in sin, and in the death of the wicked, as in holiness, repentance and our life? seeing all things are for himself, and that which glorifieth him most, is best. 11. Here also confusion causeth mischief: one distinction might have scattered this mist, *viz.* Between *sin indeed* and *sin* in *notion*. *Sin indeed*, or *essence* and *existence* never did good nor honoured God. *Sin* in *notion* or in *esse objectivo* is *no sin*, but the Matter of Vertue and Holiness, and doth much good. When you say *God knoweth sin* from *eternity*, you'l say with *Scotus*, that *in esse cognito sin* was in God from Eternity: But so *sin* is not *sin*. *David* saith, *My sin is ever before me*, Psal. 51. And we daily *Repent of it*, and *confess* it: But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind, and so it is not *sin* indeed but the notion of it, which is *in esse objectivo*. Else it would defile us to think of it, and repent of it; whereas thus sin objectively is the matter of the grace and duty of Repentance, Hatred, fear, watchfulness, prayer, confession, *&c.* And so sin in *esse objectivo* as a grace may glorifie God.

80 *Joh. à Combis compend. Theol. l.* 3. *c.* 1. tells us that sin is profitable three wayes, 1. *ut bene ordinatur, ut sur in patibulo.* 2. *Propter co-actionem, & amaritudinem.* 3. *Propter mali considerationem*: And many popular Books say the like: But this is but abusive language tending to deceive: As if sin did good, because punishing sin, and repenting of it, and hating it do good: As if hating sin were sin. Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abused words.

610. To *Aquin.* that saith *Malum non est appetibile* he saith, that *Malum moris quod opponitur bono, est proprium uniuscujusque; meum malum bono meo*——— *Though the sin of a man willing that which is forbidden him be his sin,* ——*yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another: The Reason is, because it is not forbidden to God to will it: wherefore though it be evil and dishoneſt in man to will it to whom it is forbidden, yet not to God*——— *And seeing that Moral Evil or sin is summè conducibile,* chiefly *or most conducible to make way to represent*

Gods Goodneſs, this abundantly ſufficeth to prove it deſirable to God. We ſay that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God, is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God, but as to the will of the creature, being forbidden the creature, but not forbidden God.

Anſw. Shall we preach thus to the people? Will this Doctrine convert ſouls to repentance or faith in Chriſt? 1. The queſtion is not, Whether to *will ſin* be *ſin in God?* But Whether he *will and cauſe the ſin of man?* which you ſadly aſſert.

2. *Gods Glory* is our End, and to forbear things prohibited is but the *means:* If ſin conduce as much as *Chriſt* and *Holineſs* to *Gods Glory*, why may we not deſire it *ſub ratione medii*, though not as *præceptum?* We muſt deſire that which is moſt conducible to Gods Glory.

3. Though God be under no Law, his *Perfection of Nature and will* is the fountain of all Laws, and inſtead of a Law to him. And we muſt be Holy becauſe our God is Holy.

4. It is ſtill falſe that ſin is any Medium to Gods Glory, or deſirable, or hath any good.

5. God is Good and delighteth to do good. And he is the Juſt Ruler of the World: And I would not have Kings take ſuch Juſtice for a pattern as you deſcribe, as if God vehemently forbad ſin, and ſent his Son, and Spirit, and Miniſters as an Army againſt it into the World, and will damn men for it for ever, and yet *willeth* and *cauſeth it*, as *ſummè conducibile* to his Ends, and ſaith [It is not evil to me, though it be to you. I'le torment you for doing it, though it was by my Will and predetermination.] And what Juſtice ſhould *Kings* rather imitate than Gods?

Of which vid. Gibieuf at large.

Auguſt. de Nat. & Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. *Non hoc eis dicimus quod ſibi iſte (Pelagius) oppoſuit, ut eſſet Cauſa Miſericordiæ Dei, neceſſarium fuiſſe peccatum: utinam non fuiſſet miſeria, ne iſta eſſet miſericordia neceſſaria.* Id. ibid. cap. 31. *Et altius Dei conſilium fateor me ignorare, cur etiam ipſam ſuperbiam, quæ in recte factis animo inſidiatur humano, non cito Deus ſanet, pro qua ſananda illi piæ animæ cum lacrymis & magnis gemitibus ſupplicant, ut ad eam ſuperandam & quodammodo calcandam & obterendam dextram conantibus porrigat.*

Even *Vaſquez* the Jeſuite ſaith of Gods denying men grace, and of non-entities that God willeth them, thus [*Non-eſſe alicujus rei ſecundum ſe quatenus malum quoddam ipſius rei eſt, non placet Deo—— Sed ſub alia ratione placere poteſt; nec enim in eo eſt omnis ratio mali. Nam in non-eſſe alicujus rei, poteſt comparatione ad reliquum univerſum, vel ad juſtitiam vel ad potentiam Dei aliqua ratio boni apparere, ob quã non tantum poteſt placere Deo, ſimplici complacentia, ſed etiam efficaci voluntate, qua diſcernat rem illam non facere: Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam ſuam aut gloriam non placet*

Moreover, God is *Good* and doth good. And though he made Man *freely*, yet ſuppoſing that he will make him *Man* (a Rational free agent in his Image to *Know* and *Love* him): it neceſſarily followeth that he muſt make him Holy. God cannot make a man in the Image of the Devil, and call it his own: As Parents generate Children in their own likeneſs, ſo God doth regenerate his own in his Image: He that thought it a good argument, [*What Communion hath light with darkneſs, Chriſt with Belial, &c.*] would ſure have taken our part in this, that God cannot be the Author or Cauſe of the Image of the Devil, and of the works of darkneſs.

611. Therefore where he addeth, that God *willeth* Malum eſſe *that ſin be, as the Matter of exerciſing his mercy and juſtice, not as his ſin, but tantum vult fieri malum alterius*, I deny it with horror as a reproach of Gods holineſs. The *terminus à quo* is not the *Materia miſericordiæ vel juſtitiæ*

justitiæ exercendæ. God willeth the glory of his Mercy and Justice, in pardoning and punishing foreseen presupposed sin: But he willeth not the sin, but only our deliverance from it, or punishment for it. Suppose (*per impossibile*) that the King had power to restrain all men from offending him, and yet saith, [I will do only what is Congruous to the Rational free nature of my subjects as such, and not all that I can do, and therefore will restrain them only by Laws, except some few beloved ones; but I will honour my Mercy and Justice on offenders.] Can you hence prove, that he willeth, decreeth or loveth *ut appetibilia* all the *Treasons, Rebellions, Murders* and *Blasphemies* that are committed? It is not these that he willeth *ut Materiam*, but *deliverance from these* as from the *malum à quo.* If your prodigal Son be addicted to Robbing, and you could lock him up, but you resolve that you will try him once more, and if he rob you will let him suffer imprisonment and come to the Gallows, and then beg his Pardon, that suffering may hereafter be his warning; Here if you choose rightly it is not his Robbing that you will, no not *ut sit vel fiat* (for you had rather he would forbear:) But only his forsaking it, and his suffering to that end, on supposition that he rob again.

612. Pag. 105. He saith that [*By the same reason as God might not will the being of sin, by his permission, he might not permit it.*]

Answ. A raw unproved assertion: God might not make an Indifferent free-will, left to its own liberty, with a thousand warnings and helps against sin, unless he may also Desire them to sin. Prove this, else you say nothing.

613. He addeth that sin be or exist is not only *Bonum per accidens, because God will make* it the matter of glorifying his *mercy* and *justice*; but it is *ex natura sua quoddam ordinabile ad Gloriam Dei, & consequenter Bonum est ex natura sua in genere conducibilis*———

Answ. All unproved and false. 1. Sin is not so much as *Bonum per accidens.* 2. God doth not make it the Matter of glorifying himself, but only glorifyeth his Mercy and Justice *against it* as the *terminus à quo*, and not *by it* as the *matter*, though it may be called an *Occasion sine qua non*, as to this particular act and way of his said glorification. 3. Much less is it *conducible hereto*, which implyeth a *Medium* that hath some *natural* or *moral causality.* 4. And least of all is it *ex sua natura conducibile.* It is not *sin*, but 1. Some *effects* or *consequents* of sin, 2. Our deliverance from sin, and the punishing of sin, which are conducible to Gods glory.

614. Next he insulteth over *Aquinas* twice, as *unhappy* and vain in his censures, with a *Magna est Veritas & prævalebit: laborare potest, vinci non potest:* And argueth that *because ex permissione infallibiliter sequitur peccatum, therefore to permit sin is the same as to will that sin shall be* ipso permittente.

Answ. 1. It's pity that *sin* should have so good an Advocate, and Gods Holiness so good an Adversary, through mistake. And that so unhappy a Cause should be managed so confidently and triumphantly, though it's well that it's done so weakly. 2. The falshood of his assertion about permission as general I have opened before. 1. Three sorts of things may be said to be *Not hindered* (which is all that *Permission* signifieth.) 1. *Things bent* to a certain motion, 1. By *Natural inclination* (as a Stone in the Air to descend) 2. Or by *Moral Vitiosity*, as the Will of a wicked man. 2. Things *meerly indifferent*; (1. *Naturally*, as some think the Air is to motion: 2. *Morally*: as suppose a Will such, to Good or Evil.) 3. Things *averse* to that *Motion* (as 1. Naturally a Stone to ascend, 2. Morally, as the will of an Angel or Saint to hate God, or the will of a wicked

cet ut malū quoddam ipsius est, Quia sicut non displicet persona, sic nec malum illius ut illius est placet: sed placet sub alio respectu, sub quo etiam non potest non placere: quia scilicet ostenditur in eo potentia Dei, misericordia in electos, &c.] By this he will teach men to say so of sin: But 1. He confesseth that this controversie is not of any thing real in God; (as if he had distinct real acts); but only of the extrinsecal denomination of Gods Essence. 2. He can give no reason why the *malum pœnæ* of a creature as such may not be willed of God, as much as non-entity, though not finally for it self. 3. Non-entity hath not *omnem rationem mali*, but it is enough that it hath *nullam rationem boni.* 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good. *A negatione subjecti ad negationem modi valet argumentum:* Non-entities are no true modes of the Universe. It is improper to say that Gods Power, Wisdom or Mercy is glorified by any *nothing* or *non-entity*: It is by some being that God is glorified. 5. It's a contradiction to say *Voluntate efficaci vult aliquid non esse*; How is that *efficax qua nihil efficit?* —— But God doth efficaciously hinder many inclined agents to act according to their inclination. And that impedition may be a Positive act.

So *disp.* 95. *c.* 9. he saith that the end of Gods Permitting sin,, is *ostendere divitias gratiæ suæ & liberalitatem qua usus fuit erga prædestinatos: denegans congruas vocationes reprobis, ostendit prædestinatis, easdem vocationis, quibus fuerunt ad gloriam præparati, gratis omnino ipsis fuisse donatas.* But 1. Mans act comparing himself with another is *quid reale*, & *voluntas à Deo*: And the proposition [that the other hath no grace] is *quid reale*, or *ens rationis*, But nothing declareth nothing. 2. If Gods will be his simple essence, or

ly diverſly denominated from effects and objects, how can *nothing* denominate it but as *non-efficient* or *not-willing?* Indeed it might denominate a Nolition *exiſtentiæ*, if an Act of Gods were neceſſary to hinder exiſtence; but not where *non-efficere* is enough.

Antonine better ſaith, *l.* 1. §. 17. ὥστε ὅσον ὅσον τοῖς θεοῖς, &c. *ut, quantum ad Deos attinet ac ſuggeſtiones, adjutationes, inſpirationes ab ipſis profectas, nihil obſtet omnino quo minus juxta naturæ præſcriptum confeſtim vivam, niſi ipſe tandem in culpa ſim, qui Deorum ſubmonitiones, & tantum non claras præceptiones, neutiquam obſervem.*

I marvel the Doctor inſiſteth not on his own great Reaſon, *viz.* Futurity is eternal, and therefore hath an eternal cauſe, which is God: And he that willeth the futurity of ſin, willeth the ſin, that is, that ſin ſhall be. This ſeemeth ſtronger than all the reſt, if the antecedent were true: And ſo he might prove that the futurity of the very form of ſin is God: For nothing is eternal but God: But the futurity of the form of ſin (according to theſe men) is eternal (or *ab æterno*): *Ergo* it is God. But ſaith excellent *Le Blanc* de Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 55, 56. *Præſertim nullo modo probare poſſum quod* Gu. Twiſſus *pluribus locis aſſerit, Decretum Dei & ejus Voluntatem eſſe ſolam & unicam Cauſam futuritionis cujuſlibet eventus:* e.g. *inobedientiæ Adami*, &c. *At inquit doctus ille, vir, Futuritionis quæ ab æterno fuit, nulla Cauſa dari poteſt quæ ab æterno non fuit.* Reſp. *Hoc ſupponit futuritionem eſſe aliquid reale à re ipſa diſtinctum, & quod cauſam aliam habeat quam res ipſa futura: At hoc falſiſſimum: Nam futuritio nil aliud eſt quam reſpectus quidam rationis & extrinſica denominatio rei futuræ* —— *Rellè ponitur argumentum, Ab æterno nihil fuit præter Deum: Ac proinde futuritio quæ ab* a wicked man to Love him.) Alſo you muſt diſtinguiſh between *Not-hindering at all*, and *not hindering effectually*.

And ſo it's clear, 1. That in the firſt caſe, the *Motion* will *be if it be not hindered*. But that it is not cauſed by *not-hindering it*, but by its proper moving cauſes. In the ſecond caſe the conſequence of *futurity* is falſe: And where the inclinations to *good* and *evil* (that is, to ſuperiour and inferiour prohibited good) are equal; yea, though antecedently ſomewhat unequal: Yet bare permiſſion aſcertaineth not futurity. 3. Much leſs in the third caſe; where the ſoul muſt have poſitive help or provocation. Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly *Love God*, if God did but *Permit* them.

But Gods *Permitting* or not *hindering ſin* may reſpect divers acts. 1. If God continue not his *natural ſupport*, man will be no man, but be annihilated, and ſo will neither do good nor evil. 2. If God uphold mans *nature*, in its Integrity as it was in *Adam*, and give him not Moral *means* and *helps* of *Grace*, and his natural concurſe, *Adams* ſin would have neceſſarily followed. 3. If God give *Adam* both ſuch *ſupport* and *means* to ſtand, and do no more, Gods permiſſion would not have inferred the certainty of *Adams* ſin, when he fell, any more than before: For God withdrew no grace from him which was neceſſary to his ſtanding. 4. If God give a lapſed ſinful man Nature and common grace, it followeth not neceſſarily becauſe God doth no more, that he will commit every ſin that he is not further hindered from: but it's certain that he will not do the works to which ſpecial grace is neceſſary. 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit, and continue his influx neceſſary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions, with neceſſary means, and do no more, this man will do ſome good and ſome evil, and though he may be equally ſaid to be Permitted to do this ſin as another, yet he may do one and not another. 6. God totally *permitteth* no man to ſin, but hindereth them many wayes, though he hinder not all alike. 7. It's poſſible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to ſin (or the ſame man at ſeveral times,) and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the ſin, and the other to commit the ſin and omit the duty; As many Schoolmen have copiouſly proved. Yet in this caſe *Permiſſion* would be the ſame thing to both.

But if you uſe the word [*Permiſſion*] as *connoting* the *Event*, then indeed you may ſay that *the event* (from another cauſe) will follow. And Gods *non-impedition* will *ab eventu actionis* be extrinſecally denominated *Permiſſion* in *the one caſe* and *not* in the other. But this is but from your arbitrary uſe of the word.

615. Next the Doctor aſſaulteth *Durandus* who thus argueth, *Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge. But he knoweth not ſin approvingly; being of purer eyes*, &c. He anſwereth, "1. *God approveth that* "*ſin be, though he approve not ſin.* 2. *God willeth the manifeſtation of* "*his mercy and juſtice*: Ergo, *he willeth the exiſtence of ſin as that which* "*is neceſſarily required to it.*

To which I reply, 1. The firſt anſwer is unproved and falſe. God approveth not that ſin be. If he did, few wicked men do more, as *Eſtius* ſaith: For it is not *ſin* as *ſin* or *evil* that they *will*, but that *it be* for other ends which ſeem good. 2. He phraſeth it with his [*ad quod neceſſario, &c.*] as if God firſt willed this manifeſtation of his Juſtice, *&c.* as the end, and then *ſins* exiſtence as the means (yea, the neceſſary means): But this is falſe, as I have fully ſhewed. 1. And his own opinion ſhould confute it, that maketh one Decree only *de mediis*: And this particular

articular *Manifestation being* some Acts of God, and not God himself, or the Complacency of his *Will*, must needs be part of the *media ad finem ltimum*. 2. And indeed sins *existence* is not a *necessary means* willed for ods glory: but it is a presupposed mischief, our Deliverance from which punishment for it, is *willed for his glory*: It is indeed *necessary*, but nly *necessitate existentiæ in esse prægnito* as a foreseen evil, and so preppposed to those acts of God which are the Means of his glory.

Therefore his assertion of a *Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonæ in nere Conducibilis, etsi non honesti*, is detestable.

616. *Ibid. p.* 196. He again saith, that *Though it be dishonest in the eature to sin, because forbidden, it is not dishonest in God to will that he it by his permission, it being* unice conducibile *to his glory*——— *nsw.* 1. Fie upon this *conducibile* and *unicè* too. 2. Fie upon this oft peated [*permittente non efficiente*;] It is utterly lusory or immodest: or a man that maintaineth that no sinner doth any thing in sinning, but hat God as the first total cause predetermined his will to, even as to all e entity in act and circumstances imaginable; and that in all omissions, was a natural Impossibility to have done one omitted act without this edetermining premotion: And for the man that in the next saith that *alum non est Objectum Volentis aut facientis*, but *ipsa effectio rei*, I y for this man yet to say, that the *creature effecteth sin*, and God *effecteth not*, is too too gross. The common evasion is, that sin is not any ing, and therefore not *effectible*: But why then do they say, that the eature effecteth it? when they have said and defended, that the creare doth nothing but what God doth, and what he unavoidably maketh im do.

617. *Durandus* argueth, that *Sin cannot be judged convenient by a ght understanding*: *Ergo*, not *by* God. The Doctor answereth, *That es own sin cannot be judged convenient, but anothers may.* He inanceth 1. *when a man willeth that an Usurer lend him money on usury*: *when a Christian Prince willeth a Turk to swear to a League by* Maomet: 3. *when God willed that* Absalom *should defile his Fathers Concunes.* And he addeth, *that for us to sin, is contrary to our right reaon, because it is forbidden and hurtful to us: But for God to will that e sin, is not contrary to his right reason, as not forbidden or hurtful him.*

Repl. 1. No man should will *unlawful* usury: He that willeth to *Borw, though* he cannot have it *without usury*, doth not *will* the *usury*, ut the money *non-obstante usura*. As he that chooseth to travell with Blasphemer, rather than to go alone in danger, he doth not will his *lasphemy*, but his company, *non obstante blasphemia*. 2. The same is to e said of swearing by *Mahomet*: It is only the *Oath* as an Oath that is o be willed, and not *as* by *Mahomet*; that is not willed but unwillingly ndured. 3. *Absaloms* instance is answered before: God willed only *avids* punishment, and the Passive Constupration as an effect of sin, n a foresight of *Absaloms* active Volition and sin, and not as willing his at all.

And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wisdom and will is the Cause of his holy Law, and much more against sin than mans is: And that God willeth not, and causeth not the sin of man: And is it now come to his, that sin is contrary indeed to our right reason, but not to Gods, because e is no subject? You may next say, that *Holiness* is meet for man, but not or God.

618. *Pag.*

æterno fuisse dicitur vel nihil reale fuit, vel fuit ipse Deus.——*Quod est Causa cur res in tempore existat, idem plane Causa est cur res ab æterno extitura fuerit. Sicut quod Causa est quod res aliquando fuit, Causa est cur in æternum dicetur præterita*——*Ad effectum futurum sufficit Causa futura, sicut ad præteritum sufficit Causa præterita*——This is plain and easie truth.

618. *Pag.* 197. Again he is at it, *Bonum esse ut sint mala: Quia bonum est ut Deus finem sibi præfixum assequatur: At hoc sine interventu mali & peccati nullo modo potest.*

Repl. 1. It is not *per peccatum ut medium*, though not *sine peccato*. 2. *Interventus* therefore implyeth a falshood. For *in esse cognito* sin is *antecedent* or *presupposed* to the way of glorifying *Justice* and *Mercy* upon sinners; sinners are the object: And consequently you must take it (as before proved) for antecedent to the Volition or simultaneous.

619. He urgeth, *Oportet hæreses esse, ut qui probati sunt manifesti fiant.*

Answ. That neither meaneth that *men ought to be Hereticks*, nor yet that God *loveth, willeth* or *approveth that there be heresies*: But only 1. God decreeth to manifest the difference between the sound Christians and the rest: 2. And he foreseeth that there will be heresies. 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occasion of those heresies which he foreseeth (and hateth.) The same is the case of all tryal by persecutions: And God willeth not the sin of active persecution, but only the effect or passive part. So that the *oportet* (by your own confession of it) signifieth no more than a Logical *necessitas consequentiæ*, which fore-knowledge without Volition will inferr.

620. He addeth [Obj. *It sufficeth that God permit sin*, (and *not will* it) Resp. *But either the existency of sin infallibly followeth the Permission of it, or not: If not, Gods Intention may be frustrate: If yea, What matter is it, whether God will that sin shall be, he permitting, or permit it as that infallibly it will be? so we obtain either of these, it's all one to our cause of predestination.*]

Repl. 1. If it be all one, take up with that agreement, and make no further difference with them that grant you enough. 2. In case of vehement Inclination to a sin, it would follow upon Gods total permission: (but God never totally permitteth sin.) But in other cases, it will not follow: that is, It is not a good consequence, that *This or that sin will be done*, because God doth no more to hinder it, than that which sometime hindereth it not. And yet Gods Intention is not frustrate: For sin will infallibly come to pass, from its proper cause, which God foreknoweth: And the consequence is good from his fore-knowledge. And is not that all one, as to the certainty of Gods intentions? 3. You phrase it as if *sin* followed Gods *permission*, as a *deficient* cause, or as that which *cannot* be otherwise, unless God do more to hinder it, and so were necessary thence *necessitate consequentis* (or as others call it *necessitate antecedente*) which is false, and oft denyed by your self. 4. The very truth is, *Permission* is a word of so great ambiguity and laxity, as relating to so many sorts of Impedition, that it is but delusory without much distinguishing, to say *sin will* or *will not* follow it. If you restrain it to a *non efficaciter impedire*, as is usual, it taketh not away the ambiguity much. For still the question is, What must make it *effectual*, unless you call any impedition effectual meerly *ab eventu*, whatsoever it be in it self.

621. He saith that the *Universe would not be perfect, if there were perfect holiness and no sin*, and so no *pardon* or *punishment*. But he giveth us no proof, but confident assertion, at all. I need not say, that *It would be more perfect if there were no sin*; It sufficeth me to say, that *It would be as perfect*: And so that it is not *Necessary* to the World's perfection, that there be sin or Hell. God could have freely willed the contrary. And Gods Goodness could have been as fully manifested if it had

had ſo pleaſed him, and his Holineſs too, without ſin or Hell. It's unpleaſing to me, that this good man pleadeth ſo hard againſt a *neceſsity of Chriſts ſatisfaction for ſin*, (in another digreſſion) and yet pleadeth as hard for a *neceſsity of ſin*; As if it were more neceſſary to Gods Glory than Chriſt.

622. It is very obſervable in all this controverſie, that he aſſerteth pag. 198. [*That it's paſt all controverſie, that neither God, nor the moſt ſinful creature, do will any thing, but as Good.* And that *no man can be inſtigated to malice* (or evil) *but only to the Act which is evil; becauſe he that is inſtigated, is inſtigated to do ſomething. But to the evil of an act, no efficiency is neceſſary, but deficience only.*] How far this is true or falſe, I have opened before. I here only note, that he confeſſeth that he that cauſeth the Act of ſin, (which he ſaith God doth more than man) cauſeth all that is cauſable.

623. Yet *p.* 199. he ſaith, *Sin is of man only as the cauſe*, when he profeſſeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cauſe it (yea, as the firſt total cauſe) and that as to *Deficiency*, man *can do no more than* he doth without predetermination, which if God withhold, man can no more help it, than make a World. So that all the myſterie of his language is this; that becauſe man is *under a Law*, and God *is not*, therefore man doing the ſame act as moved by God, muſt be *called the only cauſe of ſin*, becauſe it is no *ſin in God*. But, if we ſpake as plain men ought to do, ſhould it not rather be thus expreſt by you [God is the chief cauſe of ſin in man, but not in himſelf?]

624. *Pag.* 200, & 201. he hath the ſame over and over again, that *Non abhorret à rectâ ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus —— Quod ex ſe habet quod conducibile eſt ad bonum tanquam Materia ſcilicet, non tantum idonea, ſed & neceſſaria exercendæ divinæ juſtitiæ & miſericordiæ: and that this manifeſtation conjunct with ſin is Deo multò appetibilius, than that Good which ſin depriveth us of* (that is, *Holineſs:*) *Becauſe this Holineſs is only the Creatures Good, and the other is the Creators Good. Anſw.* But as the aſſertion is all falſe, ſo the reaſon is vain: For if he diſtinguiſh the Creator and Creature as ſubjects, he is quite miſtaken: For both is the Creatures good, and neither the Creators: For to *manifeſt Juſtice* and *Mercy* is not Gods Eſſence as in it ſelf, but his *Work* of *Puniſhment* and *Mercy*. And the glory of this, is but the reſplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God. And all this is in the Creatures Holineſs: The Holineſs of Chriſts Humane Nature, and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators, as is his Works of Mercy and Juſtice; And Gods glory ſhineth as much in them: And it is the glory of his Goodneſs, if not of Mercy which preventeth ſin and miſery: yea, and of *Mercy* too: For though *mercy* relate to *miſery*, it is as well to *poſſible miſery prevented*, as to *exiſtent miſery* removed: And if he ſpeak not of *Subjects*, but *Proprietors*, the *Bonum Creaturæ* is alſo *Creatoris*.

SECT. XIX.

The ſame doctrine in Rutherford de providentia *confuted.*

625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digreſſion of Dr. *Twiſſe* which is contrary to the commoneſt doctrine of Proteſtants; and I think foundeth not well in Chriſtians ears: The ſumm of which is this: [Neither God nor Devil do will ſin as it is evil; but God is the firſt *willer* of its exiſtence, becauſe it is in its own nature *ſumme & unice conducibile* to the manifeſtation of his Juſtice and mercy: And *willing* and Loving being all one in God, he thus ſingularly Loveth the exiſtence of ſin, above its contrary (holineſs) for this end: And by Predetermining premotion (which he much more largely writeth for elſewhere) he cauſeth as the firſt total Cauſe all that man Cauſeth; But it is ſin in man becauſe forbidden him, but not in God, becauſe not forbidden him; And therefore God is not to be ſaid to cauſe ſin (though he cauſe all that is cauſed) but to permit it, becauſe he cauſeth it not in himſelf; nor is he to be called a *Deficient cauſe* of *our omiſſions*, becauſe he is not bound to Actuate us; but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cauſe, becauſe he is under an obliging Law, Though God made that Law: And though he can no more than a ſtone act without phyſical predetermination, nor forbear acting when ſo acted, yet he is to be called free, becauſe he is actually *willing* (or his will doth act) and becauſe he is predetermined by none but God.] This is the true ſence of their opinion as opened by themſelves. I ſhall now briefly conſider what *Rutherford* ſaith to the ſame ſence.

626. *Cap.* 15. *pag.* 186. To *Annatus* charging *Twiſſe* as denying Gods permiſſion of ſin, becauſe he maketh him the **Cauſe* of the *Act*, the *Liberty* and the *Prohibition*, and to *Cauſe* is not to *Permit*; he hath no better anſwer than to ſay, that God *doth not permit the Act, nor the Evil of the Act*, but he *permitteth* the *evil act*: and 2. To ſay that the Dominicans and Jeſuits hold the ſame as he. Which is to *jeſt* with holy things, and not to argue. As if he ſaid, God made neither the *ſoul* nor the *body*, and yet he made the man. What! is it (as it's ſaid, that *non anima ſed unio eſt vita*) ſo Doth God *permit* the *Union* of *Actum* and *Malum*? No, that he pretendeth not.

627. To prove that God *willeth* the *exiſtence of ſin*, he bringeth the inſtance of *Joſeph*'s caſe, *Gen.* 45. To which I ſay that the text ſaith not at all that God willed the *Will* or *Act* or *Sin* of *Joſeph*'s brethren; but only the *Venditio paſſiva* or effect and the conſequents; Nay only the conſequents are mentioned in the Texts: His replyes to the anſwers prove no more than the five things which I before aſſerted about ſin. Nothing ſo much deceiveth them, as not diſtinguiſhing between the ſinful act, and the effect or paſſion, when they are called by the ſame name (as Selling, Killing, *&c.*)

628. His next inſtance is of Chriſts death, of which I ſaid enough before: But 1. He underſtandeth his adverſaries as aſcribing only the *Con-*

The ſumm of their opinion.

* *Nec omnino negari poteſt Voluntatem Dei eſſe Cauſam rerum omnium quas fieri velit.* Twiſſ. *recitante etiam* Rutherf. de Prov. c. 15. p. 186.

See all their Reaſons for Gods cauſing ſin, or willing its exiſtence anſwered by *Ruiz de Vol. Dei diſp.* 26. *p.* 262, 263, 264, 265.

As alſo againſt Gods predetermining to the immediate *materiale peccati*: *diſp.* 27. *p.* 270, *&c. diſp.* 28, & 29, & 30, *&c. uſque ad p.* 580.

As to the common ſaying that God willeth not ſin as ſin; all men will confeſs (Dr. *Twiſſ.* often) that neither doth a wicked man do ſo. *Peccans ut ſic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod eſt formale in peccato, ſeu carentiam conformitatis; ſed intendit actum ut eſt in genere moris, inquit* Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319.

I will not conceal a more difficult argument than moſt of theirs, which may occurr to others: God cauſed (*e.g.* in *Nathanael, Peter, &c.*) this act of faith before Chriſts coming; [*the Meſſiah is to come hereafter.*] When Chriſt was come, this was falſe, and ſo evil: God ſtill cauſed the faith which he gave them. Therefore he cauſed an untrue belief and evil, and that ſupernaturally. But I anſw. 1. God cauſed the habit of their faith, and the act. The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations: and in ſpecial A belief in the promiſed Meſſiah. The termination of the act on the Meſſiah as future rather than as Incarnate, required nothing poſitive in the Habit: The ſame Habit ſerved to both acts, unleſs the latter being for the nobler act had ſome addition; but the former needed none. 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumſtance, no more was neceſſary but 1. Gods word [*Chriſtus venturus eſt.*] 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cauſe it to act according to that habit: So that when God had reverſed that word [*Chriſtus venturus eſt*] he was no longer the cauſe determining the mind to believe that word; but only the cauſe that the habit of faith was ſtill towards Chriſt: But not at all *ſub ratione venturi*. For the determining word was called in, and it was an imperfection not to know ſo much, where it was not a ſin.

ſequents

ſequents of Crucifixion to Gods will; which is his miſtake: It is Crucifixion it ſelf *paſſivè ſumpta* which they aſcribe to it (ſome of them at leaſt.) And let men too wiſe againſt God deride it as much as they will, God can *will* and *Love* that Chriſt be Crucified, and yet hate and not will the *will* and *act* of the Crucifiers, but only foreſee it, as aforeſaid. And let them jeer God as Idle or aſleep, if he neither *will* nor effectually *nill* the ſin; we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty, which they ſo deride. 2. And whereas he addeth that *Active Verbs* are uſed as Gen. 45. *Miſit me Deus*, Iſa. 53. *Deus voluit eum conterere*, Zech. 13. *Ego percutiam Paſtorem*: and God delivered Chriſt to death: I anſwer, It is too too groſs to perſwade us hence that any of theſe Texts ſay that God *willeth* the ſinners *will* or *Act*. [*God ſent me*] ſpeaketh *Gods act*, that is, his diſpoſal of the effects and conſequents of them: But doth this ſignifie, [*God willed your malice or your act?*] *God did bruiſe Chriſt*; which ſignifieth that he was a concauſe of his death: but not that he *willed* or *Cauſed* the Jews to *will* or *act* his death. And ſo of the reſt.

629. The reſt of his inſtances are ſuch as I have anſwered before, or as the former anſwers fully invalidate; And therefore I will not weary my ſelf and the Reader with them.

630. *Cap.* 18. *p.* 230. he aſſerteth, that [*Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory*, and *that not per accidens* but *per ſe*. *Becauſe ſin by how much the worſe it is in genere mali inhoneſti, by ſo much the better and fitter means it is, in genere boni utilis & conducibilis* to Gods glory, *&c.*] All which I have before confuted: and think not his defence of it worth repeating.

631. Many aſſertions he hath *cap.* 18. which all depend on the falſe ſuppoſition that Sin is a *medium per ſe* of Gods glory, and the unproved ſuppoſition that God *poſitively willeth* the *Permiſſion* of it (which is nothing:) whence he inferreth that God *Intendeth* it in this and that *order*, and much other vanity. And ſtill they confound *ſin in eſſe reali* which is *no medium*, with *ſin in eſſe objectivo* which may be a part of holineſs, and *no ſin* at all.

632. *Cap.* 19. he argueth, *God uſeth men and devils in the very act of ſinning as his inſtruments*, viz. *to puniſh, to try, to humble*, &c. ergo, *he willeth the event that they ſin.*

Reſp. Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words [*inſtruments*] and [*uſeth.*] Properly an Inſtrument is an efficient cauſe moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue. And ſo a *ſinner* in and by the Act of ſinning is no Inſtrument of God. For God moveth him not to that Act as ſpecified or circumſtantiated ſo as is prohibited; And being not at all ſo *moved* by him (as *David* to murder *Urias*, and to vitiate his Wife) he is not properly thus his Inſtrument. But ſometimes the word *Inſtrument* ſignifieth a preſuppoſed Agent, whoſe Action another can improve to his own ends: As the *wind* and *water* are improperly called the Millers Inſtruments of turning his Mill; and the *ſpring* and *poiſe* are the Clock-makers Inſtruments of moving his Clock or Watch; and a Maſtiff Dog is my Inſtrument to keep away Thieves; and a Greyhound is my Inſtrument to kill a Hare, and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet, and a Hawke to catch a Partridge, *&c.* And yet we cauſe not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind, or Water (but we can hinder the Water,) nor the *niſus* of the ſpring, nor the gravitation of the poiſe (but ſet the recipients ſo as that the effect ſhall be done as we would have it:) nor cauſe we the fierceneſs of the Maſtiff, the inclination or motion of the greyhound, ferret, hawk, *&c.* but only tye them up and let them looſe as our ends re-

quire. But zeal maketh ſome men deride that God ſhould be ſaid to be no more the cauſe of ſinning; and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer, or at leaſt a will to uſe it, without *willing* and *cauſing* the thing which he forbiddeth.

2. And the word [*uſing*] ſignifieth, ſometime uſing by motion, as I do my pen; and ſometime by *ordination*, and *adjoyning ſome concauſe*, or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as *aforeſaid*; as we uſe *wind, water, dogs, hawks*: Thus only ſinners by ſinning are Gods *uſed inſtruments*: ſuppoſing his natural concurſe and ſupport.

And they are not his *Inſtruments* thus neither in the ſame ſence as theſe creatures are ours: For their *fierceneſs, craft, inclination, action*, is *good*, and we do and may *will* it for our ends: But ſin is not good; And therefore God willeth not it at all, but only the conſequent of it, or effect: And that *Effect* is not *Good*, as it is the effect of ſin, but as God ſetteth in, and cauſeth the ſame effect which a ſinner cauſeth (as in generation *per concubitum illicitum.*) But when God *willeth* and *cauſeth* the effect, and foreſeeth and permitteth the ſinful Volition and act, which concurreth to that effect, ſuch a *ſin* is improperly called his *uſed inſtrument* or *medium*, but properly is none.

633. To *Gibieuf* and others ſaying that God acteth not by ſin as an inſtrument, and willeth it not, but the effects; he anſwereth that It's abſurd, becauſe the ſin it ſelf is *caſtigatory*, and hath ſuch like effects; and therefore God need not will that effect as after it. But all this is from the fore-noted confuſion: It is not only the diſtant effect, but the very *immediate effect*, which is the Act it ſelf *ut recipitur in paſſo*, which God ſometime is ſaid *to will*. As he willed that *Jobs* Cattle were taken away, and that Chriſt were killed, and that *Malchus* eare be cut off, and that *Paul* be ſcourged, and ſmitten on the mouth, and that the Apoſtles were oft impriſoned, *&c.* And yet God only foreſeeth but willeth not that *will and act* of the agent, which he forbiddeth.

634. And here note, that when the name of the Effect or Paſſion connoteth the ſinfulneſs of the Act, then it is leſs meet to ſay that God willeth it: As to ſay that he willeth that *we be perſecuted, murdered, ſlandered, belyed*, &c. But if any will ſo ſpeak, they muſt mean only the Paſſion, as diſtinct from the action: And then the difference is but *in modo loquendi*.

635. To thoſe that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of ſin, the effect being more to be aſcribed to the Principal Cauſe than to the inſtrument, he firſt ill-applyeth ſome frivolous diſtinctions, and inſtanceth thus: [*The hangman as the Judges inſtrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge*: Ergo, *the Judge much more, in revenge*: *Non ſequitur.*] Putting in *Revenge* which is but a *Cauſe*, as if it had been the *Effect*, which was in queſtion.

And thus [*The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable*: ergo, *nor the ſtriker*: *Non ſequitur.*] As if the queſtion had been of the *Negation* of an *effect*, and not of the poſition of it.

And thus [If *two ſervants role a ſtone, one being commanded and one forbidden, one being father to the other*; *The Son* (*forbidden*) *roleth it unlawfully*: ergo, *the father* (*commanded*) *much more*: *non ſequitur.*] *Reſp.* 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the ſame act, becauſe the effect is the ſame, which is notoriouſly falſe: unleſs *de ſpecie*. 2. Whoſe Inſtrument do you ſuppoſe the *Son* to be? If the Fathers, it is becauſe the *Father commanded him* contrary to the Maſter; And if ſo, the argument is good: The Sons act was a fault who obeyed: *ergo*, the fathers

more

more who commanded him: saving that commanding maketh another no necessary Instrument, because he can disobey: But Gods premotion is supposed by you unavoidably to predetermine us.

636. But *pag.* 255. he giveth the true answer, that the consequence holdeth, not of a metaphorical improper Instrument, who hath *somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent, yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality, and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God, besides the nature of a pure instrument: such are sinners to God. Therefore it holds not, that the horse halteth:* ergo, *the rider halteth* (no nor causeth it.) Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove: and the very same that I say. The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all; but only as it is *Motion in genere:* so doth God by sinful acts: That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another, is not at all of God, but that they are Actions *in genere* is of God.

637. So *p.* 256. he well sayeth that the *fault of the pen* is not to be *ascribed to the writer, nor the effect as from that fault; nor of the Saw to the Sawyer*; And so of the *Sabeans* robbing *Job*: And he asserteth, *p.* 257. that *Diabolus & Impii homines sunt causæ principales in actu peccandi.* And what need we more? Remember then that sin is *an effect*, and hath *a Cause*, and to make man a *Principal Cause in actu peccandi* is not to deifie him: And he saith *p.* 256. that if God were the *moral impeller* as a *principal agent, he were the principal cause of sin.* But if you mean by *moral impulse*, only *commanding* it, let others judge whether *Physical premotion* be not much more than command: And whether I cause not my pen to write, though I command it not: And *quoad terminum*, to impel a man physically to *moral acts*, is moral impulse.

638. But the plausiblest argument is *Cap.* 20. *p.* 261. viz. *God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin:* * ergo *he willeth that the sin come to pass or be.* And indeed *Augustine* saith much *contr. Julian.* to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin. But I answer this, 1. Even these men themselves oft say that *God willeth not the formale peccati*, but the *materiale:* And *forma dat nomen: ergo* he *willeth* not *sin* as a punishment, in proper sence.

2. Sin it self (though denyed by many *Arminians*) is verily a *Punishment*, and more to the Sinner himself than to any other. † And it is the most *difficult* part of the question, how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself; which yet I have plainly opened before, and here repeat it. To be *sin* or *disobedience* and *to be Punishment* are no absolute entities, but are two *Relations* of one and the same Act; but not as referred to one and the same correlate. God is not at all the Cause of the *Act* which is *sinful*, in its forbidden mode and circumstances (as *Claudicatio equi* before said) but only in *genere actus*, or *hujus actus* when two sins are compared: But that the Act when done is *sin* and is *punishment*, God is the Cause of both: That is, he maketh *mans nature first*, and in *that and by revelation*, his *Law*: by which he *first maketh mans duty*, and telleth him what shall *be sin if he do it*: And next he doth by his threatning tell him, that this *sin it self* shall be the *sinners own misery* if he do it: As if (as aforesaid) God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him *ex natura rei*: And then commandeth him to avoid it; And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it. Here now God maketh the *Man* and the *Law*: God maketh not the Act *of sin* as modified or oblique, or as that circumstantiated act. But when the act is caused by Man, God by his Law causeth two Relations to *result*, first

* Vid. *Aurtol. in* 2. *d.* 37. *p.* 300, 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin, without God's willing the sin: But if we make it sin, he will make it be a punishment.

† *Gab. Biel in* 2. *d.* 36. concludeth, 1. *Omne peccatum est pœna.* 2. *Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius pœna* (viz. *non prima.*) 3. *Omne peccatum posterius pœna est prioris, & causa (nisi ultimum fuerit) posterioris.* And *Bonavent.* there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth *pœnam damni & sensus.* And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment, the *formale peccati* being first, and the *formale pœnæ* next in the same act: And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former, as being an effect of it; For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end, there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin. *Bitl. ib.* In a word, God antecedently so formed nature, that if we will sin, that sin shall be our misery, and as a voluntary self-wounding, cause our pain, and let out our blood and life.

firſt that of *ſin*, and then that of *puniſhment*. So that man firſt cauſeth the ſinful act, and then that it is *quid prohibitum*, and *quid pœnale* reſult from *Gods Will* and *Law* made before.

Now if God cauſe not that ſin which is a puniſhment to *our ſelves*, he cauſeth not that which is a *puniſhment to others*; And yet *ſuppoſing it*, he maketh it a puniſhment to us and them, on ſeveral accounts.

639. But though God cauſe not the ſin, yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and ſpirit *if we ſin*, without which grace and ſpirit we *will* ſin, If God now for former ſin do deny us, or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it, he is *morally* and *improperly* ſaid to cauſe that ſin as a *puniſhment*, becauſe that penally he refuſeth or forbeareth to ſave us from it, and ſo *permitteth* it (as is ſaid.)

640. The *Arminians* groſly erre, if he cite them juſtly, *Remonſt. in Script. Synod. art.* 1. *p.* 202. ſaying that *God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obſtinate and rebellious to ſin by his penal judgement, and yet thoſe ſins are not be reckoned to them for ſins, nor increaſe their guilt*: unleſs the word [*ſin*] be uſed equivocally: For to have *ſin* and *no ſin*, are contraries. Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to thoſe acts which would be ſin in others, as he doth Bruits, I leave to others.

Q. Whether things be good becauſe God willeth them? or he will them becauſe they are good?

641. I am weary of purſuing this ungrateful diſpute. As to his controverſie againſt *Camero cap.* 22. Whether *God will Juſtice and holineſs becauſe it is good, or whether it be good becauſe God willeth it?* It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious diſputes about that which one eaſie diſtinction putteth paſt all controverſie. Of things *ad extra Gods will* is *firſt* the *efficient*, and then the *ultimate end*, as is oft ſaid: *Gods will* as *efficient* giveth *firſt* the *Being* and then the *Order* to all things: or elſe they could never be what they are. All created Juſtice and Holineſs is ſuch, that is, *Good* (for *Goodneſs* is their *eſſence*) becauſe *Gods efficient will* made them ſo: And then Gods *final will* taketh *complacency* in them or *Loveth* them becauſe they *are* ſo. But if they talk of *Goodneſs* or *Juſtice*, &c. as it is *in God*, there is in him *no effect* and ſo no cauſe of *himſelf* or any thing in himſelf.

642. But ſome things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation, and Ordination of the World, without any other Law: And theſe are called Duties by the Law of Nature, becauſe the very *Natura rerum* is a Law, that is, a ſignification of Gods will conſtituting mans duty. It is mans eſſence to be an Intellectual-free-agent; It is impoſſible that ſuch an agent Created of God ſhould not be Gods Creature, and Gods own, and diſpoſitively a Moral governable agent, and that he ſhould not owe God all that he is and hath and can do, and that God ſhould not have the *Jus Dominii & Imperii* over him, and *Jus ad ſummum ejus Amorem**. It is a contradiction to be a *Created Man*, and not *Gods Own*, and his obliged *Subject* and *Beneficiary*. Therefore it is a contradiction that ſubmiſſion, obedience and Love ſhould not be his *Moral duty* and *good*, and that ſelf-alienation, rebellion, or diſobedience and hatred ſhould be no ſins.

643. To diſpute then (as he doth with *Camero* and his followers) Whether it be good *ex natura rei*, or by Gods meer free-will? is a ſtrange diſpute, and of moſt eaſie reſolution. Either they ſpeak of Gods *creating will*, or of ſome other *ſubſequent Volition*. Man is made man by Gods free *creating will*: And the foreſaid Relations, and duties are *made ſuch* by making *him Man*. And the duties of Love and Juſtice to others are made ſuch by his Creators placing him in a world where his

* *Deus non poſſet obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur ſibi non obedire: Quæro enim an tenetur obedire, an non? ſi ſic, habetur propoſitum: quia tenetur & non tenetur, quod eſt impoſſibile*—— *Conſequentia patet, Quia teneri non obedire, eſt teneri ad aliquid.* Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T.
Yet after he thinketh it poſſible for God to have made a Reaſonable creature not obliged; As if his very nature were not obligatory: His inſtance of the Mad is vain; for they are not actually Reaſonable.
Ockam preſumptuouſly concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious, it being no contradiction: His follower *Greg. Arim.* confuteth him; And *Cameracenſis* invalidateth the confutation, and leaveth it doubtful. But it is a contradiction to be a man, and not obliged by Nature to Love God; And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him, and yet *ſtante natura* bound to hate him: And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy.

his Neighbours are about him, who are due objects; as a part of the ſociety, like a Wheel in a Clock: The *Creators will* is before *Nature*, and therefore before *natural duty*, as the *Cauſe* before the *effect*. God could have made *beaſts* inſtead of men, who had owed him no more than beaſts can do. But from the *Nature* of a Man coexiſtent with God, his ſaid duties to God ſo neceſſarily reſult, that it *could not* be otherwiſe; nor did there need any ſubſequent act of Gods will to make that duty.

This he himſelf confeſſeth *pag.* 329, 330.

644. But thoſe that are not Duties by Nature, muſt have moreover a further act of Gods will as ſignified to make them ſo; As the Moſaical Ceremonies, our Sacraments, *&c.*

Vid. *Durand.* 1. *d.* 38. *q.* 4. *n.* 9, 10, 11. *Scot.* 3. *d.* 37. *q.* 1. *Gabr.* 3. *d.* 37. *a.* 2. *Suarez de Legib. l.* 2. *c.* 15. *Aquin.* 1, 2. *q.* 94. *a.* 5. *& q.* 100. *a.* 4.

645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable, towards one another, becauſe the very *Nature* and *Natural Location* or *Order* of the Things from which they did reſult, are mutable; And a word of God can make a change: when yet before ſuch antecedent mutation, the duty muſt be duty ſtill.

646. As to Mr. *Rutherfords* oft ſaying that *Omnis actus entitativus ſimplex eſt moraliter de ſe indifferens, neque bonus neque malus*; And then that *per actum ſimplicem* he meaneth ſuch as include not the *object*, It is ludicrous or vain talk. There *is* no ſuch Act as hath not an object, any more than phyſical *form* without *matter*. *Quicunque movet, aliquid movet; Quicunque intelligit, aut vult, aliquid intelligit aut vult, (vel ſeipſum vel aliud.)* An *Act* without its *object* is but a partial or *inadequate Generical conceptus* of that Act which hath an object; or an abſtract partial notion of an act. Why then doth he talk of that which is not? Had he ſaid that every act is in the firſt inſtant *rationis*, or *abſtract-partial conception*, an *Act in genere*, before it be intelligible as this or that act, about this or that object, he had ſpoken intelligibly as other men do.

Whether Juſtice *&c.* be eternally good or have *rationem boni æternam?*

647. Such another queſtion many called Arminians much uſe, Whether Juſtice *&c.* be eternally good? Or *An dentur rationes boni & mali æternæ & indiſpenſabiles?* which needs no other ſolution than this laſt: There is no ſuch thing as an *Univerſal, exiſtent per ſe* and not in ſome *Individual*: And ſo no ſuch thing as Love, Juſtice, *&c. Bonum, Malum*, which is not *alicujus Juſtitia, Bonum, &c.* There was no Creature from Eternity being Juſt or unjuſt, good or bad. But *Gods* perfect Nature might be *called Eternally Juſt*, in that he *muſt neceſſarily* be *Juſt*, if he had been a governour: And *neceſſarily was Juſt*, when he *freely* became a governour. And alſo this propoſition was Eternally true, (if there were eternally propoſitions) [*Si Homines exiſterent, Juſtitia in ipſis debita foret: & quandocunque Homines fuerint, Juſtitia in ipſis debita fuerit.*] But when all the ſenſe of theſe queſtions is no more, but what Duties are *natural*, and what *ſuperadded* (called *Poſitive*,) and what natural duties are *immutable* and what *mutable*, it's an unhappineſs that the world muſt be troubled with ſuch uncouth forms of ſpeech as make the queſtion unintelligible, till unravelled.

But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue (truth, juſtice, *&c.*) which therefore analogically have the ſame name (our holineſs being Gods Image) I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reaſon: Becauſe elſe we have no certainty that Gods word is true: For all our certainty is hence, that God cannot lye. But if Veracity be not in God, we cannot prove that. And if he have not that which is eminenter *Juſtice, mercy, &c.* how can we prove that he hath Veracity?

648. As to *Rutherfords* charge of *Camero* and his followers in *France*, *Amyraldus*, *&c.* with Semipelagianiſm and Arminianiſm and filthy opinions, it is but the effect of the good mans overweening, and conceitedneſs of his own apprehenſions, which muſt be allowed or endured in moſt of theſe contenders; And the fruits of ſuch diſputes is like to be little better. But the worthy praiſes of *Blondel, Dallæus, Placeus, Capellus, Amyraldus, Teſtardus, &c.* ſhall ſurvive ſuch reproach. And a thouſand pitties it is, to read a good man Voluminouſly proving God to be a *willer of ſins exiſtence*, and a prime-predetermining Cauſe of all prohibited Volitions and acts, and reproaching the Jeſuits, Lutherans, Arminians and Socinians

as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this; As if he would tempt the World to think that *Socinians* were in the right, and that *Jesuites*, *Lutherans* and *Arminians* were the only defenders of the Holiness of God, whilst *Calviniſts* made him the Lover of all the ſin in the World, as the moſt appetible conducible Medium to his Glory.

649. But (to proceed) his next Argument is, cap. 23. *Sin conferreth ſomething to the ſplendor, ornament, and plenitude of the Univerſe*: Ergo, *God willeth its exiſtence*: This is anſwered before. The antecedent is utterly unproved. Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World. His word is no proof.

See *Bonavent.* well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. *Malum fieri nullatenus bonum eſſe, ſed bene occaſio boni.*

650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments againſt that which he calleth reproachingly, *The Idle Permiſſion of ſin*; and ſaith, that it *fruſtrateth the prayers of the Saints, and their patience, their gratitude, truſt, hope, fear, joy, alloweth the arrogance of the perſecutor, fighteth with Gods Wiſdom, Clemency, Juſtice, Providence, with the Miniſtry of the Word, the Promiſes, Threatnings, with Miniſters confirming men againſt ſufferings, and it is blaſphemouſly injurious to God, and contrary to the order of things in the world, that he ſhould permit ſin, and not will the being of it.*

Reſp. What is it that a man, yea, a pious man in a blind zeal of God and ſelf-conceit, may not pour out confident words for? What a caſe is the poor Church in, when the unlearned people muſt be on both ſides charged by their Teachers with blaſphemy, what way ever they go? This man will tell them that they are **blaſphemous*, and overthrow all reaſon and Religion, if they ſay that God *only Permitteth ſin*, and doth not himſelf *will* the *being of it*, and *move unavoidably* all wills, and tongues, and hands, to all the blaſphemies, perſecutions, and murders that are done, and damn men for it when he hath done. And others will as confidently ſay that *he is a Blaſphemer*, for charging God to be much more the cauſe of all forbidden acts of wickedneſs than Devils and men are, and then damning them for it, and for putting God into the ſhape of the Devil, and painting him odious to humane nature, that man may not love him: What ſhall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides? But all his arguments are before anſwered, when I ſhewed him how many wayes God hath to ſecure the *Effects* and *Events* in the world, and attain all his Ends, and yet only *Permit*, and neither *Will*, nor *Love*, nor *Cauſe* the ſin.

* Pag. 370.

651. *Cap.* 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination; and ſaith p. 385. *God predetermineth us (to the Act of hating God) in linea meræ phyſica, & non morali.* Meer deluſory words. He maketh it by the Law of Nature a ſin to *hate him*, and then he maketh *men hate him in linea phyſica & non morali!* as if the moral ſinfulneſs reſulted not from the Law and act; that is, here from Nature it ſelf, *viz.* of the Man and act, both which God made.

652. *Pag.* 386. he ſaith, that [*Directa & expreſſa & efficax Dei Voluntio, qua Vult ut ſit ſeu fiat actus Dei odii, non facit Deum Malitia quæ per accidens ſequitur actum, authorem.*] *Reſp.* But that *per accidens* is no reaſon of the denyal, if God cauſe that accident alſo, as the firſt cauſe. If he make a Law, and make the forbidden act, the relation of *ſinfulneſs* is an Accident indeed, but ariſeth from the ſaid *fundamentum* ſo neceſſarily that it cannot be otherwiſe. But it ſhould have made a holy Divine to tremble to have ſaid, that God *directly, expreſly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God, viz.* that it *exiſt* or *be.*

I confeſs *Gab. Biel in* 2. d. 37. ſpeaketh too like theſe ſeveral atheological aſſertions: as do many others.

653. And

653. And it is falſe that he ſaith, that *God is equally the Cauſe that men hate him, if he will the Act hypothetically, ineffectually and determinably by anothers will, as if he willed it efficaciouſly.* And ſo when he maketh the Doctrine of Univerſal Concurſe and Cauſation, as guilty as his predetermining pre-motion. As if God could not make man a *free-willer* and agent, and as the ſpring of Nature, enable him and concurr to his Act as an Act, *in genere*, without cauſing it to terminate on the forbidden object *in ſpecie*. As if it were impoſſible for the Sun to be an *univerſal cauſe* of the ſtinking of a Dunghill and Weed, without being the *ſpecial*: or as if God muſt be made the cauſe of every blaſphemy, unleſs he will make the blaſphemer ſpeechleſs, and of every villany, unleſs he will ſtrike men dead to prevent it. This is not reverent and holy judging of the moſt holy God the Judge of all.

654. The ſumm of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all ſin (*pag.* 387. *& paſſim*) is but this one reaſon, *God is under no Law.* But if this be all, why do you not ſpeak out what you mean, but hold that which you dare not name, *viz.* [*That God is the chief inſuperable cauſe of all the ſin of Devils and men for which he damneth them, and that both as to the matter and form; but yet thus to do is no ſin in God himſelf, becauſe he is under no Law.*] This is your moſt plain undoubted ſenſe, or elſe your Book is non-ſenſe; What need we then any further enquiry what you hold? It is deluſion to pretend that you are accuſed for *making God a ſinner.* We charge no ſuch thing on you: But only for making him the *chief inſuperable cauſe of all the ſins of men and Devils.*

655. *Pag.* 400. he plainly profeſſeth that the *will* as a *phyſical agent is the cauſe of the act as phyſical, and as under a Law, and that act is againſt the Law, ſo he is the cauſe of the Malitia actûs*, and *culpable.* So that God *cauſing* by his own confeſſion both *Act and Law*, there is no modeſt ſubterfuge left for his not openly profeſſing that he aſſerteth God to be the cauſe of all ſin, the principal cauſe, both as to matter and form.

656. The reſt of that Diſputation ſtriketh me with ſuch horror in the reading, that I confeſs I have not the patience to proceed any further in it, nor ſhall further thus exerciſe my Readers patience. The caſe is plain. Either *Hobbs*, or *Free-will permitted*, muſt carry the cauſe in the caſe of ſin: There is no middle way. He that will read *Ruiz* and *Rutherfords* anſwer impartially, needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain reſponſes.

657. But *cap.* 29. *p.* 484. he falleth alſo on our moſt Learned and Judicious Dr. *Field*, becauſe in his *lib.* 3. *c.* 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion; and it muſt move juſt indignation in the Reader that he addeth [*idque probare conatur contra reformatas Eccleſias.*] Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches, more than to the worthy Dr. *Field*! How falſly are they intereſſed in your unhappy cauſe! See the Synod of *Dort*, where there is not a word for it. Is one *Twiſs* with his *Rutherford*, or *Maccovius*, or a few ſuch, the Reformed Churches? Let the Reader peruſe the Articles of the Churches of *England*, *Scotland*, *France*, and all the reſt, and ſee where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto ſin. Even *Janſenius* himſelf is againſt it among the Papiſts, when his *Dominican* Predeceſſors are the Fathers of it. Nothing more common with *Engliſh* Divines than (as you did before your ſelf) to explicate Gods cauſing the acts of ſinners, by the ſimilitude of the Riders ſpurring a halting Horſe, or the Suns making a Dunghill ſtink; which only ſpeak the cauſe which we call univerſal, and is the very thing which we aſſert.

So *Bannes in* 1. *q.* 23. *a.* 3. *p.* 270, 271. *Voluntas hominis mala eſt quia extorquet actum odii Dei ſine regula rationis, immo contra legem Dei; Deus autem bona voluntate vult fieri illum actum, permittens defectum Cauſæ ſecundæ in ipſo, ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat:* which is true of the act *in genere*, but not as it is *Odium Dei.* For ſo if he will it and cauſe it, he doth more than permit: and the *defectus Cauſæ ſecundæ* is that very *odium* as againſt God. And doth God cauſe the greateſt ſin that he may do good by it? He can do as much good without cauſing the evil.

And it is most unsavourily done, to get into the Chair and magisterially say [*Fieldus vir alioqui doctus, in his controversiis minime se versatum esse prodit*——*& Zumelem* * *non satis intelligit, quippe non satis gnarus controversiarum Arminianarum, & scripsit dum aulam Arminianis plus æquo faventem haberent.*†] But how easie is it for a man to overvalue himself, and contemn another? I highly value the piety in Mr. *Rutherfords* Letters. I am no fit *arbiter ingeniorum*: But when I hear other men say that one *Field* was more Judicious than many *Rutherfords*, I confess by reading their several writings I find no temptation to deny it. And why should *Field* and consequently *Davenant*, *Usher*, *Carlton*, *Morton*, *Hall*, the Synod of *Dort*, and I think the far greatest part of Protestants (I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one) who are against you, be made odious by the supposition of being not far enough from *Arminians*, rather than *Maccovius*, *Twisse* and *Rutherford* take it for a disgrace, to hold the same opinions against Gods Holiness, which the *Dominican* Fryars hold, who have been the bloody Masters of the Inquisition, and murdered so many thousand Protestants or *Waldenses* and *Albigenses*?

And that which he saith of *Fields* writing when the Court favoured *Arminianism*, is notoriously false, and such insinuations unworthy of so good a man as the speaker. *Fields* Works were printed singly before they were printed together in *Folio*. And his fifth Book was printed *Anno* 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before. And the Synod of *Dort* was called *An.* 1618. and sate 1619. also; And King *James* was a zealous suppressor of *Arminianism*, and sent five or six Divines thither to that end. And long after in King *Charles* his dayes, Mr. *Heylin* in the life of Archbishop *Laud* will tell you, that the *Arminian* Bishops then were but five, *Neale*, *Laud*, *Buckeridge*, *Corbet* and *Howson*, to whom Learned *Montague* was after added: So that they durst not trust their Cause with a Convocation. *Field* then shall be a most Judicious worthy Divine, when partiality hath said its worst.

658. And what is his error? Why he saith that *it's a contradiction to say that God causeth the Act* (in all its state,) which is the *Materiale peccati*, and causeth not the *formale*, *which is inseparable*. A foul error indeed, to tell you that he that causeth the *subjectum*, *fundamentum*, *rationem fundandi & terminum* causeth the *relation*; and that he that maketh an *European* white and an *African* black causeth the dissimilitude, and so doth he that maketh the straight Rule and the crooked line, the forbidding Law, and the forbidden act.

659. Were it not that the necessity requireth such work, because such Books are in mens hands, I should think I had injured the Reader, by this much: For my work is not to confute Books, but to assert sure reconciling truths. Otherwise the confutation of the rest of that Book (for Gods *willing and causing all forbidden acts in their full state*, and the existence *of sin*) is most easily answered.

* *Zumel in Disp.* 1. *Thom. de Voluntat. hom. & lib. arb.* pag. 219,220. *Quod Deus non sit causa peccati*, though he speak cautelously and as in other mens names, yet concludeth plainly, that God is but the *Causa universalis* of sin, and that man is the specifying determining cause, even *quæ universalem determinat ad speciem concursus & actus ipsius, sive solum determinet eam formaliter ad speciem*, &c. Yet this is a high *Thomist* and defender of absolute grace.

† Thus magisterially did good Dr. *Twisse* censure *Junius* and *Vossius* (his Son-in-law) as men unskilled in Scholastick Divinity, who were both most excellent men, and hit upon the reconciling truth, above most in their age. *Junius* his Discourse of predetermination is one of the first that ever I found that excellency in, and with his *Irenicon* is most worthy of great esteem.

SECT. XX.

The old Reconciling Doctrine of Auguſtine, Proſper *and* Fulgentius. *And firſt* Proſper ad Gallorum Qu.

660. IT is a ſtrange thing to me that when *Pelagius*, *Julian*, *Fauſtus*, *&c.* thought *Auguſtine* a *Noveliſt*, and (as *Uſher* aſſerteth) would have faſtned the title of Predeſtination-Hereticks on his followers, and almoſt all confeſs, that *Auguſtine* was, if not the firſt, yet the moſt notable publick Vindicator of abſolute Predeſtination and Grace, yet the Judgement of *Auſtin*, with his Diſciples *Proſper* and *Fulgentius*, doth not ſerve turn to quiet, if not to end theſe controverſies, among thoſe who profeſs to be their followers! when as they have ſo copiouſly and plainly written upon the caſe!

661. I intreat the Reader that is inclining to any extreams, but to read over firſt thoſe ſhort anſwers of *Proſper ad Capitula Gallorum* and *ad Objectiones Vincent.* And moſt of the *Sententiæ de Capit.* I ſhall think it worthy my labour to recite, to force them on the Readers obſervation, and let him ſee the higheſt old Doctrine of Gods Decrees.

"*Sent.* 1. Whoever ſaith, that by Gods Predeſtination, as by fatal neceſſity, men compelled into ſins, are conſtrained to death, is not a Catho-
"lick. For Gods Predeſtination doth by no means make men bad, nor is
"the cauſe of any mans ſin.

"*Sent. ſup.* 2. He that ſaith, that the Grace of Baptiſm received doth
"not take away Original ſin from them that are not predeſtinated to life,
"is not a Catholick. For the Sacrament of Baptiſm, by which all ſins
"are blotted out, is true even in them who will not remain in the truth,
"and for them that are not predeſtinated unto life.

He meaneth that thoſe that ſincerely covenanted with God in Baptiſm, were truly pardoned, though he thought ſome of them fell away and periſhed.

"*Sent. ſup.* 3. He that ſaith, that they that are not predeſtinated to
"life, though they were in Chriſt regenerated by Baptiſm, and have
"lived piouſly and juſtly, it profiteth them nothing, but they are ſo
"long reſerved till they fall to ruine, and they are not taken out of this
"life till this happen to them, as if the ruine of ſuch men were to be
"referred to Gods conſtitution, is not a Catholick. For God doth not
"therefore prolong the time of any mans age, that by long living he
"ſhould fall to ruine, and in his long living, fall from the right faith:
"ſeeing long life is to be numbered with the gifts of God, by which a man
"ſhould be better and not worſe.

Sent. ſup. 4. He that ſaith, that all are not called to Grace, if he
"ſpeak of ſuch as Chriſt is not declared to, is not to be reprehend-
"ed———.

"*Sent. ſup.* 5. He that ſaith, that they that are called, are not equal-
"ly called, but ſome that they might believe, and ſome that they might
"not believe, as if to any man the Vocation were the cauſe of his not
"believing, ſaith not right. For though *faith* be not but by *Gods Gift*,
"and *Mans Will*, yet *Infidelity* is by mans will alone.

"*Sent.* 6. He that ſaith, that *Free-will* in Man is Nothing, but it's
"Gods predeſtination which worketh in men, whether it be to good or to
"evil, is not a Catholick: For Gods Grace doth not abeliſh mans choice
"(or free-will) but perfecteth it, and revoketh and reduceth it into the
"way from error, that that which was bad by its own liberty, may by
"the operation of Gods Spirit be made right. And Gods predeſtination
"is alwayes in Good, which knoweth how either to pardon with the

"praiſe of mercy, or puniſh with the praiſe of Juſtice, the ſin which is "committed by mans will alone.

"*Sent.* 7. He that ſaith, that God for this cauſe giveth not Perſeve- "rance to ſome of his Children whom he regenerated in Chriſt, to "whom he gave faith, hope and Love, becauſe by Gods fore-knowledge "and predeſtination they were not differenced from the maſs of perdi- "tion: If he mean that God endowed theſe men in Goodneſs, but would "not have them remain in it, and that he was the cauſe of their turning "away, he judgeth contrary to the Juſtice of God. For though Gods "Omnipotence could have given the grace of ſtanding to them that will "fall, yet his grace doth not firſt forſake them, before they have for- "ſaken it. And becauſe he foreſaw that they would do this by a Vo- "luntary deſertion, therefore he had them not in the Election of Pre- "deſtination.

"*Sent.* 8. He that ſaith, that God would not have all men ſaved, but "a certain number that are predeſtinate, ſpeaketh hardlier of the alti- "tude of Gods unſearchable grace, than he ſhould ſpeak; Who would "have all men to be ſaved, and to come to the acknowledgement of "the truth; and fulfilleth the purpoſe of his will on them, whom being "foreknown he predeſtinated, and being predeſtinate he called, being cal- "led he juſtified, and being juſtified he glorified. Loſing nothing of "the fulneſs of the Gentiles, and of all the ſeed of *Iſrael*, for whom "the eternal Kingdom was prepared in Chriſt before the foundation of "the World. For all the World, is choſen out of all the World; And "out of all men, all men are adopted——So that they that are "ſaved are therefore ſaved, becauſe God would have them ſaved: and "they that periſh, do periſh becauſe they deſerve to periſh.

"*Sent.* 9. He that ſaith, that our Saviour was not Crucified for the "Redemption of the whole World, looketh not to the Virtue of the Sa- "crament (that is, Sacrifice) but to the part (or participation) of the "unbelievers: When as the blood of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, is the Price "of the whole World. From which Price they are Aliens who being ei- "ther delighted in their Captivity, will not be redeemed; or when they "are redeemed return again to the ſame Captivity: For the Word of "the Lord falleth not, nor is the redemption of the World evacuated: "For though the World in the veſſels of wrath knew not God, yet the "World in the veſſels of mercy knew him. Which God without their "preceding Merits, took out of the power of darkneſs, and tranſlated into "the Kingdom of the Son of his Love.

"*Sent.* 10. He that ſaith, that God ſubſtracteth from ſome the preach- "ing of the Goſpel, leſt perceiving the preaching of the Goſpel they "ſhould be ſaved, may decline the envy of the objection by the patro- "nage of our Saviour himſelf, who would not work Miracles with ſome, "that he ſaith would have believed had they ſeen them: And he forbad "his Apoſtles to preach to ſome people; and now ſuffereth ſome Nations "to live without his Grace——

"*Sent.* 11. He that ſaith, that God by his Power compelleth men to "ſin, is deſervedly reprehended: For God, who is the Author of Juſtice "and Goodneſs, and all whoſe Statutes and Commands are againſt ſin, is "not to be thought to compell any to ſin, and precipitate them from "innocency into crimes: But if there be any of ſo profound impiety, as "that they are reckoned to be beyond the remedy of correction, they re- "ceive not an increaſe of their iniquity from God, but are made worſe "by themſelves: becauſe they deſerved to be left of God, and given up to

"them-

" themselves and to deceivers, for their former sins: that so their sin should " be a punishment of their sin.

" *Sent.* 12. He that saith, that obedience is withdrawn from some that " are called and live piously and righteously, that they may cease to " obey, doth think ill of Gods Goodness and Justice, as seeming to con- " strain the godly to ungodliness, and to take away good mens innocency " from them; When as He is the Giver and Keeper of godliness and inno- " cency: He therefore that adhereth to God, is acted by the Spirit of God; " but he that departeth from God, doth fall from his obedience (or cease it) " by his own will.

" *Sent.* 13. He that saith, that some men are not made by God to this " end that they might obtain eternal life, but that they might be the " ornaments of their times, and for the good of others, would speak " better if he said, that God who is the Creator of all men, maketh not " them in vain, who he foreseeth will not be partakers of life eternal: " Because even in bad men, nature is Gods good work, and Justice in " their damnation is laudable. But he cannot well be blamed that saith, " that even by the condition of such the World is adorned *, and that those * But not by their sin it- " that hurt themselves by their own iniquity, are born for the good of others: self.
" For the multitude of the ungodly though innumerable is not disgraceful " (or a deformity) to the World, or unprofitable to the Kingdom of God, " seeing that by their propagation cometh the generation that is to be " regenerate; and by tolerating and loving them, Gods people become " the more illustrious. ——

" *Sent.* 14. He that saith, that they that believe not the preaching of " the Gospel, are unbelievers by Gods predestination, and that God so de- " creed, that they that believe not be unbelievers by his appointment (or " decree) is not a Catholick: For as Faith which worketh by Love is " Gods gift, so unbelief is none of Gods constitution: Because God know- " eth how to ordain Punishment for sin, but not sin it self. And it fol- " loweth not, that what he remitteth not, he committeth: The predestinate " therefore liveth by the faith which is given him: The non-predestinate pe- " rish by Voluntary and not constrained infidelity.

" *Sent.* 15. He that saith, that Foreknowledge is the same with pre- " destination, doubtless in our good works, conjoyneth (or mixeth) those " two: For what we have of Gods gift, and is said to be foreknown, must " needs be predestinate: And what is said to be predestinate, must needs " be foreknown. But in our evil works, only the foreknowledge " of God must be understood. Because as he foreknew and predestinated, " the things which he doth himself, and giveth us to do: so he FORE- " KNEW ONLY and DID NOT PREDESTINATE the things " which he neither doth himself, not requireth us to do.

SECT.

SECT. XXI.

Proſper's *anſwers* ad *Object.* Vincent.

662. I Will crave the Readers patience while I add the ſumm of his Anſwers alſo to ſome of the Objections of *Vincentius.*

"Obj. 1. *That Chriſt died not for all*———

"*Reſp.* His death is a remedy in it ſelf ſufficient to profit all; but if it be "not taken it will not heal.

"Obj. 2. *That God would not have all ſaved, though they would.*

"*Reſp.* We muſt ſincerely believe and profeſs that God would have all "ſaved:—— That many periſh, is by the merit of them that periſh: That "many are ſaved, is the gift of him that ſaved them. For that the guilty "are damned is Gods inculpable juſtice; that the guilty are juſtified is "Gods unſpeakable grace.

"Obj. 3. *That God made moſt of mankind that they might periſh for* "*ever.*

"*Reſp.* God is the Creator of all men; but No man is made by him "that he might periſh: For the cauſe of being born is one, and the cauſe "of periſhing is another. That men are born is Gods gift; that they "periſh, is the ſinners deſert: He maketh men, that they may be men——

"Obj. 4. *That the moſt of men are made of God, not to do Gods will, but* "*the Devils.*

"*Reſp.* It is madneſs, and againſt reaſon to ſay that it is by Gods will "that Gods will is not done: and that the damner of the Devil and his "ſervants would have the Devil ſerved.———

"Obj. 5. *That God is the author of our ſin, in that he maketh mens wills* "*evil, and maketh a ſubſtance which by natural motion cannot but ſin.*

"*Reſp.* This objection they make becauſe we hold original ſin and mi-"ſery——— But we hold that whatever is of Nature is of God, and none "of that which is contrary to Nature. But ſin is contrary to nature, "from whence cometh death, and all that is of death: ———God is "the author of no mans ſin, but the Creator of his Nature, which "voluntarily ſinned, when it had Power not to ſin; and by his own will "man ſubjected himſelf to the deceiver. And it is not by *Natural* but "by *Captive Motion* that he liveth in ſin, till he die to ſin, and live to "God; which without grace he cannot do.

"Obj. 6. *That God maketh in men ſuch a will as is in Devils, that of* "*its own motion can and will do nothing but evil.*

"*Reſp.* The whole world lyeth in wickedneſs——— But even very bad "men may be reconciled, and Devils cannot. ———And God put not "evil affections in men.

"Obj. 7. *That it is Gods will that a great part of Chriſtians neither will* "*nor can be ſaved.*

"*Reſp.* If you ſpeak of them who forſaking the Godlineſs of a Chri-"ſtian converſation and faith, do irrevocably paſs over into prophane er-"rours and damnable manners, it's doubtleſs that having ſuch a will, "they *will* not be ſaved; and as long as they *will* not be ſaved, they can-"not be ſaved. But it is by no means to be believed that ſuch men fell "into this deſperate caſe by the will of God, when rather God lifteth up "all that fall——— For no man is raiſed or eſtabliſhed but by his Grace. "It is therefore Gods will that they continue in a good will; And he for-"ſaketh

"ſaketh no man before that man forſake him, and converteth many that "do forſake him.

"Obj. 8. *That God will not have all Catholicks to perſevere in the "Catholick faith, but will have a great part of them to apoſtatize "from it.*

"*Reſp.* The ſame anſwer ſerveth to this blaſphemy as to the for-"mer.

"Obj. 9. *That God would have a great part of the Saints to fall from "the purpoſe of holineſs.* *

"*Reſp.* This madneſs alſo needeth no other anſwer.

"Obj. 10. *That Adulteries and corrupting conſecrate Virgins do come to "paſs becauſe God predeſtinated them to fall.*

"*Reſp.* It is a deteſtable and abominable opinion, which believeth "God to be the author of any mans evil will or evil action: whoſe pre-"deſtination (or decree) is never without Goodneſs and Juſtice †. For all "the wayes of God are mercy and truth: Adulteries and Corruptions of "Virgins God knoweth not how to inſtitute, but to damn; nor to di-"ſpoſe *, but to puniſh. Which evils when men commit, they ſerve their "own luſts——— Gods predeſtination neither exciteth, perſwadeth "or impelleth the fall, malignity, or luſts of ſinners; but plainly pre-"deſtinateth his own Judgement, by which he will reward every one ac-"cording to what he hath done, whether good or evil: which Judge-"ment would never be, if men ſinned by the will of God. But be it "will: And every man whom the diſcerning of Gods knowledge ſhall ſet "at his left hand, ſhall be damned, becauſe he executed not Gods will, "but his own.

"Obj. 11. *When inceſt is committed between Fathers and their Daugh-"ters, Mothers and their Sons, it is therefore done, becauſe ſo God fore-de-"creed that it ſhould be done (or come to paſs.)*

"*Reſp.* † If it were objected to the Devil himſelf, that he is the author "and incenter of ſuch villanies, I think that with ſome reaſon he might "diſcharge himſelf of the envy, and overcome the committer of ſuch "wickedneſs by his own willing of them. Becauſe though he be delight-"ed with the madneſs of ſinners, he can yet prove that he forced them "not to ſin. With what folly and madneſs then is that aſcribed to God, "which may not be wholly aſcribed to the Devil, who is but the ad-"jutor of the baits of ſin, and not the Cauſer (Generater) of "the Will? God then fore-decreed not that any ſuch buſineſſes ſhould "be done, nor prepared that ſoul to any ſuch end, who will live wick-"edly and filthily. But he was not ignorant that it would be ſuch, and "he fore-knew that he would juſtly judge of ſuch. So that to his fore-"decree nothing elſe can be referred, but either 1. That which belong-"eth to the due retribution of Juſtice, 2. Or to the *not due* beſtowing "of grace.

"Obj. 12. *That by Gods fore-decree men are made of Children "of God to be Children of the Devil; and of Temples of the Holy "Ghoſt, the Temples of Devils; and of members of Chriſt, members of a "Harlot.*

"*Reſp.* Gods Predeſtination, though to us while we are in the perils "of this life it be uncertain, with him is unchangeable——— But "thoſe of whom it is ſaid, *They went out from us becauſe they were not "of us*——— did willingly go out, and willingly fall away. And be-"cauſe they were foreknown to be ſuch as would fall away, they were "not

* The Reader muſt note that their common opinion then was that ſome true Saints do fall away and periſh.

† That is, [of nothing but good and juſt.]

* That is, *ut ſinat*

† Let the *Dominicans* note this.

"not predeſtinate. But they had been Predeſtinated, if they had been "ſuch as would have returned, and remained in holineſs and truth. So "that Gods fore-decree is to many a cauſe of ſtanding, and to none a cauſe "of falling.

"Obj. 13. *That all thoſe faithful and Saints who are fore-decreed* "*to eternal death, when they return to their vomit, ſeem indeed to do it* "*by their own vice: but the cauſe of that vice is the fore-decree of God,* "*which ſecretly withdraweth from them good wills.*

"*Reſp.*———Indeed to all that relapſe from faith to infidelity, from "Holineſs to filthineſs, and are not purged by emendation before the "end of their lives, nothing but eternal death is due: But it is wicked- "neſs to aſcribe the cauſe of ſuch ruines to God: who though he fore- "know by his eternal knowledge, what reward he will give to every "mans deſerts, yet this his Impoſſibility of being deceived, doth not "bring into any man either a *neceſſity* or a *will* * of ſinning. If there- "fore any man fall from Godlineſs, he is carryed headlong by his own "will; he is drawn by his own concupiſcence; he is deceived by his "own perſwaſion. There the Father doth nothing; the Son doth no- "thing; the Holy Ghoſt doth nothing: nor doth any thing of the will "of God intervene in ſuch a buſineſs; by whoſe help we know many "are kept from falling, but none impelled to fall.

* Note this you that are for his firſt predetermining all forbidden Volitions and Acts.

"Obj. 14. *That this great part of Chriſtian faithful Catholicks and* "*Saints who are fore-decreed to ruine and perdition, if they beg of God* "*perſeverance in Holineſs, ſhall not obtain it, Becauſe Gods decree can-* "*not be changed, by which he fore-ordained, prepared and fitted them* "*to fall away,*

"*Reſp.* To the breach of the Law, to the neglect of Religion, to the "corrupting of diſcipline, to the forſaking of the faith, to the perpetra- "ting of any ſin whatever, there is no predeſtination (or fore-decree) "of God at all. Nor can it be that men ſhould fall into ſuch evils by "him, by whom men riſe out of ſuch. If therefore men live in holi- "neſs, if they profit in virtue, if they remain in good ſtudies, it is the "manifeſt gift of God, without whom the fruit of no good work is ac- "quired. But if men fall away from theſe, and paſs over to vice and "ſin, God there ſendeth them no evil temptation, nor doth he forſake "him that will fall away, before he be forſaken by him. And for the "moſt part he keepeth men from forſaking him, or if they depart doth "cauſe them to return. But why he upholdeth one and not another, it is "neither poſſible to comprehend, † nor lawful to ſearch; ſeeing it may ſuf- "fice to know, both that it is of him that men ſtand, and it is not of him "that they fall away.

† *N. P.*

"Obj. 15. *That all the faithful and Saints who are predeſtinated to* "*eternal death; when they fall are ſo diſpoſed of by God, that they* "*neither can nor will be delivered by repentance.*

"*Reſp.* Falſly ſaid and fooliſhly: For they that fall away from faith "and holineſs, as they fell by their *wills*, ſo by their Wills they riſe "not:——— But God taketh the way of amendment from none; nor "depriveth any of the poſſibility of good: For he that turneth him- "ſelf from God, taketh from himſelf both the will and the power of "good. It's no good conſequence, as the Objecters think, that God "taketh away repentance from men, becauſe he giveth it them not; "and that he caſteth down thoſe that he taketh not up. For it is "one thing to act the innocent into a crime (which God cannot "do;)

"do ;) and another not to pardon the Criminal, which is the desert of "sin.

"Obj. 16. *That this great part of the faithful and holy, which is fore-*
"*decreed to eternal death, when they pray to God in the Lords prayer,*
"*Let thy will be done, do only pray against themselves,* viz. *that they may*
"*fall and be ruined; because it is the will of God that they perish by eter-*
"*nal death.*

"*Resp.* The Truth saith not this, that it is the will of God that the "faithful and Saints do fall from faith and innocency and perish. But "Truth saith, This is the will of the Father that sent me, that of all that "he hath given me I should lose none——But if by the generality "of Vocation, and the abundance of Gods goodness, even those that will "not persevere are mixt with the persevering, when these fall away from "Godliness, they fall not (or are not forsaken) of Gods help, but of "their own wills: nor are impelled to fall, nor cast off that they may "forsake; but yet are fore-known to fall away by Him that cannot be "deceived: And when they pray, Thy will be done, they pray not that "they may fall—— Which God will not do (or Cause) any way, "by any means: For this by their own naughtiness, their own liberty "will do: But this they pray against themselves, (which doubtless is "Gods will) that when the Son of man shall come in his Majesty, *&c.* "they that will not do Gods will, and yet pray, Let thy will be done, are "heard in that which is Gods will, that the imitaters of the Devil be judg-"ed with the Devil. For they that have despised Gods inviting will, shall "feel his revenging will.

SECT. XXII.

The words of Fulgentius *to the same sence.*

663. I Must crave of the Reader that he remember that my reciting the Judgement of these Fathers for the falling away and perishing of many that were in a state of Life, is not at all as declaring my own judgement, but Theirs; none then that I read of thinking otherwise *. I shall (for the End sake) be yet a little more tedious in citing some of the sayings of *Fulgentius*.

"*Fulg. l.* 1. *de Verit. prædest. cap.* 6. To good men God giveth what "good they have, and keepeth it: But to the wicked and ungodly, God "neither ever could prepare or give evil works, which they should "damnably serve: nor did he ever put into them evil wills by which "they should culpably will things unjust: but he prepared for them "the punishment of Hell, that they might feel revenging justice in "endless fire. An evil will is not of God: And therefore the just "Judge doth punish it in men, because the good Creator findeth not "in it the order of his Creation. And perseverance and contumacy "in sin and pride, because it is not of Gods giving, is condemned by God "revenging.

"*Et l.* 1. *ad Monim. c.* 26. He will punish in the wicked, that they "are bad, which he gave not, nor did he predestinate them to any ini-"quity: and that they willed unjustly was none of his gift. And be-"cause the persevering iniquity of an evil will, ought not to remain "unpunished,

* Except *Jovinian* be truly accused by *Hierom*, the brevity and obscurity of whose accusation and confutation, leaveth us very uncertain what it was that *Jovinian* held. But we are sure that the spirit of uncharitableness and contention (though in a good and learned man) had no small hand in the stigmatizing of him and *Vigilantius* as Hereticks.

"unpuniſhed, he predeſtinated ſuch to deſtruction, becauſe he prepared
"juſt puniſhment for them——— Obſerve that God predeſtinated
"wicked and ungodly men, to juſt puniſhment, not to any unjuſt work:
"to the penalty, not to the fault: to the puniſhment, not to the
"tranſgreſſion: to the deſtruction which the anger of a juſt judge
"requiteth ſinners with; not to that deſtruction (or death) by which
"the iniquity of ſinners provoketh Gods wrath againſt them. The
"Apoſtle calls them *Veſſels of wrath*, not *Veſſels of ſin*.

"*Cap.* 27. The wicked are not predeſtinated to the firſt death of the
"ſoul, but to the ſecond death they are: ———That which followeth
"the ſentence of a juſt Judge; not that which preceded in the evil concu-
"piſcence of the ſinner.

"*Ibid. c.* 23. It beſeemeth believers to confeſs that the good and juſt
"God, fore-knew indeed that men would ſin, (for all things to come
"are known to him. For they were not future, if they were not in his
"fore-knowledge:) But not that he predeſtinated any to ſin. For if he
"predeſtinated man to any ſin, he would not puniſh man for ſin. For
"Gods predeſtination prepareth for men, either the godly remiſſion of
"their ſins, or the juſt puniſhment of them. God therefore could never
"predeſtinate man to that, which he had reſolved both to forbid by his
"precept, and to waſh away by his mercy, and puniſh by his juſtice.
"God therefore predeſtinated to eternal puniſhment, the wicked whole
"foreknew would perſevere to the death in ſin. Wherein as his fore-
"knowledge of mans iniquity is not to be blamed, ſo his predeſtination
"of juſt revenge is to be praiſed: That we may acknowledge, that he
"predeſtinated not man to any ſin, whom he predeſtinated to be puniſhed
"deſervedly for ſin.

"And *ad Monimum li.* 1. *pag.* (*edit. Baſil.*) 68. reciting *Auguſtines*
"words he ſaith [He taught that only pride was the cauſe of mans ini-
"quity, and that God predeſtinated not men to ſin, but to damnation;
"and that they are not helped by God, the cauſe is in themſelves and
"not in God.] The ſame he reciteth again *ex lib.* 2. *Aug. de baptiſ.*
"*parvul.* [that their wills be not helpt by grace, the cauſe is in them-
"ſelves and not in God.] The ſame he again repeateth *pag.* 69. 70, 71,
"72. and [that *Auguſtine*'s mind was that good works God both fore-
"knew and predeſtinated:—— But evil works, that is, ſin, he foreknew
"indeed, but did not predeſtinate (or decree.) For there is not Gods
"work, but his judgement. Therefore in ſin Gods work is not, becauſe
"that ſin ſhould be done was not decreed by him: But therefore there is
"his judgement, becauſe it is not left unrevenged, that an evil man work-
"eth without God working.]

"And *ib. li.* 1. *pag.* 15. [That which is not in his work, never was
"in predeſtination. Therefore men are not predeſtinated to ſin.] So *p.* 29.
"And *p.* 31. and forward.

"And *p.* 29. [No man juſtly ſinneth though God juſtly permit him
"to ſin: For he is juſtly forſaken of God, who forſaketh God. And
"becauſe man forſaking God, ſinneth, God forſaking man keepeth ju-
"ſtice.]

664. I am loth to weary the Reader with more. Should I do the like by *Auguſtines* words it would be too wearisome. His judgement is the very ſame as theirs. I will only cite one paſſage out of him, about mans Power to believe.

Tract. 53. *in Johan.* having ſhewed that God only foreknoweth mens ſin, and foretelleth it (as the Jews) but cauſeth it not, he cometh to anſwer *John* 12. 39. They could not believe *&c.* If they could not how was it their ſin?—— ſaying, "[You hear the queſtion, brethren, and ſee "how deep it is: But we anſwer as we can.—— Why could they not "believe? If you ask me, I quickly anſwer, Becauſe they would not. "For God foreſaw their evil will, and foretold it by the Prophet——He "blinded their eyes, *&c.* And I anſwer that their own wills deſerved "this alſo. For God blindeth and hardeneth, by forſaking and not help-"ing; which he may do by a judgement ſecret, but not unjuſt. This all "religious piety ought to hold unſhaken. Far be it from us then to "ſay that there is iniquity with God: If he help, he doth it mercifully; "if he help not, he doth juſtly.]

665. By all this the Reader may ſee paſt all doubt, that *Auguſtine* and his two diſciples, (than whom none known to us in the whole world then went higher for Predeſtination and Grace) did plainly take up with this, that 1. GOD NEITHER CAUSED OR WILLED SIN, no, not ITS BEING, or the forbidden ACT.

2. That OUR SIN was of OUR SELVES.

3. That ALL GRACE and perſerverance was OF GOD.

4. That ELECTION was ABSOLUTE of GOD's meer will, and not upon his foreknowledge of any merits of mans.

5. That God predeſtinated none to ſin, but predeſtinated men to Puniſhment, ONLY ON THE FORESIGHT of their wilful ſin.

6. That he hardened men but by deſerting them.

7. That he never forſook them till they forſook him firſt, and deſerved it by ſin.

In a word, that mans deſtruction is of himſelf, but his help of God; who reſolvedly chooſeth ſome to ſalvation, and helpeth them accordingly with that effectual grace, and eſpecial perſeverance, which he juſtly giveth not to others, though if he would he could.

SECT. XXIII.

Healing Principles and Conceſſions of the Synod *of* Dort, &c.

666. I Know not how to conclude this diſcourſe more ſuitably to my ends, than by opening to the Reader who is ſenſible of the Churches ſin, miſery and danger by our contentions and diviſions, how much the parties whom I endeavour to reconcile, are agreed in judgement about theſe matters, and that in their own words. Remember ſtill that it is not ſome few that run further than the reſt (either *Epiſcopius, Curcellæus*, &c. on one ſide, or *Maccovius, Rutherford* or Dr. *Twiſſe*, or *Alvarez* and other Predeterminants on the other ſide,) whoſe particular opinions I cannot undertake to reconcile: But only the generality of the Calviniſts who go no further than the Synod of *Dort* (which is my teſt of the party) and the moderate Arminians, Lutherans, and Jeſuits (in theſe points) on the other ſide. And let none reproach me for putting in the *Jeſuites*, for as I know that very few Calviniſts fly near ſo high for Predetermination as the Dominicans do; ſo I know that (though *Arminius* himſelf was a ſober man, and *Epiſcopius* is cryed up by ſome, as *Volkelius* and other Socinians are by others, as moſt clearly rational, yet) there is none of them all that equal in accurateneſs of ſearch and clearneſs of reaſon, either many of the ancient Schoolmen, or *Suarez, Ruiz, Vaſquez, Albertinus*, and many other latter School Jeſuits.

667. The firſt thing that I will deſire of the Reader is to peruſe thoſe many healing conceſſions contained in the writings, eſpecially *Irenicons*, of many Learned Calviniſts already extant: Eſpecially *Davenants* two diſſertations, Dr. *Sam. Wards* works; the Judgements of *Davenant, Morton, Hall*, to *Dury* about this: Biſhop *Robert Abbots*, and Biſhop *Carltons* works oft on the by: Biſhop *Uſher* of Redemption, *&c.* Mr. *Fenner* of wilful Impenitency, and Hidden Manna, *Joh. Bergius* for *Reconcil. Lodov. Crocii Syntag. Conrad. Bergii Praxis Can. Junii Irenicon* and of *predeſt. term. Paræi Irenicon. Amyrald. Defenſ. doct. Calv. & Irenicon. Teſtard. de nat. & Grat. Hotton. de toler. Theſes Salmur.* but above all *Le Blancs Theſes, Voſſii Theſ. & Hiſtor. Pelag. Muſculi Loc. Commun.* And the geral *Irenicons*, as all *Durie's*, *Hall's Peacemaker* and *Pax terris*, *Burroughs Iren. Acontii ſtratagem. Satanæ* (an excellent book) *&c.*

668. Next I will inſert ſome words to this end, in the Synod of *Dort*.

I. About the firſt Article (of Predeſtination) they open free election, but mention no other Reprobation but Gods not-electing, or paſſing by, ſome whom he found in ſin, and in the miſery *in quam ſe ſuâ culpâ præcipitarunt*, &c. and not giving them effectual grace of Converſion, but leaving them in their ſin. And can any doubt of this? or do any Jeſuits or Arminians deny it?

Where alſo they declare that God is no cauſe of mens ſin, but themſelves; And that the Children of the faithful are by Covenant ſo holy, that their ſalvation who dye in infancy is not to be doubted of: And that thoſe that find not ſaving grace in themſelves, but yet uſe the means, have no cauſe to be caſt down at the mention of Reprobation.

669. II. About Chriſts death they ſay, that His ſatisfaction is of infinite value and price, abundantly ſufficient to expiate the ſins of all the world; And that the promiſe is that whoever believeth ſhall not periſh, which is to be preached to all: And that many yet repent not, believe nor,

not, but periſh, is not through any defect or inſufficiency of Chriſts ſacrifice, but by their own fault. And that others believe is of undeſerved grace.

670. III. In the third and fourth *Art. ſect.* 8, 9. they ſay that the fault is not in Chriſt or the Goſpel, that many that are called are not converted and come not, nor in God that calleth them and giveth them many gifts, but in the called themſelves that receive not the word of life, *&c.* And that you may ſee that they hold a conditional will or decree not only of *future* but of *non-future contingents*, they ſay that ["As many as "are called by the Goſpel are ſeriouſly called, and God ſeriouſly and truly "ſheweth by his word, what would be acceptable to him, *viz.* that the "called come to him.] So that here is a ſerious declaration of Gods will to thoſe that never will come to him conditionally if they would come. Theſe kind of notions pleaſe or diſpleaſe men, as the intereſt of their opinions requireth.

671. And the confeſſion of *Pet. Molinæus* received by the Synod, is worthy obſervation *pag.* 290, 291. where he ſaith ["Sin is the Meritorious Cauſe of Deſtination to puniſhment] And [Though natural corruption be cauſe ſufficient for Reprobation (as we kill new ſpawned Serpents before they hurt any) yet there is no doubt but that for what cauſe God damneth men, for the ſame he decreed to damn them: But he damneth reprobates for ſins committed; For they ſuffer in hell not only for original ſin, but for all actual ſins; whence is the inequality of puniſhment: Therefore God Decreed to damn them for the ſame ſins: For nothing hindereth but that God who conſidereth men in natural corruption and pravity may conſider them alſo polluted in the actual ſins which they will thence commit. And among the ſins for which any one is Deſtinated to puniſhment no doubt, is unbelief and rejection of the Goſpel——— No reaſon ſuffereth, that he ſhould be Reprobated for rejecting of the Goſpel—— to whom the Goſpel was never revealed——— That God deſtinated any to eternal puniſhment, without conſideration of impenitence and unbelief; we neither ſay nor think——— And though God predeſtinate the Elect to faith, he doth not predeſtinate the Reprobate to unbelief; For we muſt diſtinguiſh the *media* which God findeth in men, from thoſe which he maketh. He findeth in men unbelief the means of damnation: But faith he findeth not, but maketh. Therefore he predeſtinateth to faith, but not to unbelief: For he predeſtinateth but to that which he decreed to make. Laſtly, Impenitence in order goeth before Reprobation; but faith is after Election as being its effect———] Is not here enough to reconcile? Not only of puniſhment it ſelf.

And next of Chriſts death he ſaith that [" It is abundantly ſufficient "to ſave all men in the world, if they would believe: And that all are "not ſaved by it is not through the inſufficiency of Chriſts death, but of "their pravity and unbelief.]

672. And *pag.* 295. he ſaith " that *Arminius* holdeth irreſiſtible grace, "and that the Elect are drawn of God by effectual grace, whoſe effect is "moſt certain and infallible (by Congruity.)———

673. The *Britiſh* Divines in their Suffrage ſay that [*Pag.* 11. *Th.* 1. *Expl.* "God in the decree of Election prepareth Glory, and effectual "grace, intending that it ſhall be effectual: This he doth not for the Reprobate; and beſides this negation, they know no act of Reprobation, "as oppoſite to Election.] Rom. 9. 11. 15. 21. Joh. 10. 26. Rom. 6. 21.

"And they ſay that [the Goſpel and grace, are denyed to none but the "unworthy,

"unworthy (ſinners,) And that God damneth none, nor deſtinateth "none to damnation, but out of the conſideration of ſin.]

674. The *Haſſian* Divines *ibid. Par.* 2. *pag.* 34. ſay ["The juſt Judge (God) doth not for one cauſe Decree to puniſh; and for another execute "it on the guilty, but both have the ſame cauſe: that is, both original "and actual ſin.]———

675. The *Helvetian* Divines there ſay, *p.* 37. §. 12. ["Which is the "Order and Number of Gods Decrees, ſeeing Gods thoughts and ways "are not as ours, and none of us are of his Council, we leave to Him "alone whoſe underſtanding is infinite.]

676. The *Embdan* Divines *ibid. p.* 75. ſay ["No one is predeſtinated "by God to ſin] which they there prove.

Act. 1. 25. Rom. 3. 24, 25. Mark 15. 15, 19.

677. On the ſecond *Art.* the Britiſh Divines ſay (*p.* 78.) ["God having "mercy on faln mankind, ſent his Son, who gave himſelf a price of Redem- "ption, for the ſins of the whole world.

"*Theſ.* 4. In this Merit of Chriſts death is founded the Univerſal Go- "ſpel Promiſe———

Iſa. 55. ult. 2 Cor. 3. 6. Tit. 2. 11. 2 Cor. 5. 19. Luk. 10. 9, 11. Joh. 15. 22. Heb. 2. 3. & 4. 3. & 6. 4. Mat. 10. 15.

"*Th.* 5. In the Church, where for this Goſpel-promiſe ſalvation is offer- "ed to all, there is that adminiſtration of Grace, which is enough to "convince all the impenitent and unbelieving, that they periſh and loſe the "offered benefit, by their voluntary fault, and neglect or contempt of the "Goſpel.]

678. On the ſecond *Article p.* 103, 104, *&c.* there is the ſuffrage of the famous *Matthias Martinius*, in 26 *Theſes* of univerſal Redemption, and ſeven *Theſes* of ſpecial Redemption, and ſeventeen Errours rejected, ſo ſound, ſo full, ſo accurate, that I know not whither to referr the Reader to ſee the whole controverſie more ſhortly yet clearly and ſoundly opened: And therefore intreat him to peruſe it, ſeeing I may not be ſo tedious as to tranſcribe it all; and know not how to leave out any.

679. To the ſame ſence have *Iſelburge* and *Lud. Crocius* adjoyned their ſuffrages, the laſt being both brief and full.

Rom. 9. 12, 19, *&c.* Mat. 7. 21. Deut. 4. 34.

680. The ſame *Breme* Divines ſay no more of Reprobation but theſe three *Theſ.* 1. That there is a Decree of preterition as to ſpecial ſaving grace. 2. That none are condemned but juſtly, for their ſins. 3. That others as unworthy are converted in Mercy: And if others had ſaid no more of this, it had been never the worſe.

Paræus chideth *Gerſon*, *Biel*, *Cajetan*, *Catherinus* for their ſound opinion of Infants ſalvation without Baptiſm.

And of Infants they ſay [Of only Believers Infants, who dye before they are capable of doctrine, we determine that they are beloved of God, and ſaved, as holy by Covenant-relation: which Baptiſm is a Confirmation of———]

SECT.

SECT. XXIV.

On the other side.

681. ON the other side read but *Suarez* and *Ruiz* to save me transcribing, and see what they grant (besides that *Ariminens.* and many old Schoolmen go as far as the *Synodists*, as the *Dominicans* do much further.) *Petr. à S. Joseph. Suav. Concord.* writing for *Scientia Media*, summeth up the difference between them and the *Thomists* (that is, the *Arminians* and *Calvinists*) so briefly as is worth the reading: In which he granteth,

"1. [That God from eternity antecedently to any absolute foresight of "merits (or preparation in us) did freely and of meer mercy elect all those "to Glory that are saved:] But denyeth [that God antecedently to the "absolute foresight of sin, did absolutely decree to exclude any from "glory, or to addict them to eternal punishment: or that the Creation of "Reprobates, and all natural or supernatural good conferred on them, are "the effect of reprobation.]

"2. He granteth that [the Decree of Predestination is certain and im-"movable in three respects: 1. In that just so many shall certainly be saved "as God hath predestinated. 2. In that the same species of men shall be "saved whom God predestinated to glory: so that both materially "and formally, the number of the predestinate is certain. 3. In that by "the force of Predestination, anteceding all Merits*, yea, and Causing "them, God giveth to the predestinate, effectual helps of grace, by which "they shall infallibly come to glory.]

*That is, Rewardable acts of man.

And is not here a fair concession for peace? And must not the remaining differences be only 1. About words, 2. Or unsearchable Orders of Gods Decrees and Modes of operation? Read him further, and see.

682. *Dion. Petavius* the Jesuite is too large to transcribe. *Vol. 1. Theol. Dogm. lib. 9.* of Predestination is worth the reading; especially to know what the Fathers held of Gods Decrees, who generally agreed, that God decreed none to Hell, but upon foresight of their own sin. Though he himself doth furiously rail at *Calvin*, and *Amyraldus*, yet he so far acquitteth all other *Calvinists* save *Beza* and *Piscator*, and a few that he calleth meer fools, that he saith, They have all forsaken his opinion, and instanceth in the whole Synod of *Dort*, who he saith desert him. And he professeth that *Augustines* judgement may safely be held, which is it indeed, that those now called *Calvinists* own, except in the point of perseverance. See his *lib. 10. c. 1. & 9, 10, 11.*

Which he largely sheweth in their own words; better than any that ever I saw, and may save the Reader much labour in the investigation of the sense of the Antients herein.

But what a plague, livor and faction is to the Church and the owners souls, let but these ugly words of his be witness, *lib. 10. cap. 14. p. 728.* [*Calvinus nocentem nullum, innocentes omnes damnari statuit*] When he had made *Amyrald* an impudent lyer, for proving *Calvin* to think otherwise. O take heed of the spirit of a Sect.

683. *Suarez de Auxil. l. 3. cap. 6.* about sufficient and effectual grace, (into which all the other controversies fall,) confesseth that [Sufficient grace is that *quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum, quod tamen non facit, non ex insufficientia auxilii, sed ex libertate Voluntatis*: But effectual grace is called such not only *ab eventu & effectu, sed etiam quia vires præbet efficacissimas Voluntati, & singularem vim habet ad agendum.*]

See *Zumil* reciting the opinions of *Molina*, *Bellarmine* and *Suarez de Gratia efficaci*, Part 3. pag. 50, 51, &c.

agendum.] And is here no ground for Chriſtian Concord in this point?

But of this ſubject, I muſt ſpeak more particularly in the Third Part.

I am told to my face that our Doctrine of Abſolute Reprobation we have learned from the Papiſts; Another profeſſeth that the Jeſuits ten of them for one favour the abſolute irreſpective decree, follow herein, as they think S. *Auſtin*, but eſpecially their S. *Thomas* and *Scotus*, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole tribe at this day of the *Dominicans*, who are buſie Zealots for the Cauſe, of whoſe conſent ſome among us are not aſhamed to brag. *Twiſſe* againſt *Hoard li.* 1. *pag.* 85. This reporter maketh us at one with *Jeſuites* and *Dominicans*. And yet may we not be ſo with Proteſtants?

684. *Bellarmine* himſelf hath enough I think to convince any man, that he muſt have a ſubtile contentious wit, that can find any great intolerable difference herein between him and the Synod of *Dort*: (I write not for them that will revile Gods truth, if *Bellarmine* do but own it.) *De Grat. & lib. arb. li.* 2. *cap.* 9. this is his propoſition [Though a "Grace ſufficient be given to all, yet no reaſon from us (or our part) "can be given of Gods predeſtination,———By which we exclude not "only Merits properly ſo called, but alſo the good uſe of free-will, out of "grace, or both as foreſeen of God, though it be not called Merit, but "*de congruo*, and though it be not called a Cauſe, but a Condition *ſine "qua non prædeſtinaretur.*] (And what elſe would you have excluded?) And he goeth on in divers Chapters at large to prove from Scriptures, *Auguſtine*, Tradition, Reaſon, that there is no foreſeen Cauſe or Condition of predeſtination in our ſelves.

685. And I deſire the Reader to note his Order of the Decrees (for they muſt all be medling with the Order of Gods inward acts; But he doth it moſt briefly and plainly thus) *ib. cap.* 9.

"[According to our mode of underſtanding, this ſeemeth to be the "Order of Predeſtination in Gods mind: 1. God foreſeeth that if he "make man he will fall with all his poſterity; And withal he ſeeth that "he can deliver all or ſome as he pleaſe. 2. He decreeth (or willeth) "to create man, and to permit him to fall, and mercifully to deliver "ſome of the number of the fallen, leaving others juſtly in the maſs of per-"dition. 3. He contrived apt remedies for the ſaving of the elect: In "which the incarnation and paſſion of our Saviour hath the firſt place. "4. He approved thoſe remedies, and then choſe Chriſt and us in him, before "the Conſtitution of the World. 5. He diſpoſed, ordained, and in a ſort "commanded that ſo it ſhould be done.]

Is not this as high as the Synod of *Dort* goeth? yea, more rigid than many of the Suffrages? For he mentioneth no giving of Chriſt, or any remedy at all to any but the Elect, nor carrying the reſt any further than the common maſs of perdition, before they be forſaken; contrary to what *Martinius, Crocius, Molinæus*, the *Britiſh* Divines, and others delivered to or in that Synod: And indeed it is unſound.

686. If you ſay, that he begins with a *Scientia Conditionalis*. I anſwer, It's no more than what all ſober men will grant *de re*, that is, that God knew from eternity that if he ſo made man as he did, he would fall: or, if there were eternal propoſitions, God eternally knew the truth of this hypothetical propoſition, [If I ſo make man, he will fall.] If this was *quid intelligibile*, no doubt but God knew it. But *de ordine & de nomine*, whether it be fit to parcell out Gods knowledge (and Volitions) into ſuch ſhreds and atoms, and ſo denominate them, let them look to it on both ſides that trouble us with their diviſions.

687. And note *Bellarmines* further explication [*Of theſe acts*], (ſaith he) "the firſt is of the underſtanding, the ſecond of the will, the third of "the underſtanding, the fourth of the will, and the fifth of the under-"ſtanding; and in that laſt the eſſence of predeſtination eſpecially con-"ſiſteth.]

688. Yea, *cap.* 15. whereas many diſtinguiſh predeſtination to faith or grace, from election to glory, and ſay that the latter is upon the foreſight of faith as a condition, though the firſt be abſolute, he oppoſeth them and

and copiously laboureth to prove "that election to glory is absolute without any foreseen condition in us, as well as that to grace: Though without something in us, we have not a Right to glory: Even (saith he) as if a Physician were sure that by such a Medicine he can cure a man, and so resolveth to give it him, the Medicine is the Cause that he is cured, but not that it was ascertained by the decree of the Physician before.

689. And *c.* 15. *ad obj.* 2. he proveth Gods certain foreknowledge herein, because ["Though all have *pro loco & tempore* sufficient grace to be converted if they will, yet indeed no man is converted, and no man persevereth, but he that hath the special gift of Repentance and Perseverance, which is not given to all, but to those only for whom God decreed it.]

689. And to them that say, the Elect can refuse grace, he answereth that ["They can indeed; but it's certain that they will not; because God will call them so as he seeth so congruous, that they may not refuse his call: For thus true grace is refused by no hard heart, because it is given with a purpose to mollifie it. And there is no danger lest God should want skill or arguments, to perswade any man to what he please.]

690. And indeed before *de Gratia efficaci li.* 1. *cap.* 12. he tells us, that there are three opinions wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth: The first is, that it is called effectual only from the event, through mans consent: which he disproveth. The second, that it is only efficacious by necessitating physical predetermination, which he thinks to be an error on the other extream: And the third which he defendeth is [that it is efficacious by Gods will that it shall be so, and by the Congruity or moral aptitude of inward and outward perswasions and means which God useth with a decree to turn the will.] And who can say that God *cannot* do this? or if he can, that he doth not? Is here yet any room left for quarrelling and bitter censures in this point? *

691. *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 16. he maketh two acts of Reprobation the very same that almost all the suffrages in the Synod of *Dort* assign, and the same doctrine that *Davenant*, and the Synod deliver. His first act of Reprobation is Negative, the second Positive; ["1. *Non habet Voluntatem eos salvandi*, 2. *Habet Voluntatem eos damnandi:*] And as to the first, [*Nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sicut neque prædestinationis: Posterioris causa est prævisio peccati.*] They are unmerciful contenders that this much Reprobation will not satisfie.

692. He proveth as the *Calvinists* do; ["that it was not so much as for *original sin* foreseen, that God is said to hate *Esau*; because then he would have hated *Jacob* also: but it must be referred to the meer will of God, that one was loved to salvation, and the other so hated as not to be saved.] Just as the Synod of *Dort* saith.

693. *Francisc. à Sancta Clara, alias Davenport*, a Learned *Scotist* in his *Deus, Nat. Grat. Probl.* 1. *pag.* 3. describing Predestination out of *Augustine, Arriba, Scotus, Suarez, &c.* saith ["And with all these agreeth the description of Predestination *Art.* 17. of the *English* Confession.]

694. And *Probl.* 2. of the Causes of Predestination he noteth that ["*We mean not the Causes of Gods will, ex parte actus volendi, sed ex parte volitorum, in quantum Deus vult unum esse propter aliud.*] And on that supposition how easie is it to agree?

695. But he addeth ["If you had rather say as *Suarez* 1. *p. l.* 2. *de prad. c.* 1. that also *ex parte actus divini* (there is a Cause,) it must

* When even *Bradwardine* holdeth, that Gods Volition of mans act alone (which *Bellarmine* includeth) is the effectual unresistible Grace *ex parte Dei operantis.*

"be, *not as Gods act is absolutely considered*, for so it is his essence that "hath no cause; but as terminated on the Creature.]

696. Pag. 7. he himself professeth, that when the Protestants say that ["on the part of the Predestinate there is not so much as any meritori- "ous Cause, Disposition or Condition, they speak but the common opi- "nion of all the School Doctors, taking it properly and in Scripture sense: And what *Montague* and the *Arminians* speak of foresight, he disowneth, as contrary to *Paul, August. Aquin.* 1. *p. q.* 23. *a.* 5, *&c. Scotus, Bradwardine, Estius, Smisings,*———Yea, he rejecteth Abbot *Joachim* who denying any Cause of predestination in God, yet asserted a cause of it by an aptitude in the Predestinate and the Reprobate, one being foreseen more humble and prepared for Grace, and the other more proud and unprepared] *pag.* 5, 6.

Ruiz de Prædefin. tr. 2. disp. 6. sect. 2. p. 86, 87. *Deus pro suo beneplacito decrevit ab æterno efficaciter causare liberas operationes honestas prius ratione quam illas prævideret ut absolute futuras — unde infallibiliter sequitur liberi arbitrii operatio (necessitate consequentiæ:)* Pag. 87. 1. *Scriptura fidem, sanctitatem & quodlibet discrimen sanctorum à reprobis, reducit ad electionem gratuitam:* 2. *Ex vi sortis*, &c. 3. *Divina electio absque meritis est causa quæ discernit justos ab impiis. Quamvis (n) liberum arbitrium sit secundaria causa seipsum discernens, qua potuit resistere vel consentire — Hæc tamen liberi arbitrii cooperatio revocatur in Deum ut in primariam causam suaviter prædefinientem.* Et Tr. 3. d. 18. sect. 3. p. 222. *Ea merita nihil obsunt quidditati gratiæ quæ tanquam ex prima radice nascuntur ex prima gratia data absque ullo prorsus merito: Attamen quodlibet etiam levissimum & remotissimum meritum de congruo, si ex illo nascitur prima gratia, vel propter illud datur, obesse quidditati gratiæ:* Yea, he addeth p. 223. *Conditio, ratio, vel occasio prorsus separata à merito, impetratione & dispositione, adhuc repugnavet (primæ) gratiæ: quoniam adhuc maneret debitum connaturalitatis, quamvis abesset debitum obsequii.*

697. Yea (ordering Gods Decrees after the usual presumption) he asserteth, "that God first intendeth our blessedness as the end, before he "intendeth us grace, faith, *&c.* as the means: And therefore cannot "do it for foreseen faith, *&c.* Yea, that he first decreed to give us bles- "sedness, before he decreed to create us, as *Scotus* 3. *d.* 7. and *Ovando* "*ibid. q.* 3. *a.* 2. Yea, that God *willeth* all this, before he knoweth that "it will be, as *Scotus* 1. *d.* 39. And that seeing all Gods Volitions of "giving any good, are free, without any precedent Cause in man, it "must needs be that the Decree of glory and not of grace only, must be "without Merit. And he concludeth *p.* 13. that they have no quarrel "here with the Doctrine of the Articles of the Church of *England.*

698. Probl. 3. he resolveth with *Smisings*, that the reason why this absolute decree of God consisteth with free-will, is because that God doth not only decree the event, but also the mode, that it shall be freely done: And therefore his decree doth not only *consist* with *Liberty*, but maketh it *necessary.*

699. His feigned order of the decrees is *pag.* 27. that "1. God decree- "eth to glorifie, 2. To give grace and merits to obtain it, and that defi- "nitively: 3. Then he foreseeth that they will concurr with grace. "4. Then he decreeth the execution, that glory shall be given them by the "means of their operations.

And of Reprobation; "1. That God effectually decreeth to do so much "as he doth, on his part to give them glory; 2. And also so far to give "them grace; 3. Then he foreseeth that they will not co-operate with "that grace; 4. He decreeth to permit them to fall into sin; 5. And "then decreeth their damnation.] I would not cite this man if he were a *Thomist* or *Dominican* (who are known to go higher than the Synod of *Dort*, though their reputation at home with their party tempt them to rail at the *Calvinists*:) But as he is a *Scotist*, and so of a middle profession. (Though Dr. *Twisse* perceived how much their founding Gods foreknowledge in his Volitions, advantaged him.)

700. Supposing you to remember the *ordo signorum* of his Master *Scotus* before cited, I adjoyn the *order Doctoris illuminati* (*viz. Franc. Mayronis*) *in li.* 1. *d.* 41. *q.* 4. *Sunt quatuor signa:* "*Est ergo primum* "*in quo Judas & Petrus offeruntur Voluntati Divinæ ut neutri: & tunc* "*Voluntas Divina ordinavit Petrum ad gloriam: nullum autem actum po-* "*sitivum habuit circa Judam, secundum Augustinum. Secundum signum est* "*in quo ordinavit Petrum ad gratiam: & tunc circa Judam nullum actum* "*positivum habuit. Tertium signum est in quo relinquuntur sibi ipsis & in-* "*terque cadit in peccatum. Quartum signum est in quo Petrus resur-* "*git;*

"git; *Quia non poteſt permanere: quia prædeſtinatus intelligitur ex pri-*
"*mo ſigno. Judas autem non reſurgit; eo quod non habet relevantem in*
"*Deo: ideo reprobatur.*]

Here you ſee a Reprobation that is no Act of God, but a non-acting, or is negative *quoad actum* and not only *quoad objectum.* And he before ſaith out of *Scotus* and with him [*Ideo dico ſicut dicit Doctor noſter, Quod prius Deus videt merita quam reprobum; licet prius non videat merita quam eligat:*] which is the commoneſt Doctrine of the Schoolmen and other Papiſts, as well as *Auguſtines.*

701. So *D'Orbellis in* 1. *d.* 41. [*Et dicunt quidam quod non eſt alia ratio quare Deus iſtum elegit, & non illum, niſi quia placet——Eo enim ipſo quod placet, ideo rectum eſt, propter ſummam ipſius Voluntatis rectitudinem——Sic dicit Scotus, quod licet non videatur aliqua ratio prædeſtinationis à parte prædeſtinati, aliquo modo prior prædeſtinatione; Reprobationis tamen eſt aliqua ratio, propter quam ſcilicet iſta actio terminatur ad hoc objectum & non ad illud:——Cum Reprobare ſit Velle Damnare, Reprobatio habet ex parte objecti, rationem, ſcilicet peccatum finale præviſum——Non videtur autem dicendum conformiter de Prædeſtinatione & Reprobatione; Quia Bona Deo principaliter attribuuntur, Mala autem nobis. Quia tamen Apoſtolus videtur totum hoc imperſcrutabile relinquere,* Rom. 9. *O altitudo,* &c. *ideo dicit Scotus quod eligatur opinio quæ magis placet; Dum tamen ſervetur Libertas Divina, abſque injuſtitia. Hoc autem debet fieri abſque aſſertione pertinaci. Rationes namque particulares, propter quas ex parte diverſorum Divina inferuntur judicia, ſunt imperſcrutabiles.*]

But note, that as to the firſt part of Reprobation, *non velle dare gratiam,* *Scotus, Mayro, &c.* hold it to be nothing, or no act at all.

702. And what *D'Orbellis* next addeth of *Bonaventure* ſetteth us at no further odds. [*Bonav. dicit quod licet non ſit aliqua ratio Cauſalis, ſeu meritoria, prædeſtinationis à parte prædeſtinati, (quia ſiquis poſſet de condigno mereri primam gratiam, tunc Gratia non eſſet Gratia) Poteſt tamen eſſe aliqua ratio congruitatis & condecentiæ prædeſtinationis; Non quantum ad* ſignificatum *quod eſt* Volitio Divina, *ſed quantum ad* Connotatum *quod eſt* Gratia *&* Gloria. *Poteſt enim dici quod Deus prædeſtinat iſtum proper præviſionem bonorum operum ut aliquo modo ſunt à libero arbitrio: Licet enim Gratificatio vel Juſtificatio ſit principaliter à Divina Voluntate, hoc tamen eſt cum cooperatione & præparatione liberi arbitrii; quia ut Aug. Qui fecit te ſine te non juſtificabit te ſine te. Unde cum peccator facit quod in ſe eſt, meretur de congruo juſtificari, ſeu ſecundum quid, ex condecentia Divinæ liberalitatis.*]

But the true meaning of this is no more than Proteſtants commonly hold, that *God giveth ſpecial Grace uſually* to *ſuch* only as are *prepared for it* by more common Grace; and ſo this preparation is *quid præviſum* in Gods decree, but no Cauſe of his Act of Volition or decree.

703. And in the next words he granteth, that even this *Preparation* to ſpecial grace, is not alwayes neceſſary, [*Deus tamen ſine aliqua præparatione & cooperatione aliquos juſtificat, ut patet de ſanctificatis in utero, & de parvulis poſt baptiſmum ad cœlum evolantibus; aliis ſine baptiſmo decedentibus*—— &c.]

704. And though they oft ſay, that God would have all men ſaved *quantum in ſe*, they mean not, that God doth all to it that he can, but that he maketh all capable of ſalvation, and ſo far helpeth them, that the failing ſhall not be on his part. For ſo *Bonavent. ubi ſupra in* 1. *d.* 47. *a.* 1. *q.* 1. explaineth it, plainly adding, that here Gods

will connoteth not ſalvation it ſelf, but only the ſaid Capacity and helps.

705. *Obj.* But many ſay, that Predeſtination doth not neceſſitate the event. *Anſw. Twiſſe* told you before that we are agreed all in this; It inferreth a Logical Neceſſity *Conſequentiæ*, though not a phyſical *Conſequentis*: As *Bonavent. 1. d. 40. q. 2. Ex parte rei evenientis nullam: ex parte Dei præſcientis aliquam; ſcilicet immutabilitatis certitudinem*: Yea, as to grace and ſalvation it is certainly Cauſal as they confeſs.

706. *Obj.* Many ſay, that a predeſtinate perſon may be damned. *Anſw.* Even as *D'Orbellus in 1. d. 40. a. 2.* [*Iſta propoſitio,* [*Prædeſtinatus poteſt damnari*] *eſt falſa in ſenſu compoſito; & vera in ſenſu diviſo*] *Vide explicat.* It is unchriſtian and unmanly to revile men that ſay the ſame that we do, meerly through diſtaſte, or becauſe we will not be at the labour to underſtand them.

707. Obj. *we cannot be reconciled to them that give ſo much to mans free-will. Anſ.* How much do you mean? It's a dreadful thing to hear ſome good men ignorantly blaſpheme God, as the chief cauſe of every villany in the World, meerly upon a factious prejudice and partial oppoſition to other men, whom they never underſtood! Would it pleaſe you to hear that God draggeth men into ſin as by the hair of the head, when the Devil himſelf can but allure them? I know it would not. Do but make it plain as a granted thing, that God doth not *will* or *Love* ſin, and do more to *Cauſe* it, than the *Devil*, or the *wickedeſt ſinner himſelf* doth, and you can ſcarce tell how to differ from the greater part of the Schoolmen themſelves, or ſober moderate *Lutherans* that are thought to be diſſenters. Let it be the Devils work, and no good Chriſtians, to paint God in the ſhape of the Father of lies and all iniquity: Our God is Holy, and Holineſs becometh all that draw near him, and is the mark of all that ſhall ſee his face. Dear Brethren, let not us that daily and juſtly condemn our ſelves for ſin, and take ſuch odious titles to our ſelves, make our ſelves yet Holier than God, and make God a far greater Lover and Cauſer of ſin than we are.

I will add one deſcription of *Free-will* out of the laſt named Schoolman, *D'Orbellis* a *Scotiſt*, in *2. ſent. d. 25. dub. 2.* And tell me what the moſt rigid oppoſer of Free-will can deſire more. ["Q. Whether Free-"will be equally in all that have it? *Anſ.* Free-will may be compared "1. To that which it is free from, 2. And to that which it is free to. 1. In "the firſt ſenſe, there is a threefold Liberty; 1. From conſtraint, 2. From "ſin, 3. From miſery. Liberty from ſin is not equally in good and bad, "nor in man on earth and in Heavee. As *Aug. Enchir.* That's the "freeſt will, that cannot at all ſerve ſin. And Liberty from miſery is not "equally in all: But Liberty from conſtraint is equally in all, becauſe the "will cannot be forced. Though in God and the bleſſed there be a Ne-"ceſſity of Immutability, yet not of Co-action. And neceſſity of Immu-"tability, repugneth not Liberty: For the will is called Free ſimply, not "becauſe it ſo willeth this, as that it can will the contrary: but becauſe "that whatever it willeth, it deſireth it by its own Empire; Becauſe it "ſo willeth any thing, that it willeth to will it: And therefore in the act "of willing, it moveth it ſelf, and uſeth dominion on it ſelf; And ſo far "it is called Free, though it be immutably ordained to it. * 2. But if free-"will be compared to that *to which it* is free, *viz.* To do right (for as "*Anſelm* ſaith, It is a faculty or power to keep rectitude) ſo it is not "equally in all: For this Power is in God of Himſelf, and in the Crea-"tures received from God: And it is more in the confirmed than the noncon-"firmed,

* But it were not ſo if it were immutably ordained and moved to ſin.

"firmed, and in the good than in the bad. And seeing to be able to sin, "is a diminution of Liberty; therefore according to *Anselm*, to be able "to sin, is no Liberty nor part of liberty, taking Free-will according to "the Common Reason of it. But to have power as to the Act which de- "formity is annext to, may well be a part of Liberty, not *simply*, but of "*Created* Liberty. And so the deformity in the Act more agreeth with "free-will as it is a Creature, or as it is *of Nothing*, than as it is Free.--- "*Dub.* 3. Can free-will be compelled? *Answ.* God can destroy it, but not "force it; for that is a Contradiction: But he can well effectually in- "cline it, and make it move it self freely to which part God will. *]

* But to sin he will not so incline it.

I think this is as high as you can desire. And yet there is nothing in all this, but what both parties may well bear with, and it hath indeed much soundness in it. But here he treateth only about equality of Liberty, but how much of it the unsanctified have, he elsewhere sheweth, and I have oft told you how much the most are agreed in it.

708. To conclude, The heart and summ of all our differences is how to make God the total first Cause of all Good, and not to make him the *Cause of sin*, and the damner of man for that which he himself insuperably causeth. I hope both sides hold fast both the conclusions (that our sin and destruction is chiefly of our selves, but in God is our help, and our good and happiness is all from Him.) And if they both hold this, it is not the difficulty of joyning them together, and opening Gods unsearchable methods, that must disjoynt us, and draw us to withdraw our Love, or contemn each other, or disturb the Churches peace and unity.

709. *Gregory Ariminensis* and *Gabr. Biel* have come so near the rigid *Dominicans* that the Reader may think that they plainly say the same of Gods Causing all the Act of sin, as *Alvarez*, *Twisse* and *Rutherford* say. But let the Learned Reader note these things; 1. That over and over they affirm that though God *Cause all* the Act of sin, yet he is but the *Causa partialis*: I like not the phrase my self for the reasons before given; but by this they do greatly differ from the aforesaid Authors: see *Greg.* 2. *d.* 34, 35. *ar.* 3. frequently saying, that God is *Causa partialis*. And in answering *Aureolus ad nonum* he thus fully explaineth it: "*Dicendum quod* "*Causa dupliciter potest accipi Totalis: Uno modo Totalis totalitate relata* "ad Causam; *id est, sufficiens Causare effectum absque concursu alterius* "*Causæ præcise causando sicut Causat: & sic neganda est ista Consequen-* "*tia: Quoniam nec Deus nec Creatura est sic Totalis Causa actus mali.* "*Nunquam enim talis actus fieret, si Deus non Causaret eum; Neque* "*etiam si Creatura non causaret, & Deus non aliter causaret, quam nunc* "*de facto causat, concurrendo cum Creatura. Alio modo Totalis totalitate* "*relata* ad effectum, *id est, totum effectum causans: Et ejusdem possunt* "*esse plures totales Causæ: ejusdem enim Volitionis secundum totum est* "*Causa Notitia & etiam Voluntas.*

Here note, that 1. He taketh not *Causa totalis* for the same with *solitaria*. 2. That he asserteth only, that God causeth the *Totum* of the Act, but not by a total Causation of it: And that Gods way or sort of Causation is not sufficient to cause it if man concurred not, which they say he *freely doth*, and could do otherwise.

710. So that these mens way of freeing God from being the cause of sin is like *Scotus* his; As if (as I before made the similitude) a Father to try his Childs obedience, bids him lift up a Stone, which he cannot do of himself; and the Father holdeth his hand and joyneth his strength, yet not *ad ultimum posse*, but with a purposed restraint so far that if the Child will not put forth his degree of strength,

it ſhall not be done. But who can comprehend the wayes of Divine concurſe?

711. And it is to be noted, that when *Aureolus* argueth, that [if God immediately concurr, either he determineth mans act, or man determineth Gods act, or neither; which are all abſurd:] here *Biel* citeth *Scotus* as holding the third, and anſwering *Neither*, as no abſurdity. But *Greg. Arim.* that ſeemeth to go higher, yet ſaith, [* *Juxta modum loquendi arguentis dico quod Deus ſequitur determinationem Voluntatis: non quod determinatio Voluntatis ſit aliqua Entitas diſtincta à Voluntate & actu ejus, quia primo fiat à voluntate—— nec intelligendo quod prius natura Voluntas agat actum quam Deus, proprie loquendo de priori natura: Quoniam tunc ſequeretur quod poſſet illum agere, Deo non coagente.——Sed ad hunc ſenſum dico Deum ſequi Determinationem Voluntatis; Quoniam ideo Deus agit illum actum, quia† cum Voluntas agit. Et non ideo quia Deus agit, ideo Voluntas agit: & ideo magis proprie dicitur Deus coagere Voluntati in talem actum cauſandi, quam Voluntas dicatur coagere Deo.]

* *Vid ſupra ad 8.*

† I think it ſhould be [*Cum.*]

You ſee that theſe *Nominals* do *toto cælo* differ from *Alvarez*, *Twiſſe* and *Rutherford*. (And yet *Alvarez* would fain be moderate in that one Diſputation which Dr. *Twiſſe* in a peculiar Digreſſion oppugneth.)

712. And note, that the thing which moved *Gregory* to go ſo far as he doth is, Leſt God ſhould be denyed to be the Cauſe of all Natural Entity: But if you ſet before the will, the Creator (or Chief Good) and the Creature (or ſenſual pleaſure) the Act *in genere* as a Volition is an Entity, or *modus entis*: But who can prove that comparatively as it is terminated on the Creature, rather than on the Creator, it hath any Natural Entity, more than the act *in genere*; or any modality which God is not able to give a Creature power to cauſe, or not cauſe, without predetermination from God or any other?

713. Yea, *Ariminenſis* ſeemeth to mean this himſelf, when *ibid. d.* 34, 35. *a.* 2. *ad* 5. he ſaith [*Deus poteſt ſolus actum illum cauſare, & actum odiendi, id eſt, qui eſt odium Dei, & mendacium etiam poteſt cauſare: Non tamen poteſt cauſare actum odiendi Deum, ſeu odium Dei: neque poteſt Cauſare Mendacium vel mentiri, neque poteſt cauſare actum malum; Quare quemcunque actum cauſaret ſolus, licet ille nunc ſit Odium Dei vel mendacium, vel aliquis actus malus, ſi tamen Deus ſolus illum cauſaret, ſicut poteſt illum cauſare ſolus, non eſſet actus, neque odium Dei vel mendacium.*] But whatever he thought, I have before anſwered this difficulty of the Entity of the acts of ſin.

I mention *Ariminenſis* judgement the rather, becauſe the Learned *Calviniſts* commend him: And I remember when I once askt Arch-Biſhop *Uſher* which of the Schoolmen he moſt valued as the ſoundeſt, he ſaid *Greg. Ariminenſis.*

714. Is not all this doctrine from theſe men cited conformable to the doctrine of the Synod of *Dort*? Who in the concluſion name many poſitions which *they and all the Reformed Churches* with them do, *toto pectore deteſtari*, abhorr with all their hearts: Among which one is, *Deum nudo puroque Voluntatis arbitrio, abſque omni peccati ullius reſpectu vel intuitu, maximam mundi partem ad æternam damnationem prædeſtinaſſe & creaſſe.* And another is, *Eodem modo quo electio fons eſt & cauſa fidei actuum operum, reprobationem eſſe cauſam infidelitatis & impietatis:* Another is, *Multos fidelium infantes ab uberibus matrum innoxios abripi & tyrannice in Gehennam præcipitari, adeo ut iis nec Baptiſmus, nec Eccleſiæ in eorum baptiſmo preces, prodeſſe queant.*

And

And it is much to be noted, that in concluſion they deſire all men to *judge of the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, not by Calumnies, nor by the Private ſayings of ſome Doctors, antient or later, but by the publick Confeſſions of the Churches, and by the Declaration of this Synod.* Therefore not by the extreams of *Beza, Piſcator, Spanhemius, Twiſſe* and *Rutherford*; but by what the Articles of the Churches ſubſcribed by the Paſtors do contain. Otherwiſe we ſhall be far more fooliſh than the Papiſts, who will not expoſe their Church to obloquy or diviſion by ſtanding to the ſayings of *Alvarez* or *Molina*, or any private Doctor whoſoever.

715. And it is notorious to any impartial peruſer, that the whole form of the Doctrine of the Church of *England*, in the Articles, Catechiſm, Liturgie, Homilies, and all their publick Writings, was drawn up by men of *Auguſtines* judgement, who were for abſolute Election, and Univerſal ſufficient Redemption and Grace *ad poſſe*, but for no Reprobation but on foreſight of ſin.

716. And it is greatly to be noted, with grief of heart, that among Good men, it is partly General prejudice, but chiefly the Intereſt of their Reputation with thoſe among whom they live, which is the great impediment of the Churches Concord. The name of a *Calviniſt* is ſo hateful among the Papiſts, that even the Predeterminant *Dominicans* who go higher than ever *Calvin* did, (and the *Janſeniſts*, who go as high in the main cauſe, and higher than the Synod of *Dort*,) do yet find it a matter of neceſſity to rail at *Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, &c.* leſt their party ſhould think that they are turned Hereticks. And the Proteſtants that agree in ſome points with the Papiſts, are fain to rack the Papiſts words, to a worſe ſenſe than is meant, leſt their fierce oppoſers ſhould make men believe that they are half Papiſts, or err with them. And the moderate *Calviniſts* are fain to ſtretch hard, that they may ſeem to differ more from the *Arminians* than they do, leſt a ſelf-conceited reviler ſhould blot their names with the ſuſpicion of *Arminianiſm.* O doleful caſe of all the Churches! But where Proteſtants are *few* and made odious by the Papiſts, as differing from them further than they do, there Reputation is not ſo great a temptation; And there they freely confeſs their concord, where they do not differ. And ſo in *Colloquia Torunenſi c. 4. de grat. depulſ. Calum. ſect. 5, 6.* all the Reformed Churches of *Poland* with *Joh. Bergius* the Duke of *Brandenburgs* Chaplain, and others did profeſs, [*Falſo accuſamur, quaſi Mortis & Meriti Chriſti pro omnibus ſufficientiam negemus, aut virtutem imminuamus, cum potius idem hic quod ipſa Synodus Tridentina* ſeſ. 6. cap. 3. *doceamus*, viz. *Etſi Chriſtus pro omnibus mortuus ſit, non omnes tamen mortis ejus beneficium recipere, ſed eos duntaxat quibus meritum paſſionis ejus communicatur. Cauſam etiam ſeu culpam, cur non omnibus communicetur, nequaquam in merito & morte Chriſti, ſed in ipſis hominibus eſſe fatemur.*] Here was no partial intereſt to make them afraid of being ſuſpected to comply with Papiſts.

717. I end with this requeſt to all my Brethren who by their averſeneſs to the Doctrine of *Common* or *Univerſal Grace*, do keep open the Churches dangerous wounds, 1. That they will give Scripture leave to rule their judgements, and try whether it be poſſible to build *ſpecial Grace*, on any other foundation than *preſuppoſed common Grace?* and whether to deny *this*, be not to deny the very tenor of the Goſpel, and pull up the foundations of our Religion?

2. That

2. That they will but read over *Davenants* two diſſertations, and the ſecond Tome (at leaſt) of the Learned *Dallæus* his Apology againſt *Spanhemius*, that is, The words of an hundred and twenty antient Writers and Councils, beginning at *Clemens Romanus*, and ending with *Theophylact*, and ſixty three Proteſtant Divines and Synods (to which I think I could add as many more, that ſpeak more plainly to the point, or near it.) And if after all this they have ſo great a zeal to contract the Glory of Gods Mercy, and deny his Grace, as that they will caſt off the judgement of all the antient Churches of Chriſt, and ſo many later, rather than acknowledge it, I ſhall ceaſe diſputing with them, and ſeek to quench the fire which they kindle in the Churches of Chriſt by Prayers and Tears.

7 AP 53

The End of the Firſt Part.

THE

Second Part

OF

GODS GOVERNMENT,

AND

MORAL WORKS.

WHEREIN

Of his Laws or Covenants, of Redemption, of ſufficient and effectual Grace, of Faith, Juſtification, Works, Merits, Perſeverance, certainty of Salvation, &c. ſo far as the Church-troubling-Controverſies do require.

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A Pre

A

PREMONITION.

MY work at preſent is but to lay down ſo much of the Chriſtian Doctrine briefly, as is neceſſary to be underſtood for the reconciling of the Controverſies about Predeſtination, Providence, Grace and Free-will: And therefore paſs over many other weighty Points, and muſt not ſtand largely to prove all as I go, which carrieth its own evidence: The true nature of the firſt Law or Covenant deſerveth a more accurate diſcuſſion than I can here make; and much paſſeth as certain with ſome, which hath but little proof.

And here I meet with theſe different Opinions: 1. Some ſay that the condition of the firſt Covenant was not *Innocency*, but *ſincerity*: And that Innocency was only a Duty, neceſſary *neceſſitate præcepti*, but not *medii*: or that it was *ut medium* neceſſary *ad melius eſſe*, or to ſome certain *degrees* of felicity, whereof it was a *condition*, but not to *felicity it ſelf*. And that the Covenant of Grace doth herein agree with it; both of them damning man only for *mortal ſin*, and puniſhing them temporally only for *venial ſin*. And he ſeemeth to be of this mind, who ſaith that, *Do this and live*, or *Innocency* or *Works* was the Condition only of *Moſes* Law, but that *Adhere* and *Vanquiſh* was the Condition of the firſt Covenant: But theſe are ambiguous unſatisfactory terms: If the meaning be, [*Adhere to God and his Law* by *perfect Innocency*, and *vanquiſh* all temptations to Sin,] this is the ſame with that *Innocency* which we ſay was the Condition. But if he mean only, [Adhere to me ſincerely by *love* as thy Ultimate End, and vanquiſh all temptations which would draw thee from me, to another Ultimate End or God,] this is the ſame with the firſt opinion; which many *Papiſts* ſeem to hold.

2. But the more common Opinion is that which I aſſert, That Innocency was the Condition, not only of Life eternal, but of all the benefits of Gods Covenant, and the leaſt ſin the forfeiture of all.

They that are for the firſt Opinion think, that if *Adam* had committed but a ſmall or venial ſin (as a ſinful thought or deſire after the forbidden fruit, without the act or full conſent) it had been againſt Gods natural Goodneſs and Juſtice to have condemned him to Hell for it. And conſequently that Chriſt died not to pardon the pains of Hell as due for ſuch little ſins; but only temporal ſmaller puniſhments.

But God beſt knoweth his own Nature; And nature telleth us, That *all ſin deſerveth puniſhment*: And he that *ſinneth*, ſo far removeth his heart from God, and forfeiteth his Spirit or Grace: And he that hath once ſo turned from God in the leaſt degree, cannot of himſelf return or heal himſelf; and had no promiſe of Gods Grace to do it: And therefore it is not to be ſuppoſed that he ſhould ſin no more, but ſuch a minute ſin; for greater will come in preſently at that breach, unleſs God recover him, which he was not in Juſtice bound to do: And no one knoweth ſo well as God how much malignity is in the ſmalleſt ſin; And it was as eaſie for ſinleſs *Adam* to have continued ſinleſs, as for carnal men now to forbear groſs ſin. And he that ſinneth deſerveth not Heaven or Life: And there are divers degrees of puniſhment in Hell, according to the

degrees of Sin: And Chriſt died for all our ſins: therefore they did every one deſerve death: which conſiſted not with a right to Life: therefore not with a right to Heaven: And an immortal Soul was not naturally to be annihilated; therefore to live in ſome puniſhment as ſeparated: And *Rom.* 3. 9. all were under Sin, yet all had not groſs Sin. Rom. 6. 23. *The wages of Sin is Death.* Rom. 5. 12. *Death paſſed on all, for that all have ſinned.* Rom. 2. 12. *As many as have ſinned without Law, ſhall periſh without Law.* And we muſt pray for the pardon of all Sin: And unpardoned Sin will damn men. Theſe are the reaſons on this ſide.

They of the other Opinion ſay, That the Goſpel-Covenant ſheweth Gods *Nature* as well as the firſt Law: That God had not been unjuſt indeed, if he had permitted him to fall into great Sin, and ſo to perish, who committed the leaſt: for he ſo permitted *Adam* to commit the ſin that was before innocent: But the Juſtice of God bound him not ſo to do: nor would have damned a Lover of God, for a ſmall Sin, no more than now: That we muſt not feign a Law which we cannot prove: That God changeth not his holy Nature, and therefore not that Law which is the expreſſion of it: That Chriſt died for all Sin, and all need pardon; but that proveth not that the leaſt deſerved death, much leſs Hell; but that by Chriſt's Death the deſerved puniſhment muſt be remitted; that all, even Infants, are guilty of mortal Sin in *Adam*: That Death is the wages of that Sin which brought it, but not of the leaſt: That *Adam*'s Law was not ſeverer than that by *Moſes*, which ſaith, *Do this and live*, and yet condemned not men for ſmaller ſins; That God proclaimeth pardon of ſome Sin, in the very Law of Nature as from his Nature, *Exod.* 34. and the Second Commandment, That Nature teacheth all the World to believe it: That God ſaid not to *Adam*, [In the day that thou thinkeſt a vain thought,] but [That *thou eateſt*,] &c. That mortal Sin is pardonable by Chriſt which elſe could not by the firſt Law: but God could otherwiſe have pardoned a vain thought, if he would: That no Text of Scripture ſaith, that every Sin deſerveth Hell, nor is threatned with Death.]

And as the condition of the Penalty, ſo the condition of the Promiſe to *Adam* is here alſo controverted by Divines: 1. Some ſay that the condition of Life was perſonal, perfect, perpetual Obedience till his change; which God would make as he did by *Henoch* when it pleaſed him: (which ſeemeth to me the probableſt Opinion).

2. Others think that *Adam* was to have continued in *Eden* for ever under that ſame conditional Law (which is leſs probable.)

3. Others think, that had he over-come the firſt temptation, but ſo far as to *adhere* and *vanquiſh*, that is, to continue the love of God, and not to eat that Fruit, or commit any other mortal Sin, which of its nature killeth Love, he had been *confirmed*, as the promiſed Reward.

4. I have lately met with an exceeding ingenious *M. S.* (written partly againſt my ſelf, after others) which aſſerteth, 1. That the Glory of Juſtice is the end of Gods Government. 2. That *Do this* (perfectly) *and live*, or *Sin* (at all) and *die*, are the conſtant terms of Juſtice under every Covenant. 3. That if *Adam* had performed but *one Act of Obedience*, by that Law, he ſhould have been rewarded with confirmation, or the Holy Ghoſt (as the Angels) and with everlaſting life. 4. That now all our Reward is only the Act of Gods Juſtice, giving us life, as merited by us in Chriſt on the terms of the Law that ſaith, *Do this and*

and live, *Sin and die*; in whom we are perfectly innocent and rewardable; and we have no rewardable Righteousnes, nor any to justifie us, but *perfect Innocency* imputed; because as not to be a Sinner is no *merit* of a Reward, so *pardon of Sin* is no *Title* to a Reward, *&c.*

It is not my present task to clear up all these Difficulties, (having done more towards it in my *Methodus Theologiæ*); but only so much as our present conciliatory work requireth: But yet because I and the matter in hand are nearly concerned in the *M. S.* I shall briefly animadvert on all the substance of it; having first said of the *condition* of the penalty but a few words.

1. I am loth to confound the *certainties* with the *uncertainties*, in this matter. 1. It is *certain*, that Gods *Law of Nature was mans first and principal Law*; to which the *supernatural Revelations* were added, and comparatively few.

2. It is *certain* that *Gods Law was perfect*, and that both as the *impress* and *expression* of Gods perfect Wisdom and Holiness, and as the *Rule of Perfection* to *Adam*: And therefore that it obliged him to *perfection*.

3. But this *Perfection* to which he was obliged, was not *at first*, all that his nature would be capable of *at last*; It was not his duty the *first hour* of his life, to *Know* or *Do* as much as after the longest time and experience, and as much as in *heavenly perfection*: But he was bound to *Know*, and *Love*, and *Do* at first, as much as at that time his nature was capable of, supposing necessary Concauses and Objects.

4. This is summed up in, *Loving God with all the Heart, Mind and Might*. But the *All* in *maturity* and after full experience, and in *Glory*, is more than the *All* in unexperienced juniority. To *know, love* and *obey God*, to the *utmost intention* of his present *natural Power*, supposing due Objects, *media* and concauses, was *Adam's* duty and all defectiveness herein was culpable, or sin.

5. All sin of its own nature deserveth punishment: Therefore so would the least culpable thought or word in *Adam*, or the least culpable defect in the *extent* or *intention* of any holy affection in him.

6. It is certain that *Adam's* eating the forbidden Fruit, or any one *such sin* as consisteth not with the predominancy of his Love to God as God, in habit, such as is now inconsistent with true Grace, and is called *mortal*, was to be punished with death temporal and eternal, according to the Justice of that Law.

7. They are different questions, 1. What *God might do*. 2. What he *would do*, (as *decreed*). 3. What he *must do*, (as *necessary* because of *Justice* or *Veracity*), to the breaker of that Law. And it is clear that God *might*, as an Act of *Justice*, punish the *least culpable thought*, or *remissness* of *degree of Love*, with *Annihilation*, or with any pain-everlasting, which to the Sinner were no worse than Annihilation. Because, 1. *Antecedently to his Law*, he might have done *that much* as an affliction without sin. 2. And after he did no way (that I know of) oblige himself to the contrary to a Sinner, before the Covenant of Grace. 3. And having threatned punishment in general, he might choose what punishment he saw fit.

8. What God *would* do as decreed, the *prediction* or the *event* only can tell us.

9. That God *must* (by necessity of *Justice* and *Truth*) punish the *least* sinful *thought* or remissness, with *some degree* of *punishment*, according to *that Law*, seemeth to me somewhat clear.

1. And yet it is more clear that it is *various degrees* of punishment which are comprized in the word [*Death*] or [*Filius mortis*] in the threatning; And that we cannot say, that *Justice* made it *necessary* to God to punish the least vain thought or remissness with the greatest punishment, or damnation.

But (as to the uncertainties) 1. With what degree of punishment God in *Justice must*, or *would* have punished a vain thought, or any sin consistent with his habitual prevalent love? 2. Or whether a vain thought must needs have separated Soul and Body, or caused that which we call Hell? 3. Or whether God could in Justice have *pardoned* that *vain thought*, upon *less satisfaction* than the sufferings of Christ? These with many others are questions too hard for me, whatever they may be to wiser men.

But I am satisfied that God would never have damned in Hell any Soul that had the *habitual predominant love of God*, though *culpably remiss*, and otherwise sinful, while he remained such; yea that Hell and such love of God are inconsistent: And therefore if any such sin would have damned *Adam*, it must be by further quenching and expelling the Spirit of Grace, or forfeiting and losing Divine assistance, and so first losing that habit of love. The rest I leave to the more illuminated.

II. Now as to the *M. S.* (said to be written by a young man of *New England*, deceased, *M. W.*) it hath so much accurateness, that in reading it, I greatly lament the Authors death, before *maturity* and *converse* had rectified some of his notions, and he had longer improved his excellent understanding for the Church. And because my Doctrine is particularly opposed in it, I shall stay to animadvert on the substance of the Book.

And it may be reduced to these Propositions.

1. The great fundamental point of it is, That *man was made to glorifie Gods Justice for ever.*

Animad. This is a great *truth*, not well considered by many: But it is but a *part of the truth*, which is, That *man was made to glorifie Gods Vital Power, Wisdom* and *Love*, and is *governed* eminently by *Wisdom*, making ORDER, and *justly* keeping it, together with *mercy*, because the glory of *Holiness* and *Love* also is the end. Which I have more carefully opened hereafter.

§. 2. M. S. *The reason of special government is*, That *man is* causa consilio; *Though as he desireth and seeketh good in general, he is but a natural Agent: And therefore* Twisse *erreth in saying, that God may punish an innocent man, because he may afflict a beast.*

Ans. 1. By *causa consilio* he meaneth *a rational free Agent*, having an *Intellect* and *Free-will*; This indeed maketh and proveth man a *subject* made to be *morally* governed. But when he had laid all his stress on this *Free-will* under the name of *causa consilio*, he went too far in seeming with *Gibieuf* (whom he citeth and followeth as his great Light) to confine the *name* of true *liberty* to the *Amplitude* and *Holiness of the Will*, which is *another kind of Liberty*: And (as *Armatus* truly saith) *Gibieuf* was fitter for a seraphick pious Discourse (in a Platonick strain) than for such Controversies. 2. As *Rada* and other *Scotists* well prove, there is no Act of the Will, even to *good* in general, which is not *free*, though some be *necessary*, and the *inclination* is *natural* and not *free*. 3. Yea he proveth, that there is no such thing as a *Volition* of any good *in genere*, saving as the generical nature of good is found in some *particular* (*in esse cognito.*) 4. *Twisse* was not so weak as to call that *punishment*

ment which is not *for ſin*, but calleth it *Affliction* or *Cruciatum* only. And he ſpeaketh not what God may do by his *ordinate Will:* But I think that you are in the right, and he in the wrong, becauſe the very *making us men*, and ſo *governed Subjects*, is a declaration of Gods ordinate Will, not to make us miſerable but for ſin.

3. *M. S.* Adam's *whole man was ſanctified*, and *ſo fitted to obey*, and to *glorifie Juſtice: His free-will was not an indifferency*, but (as *Gib.*) *that noble virtue of his Soul, by which he could go above all created good, ſo that Liberty* and *Eupraxy* or *Obedience are all one: But we cannot ſtir an inch to God, above the Creature. Liberty is to imitate God, whoſe Will cloſeth with himſelf, and reſteth in himſelf for ever: And mutability is but an adjunct of our Liberty.*

An. I have better opened and diſtinguiſhed Liberty before, *Lib.* 1. *Natural Liberty* is to be diſtinguiſhed from *moral*, which you deſcribe; and vehemently aſſert the former under the name of *cauſa conſilio* that *cannot be forced:* But meer *indifferency* or *mutability* is no *Liberty* it ſelf.

4. *M. S.* Adam *was not made with notions in his Mind, no more than with colours in his Eyes; but he was made able and fit to ſee God in the frame of Nature, eſpecially in his own Will, as inclined to univerſal good---.*

An. Scaliger and others think, that Idea's are born in us, which maketh the Chicken fly at the ſhadow of the Kite, *&c.* But I rather ſay as you, that it is but a *Diſpoſition*; which will ſo eaſily act, that ſome call it an *Idea*, and it is the ſame thing that they mean while they differ about the name.

§. 5. M. S. *Do this and live*, is the way that Juſtice will be glorified in: And that *doing would merit life*, Adam *either knew by nature, or ſupernaturally, at leaſt was confirmed in it by ſupernatural revelation.*

An. This is all true.

§. 6. M. S. *Do this and live, as the only terms of life* are a *Catholick* and *Theological axiom: Not the words; but Energetick Wiſdom printed on the frame. And the meaning is, cloſe with the laſt end; or with the true Univerſal God as ſuch, which is the ſum of the Decalogue: Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. *The Wills cloſing with God: And Obedience is in the ſubordinate faculties executing the pleaſure of the Will.*]

An. 1. Obedience is firſt in the Will it ſelf. 2. *You do not intelligibly acquaint us whether by* [*Do this*] you mean any *ſincere cloſing with God as God and our End, above all Creatures*, as the godly now do, though with culpable *remiſsneſs* and *imperfections*; or only the moſt *perfect Love* and *Obedience*, without any imperfection or remiſsneſs, or vain irregular thought that is culpable. But by [*Do this*] I perceive you mean, *Take God for thy God, and love, adore, and truſt him.*

§. 7. M. S. *This was to be expreſſed by eating of the Tree of Life, and not of that of Good and Evil, ſacramentally, to acknowledge alſo the Soveraignty of God.*

An. 1. All Obedience formally reſpecteth Gods Soveraignty. 2. No doubt the Trees were ſymbolical, and the remembrance of them ſhould yet teach us to prefer *living to God*, before a *ſelfiſh, diſturſiful, needleſs* knowledge; the increaſe of which increaſeth ſorrow. 3. But that *Adam* was *commanded* to eat of the Tree of *Life*, I cannot prove, unleſs the general obligation to *chooſe the beſt* was as a Command.

§. 8. M. S. *To be naturally happy is proper to God: therefore* Adam *was to be led to it freely by a Covenant.*

An.

An. To be happy neceſſarily, and independently, and primarily, is proper to God: But you can never prove it any contradiction or impoſſible for God to make a *Creature naturally happy*; nor that there are not ſuch.

§. 9. Here the *M. S.* citeth ſome words of his *Gibieuf*, making our *Being in God initially, and finally to be our ſtate of amplitude and liberty, and our going out from God, to be our particularity and ſtate of neceſſity; as if we were pre-exiſtent in God, and our individuation ceaſed upon our return into him as our End.*

An. But theſe are *Platonick* Phantaſms; And *Gibieuf* who was a devout Oratorian, and talketh too oft of our Deification, as *Benedictus de Benedictis*, *Barbanſon*, *Baker*, and other Fryers that talk phanatically, muſt be read with *caution* and *exception*; and as the Soul need not fear too near a Union with God, as the loſs of its individuation, ſo neither muſt it *deſire* or *hope* for ſuch.

§. 10. M. S. *An unchangeable ſtate of Happineſs in the love of God, is called Eternal Life.*

An. No doubt but that is called *Eternal Life* in the fulleſt ſenſe, which actually endureth to eternity as to that particular Subject: And ſo, 1. The life of Glory perfectively. 2. And a confirmed ſtate of Sanctity here initially, are uſually called *Eternal Life.* But 3. Whether the loſſable ſtate, which the Angels fell from, and *Adam* fell from, or that meaſure of Grace, which the ancient Fathers thought the juſtified may fall from, be never ſo called alſo, I cannot prove.

§. 11. *M. S.* Adam's *promiſed Happineſs, was, 1. Eſſential, in the perfect holineſs or love of God. 2. Complemental, in the enjoying God in all the ſanctified Creatures in that Paradiſe, but not to be tranſlated to Heaven, which Chriſt only procureth us.*

An. I inclined to that Opinion 26 years ago, when I wrote the *Aphoriſms* which you oppoſe: But I now incline more to the contrary, and rather think *man ſhould have been tranſlated to Heaven as* Henoch *and* Elias *were*, upon many reaſons, which I now paſs by: Though I take it yet to be ſcarce certain to us.

§. 12. M. S. *The Holineſs of God, is his loving himſelf as his End; And the third Perſon proceeding by a reflex act of the infinite Will and ſelf-love of God, is therefore called the Holy Spirit.*

An. 1. This notion of *Gods Holineſs* (that it is his *Self-love*) is not to be contemned; It ſeemeth to be ſo, with this limitation, that you *confine* not his *Holineſs* to this, but take this only as the *moſt eminent* among the inadequate conceptions of it: For his whole *Tranſcendency*, in *Being*, *Life* and *Knowledg*, as being *adoreable* by the *Creature*, and its *End*, and the *Fountain* of all created Goodneſs, and ſpecially of Morality, is alſo Gods *Holineſs.* 2. But the ſaying that *God is his own End*, ſeemeth improper, though tolerable if ſpoken but analogically: For God neither *hath* nor *is* to himſelf a *Cauſe* nor an *Effect*, a *Beginning* nor *an End.* 3. That the third Perſon proceedeth by a reflex Act of the *infinite Will*, *many* School-men boldly ſay: And ſo ſome ſay, that he is *Gods actual ſelf-love*, which is the ſame that you call his Holineſs: And ſome ſay, that he is the Divine *Will* or *Love* conſidered in it ſelf, as diſtinct from *Vital Power*, and *Intellect* (or *Wiſdom.*) But of this I have ſpoken more largely elſe-where.

§. 13. *M. S.* Adam's *promiſed Reward was, to be fixed in an unchangeable ſtate of pleaſing God, by this Holy Spirit: not by infuſing any new quality which ſhould unchangeably faſten him to the Rule, (for no created thing can unchangeably keep a man from falling.)*

An.

An. 1. The promiſe to *Adam* is very obſcure: But *Happineſs* it muſt needs be, and *everlaſting*: 2. But it is paſt my reach to conceive how the *Spirit* of God can fix man in perfect *holineſs* without any fixing *quality* (as it's called) on his Soul. A *conſtant Act* the Soul muſt have: And 1. If that Act be cauſed by any *Divine Impulſe*, *diſpoſing* the *Soul* ſo *to act*, then that *diſpoſition* is a *quality*. 2. And if there be not both *diſpoſition* and *habit*, then the Soul will not in Glory be habitually, or qualitatively holy, but only *actually*. 3. And a *habit-acting* being perfecter than an act without a *habit* (or inclination) the Soul will be more imperfect in Glory, than in this ſtate of Grace. 4. *Operari ſequitur eſſe*: God fitteth all his Creatures to their works. And as when he will give Immortality, he will give a Nature fit for Immortality, even indiſſoluble and incorruptible; ſo when he giveth perpetuity of Love, he giveth a *nature* or *habits* fit for perpetual Action. Chriſt ſaith, *A good Tree bringeth forth good fruit, and an evil Tree evil fruit: Make the Tree good, and his fruit good.* 5. The *Operations* of Love in Glory, ſhould be *ex potentia aut violentia, aut neutra*, if there were no intrinſick *diſpoſition* or inclination to them. In a word, it is a contradiction, for a Soul to be perfectly holy, and not have the perfection of *inclination* to its *Acts*.

3. But if the meaning were, that no holy *quality alone* ſufficeth, without *Gods Influx*, that were no more than what muſt be ſaid of every Creature: without Divine Influx no Creature can *be* or *operate* a moment: No created thing of it ſelf, without God, can continue; How then ſhould it keep a man from falling: But if the *Soul* have any more *goodneſs* of *nature* or inclination in it than the Devils have, it muſt be a *created thing*, or *God himſelf*: If only *God*, that proveth not a *Saint* to be *himſelf* better than a Devil, as to nature or diſpoſition, but only that *God in him* is better.

His reaſon why the Sun is naturally fixed to its Operations, but not a glorified Soul, is (§. 14. M. S.) *that one is a natural, and the other a voluntary Agent: One, as* Gibieuf *ſaith, Non agit, ſed agitur, the other doth agere & non tantum agitur.*]

An. 1. *Gibieuf* and you were deceived, in thinking that ſuch *naturals non agunt*: Paſſive matter doth not Act *ex principio eſſentiali* (unleſs Dr. *Gliſſons* and *Campanellas* Doctrine hold true.) But the three *Active Natures*, *Intellectual*, *Senſitive* and *Vegetative* (and ſo Fire and the Sun) do *ex principio Activo eſſentali agere*: but nothing doth *Act*, without an Antecedent Influx to action from the firſt Cauſe, in which it is paſſive: For no Creature is Independent. 2. *Voluntas eſt quædam Natura, quamvis libera*: To move *naturally* only and not *freely* is proper to Agents meerly *natural*, diſtinct from *free*: But to *move freely*, and yet from a *fixed principle*, which ſhall *infallibly* determine the Soul to act freely, is not a contradiction; nor that which *Gibieuf* ſhould deny to the glorified.

§. 15. M. S. *Man, though a Creature, is the firſt Cauſe of his own action: He moveth and ſets himſelf on work: elſe he were not* cauſa conſilio: *But not immutable: elſe he were no Creature.*

An. You ſet up *Free-will* and *Power* more groſly in terms than I dare do, though, I ſuppoſe, our meaning is the ſame. Had I ſaid thus, what had I heard? I only ſay, that *man may be a cauſa prima ſecundum quid*, of the *moral ſpecification* or modification of his own Actions: But he is *ſimpliciter* no *cauſa prima* of the *Action in genere actionis*: elſe he were God. But a *cauſa principalis* he may be called, though not *prima*. 2. You never proved that *God cannot* make a Creature naturally immu-

immutable dependently on himself, that is, such as will never change unless God change them; nor that Jesus Christ is not such in his Humanity.

§. 16. M. S. *This confirmation is not by being in Heaven; but by the Holy Ghosts special working on the Soul, revealing still Gods Perfections to it.*

An. And doth this Operation of the Holy Ghost make the Soul never the better, in *nature or dispostion*, but only in Act? Though it's true, that no habits immutably fix without the Influct of the Holy Ghost.

§. 17. M. S. *Merit is the suitableness of the work to the wages.*

An. Merit is manifold, and needs better explication: In the *Commutative Justice* of meer *Proprietors*, merit is indeed the *Comparative* value of things, and in *works*, their suitableness as you say to the *wages*, that is, their *equal worth.* But in *distributive governing Justice*, there is no *wages*, but only *Reward:* And *merit* is the *moral aptitude for Reward:* which is as *various* as the *Law* is that one is governed by: There are five sorts of Law, that by five *sorts* or ways of *Justice*, require five sorts of *merit:* 1. Gods Law of *Innocency to Adam:* where *Justice* called nothing, but *personal perfect* Obedience, *Merit:* 2. Gods Law to the *Mediator*, who was obliged perfectly to keep, 1. The whole Law of Nature. 2. The Law of *Moses.* 3. A peculiar Law of Mediation (to die, rise, do Miracles, *&c.*) The keeping of *all this* was *Christs Merit.* 3. There is *Christ's Law of Grace to fallen man* (in the *first*, and in the *perfect* Editions,) where *our keeping of it*, is by *Gospel-Justice* called in Scripture ἀξία, our *worthiness* or *merit*, that is, *in tantum, secundum quid*, in relation to that Law. That is to *repent* and *believe*, to *love God* and *obey him sincerely.* 4. There is the Law of *Moses*, peculiar to the *Jews*, which hath its peculiar required merit. 5. And there are the *Laws of Men* appointed and allowed of God, which have their peculiar Justice and Merit. All these are not to be confounded, much less all denied, as if there were no merit but between *Proprietors* in *Commutative Justice*; In which sense no Creature can *merit* of God.

§. 18. M. S. *According to that Covenant, any one Act of Obedience in* Adam *would have merited confirmation and eternal life; that is, one act of holy love.*

An. I believe it not, because it is not written, nor naturally revealed, that I know of. My reasons against it are, 1. It is dangerous to add to Gods Word.

2. The words [*In the day that thou eatest thou shalt die*] seemeth to look further than to one first act or day, and is as much as *whensoever thou eatest*; though he should obey till that time.

3. It is utterly improbable that *Adam* did not perform one Act of Love or Obedience before his Fall. For, 1. We are uncertain how long he stood; However confident some *Rabbins*, and *Broughton* and some others are, that it was the same day in which he was created. 2. You confess he was made with *powers sanctified* and *fitted* to obey. 3. Gods Law of Love was written in his heart, and as old as himself; and could not but oblige a fit subject to the act. And he must sin all that while that he loved not God as God. 4. He had many *thoughts* and *affections* all that while; which were sinful if not animated by holy Love, and done in Obedience to God. 5. He spent some time, which was sinfully spent, if not spent in Love and Obedience. 6. God spake to him, and so had sensible Communion with him, which must needs oblige

oblige him to ſome love. 7. He had a Law given him to dreſs and keep the Garden, which if he accepted not by conſent in Obedience to God, he ſinned. 8. He gave names to all the Creatures upon Gods bringing them to him; which muſt be done *obediently* or ſinfully. 9. He had the Law of Marriage given him, with the Woman; which if he received not in love and obedience he ſinned. 10. He had all the World before him to ſhew him Gods Perfections, and if yet he had not one act of love to God as God, he hainouſly ſinned. 11. He had the Law of Love and Obedience given him by way of *Covenant*, that is, binding him preſently to *conſent*; And he could not delay a *willing conſent* one minute or hour without ſin: And *conſent* is Love and Obedience in the firſt act. 12. He loved *himſelf*, and his *Wife*, and other *Creatures* before his Fall: But if he *loved not God before*, then he all that while loved himſelf, his Wife, and all the Creatures more than God, yea without God: And then they were his Idols. 13. Elſe he never uſed one Creature holily before his Fall, and therefore ſinfully. 14. You make *Adam* to have had leſs actual good before his Fall than the weakeſt Chriſtian now; If not than many wicked men; who have ſome moral good *ſecundum quid*, though not *ſimpliciter*.

4. I do not think that the Reward *which Chriſt was to have* for *his fulfilling the Law* was *immutability* or *confirmation*: For I think he had *that in his very nature*, by the Unity of the Divine and Humane in one Perſon. But I think that the *perfect Glory* of his *Humanity* was part of his Reward, *Phil.* 2. 7, 8, 9. *Heb.* 12. 23, &c. And therefore that *Glory* hath much more in it, than *confirmation* in *Grace*: But it's plain in the Goſpel, that it was not only *one Act* of *Obedience*, which was *Chriſts condition*, in order to his receiving the Fruits or full Reward of his Merits: But it was *perfect Holineſs* of *Nature* and *Life* to the *end* of his *courſe* on *Earth*. Elſe you muſt ſay that Chriſt's firſt Act of Obedience was his performance of his Covenant-Condition, and all the reſt for ſome other purpoſe only; which is abſurd.

5. One act of our Obedience now is not the fulfilling of all the Condition of the Covenant of Grace, nor entitleth us alone to Glory, unleſs God cut off our life as ſoon as that act is done: Perſeverance to the end is part of our Condition of Glory. And we know of no ſuch difference between *Adam*'s Covenant or Caſe and ours, as will prove it otherwiſe with him.

6. Elſe it would make the Conditions of the Covenant of Grace to be much harder and ſeverer than of the Law of Innocency; which is not likely: To perform *one* act of Love and Obedience, is not ſo hard as to do it to the death, though we loſe our lives in the expreſſions of it.

Object. *But our firſt Faith giveth us Right to the Spirit of Confirmation and Immutability, though more muſt be done for Perfection.*

Anſw. 1. It appeareth then that Perfection and Glory is more than Confirmation. 2. It is certain, that the Regenerate are *mutable* as to the degrees of Grace, and are far from Perfection at the firſt. 3. The generality of the Fathers and ancient Churches thought that true Juſtification, and Right to Heaven, and true Love to God, was loſt by many: And *Auſtin* himſelf and his Followers ſo thought. 4. And they that think otherwiſe yet know, that Glory is ſtill given us (*quoad jus* in the Promiſe) on condition of our perſeverance: And we ſhould hardly find ſo many Threatnings againſt them that fall away, if all might ſo eaſily know that the firſt act of Obedience doth ſo fix us, and give us in juſtice a Right to Immutability.

§. 19. M. S. *The Arguments to prove that any one Act had the promiſe of Immutability and Glory are theſe,* Argument 1. *If God were to declare his rewarding Juſtice, then he muſt reward one act.* Thus *Bradwardine* alſo chideth his Maſter *Lombard*, as inclining to *Pelagius*, for holding that *Adam* could have forborn Sin by his Free-will, without Gods ſpecial Grace, that is, his Will that ſo it ſhould be: which he ſaith was neceſſary before the Fall as well as ſince: and that elſe *Adam* by once not ſinning, when tempted, had merited Confirmation, as he ſaith the Angels did, being tempted by *Leviathan*, *lib.* 2. *c.* 10.

An. 1. God was not obliged to any Reward, but according to the tenor of his Law. Prove that his Law promiſed Glory or Immutability for one act? 2. *Bonum eſt ex cauſis integris:* one act is but a ſmall part of a mans life. The Promiſe was to the *whole* courſe only. 3. God did reward every act: His acceptance, and the continuance of all the bleſſings of that Paradiſe, and the comfort of his Love, was a great Reward.

§. 20. M. S. *If one act of Obedience deſerved unchangeable Happineſs, then God muſt beſtow it. But,* &c.]

An. I deny the minor: One act deſerved it not. No act deſerved in Commutative Juſtice: And no act deſerved it of governing Juſtice, but ſuch as the Law antecedently made it due to.

§. 21. M. S. *Merit, it is a ſuitableneſs of the work to the wages. They that pleaſe God are under his good pleaſure; the fruit of which muſt be in enjoying of his Spirits infinite aſſiſtance. This* Adam *might have claimed of Juſtice, and gloried: for one act deſerveth a Reward.*]

An. This is ſufficiently anſwered; 1. *Wages* ſtrictly taken is *Merces* given by a Proprietary commutatively: It's blaſphemy to ſay that God can owe any Creature ſuch, for he can receive nothing but his own. The word when uſed to us, is improperly taken: But *præmium* a Reward we have; but no work deſerveth that, but by the *ordinate Juſtice* of the Law. Some few *Papiſts* talk of a *dignity ex proportione operis*, but the *Scotiſts* and the *wiſeſt* of them deny any but, 1. *Ex congruitate.* 2. *Ex pacto.* Your *ſuitableneſs* may ſignifie either, 1. A *congruity ad fines regiminis*; or elſe *ad præmium qua promiſſum:* And thus it's true: But it's not proved that any *one act was* ſuch. 2. Or it may ſignifie a *ſuitableneſs in proportion ex ſimplici dignitate operis*, obliging the Governor antecedently to his Law. 2. Or obliging God as Proprietor to compenſation; And ſo it is untrue, that Merit is a ſuitableneſs of the work to the wages, here.

2. It's unproved that Gods pleaſedneſs muſt ever be ſhewed by the Spirits infinite aſſiſtance: or that one act deſerved this. It's unlike that the Angels that kept not their firſt ſtate, did never one act of Obedience, nor were never under Gods approbation; Prov. 16. 7. *When a mans ways pleaſe the Lord, he maketh his Enemies to be at peace with him:* God ſaith, This is a Reward: You ſay leſs than eternal life is none; 1 King. 3. 10. *The ſpeech of* Solomon *pleaſed the Lord:* And yet one would think by his filthineſs, and Idolatry, and forſaking God, that he was not glorified, nor made immutable. *With the Sacrifice of Alms God is well pleaſed,* Heb. 13. 16. Phil. 4. 18. and with Relation-Duties, *Col.* 3. 20. And yet all that did them (even ſincerely) were not glorified then, nor abſolutely immutable.

§. 22. M. S. Arg. 2. *Unchangeable miſery would have been the reward of one ſin:* Ergo, &c.]

An. I deny the consequence: Misery was threatned to one sin; Glory was not promised to one act of Obedience. Obedience, during life, is certainly due from Man to God: He that denieth it him in one act, denieth him his due: But he that giveth it him in one act, giveth him but little of his due. Your Argument is like these: The Souldier that is a Traytor in one act, deserveth death: Therefore he that watcheth or fighteth but once deserveth all his wages and honour. The Son that curseth his Father once, deserveth punishment: Therefore he that obeyeth him once deserveth the Inheritance. He that is bound to pay an hundred pound forfeiteth his Bond if he leave a penny unpaid: Therefore he forfeits it not if he pay but a penny: The Servant that is hired for a day or year, doth forfeit his wages if he be idle or rebel an hour or a day: Therefore he deserveth his wages, if he do Service but an hour or a day: The disease of one part may kill a man: Therefore the health of one part only will keep a man alive. He that is hired to build a House or a Ship well, forfeits his wages for one hole, or gross defect: Therefore he deserveth his wages if he lay but one Brick or Board. But *bonum est ex causis integris.*

§. 23. M. S. *His Sin is more his own than his Obedience.* Ans. *The assistance of the Spirit could not take place in the first act, because not deserved: And his Obedience would have been as much his own as his Sin.*

An. This is quite beyond the *Jesuites*: 1. It's true that the *rewarding* gift or help of the Spirit (for confirmation) *was* not given *Adam* to his first act: But it's not true that he had *no help* of the Spirit: If you will not call Gods necessary Grace, which you said did *sanctifie* all his powers, by the name of the *Spirits help*; you must say, It was the help of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; without which he could have done nothing. 2. But can you think that God did as much to *his Sin*, as to his Sanctification; and caused it as much as he was ready to cause his first Obedience? Should he have been no more beholden to God for his Holiness than for his Sin? This is too indifferent a Liberty, and not *Gibieus* Amplitude. It is not possible for a Creature to have any thing that's good but of God, nor any good from God but by meer free Gift, as to the *Good* or *Value*; though it be by rewarding Justice *quoad ordinem conferendi*, and comparatively, why this man hath it rather than that.

§. 24. M. S. *There is no stinting or determining, unless you stop here (at the first act.)*

An. I deny it: There are three Opinions more that are all more probable. The first which supposeth the Reward of life eternal due upon the over-coming of the Devils first temptation, which would have drawn from the Love of God; And so [*Love and Conquer once*] was the Condition. The second which supposeth that the Condition was the Conquest of *this particular Temptation*, to eat of the forbidden Fruit, and the after eating of the Tree of Life. The third which supposeth the only Condition of life eternal to the *personal*, *perfect*, *perpetual Obedience*, or perseverance, till God of his own pleasure should translate *Adam*, and end his life of trial. I take this last to have far most probability, for all the Reasons before given: I am sure that the tenor of the Law of Nature made it *Adam's Duty* still to love God, and obey him, and resist all that was against it: And I find no Promise that his *Nature*, or the Law of Nature should be changed, for this or that act, or for conquering some one temptation. I find that

Chriſt's own Covenant-Condition was more than one act: And the Condition of our Glory is *overcoming*, and being *faithful to the death*, and *continuing in Chriſt*. And I will not add to the Covenant of God.

§. 25. M. S. Arg. 4. *From the nature of an obediental act: which includeth the approving of the whole Law.*

An. 1. *Approving the things that are excellent*, is made conſiſtent with wickedneſs, *Rom.* 2. But I will ſuppoſe you to mean a full *conſent* to the *Covenant* of *Innocency*. But 2. How prove you that ſuch *conſent* was the whole condition of life, and that it might not be fallen from? and that *Adam* never did conſent before his Fall? and yet not ſin. 3. All the godly approve of Gods Law, and conſent to it, and love it, and yet merit not as keepers of it; for they break it, *Rom.* 7. 4. Yet *Covenant-keeping* to *the laſt*, as well as *Covenant-conſent the firſt* moment, is now to us the condition of immutable Glory.

§. 26. M. S. *Adam would not obey at firſt, but ſuſpend while he looked about the World, to ſee if there were any good ſufficient for him below God: Therefore he ſinned not then.*

An. This is before confuted: He could not in that Integrity, and after ſuch divine Revelation, be unreſolved one hour whether he muſt firſt love and obey his Maker, without ſin.

§. 27. *God cannot freely give eternal life to a Creature without Reward for doing, becauſe the reaſonable Creature was made for the Glory of Juſtice.*

An. 1. You may ſay, that *God will not to man*, but not that he *cannot*, nor that he doth not to any Angel. For man was not made *only* for the *Glory* of *Juſtice*, but of *Power*, and *Love*, or *Goodneſs* alſo. 2. It's certain, that God as a *free Benefactor giveth many good things freely, and not as a Reward for doing:* As 1. He ſo freely made all things good in the Creation, and gave man all his antecedent good: He ſo gave *Adam* his primitive Holineſs, and Helps, and Paradiſe, and all the Creatures. 2. He ſo gave Chriſt to the World, without deſert: and ſo far pardoned the firſt ſin, as that cometh to. 3. He ſo far gave man the Covenant of Grace. 4. He ſo gave all Chriſt's Miracles, Reſurrection, Doctrine, the Scripture, *&c.* 5. He ſo gave Apoſtles and Miniſtry to the World. 6. He ſo ſendeth the Goſpel to ſome Nations and Perſons above others. 7. He ſo giveth to many the firſt ſpecial Grace, as he did to *Paul*. 8. He ſo giveth to many Kingdoms and Perſons Wealth, and Health, and Strength, and ſuch other mercies above others. 9. He ſo giveth greater meaſures of Grace to ſome than to others. 10. And it ſeemeth that he ſo (in part) giveth the ſame Glory to ſome that came in but at the laſt hour of the day. It is certain, that all *in quantum tale*, is from God only as a free Benefactor, or as the *Amor primus*: And the *order* of diſtributing it is two-fold: Some antecedent to mans merit or acts, and independent on it: And this is no Reward, (though ſometime it is an antecedent act of Juſtice, ſuch as is the making of a good Law or Promiſe.) And ſome conſequent *juxta mormandegis*; And theſe are Rewards: And though God hath aſſured us now, that no man ſhall have Heaven but by rewarding Juſtice, yet that may be, becauſe he thought meet to place man firſt on Earth in a life of trial, and undetermined Liberty: But that he hath no Angel that was made Immutable, or that Chriſt was not made immutably holy, let them ſay that can prove it, for I cannot.

§. 28. M. S. *It's like that the Angels that ſtood and they that fell had unequal help: for unequal Effects are of an unequal Cauſe.* *But* Adam *and the Devils*

Devils had ſufficient Grace, and God forſook them not till they forſook him.

An. 1. This laſt I accept as true, and more than ſome will grant. 2. The firſt is above our reach: only we can ſay, both that God giveth more Grace to ſome than to others freely. 3. And yet he himſelf is ſimple and immutable in cauſing of various and mutable Effects.

§. 29. M. S. *By Chriſts paſſive Obedience imputed we are pardoned and juſtified, and by his active imputed we deſerve the Reward, and are under Gods approving Will.*

An. 1. By the *merit* of his *habitual*, *active* and *paſſive*, that is, of his performing all his mediatorial Covenant with the Father, we are *pardoned*, and *juſtified*, and *adopted to eternal life*, *principally* as a *Reward to Chriſt* (not *to us* as *meriting by him*) and *ſubordinately*, according to Goſpel-Juſtice or Order, as a Reward to Believers for their *Faith* and *Obedience*; by him who will Reward every man according to his Works, and will be glorified in his Saints, and admired in Believers, *becauſe* they believed, 2 *Theſſ.* 1. 6, *to* 12. We are *under Gods approving Will*, *principally* as *united* to Chriſt, reconciled, juſtified, adopted; and ſubordinately as *ſanctified* and *obedient*. For the *Father loveth us*, *becauſe we have loved Chriſt and believed*, Joh. 16. 27. *And it is life eternal to know the Father and the Son*, Joh. 17. 3. *And becauſe we do thoſe things that are pleaſing in his ſight*, *what-ever we ask we receive*, 1 Joh. 3. 22.

§. 30. M. S. *By Chriſts imputed ſuffering we are but where we were: For the Law to have nothing againſt us will not juſtifie us, unleſs it have ſomething for us.*

An. This great queſtion needeth diſtincter handling: *Adam's* Law doth not juſtifie us, but condemn us, nor *Moſes's* neither; nor any but the Law of Grace. Your foundation is unſound. 2. The *imputing of Chriſt's Suffering*, is not Gods Language, but your own, and may be well or ill underſtood. 3. If the Law have nothing againſt us, it hath no Sin of Omiſſion againſt us: Therefore not our omiſſion of Love and Obedience. And then we are reputed ſuch as had perfect Love and Obedience. 4. But indeed it is not ſo. By the deeds of the Law no Fleſh can be juſtified: The Law ſtill hath this againſt us, that *we have ſinned*; which he that denieth is called *a Lyar*, 1 *Joh.* 1. The *Reatus Culpæ in ſe*, or the *Reality* of this, that *we have ſinned*, is impoſſible to be done away. But the *Reatus pœnæ*, *& culpæ ut ad pœnam* is done away: But not by the Law, but by the Redeemer and new Covenant. The Law doth not ſay, *We are ſinleſs*, or *deſervers of life*: But the Goſpel ſaith, *We are pardoned*, and *adopted*, and *ſanctified*, through Chriſt's perfect meritorious Righteouſneſs.

§. 31. M. S. *Elſe Sin and Puniſhment ſhould be the cauſe of life: for Sin is the cauſe of Suffering, and that of Pardon.*

An. This is the groſſeſt paſſage in this Book; A palpable fallacy. You may as well ſay that *Lazarus's dying* and *being buried* were the cauſes of his reviving; becauſe antecedent evils from which he was revived: Or that the *Jews* killing Chriſt were the cauſes of his Reſurrection; Or that *Peter's* cutting off *Malchus* Ear was the cauſe that Chriſt cured him; Or that *Peter's* denying Chriſt was the cauſe that Chriſt pardoned him. Sin deſerveth Puniſhment; but Puniſhment as ſuch deſerveth not Pardon or Life: They in Hell deſerve not Heaven. If God had threatened but a temporal Puniſhment; As a *years* ſickneſs, *&c.* this had not *deſerved* the following impunity, or peace, but only interrupted peace, the Sin deſerving this and no more. A Malefactor's ſcourging deſerveth not his

his after peace. And Christ's Suffering merited not our Pardon as re*puted our ſuffering*, *nor meerly* as *ſuffering*; For had *we ſuffered*, we had *not been pardoned*. But the *voluntary Suffering* of ſo *glorious and innocent a Perſon*, to *demonſtrate Juſtice*, *deſerved* our impunity and more, becauſe God would have it ſo, and it was a means *moſt apt* for this excellent end, to ſave loſt man, and to vindicate and glorifie the *Wiſdom*, *Truth* and *Juſtice* of the Univerſal King, and to demonſtrate the Goodneſs and Love of our great Benefactor. But ſufferings as *ſuch* do *merit* nothing; even *Chriſts own Sufferings merit* but as they are the *fruits* of *Obedience* and *voluntary conſent*, on the foreſaid accounts; much leſs do the ſufferings of the *Sinner merit*: For he is ſuppoſed involuntary in them; and it is God the Judge that is the Author of them as ſuch.

§. 32. M. S. *Elſe the Law ſhould be laid by, and life given without it.*

An. The root of all your Error is, That God giveth us life by the Law of Innocency or Works, and that we are juſtified by that Law; which is not true. God laid none of it by; but *man* by ſin made the *promiſſory* part (which *gave* life on condition of *perfect Obedience* and *Innocency*) to be impoſſible, or null: It ceaſed *ceſſante capacitate ſubjectorum*, by *mans* mutation, and not by Gods: But the preceptive part remaineth ſtill, as far as it reacheth materially the ſtate of Sinners. But man having made it impoſſible to be juſtified by the deeds of the Law, God made us a new Law or Covenant, according to which he judgeth Sinners, and by which he firſt giveth Righteouſneſs, and then according to it ſentenceth men as Righteous.

§. 33. M. S. *Juſtification of the Poſterity of* Adam *ſhould have been the ſame for ſubſtance as of Believers by Chriſt.* Adam's *one Act ſhould have confirmed all his Poſterity in him as a publick Perſon: The Covenant of Works and of Grace agree in juſtifying by imputed Righteouſneſs: but one of a Head by Generation, the other by a divine Perſon.*]

An. This is preſumptuous adding to Gods Word, in the very ſubſtance of the Covenants; yea and a flat contradiction of it 1. What Scripture telleth us, That all *Adam's* Poſterity ſhould have been confirmed in immutable Holineſs, if he had obeyed?

2. What Scripture ſaith, That *one Act* ſhould have done this?

3. What Scripture ſaith, That his *Righteouſneſs ſhould have been imputed to all his Poſterity? and they all accounted to have fulfilled the Law in him?* The Scripture tells us nothing of Gods purpoſe to make ſo ſuddain a change of his Law, as if he made it but for *one man*, yea for *one Act*, and then would make another to Rule the World by ever after: The Law ſaid (in ſenſe) [*Obey perfectly and live; Sin and die*]. Now if the Condition had been performed by *one Act*, or *one man*, for all the World that ever ſhould come of him to the laſt, and they all be born in the fixed poſſeſſion of the Reward, then the Law which giveth that Reward ſtill but conditionally hath no more place. As *in Hell*, God doth not ſay to the damned, *Obey* and *live*, ſo neither doth he ſay to them in *immutable Glory*, I give you *immutable Glory* if you will obey. The *means ceaſe* ſo far as the *end* is either *attained*, or *deſperately loſt*. He that ſaith, *Run well, and you ſhall have the prize: Fight well, and you ſhall be crowned; Overcome, and I will give you a Kingdom*; will not ſay the ſame to them, when after *running*, *fighting*, *overcoming*, they have received the *Prize*, the *Crown*, the *Kingdom*; (though *poſſibly* they may have the *continuance* on condition ſtill if that *continuance* was not alſo promiſed on the firſt *condition* alone.) So that you feign Gods Law to be incredibly mutable, if God ſaid by it to *Adam*, *Obey in one Act* (or

obey

obey thy ſelf) and thou and all thy Poſterity for that ſhall have the Reward: For then he can never be ſuppoſed to ſay the ſame again to *Adam*, or to any man: And yet you think you ſtand ſo much for the immutability of that Law, as that we muſt all be juſtified by it to the end.

Nay it ſeemeth that after *one Act* of Obedience, all the World ſhould have been under *no Covenant* any more; or no *promiſſory conditional Law*, but only *fixed* by *neceſſitating Light* and *Love*, as thoſe in Glory are: For when this *Condition* was fully performed, this Law or Covenant as conditional muſt needs ceaſe: And you imagine not, I ſuppoſe (at leaſt mention not) any other conditional Covenant that ſhould ſucceed it. And neceſſitation is not a Moral Law, ſuited to ſuch as you call *cauſæ conſilio* in this life. You would make all the World after one Act, to be if not lawleſs, yet *Comprehenſors* and not *Viators*; Profeſſors of life eternal, and not ſeekers, in a life of trial.

But I find not but that all *Adam*'s Poſterity ſhould have been born and lived under the ſame Law that he was made under: And all of them ſhould ſtill have heard, [*Obey and live, or Sin and die*]. And if *Adam* had obeyed till his tranſlation to Glory, or confirmation in the Reward, I find not in Scripture any Promiſe that this ſhould have been imputed to his Poſterity, as the full performance of the Condition of their Life or confirmed Happineſs: but that ſtill their own ſinning would have been a *poſſible thing*, and *death* would have been the wages of their Sin.

You ſeem not to ſet *Adam*'s Merits and imputed Righteouſneſs any higher than Chriſt's. And I am too ſure that the juſtified Members of Chriſt do *ſin*, and muſt aſk daily pardon; And whether or not they be confirmed againſt total Apoſtaſie, I am ſure few if any of them are confirmed againſt the poſſibility, or exiſtence, or futurity of Sin, And if you ſay that *Adam*'s Poſterity, though confirmed, ſhould have ſinned too, but ſhould have been pardoned as we are; It would be another preſumptuous addition and contradiction of Scripture, to aſſert Pardon without a *Saviour and a pardoning Covenant.*

3. *Adam*'s Obedience would have juſtified his *next iſſue* from this *falſe Accuſation*, [*You are born of a ſinful Parent, or not of a righteous Parent*]. But it would have juſtified no man againſt this Accuſation, [*You are perſonally a Sinner*, or *have not perſonally loved God and obeyed him*]. Therefore it would have juſtified any man againſt this Charge, [*You are to be condemned for* Adam's *ſin*]. But it would have juſtified no man againſt theſe Charges, [*You are to be condemned for your own perſonal Sin*; or, *you have no right to Glory by Gods Promiſe to the adult, which maketh their perſonal Obedience the Condition*].

4. And (though I cannot again here have time to deal with Confounders, who think that *Imputation* or *Juſtification* are words which have but *one ſenſe*,) I muſt ſay that even ſo, *Chriſt's Righteouſneſs* is not ſo *imputed* to any man, as to be to him inſtead of his *perſonal Obedience to the Law* or *Covenant* of *Grace which he is under*: But it will juſtifie any *Believer* from theſe Accuſations, [*You muſt be caſt into Hell for breaking the Law of Innocency*, or *you muſt be ſhut out of Heaven, becauſe you deſerved it not by perfect Obedience*; or *you have no perfect or ſufficient Saviour*; or *you are ſuch as God cannot pardon without wrong to his Truth, Wiſdom or Juſtice.*] It will juſtifie no man from any of theſe Charges, [*You are Sinners: you deſerve condemnation by the firſt Law: you are Impenitent, or Unbelievers, or Hypocrites*; or *have not performed the conditions*

tions of life in the Law of Grace.] The two first we must *confess*, and not justifie our selves by a denial: And against the last we must be justified by our own Repentance, Faith and sincere Obedience: He that will say to the Accuser, that chargeth him with final *Infidelity*, *Impenitency* or *Unholiness*; I am justified by the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, will but add to his sin.

5. There are all these differences between our Justification according to the first Law (had we been capable of it) and that which we now have. 1. One would have been by God as Creator and Legislator to the Innocent: The other by Christ as Redeemer and Legislator to the sinful World. 2. One would have been for *personal*, *perfect*, *persevering Obedience*: The other for *Christ's Merits*, as purchasing a free *Pardon* & *Grace* to penitent Believers, and upon our *own Faith* and *Repentance*, as the Conditions of the new Covenant. 3. One would have been without *pardon*; and the other chiefly or much *by pardon*: In one, if our Publick Root had perfectly obeyed, we must also have perfectly obeyed, or die. In the other, because *our Publick Root* did perfectly obey, *Faith* and *sinceere Obedience* to the end, is all that is required of us to our Glory. 4. In one the personal matter of worthiness or merit, must have been all that perfection which God in justice could require of man: In the other, it is only, The acceptance of a free Gift, according to its nature and use, and after the thankful use and improvement of it: with other such differences.

§. 34. M. S. *What Christ did as surety is imputed to us; but not his Suretiship, or being a publick Person.*]

Ans. This is true, if you understand Imputation in Scripture sense, or soundly, and not in their sense who presumptuously say, That God reputeth us to have done all by Christ, which he did for us in his Obedience to the Law.

§. 35. M. S. *Christ did not all that he did as Surety; but only that which answered the Law.*]

An. I suppose you mean, *that which the Law requireth of us*: But the word [*Surety*] is ambiguous, and after here explained, and whether you understood it *sano sensu* I know not. He did all that he did as the Mediator and Sponsor, for mans Redemption: And we are *pardoned* and *justified by* the *merit* of all his own Covenant-keeping with the Father; even of such acts as the Law required not of us: And some which the Law required of many, he did not, because it required them not of him.

§. 36. M. S. *The Law said not, That Christ must be a holy Husband or Father*, &c. *The Imputation of one Act of Christ's Obedience is sufficient* (to our Justification and Merit of life) *though it need not be curiously set in this or that part of his life.*]

§. Still more presumption; 1. Where saith the Scripture so? 2. You must not assert absurdities or presumptions, and then think to put off the detection of them, by calling it *curious*? If this be true, doubtless it was Christs *first act* of *Obedience* which *merited Glory* for us. And so it is that *first only* that must be imputed to us, to that end. And who ever thought so before you? The Fryars have some of them said, That *minima guttula sanguinis Christi, One drop of his blood was enough to redeem all the World*: And our Divines say, Why then was the rest shed? So I ask you, 1. Why did Christ do all the rest of his Obedience after the first Act? Hath none of it the same end and use? 2. How shall we be sure that a Sinner must not *plead* or *trust* to any of Christ's Righteousness,

neſs, but the firſt act for his *Juſtification* and *Reward?* or muſt he truſt for it to that which was never by Chriſt intended for it? 3. This is contrary to the Scripture, which layeth our Juſtification on his *whole Righteouſneſs* as *meritorious*, and on his *Obedience to the Death*, and on his *riſing again*, and on other parts firſt, *Rom.* 4. 24. & 5. throughout, *&c.* 4. Sure they that are ſo curious, as to tell us which phyſical act of Faith juſtifieth (*in ſpecie & numero*) (for ſome ſay only the *firſt* inſtantaneous act doth juſtifie,) will not think it curioſity to enquire *which one Act of Chriſts Obedience* juſtifieth us? when according to your Doctrine, it is evident that it muſt be the firſt: And they that ſay, It is Juſtification by Works, to be juſtified by any act of Faith in *ſpecie*, beſides the *recumbency on his Righteouſneſs to be imputed to us*, or by any *numero* beſides the *firſt*, will likely ſay that it is Juſtification by *another Righteouſneſs* than that which the Scripture ſaith is imputed to us, to be juſtified by the Imputation of any but the firſt Act of Chriſt's Obedience. Or elſe that (if all be imputed) we have a redundancy of Righteouſneſs, and deſerve many Heavens, or one oftener than needs. But when men have received ſome unſound Principles, all things muſt be forced to comply with them.

§. 37. M. S. Towards the end, the *M. S.* ſummeth up my *Aſſertions*, and ſetteth down ſome as contrary to them. In reckoning up mine, he ſheweth candor and ingenuity, and a good memory, having not the Book at hand: But I muſt advertiſe his *Readers*, 1. That he taketh all from my *Aphoriſms*, the firſt Book I wrote, in my youth, when my Conceptions of theſe things were leſs digeſted; wherefore I have above twenty years ago retracted that Book, till I had leiſure to correct it, and have ſince more fully opened my judgment in my *Confeſſion*, and in my Diſput. of Juſtification and other Writings, and moſt fully in my *Methodus Theologiæ* unpubliſhed. 2. That he over-looketh my aſſerting our Adoption to be by the Merits of Chriſt's Active Obedience, yea and our Juſtification too, as well as by his Paſſive. 3. That reciting my words, that it is by Gods Will in the form of his Donation or Covenant that Faith hath that uſe to Juſtification which is *neareſt* it, *viz.* the *formal Reaſon* of a *Condition*, he leaveth out my other aſſertion, that *Faiths material diſpoſition* or *aptitude* to this *form* or *office*, is the very *nature* of it, as fitted to that uſe about its Object, Chriſt, which Gods deſign and our caſe required.

His Aſſertions as againſt me are as followeth.

§. 28. M.S. 1. *There is no way to Life but by Doing: It is not enough that the Law be not diſhonoured, but it muſt be glorified.*

An. Doing is a word of doubtful ſenſe: It's one thing to *Do* all that the Law of Innocency required; and another thing to do all that the Law of Grace maketh neceſſary to life: It's one thing to *Do* all our ſelves, and another thing for a Mediator to merit Pardon and Life (to be given conditionally by a new Covenant) by Doing all in kind (and much more than all that we ſhould have done) for us (though not in our *perſons*). The way to Life now hath many parts, 1. Chriſt's perfect, habitual, active and paſſive Righteouſneſs, (fulfilling the Law of Innocency, and the Law of *Moſes*, and the peculiar Law of the Mediator,) to merit *Pardon*, *Spirit*, *Adoption* and *Glory* to be given by the New Covenant on its terms. 2. The ſaid New Covenant as the donative Inſtrument and Law of Life, and Pardon, and Adoption by it. 3. Our *doing* or performing the Conditions of the New Covenant by Grace. But our *perſonal Doing all* according to the *Law of Innocency*

really or reputatively, to be justified by that Law, is *none* of the way of Life, which you think the *only way*. (And I hope we shall both meet there).

§. 39. M. S. *It's clear as the light of the Sun, that their fundamental distinction is absurd, to make sinning and suffering equivalent to doing: because he that hath born the utmost penalty, hath done no more towards living, than he that never sinned or suffered: else* Adam *in Innocency should have been sentenced worthy of life. If a Servant instead of his Service steal, and restore it, he meriteth not his wages*, &c.]

An. 1. It's certain that you mistake and wrong us: I never put *sinning* among the things that are equivalent to *doing* or *meriting*: Of this before. 2. I doubt you noted not sufficiently that no Creature can merit commutatively as a Proprietor of God, as a Servant doth his wages; nor can have any thing of God but what (in respect of *such merit* and the *value of the thing*) is an *absolute free Gift*: *free* as to *commutation*: And that all Gods Laws of Life, are but a prescription of the *wise Order* in which *he will give his free benefits*; As a Father will give Lands to the Son that will behave himself decently and thankfully, and not to the contemptuous Rebel: So that as to *commutation* no Man or Angel hath other merit, than *not to commerit* the contrary (perdition): God is never the better for our Doing. If you dream of *meriting commutatively* from a *Proprietor* by *work for wages*, I can soon tell you what we set up instead of such merit: I hope you had no such thoughts, but want of due distinguishing. But as to *Doing* and *Merit* in respect to Paternal *Justice*, that which I set instead of fulfilling the first Law is as aforesaid, (not *sinning* and *suffering*, but) 1. Christ's Satisfaction, and the Merit of his compleat Righteousness. 2. The Gift of Pardon and Life by a new conditional Covenant merited and made by him. 3. Actual Pardon of all sin thereby. 4. Actual Adoption. 5. Our fulfilling the Condition of that Covenant, that these may be ours.

And thus the Law was *dishonoured* by our Sin, but is *glorified* by *Christs Obedience* and *Satisfaction*; And *Gospel-Justice*, but specially *Mercy*, glorified in our *personal Obedience* to the *Gospel*: without *such Doing* indeed (*Christ's* as *Principal* in fulfilling the Law in the Person of a Mediator, and *ours* as *subordinate* in obeying the Gospel,) there is no Glorification. And I think this is plain truth.

But in your instance of a Servant deserving his wages, you seem to look at *Commutative Justice*, when we have to do only with *governing (Paternal) Justice*: And you should have remembred that if the Servant do not his Work, in order of *governing Justice*, it is *his crime*: And if he have *no fault*, he hath *no fault of Omission*: And he that hath *no Sin of Omission* hath *done all his Duty*, and so deserved the Reward. As for *Adam*. 1. In the first instant of his life he was bound to no present Duty, before he could do a moral Act. 2. But afterward I think he merited *in tantum & pro tempore*; and had not the Condition of the Promise been of further extent than one act, he had merited life: But a Reward for a years Duty is not merited by an hours.

§. 40. M. S. *There is a medium between just and unjust: He was* non-justus; *He was not actually just, though habitually: He had done nothing for which the Law could justifie him: else why did he not live for ever?*

An. 1. *Habitual holiness* fits a Soul for Glory, where no more is due (as if one die immediately.) And so it would have done *Adam*, had God translated him instantly, and made him no Law of actual Duty. 2. But afterward that *Adam* in Innocency did that for which the

the Law would juſtifie him *in tantum*, for that time, He fulfilled all the Law for ſo long: elſe he had ſinned by Omiſſion. 3. But that Law giving life eternal only to *Obedience to the end of his time of trial*, he merited not that life by initial Obedience. This was *initial imperfect Righteouſneſs*, wanting perſeverance; but not a *medium* between *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, except as *Juſt* ſignifieth the *merit of Life by perſevering Righteouſneſs to the laſt:* And ſo I never denied but in a *diſobliged Subject* there is a *medium: Adam* was not bound to do a years work the firſt hour; and ſo was neither *juſt* nor privatively unjuſt as to the future years work: but as to what he was *preſently obliged* to, he was either *Righteous* or a *Sinner*. Here you come ſhort of neceſſary accurateneſs. *Perſeverance* is a part of *our Condition* of Glorification: Yet he that is not dead is juſt, if he be a Believer and obedient: And if God now call him by death, he ſhall be glorified: But he hath not now done all that is to be done till his death, if he live longer: So that his Right to the preſent poſſeſſion of Glory before death is not juſtifiable, but his Right in caſe he now die, is.

§. 41. M. S. *Faith*, ⁊c credere *cannot be put in exchange for* fac hoc; *and therefore juſtified only as it relateth to him who hath ſuffered and done for all that will receive him.*

An. 1. *Exchange* is an ambiguous word: Here is no proper exchange. *Faith* is not a fulfilling of the Law of Innocency, nor ſo reputed by God: Chriſt did both ſatisfie for our not-fulfilling it, and alſo by that and by fulfilling it himſelf (not *in our perſons*, but *his own*) did merit the free Gift of Life to us to be ours, upon new Covenant terms, and *Faith* and *Repentance* are the Conditions of that New Covenant, and ſo are that Duty which is laid on *our ſelves to do* inſtead of perfect Obedience, ſuppoſing Chriſt's Satisfaction and Merits, which are inſtead of it *quoad precium* or principally, as our ſaid acts are inſtead of it *as to what is neceſſary in our ſelves:* And the Apoſtle who ſo oft ſaith, *Faith is imputed to us for Righteouſneſs, doth neither* by *Faith*, mean *Chriſt*, nor mean that Faith is imputed as a fulfilling the Law of Works: But that having no ſuch *merit* of our own, (or Righteouſneſs) our believing in him that hath ſatisfied and merited for us, is reckoned to us inſtead of a Righteouſneſs or Merit, as being all that now is *neceſſary* to our *Juſtification* in our ſelves, (our perſevering Obedience *being* afterward *neceſſary* to our Glory.)

2. No doubt *Faith* relateth to Chriſt, and here *connoteth* him as its Object: It were not Chriſtian *Faith* elſe: But it is alſo related to the New Covenant as its Condition, and in that form hath its place to our Juſtification, which cannot be denied: Therefore you untruly ſay, [*only as relating to Chriſt*,] and your words confute your ſelf: You ſay, [*Who hath ſuffered and done for all that will receive him.*] You ſpeak either of *ſecret Decree* (and that giveth no Right) or of Covenant *Donation*: And to ſay, *He and his benefits are given in Covenant to all that will receive him*,] is all one as to ſay, *The Covenant giveth them on condition that we receive him*]: which is true.

§. 42. M. S. 5. *It is impoſſible that the terms of the Covenant of Grace can be any other than they are: becauſe nothing but receiving him can make him mine.*]

An. 1. That proveth not that *Faith is not* the *Condition*, but that *it needs muſt be ſo.* 2. It *is impoſſible*, now the Covenant is ſo made, *viz. ex neceſſitate exiſtentiæ:* But that God *could have* made it no otherwiſe, is not a thing for *man* to ſay. 3. Confound not *paſſive Reception* with

active moral Reception: Juſtificari is *paſſively* to *receive Juſtification*; and to be firſt related to *Chriſt as mine*, or to be one that he is given to, is *paſſively* to *receive* Chriſt: *Active moral receiving* is the *Wills conſenting* thus to have him on all his terms, and is the *means* of the other: It is *this* and not the *other* that is Faith: And could not God poſſibly have made *Chriſt ours*, by any alteration of the *terms*: ſure they that confine Faith to the receiving of Chriſts imputable Righteouſneſs, will grant that God could poſſibly have put one act more of Faith into the Condition, or one act of Gratitude, Deſire, Love or Repentance? And Dr. *Twiſſe* thinks he could have given a man a Right to Life without Chriſt's Satisfaction, and to Chriſt without Faith, and that ſo he doth to Infants.

§. 43. M. S. *There is no Righteouſneſs in point of Juſtification, but only in conformity to the Rule, Do this: that only brings a man under the approving Will of God.*

An. 1. But what is the *Do this* that you mean? *Adam's Law* ſaid, *Do this and live: Moſes Law* ſaid, *Do this and live:* The Law given to Chriſt ſaid, *Do and ſuffer this, and I will give thee Power over all Fleſh, to give eternal life to as many as I give thee, and believe*]. The Law of Chriſt to Sinners ſaith, *Do this and live: This is the work of God that ye believe*, &c. But all theſe *Doings* are different, for all that; It's an unknown *Faith* or *Repentance* which is no *Act* or *Duty*. 2. There is no Righteouſneſs but the conformity to the Rule of Righteouſneſs, if you ſpeak only of that Righteouſneſs which is of *that ſpecies:* But there is another ſort. He that is *juſtifiable* is *juſt* ſo far. If Satan ſay, *Thou art condemnandus, to be damned to Hell, and ſhut out of Heaven, for breaking the Law of Works:* I muſt deny it: not by ſaying, I *did* not *break it*, but keep it by another, or *I did not deſerve damnation*; but by alledging, *He that is pardoned, is not to ſuffer any pain of ſenſe or loſs: I am pardoned by the New Covenant, through the Merit of the Satisfaction and perfect Righteouſneſs of Chriſt. Adam's* Law will not juſtifie you; nor *Moſes's* Law neither: The Law requireth *perſonal perfect Obedience*: It never ſaid, [*Thou or another for thee ſhalt obey:*] It knoweth no Surety: To give a Surety, and to accept his ſuretiſhip, is the act of the Law-Giver as *above* his *Law*, not *fulfilling* that Law, but ſecuring the ends of Government (and of it) by another way: To pardon a Sin and Penalty is not to fulfil the Law that threatened it, but to diſpenſe with it; which Juſtice can do upon a valuable conſideration, ſecuring the ends of Government: And Veracity is not impeached by it. For 1. The ſenſe of *filius mortis* is, *Death ſhall be thy due*; and ſo it was. 2. And *death* was actually inflicted on *man* himſelf, though not all that which he deſerved. If the Law of Innocency juſtifie you, you need no Redeemer, you need no Pardon, you need no New Covenant to juſtifie you, nor can it do it.

3. We are juſtified by *Doing*, though not by our fulfilling the Law of Works, by our ſelves or another. We are juſtified by two ſorts of *Doing:* Principally by the Merit of Chriſt's perfect Righteouſneſs; and ſubordinately by our fulfilling the Conditions of the Covenant of Grace, (which Baptiſm celebrateth.)

4. Gods Will *approveth* of all that is good, ſo far as it is good: It approveth of habitual Holineſs in *Adam*, and would have done in his Infants had he ſtood; and doth ſo in all Chriſtians now: And I will believe that Chriſt, before he actually obeyed, was under Gods *approving Will.* But not as one that had *merited by Obedience:* For God doth not

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ſuppoſe any to do that which they do not, nor *oblige* them to do *to-morrows work to-day.*

§. 44. M. S. *The iſſue in a word is,* 1. *Suffering for Sin is not doing, nor equivalent in point of Juſtification,* 2. *Nor can God, having ſatisfaction for what was done croſs to his Law, lay aſide that in order to the conveying of Life, and ſubſtitute believing inſtead of it. Therefore Faith juſtifieth* ratione objecti *only. Now we* [Do] *in another, Chriſt, inſtead of doing in our own perſons.*

An. I doubt this is another Goſpel than the Apoſtles delivered us; though I hope that practically we meet in one. 1. To the firſt I anſwer, It's true; but you do ill to intimate that we think otherwiſe. *Suffering* by the Sinner never ſatisfieth, becauſe it muſt be everlaſting: Suffering by Chriſt ſatisfieth not *meerly as ſuffering*, but as the *voluntary ſuffering of God-Man, aptly glorifying Juſtice and Love, and ſecuring the ends of Government.* This *Satisfaction* is not equivalent to *doing* in Juſtification: For *Doing all required*, would have juſtified us againſt this Charge, [*Thou art a Sinner, by Omiſſion and Commiſſion, and thou haſt deſerved Death, and haſt not deſerved Life, according to the Law of Works.*] Againſt this Charge, I look for no Juſtification, but confeſs it is all true. But Chriſt's *Satisfaction* juſtifieth us againſt this Charge, [*God muſt damn thee (by paine of loſs and ſenſe) or elſe he is not juſt, becauſe thou haſt deſerved it.*] And Chriſt's *perfect Righteouſneſs* alſo juſtifieth us againſt this Charge, [*God muſt damn thee and deny thee life, becauſe thou didſt not merit it by perfect Obedience*]. The Juſtifier ſays, No: becauſe Chriſt's Merit in Doing and Suffering hath glorified the Law and Juſtice of God inſtead of my Merit, and hath procured us Pardon and Life given by the New Covenant.

2. To the ſecond I anſwer, 1. God did not *lay aſide* his firſt Covenant, but *man by ſin did lay it aſide*, by making the *Condition impoſſible.* 2. You overturn the Goſpel too much, by thinking that the Law is *not laid aſide* as a *Covenant* or *Promiſe*, (though I grant that the Precept as a Rule of Life continues:) To ſay that the ſenſe of *Adam*'s Law was, [*Thou or another (Chriſt) for thee, ſhalt obey.*] And that *we are juſtified by that Law*, is to confound *Law* and *Goſpel*, and make a *Goſpel* of that *Law*, and make the Covenant of Works not to condemn us; or both to condemn and juſtifie, and to feign man to *live* and be *judged* by the Covenant that is ceaſed. God ſaith now to no man living, [*Be innocent, and ſo merit life, that thou maiſt live.*] And God doth not *repute us innocent* at all.

3. To the third I anſwer, It is notoriouſly untrue, that *Faith juſtifieth* only *ratione objecti*, unleſs you mean that *efficiently* it juſtifieth not at all, which is true. For we are juſtified by it alſo *ratione fœderis*, becauſe that which is *materially Faith in Chriſt* (a juſtifying Saviour) and ſo connoteth its *Object* as the meritorious Cauſe of the free Gift and Pardon, is (by reaſon of this aptitude) made the Condition of that New Covenant or Gift, which is its *neareſt* intereſt or reaſon of our being juſtified by it. And it is the Law of Grace by which we muſt be judged and juſtified. And at that Bar, the queſtion which Life or Death dependeth on, will be (ſuppoſing Chriſt's Merits) whether we are *penitent Believers*, or *impenitent Unbelievers*, and ſo have part in Chriſt or not: And if Satan accuſe us as being *impenitent Unbelievers*, and the queſtion be whether we have *true Faith* or not? my Opinion is, that we cannot be herein juſtified by pleading the *Object*, when the *Act* is queſtioned, and ſaying, That Chriſt fulfilled that Law: unleſs you could prove that he

he juſtifieth impenitent Infidels, and (as *Saltmarſh* ſaid) *repented* and *believed* for us.

But the grand Caſe remaineth, *Whether we are juſtified by the Law of Innocency, by fulfilling it, and meriting in another, without any ſort of doing of our own by our ſelves?*

Mr. *Wotton*, Mr. *Gataker*, and abundance more, have long ago ſaid much to confute your Error, beſides Mr. *Bradſhaw*, whom you name; But I add, I. I have before proved that by the deeds or ſentence of the Law of *Adam* or *Moſes*, no man can be juſtified: 1. He that hath ſinned againſt it cannot be juſtified as not having ſinned: For *factum infectum fieri* is impoſſible to God himſelf. 2. The Law that condemneth us doth not juſtifie us. 3. What *Paul*, *Rom.* 3. & 4. frequently ſaith againſt Juſtification by the Law of *Moſes* will hold here *a fortiori:* And Chriſt keeping *Moſes* Law (as far as he was capable of Obligation) that alſo would elſe have been imputed, and ſo we ſhould have been juſtified by that Law alſo; which the Scripture copiouſly denieth. He that ſaith, *He hath no ſin, deceiveth himſelf, and is a lyar, and the truth is not in him.* And the Law of *Adam* juſtifieth no man that hath ſin.

II. *We did not fulfil it and merit in Chriſt:* But Chriſt did in the Perſon of a Mediator, voluntarily undertaking it, on his Fathers terms, and not as our Inſtrument, or in our *Perſons*. I have elſe-where given abundance of Arguments againſt that, which I muſt not here repeat. This Author took notice of my Objection, that he that is *reputed perfectly Innocent and Obedient*, is uncapable of Pardon, and needeth no ſatisfaction, or remitting, or rewarding Covenant, beſides that which he kept, but anſwereth it not. This ſubverteth the Goſpel and Religion. *Quer.* If there be no Reward nor Life but of Juſtice, and no Reward but for Chriſt's Merits, and all Believers equally merited in Chriſt, as fulfilling all the Law; 1. Whence cometh the inequality of Grace and Glory? 2. How come any Believers to be left long under ſins and weakneſs of Grace, and temporal puniſhments?

III. The Merits of Chriſt have procured us the New Covenant (ſealed in Baptiſm) by which we have a *new Rule officii & judicii*, (for ſuch is every Law) Chriſt is not the only Subject of God: He made us not lawleſs or Rebels. God ſtill ruleth the Church by a Law or Covenant: This is the *Law or Covenant of Grace:* Deny this Covenant, and you deny the *Goſpel:* This Covenant or Law obligeth us to Duty: And it promiſeth and giveth Pardon and Life in and with Chriſt: This Covenant hath Conditions; various conditions of various Benefits; Our firſt *true conſent* (which Baptiſm celebrateth) that is, our *firſt believing and repenting* is the condition of our firſt *Union* with Chriſt, and our *Pardon*, and *Adoption*, and the Spirit. Our ſincere Love and Obedience to the end, and over-coming, is the further condition of our final Juſtification at Judgment, and our Glory. This Covenant we are now under, and by this we muſt be finally judged, juſtified, or condemned. No man ſhall be ſaved, unleſs (if at age) he perſonally perform the conditions of this Covenant: And every one ſhall be ſaved that doth. Faith, Repentance, Love to our Redeemer, Gratitude, Prayer, ſincere Obedience, are all ſuch *Doing*, as by this Covenant are made the neceſſary means of Glory: But not ſuch *Doing* as *Paul* oppoſeth to the *Jews*, as maketh the *Reward not of Grace, but of Debt.* The Author of this Law is juſt: His *Juſtice* will give to the performers of the Condition all that he hath promiſed.

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The Scripture oft uſeth all theſe Titles; 1. That of *Reward*, as being the ſtate of the benefits retributed. 2. That of *Juſtice*, as being the principle of *Reward*. 3. That of *Works*, as being the *matter rewarded*; even our *perſonal Works* wrought by Grace, and not only thoſe which Chriſt did. 4. That of *worthineſs or merit*, as being the *relation* of the *Work* and *Perſon* to the *Reward*. 5. That of *Righteouſneſs*, as being the ſtate of the Perſon performing theſe Works, as pronounced by the New Covenant. If I prove not all theſe by expreſs Scripture, believe your new Goſpel.

I. It is *Reward*, Heb. 11. 6. *He that cometh to God, muſt believe that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him.* It's the ſecond Article of Faith, *Prov.* 13. 13. *Mat.* 6. 4. *Himſelf ſhall Reward thee openly*, and *verſ.* 6. 18. *Prov.* 25. 22. *Mat.* 16. 27. *Then ſhall he reward every man according to his Works*; even Chriſt when he cometh in Glory with his Angels: If you ſay, He meaneth his Works done by Chriſt, read *Mat.* 25. and believe it if you can. So *Rev.* 22. 12. 2 *Joh.* 8. *Heb.* 11. 26. *Col.* 3. 24. *Ye ſhall receive the Reward of the Inheritance. Col.* 2. 18. 1 *Cor.* 9. 17, 18. 1 *Cor.* 3. 8, 14. *Luke* 6. 35. *Mat.* 5. 12, 46. & 10. 41, 42. *Prov.* 11. 18. *Pſal.* 19. 11. & 58. 11. *Heb.* 10. 35.

II. Goſpel *paternal Juſtice rewardeth* men (ſuppoſing Chriſt's Merits) 2 *Tim.* 4. 8. *A Crown of Righteouſneſs, which the Lord the righteous Judge ſhall give me, and not to me only, but to all them that love his appearing.* Rom. 2. 5. *The righteous Judgment of God, who ſhall give to every man according to his Works. To them that by patient continuance in well-doing*, &c. 2 *Theſſ.* 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. *Pſal.* 67. 4. & 46. 10. *Pſal.* 11. 7. *Gen.* 18. 23, 24, &c. And multitudes of other places, *Heb.* 6. 10. *God is not unrighteous to forget your work and labour of love.* 1 Joh. 1. 9. *If we confeſs our ſins, he is faithful and juſt to forgive our ſins*, &c. *Iſa.* 45. 22.

III. The thing *rewarded* is called *Works* done by man (not legally juſtifiable, but evangelically) *Mat.* 16. 27. *Rev.* 2. 26. *Rev.* 14. 13. & 20. 12, 13. *Jam.* 2. 21, 24, 25, 26. *Rev.* 2. 2, 9, 13, 19. & 3. 1, 2, 8, 15. *Heb.* 6. 10. *Rev.* 22. 12. 1 *Cor.* 15. *laſt.* And it's called *Doing*, 2 *Theſſ.* 3. 13. and *Gal.* 6. 9. *Rom.* 2. 7. 2 *Cor.* 5. 10. *Heb.* 10. 36. *Mat.* 25. 21, 23. & 12. 50. & 7. 22, 23. & 6. 1, 2. *Luke* 8. 21. *Joh.* 13. 17. *Col.* 3. 23, 24. *Heb.* 13. 21. *Rev.* 22. 14. And *keeping* his *Word* or *Commandments*, 1 *Joh.* 3. 22. and 1 *Joh.* 2. 3. and *Joh.* 15. 10. & 14, 15, 16. *Dan.* 9. 4. *Eccleſ.* 12. 13. *Prov.* 4. 4. *Exod.* 20. 6. *Deut.* 5. 29. *Ezek.* 18. 21, &c. And *Obeying*, Heb. 5. 9. *He is the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him.* Acts 5. 22. Rom. 6. 16. *Obedience unto Righteouſneſs*, &c.

IV. The Relative aptitude of the *Work* for the *Reward* is called *Worthineſs*, or *Merit*, and the performer *Worthy* (evangelically not *legally*). And ἀξία primarily ſignifieth that which preponderateth in the ballance; but cannot note here any *worth* or *merit* by *commutation*, but that *aptitude* which reſulteth from the *goodneſs* of the *action* as *related* to the *Promiſe*, Rev. 3. 4. *A few---which have not defiled their Garments, and they ſhall walk with me in white, for they are worthy.* 2 Theſſ. 1. 5, 6. *The righteous Judgment of God, that ye may be counted worthy of the Kingdom of God, for which you ſuffer. Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompenſe---to you that are troubled, reſt with us---.* 11. *That God would count you worthy of this calling.* Luke 20. 35. *They which be counted worthy to obtain that World----.* 21, 36. *That ye may be accounted worthy*

to

to escape----and stand before the Son of Man. So *Eph.* 4. 1. *Col.* 1. 10. 1 *Thess.* 2. 12. *Mat.* 10. 37, 38.

V. The title of *Relation* given to the *Works* and *Persons* evangelically is *Righteousness*, or *Justice*, 1 Joh. 3. 7. *He that doth Righteousness is righteous.* Matth. 25. 46. *The righteous into life eternal:* 21. *Well done good and faithful Servant*; v. 35. *For I was hungred, and ye,* &c. *Mat.* 13. 43. *Mat.* 10. 41. *Ezek.* 18. 20, 24. & 33. 12, 13, 18. *Rom.* 6. 16. & 8. 10. 1 *Cor.* 15. 21. *Eph.* 5. 9. & 6. 14. 2 *Tim.* 4. 8. *Heb.* 11. 33. 2 *Cor.* 9. 9. And the godly are called *Righteous*, in relation to their *Hearts* and *Doings* near an hundred times (if not much more) in Scripture, though but in subordination to Christ's meritorious Righteousness, and but *secundum quid*, and not *simpliciter.*

See the Texts further recited in my *Confession of Faith.*

And now he that (considering all this) believes, 1. That Christ is no King, 2. Or we no Subjects, 3. Or that he hath no Law of Grace or Covenant, which we are under, 4. Or that this Law, or Covenant, will not justifie them that perform that Condition, (from legal-executive damnation, by giving them Pardon, and Right to Life, for the Merits of Christ): 5. And that Faith, Repentance, and persevering holy Obedience, will not *materially* justifie any man that hath them from the charge of having no part in Christ, because of Infidelity, Impenitency, Unholiness or Apostacy; 6. Or that he that performeth the Gospel-Conditions shall not be judged rewardable, or evangelically worthy of the promised Reward; 7. Or that the same thing which is *Good* and a *Benefit* is a *Gift* absolutely free against commutative Merit, is not yet *quoad ordinem conferendi & recipiendi* a *true Reward.* 8. And so that we have no *Reward* for any Works but what Christ did in his own Person. 9. And that the Judgment-Day will be to try whether Christ did his part or not, and so to judge him, and not to try whether we *have part in him*, and did *our* parts or not, by repenting, believing, loving, obeying and overcoming, and so to *justifie us*, *primarily* by his *Merits* and *Covenant*, and *subordinately* by our performance of the Conditions; And 10. He that believes that instead of all this, *we our selves did by Christ as our legal Person both keep all the Law of Works from first to last*, and merit Life, and also satisfie Gods Justice for not keeping the Law, and so redeem our selves, or suffer in Christ for our own Sins, and purchase Pardon and Salvation for our selves: 11. Or that God accounteth us so to have done, what we did not: 12. And so that it is the Law of Works and Innocency by which we our selves are justified: 13. And that for meriting in Christ we are fixed presently in the *immutable state* of eternal life, which is the Reward: 14. And that this is not a *Reward to Christ only*, but *to us* as *Meriters in him*; He that can believe all this, with abundance more of the Libertine new Gospel-Doctrine (commonly called *Antinomian*) which dependeth on it; doth quite differ from my Faith, *who believe that Christ suffered, satisfied, fulfilled* the Law, and *merited* in the Person of a free Mediator only; fulfilling all his own mediatorial Law or Covenant, and receiving his Reward, and freely upon these Merits, and his Power received, making a Deed of Gift of Himself and Life (Pardon, Adoption, Spirit and Glory) to all that truly consent to his Covenant, and overcoming do persevere therein, and perform sincere Obedience to the last: by which Law or Covenant he will judge men at last, that is, will justifie or condemn them: And this *short* and *plain* Doctrine of Faith is it, which I am constrained by the *full* and *plain* testimony of the Scriptures to embrace:

And

And I never yet ſaw any thing againſt it, which is not eaſily confuted, though my life is not like to be long enough, nor am I idle enough, to write againſt all that have written againſt me.

In concluſion, I muſt give notice to the *Reader*, that there are many great and weighty Points of great difficulty concerning our LOVE to GOD, and the order of it in reſpect to Faith, Repentance, the love of our ſelves and our felicity; and our love to Creatures, *&c.* which I paſs by in this *Treatiſe*, as having ſpoken with ſome care of them in my *Chriſtian Directory*, in the *Appendix* to the Chap. *Of loving God*, in *Tom.* 1. And if that ſeem too intricate to any, as being too long; in brief, I ſuppoſe that the *Thomiſts* groſly err in placing beatitude chiefly in the Intellect, and their Reaſons (eſpecially as *Medina* uſeth them) are very weak; and the *Scotiſts* are more ſound, who place it in the Will, and thoſe other moſt ſound who place it in the perfection of the whole man actively; but objectively in God: And moſt plainly that very *plain* judicious School-man *Ægidius Romanus Quodlib.* 3. *Qu.* 18. *p.* 187, 188. who ſaith in ſhort, 1. That God is the final Object ſimply; 2. That the love of God (or *velle*) is the final act; or beatitude *formaliter*: 3. That beatitude (or rather the *ratio finis*) is principally in the Object, and next in the Act: 4. That ſubſerviently or *quodam genere* the *viſio Dei* is the Object, and the *velle videre Deum* the Act. See alſo *Ægidius*, *Quodl.* 4. *qu.* 11. clearly proving three ways that we muſt love God above our ſelves, yea and not (properly) for our ſelves, but for himſelf, and our ſelves and all things for him.

But 1. I think he miſtaketh in ſaying that the *Act* of the *Will* is not the *Object* of the *Will*, and ſo that *Viſio* and not *Amor* are *felicity objective*: For as *Ameſius* ſaith, *Dicimus omnium gentium conſenſu volo velle*; and *one Act* may be the Volition of the *next*; and a complacency in that paſt: And what doth a Believer will more than perfectly to *love God*, next to God himſelf? And *Amo Amore* is an Act that we have full experience of. 2. And I am paſt all doubt, that *Beatitudo noſtra qua talis* is not the principal end of man, but God, 1. In his own *Perfection* or God-head; 2. The fulfilling or *pleaſing* of the *Divine Will*; 3. The Glory of Gods Image or Perfections as ſhining, 1. In the Univerſe, 2. And therein moſt eminently in the glorified Society, 3. And therein moſt eminently in the Perſon of Chriſt, 4. And next in all thoſe that are moſt excellent in their Order, 5. And among them in our ſelves, our holineſs and felicity: And this but in our own rank and place: For our Perfection and Unity with Chriſt and the glorified, will end all that narrow corrupt ſelfiſhneſs, which now maketh men dream that they are chiefly their own ends, (that is, their own gods) and that their Beatitude is the higheſt final notion, as if God were to be loved chiefly for *our ſelves*, as the *means* of our Beatitude: It being worth the conſidering, whether it be not a wrong to God to love him at all *ſub ratione medii* to our ſelves as an end, though we muſt love him as the *firſt Efficient* of all our Good, and our Great Benefactor, our ſelves and benefits being but means to Him, though yet (not He, but) many of his *Gifts*, may be loved as means to our Happineſs, and that and all things for God himſelf.

Among the *Scotists*, *Rada* well openeth this Case; and the worst of them all (*in* 4. *Sent. de Beatitud.*) is far better than Dr. *Stern*, the *Dublin* Physitian, in his *Medela Animæ*, and too many more novel immature Disputers, who would make our *Happiness* the chiefest end both of our *selves and God*, meerly because that God can have no addition of Felicity: A reason vainly excluding such other respects, as men that write of such Subjects should not be ignorant of: especially when they reproach the School-men, and save themselves the labour of understanding them; (when though they are too presumptuous and curious, yet) one *Rada*, one *Ægid. Column. Rom.* one *Joseph Angles*, &c. hath more clear explication of such Difficulties as they presumptuously tamper with, than an hundred of our late Oratorical Novelists, who are proud of their undigested new Philosophy, and their unripe daring Wits.

THE

THE Second Part.

OF GODS GOVERNMENT, AND MORAL WORKS.

SECT. I.

The first Law.

1. GOd the free Creator, Lord and Benefactor of the world, was pleaſed to make his Creatures of various ranks; and among the Rational to make Man a free undetermined ſelf-determining Agent, not fixed by Neceſſity in Love and Obedience, but left with a Power of Loving and Obeying, which he could uſe or not uſe; that ſo he might be a fit ſubject of Gods Moral Government by Laws, and perſwaſions in this world, in order to a more fixed ſtate of holineſs. Not but that Angelical Confirmation had been better for us; But it pleaſed not God to compoſe the univerſe of Creatures only of the nobleſt order.

2. When God exerciſeth only a Moral not-determining operation upon this world of Free Agents, it is not any diſhonour to his *Will* or *Power* as if he *could* do no more; But it is his Delight thus to govern the creature according to the nature and rank which he hath made it in; and his non-volitions and non-operations of a higher ſort, are agreeable to his Perfection, Wiſdom and Liberty; Higher action being uſed on higher creatures.

3. Yet hath God placed and kept theſe free Agents, not only under his Moral Government, but alſo under his Dominion and diſpoſal; ſo that he will do with them as his own, what he liſt, and none ſhall fruſtrate his diſpoſing Will.

4. It pleaſed him firſt to make man perfect under a Law of Perfection, making innocency or perfection the only condition of Life, and the contrary of Death.

5. When Man had ſufficient Grace to have kept this Law (not ſufficient to aſcertain the event, but ſufficient Power to have ſtood, that is, as much Grace as was neceſſary to his ſtanding, *ſine qua non eſſe potuit, & cum qua eſſe potuit*) he broke it, and ſinned againſt that ſufficient Grace, before God either denyed him any thing neceſſary, or withdrew any from him.

6. From whence it is clear that the Nature of *Man's Will* is ſuch, as that it is made to uſe a Power which doth not neceſſitate, or determine it ſelf, or is determined neceſſarily, but freely: And that it is no Deifying of the Will, nor extolling it above its Nature, to ſay that it can act or determine it ſelf, without Gods pre-determinating premotion; or by that ſame meaſure of *help* which at another time doth not determine it. Though its Nature, and its Act as ſuch be of God, yet ſo is its *Liberty* too; and therefore by the Power and Liberty given by God, the Will can act or not act, or turn it ſelf to this object or to that, without more help than the ſaid natural ſupport and Concurſe: And this Power and Liberty is its Nature, and Gods Image.

7. From hence alſo it is evident that there is ſuch a thing (or operation of God) as Grace Neceſſary called ſufficient, which is not effectual. For God took no Grace away from *Adam* before he ſinned, nor let out any temptation upon him which he was not able to reſiſt; nor did he ſin for want of neceſſary Grace; but by that ſame degree of help might have overcome.

8. God paſſing Sentence on faln Man for ſin, would not forgive him the temporal death, nor common calamities of this life, but curſed the creatures which he was to uſe, as part of his penalty.

9. But the Great evil which ſin brought on man, was the loſs of Gods approbation and complacency, and of his Spirits ſaving Communion and help, and of Gods Image on man's Soul, and of Communion with God herein; and alſo his right to life eternal. All which man's own ſin caſt away, and man was both the Deſerver and Executioner, without any change in God.

10. Yet was all this privation penal, in that God made Man ſuch a creature, as that his own ſin ſhould become his puniſhment or ruine if he committed it, ſo that all Puniſhment is not determinatively of God, though Gods Antecedent Will did make that which by man is made a Cauſe. As in argument, God ſaith antecedently [If thou ſin, thy own ſin ſhall be thy torment and miſery] and man ſaith [*I will ſin*] Therefore it is Man that is the determining Cauſe of the Concluſion [*My own ſin, ſhall be my torment and miſery*]: So it is in Cauſation, God antecedently to man's ſin, doth reſolve [*I will make Man ſuch a Creature, with ſuch a Mind, Conſcience and Will, as that his Holineſs ſhall be his Health, and Joy, and his immediate Receptive capacity of my favour and of his Communion with me, and of his title to my ſpirit and Glory: And that if he forſake me and his Holineſs, in the very Nature of the thing, he ſhall loſe all this Life, Light, and Love, Joy and Communion, and title to my Grace, and ſhall feel the torments of his own Conſcience telling him of his ſin and loſs.*] This is Gods *Antecedent Law*: Nay, this is Gods *Antecedent Creation*, to make man ſuch a *Creature*. Now if man ſin, his own *ſin* doth *ipſo facto* become his miſery, and yet is not *cauſed* at all *by God*. But yet that his Nature was *made ſuch* as ſin ſhould prove a miſery to, was *Gods* Work. And from that *Antecedent Creation* or *Conſtitution* the *Relative form* of a *Puniſhment* reſulteth to the Sinner. Even as God ſaith [*If thou Murder it ſhall be thy ſin*] or [*Thou ſhalt not Murder*] And man *doth Murder*: Here the Act that is ſin is of man; but that the *Relation* of ſin belongeth to that act, reſulteth partly from the *Law* which forbiddeth it; and yet God is not the *Cauſe of ſin*; though he Antecedently decreed, [*Murder ſhall be ſin if thou commit it.*] So is it alſo with this ſort of *Puniſhment* which is either ſin it ſelf, or the effect or reſult of ſin immediately.

By

By which we ſee that when *ſin* and *puniſhment* are found in one thing, God is the Cauſe (Antecedently) of the *formal Relation* of a *Puniſhment*, without being a *Cauſe* of the *ſin*: yea, antecedently is ſome cauſe of the *formal relation* of the ſin, by his Law, without cauſing any of the ſin it ſelf, as the author of it.

As if God make man of ſuch a temper, as that ſurfetting, drunkenneſs, luſt, will make him ſick, and hazard his life; Here God did no otherwiſe puniſh him than by making him *ſuch a man*; which he turned to his own deſtruction by his ſin. If a man make a thorn Hedge about his Garden, that men may not ſteal his fruit, and thoſe that will ſhall prick themſelves, it is *they* that prick and puniſh *themſelves*. If God ſay, He that will leap into the fire ſhall be burnt, or into the water ſhall be drown'd; it is they that *do it* that cauſe the evil; and yet ſome *formal relation* of *penalty* may reſult to it from Gods conditional antecedent Law. I ſay not that God executeth no other kind of puniſhment: But theſe are the moſt common.

11. Man having thus caſt away Gods Image and his Innocency, could beget a Child no purer, holier or better than himſelf: For he could not communicate that which he had loſt. So that our Nature is vitiated with Original ſin, and unhappy in the miſerable effects. *Bradwardine* hath a ſhift which ſerveth them that ſay man could do no good in Innocency without ſupernatural Help, *viz.* Making that Help to be *Gods Will* that it ſhall be done: But is not Gods Will called our natural Help when it is the fountain of Nature, working by natural means? It's true that free will without Gods Will could do nothing.

12. The promiſory part of the Covenant or Law of Innocency became null or ceaſed with man's firſt ſin, *ceſſante ſubditorum capacitate*; and ſo the *Condition* which is its *modus*. So that no man ever ſince was under the Obligation of that Law as a Covenant of life, ſaying [*Be Perfect or Innocent and Live*], nor obliged to *perfect perſonal perpetual* obedience as the condition of Life; for it was become naturally impoſſible. And God maketh not Promiſes and Covenants upon *Natural* impoſſibilities, whatever we ſay of *Moral* ones. If the Devils before their fall were under this Covenant [*Be Perfect and Live.*] Yet now they are not under it.

Here ſome worthy Divines go into both extreams: Some ſay that all the Law of Innocency is ceaſed, Precept, Promiſe, and Threatning. Others ſay that all ſtill are in force or being. The Truth I think is between them as followeth.

1. God ſtill commandeth perfect obedience, ſo far as that the leaſt violation of his Law is ſin.

2. This Law bindeth us as the Creator's Law: but not as *meer Creator*: But as put with Nature into the hand and power of the Redeemer, to whom all Power or Government is committed, and ſo all Laws are now both the Creators and Redeemers.

3. Theſe Precepts bind us not now in ſo full a ſort as they did *Adam*, even to obedience; Though the Law be as perfect: Becauſe there is ſome *Diſpoſitio Recipientis* neceſſary to the effecting an Obligation upon us: And where any Natural Impoſſibility hath befaln us, though by ſin, it will make ſome alteration in the obligation.

4. The Commination of the ſaid Law is ſo far ſtill in force, as to make Puniſhment (even perpetual) to be our deſert for every ſin, and ſo far to oblige us to Puniſhment, that if we are not pardoned, we ſhall not eſcape; for it is natural for ſin to deſerve Puniſhment.

5. This

5. This obligation is not only *Remediable* or *pardonable*, but *conditionally* (as well as by the Fundamental Merit of Christ) *Remedyed and pardoned to all men immediately*; *and actually pardoned* to penitent Believers.

6. The *Promissory* Covenanting part was not (properly) *Abrogated by God*: For he was not the *Changer*.

7. The Promissory part is now *really ceased*, and is *No Promise*, not *No Covenant* of God: And this was done by *Man's ceasing* to be a capable subject; which because some few worthy Divines deny, I prove.

1. If it be yet a Promise, it is Absolute (which none saith) or *Conditional*: And if so, either the Condition is *quid præteritum*, *quid præsens*, *vel quid futurum*: But none of these; 1. A *Past* and *Present* Condition are not proper Conditions of the thing, but *forms* of speech: And either that Condition already is, or is not; If it *be*; the Promise is absolute in sence: If it *be not*; the Promise is No Promise in sence, but equivalent to a Negation, as common reason as well as the civil Law confesseth. If it be *quid Ignotum*, the notice may be *Conditional* still, but not the proper *Donation*. But here it is *quid notissimum*, and God is feigned to say, *If* Adam *and his Posterity have no sin, I will justifie and bless them*; which is equivalent to [*I will not*]. If the Condition be supposed *Future*, e. g. [*If* Adam *and his seed sin no more, they are just*] it is false, because they are already guilty.

2. The essence of a *Condition* is to *suspend the effect*, till performed. But here the effect is *not suspended*: *Ergo* there is no conditional promise. Total loss is no suspension.

3. When the Condition is once totally violated and become impossible, all sence and civil Law saith, *Res transit in judicatum*, *& Lex in Sententiam*; and the Promise ceaseth *Cessante capacitate Promissarii*: And so it is here.

4. That which is a Promise is also a Law, and is essentially the Expression of Gods *Will for the Government of his Subjects*, and for a conditional Rule of Right to the thing promised: This is its very definition. But it is unworthy of God, to say that he doth ever since the fall, tell the world, [If you are not faln or Sinners, you shall be justified] or [on condition that you be such as never did sin, you shall live]. This were to threaten or condemn us ironically or with derision, under the name of a Promise, or Covenant, or Law.

Yet the change as I said is made by man, who hath made himself uncapable to be the object of such a Promise, or subject to such a Law.

And I know that it is a Question of no small Difficulty, whether any proper promise of life was made to *Adam* himself, and so whether this was properly a Promising Covenant? But I can presume to say no more than I can prove; which is, 1. That as *Natural* there seemed to be in it an intimation of the Will of God, to give *Adam* perpetual felicity if he obeyed, 1. In that God made his Soul Immortal: Not such as could not cease to be; but such as in its Nature was fitted to perpetuity. And a perpetual Soul must be perpetually happy or unhappy: And God would not subvert the Nature of Spirits, nor make Souls unhappy for nothing. 2. Because Holiness it self would be and infer Happiness to a perpetuated Soul. To love God perfectly is to be perfectly happy. And God would not have taken away man's holiness from him. 3. Because God having voluntarily become man's Rector, that Justice which consisteth in doing as a Rector *ob fines regiminis*, *secundum mores subditorum*, seemeth to be a virtual Promise, that it shall go well with the obedient. 4. Because God put into man's Soul a natural inclination to its own perpetual felicity.

felicity. 5. And alſo a holy Inclination perpetually to *Love* his God, and to know him. 6. And God commanded Man in the very Law of Nature (and poſitively) certain means to be uſed, no doubt in order to ſuch felicity as the end which man by nature was obliged to intend. And doubtleſs God would not do all this in vain; His command to ſeek Life, is a kind of Promiſe, that faithful ſeekers ſhall obtain it. 7. And as Nature made Puniſhment due to the ſinner; ſo it ſeemeth implyed in that very threatning of Nature, that the obedient ſhall ſpeed better.

Whoever is angry with me for it, I muſt ſay, that theſe Natural Evidences are no inconſiderable perſwaders of my judgment, and directors of it about the certainty and nature of the Promiſe to *Adam*.

2. But beſides theſe, though the Scripture be very ſilent here, yet the ſame ſeemeth implyed, 1. In the threatning of death to *Adam*. 2. In the titles of [*Redemption Reconciliation Remiſſion*,] &c. given in the Goſpel to the acts of our Salvation by Jeſus Chriſt: which ſeem to import that they reſtore us into that ſtate of Heavenly hope, which we fell from in *Adam*; when we all ſinned and came ſhort of the Glory of God, *Rom.* 3.

SECT. II.

The firſt Edition of the Law of Grace.

13. When God judged man for ſin, at once he promiſed him a Saviour, and through him as promiſed, made a new Law of Grace with man.

14. This Law giveth pardon of the Spiritual and Eternal Puniſhment, and of all ſave what was excepted in the Sentence foregoing: But pardon, not to be abſolutely and immediately received, but by *degrees* and upon certain *terms*: And with pardon a free gift of *Life Spiritual* and *Eternal*, and ſo of the *Spirit* and *Communion with God*, on the ſaid conditions.

15. The Promiſe *Gen.* 3. 15. is plain as to *Mercy* and *Salvation*, and darker as to the *promiſed ſeed*, and his *mediation*; and dark as to the *Condition* on man's part: But (by Sacrifices, *&c.*) it is like that *Adam* had it more explained to him, than thoſe ſhort words make it to us: But this is clear that by this new Covenant God becometh man's *Merciful Redeemer* and *Pardoner*, and *Ruler on terms of Grace* in order to *recovery* and *Salvation*; And that man was to *Believe in God as ſuch*, and accordingly to devote himſelf in Covenant to him.

16. *This Law* or *Covenant* was made with *all Mankind in* Adam: For all were in his loins; and God hath given us no more proof that the firſt Covenant was made with *Adam* as the Father of Mankind, than that the ſecond was ſo made.

17. Gods *dealings with Mankind* are a certain confirmation of this truth, and an *expoſition* and *promulgation* of *this Law* and *Covenant of Grace* as extended to *all Mankind*. For God *doth not uſe them* according to the rigor of the violated Law of Innocency, but giveth them *abundant mercies* and *means* which tend to their *Repentance* and *recovery*, and obligeth them all to Believe that he is merciful and their caſe is not deſperate, and to Repent and uſe his means and mercies in order to their return to God and their Salvation. There are no Nations in the world

world that even to this day are not under such *mercies*, *means*, and *obligations*; and therefore none that are left as the Devils in Deſpair, under the unremedyed Covenant of Innocency alone.

18. But though the Law of Grace made to *Adam* be it which the world was then put under, and to be Ruled by, and the tenor of it extended to all Mankind; yet thoſe that would partake of the *Bleſſings* of it, were to *conſent* to it as *Covenanters* with God, and to Believe in and obey God their Redeemer pardoner and reſtorer, in the thankful ſence of all this mercy; which becauſe the ungodly did not, they and *their poſterity* fell under a double guilt and curſe, both as violaters of the Law of *Innocency* and of *Grace:* and therefore incurred a ſpecial penalty: *Cain* and *his off-ſpring* being firſt thruſt out further from the believing obedient people of God, and at laſt the whole world except eight perſons periſhing in the deluge.

19. *Noah* with his houſe being ſaved to be the Root of all Mankind that ſhould ſucceed him, God renewed with *him* and *Mankind in him*, the ſame Law or Covenant of Grace which he had made with us in *Adam*, with ſome additionals: To ſhew us that though the wicked and their ſeed had forfeited the *benefits*, yet the *Covenant* was not altered, but ſtood in its firſt ſence in force to all, and would pardon and ſave all true *Conſenters*.

20. *Cham* for his tranſgreſſion brought a new Curſe on himſelf and his *poſterity*, beſides the meer fruit of *Adam*'s Sin. So that though God altered not his Law of Grace, yet they became a curſed Generation.

21. By multiplyed tranſgreſſions, the Sons of men did ſtill more degenerate and revolt from God, till *Nimrod* and others by wickedneſs and preſumptions brought down the new and grievous penalty of *confounded tongues*, (the great hinderance of the propagation of the truth to this day) And at laſt, the moſt fell to odious Idolatry, not knowing the true God, but given up to ſenſuality and wickedneſs.

Abraham's Promiſe.

22. *Abraham* being faithful and eſcaping the Idolatry and wickedneſs of the world, was eminently favoured and beloved of God, and believing and truſting God in his promiſes and in the great tryal of his Son, is honoured with the name of the *Father of the Faithful:* And God *renewed* with him the *Covenant of Grace* which he had made to *all men in Adam* and *Noah*, with ſpecial application to his comfort; and added a *ſpecial peculiar Promiſe to him*, that his *Seed* ſhould be a *holy Nation* choſen out of all the world to God, and that of him the *Meſſiah* ſhould come, of *both* which *Promiſes* (the *common* and the *ſpecial*) *Circumciſion* was a Seal.

23. Yet this was no *repealing* of the *Law of Grace* which had been made to *all the world*, nor was it an *excommunicating* or *rejecting* of all others, or a confining of Gods Grace and Church to *him* and *his poſterity* alone; but only an *exalting* them *above all others* in theſe peculiar dignities and priviledges. For at that time holy *Sem* was living, and long after, who in all likelyhood was a King, and its like that the *Poſterity* of him and *Japhet* were not all faln away from God; and *Melchizedek* was ſuch a *King of Righteouſneſs and Peace and Prieſt of the moſt high God* as was a great type of Chriſt's own Heavenly Prieſthood, and therefore it's like had ſome Subjects that feared and worſhipped God. The Scripture giving us the Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh Nation*, and affairs as the principal, and of the reſt of the world but a little on the by, we cannot know by it the full ſtate of all other Nations, nor what Religion and

and Worſhippers of God were there. But the Hiſtory of *Job* and his Friends, the probability that all the Children of *Iſmael*, of *Keturah*, of *Eſau*, forſook not God (for they were circumciſed and therefore were *Covenanters*) with the Caſe of *Nineve* after; and *Abraham's* thoughts that even a *Sodom* had at leaſt had fifty righteous perſons in it, *&c.* aſſureth us that the *Jews* were not God's *only Church*, but a *peculiar people*, and a Nation holy above the reſt. And as the Covenant of Grace was ſtill the *Governing Law* to the reſt of the world, (though moſt rejected it by rebellion) ſo it is not to be thought that *none conſented* to it and were faithful.

24. The *ſpecial promiſe* to *Abraham* of the *Meſſiah to be his ſeed*, which was *more* than was made to *Adam* and *Noah*, as it *belonged* not to Mankind in general, ſo was it not *promulgate* or *known* to them, but only to the *Jews*, and the few that converſed with them. Therefore the reſt of the world, were not *obliged* to know and believe it, who *never heard of it*.

25. What *Conditions* of pardon and life were neceſſary to all Mankind then in general, is moſt probably gathered out of theſe Texts of Scripture. *Exod.* 34. 6, 7. *And the Lord--proclaimed the Name of the Lord--- The Lord, the Lord God, Merciful and Gracious, long ſuffering and abundant in Goodneſs and Truth, keeping Mercy for thouſands, forgiving iniquity, tranſgreſſion and ſin, and that will by no means clear the guilty, viſiting the iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, and to the Childrens Children unto the third and to the fourth Generation.* This is the deſcription of God given by his own mouth, as he is to be *Believed in*, and as they were to be ſubject and devoted to him: And what mouth can ſurelier reveal him. And *Heb.* 11. 6. *Without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God; for he that cometh to God muſt believe that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him.* Act. 10. 34, 35. *Of a truth I perceive that God is no reſpecter of perſons, but in every Nation he that feareth him and worketh righteouſneſs is accepted with him.* And *John's* and Chriſt's Preaching were, *Repent*; And *Except ye Repent ye ſhall all periſh:* And Chriſt was a Prince, and a Saviour to give *Repentance* to *Iſrael* and *Remiſſion of Sins*. The terms of the Univerſal Covenant.

26. The belief of the *pardoning Mercy* of God to the *penitent*, and the *recoverable* ſtate of Souls, and the *duty* of *Repenting*, and *ſeeking pardon* and mercy of God, in order to Salvation, in oppoſition to *deſpair* and *neglect* of all endeavours for recovery, is ſo common to all Mankind, that (though ſelf-love may make them hope inordinately for that which they would have to be true; yet) it is moſt apparent that it proceedeth from ſome *Natural notion of God*, and is to be numbred with the *Notitiæ Communes*; which are paſt controverſie with *all Mankind*.

27. Therefore though the *Law* of *Innocency* was the *Law of Nature* in the *firſt* and *eminent* ſence, yet this *Common notice of Gods pardoning Mercy*, and man's *duty to Repent*, hope and ſeek Salvation may well be called, *The Law of lapſed Nature*, as the other is the *Law* of *Innocent Nature*. For the *Nature of God*, and *the nature of Man, with all circumſtant Natures, and the courſe of natural Providence running ſo much in the way of great reſtoring mercy*, do certifie mankind of the foreſaid hopes and duties.

28. For it is not (as ſome have ſaid) an *abſurdity*, but a *certain Truth*, that the *Law of Nature* is as far *mutable* as *Nature* it ſelf is mutable. For the Law of Nature (commonly miſ-deſcribed) is nothing elſe but the *Nature* of *Man* and *all other Creatures* of God, ſo far as *per modum ſigni*

they notifie to us Gods Will appointing what ſhall be Due from us and To us, as the inſtrument of Gods Government of Mankind. Now this Notification is moſt by the Reſultancy of duty from the *Nature of Man* compared with *God* and *all the Creatures* that he hath to do with. And the very variety of circumſtances (as in the caſe of *Adam*'s Childrens Marriages and ours, *&c.*) may alter Nature's ſignification, obligation and Law.

29. That which is called the *Covenant of Nature* or *Innocency*, was in the Main the very *Law of Innocent Nature* in all the parts of it. 1. Nature being perfect, revealed Man's *Duty perfectly to obey*. 2. Nature declared *Puniſhment* to be *due* to *ſin*; yea to *all* ſin. And this puniſhment to be ſuitable to the nature of the *Offender* compared with the *God offended*, and the injury done. Eſpecially that if men will undoe themſelves, by forſaking Life and Love and Joy, and caſting themſelves into *darkneſs, diſeaſedneſs and miſery*, when it is foreſhewn them, God is not bound to hinder or recover them. 3. Nature telleth man that God who made his Soul a *ſimple Intellectual ſpirit*, and *Life it ſelf* (though *created* and *dependant*) intended not to *annihilate* it; and that its noble faculties, fitted to *know God*, and *Love* him, and *Live to him* perfectly in *Immortality*, were *made for* this employment in Immortality, and not in vain. And that he that *Naturally* maketh it mans *duty* to *hope* and *ſeek* for *Immortal happineſs*, hath not made this *hope* or *duty* in vain: Nor will fail or fruſtrate or deſtroy them that forfeit not their hopes. So that the *Covenant* depends not *alone* upon *ſupernatural Revelation*.

30. But that which *Nature* revealeth about the penalty, is 1. Not that God of *neceſſity muſt puniſh* the loſs of Innocency as highly as he *may* do. 2. But that he *may juſtly* puniſh the Sinner in rigour, by temporal, ſpiritual and eternal miſeries. 3. And that the Ends of Government (the honour of his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Power, *Truth and Juſtice*, and the order of the humane world) do require that ſin *ſcape not free*, but ſome exemplary puniſhment be a Vindication of God, and a warning to Man: which our *death*, *afflictions*, and *ſpiritual* ſufferings manifeſt in part, and the ſufferings of Chriſt more fully. So that *pardon*, and *diſpenſing in part* with his Right to puniſh us according to the Law firſt broken, is no *falſhood* in God, nor any *injuſtice*, nor any violation of his Law of Nature.

31. The *Law* which God put *all mankind* under after the fall, and the world without the Church is *under ſtill*, is the *Preceptive part* of the *Law of Innocent Nature* as *de futuro*, the *promiſe* of it being *ceaſed*, and the *penalty* not *totally nullifyed*, but made *remedyable* by an act of oblivion or *Conditional Covenant of Grace*. q. d. [*Thou ſhalt perfectly obey me, for the time to come; and every ſin ſhall deſerve everlaſting puniſhment, ſo far as that I might juſtly inflict it, and will do it if it be not remitted: But all thy ſin ſhall be forgiven thee, and thou ſhalt have the free gift of pardon and ſalvation, if thou Believe in me thy merciful Saviour, and repent and give up thy ſelf to me to be ſaved, and to be Mine* by ſincere obedience and Love.]

32. The deliverance of the *Iſraelites* from *Egypt* by *Moſes*, and their imbodying into a new Common-wealth, with a Theocratical Government in a *peculiar* manner, and a new body of *Divine Laws*, were all done in performance of Gods Covenant with *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob*, ſeparating their ſeed as Holy from all the world. Not as if no other were Holy in the world; but as the Prieſts and Levites were ſanctified to ſtand nearer to God than the people, and ſo ſpecially Holy; even ſo

Iſrael

Iſrael was a Holy Nation, as being *nearer God* by ſeparation than the reſt of the Nations of the world.

33. The entire Law of God which the *Iſraelitiſh* Nation was under had all theſe parts. 1. The remaining preceptive and directive part of the Law of Nature. 2. The Univerſal Covenant of Grace made with all mankind in *Adam* and *Noah*, and perſonally renewed to *Abraham* for himſelf and his poſterity. 3. The ſpecial promiſe to *Abraham* and his ſeed as a *peculiar people* of whom the Meſſiah ſhould come. 4. The body of the *Law of Moſes* as a *Law for that Common-wealth or Politie* (which was not ſo given to any other Common-wealth or Nation.)*

1. The firſt of theſe undoubtedly is ſtill in force.

2. The ſecond is turned into the perfect edition of the Covenant of Grace, to thoſe that have the Goſpel: And it continueth to the reſt of the world unrepealed, as to the ſubſtance of the mercies of it, (further than men deprive themſelves of them by forfeitures, as wicked men here do as to the mercies of the Goſpel) But as it is a promiſe of Chriſt's future incarnation, it ceaſed by his coming.

3. The third is ceaſed by performance and by the *Jews* apoſtacy: Though ſome think ſtill that it is in force, and that a national converſion ſhall perform that promiſe to the full. But Mr. *Calvert* (a Learned young man) hath lately written to prove that no ſuch national converſion is to be expected, but only ſuch additions of particular mens converſion to the Catholick Chriſtian Church, as are of that kind which hath been more fully done on the *Jews* already.

4. As to the reſt, it hath troubled Divines how far *Moſes's* Law is abrogated or ceaſed; partly as to the Judicials, and chiefly as to the Decalogue. And that we may not be too forward to call one another Legatiſts or Antinomians for this difference (thoſe now called Antinomians being rather Libertine denyers of the Law of Chriſt) I will notifie to thoſe that know it not, that it is as much a difference among the Papiſts greateſt Doctors, who yet bear with one another in it, and the Pope decideth it not. Some ſay that the Decalogue now obligeth not as the Law of *Moſes*, but only as the Law of Nature, and of Chriſt: So *Soto de Inſtit. li. 2. q. 5. ar. 4. concl. 2. Medina* 1. 2. *q.* 103. *ar.* 3. quem aliqui moderni ſequntur, *ſaith* Suarez, *de Leg. l. 9. c.* 11. *p.* 761. and *Tolet.* in *Rom.* 3. *Anot.* 15. *Salmer. ad Rom. 7. diſp. 6. Victor. Relict. de Matrim. 2. p. n. 3. Barrad. To.* 1. *li.* 2. *c.* 21. *Valent. To.* 2. *diſp. 7. q. 7. punc. 7.* To whom *Suarez* joyneth himſelf; confeſſing (*pag.* 764, 765.) that if (as ſome hold) *Moſes* Law had been only a Declaration of the Law of Nature, and not *de novo* preceptive, it could not be ſaid to ceaſe. But he truly holdeth it to be *conſtitutive* or *preceptive* alſo to thoſe that it was by *Moſes* delivered to: And of this opinion I profeſs my ſelf (notwithſtanding all that on other points I have written againſt the Antinomians) Believing that Chriſt now is the Univerſal Law-giver; and that the very Law of nature (as Nature it ſelf) is now *His Law*, and that *he* hath taken it in to his Goſpel adminiſtration, and ſo the Decalogue is *materially* in force, but not *formally* as part of the proper *Moſaical Law*, ſave only that as *Declarative* and *ex paritate rationis*, we may collect that God who for ſuch reaſons ſo bound them, doth bind us to the ſame things by the ſame natural Reaſons.

But there are other Papiſt Doctors that hold that as to the *Morals Moſes* Law as preceptive is ſtill in force, even as then by him delivered, and that to all Chriſtians, ſo *Bellarm. de Juſtif. li.* 4. *c.* 6. *Lorin. in Act.* 15. *Vaſquez* who with *Durandus Paludan. Paul. Burgenſ.* And *Suarez* ſaith that

* *Leg.* Suarez *de Leg. l. 9.* who *c. 6.* diſtinguiſheth of the Law ſtrictly taken, and ſo it hath not (ſaith he) promiſes of eternal felicity; and the Law as including the promiſe to the Fathers; and ſo it had ſuch promiſes. But thoſe promiſes being the Soul of the Law ſhould not by the *Jews* have ever been ſeparated from the reſt, in their conceits of it.

Alph. a Caſtro and moſt ſo ſpeak: And *Vaſquez* denyeth the Law of Nature as ſuch, to have properly a *Divine Obligation*, ſaith *Suarez*, which he confuteth *de Leg. l.* 9. *c.* 11. *p.* 764, 765. But this controverſie when examined, containeth not much more than verbal diſagreement, and ſo their mutual forbearance doth confeſs.

34. The *Jews* inſtead of excelling in Holineſs proportionably to their priviledges, did grow carnal and proud, and 1. Much neglected the Law of Nature. 2. Much over-looked the ſpiritual Covenant of Grace, made with them and all the world. 3. And miſunderſtood the chief part of the ſpecial Promiſe made to *Abraham*, not underſtanding commonly the high, ſpiritual or univerſal Office and Kingdom of the Meſſiah, but dreaming that he was but to be their Monarch, to make them great, and to ſubject the world to them. 4. And they miſunderſtood the Law of *Moſes* or Covenant on Mount *Sinai*; as if the deſign of it had been but by its ſpecial holy excellency to juſtifie the doers of it, by and for the doing, and to pardon all the ſpiritual and perpetual puniſhment of Sin, upon thoſe terms which it appointed for a Political pardon, and to give life ſpiritual and eternal, upon thoſe bare conditions on which their Law gave them Political benefits. Over-looking the great cauſes of Juſtification and life in the Meſſiah, and the common Covenant of Grace, and Promiſe of the Meſſiah made to *Abraham*. And this is the error which Chriſt and his Apoſtles found them in. Yet proudly boaſting of their Law and Political priviledges, and deſpiſing all the reſt of the world, as out-caſts in compariſon of them.

35. Though the behaviour of all the reſt of the world, till Chriſt's coming be little notifyed to us, yet this much is ſure, that they were commonly more Ignorant and Idolatrous than the *Jews*, that yet they retained the common notices of nature; that they remembred by Tradition thoſe intimations of the neceſſity of propitiatory Sacrifice, ſo as to keep up the cuſtom of Sacrificing among them: That many of them with exceeding diligence ſought to find God, or know him in the works of Nature and Providence, and attained to great and excellent underſtanding, eſpecially in *Greece* and *Rome*: And many of them lived very ſtrict auſtere and laborious lives, in great Juſtice and Love, and in the practice of many excellent Precepts towards God: For the *Heavens declared the Glory of God, and the firmament ſhewed his handy-work: Day unto day uttered ſpeech, and night unto night ſhewed knowledge; There was no ſpeech or language where their voice was not heard: Their line went through the earth, and their words to the worlds end*, Pſal. 19. 1,2,3,4. *For all Gods works do praiſe him, and the Lord is good to all, his tender mercies are over all his works*: Pſal. 145. 9, 10, 17. *He is King in all the earth. He was not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles alſo.* Rom. 3. 29. *Becauſe that which may be known of God was manifeſt in (or to) them, for God had ſhewed it to them. For the inviſible things of him from the Creation of the world, are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made: his Eternal power and Godhead, ſo that they are without excuſe, becauſe that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful*, Rom. 1. 19, 20, 21. God left not himſelf without *witneſs, in that he did good and gave men rain from heaven and fruitful ſeaſons, filling their hearts with food and gladneſs*, Act. 14. 15, 16. *Seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things, and hath made of one blood all Nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they ſhould ſeek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him*

him and find him: though he be not far from every one of us: For in him we live and move and have our being; For we are also his off-spring, Act. 17. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. *For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek; For the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him. For whoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved: But have they not heard? Yes verily, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world*---Rom. 10. 12, 13, 18. *Despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to Repentance? Who will render to every man according to his deeds. To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for Glory and Honour and Immortality, Eternal life---Glory, honour and peace, and to every man that worketh Good, to the Jew first and also to the Greek; For there is no respect of persons with God---For not the hearers of the Law are just before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified. For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves; which shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witness; and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another. In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel---If the uncircumcision keeps the righteousness of the Law, shall not his uncircumcision, be counted for circumcision? He is a Jew which is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter whose praise is not of men but of God,* Rom. 2.

SECT. III.

Of Christ's Incarnation and our Redemption.

36. In *the fulness of time God sent his Son made of a Woman, made under the Law, to redeem them that were under the Law.* Rom. 4. 4. But not them only; for *God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.* Joh. 3. 16. *He was made sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. He redeemed us from the Curse of the Law, being made a Curse for us.* For he is *the Saviour of the world,* and the *Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world. He is the Propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world:* 1 Joh. 2. 2. *For he tasted Death for every man,* Heb. 2. *being the Saviour of all men, but especially of those that believe,* 1 Tim. 4. 10. *For if one dyed for all, then were all dead; And he dyed for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him that dyed for them and rose again,* 2 Cor. 5. 14, 15.

37. As the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father in his Divine nature only, was the *interposing Redeemer* by *undertaking,* before his Incarnation, and *governed* the *faln world* by the fore-described *Law of Grace*; so upon his *Incarnation initially,* and upon his *performance plenarily all things are delivered into his hands*; even all the world so far as it was defiled and cursed by Man's sin; *Man* as the *Redeemed,* the *Creatures* as his *utensils,* and goods, (and *Devils* as his and our *Enemies:*) *All Power in Heaven and Earth was given him,* Matth. 26. 19. Joh. 13. 1, 3. and 17. 2, 3. *All judgment was committed to him; and the Father judgeth no man* (but by him): *But hath given him to have life in himself, and to raise*

raiſe the dead, Joh. 5. 22, 23, 24, 25. *For he hath made him Head over all things to his Church*, Eph. 1. 22, 23. *And for this end he dyed, roſe and revived that he might be the Lord of the dead and the living*, Rom. 14 9, 10. *For God hath exalted him and given him a name above every name, that in the name of Jeſus every knee ſhould bow*, Phil. 2. 7, 8. And as in *Adam all die, even ſo in Chriſt ſhall all be made alive*, 1 Cor. 15. 22.

38. Chriſt upon his Incarnation performed but what God had Decreed, before the foundations of the world, and had obſcurely and generally promiſed after the fall, at the firſt making of the Covenant of Grace. Which Decree of God, is after the manner of men called by ſome *a Covenant between the Father and the Son*; eſpecially becauſe the Prophets have ſometimes (as *Iſa.* 53.) deſcribed it by way of prediction as a *Covenant* between the *Father* and *Chriſt incarnate*. If we conceive of it properly under the notion of a *Decree* firſt, and a *Promiſe after* unto the world, ſo the *Will* and Mercy of God the *Father* and *Son* (with the Holy Spirit) are the cauſe of mans Redemption, Pardon and Salvation, even the fundamental Principal total Cauſe: And the *Promiſe* was man's ſecurity; and *Chriſt* as *promiſed* was the primary great Means, which was to procure us the reſt, by *doing* that, upon the *fore-ſight* and *fore-decree whereof*, God did before-hand pardon and ſave Sinners. But if you had rather mention it as in the form of a *Covenant*, (which before the Incarnation, muſt be *improperly* taken, being only of God to himſelf, or a promiſe of and to Chriſt as to be incarnate) then the undertaking of the Father, and the Son herein muſt be carefully diſtinguiſhed and deſcribed. The Father giveth up to Chriſt as Redeemer the whole lapſed curſed reparable world, (the ſeveral parts to ſeveral uſes) and eſpecially his *choſen* to be *eventually and infallibly ſaved*, and promiſeth to accept his *Sacrifice and performance*, and to make *him Head over all things to his Church*, and by him to eſtabliſh the *Law of Grace* (in its perfect Edition) and to give him the Government reſpectively of the Church and world, and to Glorifie him for this work with himſelf for ever. And the ſecond perſon undertaketh to aſſume man's Nature, to do and ſuffer all that he did, in perfect obedience to his Fathers Will, and Law of Redemption, to fulfill all Righteouſneſs, conquer Satan and the world, to ſuffer in the fleſh, and be a *Sacrifice for ſin*, and to conquer Death, and teach, and rule, and purifie, and raiſe, and juſtifie and glorifie all true believers.

* *Eadem fuit fides in antiquis patribus & modernis qui alio modo credebant in ſpecialia & alia credibilia quam nos. Immo aliquid credebant quod nunc eſt falſum.* Alliaco in 3. q. 1.

39. Before the Incarnation, Chriſt's *future death and obedience* being not exiſtent, were no real *exiſtent Cauſes* in *themſelves* of men's Juſtification: But that *Wiſdom* which *foreſaw* them, and that *Will* of God which *Decreed them*, as ſuch (and not they without that *fore-ſight* and *Decree* as exiſtent) were the cauſe.

40. Nor were they either *before* or *after* the performance a proper *Cauſe* of *Gods Will* which pardoned us; For Gods *Will* in it *ſelf* can have no *cauſe*. But they were *Cauſes*, 1. Of the *Thing willed*, and 2. Alſo of the extrinſecal *denomination* of *Gods Will* from the object and effect (of which anon).

41. Chriſt did not take upon him ſtrictly and properly, the Natural or Civil *perſon* of any *Sinner*, much leſs of all the Elect, or all Sinners: But the perſon of a *Mediator* between God and Sinners: (Of which more afterwards).

42. Chriſt was not our *Delegate*, *Deputy*, *Miniſter* or *Inſtrument* to do what he did in our names, by *repreſenting our perſons*; as a man's Servant payeth his Maſters debt by his command, or doth ſome work

which

which he was to do by himself or by another. Nor did God or his own consent put him into any such *Instrumental Relation*, in our *Civil persons*.

43. Yet did he in the *person of a Mediator*, not only *merit* and *suffer pro nobis & nostro bono*, but also voluntarily as part of his Mediatorial work, suffer the *penalty*, *nostro loco*, in our stead: Not by a *full representation of our persons*; nor as if we could hence truly say, that *we did* (in *sensu Legis vel Civili*). *Suffer in Christ, or satisfie Gods Justice our selves by Christ*, nor that God or the Redeemer do reckon it to us, or ever will, to be a *thing done by us in our own Civil person*, though by *Christs Naturvl person*; nor will ever give us all the fruits of it, on that reason and account, as supposing *us* so by Christ to have satisfyed for, or Redeemed our selves. But he suffered in the *stead and place* of *Sinners*, to *satisfie Gods Wisdom, Truth, and Justice*, and to procure pardon and life for Sinners, to be given out by himself, on his terms, and in his way.

44. Much less did Christ in our persons, and we in and by him, in a civil sence, become habitually holy, and perfectly fulfill all righteousness: Nor doth God ever repute us to have our selves in our own civil persons, thus fulfilled the Law, and been holy in and by Christ, or will justifie us on such a supposition.

45. Christ is said *to be made sin for us*, in that he was made a *Sacrifice for sin*: But never was a *Sinner indeed*, or in *Gods esteem*: For God judgeth not *falsly*: Nor did he ever take to himself the *Guilt of fact*, or *fault* in it self, but the *punishment* and the *guilt* only in relation to *punishment*; the *Reatum pœnæ, non culpæ qua talis*. But if any will call the *Reatum pœnæ* by the name of *Reatus culpæ quoad pœnam tantum*, because of the relation and connotation, I strive not against the Name, so we agree of the thing: But safest words are best; especially seeing that *obligatio ad pœnam* is it that is most usually and eminently called *guilt*: But Christ never undertook to be reputed of God one that was truly and formally *wicked* or a *sinner*; but only one that was a *sponsor* who consented to suffer for Sinners, that they might be delivered. And they are ill words of them that say, Christ was by imputation the most wicked man, the greatest Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or Sinner in the world; Though such men may mean well, it were better speak in the Scripture phrase, and not so far overgoe it.

Had God imputed our sins so to him as to have esteemed him a *Sinner* or *guilty* of our *habitual* and *actual sin* as *sin* (even our *hatred of God*, and all our *wickedness*) God must necessarily from the perfection of his Nature, have *hated him* as a *wicked enemy*; yea, more than he *hated* any other man, as being guilty of a world of wickedness. Whereas God was still *well pleased with him*, and never *hated him*.

46. The *satisfaction* which Christ made to the justice of God was *full* and *perfect*; and so was his *merit* by his *perfect Righteousness*.

47. The *perfection* of Christ's *satisfaction* consisteth not in its being in stead *of All the sufferings due to all for whom he dyed*, so that none should therefore be *ever due* to the persons themselves. For *death, afflictions*, and the *want of Grace*, and withholding of the Spirits further help, *&c.* must be suffered even by the Elect: But it consisteth in its full *sufficiency to those Ends* for which it was designed by the Father and the Son.

48. The

48. The very *Nature* and *Reason* of the *satisfactorineſs* of Chriſt's ſuf-ferings, was not in Being the *very ſame* either in *Kind* or in *Degree*, which were due to all for whom he ſuffered: For they were not ſuch: Of which more afterwards.

49. They could not be the ſame which was due *by the Law*: For the Law made it due to the *Sinner himſelf*. And *anothers* ſuffering for him *fulfilleth not the Law* (which never ſaid, *Either thou or another for thee ſhalt dye*) But only *ſatisfied* the *Law-giver* as he is *above* his own Law, and could diſpenſe with it, his *Juſtice* being *ſatisfied* and ſaved. *Dum alius ſolvit, aliud ſolvitur.* 2. And *ſin it* ſelf (though not as *ſin*) as it before opened, was the greateſt part of the *Sinners puniſhment* (To be alienated from God, and not to love him and delight in him, but to be corrupted and deluded and tormented by concupiſcence). 3. And the immediate unavoidable conſequents reſulting from ſin it ſelf, were puniſhments which Chriſt did never undergo. (As to be *Hateful* or *displeaſing* to God, as contrary to his Holy nature; to be *related* as *Criminal*, to loſe all *Right to Gods favour* and *Kingdom*, &c.) 4. And none of the further puniſhments which ſuppoſed *real faultineſs* could fall on Chriſt; as the torment of *an accuſing Conſcience* for rejecting and offending God, for caſting away our own felicity, and running into hell, &c. the ſenſe of *Gods hatred* of us as *real Sinners*. 5. Much leſs the *deſtitutions* of the *Spirit of Holineſs*, to be left without *goodneſs*, in a ſtate of ſin, and to *hate God* for his juſtice and holineſs, which will be the damneds caſe. The blind zeal of them that think they wrong the ſufferings of Chriſt, if they make them not thus of the *ſame kind* with all that we deſerved, doth lead them to the intollerable Blaſphe-ming of our Saviour; which if underſtood, they would themſelves abhor.

50. Nor could Chriſt's *ſufferings* be equal in *Degree*, *intenſively* and *extenſively*, to all that was deſerved by the world: As is eaſily diſcernible by peruſing what is now ſaid, ſeeing our deſerved ſuffering lay in things of ſuch a Nature, as to *be left in ſin it ſelf*, *deſtitute of Gods Image*, and *Love* and *Communion*, under *his hatred*, *tormented in Conſcience*; beſides the everlaſting *torments of hell*, which are more than theſe, upon all the millions of Sinners which were redeemed.

51. Yet did Chriſt ſuffer *more in Soul* than in *Body*, being at the preſent deprived of that *kind of ſenſe of Gods Love*, and *Joy* therein, which was no part of his *holineſs* or *perfection*, (but no other) and having on his Soul the *deep ſenſe of Gods diſpleaſure with Sinners* and of his *hatred of ſin*, though no ſence of Gods *hatred to himſelf*. For it is conceiveable how Chriſt being the Lover and ſurety or Sponſor for Sinners, and undertaking to ſuffer as a Sacrifice for their ſins, and in their ſtead, might have on his own Soul the ſorrowful ſenſe of Gods hatred of ſin and wrath againſt Sinners, though not properly terminated on himſelf; and ſo he bore the ſorrow of our tranſgreſſions, and was *ſo far forſaken of God* for *that time*, and not further.

52. The true Reaſon of the *ſatisfactorineſs* of Chriſt's ſufferings was, that *they were a moſt apt means for the demonſtration of the Governing*

If in any of theſe points men of leſs accurateneſs uſe not the ſame words, take not therefore the old way of proclaiming them Hereticks, till you have tryed how far they erre indeed. Moſt of our lower Divines of all parties would be made Hereticks for want of Skill in the denominations allowable or not allowable by the Communication of idioms, if the Schoolmens accurateneſs muſt be the teſt. *e. g.* If the queſtion were whether the Humanity be part of Chriſt, or Chriſt be compounded of a Divine Nature and Humane, &c. Many would affirm it, that mean well. But ſaith *Alliac. Camerar.* 3. *q.* [*Neque perſona neque natura divina eſt compoſita; nec Chriſtus eſt compoſitus ex duabus naturis, divina ſcilicet & humana; ſive ex tribus rebus, Corpore ſcilicet, anima & divinitate: ſed tantum ex duabus, ſecundum humanitatem, ſcilicet corpore & anima eſſentialiter, & ex infinitis partibus quantitativis integraliter. Nec non eſt concedendum quod humanitas ſit Pars Chriſti. Nam ſicut homo non eſt compoſitus ex albidine, & ſubſtantia, ſic nec Chriſtus eſt Compoſitus ex humanitate & perſona divina.* How many have gone for Hereticks for want of the Language of Arabick and the Schoolmen?

Juſtice,

Justice, Holiness, Wisdom and Mercy of God, by which God could attain the ends of the Law and Government, better than by executing the Law on the world in its destruction, (as in general was before intimated.)

53. The *measure* of the satisfaction made by Christ was, that it was a *full salvo to Gods Justice, and demonstration* of it, that he might give Pardon and Life to Sinners, upon the new terms of the Covenant of Grace, and give what he after gave.

54. The *matter* of Christ's *meritorious Righteousness*, was his *perfect fulfilling the Law given him as Mediator*, or the *performance* of the *Conditions* of his *mediatorial Covenant:* From which resulted the *Merit*, so the *Dueness* of all the Benefits which God had promised in that Covenant as *to Christ*, though mostly *for* men. This was the Righteousness of Christ for man, and hence arose his *Merit for us.*

55. The *matter* of his *Law of Redemption* required of him was threefold, 1. That he should by *habitual and actual* perfect Holiness fulfil the *first Law of Nature or Innocency* which *Adam* broke; not just as it obliged *Adam*, in every point, but as it was common to man, and belonged to Christ as Man. 2. That he should fulfil all the *Law of Moses* given only to the *Jews*. 3. That he should perform the great things *peculiar to himself as Mediator*; which were to be a *Sacrifice for Sin*, to do his *Miracles*, to *teach the Church* as its Head: to *Rule* it, and to appoint Orders and Officers for it, to rise again, to conquer Satan, Death and Sin, *&c.*

56. That Christ did not *fulfil all the Law in our persons*, so as that *we did it in and by himself*, and are *thereby justified*, is further evident, in that he did not all the *Duties* which the Law bound us to perform, and for not doing of which we are truly Sinners. He did not do any of the proper Offices of a *Husband* to a *Wife*, or of a *Wife* to a *Husband*; of a *Father* to *Children*; of a *Servant*, or a hired day-labourer to a Master; of a *Magistrate* (*King*, *Judge*, &c.) to Subjects: of a *Captain* to Souldiers, or Souldiers to their Captain; of a *Landlord* to Tenants; of such as have *great riches* towards the poor: of the *sick*, the *imprisoned*, and abundance such like. Besides the personal Laws given to *Adam* in the Garden, to *Noah*, to *Abraham*, to *David*, *Solomon*, the Prophets, and such others. Christ did not these same things for us; nor we fulfilled not these particular Laws in him.

57. The Disputes whether it be Christ's *Divine*, his *habitual*, his *active*, or his *passive Righteousness*, that is made ours to our Justification, seemeth to be but the Off-spring of the error of the undue sense of Christ's *personating* or *representing* us in his Righteousness: And the parcelling out the uses and effects, (that one is imputed to us instead of habitual Righteousness, another instead of actual, and the third pardoneth our Sins,) is from the same false supposition. (It's well that they suppose not that his *Divine Righteousness* is imputed to our *deification.*) But the case is plain, 1. That Christ's *whole Humane Righteousness, habitual, active and passive*, are *meritorious* for us, (not as being the very same things, all which we should have *done*, and *suffered*, and *had*; as if we *had*, *did* and *suffered* them our selves by one that *had*, *did* and *suffered* them in *our persons* (in a Law-sense.) But as being the *parts* of that *one Righteousness* of Christ as *Mediator*, which consisteth in the *full performance of the Law of Redemption*, or of his *own Covenant* with his Father, undertaken for our sakes. Having *been*, *and done*, *and suffered* what he promised, he is Righteous.

2. And his *Divine Righteousness*, by virtue of the hypostatical Union, *dignifieth* his *Humane* to its *meritorious* value.

58. By his *Satisfaction* or *Sacrifice*, and *this Merit*, Christ did procure all that *Pardon*, *Life and Benefits*, *whatsoever* that consequently are given us of God: And so is the true *meritorious cause* of all.

59. That *Sacrifice* and *Obedience*, *Righteousness* and *Merit*, which was directly given *to God*, *for man*, by performance of Christ's undertaking, may yet be consequently said to be *given unto man*; In that it was given to God *for man*, and in that the *Benefits merited* are given *to man*; and so *relatively* as to those Benefits, the *Sacrifice*, *Obedience*, *Righteousness* and *Merit*, may be said to be *given us*. As the *Ransom* is given *to the Captive* which is given *for him*, because the *liberty* purchased by it is given him. (Of which more after.)

SECT. IV.

Of the New Covenant, or the Law of Grace in the Second Edition.

60. The *New Covenant* is *Christs Law of Grace*; his *Instrument* by which he *giveth Title* or *Right* to the *Benefits* promised, and conveyeth Right to the Fruits of his Sacrifice and Merits; And his *Law* by which he *governeth* the *Church* as a Saviour, in order to Recovery and Salvation.

It hath greatly scandalized the *Papists* against us to find some old *Protestants* deny Christ to be a Law-Giver, and in his Gospel to have a Law. The case is sad, that any in opposition to others should run into such an *Antinomian* extream: They are unlike to be good Preachers of Christ's Law, who maintain that he hath no Law: And there can be no sin against it, nor expectation of being judged by it, if he have none. And he is no King and Ruler, if he have no Law. But yet let the *Papists* forbear i[illegible]ing, and remember that the true meaning of most of them is no more, than to assert what *Suarez* himself propugneth, *viz.* that besides Revelations, and the Duties thence naturally resulting, (by natural Law) and the Sacraments, Christ hath no other Laws. And both *Suarez* and they are here to blame (for the *Papists* that are by some accused for calling the Gospel a Law, do also give too little honour to Christ's Laws); It beseemeth none of them to use such ill Language, what-ever they mean. If they should say that the King is no Law-Giver, and hath no Laws, they would wrong him by that Language (as denying his Royalty) how well soever they should interpret it. For the Legislative-Power is the principal essential part of Soveraignty. But if any really deny Christ to be a Law-Giver, and when he hath done reproacheth the *Papists* and *Arminians* for contradicting it; it is but as the blind reproaching the purblind for seeing; when they that give most to the Laws of Christ (among these Contenders) do give too little.

The Baptismal-Covenant, is a Law as imposed, and as imposing the Covenant-Duties, and as determining the conditions of Life and Death, according to which men must live and shall be judged: yea it is the most famous Law, which Conscience hath to do with; Though it be a Covenant as consented to, in the contract. That Sinners have terms of Life and Death, and offered Remedies against all their Guilt and greatest Punish-

Puniſhments, and Means preſcribed, and Duties commanded in order to their recovery, when the Law of Innocency condemneth them; eſpecially the obeying of the Miniſtry, and Word, and Holy Spirit of Chriſt, preſcribing them his way of cure as their Phyſician, all this is a Law of Grace; even the Law of Liberty, and the Law of the Spirit of *Life*, which freeth us from the Law of Sin and Death. Chriſt's Law conſiſteth of two parts: (as is ſaid) 1. The Law of Nature (called by many moral) as commanding the love of God and its attendent Duties, not now to an innocent man, but to a condemned-recovering Sinner, as the health to which his Phyſician doth reſtore him. 2. And the remedying Law which is more proper to the Redeemer called *the Law of Faith*; which appointeth us the terms and means of our recovery: which is, 1. *Supernatural* as to the Revelation of the *matter* and *reaſons* of it, and the foundation of all in Chriſt's Work of Redemption and his Legiſlation: 2. But as to the *obligation* or *efficiency* of mans duty, it is both *natural* and *ſupernatural* at once: that is, when it is preſuppoſed that Chriſt hath done, ſuffered and offered to our acceptance, all that is ſo aſſerted of him in the Goſpel; 1. Nature obligeth us to believe it (upon evidence of credibility) and to accept it, and thankfully improve it: 2. Chriſt as the Fathers Adminiſtrator, and our King, hath poſitively commanded us the ſame.

Were it not for wearying the *Reader*, and my ſelf, I would here anſwer all that *Suarez* ſaith, (*de Legib. li.* 10. *c.* 2.) to prove that no *præceptum poſitivum morale* is added by Chriſt: And I would eaſily prove that as ſome parts of *Nature* are unalterable, and accordingly natural Duty, ſo ſome things of *Nature* are mutable, and ſo is that natural Duty which is founded on them: And Chriſt hath by ſupernatural Performances and Revelations made ſuch changes in the nature of things, as inferreth new natural Obligations. Were the Devils redeemed, and Grace now offered them, nature would make it their duty to accept it.

In ſum, it is a ſufficient confutation of all *Suarez*'s Reaſons, to ſay, that they run upon this falſe ſuppoſition, that *Nature* and *ſupernatural Precept* may not both oblige man to the ſame duty, and that God cannot lay two Obligations on us to the ſame action. For all that he laboureth, is to prove that ſuppoſing the Revelation, Nature bindeth us to believe all the Chriſtian Articles, to preach, and hear, and pray to God by Chriſt, to love our Redeemer, and be thankful, *&c.* and that the Goſpel is thus fitted to lapſed Nature, as the firſt Law was to innocent Nature. All which I like very well, and take it for a great honour to Chriſt and the Goſpel, that it is ſo ſuited to the natural neceſſity and ſtate of fallen and miſerable man, and may be called the Law of ſinful Nature. But *Suarez* himſelf had before proved that *Moſes*'s Decalogue was both a Declaration of what Nature bound men to, and yet alſo the matter of a new Precept of God: And why could he not ſee the ſame of the Goſpel, it being ſo evident, that it containeth Chriſt's Commands? And the very ſum of our Miniſtry is, 1. To diſciple and baptize all Nations, *&c.* 2. And then to teach them to obſerve all that Chriſt commanded. And indeed *Suarez* confeſſeth (*p.* 816.) That Chriſt did by new commanding add new Obligations to the duties of Nature, though he deny that Chriſt added any poſitive Precept as to the moral matter commanded by the Law of Nature---.

And by this inſtance you may ſee how near ſome men agree, that ſeem much to differ. But as to them that inſiſt on it, that the Goſpel and

New Covenant are no *Laws*, and that we have none from Christ but the Decalogue and Old Testament; were I to write against them to purpose, I would plentifully prove them Subverters of Christianity it self, and give full evidence against them, to any that believe the holy Scripture. And contrarily I would prove, that there are no Divine Laws but what are truly the Laws of our Redeemer, now in the world, and that all Infidels are ruled, and shall be judged by a Law of Grace, though not of the last evangelical Edition; and that he that feareth not breaking the Laws of Christ, shall hear at last; *Those mine Enemies that would not that I should Reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me*, Luk. 19. 27. (*a*)

(*b*) As to the question, Whether Christ's Law be *exterior in signis* (vocal and written) or in the *Heart by the Spirit*, *Suarez* truly saith, That *lex imperans* is *in signis* (in Scripture words) but *lex impellens* is the *Spirit*; which though here the chief, yet is not properly but metaphorically called a Law, (*pag.* 819. *& li.* 1. *in principio.*) Though he add, that it was eight years before the Gospel was written by *Matthew*, and longer by the rest, and that all that time and since it is written in the Heart. But memory may retain a vocal Law, before the Heart (by love and subjection) do receive it.

61. In this Law or Covenant is made a *free universal Deed of Gift of Christ first, and of Pardon, Spirit and Glory in and by him to all Mankind* without exception, who will *believingly accept it in its true nature*, as it is offered therein; Or [*If they will so accept it as Believers.*]

62. *This Covenant* is to be preached by Christ's Ministers, and men invited to believe and consent: And all that so do, are to *profess that consent* by a *solemn Covenant in their Baptism, and so to give up themselves devotedly to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; renouncing the Devil, Flesh and World.*

63. For Faith in God the *Father* is as essential a part of that Faith which we must profess in Baptism, and is called commonly *justifying*, as Faith in Christ is: And so is Faith in the Holy Ghost in its place. For it is not possible to believe in Christ, without believing first in God, to whom he is the way, and with whom he is our Mediator; nor to believe in him fully as Christ, unless we believe in him, as *giving* us the *sanctifying Spirit.*

64. This Covenant is nevertheless *free* (as to the *donation* of the Gifts,) for being conditional: For the *Condition* is not the *purchase, procurement* by efficient causality, or any way a *proper cause* of the *Gift* as *given*, but only a *dispositive cause* of *our reception* of it, and of the *Gift as received:* It is a *removens prohibens.* The Condition as *imposed*, and as the *mode of the Promise*, is only a *suspension of the Donation and Right till it be performed:* The Condition as *performed* is a *removing the suspension:* And so it is a *receiving cause*; which is but *dispositio materiæ receptivæ* (of which more in due place.)

65. And the *Gift* is nevertheless *free*, because the Condition is but such as is *morally*-antecedently-*necessary* to the reception of *free Gifts.* For though *physical Donation* oft make its own way, and pre-require not such Conditions as these at least; yet *moral Donation* by *Deed of Gift*, supposeth that the person *will* receive it, and *despising*, or *unthankful refusal*, or turning it against the Donor, nullifieth such a Donation in the Civil Laws of men.

66. And

(*a*) That Christ is truly a King, and so a Law-Giver, and hath proper Laws, and not only Doctrines (and how great an injury some *Protestants* have done the Church by denying (besides the *Antinomians*) See *Suarez, de Leg. l.* 10. *c.* 1. whose proofs of the thing are unanswerable; And I have long ago proved it in other Writings.

But *Suarez* asserting that Christ's Law is only Moral and Ceremonial, (in the Sacraments) and not judicial, doth plainly confess that God never instituted the Papacy and their Discipline: Yea he saith, *c.* 2. *p.* 812. [*Christus in sua lege nihil de præceptis judicialibus statuit: etiam si in Ecclesia Christi ut talis est, aliquæ leges judiciales sint necessariæ ad politicum regimen Ecclesiasticum, quod suo modo spirituale est; nihilominus noluit Christus dominus per se ipsum illas leges ferre, sed id Vicariis suis commisit, potestatem ad illas ferendas eis tribuendo: Et ideo illæ Leges non sub Lege Divina, sed sub canonica computantur: Proprie igitur loquendo de Lege divina nova, in illa non inveniuntur præcepta judicialia.*] So that Christ never made the Papacy, nor any of its Laws. But indeed he appointed Baptism as our Church-entrance, and more than a Ceremony: and the state of Church Officers, and their work and discipline, *Mat.* 18. And what his Spirit did in the Apostles, he did in another sort than he doth by any ordinary Ministers that have but the Spirits ordinary help.

(*b*) *Aquinas* and many other *Papists* joyn with some late Sectaries, and say that it's the Spirits Operation on the Heart, that is the *Lex nova*, and that it is not written: But he could not deny but that yet the Gospel is *Lex nova Scripta*: But falsly *de nomine* taketh this but for the secondary sense of the *Lex*: which is the first, and that the obliging Law; and the other the effects of it as various as persons are that have it, and not the Rule of Obligation: And elsewhere I have shewed also *de Lege naturæ.*

66. And the *Benefits* are nevertheleſs *conditionally given*, though the *Spirit of Chriſt cauſe us to perform* the Condition: For they are called *conditional* from the *mode* or *form of the Covenant*, which giveth men Right to Chriſt and Life expreſly on condition of believing.

67. Though this believing be ſometimes deſcribed as the aſſent of the Intellect, and ſometimes as the conſent of the *Will*, and ſometime as a *practical affiance*, truſting Chriſt as a Saviour, to ſave us, with Soul and Body, to the renouncing and letting go all other truſt; Yet when ever *Juſtification* and *Life* is promiſed to Faith, all theſe *three* are the *eſſential* parts of it.

68. The cleareſt diſcovery of the true nature of Gods Covenant with man, and of that Faith by which we partake of the benefits of it, is in *Baptiſm it ſelf*, which hath ever been the entrance of men into *Gods Covenant* as *conſented* to, and *mutual*, and ſo into a *viſible ſtate of Chriſtianity* and memberſhip of Chriſt and the Catholick Church. And therefore it is happy for us, that Chriſt ſo expreſly delivered the *form of the Baptiſmal Covenant*, and the Univerſal Church hath ſo ſafely in her practice kept it.

69. This *Baptiſmal Covenant* which is *conditional*, and the *conſent* to which doth *make us Chriſtians*, muſt be ſtill diſtinguiſhed from the *Covenant between the Father and Chriſt*, or *his Law of Redemption:* And God promiſeth not *to us*, all that he promiſeth *to Chriſt for us*; nor giveth all *to us* which he giveth *to him*.

70. And it muſt be diſtinguiſhed from Gods *meer Predictions* concerning his Elect (that he will call them, renew them, and ſave them,) or if thoſe Predictions run in the form of a Promiſe, either as they are promiſes to *Chriſt* concerning the Elect, or as promiſes to the *Church in general*, how God will *perfect* it, ſtill they give no man a Law-Title or Right to any of the Benefits, till he is a Believer: They juſtifie and pardon no man: And ſo they muſt not be confounded with the *Baptiſmal Covenant*, which is Gods *ſtated Inſtrument* of *Juſtification* and of *Government*, and the Law by which he will Judge us at the laſt.

71. This *Baptiſmal Covenant* is the *character* and teſt, by which we muſt *judge who are Chriſtians*, and *members* of the *Catholick Church* of Chriſt, and not by their Subjection to a pretended *vicarious univerſal Monarch*. And this is the character (with conſent to his relation there) by which every mans fitneſs for memberſhip in a particular Church muſt be judged of; And not by *other Covenants* (beſides that conſent) and proofs of *Converſion*, not here included. And this containeth the true Characters, by which every man may know himſelf whether he be a *true Chriſtian*, and muſt judge of his ſincerity and right to Chriſt, Juſtification and Salvation, as he is or is not a ſincere conſenter to it truly underſtood in the eſſential parts.

SECT. V.

Of the Gift and Works of the Holy Ghoſt.

72. There are three ſorts of Operations of the Holy Ghoſt, one common, and two proper to them that *ſhall have*, or already *have* Juſtification.

1. The

1. The first is *preparing common Grace*, which maketh men fitter for special Grace, which yet they may have that perish.

The Thomists make the act of contrition and charity to be the *ultimate* disposition to Justification, which is with them the habit: And yet they say, that it floweth from that habit; And if the distinction of *Alvarez Disp. de Aux 59. p. 264. & passim* be not contradiction, I understand it not, [*Eadem contritio quæ est ultima dispositio ad gratiam, & in genere causæ materialis antecedit illam, in genere tamen causæ formalis & efficientis, est effectus ejusdem gratiæ.*] Though that which is the effect of one act of Gods Love, be the Object of another act.

2. The second is that Grace of the Spirit by which we perform the *first Act of special Faith and Repentance*, called commonly by Divines *Vocation*, which goeth before any *special habit*; but not before any holy *seed*; Because the very influx of the Spirit on the Soul is as a *seed*, which exciteth the *first act* before a *habit*, though not ordinarily before some *preparations*. This *Faith* is *commanded* us as our *duty* first, and made *necessary* to us, as the *Condition* of the Covenant; And when we know it to be thus required of us, and hear in the Gospel the Reasons which should perswade us, then the Holy Spirit moveth us by his Influx to *believe and consent*, where *God* and *man* are conjunct Agents; but man subordinate to God.

3. The third sort is the Spirits Operation of the *habit of Divine Love*, and all *other Graces* in the Soul, which is called his *In-dwelling*, and *Sanctification*; This is that Gift of the Spirit (besides Miracles of old) which is promised to Believers: To this, *Faith* is the *Condition*: To this, upon believing it is that we have *Right given us by Gods Covenant*; and thus it is that by *Baptism our right to the Spirit*, as an *in-dwelling Sanctifier* and *Comforter* is given us.

73. This third Gift or Work of the Spirit eminently so called, is in the same instant of *time* given us as the *second*, (but not of *nature*) or at least immediately thereupon when we believe: But yet they are not to be confounded on many accounts.

74. But yet though some *degree* of the Spirit be presently given to every Believer, it is usually but a spark at first; And there are further *means* and *conditions* appointed us for the *increase*, and actual helps from day to day: And he that will not wait on the Spirit in the use of those means, doth forfeit his help according to his neglect.

75. Hence it is that *most*, if not *all* Christians have *lower measures* of the Spirit than otherwise they *might* have, and that *judicially* as a punishment for Sin; However God is *free* herein, and if he please *may give more* even to them that *forfeit it*.

The extent of the New Covenant.

76. This Covenant of Grace, being a *conditional pardon of all the world*, is *universal* in the *tenor* or sense of it; It is of all Mankind without exception that Christ saith, *If thou confess with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart, thou shalt be saved:* No person antecedently is excluded in the world.

Matth. 28. 19, 20. Mark 16. 15, 16.

77. And as to the *promulgation* of it, Christ hath *commissioned his Ministers to preach this Gospel to all the world, and to every Creature*: So that to the utmost of their power they are to offer and publish it to the whole world. And Princes and people are all bound in their several places to assist them, and to help to propagate the Gospel throughout all the Earth: So that the restraint of it is not by the *tenor of the Law*.

78. Those Nations which despise and refuse the Gospel are justly deprived of it, penally for that rejection.

79. Those Nations that live inhumanely and wickedly against the means and mercies which they have, do forfeit their hopes of more.

80. As God in all Ages hath visited the sins of the Fathers on the Children, as the instances of *Cain*, *Cham*, *Nimrod*, and others commonly shew, and hath proclaimed it as his Name, *Exod.* 34. and put it in Tables of Stone in the Second Commandment (and not only of *Adam's* sin); so may he justly deal by the Posterity of the Despisers of the Gospel,

pel, in denying it them. Though he *may freely* give it the unworthy when he pleaſeth.

81. All the reſt of the world who have not the Goſpel, and the Covenant of Grace in the laſt Edition, are left by Chriſt in *as good a ſtate (at leaſt*, if not *better*) than *he found them* at his Incarnation. He took away no mercy from them, which they had.

The ſtate of thoſe that have not the Goſpel.

82. Therefore, as it is before proved that before Chriſt's time, none of the world were left deſperate, under the meer violated Covenant of Innocency, but that the tenor of that New Covenant, as made to *Adam* and *Noah*, extended to them all, ſo are they ſtill under all the *Grace of that Edition* of the Covenant, further than they are *penally deprived* of it for violating it. The Law of Grace in that firſt Edition is ſtill *in force*, and the Law by which the world ſhall be *governed and judged*; They are all Poſſeſſors of *Mercy which leadeth to Repentance*, and *bound* to uſe *the means* afforded them in order to *Repentance* and *Salvation*, and it is their ſin that they do not: For which it is ultimately that they are condemned. Though wickedneſs harden men againſt the Law of Grace, that changeth not *Gods Law* to them, but brings them under the *penalty*. Not that any are bound to expect *a Chriſt to come*, but to perform the common Conditions of that Covenant before deſcribed.

Of *Zuinglius*'s Opinion of the Salvation of Heathens by name, *Hercules, Theſeus, Socrates, Ariſtides, Antigonus, Numa, Camilli, Catones, Scipiones*, &c. *Vid. Montatut. exercit.* Eccleſ. 1. Sect. 4 & *Twiſſum contra Corvinum*, pag. 371. col. 1. *Omnium temporum una eſt fides; Deum eſſe, eundemq; & Juſtum, & Bonum, & Remuneratorem ſperantium in ſe; omnium plene meritis reſpondentem, ante legem, ſub lege, ſub gratia: Nemini rectum ſapienti venit iſtud in dubium: ſine iſta nemo unquam ingreſſus eſt ad ſalutem.* Rob. Sarisberienſ. Polycrat. *de nugis curial.* Pol. Peucer Hiſt. *Carcerum* againſt the *Lutherans* Concord faith, *p.* 715. *Etſi nec ad Ethnicos ante natum Chriſtum nec ad Judæos poſt natum Chriſtum miſit ſingulares miniſtros: ſonuit tamen vox doctrinæ de Deo patefactæ utroq; tempore: Hoc modo & adhuc ſonat, ut exaudiatur nunc etiam a* Turcis & Judæis: *Nec fuerunt unquam excluſi prorſus a gratia & miſericordia Dei ante Chriſtum Ethnici: E quibus innumeri ex omnibus gentibus fuerunt ad Deum converſi: Poſt Chriſtum natum* Judæi: *Pauciores ex his tamen.*

83. Therefore no man is now condemned for *Original Sin alone*; Though it is *pardoned to no man*, till he perform the *condition* of it, in the pardoning Covenant. For God having brought all men under terms of mercy tending to recovery, they ſhall be judged as they uſe that recovering mercy, according to that Law of Grace which they are under, whether of the firſt or laſt Edition.

84. The exception which ſome make of *Infants* is vain: Becauſe as far as God hath revealed his mind about them to us, he eſteemeth them and uſeth them as parts of their Parents and Owners, and if he condemn them, it is not for *Adam*'s *ſin only*, but alſo ultimately for *their Parents rejection of recovering Grace, and not devoting them to God in his Covenant*. And though God will not condemn the Children for the Parents ſin; that is, when they *themſelves repent and turn to God*. But the Scripture is moſt plain and frequent in expreſſing our guilt of our nearer Parents ſins againſt Grace, which is a part of our *Original Sin*: and ought not to be ſo ſlighted as uſually it is. However, 1. It is an incredible Opinion, That God ſhould *rule and judge all the reſt of the world by a Law of Grace*, and leave *only* poor *Infants* without *any mercy*, under the meer Law of Innocency, and judge them only by another Law, than he doth all the world. 2. And it is the trick of a Deceiver to argue *ab ignotiore*, and carry his Cauſe into the dark. And Infants Caſe is left to us in Scripture much darker than that of the adult.

85. Therefore it ſeemeth plain to me, that though *Chriſt's Church* be now incomparably happier than the *Jewiſh Church* was, (in magnitude, light, and grace, and excellency of priviledges,) far above all the reſt of the world, and ſo excelleth the ſtate of Heathens far more than the *Jewiſh Church* excelled them; Yet the reſt of the world ſtand now in much like relation to God and the Chriſtian Church, as before Chriſt's Incarnation they did to God and the *Jewiſh* Church, who were his peculiar (but not his *only*) people; the *fœdus peculiaritatis* was theirs only; but not *fœdus gratiæ*: So are we much more, as a *holy Nation, a royal Prieſthood* to ſtand *nearer God* than the reſt of the world: But whether the *Jews* were *all Gods* people *on Earth* I have before diſcuſſed, and proved the negative.

86. But

85. But certainly in no Nation under Heaven, there is no *coming to God*, or *pleasing him without Faith*; nor *seeing him without Holiness*; nor *any Name given under Heaven by which men can be saved, but by Christ*; nor *any Sanctification but by Christ's Spirit*; nor *any coming to the Father but by the Son*; nor *any Pardon and Life but by a Covenant of Grace, and by the Merits and Purchase of Christ.* But how far he giveth this Spirit and *Grace* where he is not known himself as Incarnate, is all the difficulty: (As to Infants and Adult).

Heb. 11. 5, 6.
Heb. 12. 14.
Act. 4. 12.
Rom. 8. 9.
Joh. 14. 6.
1 Joh. 5. 10, 11, 12.

86. Though God hath said less to us of their case that hear not the Gospel, than of Believers and Unbelievers (*privative*, * that hear it) because it less concerneth us to know it, and to be busie in judging the Servants of another, yet in this point are mens confidence and oppositon most vehement. "On one side some say, [Before I "would believe that God hath shut all the millions of the Earth, from "*Adam*'s days till now, save a few *Jews* and *Christians*, out of all possi- "bility of Salvation, so that they are left as the Devils without help, "hope or means, and perish Infants and all meerly because God will "have it so, and that in everlasting fire; I will easilier believe that the "Gospel is not true, as having less of Natures light to condemn me, than "for receiving such thoughts of the infinitely Good and merciful "God.]

* I desire the *Reader* to peruse *Gataker*'s *Preface* to *Antoninus* of the *Stoicks*.

On the other side, if I do but open the undeniable Mercies of God to all, which all the world hath experience that they possess, and the Covenant of Grace which the whole current of Scripture proveth them under, some men that are so very wise in their own eyes, as hardly to suspect any thing to be an error which they have long held, and that build much of their Religion and Theological Reputation, in adhering to the Opinions of those whose communion they think most honoureth them, and out of a blind zeal for that which they account Orthodox, will presently without impartial consideration, or friendly debate, magisterially pass their judgment among those that reverence them, and backbite those that they cannot confute, and say, ["Such a man hold- "eth dangerous Opinions, that Infidels may be saved,] and it's like falsly represent my words. When yet the same men perhaps will maintain that all the *Elect are justified before they believe*, and so that *Infidels*, even *privative*, are *justified*, so they be but *elect*: And this seemeth to them no injury to Christ: so powerful is prejudice, and pride, and partiality.

87. The question whether any besides Christians are put into a *possibility of Salvation* is easily and certainly resolved in the affirmative from what is said: But the question whether any or how many are actually *saved*, doth depend on the resolution of the question, whether any of them are *truly sanctified*, that is, [*do truly love God and Holiness, above the Pleasures, Profits and Honours of this world.*] For nothing is more certain in Gods Word, than that *all that do so* shall be saved: For a man to live in Hell with the predominant *love of God*, is as great a contra-

Subit me certe subinde (ita ista dum lego, affectum me sentio, & ingenue agnosco) non stupor duntaxat, sed horror etiam, cum arcani Divini admiratione vehementissima conjunctus, serio apud me reputantem, quam longe in multis ab eo absim quod de se vir iste, vere ad salutem perducentis tramitis ignarus, de se profitetur, nec quin vere & ingenuum, ambigi posse videtur: ut proinde & Marco & Epictето tanto assurgens Hymnum illius vel maximo majorem & praestantiorem decantare jugiter debeam——Gataker *Prolog. in Antoninum.*

Read the multitude of Testimonies of the Virtues of *Antonine*, collected by *Gataker post opera.*

Fuit Marcus Antoninus, vir omnium virtutum & sanctitate vitæ præcipuus, cœlestisq; ingenii. Sebast. Munster. Cosmogr. li. 2.

Bonitatis ac sapientiæ numine ab omnibus dum viveret in ea æstimatione honoreq; habitus, qua nemo unquam vel ante ipsum, vel quod noverimus post ipsum fuerit. ——*Nunquam ita conspiravunt scriptores, in tribuendo cuiquam quæcunq; paterant bonitatis, integritatis, innocentiæ, cujusvis denique tituli apud ethnicos speciosissimi testimonia: Celebrant illum non tantum ut principem optimum, sed simpliciter & absolute ut hominem optimum & philosophum optimum omnium qui unquam extiterunt. Estq; hoc ipsius peculiare encomium, quod ita prædicetur, citra exceptionem ullam prædicatur.* Mer. Causabon. Præf. in Vers. Angl. *ut citat. per* Gataker.

diction,

dition, as for a man to be *ſick* in health, and both in the greater degree. God cannot damn or forſake a Soul that loveth him and is holy, (*in ſenſu compoſito.*)

88. And whether any or how many without the Chriſtian Church, do truly *love God*, is a queſtion which dependeth as to *probability* upon the foreſaid *grounds*, but as to the *certainty of the fact*, upon that *heart-knowledge* of other men) which belongeth to God only. 1. How can I that live in an obſcure corner of *England*, know whether any love God in *Siam*, *China*, *Japon*, or *Perſia*, or at the *Antipodes*. 2. If I were with them all, and acquainted with every perſon in the world, I could have but a *probability* of the affirmative of any one, becauſe I am not acquainted with the heart. But when the Scripture aſſureth us that it is the *Law of Grace*, and not only that of *Innocency*, which all the world is *governed by*, and ſhall be judged by, and ſo that their Sanctification and Salvation is *poſſible*; there is ſo great a probability, that this Covenant, and the mercies of it, are not in vain to *all* of them that are under it alone, and that the thing that is *poſſible* to ſo many millions, doth come to paſs with *ſome*, that an impartial conſiderer of Gods Nature and Government, may eaſily ſee what to think moſt probable.

89. Thoſe therefore that teach the Church, that it is a *certain truth*, that *no one in the world* (*Infant* or *Aged*) is *ſaved from Hell fire*, but *Chriſtians* only, and that this is not only *certain* to ſuch great underſtandings as their own, but *muſt be ſo to all true Chriſtians*, do but diſcover that they over-value their own underſtandings, and that ſiding hath contracted their thoughts and charity into a ſinful narrowneſs, and that the Opinions of men, counted Orthodox, prevaileth more with them than the evidence of truth, and I think that they are to be numbred with thoſe that by over-doing, do dangerouſly undermine the Chriſtian Faith.

90. The Texts urged by them for this pretended certainty, are all abuſed ſome of theſe ways: 1. Either ſome one difficult Text is expounded contrary to the current of the whole Scripture. 2. Or the words that are ſpoken only of *privative Unbelievers* who hear the Goſpel, are expounded of *negative not-Believers* who *never heard it*, nor could do. 3. Or that which is ſaid againſt *Unbelievers in general*, is expounded as againſt the *non-Believers* of the Articles of the *Chriſtian Faith* which are ſuperadded ſince *Chriſt's Incarnation* in ſpecial; As if all the *Apoſtles* before they believed *Chriſt's Sacrifice*, *Reſurrection*, *Aſcenſion*, &c. were *Infidels* in a ſtate of damnation. 4. Or elſe they ſuppoſe (without proof) that the Spirit and Grace of Chriſt can extend it ſelf to none that *know him not as incarnate*, *crucified*, *riſen*, *glorified*, &c. (and ſo that the Apoſtles had no Grace till the Reſurrection). Some ſuch fallacy is in all theſe particular textual arguments, eaſily diſcernable.

91. Were it not evident in Scripture, that the world is *under the Law of Grace* as the *norma officii & judicii*, (as it is) yet could no man truly ſay that he is *certain*, that no one of them ſhould be ſaved. For if they were all under the Law of *Innocency*, yet there is this great difference between it, and the Law of Grace, that whereas the ſentence of the latter is peremptory, excluding all hope of Diſpenſation and Pardon, to the final Rejecters of its Grace, for ever; yet the *former* was a Law whoſe penalty was *remiſſible*, and it did not paſs a peremptory ſentence of diſpair. Though it gave no hope of Pardon, yet it took not away the hopes of it: that is, It had a *threatening-diſpenſable*:

(as Dr. *Twiſſe* and many other ſay, *Without a Saviour had God ſo pleaſed*; And as others ſay, *Through the virtue of Chriſt's Sacrifice even to them that know him not.*) For the commination of that Law (which threatened not the death of a *Surety*, but of the *Sinner*,) was actually diſpenſed with in our Juſtification. And what God *can do*, they ought not to ſay, that they *are certain* that he *never will do it*, unleſs he had firſt ſaid ſo himſelf.

92. If in all Humane Judgments Nature dictateth that in doubtful caſes, the Judge ſhould rather propend to the better interpretation, and favourable Judgment; why ſhould it not be ſo in our judgment of God and man? The Nature of God is infinitely good; He hath proclaimed his Name, as aforeſaid, even in the terrours of Mount *Sinai*, to be a *God gracious*, *merciful*, *long-ſuffering*, *pardoning*, &c. He hath proteſted or ſworn, that he hath *no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but rather that he repent and live:* and ſo that he firſt ſeeketh the Glory of his Mercy; and exerciſeth juſtice in mans deſtruction, but as his *ſecond* work: He that ſaved no man (but Chriſt himſelf glorified) upon the terms of *Innocency*, but all by *Grace*, and never elſe took one Soul to Heaven, who had not firſt deſerved Hell, doth ſurely firſt ſeek the Glory of his Grace. And we know that 1. *All Judea* was a ſmall Country, like *England*; An inconſiderable point or ſpot of the Earth, as to its magnitude. 2. That moſt of the worlds duration in likelihood was over (as Biſhop *Uſher* reckons, 4000 years) before *Chriſt's death*, and the ſecond Edition of the Covenant. So that if none but *Jews* were ſaved all that while, the number was comparatively next to none. 3. That no man that I know of hath preſumed to ſay, that before *Moſes* time, none but the Seed of *Abraham* were ſaved. 4. That the Covenant made by *Moſes* at Mount *Sinai*, and the incloſure of the *Jews*, was no caſting off the reſt of the world into a worſe condition than they were before. 5. That none yet have preſumed to ſay, they are certain that all the Seed of *Keturah*, of *Iſhmael*, of *Eſau* were damned: much leſs that *Sem* and all his Subjects, *Japheth* and all his Subjects (and Poſterity till then) or that *Job* and his *Friends*, and *Melchizedec* and all his Subjects, were certainly damned. 6. That the *Jews* themſelves were for the moſt part ſo wicked, that ſeeing few even of that little Country were ſaved, if you are ſure that *no others* were ſaved, they were but a few in the world indeed. 7. That the *Apoſtles* (as is ſaid) were in a ſtate of Salvation, when under Chriſt's own teaching, they believed not many great Articles, now eſſential to the Chriſtian Faith. So that all ſet together, will tell us, that the concluſion of the *certain damnation of all without the Jewiſh and the Chriſtian Church*, ſeemeth not very deſirable either as to the *Glory of the good and gracious God*, nor as to the *good of Mankind*; And therefore we ſhould not propend that way in a caſe of doubtful arguing. And I deſire the *Reader* impartially to conſider, though *Abraham* knew not till God told him how bad *Sodom* was, yet when he aſketh of God to ſpare it if there were but fifty Righteous in it, whether he do not imply that he thought moſt other Cities of that bigneſs had at leaſt fifty righteous, if not more? For when God told him, that he would deſtroy it for the cry of their ſins, he muſt needs judge it worſe than ordinary? And was *Abraham* more ignorant than we? the Father of the Faithful? a Prophet that ſaw Chriſt's day and rejoyced?

93. It is a *certain truth*, that as *God the Creator*, ſo *Chriſt the Redeemer* doth extend his *mercy farther* than he himſelf is known: And as the Sun ſendeth ſome light to the world before it riſeth and is ſeen it ſelf, ſo doth Chriſt

Christ send many excellent Gifts of his Grace, to those that know him not as Incarnate. And when all the world is delivered into his hand, we have reason to believe that the mercies which Philosophers, and all others in the world had, were communicated *by him*, (as the second Person, or Wisdom and Word undertaking mans Redemption, first, and as the Word Incarnate after.)

94. Those ancient Fathers of the Church, who lived near the Apostles times, (as *Clem*, *Alex.* &c.) who believed that some without the Church were saved, were never condemned for it as Hereticks, no not by the busie condemning Ages.

SECT. VI.

Of Universal Redemption.

95. By what hath been said, it appeareth how far Christ may be said to have *died for all*. Certainly (*de re*) all that Christ *giveth to all*, which is the fruits of his Death, he *procured for all* by his death: whatever we say of *conditional Intentions*, he certainly *intended to give all that he giveth*. But all these following particulars *are given* by Christ, either to all, or to more than the Elect.

1. The Humane Nature, common to all, is advanced and brought nigh to God, in Christ's Incarnation. 2. Christ's Sacrifice for Sin, and his perfect Holiness, are so far *satisfactory* and *meritorious* for all men, as that they render Christ a meet Object for that Faith in him which is commanded men, and no man shall be damned for want of the satisfactoriness of Christ's Sacrifice, or for want of a Saviour to die for him, and fulfil all Righteousness, but only for the abusing or refusing of his Mercy. 3. Christ's conquest of the Devil and the World, hath made man's conquests of them the more easie or possible. And his Victory over Death and his Resurrection, hath procured a Resurrection to all the World. 4. All men are his *Subjects* by *Obligation*, as he is the Redeemer, and so are under his healing, saving kind of Government. 5. A clearer revelation of Life and Immortality, is made by him, even to those that perish. And they have far greater helps than else they would have had, to set their hearts on a better World. 6. Especially a Law of Grace is made by Christ for all the world; (In the last Edition to all that hear the Gospel, and in the first to all the rest.) By the Promise of which, as by an Act of Oblivion, or Instrument of Donation, God hath Enacted and Given a full Pardon of all Sin to all Mankind, with Reconciliation, Adoption, and Right to Christ and Heaven, on condition of their *acceptance* of it, as offered them. So that men are pardoned and justified by that Instrument or Gift, if they will believe, and will not unthankfully reject their Mercies. 7. Apostles and ordinary Ministers were appointed to preach this Gospel to all the World, and make the Offer of Christ and Life to all men without exception. 8. The execution of the violated Law of Innocency is forborn to all men, in the greatest part; Judgments kept off; and they kept out of Hell, while they have time and means to prepare for their Salvation. 9. Many and great Mercies which signifie Gods goodness, and lead towards Repentance, are given to all the world; even mercies forfeited by sins against the Law of Innocency, and given by the Grace of our Redeemer.

Joh. 1. 11, 12. & 3. 16, 17, 18, 19. 1 Joh. 5. 10, 11.

Matth. 28. 19. Mark 16. 16.

10. It is made all mens *duty*, to believe (the Revelation made to them) to repent, to accept more mercy, and to ſeek their own Salvation. And ſuch duty is not the ſmalleſt mercy. 11. He hath recorded his Word and Grace in the holy Scriptures, which all are allowed to uſe for their good. He hath filled his Doctrine or Goſpel with ſuch powerful convincing Reaſons and Perſwaſions, which have a tendency to convince men, and convert them. 12. He ſecondeth his Word by many ſuch Providences (in his Works, his Mercies, his Afflictions,) as greatly tend to win mens Souls. 13. He hath left his excellent Example to the world, which greatly tendeth to mens Conviction and Salvation. 14. He hath appointed ſeveral Church-Ordinances, which are mercies to more than the Elect; as is the viſible communion alſo which they have with the Upright, and their examples, prayers, *&c.* 15. To all theſe he addeth an obligation on all Chriſtians, to do their beſt to convert and ſave all others. 16. And the Office of Magiſtrates under Chriſt, is appointed for theſe ſaving uſes, to promote the Salvation of the people. 17. Death it ſelf is now turned into a medicinal means, by the proſpect of it to convert and ſave men. 18. Uſually Gods patience alloweth men time of Repentance, and taketh them not at the firſt denial, that they may conſider and correct their former error. 19. Remedies are offered men fetcht from Satan and Sin it ſelf. The Tempter (by the malice of his temptations) oft detecteth his own fraud and mens danger. A natural enmity againſt Devils, and all that is known to be of them, is put into all Mankind: And Sin hath a ſting to the Fleſh it ſelf, and is made ſuch a miſery to Sinners even in this life, as may much tend to alienate and deter them from it. And the world it ſelf is made ſuch a palpable vanity, and ſmart vexation, as tendeth to drive men to look out for a better, and not to love it above God. 20. Laſtly, To all theſe means, there are certain *internal motions*, and ſtrivings of the Spirit of Chriſt, which he commonly vouchſafeth men in ſome degree, and which irritate Conſcience to do its office; and which if men will but ſo far yield to as they can, have a tendency to their recovery. All theſe twenty ſorts of means and mercies Chriſt giveth to all, or to more than the Elect.

Act. 14. 17. & 17. 27, 28.
Rom. 1. 19, 21.
Rom. 2.

96. It being certain *de re* that Chriſt ſo far died for all, as to procure them all ſuch Benefits as he giveth them, the queſtion remaining is *de nomine*, whether it be a fit phraſe to ſay that *Chriſt died for all?* And this is put out of queſtion by the Scripture, which frequently uſeth it, as is proved by the fore-cited Texts. We may well ſpeak as God ordinarily there ſpeaketh.

97. There are certain fruits of Chriſt's death which are proper to the Elect, (or thoſe that are in a ſtate of Salvation). As 1. Grace eventually effectual working them to true *Faith*, *Repentance* and *Converſion*. 2. Union with Chriſt the Head, as his true living members. 3. The actual forgiveneſs of ſin, as to the grand ſpiritual and the eternal puniſhment, *Rom.* 4. 1. 7. & 8. 1. 33, 34. 4. Our actual Reconciliation with God, ſo as to be beloved as his peculiar people. 5. Our Adoption and Right to the heavenly Inheritance, *Pſal.* 4. 6. & 8. 16, 17, 18. 6. The Spirit of Chriſt to dwell in us, and ſanctifie us, by a habit of Divine Love, *Rom.* 8. 9, 13. *Gal.* 4. 6. *Col.* 3. 10. 1 *Pet.* 1. 16. & 2 *Pet.* 1. 4. 1 *Joh.* 4. 15. *Joh.* 3. 5, 6. 1 *Cor.* 6. 19. *Gal.* 5. 17, 18, 22. 2 *Cor.* 6. 1. 7. Imployment in ſincere holy acceptable Service, where they and their duties are pleaſing to God, *Heb.* 11. 5, 6. 1 *Pet.* 2. 5, 9. 8. Acceſs in prayer, with a promiſe of being heard in all that's good for

Rom. 8. 30, 31.
Act. 26. 18.
1 Joh. 5. 11, 12.
Joh. 15. 1, 2, 6.
Eph. 1. 22, 23.
Col. 1. 19.
Eph. 3. 17.
Act. 5. 31. & 13. 38, 39.
Col. 1. 13, 14.
Rom. 5. 1, &c.
Tit. 3. 5, 6, 7.
1 Pet. 1. 3, 4.
Pſal. 50. 15. & 46. 1.
Rev. 22. 9.
Heb 1. 14.

for us (in Gods measure, time and way,) through Christ, *Joh.* 14. 13, 14. *Heb.* 10. 19, 20, 22. 9. Well-grounded hopes of Salvation and peace of Conscience thereupon, *Rom.* 5. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. 10. Spiritual communion with the Church-mystical in Heaven and Earth, *Heb.* 12. 22, 23, 24. *Eph.* 2. 19, 20, 21, 22. 1 *Cor.* 3. 22. 11. A special interest in Christ's Intercession with the Father, *Rom.* 8. 32, 33, *&c.* 12. Resurrection unto Life, and Justification in Judgment; Glorification of the Soul at Death, and of the Body at the Resurrection, *Phil.* 3. 20, 21. 2 *Cor.* 5. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. *Rom.* 8. 17, 18, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, *&c.*

All these Benefits Christ hath made a *conditional* Deed of Gift to all the world: But only the Elect *accept* them, and *possess* them. From whence we certainly infer, that Christ never *absolutely intended* or *decreed* that his death should *eventually* put all men in possession of these Benefits: And yet that he *did intend and decree* that by his death all men should have a *conditional Gift* of them. (As Dr. *Twisse* doth frequently assert.)

98. Christ therefore *died for all*, but not *for all equally*, or with the *same intent, design or purpose:* So that the case of difference in the matter of Redemption, is resolved into that of *Predestination*; and is but Gods *different Decrees* about the *effects* of Redemption.

99. The particle [*For*] when we question whether Christ died [*For*] All is ambiguous: 1. It may mean [*In the strict representation of the persons of all as several, so that they may be said to have died or satisfied in and by him, as civilly in their own persons, though not naturally*]. And thus Christ died not *for all*, or for *any man:* which yet is in some mens conceits, who thence say that Christ died not *for all*, because he did not so *personate* all. 2. It may signifie [*to die by the procurement of all mens sins, as the assumed promeritorious cause.*] And thus *Paræus* himself in his *Irenicon* saith, That *the sins of all men lay on Christ*; and so he *died for all*, that is, *for all mens sins as the cause of his death:* And you may tell any wicked man, *Thy sins killed Christ* (what-ever the deniers say to excuse them). 3. Or it meaneth, that Christ died *finally for the good of all men.* And that is true, as afore explained. He died for the *good of all*; but not *equally*; that is, not with the same absolute Will, Decree or Intention of attaining their Salvation.

100. But the *conditional New Covenant*, without any difference in the tenor of it, doth *equally give Christ*, Pardon and Life to all Mankind (antecedently to mens rejecting the offer) on *condition of acceptance.* And Christ *equally satisfied Gods Justice* for all the lapsed Race of *Adam*, so far as to procure them this Gift or Covenant, and the other foresaid common mercies: But not equally as to his Decree of the success: For there Election differenceth.

101. It is a thing so contrary to the nature of Christianity, and the Spirit of Christ in his Saints, to extenuate Christ's Merits, Purchase, Interest or Honour, or rob him of his due, that doubtless so many sincere Christians would never be guilty of such injurious extenuations, and narrowing of Christ's successes, but that they cannot reconcile *special Grace* with *universal*, and mistakingly judge them inconsistent: Nor durst opprobriously reproach his universal Grace, as they do, by calling it *vain, lame, imperfect*, a *mockery*, &c. if the conceit of their defending some truth by it did not quiet and deceive their Consciences. Whereas indeed *universal Grace* and *special*, do as perfectly and harmoniously consist, as *Nature* and *Grace* do, and as the *foundation* and the *building*, and as any generical and specifick Natures: And so doth a *general*

Decree,

Decree, that [*All who will believe ſhall be ſaved*, and that *this Promiſe ſhall be made to the world*] with a *ſpecial* Decree that [*Paul ſhall believe and be ſaved.*]

But on two accounts I paſs by all the reſt about the extent of Redemption, 1. Becauſe I muſt give you a ſpecial Diſputation or Tractate on that ſubject. 2. Becauſe the moſt Judicious of *Engliſh* Divines (ſo far as I can know them by their works) Biſhop *Davenant* hath ſaid ſo much in his two Poſthumous Diſſertation *de Redempt. & Prædeſtinat.* (Publiſhed out of the hands of Biſhop *Uſher*) as might ſuffice to reconcile contenders on theſe two points, were not men ſlothful in ſtudying them or partial or incapable in judging of theſe matters.

SECT. VII.

The Antecedent and conſequent Will of God, &c.

102. The diſtinction of Gods Antecedent and Conſequent Will, uſed by *Damaſcene*, is by many applyed to this controverſie, but by none that I have read ſufficiently explained, which is the cauſe that ſo many good men reject it, becauſe they miſunderſtand it. It's truly ſaid, that by his *Antecedent Will*, God would have all men to believe, repent and be ſaved, but by his *Conſequent Will*, he will have all condemned whom he doth condemn. But then it muſt be underſtood, that this diſtinction is not applyed to the *Will of God*, as he is meerly an *Abſolute Proprietary*, or *Benefactor*, but as he is the *King* or *Rector* of the world; and ſo his *Legiſlation* is his *Antecedent Will*, and his *Judgment* is his *Conſequent Will*. And no man of Religion can deny, either that *Gods Law* is the ſignification of his *Will*, or his *Will ſignifyed*, or that his *Judgment* and *Execution* is his *Will declared*; or that Gods Law of Grace doth conditionally give pardon and ſalvation to all, *antecedently* to man's performance or rejection of the condition, or that God *condemneth* Infidels *conſequently* to their Infidelity. The *Law Antecedently* to *Mans part* ſaith, *He that believeth ſhall be ſaved*; and the *Sentence* conſequently to his fact, ſaith, *Judas an unbeliever or impenitent, ſhall periſh.* And thus the diſtinction hath no doubt or difficulty.

103. God by *commanding faith and repentance*, and making them *neceſſary conditions* of Juſtification, and by *commanding perſeverance*, and threatning the Juſtified and Sanctified with damnation if they *fall away*; and making *perſeverance* a *condition of Salvation*, doth thereby provide a *convenient means* for the performance of his own Decree, of giving *Faith* and *Repentance* and *perſeverance* to *his Elect*; For he effecteth his ends by ſuitable *moral means*; and ſuch is this Law and Covenant, to provoke man to due fear, and care and obedience, that he may be wrought on as a man.

Of Juſtification by Faith, &c.

104. To be juſtifyed by *Faith* in general, agreeth to the ages before Chriſt's Incarnation, and thoſe ſince: But ſo doth not the *ſpecial kind* of faith by which they are juſtifyed. For much more is *Eſſential* to that faith which we muſt be juſtifyed by to them that are under the laſt edition of the Covenant of Grace, than was (or is) to them that were under the firſt alone. *Abraham* believed not all our eſſential Articles of faith.

105. To

What that Faith is.

105. To be justified by faith in *Paul's* sence, is all one as to be justified by *becoming Christians*. To be a *Believer*, a *Disciple*, and a *Christian* are all one in the Gospel sence.

106. The faith by which we are justified, as is aforesaid, is best understood by the Baptismal Covenant, and is essentially a *Believing Fiducial consent* to our Covenant relation to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as our Reconciled Creator and Father, our Saviour and our Sanctifyer, connoting the forsaking of all inconsistents. For it must needs be the *same faith* by which we have right to the benefits of that Covenant, and by which *we* are *justified*; because we have our remission and justification by the Instrumental donation of the Covenant, it being one of the benefits given by it: But *Practical Faith*, or *Believing-consent* is our condition of receiving our Covenant right to all the benefits in general; therefore to Justification in particular.

107. The Phrases of [*Justifying faith*] and [*Faith justifying us*] are humane and not Scriptural at all: And though they may be well used with explicatory caution, as being well meant, yet they are more lyable to mislead men, than the Scripture phrase, that [*we are justified by Faith*]; Because the former phrases are apter to insinuate an *Efficiency*, than the other; whereas faith is no *efficient cause* of our *Justification* nor any other act of Man: And the Scripture that speaketh of Justification by Faith sometime useth the phrase ἐκ πίστεως which no more signifyeth any Instrumental *efficiency* of Justification, than ἐξ ἔργων νόμου *ex operibus*: And though sometime διὰ πίστεως be used, it is to signifie no more than that God hath appointed it to be the *Medium* of our Justification as a condition, but not as any efficient cause.

108. The Faith by which we are justified (as I touched before) hath God the Father for its object as essentially as Christ the Saviour; as the said Baptismal Covenant sheweth; and that not only secondarily as Christ being the Mediator and way to the Father, our faith in Christ connoteth the final object; but also directly and primarily as the Father is the first in Trinity, and as Creator first related to us, and as the end is first in our intention: *Joh.* 17. 3. *This is life eternal to know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.* Joh. 13. 1. *Let not your hearts be troubled, you believe in God, believe also in me.*

109. And as essential is it to this Faith to believe in Christ as the Purchaser of Holiness and Heaven, as to believe in him as the purchaser of *pardon*; and to believe in him as the Teacher and Ruler of the Church, as to believe in him as the justifyer of believers. The inseparableness of these acts is commonly confessed.

110. Indeed it is essential to this faith, 1. To be the act of the three essential faculties of man's Soul, the *Vital Power*, the *Intellect* and the *Will*, 2. And to have for its object God the *Father*, *Son and Holy Ghost*; and that in Christ, all that is *essential to him as a Saviour* be its object: And therefore, 1. That it be an *Assent, Consent and practical Affiance*, 2. That it be a believing in Christ as God and Man, and as the *Teacher, Priest and King* of the Church, *revealing* the Gospel, *reconciling* us to God, and *Ruling* us in order to Salvation.

111. To say that some one only of these parts of Christ's office, as they are *Conceptus inadæquati* of a Saviour is the only object of justifying faith, and to say, that justifying faith is only *one Act* of the Soul, or *many*

The Controversie between the Papists and us about Justification is agitated in vain till we agree of the sence of the words [Justification and Remission]. As I said elsewhere they take not only Justification for a qualitative change (such as we call Sanctification) but Remission of Sin); for, they know not what themselves: most of them talk as if it were a putting away the Sin in its essence, which can be meant of nothing but the Habit; for the fact cannot be *infectum*: Others seem to take it *for* remitting the punishment also with that change. *Malderus* most plainly in 1. 2. *q.* 113. *a.* 1. and *p.* 567. saith that Remission of Sin is, Ablatio Reatus culpæ; *At esse* longe *aliud quam* Nolle illud punire; *non enim tantum facit Hominem non puniri, sed etiam non esse* Pœna dignum. *Minus tamen est quam* in amicitiam recipi, though yet no man is in a middle state, *neque Dei amicus neq; inimicus*, yet *cogitationes possunt separari, & Peccata Remittere idem est quod non imputare si hoc non accipias pro dissimulare, sed pro desinere esse offensam cum per Remissionem, Deo non imputante est quasi non fuerit.* By this you may see that these Papists hold the same with those Protestants whom they seem most to resist and cannot hide it: But, 1. It will be true to eternity that *Peter* sinned. 2. To say so, is to *blame* him. 3 His sin deserv'd death. 4. The Law and the nature of sin past are the same after pardon as before. 5. God doth not change his mind of sin. 6. Gods offence or displeasure is not a passion or mutable, but his essence as denominated from the object, to be [his *Velle punire* and Justice that must punish] 7. For God to be appeased and no more offended, is but his *Nolle punire peccatorem*, and not

to be obliged in Justice to punish him, but by his Covenant related to him as one that will not punish. 8. This change is in the sinner becoming not punishable; 9. That is, not worthy of it in the Gospel-sence, though worthy by the Law of Innocency. 10. All this is but that the *Reatus pœnæ & culpæ quantum ad pœnam* is remitted, but not the *Reatus culpæ simpliciter in se*— And thus we are all agreed.

acts

acts of *one only faculty*, or to say that we are justified only by such a one, and that to expect to be justified by *Assent*, *Consent and Affiance*, or by believing in Christ as our Teacher and Ruler as well as Priest, and as a justifying Judg, as well as a Justifying Sacrifice, and as a fulfiller of the Law, is to expect justification by *Works*, as *Paul* denyeth it; This is a vain distinguishing, a falsifying the Doctrine of faith and justification, a departing from the Scripture simplicity by corrupting seeming subtility, and one of those humane inventions which have wronged the Church. And it is no wiser than to say, that when we speak of *taking* or *receiving* a Man to be a Husband, a Physician, a King, it is but one physical act of the Soul, that is meant, or about one only physical conception in the object, which is inadequate. Whereas all such Moral or Civil acts contain many physical acts, and are suited to all things in the object which are essential to it in its moral or civil nature or relation.

112. And it is but the same deluding subtility, and vain curiosity, or a playing with deceitful words, to say that we are justified by faith, *Quatenus recipit Christi Justitiam*, As *it* believeth in Christ's *Sacrifice* and *perfect obedience* only, and not, As it believeth in him as Teacher, Ruler, Sanctifier, Judg, or as he intercedeth for us in Heaven, *&c.* when the Scripture saith no such thing at all, but simply *maketh faith in Christ* (supposing *Faith in God the Father*) to be that by which we must be justified.

113. This distinction is founded in another falshood supposed, which is that the effects of all Christ's saving works are as distinctly to be ascribed to several *Receiving Acts* of *faith*, as they are to the several *procuring acts of Christ*, the object of faith, which is another corrupting addition to God's Word. One part of the work of our Salvation was done by *Christ's humiliation*, and another by him in his *exaltation:* one by his *overcoming* the Devil, and another by his overcoming the World; one by his Cross, another by his Grave, another by his Resurrection, another by his ascension, another by his making the new Covenant, another by his sending the Spirit, another by his sending the Apostles, another by his intercession in Heaven, another will be done by our Resurrection, and another by his last Judgment, and our Glorification; one by him as an *obeying-subject*, another as a *Sacrifice* for sin, many by him as a *Prophet*, many as a *Priest* and many as a *King and Judge:* But to say therefore that our acts of faith as *Receptive* have as various respects to the effects or benefits, and that we are justified by him only as we *believe in him as Righteous*, or a *Justifyer*, and that we are adopted as we believe in him in another respect, and sanctifyed as we believe in him in another respect, *&c.* these are the dreams of corrupting curiosity. For that Christ who by all these several works, hath done all the office of a Redeemer to procure these several effects, is preached and offered to us to be *entirely* as *such a Redeemer*, *believed* in and *received*, and upon the condition of such an *entire faith* only, *Christ and all these benefits conjunctly* are by *one Covenant given* us, and no otherwise. And *believing in Christ as Christ*, who by all those acts hath himself procured us this Covenant, and these gifts, is that by which we are justified as it is one undivided faith; And the *quatenus* here as to Christ's own procurement of the effects hath its place, but as to the Act of our faith, and Christ as the object constituting that faith, there is no such diversity or order to be feigned, as if the several effects were accordingly to be ascribed to our several Believings or Receiving acts.

114. The ambiguity of the very word [*Receiving*] hath drawn many into this error: *Receiving* signifyeth sometimes a *Physical reception*, which is

is meerly *Paſſive*, or the Relation of the Patient as ſuch to the Act and Agent. And this is twofold, 1. The Reception of a real being; and ſo to be *ſanctified* is to *Receive Sanctification*. 2. The Reception of a *Relation*, ſuch as all *Jus*, *Right* to a thing is; and ſo to be *pardoned*, *juſtified and adopted*, and to *Receive pardon*, *juſtification and adoption*, is all one.

2. Sometimes it ſignifyeth *Moral* or *Civil receiving*, which is nothing but 1. *The conſent* of the *mind*, called *Acceptance*. 2. And as to corporeal objects, ſometime, the *voluntary* act of the body; as the *Hand*, taking that which is offered. Now if the *Receiving* in queſtion were phyſical, (either *rei vel juris ad rem*) then indeed it would be ſo neerly related to the thing received, (which as received is *no object*, becauſe *Receiving* ſo is no *act*) as that this *quatenus* in queſtion might be applyed to it. For it may well be ſaid *I receive Juſtification quatenus Juſtificatus ſum*, as I am juſtified, and I *receive Sanctification* as I am *ſanctified*, and *vice verſa*, for they are but various words ſignifying the ſame thing. But of *Moral Receiving* the caſe is otherwiſe: For this is not *phyſical Reception*, but only a *Moral Act*, which is made a *neceſſary medium*, or *Condition* to *Phyſical Reception*, and thence is called *Receiving*; ſo *Accepting* or *Conſenting* is a moral means or condition of that *Having* or *Poſſeſſing* which is conſequential. And this *Acceptance* hath relation *immediately* to the thing as *Given only*, to be *made ours*, according to the *Will of the Giver*, and not *made ours* according to the order of the *things given*: That is, 1. The *Ratio proprietatis*, the Reaſon that they *are ours* is the *will of the Donor*, and the Collation is according to the *order of his Will*; though the *Things Given* have their intrinſick difference.

By this you ſee the anſwer to what Mr. *Lawſon* in his excellent *Theopolitica* hath ſaid againſt me on this point. Of which ſee fullyer my anſwer to Mr. *Warner* in my Diſputes of *Juſtification*.

115. All men confeſs, that this *Moral Reception*, is an Act, and therefore hath *an object* (which *Phyſical Reception* is not). And that thus to *Receive* doth ſuppoſe a *Moral Gift*, which *Gift* maketh not the thing *ours neceſſarily*, as phyſical operation doth, but on ſuppoſition of our voluntary Reception or Conſent. And all confeſs that Gods Donation is by his Covenant, Teſtament or Promiſe; and this Covenant hath its proper nature and mode, that is, the *Condition as impoſed*, antecedent to our Receiving. Therefore as the thing Given is made ours by the Donation, ſo according to the order appointed by it: and our Conſent no otherwiſe maketh it ours than as the *Condition of the Gift performed*. But Gods Covenant doth Give us *Chriſt and Life*; that is, Juſtification, Sanctification and Glorification in *tithe* or *right*, in one Gift, to be Accepted by *one entire faith* as the *Condition*, not making at all the order of the Gifts and faiths reſpect to them in that order, to be any of the *Ratio proprietatis*.

116. This will be plainer by humane inſtances. A Servants Relation is founded in his conſent to be a *Servant*; a Wifes Relation is founded in her Marriage-conſent to be *a Wife*, and to take that man for her Husband ſimply without any more adoe. Now if the Maſter of that Servant, or the Husband of that Wife, be a noble man, a rich man, a wiſe man, a good man, and they knew all this, and by knowing it were induced to conſent, and are to have their proportionable benefits by his Nobility, Riches, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, yet their title to theſe benefits ariſeth not from the act of their *conſent* as it reſpected theſe benefits ſeverally and diſtinctly, but meerly by *conſent* to their *Relation*, as being *his Condition* of Collation. The Wife is made Noble by her Husbands Nobility, ſhe is made Rich by his Riches, ſhe is inſtructed by his Wiſdom, &c. But ſhe hath no *more Right* to his *Riches* for marrying him in the notion of *Rich*, or for *conſenting* to him for *Riches*, than for marrying

rying him in the *notion* or *thought* of his *wiſdom* or *goodneſs*. On her part, it was not conſent to be Rich by him that gave her right to his Riches, and conſent to be Noble by him that gave her right to Nobility; but *conſent ſimply* to be *his Wife* that gave her right to all.

117. This is yet fullyer evident in that moſt uſually men make conſent to *one thing* to be the condition of their Receiving or Right to another. And uſually that which one is moſt *backward* to, is made the condition of their Right to that which they are moſt *forward* or willing to have. The Maſter doth not ſay, If thou wilt have thy wages, thou ſhalt have right to it: But if thou wilt do my work, thou ſhalt have thy wages. The condition of Marriage is conjugal Love and fidelity: *q. d.* I will be thy Husband, and give thee right to all that I have, if thou wilt be and do what is eſſential to a Wife] and not [if thou wilt have my Riches, *&c.*] If a Father give a Child a free gift on any condition, it will likely be [If thou wilt be a thankful and obedient Child] and not [If thou wilt have it.] Or if meer *conſent* to *have it*, be put, it is uſually when it is ſome gift which it is ſuppoſed that the perſon is not very willing to have: [As if a Sick man will have Phyſick, if an ungodly man will have Teaching, Books or Godlineſs it ſelf.] But to this uſually they are induced by the Promiſe of ſomewhat elſe which they are willing of: As to the Sick [If thou wilt take this Phyſick, thou ſhalt have health.] To the ungodly [If thou wilt have Chriſt and holineſs, thou ſhalt have pardon and happineſs.] Now in the ſence of Phyſical *Receiving* [He that receiveth Phyſick, hath Phyſick] and [He that receiveth health, hath health] &c. But in the moral ſence of *Receiving*, which is *Accepting* as it is the *condition* of a *gift*, ſo [He that *receiveth the Phyſick ſhall have the health*] and [*He that receiveth Chriſt and his ſanctifying Spirit*, ſhall have *Pardon, Juſtification, and Salvation*] Not that his *willingneſs* to have [*pardon and happineſs*] is the chief or only condition of his [pardon and happineſs.] But his *Accepting Chriſt and his Spirit* which men are naturally unwilling of, is the condition of that [*pardon and happineſs*] which men would have.

By all which it appeareth that to ſay, [*Faith juſtifyeth me as it is the Receiving of Chriſts Righteouſneſs, and not as it is the Receiving of Chriſt as a Teacher, Ruler*, &c.] is a confounding or ſeducing ſaying. For, 1. If it intimate that *Faith Juſtifyeth* us as an efficient cauſe [principal or Inſtrumental] it is falſe.* 2. If it mean that [*Faith* is the *Condition* of *Juſtification quatenus*, as *it receiveth Chriſts Righteouſneſs only*,] it hath either *one* or *two* falſhoods. 1. If it mean that *Faiths receiving act*, is the *formalis ratio Conditionis*, or that it juſtifyeth not *qua conditio donationis*, but *qua Receptio Juſtitiæ Chriſti*, it is falſe. Therefore *qua* here can ſignifie nothing but the *Aptitude* of faith to be made the condition, and ſo *Qua & Quæ* here are all one: 2. And then that [*only the Accepting* of *Righteouſneſs juſtifyeth us*, that is, *Is the condition of our Juſtification*] is a falſhood.

* Unleſs by Juſtifying they mean the acts of Love, Hope, Obedience called Holineſs.

118. Therefore our *conſent* to be a *Holy* and *obedient people*, or to take Chriſt for our Teacher, Exemplar, Ruler, Sanctifier by his Word and Spirit, and Judge, hath at leaſt as great a hand in our juſtification, (being principally the *Condition* of the *Promiſe*) as our belief in our acceptance of Chriſt's Righteouſneſs hath.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Of Justification by Christ's Righteousness, imputed.

119. *Christ's personal Righteousness, Divine* or *Humane, habitual, active* or *passive* (as it's called) is not *given us* or *made ours*, truly and properly in *the thing it self*, but in the *effects* (as was aforesaid) for neither the same *matter*; nor the same *form* is strictly *ours*. 1. That neither of them is ours in a *physical sence* is undeniable. If the Divine Righteousness were so *ours*, we were Gods. And a *Habit*, an *Act*, and a *Passion* (materially) cannot be removed from one subject to another, nor the same be in divers subjects: These are as palpable contradictions as Transubstantiation is. And the *Relative form* is founded in the matter or subject, and can no more be removed. The paternity of a *Generator*, and the *paternity* of an *Adopter*, are not the *same*, but two. And a Relation is an accident, also which perisheth when removed from the subject; and in another is another. 2. If it be said that both are ours *Morally* or *Imputatively*, I answer, *It is true*: But that phrase is of large and doubtful signification. 1. If the meaning be that [*The Covenant of Grace doth as certainly pardon or justifie us* (in the way and degree promised by it) *for the merit of Christs Righteousness* (in performing his Mediatorial Covenant with the Father) *as our own merit* (had it been possible) *would have done; or our Innocency would have Justifyed us by the Covenant of Innocency*] this is true.

2. But if the meaning be that [*Christs merit and satisfaction*, by *perfect holiness, and obedience, and suffering*, are *supposed or Reputed by God to have been inherent in us, or done by us in our civil person in Christ*; or that *in a sence natural or Legal we did all those things our selves, or that God judgeth us so to have done, by Judging Christ and us to be the same civil person*; or else that all the *Benefits of Christs Righteousness shall as fully and immediately be ours, as if we had been, and done, and suffered, merited and satisfyed in and by Christ*; All this is false.

120. For if this were so, we could need *no pardon*; for he that is reputed to be *Innocent*, by fulfilling all the Law, is reputed never to have *sinned*, by *omission or commission*: And he can have no *pardon* of *sin*, who hath *no sin* to be pardoned. Therefore such an Imputation of Christs Righteousness to us, would make his *satisfaction* null or vain, or certainly neither *imputable* to us, nor *useful* for us.

121. Some to avoid this do divide the *Time* of our *Lives*, and suppose *Christs sufferings* to have satisfied and purchased pardon of our sins, for all the *Time before our Believing*, and his *Righteousness* to be *imputed* to us for the *Time since* our Believing: But this is a humane fiction: For our sins *after believing* must have *pardon* too, by Christ's satisfaction.

And some distinguish of our Time and State under the *two Covenants*, and say that Christ's satisfaction was for the pardon of our sins under the *first Covenant*, which continued but till the *promise made to* Adam, *Gen.* 3.15. And so was for none but *Adam's sin imputed to us*; and that after that all being under the *new Covenant*, it condemneth none but the *finally impenitent* (who scape not) and so that Gods *pardoning* men since the *new Covenant* is but his *preventing* their *need* of *pardon*, or else pardoning *temporal punishments* only: But this is contrary to the Gospel,

How little the Papists differ from the Imputation which they quarrel with. See in *Bellarm.* words cited and approved by *Davenant de Justit.* And *Pet. a S. Joseph. Theol. Speculat. l.* 4. *c.* 10. saith, [Obj. *Peccatum remitti non potest quamdiu homo manet conversus ad creaturam & aversus a Deo: At semper aversus erit a Deo nisi mutatur.* Resp. *Sufficere mutationem moralem, quæ per solam Dei condonationem fieri potest, ut jam homo non dicatur aversus a Deo.* (This is Antinomianism, and false; As if God called not him *averse* who is really averse.) Obj. 2. *Si peccatum remitti potest sine actu aut habitu --per solam imputationem erit quæ est hæreticorum sententia.* Resp. *Hæreticos loqui de facto & non de imputatione peccati remanentis & vere non remissi: nos de possibili & de vera remissione qua peccatum tollatur.*] See how the case is turned and wranglers deceive themselves. We hold it neither *de facto* nor *de possibili*: and they hold it *de possibili* and not *de facto*, viz. that bare pardon and non-imputation may put away the very being of sin, and may save men. Of which more afterwards.

But many others deny that sin can be remitted by extrinsick condonation: See *Cacer's Sum. The.* 22. *c.* 2. They ordinarily take Remission for destroying the sin it self.

which tells us that Chriſt *dyed for our ſins*, even *all* that ever are *forgiven*, and that *all are forgiven* to believers, (and not the *neceſſity* of forgiveneſs *prevented*) and not only *Adam*'s ſin as ours: Nor only the temporal, but the perpetual puniſhment. And even *temporal puniſhment* is not due to the *innocent*.

122. Some diſtinguiſh only of *Actions*, and not of *Time*, and ſay Chriſt's Sacrifice *ſatisfyed* for *all our ſins*, that they *may be forgiven*, and his *righteouſneſs* is imputed to us, that we may be alſo accounted *juſt*; But this is but either *ambiguity*, or the fore-detected groſs *contradiction*. For if by *Juſtice they* mean *Reputed ſinleſsneſs*, or *perfection*, then theſe two cannot ſtand together: For he that is ſuppoſed a *Sinner*, is ſuppoſed not *ſinleſs* or perfect; And he that is ſuppoſed *ſinleſs* cannot be ſuppoſed *pardonable*.

123. Some think to avoid the contradiction, by diſtinguiſhing only the *moments of Nature*, and double reſpect of the *ſame mans* action: They ſay that *we are firſt* in order of Nature ſuppoſed to be *Sinners*, and *pardoned*, and then to be ſuch as moreover need the reputation of *Innocency* or Righteouſneſs which is added to pardon. But, 1. He that is pardoned all ſins of omiſſion and commiſſion, is accounted *Innocent* and *Righteous* as to any *Guilt of puniſhment*, either of *ſence* or *Loſs*. 2. And he that is *after* accounted *Innocent* and *Juſt* from his firſt being to that hour, is judged never to have needed pardon: And ſo they make God come with an after act, and condemn his own foregoing act of error and injury; or at leaſt to contradict it, and in the firſt inſtant to ſay [*I pardon this Sinner*] and in the ſecond to ſay [*I now repute him one that never ſinned or needed pardon.*]

124. But the *commoneſt* way of ſuch Divines is, to ſay that *Chriſts Righteouſneſs* is *firſt imputed*; that is, *we are reputed to have perfectly obeyed and been habitually holy in Chriſt, and then ſin is next pardoned as a* fruit of the *merits* of this. But this is ſtill but the oft detected contradiction, that we are firſt *accounted ſinleſs*, and therefore our *ſins are forgiven us*.

125. Some ſay that the Law ſince the fall obligeth us both to *obey* and *to ſuffer*, and not to *one only*; elſe a Sinner bound to *ſuffer*, ſhould not be bound to obey. Therefore Chriſt muſt do both for us: But this is too groſs for any man to utter that ever knew what Law and Government is. Do they mean *that as to the ſame Act and time*, the Law bindeth us to obey and *ſuffer*? or for *divers* acts and *inſtants* of time? Do they mean that the Law bound man both to *perfection* and *ſuffering* for perfection, or to ſuffering for ſin? No man doubts but when one ſin is committed, and puniſhment deſerved, the Law is ſtill the Law, and bindeth men ſtill to *obey* or *ſuffer* more the next moment, and again to *obey* or *ſuffer* more the next moment. But this concerneth not our queſtion. Did the Law bind *Adam* to obey and to ſuffer before he ſinned? Did it bind him both to obey and ſuffer for his new ſin the next inſtant? It's true it bound him to ſuffer for his *old ſin*? but not for the *next* before it is committed. And the obligation *to duty* goeth before the obligation to *puniſhment* for that *ſame action*; becauſe the *action* cometh between; and the firſt is an act of Gods *antecedent Will*, and the ſecond of his *conſequent Will*, that is, of the *Retributive*, and not the *Preceptive* part of the Law.

And they note not that the queſtion is not, what *obedience* a man is *bound to*, but what he *performeth* or muſt be reputed to have performed. If they will ſpeak ſo unaptly as to ſay that the Law commandeth

Lapſed

Lapſed man, *not to have ſin*, or *imperfect man to have been perfect*; that is, that the Command to day bindeth Adam *ad præteritum* not to have ſinned yeſterday, or bindeth to Impoſſibility in nature, that exiſtent ſin ſhould not be exiſtent, (in all which I leave them to their liberty of words) yet it is certain that no man *hath perfectly obeyed* for one year or day. And therefore if Chriſt's perfect obedience and holineſs be imputed to them from their firſt being, then they are reputed *not-lapſed*, *nor-ſinners* from the beginning and, ſo not pardonable. But if it be only for the time *after ſin* that Chriſt's *perfection* is *theirs*, after *what ſin* muſt it be? If after *Adam's*, then we need no pardon of any but *Adam's* ſin. If *after converſion*, then we need no pardon for ſins *after Converſion*. If after our laſt ſin, then Chriſt's perfection is not imputed to us till after death.

126. Others would come nearer the matter, and ſay that we are reputed Righteous as *fulfillers of the Law*, and yet reputed *Sinners* as *Breakers* of the *Law:* and that though there be no *medium* in naturals between light and darkneſs, life and death, yet there is between a breaker of the Law, and a fulfiller of it, *viz.* a non-fulfiller; and between *juſt* and *unjuſt*, that is *not-juſt:* But this is a meer darkneſs: There *is a medium negative*, in a perſon as *not obliged*; but none between *Poſitive* and *Privative* in *one obliged* as ſuch. A ſtone is neither *juſt* nor *privatively unjuſt:* Nor a man about a thing never commanded or forbidden him: But what's this to the matter? God's *Law* is pre-ſuppoſed: we talk of nothing but *Moral acts*: The Law forbiddeth *Omiſſions* and *Commiſſions:* both are ſin. Do theſe men think that he is not reputed *Poſitively juſt*, (and not only *not-unjuſt*) who is reputed never to have committed a ſin, nor left undone a duty in his life. Can the Law be fulfilled more than ſo? What is Righteouſneſs if that be not?

Obj. Adam was neither juſt nor unjuſt in his firſt moment; no nor till he ſinned ſay ſome, becauſe till then he was not obliged to obey, or at leaſt to any meritorious act, that is, to love God.

Anſ. 1. *Adam* was in his firſt inſtant but Habitually juſt, and not by Act, becauſe not obliged to impoſſibilities any more than an Infant or a ſtone: But we ſpeak only of obliged perſons. 2. It is not true that *Adam* was not obliged to obey and Love God before he ſinned, or that he never Loved God as God.

Obj. At leaſt *Adam* merited not the Reward, though he ſinned not till then.

Anſ. 1. He merited what Reward he had, *viz.* the continuance o his bleſſings firſt freely given: but not an immutable ſtate. 2. It is yet unreſolved what that was by which *Adam* muſt merit Immutability and Glory? whether, 1. Once obeying or conſent to his full Covenant. 2. Or once loving God. 3. Or conquering once. 4. Or eating of the tree of Life. 5. Or perſevering in perfect obedience to the end; that is, till God ſhould tranſlate him, which is moſt likely. His not *Meriting Immutability* before the time, was no ſin, we confeſs. 3. And we maintain as well as you, that Chriſt hath not only ſatisfied for ſin, and merited pardon, but alſo *Merited Immutable Glory*. But conſider, 1. That *Adam's* not doing that which was to merit Glory, was his ſin of omiſſion, and to pardon that omiſſion, is to take him as a meriter of Glory. 2. Therefore it muſt be ſomewhat more than he forfeited by that omiſſion and his commiſſion, which cometh in by Chriſt's merit above forgiveneſs. 3. That Chriſt merited all this, both by his active, paſſive,

passive and habitual Righteousness, by which he merited pardon. 4. That it was not we that merited it in him, but he, to give it us only on the terms of a Law of Grace.

127. Yet some come nearer, and say that, *To punish* and *not-Reward* are not all one: And so the respect that Sin hath to the deserved *punishment* needed pardon and satisfaction: But our *deserving the Reward* needed *Christ's perfect Obedience to be imputed.* In this there is somewhat of truth. But you must avoid the errors that lie in the way, and are by most supposed truths. 1. Remember that man can have nothing from God, but what is a *meer Gift* as to the *matter*, though it be a *Reward* as to the *order and ends* of collation. And in this case, *punishment* is *damni* as well as *sensus*; And so the *loss of the Reward* is the principal part of Hell or *Punishment.* So that if Christ's death hath pardoned our sins of *Omission*, we are reputed to have done all *our duty*; And if so, we are reputed to have *merited* the *Reward:* And if he *pardon* our sin as to *all punishment of sense and loss*, he pardoneth them as to their forfeiture of *Heaven* as a *Gift*, if not as a *Reward.*

128. But, say they, remission of sin is but part of Justification, because a man may be forgiven, and yet not reputed never to have broken the Law. To put away guilt, and to make one righteous are two things. *Ans.* Still confusion. Guilt is either of the *fault* as such, or of the *punishment*, and of the fault only as the *cause of punishment.* If all guilt both *culpæ & pœnæ* were done away, that person were reputed *positively righteous*; that is, never to have *omitted a Duty, or committed a Sin:* But indeed when only the *Reatus pœnæ (& culpæ quoad pœnam)* is done away, the *Reatus culpæ in se* remaineth. And this Christ himself never taketh away, no not in Heaven, where for ever we shall be judged, *once to have sinned*, and not to be such *as never sinned.*

Of this see *Wotton de Reconcil.* at large.

129. And this seemeth the very core of their error, that they think we must be justified in Christ by the *Law of Innocency*, which justified *Christ himself*; and that we are quit or washed simply from all *guilt* of *fault*, as well as obligation to punishment: which is a great untruth, contrary to all the scope of the Gospel, which assureth us, that we are justified by the *Law of Grace* or *Faith*, and not by the *Law of Works:* That *Christ* freeth us *from the curse* and *penalty* of the *Law:* which he could not do, if we were reputed never to have deserved it, as never being Sinners. If we are reputed such as *fulfilled the Law of Innocency* (by another in *our civil person*, or as *fully representing us*,) all the Gospel is over-turned: There is no room for *Repentance*, none for the *satisfaction* of Christ, none for Faith in *his blood*, nor for *Pardon*, or *prayer for Pardon*, or any *Grace*, *Act*, *Duty* or *Ordinance*, *Sacraments*, *Confession*, or any thing which supposeth *Sin.*

To say that *Adam's* Law meant, [*Do this, by thy self or by Christ, and thou shalt live,*] is a Humane fiction, not found in Scripture, confounding the Law of Innocency with the Gospel: And to say that the New Covenant maketh us one Person with Christ, and then the Law of *Adam* doth justifie us, is a double error. We are not reputed one Person with Christ; nor doth the first Covenant justifie any but the Person that performeth it. But we maintain as well as they, that the same *Righteousness of God* in himself, is manifested in both Covenants, and the same holy love of perfect Obedience, and the *ends* of the first Covenant are secured by the second. But the *tenour* and *terms* are not the same, nor the *Righteousness* of the *subject* as denominated from *those terms.* It is not the same Law which condemneth us and justifieth us, nor that justifieth Christ

hriſt and us; nor is it the ſame Habits, or Acts, which are the immedi- *fundamentum* of the Relation of *righteous* in Chriſt and in us, ough his Righteouſneſs be the meritorious cauſe of ours. And there- re not the ſame with the thing merited.

130. The Truth which they grope after, and muſt reconcile them is as followeth. Chriſt in his Sufferings did ſtand in the room of ners as their Sponſor, and ſatisfied Juſtice as was ſaid before: And od had other ends yet to accompliſh: It was meet that the perfection his Law ſhould be glorified by a perfect fulfilling of it by Chriſt, en we had failed. Satan was hereby confounded: God pleaſed and noured: Man ſhewed what he ſhould have been, and yet ſhould do: ns nature in Chriſt was thus actively and habitually perfected: By all s Chriſt performed his Obedience to the *mediatorial Law*, and *his venant of Redemption*; and ſo acquired a right firſt *to himſelf* of giving t the *purchaſed Benefits* to Sinners, by a new Law or Covenant of Grace d according to it; By which Covenant, only as his Inſtrument, the ther and Son give us Right to them, in an Order there eſtabliſhed. l that is there given to us, Chriſt purchaſed for us, by performing his *n Covenant* firſt with the Father, by perfect Holineſs, and Obedience, en in his Sacrifice on the Croſs, and by all that he undertook to do as Redeemer, antecedently. The Purchaſe was made for this *Donation* its end, and is commenſurate *to* it: juſt ſo much as Chriſt hath *given* as to *matter*, *manner*, *terms*, *degree*, *time*, &c. he did *purchaſe* and *rit* for us, and no more. Had he antecedently done all that he did *our perſon*, and *we in him*, in *Law ſenſe*, the *thing it ſelf*, with its *ſeparable conſequents and effects*, had been all ours *ipſo facto*, before and thout the donation or conveyance of a new Law or Covenant; nor d they been ever given us upon *terms* and *conditions*, when they were *r own before*, without thoſe terms. But now what is given us by the ew Covenant, we have title to on this account, becauſe it was pur- haſed by the *perfect Merit* and *Saerifice* of Chriſt, and ſo *given us by m*, and by the *Father*. So that it is *ours* as *ſure* as if *we had merited it r ſelves*, but not *ours* in the *ſame order*, and *meaſure*, and *time*, and *rms*, as if we had merited it our ſelves (in our natural or legal per- ons). For then it would have been all ours at once *ipſo facto*, even e *merit it ſelf*, and the fore-ſaid *effects*. We deſerved puniſhment, d Chriſt was puniſhed in our ſtead, that we might be *forgiven*; not *mediately*, but on *Covenant-terms*: we had *forfeited Life* by ſin; And hriſt *merited Life* for us by his Perfection, (not in *our perſons*, but in e *perſon of a Mediator*,) which *Life* was to be given to us by the ſaid *ovenant*: The *antecedent benefits* (ſuch as the *Covenant* it ſelf) he iveth *abſolutely*, and *antecedently* to any act of ours. God *reputeth* all his *Satisfaction* and *Merit* of Chriſt to be as *meet* and effectual to pro- ure us all theſe Benefits, to be *thus given*, as if we our ſelves had *done* and ffered: And in this ſenſe *Chriſt's Righteouſneſs* is *given* us, and *made ours*, n that it is *given for us*, and we have the ſaid benefits of it: Not that God doth give us the very *habits of Holineſs* which were in Chriſt, nor e *tranſient acts* which he performed, nor the very *Sufferings* which he nderwent, nor the Relation of *righteous ſatisfactory* and *meritorious*, as was that *numerical Relation* which immediately reſulted from Chriſt's wn Habits, Acts and Sufferings; For ſuch a tranſlation of accidents is contradiction. But God giving us all the *effects*, or *Salvation merited*, it ſelf properly, is ſaid alſo not unfitly to give us the *Merit* or *Righte- uſneſs* which procured them; that is, as it was paid to God for us, to pro-

Herveus Natal. quodlib. 4. *q.* 14. could ſpeak thus much better than many *Proteſtants*. [*Sicut meritum Chriſti quantum ad actum quem exercuit, non tranſit in alios; tranſit tamen in alios quantum ad effectum illius meriti illis qui applicantur ad Chriſtum mediantibus Sacramentis vel mediante fide propria; Qui quidem effectus eſt Gratia quæ eſt contraria, culpæ, & quæ reddit hominem dignum vita æterna: Ita etiam demeritum Adæ, licet non tranſeat in alios quantum ad actum quem exercuit, tamen tranſit quoad effectum culpæ originalis, quæ eſt contraria gratiæ, & reddit dignum pœna æterna, & indignum vitæ æterna.* How doth this differ from the ſoundeſt *Proteſtants* as to the Imputation of Chriſt's Righteouſneſs to us, or *Adam's* ſin.

procure them; even as he is ſaid to give Chriſt himſelf (antecedently to our Faith) to the World as a Saviour. And thus Chriſt's Righteouſneſs, Merit and ſatisfaction may be ſaid to be imputed to us, in that it is *thus given us*, and *thus* truly *reputed ours*.

131. But when the Text ſaith, *Rom.* 4. 24. *Righteouſneſs is imputed to us*, the meaning is no more, but that God *reputeth* or *judgeth us* righteous though we have not the Righteouſneſs of Innocency, or of the Law of Works; which indeed is done for Chriſt's meritorious Righteouſneſs procuring it: But the Text ſpeaketh not of Chriſt's *perſonal Righteouſneſs* in *matter* or *form*, imputed to us as being it ſelf our own. Imputing Righteouſneſs to us, is a conſequent Act (after Faith) of God as Judge, and not an antecedent donation.

132. And it is true that *formaliter*, *non-punire & præmiari*, not to *puniſh*, and to *Reward* are not all one: And in ſome caſes a man may be freed from puniſhment, who is not rewarded: But it is as true as is aforeſaid, 1. That Gods Salvation, and all his Benefits, are ever *free Gifts* as to the *matter* and *value* firſt, and then the relation of *a Reward* is but *ſecondary* as to the *Order* of collation, and the reaſon *comparative*, why one man hath them rather than another (as a thankful Child hath the Gift which the Contemner goeth without). 2. And that *here*, Not to *have this Gift* (forfeited by *our ſin*) is to be puniſhed: And ſo here *non-donari*, is *puniri* materially though the relations differ. 3. And that it is the *ſame Righteouſneſs of Chriſt* which meriteth our *Impunity quoad damnum & ſenſum*, and which meriteth our *Right to the Gift of Life*, both *ſub ratione doni* as a Gift, and *ſub ratione condonationis* as a *forgiveneſs* of the forfeiture, and of the *pœna damni*: So that here is no room for the conceit, that Chriſt's death was only to purchaſe Pardon, and his Righteouſneſs to merit Life. That which confounded men here is, their taking the *divers Reſpects*, and *Connotations*, and *Conceptions* of one and the ſame thing, to be divers ſeparable things: The ſame Law hath the *Preceptive* part (to *do* and *not do*) and the *Retributive* part (penal and rewarding). The ſame Obedience of *Adam* was *doing* what was *commanded*, and a *deſerving* what was *promiſed*. But *more* was *promiſed* to *perſevering Perfection* than to the *firſt act* of Obedience. One Sin deſerved death; but one act of Obedience deſerved not immutable Glory. And as the ſame Act is formally *Obedience* related to the Command, and formally *meritorious* or *præmiandus*, as related to the *Promiſe*. And the ſame Act is *ſin* and *puniſhable*, as related to the Precept (or Prohibition) and Threatening; ſo the ſame Glory is a *free Gift* in one reſpect (as related *ut bonum* to God as Benefactor) and a *Reward* in another (as related *quoad ordinem conferendi* to God as *Rector*.) And the ſame *loſs of Glory* is *pœna* related to the Threatening, and it is the loſs of a *Reward* as related to the *Promiſe*. And ſo the ſame *Merits* of Chriſt's active, and paſſive, and habitual Righteouſneſs, do cauſe our Glory, both by giving us pardon of our forfeiture, and by Covenant-Donation, and as a Reward to Chriſt, and to us when we perform the conditions of his Gift.

133. And it is certain, that Chriſt's *Sufferings* are firſt *ſatisfactory*, and then *meritorious*, being a part of his Active, that is, *voluntary Obedience*. And Chriſt's *Holineſs* and *Obedience* are *meritorious of pardon of Sin*, as well as of *Salvation*.

134. If there be (as there is) any thing which is given us through Chriſt, more than our own Innocency or Obedience would have merited, the *Gift of that is more than remiſſion of Sin*; And is to be aſcribed accordingly

accordingly to the Purchaſe of *Chriſt's Merits*. But yet both his *Holineſs* and *Sufferings* (though not *as ſufferings*) did *merit* it: And that was not a *fulfilling of the Law in our ſtead.*

135. This ſuperadded Gift (what-ever it is) ſeemeth in Scripture to be included in *Adoption*, and not in *Juſtification*: But yet it may in this ſenſe be called *Juſtification*, in that when our Right to that *Gift* is queſtioned, that Right muſt be juſtified by the Covenant-Donation, and by Chriſt's meritorious Purchaſe of it. But this is only *de nomine*: We are agreed of the thing.

136. It is greatly to be noted, that as a *Reward* is in the formal notion more than *not puniſhing* (where materially they are the ſame) ſo Chriſt hath not at all *merited* that eternal *Life* ſhould be *ours*, by way of *Reward for our fulfilling the Law in him*, but that it ſhould *ours* by *his free Gift*, as *a Reward to Chriſt for his own Merits*. So that the Relation of a *Reward* for *Perfection*, belongeth only *formally to Chriſt*, (who taketh it as *his benefit* that *we* are ſaved through his love to Souls) but not at all to us. And to ſay (as too many hold) that Heaven is *our Reward* for our perfection of *Holineſs* and *Obedience* in and by Chriſt, is a Humane Invention, ſubverting Chriſt's Goſpel; or unfit ſpeech, if better meant.

137. Yet a *Reward it is to us*, to be glorified; but that is not for our fulfilling the Law of Innocency by Chriſt, but for our *believing in Chriſt*, and *performing the conditions* of the *Covenant of Grace*: which giveth us Life as a *free Gift*; but yet in the order of the condition it hath the relation, and name of a *Reward to us*, in the Scripture.

138. So that here are three *rewarding* Covenants before us: 1. The *Covenant or Law of Innocency* rewarding man for perfection to the end; And this rewarded none but Chriſt: And it is falſe that we are rewarded by that Covenant, or juſtified *by it*, for *Chriſt's* fulfilling it. But it juſtified Chriſt. 2. The Law or Covenant made only *to and with Chriſt the Mediator*: And this Covenant further *rewarded Chriſt* as *Mediator*, giving *him* all that it promiſed to himſelf and us, for his performing the mediatorial conditions. And ſo *our Life* is *Chriſt's Reward*. 3. The Covenant or *Law of Grace* (for it is the ſame thing in ſeveral reſpects that's called the *Law* and the *Covenant*), which giving Life on the condition of *Faith*, doth juſtifie and reward Believers. And we are juſtified and rewarded by no other Law.

139. When *Rom.* 4. oft ſaith (and other Texts) that we are *juſtified by Faith*, it connoteth and includeth that we are juſtified by *Chriſt* and his Sacrifice, Merits and Covenant reſpectively, *believed in*: But yet it is not *Chriſt*, nor his *Sacrifice*, or *Merits*, or *Promiſe* that is meant by the word [*Faith.*] It was a groſs abuſe of the Text ſo to expound it: Faith connoteth the Object, but it is not Chriſt that is called *Faith.*

140. But the meaning is, that man having forfeited Life, Chriſt's Righteouſneſs (habitual, active and paſſive,) hath merited, that it ſhall be given us as a free Gift, but yet regularly under a Law: But the Law maketh

All the ſtir of the *Papiſts* is to prove that we have inherent Righteouſneſs as well as pardon, which *Proteſtants* are as much for as they. The reſt is *de nomine juſtificationis*, Malder. 1. 2. q. 113. a. 2. p. 572. *Apoſtolus*, 2 Cor. 5. *non aliud vult quam Chriſtum cui nullum debebatur ſupplicium, factum fuiſſe hoſtiam pro noſtro peccato, ut nos qui apud Deum nihil merebamur, præter. ſupplicium, juſtitia Dei fieremus in ipſo; id eſt, gratis ſine noſtris operibus conſequeremur per ipſius merita juſtitiam coram Deo.*] What doth this differ from the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.

Idem ibid. Quando Apoſtolus dicit multos conſtitui juſtos per unius obedientiam ſignificatur cauſa meritoria, non autem formalis: And ſo ſay we: But ſome call Chriſt's Righteouſneſs the *cauſa materialis*, meaning no more but that it is the matter of that Merit, for which we are juſtified; As if *Adam* had perfectly fulfilled the Law, his fulfilling it, had been meritorious of his ſentencial Juſtification, and yet the matter of his conſtitutive Juſtification; that is, of his Righteouſneſs. And ſome unaptly call it the formal cauſe: But an unapt logical notion is not an error in Faith or Theology.

Idem ib. p. 573. *Quamvis ex omnino rigida juſtitia ſolus Chriſtus Dominus ſatisfaciat; de condigno tamen, ita ut merces operi bono debeatur poſt Dei promiſſionem, meretur juſtus coronam juſtitiæ quam reddet in illa die juſtus judex: Eſt noſtra juſtitia totâ, totum meritum, tota ſatisfactio dependens a merito & ſatisfactione Chriſti.* Still here is a wordy Controverſie.

maketh nothing but *believing acceptance* the condition of our Right, and he that doth that much, ſhall, without perfection, be eſteemed and uſed as righteous for the ſake of the ſaid Righteouſneſs of Chriſt. So that in point of *Merit*, as to the *value* of the thing, *Chriſt's Righteouſneſs* is inſtead of our *Innocency:* But as to the *order* of *collation*, ſomething being ſtill to be required of us as a *condition of Right*, ſo our *Faith* now is inſtead of our *Innocency*, as being all that is *laid on us* inſtead of it, that we may have right to Juſtification. And to aſſign this *condition* on our part, *Paul* ſaith, That *Faith is imputed to us for righteouſneſs*. To deny this ſenſe, is to uſe violence with the Text.

141. Chriſt's *Righteouſneſs* is made ours, as *our Sins* were made his; which is not *in themſelves*, as is aforeſaid: God forbid we ſhould think that Chriſt was ever *reputed by God* to be a *Sinner*, a *Blaſphemer*, a *Murderer*, an *Enemy to God* and *Goodneſs*, one that had Satan's *Image*, and was *his Servant*, a *Perſecutor* of himſelf, *&c.* But only our ſin was imputed to him as to the puniſhment deſerved: that is, he aſſumed the *Reatum pœnæ*, the puniſhment, and a *dueneſs occaſioned* by our ſin; but made *his own* by his *voluntary ſponſion*; But never had he the *reatum culpæ* in its ſelf, but meerly as aforeſaid reſpectively to the puniſhment. Even ſo we have the *Righteouſneſs* of Chriſt, not *in its ſelf*, as *Proprietors* of it, but in relation to the *effects*; that is, we have the *effects*, even our *Juſtification*, and other benefits as *purchaſed by it*, and for its ſake: And as our *guilt*, or obligation to puniſhment, was not *Chriſt's*, till his *voluntary ſponſion* or *conſent* did make it ſo; Even ſo his *Righteouſneſs* is not ours in the *effects*, till our *voluntary conſent* accept it: Becauſe it is not a *natural*, but a *contracted* Relation that is between Chriſt and us. And as it is not a *ſtrict propriety* in Chriſt's *Righteouſneſs* that we have, ſo it is much leſs a *plenary* and *abſolute* propriety: nor have we it in the Relation of a *meritorious cauſe* to *all uſes*, as if it had been *fully our own*, but only *limitedly to thoſe uſes* which God accepted it for, and hath aſſigned to it in the Goſpel; that is, it is but a certain ſort and meaſure of mercies that are given us from it in Gods time and way.

142. To the aſſerting of the rigid ſenſe of Imputation, they are neceſſitated to ſay that, which ſuppoſeth Gods repute of the matter to be falſe; that is, that he reputeth us to have done that in and by Chriſt, which we never did by him: But God judgeth nothing to be otherwiſe than it is? that he judgeth Chriſt to have been the Sponſor and Mediator, and in that perſon to have done and ſuffered as he did, is becauſe it is true: But he judgeth him not to have been the *legal Perſon* of the *Sinner*, and *as many perſons* as there be redeemed Sinners in the world, becauſe that is not true.

143. They ſay that what the *Surety doth*, the *Debtor doth* in Law-ſenſe, and to judge ſo is not to err. But there are ſeveral ſorts of *Sureties*, much more of *Inſtruments* in paying a Debt. 1. There be *free Sureties*, who are not obliged to the Debtor as his *Dependents*; and theſe either by *counter-ſecurity*, or by *right of the thing*, may recover all of the Debtor again. And therefore the Law ſuppoſeth not the Debtor to have payed the Debt by them; but that the Creditor made them both *Joynt-Debtors for his own ſecurity*. 2. There are *Sureties antecedently*, and *Sureties conſequently:* One that before the Debt doth conditionally make himſelf a Joynt-Debtor, in caſe the Principal pay it not; And there is a Surety more properly called an *undertaking-Friend*, who *after* payeth the Debt, being diſobliged before. Chriſt was not a Surety of the firſt ſort, in Law-ſenſe; And if you call Gods *Decrees*, which are his

his *Eſſence*, *Suretiſhip*, your liberty of words changeth not the caſe. 3. There is a Surety who payeth the Debt in the *name* and *perſon* of the *principal Debtor*; (And he is not properly called a *Surety*, but an *Agent* or *Subſtitute*:) And Chriſt was none ſuch; nor is any *proper Surety* ſuch. And there is a *Surety* which, by the Creditors conſent, doth pay the Debt in his *own name*, agreeing that the chief Debtor ſhall have no benefit by it but from him, as he ſhall give it, on certain terms: And this was *Chriſt's caſe*. 4. There is a Surety that payeth the *ſame debt* that was due from the Principal: And there is a *Surety* or *Friend* that undertaketh only to make the Creditor *ſatisfaction*, becauſe the Debtor cannot pay. And this is the caſe. 5. Laſtly, There is a pay-maſter that is the *Debtors Inſtrument*, whether *Servant*, *Delegate*, or whoever at his command or requeſt doth pay it in his *name* and *perſon*: And this is not the caſe. And there is a proper Surety, who is a *third perſon* and no *Inſtrument*, and payeth it in his own name though for another. This, as I ſaid, is the caſe; and therefore it is not we that paid it.

Therefore to the Objection I ſay, that to judge Chriſt ſuch an *Inſtrument* or *Delegate* of ours, or *Surety* that did all in *our legal perſon*; is to misjudge and err, as is proved, which God cannot do.

144. Chriſt *did* and *ſuffered* in the *common nature* of man, though not in the *perſon* of each Sinner. And *mans nature* is ſo far redeemed by him, that for the meer Original Sin of nature alone, no man ſhall periſh, unleſs he add the rejection of Grace; (of which ſomewhat is ſaid before.) But yet as *Nature* exiſteth only in *perſons*, ſo it is *all perſons*, who have this much benefit and more. But that he *merited* and *ſatisfied in our Nature*, is a proper ſpeech, and truer than that he did it in *our perſons*.

145. But all this ſimilitude of a Creditor and Debtor, is to be limited in the application, according to the great difference of *Sin* and *Debt*, which will infer a great diverſity in the conſequents; which may eaſily be collected by the *Reader*.

How far Chriſt died for ſins againſt the Law of Grace.

146. As to the great and weighty queſtion, whether Chriſt died for ſins againſt the *New Covenant*, or only for thoſe againſt the old: I anſwer, Diſtinction is here notoriouſly neceſſary. 1. If by the old Covenant, or firſt Covenant, you mean the conditional Promiſe, [*Be perfect and live*] no ſin ſince *Adam's* is againſt that conditional *Promiſe*, becauſe it *ceaſed* through mans incapacity, upon the Fall; And Chriſt died not *only* for the *firſt ſin*.

2. If by the *firſt Covenant* you mean, the *bare command of perfect perpetual Obedience*, Chriſt died for *ſins* againſt that command which is ſtill in force, but not as a *Covenant of Life* given on that condition.

3. If by the *firſt Covenant*, you mean the *punitive part of the Law of Innocency*, ſaying, [*Thou ſhalt die if thou obey not perfectly.*] So *Chriſt died for all our Sins in the ſtricteſt ſenſe*, even as we are condemnable for them by *that Law*. And that part alſo of the Law continueth to make *puniſhment our due in primo inſtanti*, though with an adjoyned remedy.

4. If by the *New Covenant*, you mean the *meer preceptive part* of Chriſt's *ſupernaturally-revealed Law*, or of the foreſaid *Law of Nature*, as in the *hands* of Chriſt, ſo Chriſt died for ſins againſt the *Law of Chriſt*. 2. If by the *New Covenant* or *Law* you mean, the *Promiſe* and *Threatening* of *Chriſts Law*, or either; ſo Sin may be ſaid to be againſt them in two ſenſes: 1. *Objectively*, as they are *neglected* by us: And ſo that Sin *formally* is only againſt the *Precept*, and Chriſt died for it. 2. Or as the

Sin hath *puniſhment threatened* by the *Sanction*, and no *pardon given by the Promiſe:* And ſo Sin is in two ſenſes alſo againſt the ſaid *Sanction*: that is, 1. When it is ſuch a Sin as the Promiſe *giveth no pardon to conditionally*, And ſuch as the commination *peremptority* condemneth the Sinner for to remedileſs miſery. And this Sin is the *final non-performance* of the Goſpel-Condition (Faith and Repentance). And ſuch only are *fully obliged* to ſuffer Hell by the commination of the Law of Grace: And for ſuch Sin Chriſt never died: not becauſe he never died for *the perſon* as to any *other ſin*, or for any *benefit*, as ſome teach: But becauſe, 1. He reſolved never to *die for that ſin* it ſelf, (of *final Unbelief, Impenitence* and *Unholineſs.*) 2. And becauſe he never died to *ſatisfie his own Law of Grace*, and to take off its proper *full obligation* to final puniſhment; but only to *ſatisfie God* inſtead of *mans ſuffering* what the *Law of Works* obliged him to.

2. But there is alſo a *mediate* or *conditional* dueneſs of puniſhment, according to the Law of Grace: which is when a man by not *believing* and *not-repenting* at the *preſent*, and by neglecting and reſiſting Grace, doth ſo far forfeit all Grace and Salvation, as that God *may cut him off, and caſt him into Hell if he will*; not having peremptorily ſaid, that he *will do it*; nor given men any *aſſurance that he will not*. This man is not *immediately* and *fully* under the *dueneſs of Hell fire*, but on ſuppoſition that God ſhould *firſt cut him off*; and then his Impenitence would be *final*, which is the firſt caſe: But this perſon is under all this guilt. 1. Guilty of puniſhment not forgiven againſt the Law of Works. 2. He is ſo far guilty of puniſhment, according to the Law of Grace, as 1. That no pardon is given him, or due to him. 2. And God may juſtly take away his Spirit and forſake him. 3. And God may juſtly cut him off. 4. And if God ſhould cut him off, Hell will be his full immediate due.

Chriſt not capable of our kind of Obedience.

147. By this it *further* appeareth, that we cannot be juſtified as *perſonally fulfilling all Righteouſneſs in Chriſt:* Becauſe we are all our lifetime principally under thoſe great Duties of the *Law of Grace*, which Chriſt neither *did* nor could do for us. We are bound all our days to accept a Saviour, to accept pardon of Sin, and mortifying Grace, to confeſs our Sins, to repent of them, and ſorrow for them; to labour in the uſe of all Means and Ordinances to mortifie them; To do all our duties as *Sinners*, in that manner as thoſe muſt do that are in a Phyſicians hands for Cure; To receive and apply Chriſt's Merits to that end; to beg his Interceſſion and daily pardon; To labour that imperfect Grace may be ſtrengthened: In a word, *Sin*, and a *deſire of healing*, ſo affect all that the Goſpel commandeth us, that Chriſt was not capable of any of this. And if all this was undone till our Converſion, and much of it undone after our Converſion, and yet Chriſt never did it *for us*, nor we in him; How can it be ſaid that we are juſtified by *fulfilling all the Law in and by Chriſt?* yea the Law of *Nature* ſtill commandeth us, to obey the Law of Grace, ſuppoſing it made and revealed to us.

The *Idem* or *Tantundem*.

148. The queſtion whether Chriſt payed the *Idem* or the *tantundem*, is *hence* alſo more fully reſolved: By *payment* is meant, either *Holineſs* or *Suffering*. And 1. This ſheweth that Chriſt's *Obedience* was not *materially* the ſame with ours (as aforeſaid). 2. And I before proved that a great, and the far greateſt part of our *puniſhment* was ſuch as Chriſt *could never ſuffer*; either *permitted Sin it ſelf*, or *deſertion* by the Spirit of Holineſs, or *divine diſpleaſure* and *hatred*, or *accuſations* of *Conſcience*, &c. 3. And the Law binding only the *Sinner*, and not any *Surety* to *ſuffer*, and every man *perſonally to obey*, moſt clearly it is not *Idem quod debetur*,

debetur, were it but meerly becauſe it is not *ejuſdem* or *per eundem.*

149. Indeed *ſolution* of the *Debt*, and *ſatisfaction ſtrictly* taken thus differ, that *ſatisfaction* is *ſolutio tantidem, vel æquivalentis alias indebiti.* And if Chriſt be ſaid to have paid the very *ſame duty* and *puniſhment* which the Law required, he is denied to have *ſatisfied* for our *non-payment:* For a *Law* that is fully *performed* can require no more, nor the *Law-giver* neither: And therefore both *Satisfaction* and *Pardon* are *ſhut out.*

150. It is not properly the *Law* which is *ſatisfied*, but the *Law-giver* as *above Law* as is ſaid: But yet *improperly* the *Law* may be ſaid to be ſatisfied in that the *ends* of the Law-giver in it are obtained.

151. Though I owe much thanks to God for what, near thirty years ago, I learned from *Grotius de ſatisfact.* yet I muſt ſay that in this great queſtion, whether Chriſt *ſatisfied* God for Sin as *Domino abſoluto, vel ſi parti læſæ, vel ut Rectori*, which he aſſerteth *alone*, I take him to come ſhort of *accurateneſs* and *ſoundneſs*; And that this is the truth.

God is to man, 1. *Dominus abſolutus*, that is, *our Owner.* 2. *Rector ſupremus.* 3. *Amicus, Benefactor: vel Pater & finis.* Sin is againſt God in all theſe *three Relations:* 1. As our *Owner*, it is a *denying* him and *alienating his own quoad uſum.* 2. As *Rector*, it breaketh *his Law.* 3. As our *Lover* and *End*, it is a *departing from him.* For 1. As our *Owner*, we owe him *total reſignation* and *uſe* as ſuch. 2. As our *Ruler*, we owe him *ſubjection* and *Obedience* as ſuch. 3. As our *Friend* (*Benefactor & Amatiſſimus*) we owe him *Gratitude* and *Love* as ſuch (which yet is part of *Obedience* too.) Now *Sin* being the privation of *all this*, God is to be ſatisfied for it as ſuch, in all theſe three Relations; And is *pars læſa* in all theſe three Relations, that is, he is *injured*, though not *hurt.* It is true, that *Government* and *puniſhing* Juſtice, formally as ſuch, belong to God only as Rector. And *ſatisfaction* is made him *eminently in that Relation*; yet alſo to compenſate the injury done by ſin to him in the other two Relations alſo.

SECT. IX.

Of the nature and diſtinctions of Juſtification.

152. Juſtification is a word of many ſignifications, the Scheme whereof ſhould I give them all, would ſeem to moſt *Readers* a troubleſome diſtinguiſhing. Therefore I take up with theſe three moſt notable ſenſes. 1. Juſtification *conſtitutive:* 2. *Sentential:* 3. *Executive.*

The firſt is to *make a man righteous*; The ſecond is to *judge him righteous*; The third is to *uſe him as righteous.* 1. By *Impunity*; 2. *Reward.** And 1. Of conſtitutive Juſtification.

* The *Papiſts* are confounded in the point of Juſtification, by ſticking to confounding words: They talk of *Juſtification* and *remiſſion of ſin*, but it ſelf, and not only the 1. By ſin they mean, is paſt as ſoon as done.

cannot tell men intelligibly what they mean. They ſay that Remiſſion is a putting away the ſin *Reatum pœnæ*, and yet ſay (many) that it may be done without any phyſical change of the Sinner not the Habit; for that cannot be removed without a phyſical change. 2. Nor the act: For that 3. When they ſay it is *macula moralis habitualiter remanens*; they talk gibberiſh and play with a metaphor, and the word *habitualiter*:] A true habit is *quid phyſicum*, and what *macula* is they can tell no man beſides a habit, diſpoſition, privation or relation: If they mean that it is the *Reatus culpæ*, or culpability that is done away, and not only the *Reatus pœnæ*, they hold the ſame thing which they oppoſe in thoſe *Proteſtants* that go too far from them. And it is not ſound: For the pardoned Sinner will be culpable, though not puniſhable for ever; that is, will be really the man that ſinned; and it will be an everlaſting truth, This man ſinned, though he be pardoned: See *Pet. a S. Joſeph. Theol. Speculat. l. 4. c. 10. pag.* 509, 510, 511.

The *Papiſts* ſay, *Homo eſt formaliter juſtus per formam gratiæ ipſi extrinſecam, & non tantum per juſtitiam Chriſti illi imputatam*: And yet [*Nullus actus quantumvis perfectus ſive ſit contritio, ſive Amor Dei ſuper omnia, eſt cauſa formalis juſtificationis: Patres dicentes charitatem eſſe perfectam juſtitiam, intelligendi ſunt diſpoſitive, non autem formaliter.* Becauſe it is in the Habit, and not in the Act, or rather as others of them ſay in ſome internal inclination antecedent to the habits of Faith, Hope and Love, that they place Juſtification, or as we call it, Sanctification, *Pet. a S. Joſeph. Theſ. univerſ. de grat. Hab. pag.* 88, 89.

153. God

153 God never *judgeth* a man righteous (either by *ſecret eſteem* or *open ſentence*) till he have *made him ſuch.*

154. To be *made righteous*, is to be *juſtified in Law-ſenſe*; which is, *To be juſtifiable* (or *juſtificandus*) by *ſentence.*

155. A man is *righteous*, 1. *Particularly*, *ſecundum quid*, as to ſome *particular cauſe* that he is accuſable of. 2. Or *univerſally as to all cauſes.* 3. Or *eminently*, as to all thoſe cauſes that *Heaven* or *Hell* depend upon.

156. 1. No man is *univerſally righteous*, *really* or *reputatively.* God judgeth no Saint in Heaven to be one that *never ſinned*: And he that hath *once ſinned*, is unavoidably under the *Relation of one that ſinned*, to eternity, *ex neceſſitate exiſtentiæ*: which *Relation* is the very *Reatus ipſius peccati*; though all the *ill effects* be remitted.

157. 2. Every man hath *ſome particular righteouſneſs.* For the worſt man may be *falſly accuſed*, and be *righteous* as to that *falſe accuſation.* But this will not ſave him.

158. 3. That *eminent Righteouſneſs* neceſſary to our Salvation, though it be not *univerſal* or *perfect* (elſe we ſhould never be *afflicted* by chaſtiſements or denials of Grace, or permiſſions to ſin); yet is it at leaſt perfect as to its proper uſe, and to our glorious perfection; And may be called *our univerſal Righteouſneſs*, becauſe it is all that we have. And it conſiſteth not of any one or two *Cauſes*, but of *many*: Of which no one muſt be excluded or ſet againſt the reſt. As there are ſeveral *Allegations* or *Accuſations* againſt us, ſo there muſt be ſeveral parts of the *matter* of our Juſtification.

159. Not only an *actual Accuſation*, but a *poſſible* or *a virtual one*, which we are *liable* to, ſufficeth to denominate *Juſtification* as *in contrary*, in the firſt *Law-ſenſe* of Juſtification.

160. It is our *Right* to *Impunity*, and to the *heavenly Glory*, which is to be *juſtified finally* in Judgment; and our *perſons* as the *Subjects* of that *Right*: And our *Actions* but *mediately* in order to that end.

161. It is only at the Bar of *Chriſt as Redeemer*, that we are to be *judged* and *juſtified*, and not by *God only as a Creator.* Therefore it is by the *Law of Grace* that we muſt *be judged to life or death*, finally, and not by the *ſole Law of Innocency.*

162. Therefore no man is *juſtified* by the *Law of Innocency*, either by the *preceptive* or *retributive* part: But we are juſtified only by the *Law or Covenant of Grace*, againſt the Accuſation which may be brought againſt us from the *Law of Innocency*: Againſt it; not by it.

163. We are liable to all theſe following *Accuſations*, which will open to us the *correlate Juſtifications*, and the *matter* of each part.

1. It may be ſaid by the Accuſer of the Brethren, [*Thou art a Sinner*, againſt the *Precepts of Nature and Grace.*] He that denieth this is a Lyar: Againſt this Charge there is no *Juſtification* for ever. But we muſt in Heaven confeſs that we *have ſinned*: but Glory be to him that *waſhed us from our ſins in his blood* (by Pardon and Sanctification.)

164. 2. Next it may be ſaid, that [*We did deſerve Hell by our Sin.*] This alſo is to be confeſſed for ever.

165. 3. It may be ſaid, that by Gods *Law of Innocency* Hell is our *due*, and therefore we are to be *condemned to it.* To this, we deny the *conſequence*; becauſe *we have right to Impunity and to Glory, freely given us by God our Redeemer by a Covenant of Grace, merited for us, by the Obedience and Satisfaction given for us by Chriſt our Saviour.* Where note, that here in this firſt part of our Juſtification, there are all theſe co-

conjunct neceſſary Cauſes. 1. *Gods Love and Mercy giving:* 2. *Chriſt's Righteouſneſs and Satisfaction meriting.* 3. *The Covenant inſtrumentally giving.* 4. *Right to Impunity and Glory* (by *Juſtification* and *Adoption* conjunct) the *thing given:* which *Right* is our *very Righteouſneſs* againſt *this Accuſation*; that is, a *relation*, whence the *other relation* of *juſt* and *juſtifiable* reſulteth: (For if you will not here ſee *relations* reſulting *from relations*, pretend not to true accurateneſs in your ſearch.)

166. Theſe four Cauſes now were enough to *conſtitute*, and *ſo prove us righteous* againſt the *Charge* of being *damnandi*, if we were queſtionable no further. But the turning point of the day is yet behind; 1. Our allegation of Juſtification by Chriſt and the Covenant may be denied. It may be ſaid by the Accuſer, that the Covenant juſtifieth none but *penitent Believers*, and giveth plenary Right *to Glory to none but Saints and perſevering Conquerors*, and that *we are none ſuch.* Againſt this Accuſation we muſt be juſtified or periſh; elſe all the reſt will be uneffectual. And here to ſay, that *it is true, I died an impeninent Perſon, an Infidel, Hypocrite*, or *Ungodly, but Chriſt was a penitent Believer for me, or ſincere and holy for me*, or that *he died to pardon this*,] all this will be falſe and vain. Chriſt's Merits and Satisfaction is not the Righteouſneſs it ſelf which muſt juſtifie us *againſt this Accuſation*; But our *own perſonal Faith, Repentance, ſincere Holineſs and Perſeverance*,] purchaſed by Chriſt, and wrought by the Spirit in us, but thence, *our own acts.* He that cannot truly ſay, *The Accuſation is falſe. I am a true Penitent, ſanctified perſevering Believer* muſt be condemned and periſh. Thus Faith and Repentance are our Righteouſneſs by which we muſt thus far be juſtified.

Of our own perſonal performance, or righteouſneſs, how far neceſſary to our Juſtification.

167. But this is but a *particular mediate ſubſervient* Righteouſneſs, and part of our Juſtification, ſubordinate to Chriſts Merits.

168. Yet this being the Condition on our part for our Participation in all the free Gifts of the Covenant; Scripture uſeth to deſcribe Gods Judgment as enquiring after this. The great thing to be glorified in Judgment, is Gods *Love, Wiſdom, Juſtice and Truth*, and Chriſt's great *Merits* and performance in our Redemption; But the great thing *queſtioned, accuſed, tried* and *judged* will be *our performance* of the Covenant of Grace as to *our conditions.* The day is not to *try God* whether *he be juſt*, or *Chriſt*, whether *his Merits and Satisfaction were ſufficient*; and whether he have done his part: But to *try man* whether, 1. He have true *Right* to *Impunity* and *Glory.* 2. Whether he have performed the Condition on which the Covenant giveth that Right, and be indeed the true *Receiver* of it. The Devils hope cannot lie at all, in proving *Chriſt* or the *Covenant faulty*, or *defective* on their part; but in proving *us* to be none of the perſons that have Right. This therefore is the Righteouſneſs mentioned, *Matth.* 25. and of *Faith imputed*, Rom. 4, *&c.* and elſe-where.

Mr. *W. Thomas* of *Ubley*, in his Book againſt *Speed* the *Quaker*, ſaith, *pag.* 42. *part.* 2. [This is an old Popiſh trick to make much of the Doctrine of the St. *James* in a miſtaken interpretation, and to lay aſide the Doctrine of St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 3. 28. when they ſhould joyn both together, and aſcribe to *Faith* the juſtification of men as *ſinners*, and to *work* their juſtification as Believers.] This is ſound, and needeth but fuller explication.

169. But if we will ſpeak of *Righteouſneſs and Juſtification entirely*, as that which containeth *all its Cauſes*, we muſt ſet all the five forementioned together, giving each one its proper place, and no one the place or office of the reſt. And give leave to the ſelf-conceited, pieviſh, ignorant, blindly to revile you, for ſaying that you joyn your Faith and Holineſs to make *one Righteouſneſs* with that of Chriſt, as if it were not ſufficient. And tell him, that Chriſt's Righteouſneſs is not *ours abſolutely* in it ſelf, but to and in the proper *effects:* And that it is *perfect* as to its proper *ends*; And that he never intended it to this end, to be inſtead of *Faith* and *Holineſs* in us, nor to make them needleſs to our Salvation.

170. No

170. No man muſt aſcribe any thing to his own Faith or Holineſs in the leaſt degree, which is proper to, 1. Gods Mercy or Grace. 2. To Chriſt, or his Righteouſneſs or Merits. 3. Or to the Covenant: nor any thing but its proper part: And that muſt be granted it.

171. It is a vain Fiction in them that think our Right to *Juſtification* or *Impunity*, and our *Right to Salvation*, have not the *ſame cauſes and conditions*, but that our *own Repentance and Obedience* is a *condition* of our *Right to Salvation*, but not to *Impunity* or *forgiveneſs*. Whereas our very *Juſtification* is a juſtifying of our *Right to Salvation*, and the ſame Covenant giveth them conjunctly on the ſame conditions.

172. But our Right to both as *begun*, hath leſs for the condition than our Right to them as *continued and perfected*. For our believing conſent to the Baptiſmal-Covenant putteth us into *immediate Right* to all the benefits of the Covenant which we are then capable of, but not to all that we *ſhall be made further capable of hereafter*; we *are pardoned*, and ſhould be *glorified*, if we preſently *died*: But as we have more Grace to receive, ſo we have more Duty to perform as a means, yea a condition, of obtaining it.

What right the Covenant giveth to the after-helps and degrees of Grace.

173. This (over-lookt by many) is much to be conſidered, both as to the caſe of *Infants baptized*, and the *Adult*. Many wonder that the Children of godly Parents prove oft ſo bad, as if by the Baptiſmal-Covenant they had received nothing from God. But the Synod of *Dort*, *Art.* 1. §. 17. well concludeth that *godly Parents have no cauſe to doubt of the Election or Salvation of their Children dying in Infancy, they being holy and in the ſame Covenant with their Parents.* But the *continuance* of Gods Grace hath a *continued condition and means* to be uſed on our part. The *condition* which the Covenant requireth to an *Infants firſt Juſtification*, is, [*that he be the Child of a true Believer, by him dedicated to God*]. And as the *firſt Condition* is to be found in the Parent (or Owner) ſo muſt the Condition of *continued Grace* as long as the Child continueth an Infant. And that is the *continuance* of the Parents Faith, and his *faithful performance of his promiſe* made to educate his Child in the way of God: But if the Parents ſhould preſently both turn Infidels, and ſo educate their Child, and give him up as the *Janizaries* are, to an Infidel to educate, I know God *may* nevertheleſs give him Grace above his Promiſe if he pleaſe (for a Benefactor as ſuch is free): but I know of no aſſurance of it by Promiſe. For in Baptiſm *both Parties were obliged for the future*, and not *one only*. And if when the Child cometh to the uſe of Reaſon *he wilfully* reject and reſiſt Gods Grace, and break his Covenant, he forfeiteth Gods further Grace. And I have noted, 1. That moſt Children which I have ſeen very early wicked, have been ſuch whoſe Parents groſly neglected their Duty and Covenant as to a holy prudent careful Education of them; as if God muſt needs ſave their Children, becauſe they were the Children of Believers, who thus betrayed them. 2. And thoſe that were well educated by their Parents, uſually ſhew hopeful ſigns at firſt, till their own luſts grow up, and deceive, and overthrow them. The *nature* of the mutual Covenant, and the ſad experience of the caſe of many baptized Children, maketh me incline to this Opinion; which I do not peremptorily aſſert, but humbly propoſe to better judgments with ſubmiſſion: but what-ever we ſay of the Parents, I doubt not but to the perſon at age, future benefits have future conditions.

174. Though Gods Decree is that his Elect ſhall perſevere, yet I conceive (with ſubmiſſion to better information) that the *Baptiſmal-Covenant*

Covenant as ſuch doth not *abſolutely promiſe* or *give right* to ſo much Grace as ſhall *certainly cauſe the baptized to perſevere*; that is, all that are rightfully baptized (even *coram Deo* as well as *coram Eccleſia*) have not perſeverance ſecured to them by *baptiſm*. But only the *Holy Ghoſt is given to them by Covenant* to be their Sanctifier, and carry on his work to their Salvation, if they will uſe thoſe *means* which God hath appointed, and doth enable them to uſe, in attendance on his Spirit.

Though Election infer the certainty of perſeverance, I never ſaw their aſſertions proved, who ſay, 1. That if *Adam* had once obeyed (ſay ſome) or overcome that one Temptation (ſay others) God promiſed confirmation to him and all his Poſterity. 2. That the Baptiſmal-Covenant promiſeth confirmation and certain perſeverance to all the baptized, regenerate or juſtified. What God doth, I am not now queſtioning; but what in that Covenant he promiſeth to do.

175. It is plain in the Scripture, that when men are *converted* and *baptized*, the *particular helps* of Grace are promiſed them upon further *particular conditions*: And that the continuance of *Pardon* and *Right* to Life, is promiſed them upon the *continuance* of their *Faith*, and *uſe of means*; And that *actual Glorification* is promiſed them on *condition of overcoming and perſevering*: And therefore that we muſt uſe and take all theſe as *conditions*.

176. It is ordinary with ſome Writers and Preachers to tell men, that *no part of their Righteouſneſs is in themſelves*; and with others, that at leaſt *none which they are juſtified by in any part is in them*; and that it is *all in Chriſt only*: And that nature is loth to yield to this, but thinketh it a fine thing to have ſome little part of the honour to it ſelf: And as to the honour of a good Action, if it be but 999 parts that it aſcribeth to God, and taketh *one* part of a *thouſand* to our ſelves, it is a dangerous arrogation: we muſt *have none*.] This well explained, may be made ſound: But thus groſly delivered, it is but a popular cheat under the taking pretence of *ſelf-abaſement* and *giving Chriſt all*. The Devil is as willing as any one, that you ſhould have nothing honourable or praiſe-worthy in you: and be as vile as he can make you. It is God who *honoureth thoſe that honour him*, and praiſeth his Saints as the *excellent on Earth*, and his *Jewels and peculiar Treaſure*, adorned with his own *lovely Image*, *and partakers of the Divine Nature*, *and members of Chriſt*, *as his own Fleſh*: And it is Satan and wicked men that vilifie and diſhonour them. And I have oft lamented it, that theſe very men that hold this kind of Doctrine of ſelf-abaſement, as having no *part of Righteouſneſs*, nor ſhare at all in *any good work*, are yet too oft ſo proudly conceited of their own goodneſs (even for *holding that they have none for which they are praiſe-worthy*) as that their pride is no ſmall trouble to the Churches and all about them.

What muſt be in our ſelves.

177. What-ever is of God is good: and what-ever is good is laudable or praiſe-worthy, and *meriteth* to be *eſteemed as it is*.

178. All the *ſanctified* are *inherently righteous*: But with an *imperfect righteouſneſs*, which will no further juſtifie them in Judgment, ſave only againſt this Accuſation, that *they are unholy*.

179. There is *no Righteouſneſs* which will not juſtifie him that hath it, *in tantum*, ſo *far as he is righteous*: For the contrary is a contradiction. For to be *juſt* is to be *juſtifiable*: He that gave but ſix pence to the poor is juſtifiable againſt this Accuſation, *that he did not give it*.

181. *All the Righteousness* which *formally* justifieth us, is *our own* or *on our selves* where it justifyeth us: For to be *made just* or *justified* in the first sence *constitutively*, is nothing else but to be made such as are *personally themselves just*. *Pardon of sin* is made *our own*; *Right* to Christ and Glory is made our *own*; Though *Christ's Righteousness* was the only meritorious cause of all this; which therefore is and may be called our *Material Righteousness*, as that which *meriteth it* is the *matter*.

182. He that is *no cause* of any *good work*, is *no Christian*, but a damnable wretch, and worse than any wicked man I know in the world: And he that is a *Cause of it*, must not be *denyed* falsly to be a cause of it: Nor a Saint denyed to be a Saint, upon a false pretence of self-denyal.

183. As God is *seen* here in the Glass of his works, so he is to be *loved* and *praised* as so appearing: Therefore he that dishonoureth his work dishonoureth God, and hindereth his due love and praise; And his most *lovely* and *honourable* work on earth, is his *holy Image* on his Saints: And as Christ will come to be *admired* and *glorified* in them at last, so God must be *seen* and *glorified* in them here in some degree. And to deny the Glory of his Image is the malignants way of injuring him, and that in which the worst will serve you. He that will praise God as *Creator* and *Redeemer* must praise his *works of Creation* and *Redemption*: And is it the way of praising him as our *Sanctifyer* to dispraise his work of *Sanctification*?

184. Those poor Sinners of my acquaintance who lived in the grossest sins against Conscience (as Drunkenness, Whoredom, &c.) have been glad enough of such doctrine, and forward enough to believe, that there is *nothing in man that in any part can justifie him*, or that is *any part of righteousness*, but it is *all out of us in Christ*, and therefore they are as *justifiable* as any: But Conscience will not let them believe it as they desire.

185. It is arrogant folly to *divide* the praise of any good act between God and Man, and to say God is to have so many parts, and Man so many: For the *whole* is *due to God*, and yet *some* is *due to Man*: For man holdeth his honour only in subordination to God, and not dividedly in co-ordination: And therefore *all* is due to God: For that which is *Mans* is *Gods*, because we have nothing but what we have received. But he that arrogateth any of the honour due to God or Christ, offendeth.

186. If all had been taken *from Gods honour* which had been *given to the Creature*, God would have *made nothing*, or *made nothing Good*: Heaven and Earth, and all the World would derrogate from his honour; and none of his Works should be praised: And the *better* any man is, the more he would dishonour God; and the wickeder the less. But he made all Good, and is Glorious in the Glory, and honourable in the honour of all: And to justifie the holiness of his Servants is to justifie him.

187. If these Teachers mean that *no man hath any power freely to specifie the Acts of his own will, by any other help* of God, besides necessitating predetermining premotion, and so that every man doth all that he can do, and no man can do more than he doth; They dishonour God by denying him to be the Creator of that *Free-power*, which is essential to man, and which God himself accounteth it his honour to create. And they feign God to damn and blame all that are damned and blamed, for as great Impossibilities, as if they were damned

I would here cite the words of *Beza*, *Paræus*, Dr. *Field*, *Bonhaus*, *Ballinger*, *Albertus*, *Zanchy*, *Æpinus*, *Spangenbergius*, *Brentius*, *Confess. Augustan.* &c. Asserting that [Justification] is oft used as Sanctification in Scripture, and that plenary Justification hath three parts. 1. Pardon. 2. Accepting us into favour and life. 3. The gift of the Holy Ghost, or inherent righteousness] but that *Guil. Forbes* hath largely done it. *Consid. Pacific.*

2 Thes. 1. 9, 10.

damned and blamed for not making a world, or for not being Angels.

188. Thus alſo ſuch men, teach that *Chriſt ſtrippeth a Chriſtian* of two things, *His Sins*, and his *Righteouſneſs*: Or that *Two things muſt be caſt away, for Chriſt*; *Sins* and *Righteouſneſs*: But they ſhould ſpeak better, if they would not deceive; nothing is to be caſt *away* as evil *but Sin*. *Righteouſneſs*, truly ſuch, is *Good*, and never to be caſt away. If it be *no Righteouſneſs*, why do they falſly ſay that we muſt caſt away our *Righteouſneſs*. To caſt away a *falſe conceit of Righteouſneſs*, is not to caſt away *Righteouſneſs*, but *Sin only*. Indeed beſides *Sin*, we are ſaid juſtly *to caſt away* that which would be the *Object and Matter of Sin*: And the phraſe is fitlyer applyed to a thing *Indifferent*, than to a thing *neceſſary*, leaſt it ſeduce. There is nothing ſo Good, which may not be made the object of Sin, not Chriſt or his Righteouſneſs, or God himſelf excepted; But we muſt not therefore ſay that *we muſt caſt away God* or *Chriſt*, becauſe we muſt not thus objectively abuſe them: So *Holineſs* and true *Righteouſneſs* (Inherent or imputed) may be objects of ſinful *pride* and *boaſting*; But it is not edifying Doctrine therefore to ſay that we muſt caſt away *Inherent* and *Imputed Righteouſneſs*: But yet true ſelf-denyal requireth that we *deny* our *Righteouſneſs* (Inherent or Imputed) *to be* that which indeed *it is not*. And ſo when men accounted the Jewiſh obſervations to be a *Juſtifying Righteouſneſs* in competition with, and in oppoſition to Chriſt, *Paul* counteth it as *loſs*, *and dung*, and *nothing* in that reſpect: when yet elſewhere he ſaith, *I have lived in all good Conſcience to this day*. And Chriſt himſelf fulfilled that *Law and Righteouſneſs*. So if a man will conceit, that his *common Grace* will juſtifie him without Holineſs, or his *Holineſs*, without *Pardon* and the *Righteouſneſs of Chriſt*, he muſt *deny* this *Righteouſneſs*; that is, he muſt deny it *to be what it is not*, and muſt caſt away (not it, but) the *falſe conceits of it*: And ſo if any Libertine will ſay that *Chriſts Righteouſneſs imputed to him*, will juſtifie him, *without faith*, or be inſtead of *Holineſs* to him, he muſt deny *Imputed Righteouſneſs* thus, to be what indeed it is not.

That all that are ſaved have inherent Righteouſneſs or Holineſs, none of us all deny: nor yet that *in tantum* we are Righteous by it: Nor that a man accuſed as being an Infidel, Atheiſt, Impenitent, ungodly, an Hypocrite, *&c.* muſt be juſtified by pleading all the contraries in himſelf, or elſe periſh: And all agree that this inherent Righteouſneſs is imperfect, and in us ſound with ſin: and therefore that no man can be juſtified by it without pardon of ſin; nor at all againſt the charge of being a ſinner, and condemnable by the Law of Innocency. And what remaineth then, but to trouble the world with contending *de nomine*, whether this imperfect Righteouſneſs ſhall be called Righteouſneſs: and the giving of it called Juſtifying or making us righteous ſo far?

189. When we tell them, that, *If we had fulfilled all the Law reputatively by Chriſt as our Legal perſon, we could not be bound to further obedience to it*, They anſwer, that we *are not bound to obey to the ſame ends as Chriſt, that is for Righteouſneſs*, or *Juſtification* or *merit*, but in *Gratitude*. But this is but to give us the cauſe, and ignorantly to deſtroy their own. For, 1. This is but to ſay, that when a man is reputed to have fulfilled all the Law, yet it is to be reputed unfulfilled as *to certain ends*. As if he fulfilled all the Law that fulfilled it not *to all due ends*: 2. Or as if the Law obliged one man to fulfill it twice over for the ſame lifes time; once ſimply and in all its obligations, and another time for *other ends*. 3. Or as if the Law required any more than *abſolute perfection*. 4. Or that abſolute perfection had not been in Chriſt's holy obedience. 5. Or as if there were any obedience whoſe end is not *Righteouſneſs* and *Juſtification*, againſt the change of the contrary diſobedience. Do not theſe men obey that they may be ſo far righteous? Or is not every man ſo far Righteous as he doth Righteouſneſs? Is not every man

Mort againſt the wrong ſence of Imputation; confuting many Sophiſms.

At quis unquam e noſtris nos per juſtitiam Chriſti imputatam formaliter juſtificari, aſſeruit? Prideaux *Lect.* 5 *de Juſt. cap.* 4.

The Papiſts concur with them that feign a middle ſtate between Juſt and privatively unjuſt, *viz.* not juſt negatively, ſo *Brianſon* in 4. *q.* 8. *Cor.* 3. *fol.* 145. at large: But they can

give us no inſtance but in a ſtone or other incapable creature, that is not obliged: And we confeſs that if a man can be found that is not obliged to be Juſt, he is neither juſt nor (Privatively, but Negatively) unjuſt: But what's this to our caſe? And the Papiſts commonly joyn with them, that ſay that God remitteth not only the *Reatum vel Obligationem ad pœnam*, but alſo the *Reatum culpæ in ſe*; But when they come to open it, they mean but that God is not diſpleaſed with, or hath not a punishing *will* againſt the Sinner: As if they knew not that as Gods Love is our chief reward, ſo his diſpleaſure is our chief puniſhment; And that Remiſſion doth make no change in God, but by taking away Guilt of Gods hatred and other puniſhment, God then is reconciled becauſe they are not objects of his hatred: And to take away the *Reatum pœnæ* and the *Reatum culpæ, non in ſe, ſed quoad pœnam* is all one, and all that both ſides mean if they underſtand what they ſay. But to all eternity it will be true, that we once ſinned, which none deny.

that loveth God juſtifiable as a Lover of him for ſo far as he loveth him? 6. And is not *Gratitude* an *end*, and a thing commanded by the Law? If we obeyed perfectly in Chriſt, we were perfectly *thankful* in Chriſt. 7. But if they ſay that Chriſt fulfilled only the Law made to *Adam* for us, and not his own Law of Grace, and therefore that he obeyed for us, only to the ends of that Law; I anſwer, 1. If the ends and matter of that Law be fulfilled by us in him, our obedience to any other muſt be needleſs: For he that is ſuppoſed never to have ſinned, need not uſe any means for pardon or remedy. 2. By this rule Chriſt only fulfilled the Law for *Adam*, and *Eve*, and for us only as we were in them, which is only Virtually and not Actually at all; but not at all for us according to any obligation that ever fell upon our perſons. For, 1. We were never perſonally bound to *perfect perſonal perpetual obedience as the Condition of life*; For that Covenant as to the *promiſe* and *condition* ceaſed before any man was born. 2. And all the duty in the world which we *are bound to*, is to be done for *Evangelical ends*; for recovering Grace, and unto Gratitude, *&c.* To ſay therefore that we are perfectly Righteous, as having perfectly obeyed all Gods Law in Chriſt, and yet that we are bound to obey all that Law that ever we were under to another end; and that Chriſt obeyed for us only as to that which we were never under *perſonally* but *virtually* in *Adam*, this is to ſay and unſay. 8. Laſtly, they ſee not that their own anſwer implyeth the truth of what we aſſert; and is the ſame that we give; which their cauſe is uncapable of: viz. We ſay, "that Chriſt did indeed moſt perfectly obey the Law of Inno-"cency, ſo far for us and in our ſtead (though not in our perſons) as "that he hath vindicated the truth and glory of God and his Law, by "doing that which we ſhould have done and did not: And hath merited "for us a better Covenant, which obligeth us not at all to obey for the "ends of the firſt Covenant, *viz.* that our perfection might be our Right-"ouſneſs, or the condition of life; but only to obey for the ends of the "new Covenant, for the obtaining and improving of Recovering Grace, "and Salvation by Chriſt freely given us: which we our ſelves muſt do "or periſh.

190. And whereas they tell us that [*We may as well ſay that man muſt not dye becauſe Chriſt dyed for us, as not obey becauſe Chriſt obeyed for us.*] They ſtrangely uſe our reaſon againſt themſelves and know it not. For we ſay that *we muſt dye* becauſe we did not perfectly either *obey* the Law or *ſuffer all its penalty* by Chriſt as our *legal perſon*: But he ſuffered only to ſatisfie Juſtice *in tantum* to this end, that man himſelf ſuffering death and temporal afflictions, and obeying the Law of Grace, might be ſaved from all the reſt of the puniſhment. But if we *had* ſo fulfilled the Law as aforeſaid, by *Doing* or *ſuffering*, we could not have dyed nor ſuffered the *leaſt affliction* as a *penalty*. For all *puniſhment* in the *eſſence* of the *Relation* is *for ſin*.

191. And when they ſay that [*It is no more inconvenient to ſay that Chriſt was perfect in our perſon, than that he ſatisfied in our perſon and we by him.*] I anſwer, 1. Both are falſe and ſubvert the Goſpel, as aforeſaid. 2. But yet we may fitly ſay that Chriſt *ſuffered in the perſon of a Sinner*; but mark the ſence. 1. *Suffering* as *penal* belongeth to a *Sinner as ſuch*: But *Satisfaction* is an *Effect* of Chriſt's ſuffering, which reſulteth not from the *meer ſuffering*, nor from the *perſon* of a *Sinner*: but from the *Will* and *Covenant* of God made to that excellent perſon who was *God* and *perfect* Man. So that it is not ſo aptly ſaid, *He ſatisfyed*, as it is that *he ſuffered*, in the *perſon of a Sinner*. 2. Note that it is not *any other man's* perſon

perſon that we mean that Chriſt ſuffered in, but his *own*. And we mean that *he took upon him the perſon of a Sinner himſelf*, in as much as he *conſented to ſuffer for Sin*. And ſo *perſonating* here is not meant *becoming any other man's perſon* in *Law ſenſe*, ſo as that other legally ſuffered what he did; But it is only his *own perſons* becoming a *ſufferer* in the ſtead of *Sinners* for *their Sins*: As the Apoſtle ſaith, *He was made ſin for us*, ſo he might as truly have ſaid, *He was made a ſinner for us*; that is, ſo far by Imputation, as that he undertook to ſuffer as Sinners ſuffer, and for their ſins.

But becauſe wordy controverſies ſeeming real, are the great troublers of the world, leſt any ſhould think that we differ more than indeed we do, I would fain bring the matter as far from under the ambiguity of words as poſſibly I can. To which end I further add, 1. That as we hold that *Adam* was the Natural Root or Parent of Mankind; ſo alſo that Chriſt was the *Fœderal* Root of all the ſaved, and in ſeveral reſpects (though not all) a ſecond *Adam*.

2. *Adam* was but one ſingle Natural perſon, nor did God (by error or arbitrary reputation) eſteem or account him to be any other than he was. None of our perſons were diſtinct perſons in *Adam*, nor thoſe perſons that now they are: Therefore we were not ſo perſonally in him at his fall: But all our perſons are in time and mediately by our Progenitors derived lineally from him (yet we deny not all Souls to be from God, and all Bodies an accretion of the common Elements); not as having been *Perſons* exiſtent in him, but being *Perſons cauſed* remotely by him. Our preſent Perſons were *ſeminally* or *virtually* in him; which is as much as to ſay, that not the *Perſon*, but the *Semen Perſonæ vel virtus cauſalis* was in him: To be only *Virtually*, or *Cauſally* or *Seminally* in *Adam*, is in proper ſpeech for that Perſon not really to have been in him: For *Cauſa non eſt effectus*, & *Virtus generativa non eſt Perſona generata*: To be only *Virtually* in *Adam* is *terminius diminuens* as to perſonal inexiſtence, and denyeth it. And as Dr. *Twiſſe* hath oft well aſſerted, It is our natural relation to *Adam* ſuppoſed in Gods Law, which is the reaſon of our participation in his Sin, and not any Will or Judgment of God, without or beyond our Natural intereſt: For elſe it ſhould be God moſt properly who by his arbitrary imputation ſhould either make us Sinners, or repute us ſuch when we are none. But yet when we become *Perſons*, it is by Derivation from *Adam*, and ſo the effect can be no better than the cauſe, and as ſoon as we are Perſons we are Guilty perſons, having Guilt with perſonality from him, though we were not perſons in him.

3. So Chriſt is, though not the Natural, yet the Federal *Adam* or Root of Believers: when he ſatisfied and merited, we were not in him either as in *Adam ſeminally*, as in a natural Generator, nor as exiſtent Perſons, nor did God falſly ſo repute us to be: But he was then the *Cauſe* (materially) or had that *Virtus effectiva*, which would Juſtifie, and Sanctifie, and Glorifie us in due time. It was the *Nature* of Sinners, though not a ſinful Nature which he aſſumed; But that Nature which he undertook was exiſtent in his Individual perſon: and no other Individual perſon was exiſtent in his exiſtent perſonal Nature: So that when we ſay it was the common Nature of Man, we mean only *ſpecificè*, that Nature which is of the ſame *Species* with all other mens, but not that which exiſted individually in any but himſelf; and a *Species extra individuum* is nothing but an *ens rationis*, or a notion. But it was individual *Perſons* in whoſe *ſtead* or place Chriſt ſuffered, and whom he undertook to Juſtifie, Sanctifie, and Save, and gather into a holy Society to

that

that end; and to that end he undertook and performed his office, and merited all this by his perfect righteousneſs: So that hereby he made Himſelf a Federal Head and Root of a holy Society (his Church): And whenever any perſon doth Believe and is united federally to him, he then receiveth the effects of that which was before in Chriſt as a *Virtus effectiva.*

The Law made to *Adam* or to us, did not aſſign Chriſt to this office, nor oblige him to ſuffer or merit for ſinners according to it: Therefore by ſo doing he fulfilled not the Law, as it obliged us; that is, by that obligation, nor ſuffered by that obligation which bound us to ſuffer; But by the obligation of his own Conſent, and that Law which was peculiar to himſelf as to the formal obligation, though materially he was bound by it to fulfill the Law of Nature and of *Moſes.*

The Law of Innocency then or Works, took not Chriſt for the Civil or Legal Perſon of ſuch Sinner, or Believer, no more than it made him ſuch.

4. As Gods Law to the Mediator made him this office, ſo Chriſt's Law of Grace doth *quoad jus & Relationem* give to every true believing Covenanter, firſt, Chriſt himſelf in union to be their federal Head, and with him title to his Grace, Spirit and Glory. And now they are Perſonally and actually his federal Subjects, Friends, and Members; and have right to all his conferred gifts.

5. But this right floweth not immediately to them, from what Chriſt did or ſuffered for them; but from his Law or Covenant of Grace, by which as his Donative and Ruling Inſtrument he conveyeth that title to them.

6. And therefore they have no right before the *Time*, nor any but on the *Conditions* and *Meaſure* ſpecified in that *Covenant* or Law; ſo that Righteouſneſs is not *theirs* becauſe *it is Chriſts*, nor in the *manner* or *meaſure* and to the *ends* of the donation.

7. This much containeth the matter of this Doctrine of the Collation and Imputation of Chriſt's righteouſneſs, ſtill remembring that as no one till he was a Perſon, could be a perſon-guilty of *Adam*'s ſin; nor when he was a perſon, *any ſooner* than he was alſo guilty of his *own inherent pravity*, and none that had the uſe of Reaſon was guilty of *either* or *both* theſe *only*, without the guilt of his *own Actual Sin*, and all three together, (1. *Adam*'s ſin juſtly imputed to us, 2. And our innate Pravity, 3. And our actual Sin) are the parts which conſtitute our plenary guilt; even ſo no one till he is a *Believer* is related as a *Member* of a *Perfectly Righteous Saviour*; and that is done no ſooner (in time) than he hath the *Inherent Righteouſneſs* of his *perſonal faith* and *federal conſent*; and that obligeth him to the further *active righteouſneſs* of a *holy life*, and all theſe three *conjunct* (though not *co-ordinate*) make up the total Righteouſneſs of a Saint, *viz.* 1. Our *Relation* to *Chriſt* in *Union* as to a *perfectly Righteous Head*, who *fulfilled all righteouſneſs for us to merit our Juſtification* (which is called Chriſt's Righteouſneſs Imputed to us, as being thus far reputed ours). 2. And our penitent believing conſent to his Covenant, which is the condition of the foreſaid Relation to Chriſt. 3. And our after Sanctification and obedience to Chriſt's Law.

8. And when we are commonly thus far agreed of the Matter, if any will contend for their ſelf-coyned phraſes and words, and not being content to call Chriſt our Redeemer, Saviour, Teacher, King, Prieſt, Head, Lord, Teſtator, Sponſor or Surety, Ranſom, Price, Sacrifice, *&c.* as the

the Scripture doth, will needs plead that he is or was *our Person*, or was holy, obedient, suffered *in our Persons*, *Legal* or *Civil*, or was our Substitute, Delegate, Instrument, *&c.* his contention will be both *corrupting* and *dividing*: And yet I will acknowledge that among Lawyers the word [*Person*] hath so many senses, that in some of them (were they our way of speech here) it might be said that Christ did in some things personate each Sinner, or each believer, limitedly, *in tantum & ad hoc, & non simpliciter, aut ad omnia*: And all verbal quarrel I would shun even with them that speak ineptly, and dangerously, and injuriously to the truth and Church, so they will but by a sound and necessary explication vouchsafe us an Antidote against the hurtful tendency of their phrases.

9. *Obj.* If Christ's person be given us, then his personal Righteousness is given us with it. *Ans.* Yes, as his Person is: He is not given us as Proprietors and Lords to become our Own at our dispose: Nor is his Person made one Person with each or any of us: His Person is not turned into ours, nor ours into his: As the Husband is not the person of the Wife, nor the King of each Subject; But as one that hath a Great, Wise, Learned, Bountiful, Holy King or Husband, hath also his Greatness, Wisdom, Learning, Bounty and Holiness, as they have *him*; that is, *As his perfections for their good as far as his Relation binds him*, but not as *his endowments*, were *removed* from *him* to *them*, or *falsly reputed* to be *in them*, or *his person* to be *their persons*; so here, as we have a *Christ*, so we have a *perfect Righteous Christ* given us to be our federal Head when we believe; and the Righteousness which is not in us but in him is *ours*, so far as to be *for our Good*, as far as his *Office* and *Covenant* do oblige him: So that a Righteous Christ, and therefore the Righteousness of Christ are ours, *Relatively themselves*, *quoad jus beneficis*, so as that we have right to these Benefits by them, which we shall possess: and for the merits of his Righteousness we are conditionally justified and saved before we believe, and actually after: But are not accounted to be Christ, nor the Legal Actors of what he did, nor Christ accounted to be each of us.

SECT. V.

Merit.

192. The great Controversie about humane *Merits*, which hath made so great a noise in the world, is of so easie solution, that I can scarce think but almost all sober understanding Christians in the world are agreed in sence, while they abhor each others opinions as ill expressed or misunderstood. Distinguish but, 1. Of *Commutative Justice*, and *Distributive Governing Justice*. 2. And *of Governing Justice* according to Gods several Laws, of *Innocency*, *Mosaical Works*, and of *Grace*. 3. And of *Justifying* and *Meriting simply*, and *comparatively*; And the case is so plain, that few things are more plain to us, that Christians controvert, *Viz.*

Confes. August. Art. 6. *Semper sentiendum est, nos consequi remissionem peccatorum & personam pronunciari justam id est acceptari, gratis propter Christum per fidem; posita vero placere etiam obedientiam erga legem, & reputari quandam Justitiam, & mereri præmia.*

Et Art. de Bon. operib. [*Quanquam hæc nova obedientia procul abest a perfectione legis, tamen est*

Justitia & meretur præmia, ideo quia personæ reconciliatæ sunt.

Ita de operibus judicandum est quæ amplissimis laudibus ornanda sunt quod sint necessaria, quod sint cultus Dei, & Sacrificia spiritualia & mereantur præmia.

16. Exercitatio nostra & conservat ea, & meritur incrementum juxta illud Habenti dabitur: & Augustinus præclare dixit, Dilectio meretur incrementum dilectionis, cum vir exercetur. Habent enim boni opera Præmia cum in hac vita, tum post hanc vitam in vita æterna.

1. To dream of meriting from God by any Creature, Man, or Angel, in point of *Commutative Juſtice*, is *blaſphemy* and *madneſs*; that is, That we can give him any thing that ſhall *profit him*, or which is not *abſolutely his own*, as a compenſation for what he giveth us. He maketh himſelf a God that aſſerteth this of himſelf. 2. To ſay that any ſince *Adam* ſave Chriſt, doth merit of God in point of *Governing Juſtice*, according to the Law of *Innocency*, is a falſhood: And he that ſaith, *He hath no ſin, is a lyar*. 3. To ſay that we can merit pardon, or Juſtification, or Salvation meerly by obſerving *Moſes* Law, was the *Jews* pernicious error. 4. To ſay that our faith and performance of the conditions of the new Covenant, doth merit by the *retributive Sentence* of the *old Covenant*; or that it is in whole or part any *meritorious Cauſe* that *God gave the world a Saviour*, or that *Chriſt freely pardoneth and juſtifieth us all conditionally* by the new Covenant, or that it ſuppoſeth not *Chriſt's Righteouſneſs* to be the *total ſole meritorious Cauſe* of that *pardoning Covenant*, and all the *benefits* as *thereby conditionally* given; All this is groſs contradiction. 5. To deny *ſubordinate Comparative Merit*, or *Rewardableneſs*, as from Gods *Governing diſtributive paternal Juſtice* according to the Covenant of Grace, conſiſting in the performance of the conditions of that Covenant, and preſuppoſing Chriſts total merits as aforeſaid, is to ſubvert all Religion and true Morality, and to deny the ſcope of all the Scriptures, and the *expreſs aſſertion* of an Evangelical *worthineſs*, which is all that this [*Merit*] ſignifyeth: To ſay nothing of contradicting Catholick antiquity, and hardening the Papiſts againſt the truth.

193. This *Comparative Merit*, is but ſuch, as a *thankful Child* hath towards his Father who giveth him a purſe of Gold on condition that he put off his hat, and ſay, I thank you, who *deſerveth* it in *Compariſon* of his *Brother*, who diſdainfully or neglectfully refuſeth it. This laſt being *abſolutely* ſaid to *Deſerve to be without it*; but the former only *comparatively* ſaid to *deſerve to have it as a free gift*.

194. And thoſe that reject the ſaying of ſome Papiſts who *in this ſence*, ſay that *Chriſt merited that we might merit*, placing our Evangelical merit in a meer ſubordination to Chriſts, do but ſhew what prejudice and partiality can do, and harden thoſe who perceive their errors.

Whether faith be not the meer Acceptance of a free gift according to its Nature? Againſt Merit, read of Papiſts *Waldenſ. de Sacram. tit.* 1. *Gregor. Armin.* 1. *d.* 17. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Durand.* 1. *d.* 27. *q.* 2. *Marſil.* 2 *d.* 27. *Brugenſ.* in *Pſal.* 35. *Eckius* in *Centur. de Prædeſt. Et inquit Fr. a Sancta Clara Deus, Nat. Grat. p.* 138. *tribuitur etiam* Cuſano, *nec longe differt* Stapletonus *noſtras* Leg. *&* Suarez *in* 3. *p. Tho. Diſp.* 10. *Sect.* 7. *q.* 3. See the *Thomiſts* ſence of Merit, in *Lud. Carbo Tho. Compend.* 1. 2. *q.* 23. *art.* 4. *p.* 240.

195. Some man may think that the high things required in the Goſpel, ſelf-denyal, forſaking all, running, ſtriving, working, loving, overcoming, *&c.* are more than the meer *Receiving of a free Gift*. But, 1. If it were ſo, yet our *firſt faith* would be no more, by which we are Juſtified from all the ſins of our unregeneracy. 2. But upon conſideration, it will all appear to be no more materially: For, 1. When we ſay that it is the *Receiving of the free Gift*, we muſt *mean According to the Nature* and *to the uſe of that Gift*. As if you be required to *take food*, the meaning is, *to Eat it*, and not to throw it away: If you be required to take ſuch a man to be your King, your Maſter, your Tutor, your Husband, your Phyſician, *&c.* the meaning is, *As ſuch, to the uſe of his proper office*. And ſo Accept of God as God, that is, our Abſolute *Owner*, *Ruler*, and *End*, and Chriſt as our Saviour, Prophet, Prieſt and King, and the Holy Ghoſt as our Sanctifyer to Illuminate, quicken and renew us, is the ſum of all the Poſitives of the Goſpel. 2. For this very *Acceptance* of them in this *Nature*, and to this *Uſe*, includeth the *uſing* of them after accordingly: And if we do not ſo *uſe* them, we thereby *reject* them, and loſe our own benefit of them; as he that *eateth* not his meat, refuſeth and loſeth it; and he that weareth not his Cloaths; and he that learneth not of his Teacher. 3. And then *Self-denyal*, and *forſaking contraries*, and

and resisting impediments, is but the same *motus ut a termino a quo*; And he that refuseth to come out of his Prison and Chains, refuseth his Liberty; and he refuseth the Gold, that will not cast away his handful of dirt to take it. So that really all is but a *Thankful Accepting of the mercy of the new Covenant according to its nature and use as it is offered.*

196. It is a great question whether a man may *Trust to his own Faith, Repentance or Holiness.* But some men still trouble the world with unexplained words, where no sober men differ. No wise man can dream that we may *Trust* to these for more than their proper part; as that we may *Trust* them to do any thing proper to God, to Christ, to the Spirit, to the Promise, *&c.* And to use the phrase of *Trusting* to our own faith or *Holiness* when it soundeth absolutely, or may tempt the hearers to think that they may *Trust* them for Gods part, or Christ's part, and not only for their own, is a dangerous deceiving course. But that really they may be *Trusted* for their *own part*, and *must be so*, no sober person will deny: For so to believe, obey, pray to God, *&c.* and not to *Trust* to them in their place; that is, not to think that we shall be ever the better for them, is unbelief and indeed distrusting God, and saying, *It is in vain to serve him*, and *what profit is it that we call upon him?* And such diffidence and despair will end all endeavours: *Let every man prove his own work, and so shall he have rejoycing in himself and not in another. This is our Rejoycing the testimony of our Consciences that in simplicity and Godly sincerity we have had our Conversation in the world.* If we are Justified by *faith*, we may *Trust to be Justifyed by it.* But the rare use of such a phrase in Scripture, and the danger of it, must make us never use it without need. (As if we were disputing whether the Popish or Protestant Religion be that which a man may *trust* for his Salvation) or the like. And when ever it's used, it implyeth our Trust in God and our Saviour only for their part.

Of Trusting in our own faith, repentance, holiness, *&c.*

Of which see more in my Life of Faith.

Tollit gratia Meritum: non quod omnino nihil agamus, sed quia non satisfacimus legi, & procul absumus a perfectione. Melancth. in Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 7.

Gal. 6.

2 Cor. 1. 12.

197. To conclude this great point of *Imputed* and Inherent Righteousness, it may be objected, that *The same man may well be judged a Sinner deserving hell, never fulfilling the Law, nor satisfying Justice, nor deserving Heaven, in himself; that is, in his Natural person, and yet be judged one that never sinned, but fulfilled the Law, is perfectly holy and righteous, and merited Heaven in his Legal or Civil person, in and by Christ;* To which I answer, *One man is but one, and hath but one person.* But if you take the word [*Person*] equivocally, as signifying another that is made like *him* in some respects, or that hath his Nature, or doth somewhat in his stead and for his benefit, as a second person, say so, and we will strive with no man about words: If you will say we are now on earth in our *Natural persons*, and are in *Heaven in Christ*; or that we are *Redeemed* in our Natural persons, but *Redeemed our selves* in *Christ*; or that you are *sick* in your *Natural person*, and well in *your person in Christ*, &c. I like not your *language*; but there are scarce any words so bad, which a man may not put a good sence on. But we would *be understood*, and plainly ask, whether Christ was properly every sinners or believers person in Law-sence, so that *ipso facto* God accounteth us to have been *habitually* and *actively* perfect in *Him*, and to have *merited* and *satisfied* in him? If so, the Law can look on *one man* but as *one*: And he that paid a debt by his *Servant* or any other as his *Legal person*, cannot be required to do it again in his *Natural person*, unless you will say that God loveth our *Legal person*, and will save it, and may hate our *Natural person* and *damn* it. The Scripture useth no such contradictory subtleties as these.

The last objection of the mistakers of Imputation.

To save me that much labour of citations, I desire the Reader to see in *Guil. Forbes. Consider. Pacific.* the Concessions of *Vega, Pighius, Stapleton*, and other Papists about Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, as granting us all that Protestants mean (as *Bellarmine* expresly doth) as *Davenant, Nigrinus, Job. Crocius*, and many others have observed.

SECT. XI.

How faith Juſtifieth.

198. The common ſaying that *faith juſtifieth* as an *Inſtrument* might paſs as tolerable, if too many did not ſtrain it to a wrong ſence, and raiſe unwarrantable Doctrines from it, and harden the Papiſts by unwarrantable Anſwers. A *Juſtifying Inſtrument* properly is an *efficient Inſtrumental cauſe* of Juſtification, which I have elſewhere too largely proved that faith is not, either *Gods Inſtrument* or *ours*, *Phyſical* or *Moral*, nor any way *efficiently* juſtifieth us. But *juſtifying*, is one thing; to *Receive* juſtification is another thing, and to be *juſtified* is a third. Faith is no juſtifying act: But faith is in its *Eſſence* the *Acceptance* of an offered God, Chriſt, Spirit, for Life: This *Acceptance* is by the Covenant made the *condition* of our *paſſive* true *Reception* and *Poſſeſſion* of *Right* (before opened): To be ſuch a *Condition performed*, is to be a *removens prohibens* of the ſaid *Reception*: which is ſtrictly to be *Diſpoſitio materiæ recipientis*; And ſo it may be called, 1. A *Receiving Cauſe*. 2. And a *mediate diſpoſitive Cauſe* of the effect, *Juſtification* as *Received*, but not as Given: (As I ſaid Dr. *Twiſſe* chooſeth to call it) But this *cauſa Diſpoſitiva* is part of the *cauſa Materialis*, viz. *Qua diſpoſita*: A *cauſe*, or more properly a *condition* why *I receive Juſtification*, and by *receiving it* am *juſtified*; which is their meaning who call it *A Paſſive Inſtrument*, that is, *A Receiving Inſtrument*.

199. The plain eaſie truth is, that *Faiths Nature* which is to be [*a believing Acceptance of Chriſt, and Life offered on that Condition*] being in *very eſſence* is but its *Aptitude* to the *office* it hath to our Juſtification; by which the Queſtion is anſwered, *why did God promiſe us Chriſt and Life on the Condition of faith rather than another?* Becauſe of the congruity of its Nature to that office. But the *formal Reaſon* of its *office* as to our Juſtification is Its *Being* the *performed Condition* of *the Covenant*. And if God had choſen another condition, a condition it would have been. Now the true notion in Law being a *Condition*, Logicians would call this improperly a *Receiving cauſe*, and more properly *A Receptive Diſpoſition* of the *matter*, reducing it to *Phyſical notions*. But the moſt proper term is the plaineſt, [*We are juſtified by that faith, which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, as Given us on that condition in the Baptiſmal Covenant, becauſe* (or *as*) *it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby*]. Underſtand this plain doctrine, and you have the plain truth.

200. They that ſay contrarily that Faith juſtifieth proximately as it is an *Inſtrument*, or a *Receiving Accepting act*, and not as a *Condition* of the Covenant, do evidently chooſe that which they vehemently oppoſe, *viz.* that the τὸ *credere* juſtifieth: For the very τὸ *credere* or the eſſence of Faith, is to be an *Acceptance* of *Chriſt given*. But if they will avoid this, ſay that *By Faith* they mean [*Chriſt believed in*,] then they ſay that by *Receiving Chriſt* they mean not the *receiving* of him, but *Chriſt himſelf*: And why then do they not ſay ſo, but trouble the world with ſuch unintelligible phraſes: But to open the ſenſleſsneſs and conſequents of that Doctrine would but offend. All know that Chriſt as the object is connoted as eſſential to the act of Faith.

Note, that when we call faith an Accepting it relateth to the Donation of the Covenant and the *Donatum*, which is a *Jus ad beneficia*: Renovation is effected by faith as a ſecond cauſe, but Pardon is Accepted by it: And we fully grant the Papiſts that Renovation and pardon go together, whatever they call them. And ſome of themſelves do ſpeak juſt as we *de Remiſſione & Macula*, which others are confounded about. Vid. *Wotton*'s citations out of the Schoolmen *de Macula*: *de Reconcil. pec.* And *Brianſon* ſaith (in 4. *q.* 8. *fol.* 116. that ſin as remitted or guilt, is [*Tantum quædam Relatio rationis, in quantum eſt objectum intellectus & Voluntatis divinæ*: *Quia poſtquam commiſit peccatum Dei voluntas ordinat ipſum ad pœnam correſpondentem peccato, & Intellectus prævidet pro omni tempore donec pœna debita ſit ſoluta. Videre peccata Dei, eſt ad pœnam imputare*: *Avertere faciem eſt, ad pœnam non reſervare*: Auguſt.----*Ergo nihil aliud eſt poſt actum ceſſantem peccatis offenſa, Macula, reatus, niſi iſta relatio rationis*: *Sed hujus Ordinatio ad pœnam ut eſt diſconveniens ipſi animæ, dicitur ejus Macula*: *ut autem eſt obligatio formaliter ad iſtam pœnam dicitur Reatus*: *Et ut eſt divinæ voluntatis*, &c. *dicitur Offenſa*: *Nihil* [n] *aliud eſt* Offendi *vel* Iraſci *in Deo, quam velle Vindicare iſta pœna*]: But he after owneth that the *culpa* is another thing.

SECT. XII.

How Repentance is joyned with Faith.

201. Repentance is a *Diſpoſitio materiæ recipientis* too, and a *part* of the condition of the Covenant: And *ſo far* a *Material* or *diſpoſitive Receiving Cauſe*: But not an *Acceptance of the Gift* formally, in its averting act.

202. *Faith* and *Repentance* are words uſed in Scripture in divers ſignifications. As Faith is ſometimes taken for bare *Aſſent*, as *Jam.* 2. and uſually for *Affiance* or *Truſt*, and always when it denominateth a Chriſtian or Juſtified Believer as ſuch, it eſſentially includeth all the three parts, *Aſſent*, *Conſent*, and *Affiance*, but yet denominateth the *whole* by a word which principally ſignifieth *One* act (which commonly is *Affiance* as including the other two); ſo *Repentance* is ſometime taken comprehenſively for the whole Converſion of a Sinner to God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt; and ſo it *includeth Faith* in the *narrower ſence*, and is the *ſame thing* as *Faith* in the *larger ſence*, but expreſs'd under *another formal notion*. Sometimes it is taken more narrowly, and that 1. As to the *Act*. 2. As to the *Object*.

Saith *Malderus*, Gu. Ameſius *a parte recedit ab antiquo Calviniſmo, quia requirit ad juſtitiam bona opera tanquam conditionem prærequiſitam, quod etiam extendit ad ipſam electionem.*] See here how little the Papiſts underſtand us.

1. As to the Act; and ſo the word *Repentance* ſignifieth only the *Averſion of the Soul from evil*, by ſorrow and change of mind: And this is the ſtrict formal notion of the word, though *uſually* it be *taken more largely*, as including alſo the *Converſion* of the Soul to Good; which is the uſual Scripture and Theological ſenſe; though the *word it ſelf* do chiefly ſignifie the *Averting* act.

2. As to the *Object*, 1. Repentance ſometime ſignifieth the *Turning* of the Soul from *Sin* and *Idols* to *God as God*; And ſo *Repentance towards God*, is diſtinguiſhed from *Faith towards* our *Lord Jeſus Chriſt*. 2. And ſometimes it ſignifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from *ſome particular Sin*.

203. *Repentance* as it is the *turning of the Soul from ſin and Idols to God*, is the ſame with *Faith in God* in the large Covenant-ſence, and *includeth Faith in God* in the *narrower ſence*. *Repentance* as it is our *Turning* from *Infidelity* to *Chriſtianity* is the ſame with *Faith in Chriſt* in the *large Covenant-ſaving-ſence*, and includeth *Faith* in Chriſt in the *narrower* ſence (as it is *meer Aſſent*). Repentance as it is a *Turning from the Fleſh to the Holy Ghoſt as our Sanctifyer*, is the ſame thing as our *Faith in the Holy Ghoſt* in the *large Covenant ſence*, and *includeth Faith* in the *Holy Ghoſt* in the *narrower* ſence. But when they are the *ſame thing*, the *ratio nominis* or *formal notion* is not the ſame. As man's *mind* is not ſo happy as to conceive of all things that are *one* by *one entire ſingle Conception*; ſo we are not ſo happy in our *language*, as to have *words* enough to expreſs things entirely by *one name*; but we muſt have ſeveral words to expreſs our inadequate conceptions by. And ſo that is called *Repentance* as the

* The Papiſts take Repentance it ſelf to be part of the Remiſſion of Sins: And let the Reader note, for the fuller opening of what I have ſaid of their darkneſs thereabouts, that *Janſenius Aug. To.* 1. *li.* 5. *c.* 22. *p.* 126. maketh four things to be inſeparably conteined in Remiſſion, though diſtinguiſhable. 1. The Converſion of the Soul to God. 2. The abſterſion of the Macula or filth. 3. Reconciliation or the remiſſion of Gods offence. 4. The relaxation of the æternal puniſhment: That all theſe are then at once given us, we are all agreed: But whether the name *Remiſſion* or *Pardon* of ſin be meet for them all we diſagree. Is it not viſible then how unhappily we ſtrive about words, when we talk like men of ſeveral Languages. But all is but renovation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offenſe is the firſt part. And *Macula* is either the ſin it ſelf, or the relative conſequents.

Souls motion from the *Terminus a quo*, which is called sometimes *Faith* or *Affiance*, and sometimes *Love*, from the *motion* of the Soul to the *Terminus ad quem*, though the *Motus* be the same. But when *Faith* and *Repentance* are *distinguished* as several parts of the *Condition* of the new Covenant, the common sence is, that *Repentance* signifieth the *Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God*, which *is*, or includeth *Faith in God*: And *Faith* signifieth specially *Faith in Christ as the Mediator* and way *to God*; And *so Faith* is below *Repentance*, as a means of it.

204. By this the question whether *Faith* or *Repentance* be first, may partly be resolved, and partly *cast out* as founded in confusion. As they are both *one thing*, *neither* can be *first*, any otherwise than the same *Motus ut a termino a quo*, *& ut ad terminum ad quem*. But as they signifie *divers things*, they have each of them *divers acts*, and in respect of *each*, are *before* each other. The *Assenting act* of *Faith* in general must needs be always *before Repentance*, as it is an *Act of the Will*. But the *consenting Act of faith* is also part of *Repentance*, and must follow that part of *Repentance* which is a *change of the understanding*. But whether the *Repentance* as *towards God*, or *Faith in Christ* be first, or *Love to God*, and *Faith in Christ*, I have discussed as accurately as I can, in my *Christian Directory*, *Par.* 1. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 182. and therefore thither refer the Reader.

How Faith and Love differ.

205. And how *Faith* and *Love* differ I have there also opened, and therefore shall now only say, that Faith as it signifieth meer *Assent*, differeth from *Love*, as the act of the *Intellect*, from *Volition*: And Love formally taken presupposeth the *Assent*, and doth not contain it. But *Faith* taken largely in the sence of the Baptismal Covenant, containeth in it *Consent*, which is the *Wills Volition*, and therefore must needs have some *initial Love* in it as it acteth in *Desire*. This Faith in God hath some *Desire* and *Volition of God*, and *Faith in Christ*, which is the Souls *Practical Affiance in him*, hath some *Love to Christ* in it. But the denomination is not from the same *ratio formalis* in each. It is eminently called *Faith*, when giving up our Souls to Christ to be saved in practical Affiance is the great work of the Soul, though it have something of Love essential to it. And it is eminently called *Love* (morally) when the Complacency of the Soul in Christ thus trusted, and in *God our end*, is the great work or business of the Soul.

206. This *Holy Love* as a *fixed habit* and *employment* of the Soul, and our *Relation* to the *Holy Ghost* to *work it in us*, is it that is promised and *Given quoad jus* in the Baptismal Covenant, of which *Faith*, though it have somewhat of actual *Love or Volition* in it, is the antecedent condition, which also I have so fully opened as afore cited, that I refer the Reader to it for this also. And somewhat was said of it before.

SECT.

SECT. XIII.

Of the degrees of Pardon or Juſtification.

207. Some men leſt they ſhould yield that *Juſtification is not one perfect finiſhed act done but once*, do feign that it is *only the firſt act of Faith by which a man is juſtified.* Indeed it is only the *firſt act* by which he is *changed* from an *unrighteous* to a *righteous ſtate:* But to think that therefore we are *never after juſtified by Faith*, and ſo have no *actually juſtifying Faith all our lives*, but for *one inſtant only*, is fitter for a Dreamer than a theological Diſcourſer.

208. Our firſt *conſtitutive Juſtification*, being in its nature *a right to Impunity, and to Life or Glory*, * is a *Relation* which muſt be continued to the end, and therefore muſt have the true cauſes and condition continued, and would ceaſe if any of them ceaſed.

* *Eſtius* tells us, that Remiſſion of Sin is that which *Regeneration* meaneth by Regeneration and Juſtification: But what they mean by Remiſſion they cannot tell themſelves, as aforeſaid: Pardon of the guilt they mean not, or elſe they mean ſeveral things in one word.

209. As to the queſtion therefore *whether Juſtification be loſſable, and Pardon reverſible*, I anſwer, that the grant of them in the Covenant is unalterable; But mans will in it ſelf is mutable, and if he ſhould ceaſe believing by Apoſtacy, and the condition fail, he would loſe his Right, and be unjuſtified and unpardoned, without any change in God. But that a man doth not ſo *de facto* is to be aſcribed to *Election* and *ſpecial Grace*, of which afterward.

210. Though all our paſt ſins are pardoned at our firſt Faith or Converſion (or as the Ancients ſpeak in Baptiſm) yet it is moſt certain that *Pardon* or *Juſtification* is not *perfect* at firſt, no nor on this ſide death: And the ſaying of many that *Juſtification is perfect at firſt*, and *Sanctification only by degrees*, is a palpable error, as I have elſe-where oft ſhewed. For that is not perfect, 1. Which is not continued and brought on to its end, but upon *continued conditions*, and *diligent uſe of means* to the laſt. * 2. Which leaveth *many penalties unremoved*, which have further means to be uſed for their removal, and further Right to it to be obtained: To have more and more Grace, and leſs and leſs Sin; and to have nearer communion with God, are bleſſings as to the degrees, which we muſt by degrees attain a further Right to, and the privation of them are ſore penalties to be removed. 3. We have new ſins to be pardoned every day. 4. Our remaining *Corruption* is ſuch as needeth a continued Pardon, till it be perfectly done away. 5. The Day of Judgment is not come, for which the moſt perfect Juſtification is reſerved.

* *Neq; enim peccati ſui veniam impetravit* Adam, *ut a morte temporali, immunis eſſet.* Twiſſ. contr. Corvin pag. 343. col. 2.

SECT. XIV.

Of Juſtification by Sentence of the Judge.

211. The ſecond ſort of Juſtification, which is by Sentence, is done by Chriſt as *Judge*, and ſo is an act of his Kingly Office.

212. Therefore were it true (as it is not) that juſtifying Faith were only the receiving or believing in Chriſt as a Juſtifier of us, it would not be a believing in him in his Prieſtly Office only but in act: For he merited our Juſtification as a humbled Servant, and a Sacrifice: He giveth

giveth it us in Right by his Covenant or *Law of Grace* as *King and Benefactor:* He promulgateth it as *Prophet*; He *paſſeth the Sentence* as *King and Judge*; He *executively taketh off the penalty, and glorifieth us as King and Benefactor.* There is no Juſtification by a partial Faith.

213. Though the *eſtimation* of a man as *juſt*, called the *Sententia judicis concepta*, as diſtinct from the *ſententia prolata*, be ſaid to be an *immanet act* of God, and therefore from eternity, yet it is a miſtake: For though it be not *tranſient effectivè* and do *nihil efficere ad extra*, yet it is *tranſient objectivè*, and doth preſuppoſe the exiſtence of the qualified *Object:* For though Gods *Knowledge and Will in genere*, or as ſuch, are his *eternal Eſſence*, yet *Gods Knowledge and Love* of *John* or *Peter* as Believers, are terms which ſignifie not his *Eſſence as ſuch*, but as *tranſient* and *terminated* on thoſe *exiſtent perſons relatively*: So that the extrinſick denomination from the *exiſtent Object* is *temporary* as *it is.*

214. As the Angels rejoyce at a Sinners Converſion, and therefore know it, ſo the *notifying* of Gods *acceptance* and pardon to the Angels may be called *ſome ſort of ſentential* Juſtification.

215. And the notifying our *conſtitutive Righteouſneſs* to our *Conſciences*, is *ſome kind* of *ſentential* Juſtification.

216. But this Juſtification called *in foro conſcientiæ* is not the *Juſtification by Faith* ſo much ſpoken of in Scripture: For that ever goeth before this. A man is ever made juſt, before he can be eſteemed, judged, or known to be ſo. And this *in conſcience* is an uncertain mutable thing, according to the weakneſs of the man: And oft he that is juſt before God, doth moſt doubt of it, and condemn himſelf: This juſtification may ceaſe when we ſleep or think of other things; and may riſe and fall daily, if not be often loſt. And it is not of that grand importance to our Salvation, as juſtification by Faith is.

1 Cor. 4. 4.

SECT. XV.

Of initial executive Pardon or Juſtification.

217. But the moſt notable juſtification by way of *ſentence* is, 1. By Gods *initial Executions here.* 2. By the publick *Sentence* and Execution at the Day of Judgment.

218. God *ſpeaking not by Voice*, that is called his *Sentence* which *deciſively declareth* his Judgment. But the *Execution* moſt notably declareth that: Therefore though they be two things with men, and ſometimes with God, yet *Sentence* being oft paſſed principally by *Execution*, they are *then* both one.

219. In *this ſenſe* to *ſanctifie* a man, is to *juſtifie* him *executively*, and ſo *ſententially.* For *executive Juſtification* and *Pardon* is the *actual Impunity, removing* of deſerved Puniſhment, and *actual giving poſſeſſion* of Life and Salvation, which conſtitutive Juſtification gave us *Right* to. And as our privation of the Spirit and Holineſs, and to be left in ſin, is a great puniſhment; ſo to have the Spirit and Holineſs given us, is *executive Pardon and Juſtification*; And ſo will *Glorification* much more.

See my *Epiſt.* before Mr. *Hotchkis* Book *of Forgiveneſs*, and his Book.

220. *Executive Pardon* and *Juſtification* therefore, though the laſt of three ſorts is the *nobleſt*, as ſuppoſing both the other, and being their end and the perfecting of the whole work.

221. Now

221. *Non-punire* is not always *Pardon*, becauſe it may reſpect an *innocent* and *uncapable* Object. But the Rulers *non-punire ſontem* is pardon, in what degree ſoever. But a *non-punire* as the *execution* of an *Act of Oblivion*, or *Gift of Right to Impunity*, is the fulleſt executive pardon.

222. The ſame muſt be ſaid of *nolle punire*; which is no pardon as to the *Innocent*, nor to a fore-ſeen Guilt not yet exiſtent; no more than to a ſtone: But when the perſon becometh *guilty* and obliged to ſuffer, then Gods *nolle punire* becometh *de novo* a pardon *denominatione extrinſeca*, without any change in God.

More of that imperfection of Pardon againſt *Ockam* and others.

223. For God *perfectly to forgive ſin*, while *any ſin remaineth* in the ſoul (epecially *habitual*) is a contradiction: For ſin it ſelf, though not as *ſin*, nor as effected, yet as *permitted* and not healed, is the greateſt puniſhment as was ſaid. And there is no perfect pardon of the puniſhment, while ſuch puniſhment is continued. And *Ockam*'s great ſubtilty failed, when *Quodlib.* 4. *q.* 1. he determined that *per potentiam abſolutam Deus poteſt ſalvare hominem ſine charitate creata*, unleſs he meant that he can *charitatem dare aliter quam creando:* For to ſave a man without *Grace* or *Love* is a contradiction.

His firſt Argument is, [*God can do that immediately which he can do by any ſecond Cauſe efficient or final:* * *But Love or Grace given is an efficient or final ſecond Cauſe: Therefore God can ſave a man without it.*]

Anſ. The minor is your miſtake: Love here is *Salvation it ſelf*, begun in this life and perfected in the next: And to give it, and not to give it are contradictions. All the reſt of his arguments go upon the ſame miſtake, as if *Love* were but a meritorious cauſe of Salvation, and not the thing it ſelf.

* Can they tell us intelligibly how the ſin of Unbelief and not-loving God, and other privations can be really put away, without the contrary quality or act? *Scotus*, with *Rada* & other *Scotiſts* go the ſame way upon the ſame falſe ſuppoſitions. And to confute one of them, is to confute all.

And ſo the *Papiſts* that ſay Original Sin is forgiven in Baptiſm, as to the whole *culpability* and *penalty* (as *Petavius* in *Elench. Torriat. Vincent. Lerin* (i. e. *Eromondi*) *p.* 111. *c.* 29.) do groſly err: For 1. It cannot be that the pravity of mans will ſhould not be culpable? 2. And the remaining of that pravity is it ſelf a great puniſhment of the ſin which procured it. The truth is (which ſhould ſatisfie them) that to the truly baptized, or heart-conſenters to Gods Covenant, Original Sin and all ſin is pardoned as to the great eternal pernicious puniſhment; But not abſolutely and perfectly pardoned yet, as to all degrees of puniſhment: Nor is all the culpability ceaſed.

And as erroneouſly, *Q.* 4. he determineth that *per potentiam abſolutam*, God can *remittere peccanti culpam & pœnam ſine infuſione gratiæ creatæ*, unleſs he had put the queſtion only *de modo conferendi gratiam, an alio modo ſine infuſione Deus illam poteſt efficere?* But who knoweth what *infuſion* is diſtinct from other Divine efficience. Or unleſs he had ſpoken only of Gods giving the *jus ad rem*, *& non rem ipſam*, viz. *Ipſam impunitatem.* For undoubtedly the *pœna damni* (properly *pœna*) is the privation of the Souls *rectitude*, *health* and *happineſs*, which all conſiſt in the love of God: And to pardon a mans forfeiture of Happineſs executively, without giving him the happineſs which he forfeited, or to give man happineſs without giving him love to God, are both groſs contradictions; unleſs equivocally you meant, *making a man ſome other thing*, and giving him the happineſs of that other thing.

His firſt argument here is, [*Whomſoever God can by his abſolute power accept as worthy of life eternal without infuſed Grace, to him he can forgive all ſin without infuſed Grace:* But, *&c.* For proof he referreth us to that which I now confuted, adding, That *God could accept a man in his pure naturals to life eternal.* I anſwer, It is a fiction that ever man had ſuch naturals made by God, as were not indued with the principle and diſpoſition of holy love, the ſame thing which *infuſed Grace* firſt reſtoreth; much more that *Adam* lived without the acting of this love. But if it were ſo, yet to accept man to life eternal, is to accept him to the love of God; ſo that if he did prove that a graceleſs man might be predeſtinated to Glory, he did but prove that he is predeſtinated to perfect holineſs and the love of God; And though without this he may be *predeſtinated*, or might have had a *promiſe*, and *right* by *promiſe*, yet without it he could never have the *thing promiſed*, for that were to have

have God and not to have him; nor yet his neceſſary diſpoſition for fruition; for without holineſs he is not a capable diſpoſed recipient of Salvation. The reſt of his arguments run all upon this error, as if love and holineſs were only the means, and not the end and Salvation given.

SECT. XVI.

Of aſſurance of Pardon, Juſtification and Salvation: And whether it be Faith.

224. The Faith by which we are *juſtified* is not a *believing that we are juſtified*, but a *believing that we may be juſtified*: Not a believing that *Chriſt is ours more than other mens*, or that we *ſhall be ſaved*; but a *believing in Chriſt that he may be ours, and we may be ſaved by him.*

225. There is *aſſurance* in this Faith; not aſſurance that we *are ſincere*, or *ſhall be ſaved*: But aſſurance that Gods Promiſes and all his Words are *true*, and that he will perform them; and that Chriſt is the Saviour of the world, and that the love of God is our End and Happineſs, and that all this is offered to us in Chriſt, even Pardon and Life, as well as others; which offer Faith accepteth truly; But the Believer is oft uncertain of the ſincerity of his own belief, and ſo of his Salvation.

I know that the learned Conciliator *Guiliel. Forbes* doth confidently charge them as guilty of confuſion, who place Faith in more faculties than one, and what call it *Fiducia*. But I doubt not but the error is his own, which tendeth to confuſion, by not diſtinguiſhing a meer phyſical act from a moral or political, which is made up of many phyſical acts: And if he (or Biſhop *Geor. Downame*, *Camero*, or any that go that way) had been put to tell what one phyſical act they will confine Chriſtian juſtifying Faith to, they would have found themſelves in confuſion: To ſay, It is aſſent, denieth not but that it muſt be an aſſent to many verities: And this aſſent ſignifieth at once a belief that God is true, and that this is his word, and that this word is true. He that ſaith, It is a belief of the aſſertion for the credibility of the Aſſertor, can ſcarce prove that he nameth but one Act: And I know no ſuch aſſent which doth not eſſentially contain a truſting to the word of the Aſſertor or Teſtifier, called *Fiducia*. Can you believe a Man, word to be true, becauſe he is credible, and not *truſt* his credibility ſo far as believing him importeth: It is a contradiction? *Fides credentis* is nothing but a truſting to the *Fides dicentis*, and they are Relatives, as Act and Object. Though I grant that there is alſo a quietting applicatory Truſt or *Fiducia*, which is but the exerciſe of Faith as ſuppoſing me to ſee my intereſt in the Promiſe, which cometh after our firſt believing, in which we ſee but our receptive capacity that the Promiſe includeth me with the reſt of Mankind, and the thing promiſed is offered to me.

226. How much certainty we have of Divine Revelation and Scripture verity, I have ſo fully opened in many *Tractates*, and laſtly in one called [*The certainty of Chriſtianity without Popery*] that I will not here repeat it, further than to ſay, that it is not a *perfect apprehenſion* which we call our *certainty*, nor yet an *uneffectual doubtful* one; But ſuch a one as will carry a man on confidence of Gods Word to a *holy life*, and to the forſaking of all other hopes, even *life* it ſelf, for the *hopes* which are given us by Chriſt: which yet may have ſeveral degrees in ſeveral perſons. But *objective certainty*, which is the *evidence* of verity, is more full than our ſubjective certainty (for want of our due receptivity in us) and is ſtill the ſame in it ſelf, though not equally brought or revealed to all.

227. Even doubting of the truth of the Scripture and Chriſtianity may ſtand with ſaving Faith and Salvation, when it is not predominant, nor ſo great as to keep us from the ſaid forſaking all for Chriſt and Heaven.

228. Doubting of mans own Salvation, is not always from weakneſs of Faith directly, much leſs is it the want of Faith it ſelf. For ſometime a man may doubt, meerly as doubting of the ſincerity of his own Faith, and not at all doubting of the truth of the Word of God. But when it is the doubting whether the *promiſes be ſure*, which maketh a man doubt whether he *ſhall be ſaved*, this doubting is the *debility of Faith.*

229. The

229. The ſame may be ſaid of *diſpair*: That diſpair is from the weakneſs or want of Faith, which cometh from an *unbelief* of the *truth* of the *Promiſe*: And that alſo is pernicious diſpair which (from what Cauſe ſoever) is ſo great as to take men off the uſe of neceſſary means, to attain Salvation. But that diſpair which cometh from over-much ſelf-condemning, and a conceit that a mans heart is falſe, and not that Gods Promiſe is falſe, may ſtand with true Faith and Salvation, if it be not ſo great, as to take him off the uſe of neceſſary means.

230. No man ordinarily can be aſſured of his *Salvation* or *Juſtification* without extraordinary Revelation, but by being aſſured firſt of the truth of *Gods Promiſe*, and of his *own ſincerity in believing*: For his aſſurance is of the concluſion of this argument, [*Whoſoever ſincerely believeth and repenteth is juſtified: But I ſincerely believe and repent; therefore I am juſtified.*] And the weakneſs of the apprehenſion of either of the premiſes is ever in the concluſion, which always followeth *partem debiliorem*.

231. There are therefore but *two ſorts* of men who can *believe that they are juſtified by a Faith properly called Divine*, that is, *which is a belief of Gods Word herein*; 1. Thoſe that God revealeth it to by prophetical or extraordinary Revelation (if there be any ſuch.) 2. Thoſe who are more certain of their *own ſincere Faith*, than they are that *Gods Word it ſelf is true* (if any ſuch there be in the world.) For with all others the certainty of the ſincerity of their own Faith being weakeſt, the concluſion followeth it.

232. If any man can poſſibly doubt more of the truth of Gods Word, than of the ſoundneſs of his own Faith; though that mans Faith may be called *Divine*, it is no honour to it, becauſe it hath ſo much doubting of Gods Word mixed with belief: And it's like his greater aſſurance of his belief of it, is but his error, or infirmity.

233. Ordinarily therefore no Chriſtians can believe *fide Divina*, that they are juſtified and ſhall be ſaved; that is, *this is no Word of God*, but a *concluſion*, of which one of the premiſes only, and that the *ſtronger* is Gods Word.

234. To ſay that *he that believeth ſhall be ſaved*, is equivalent to this, [*I ſhall be ſaved*] is not true nor reaſonable, ſeeing [*I believe*] is not *Gods Word*, nor ſo certain as Gods Word: And one of the premiſes is not equal to both.

245. When they ſay, That *it's all one, when I am ſure that I believe.*] I grant it, if 1. This be in it ſelf as *evident*. 2. And as *certain to me* as *Gods Word* is; otherwiſe I deny it.

236. Obj. *A man cannot believe, and not know that he believeth.* *Anſ.* But a man may *ſincerely believe*, and yet through ignorance either of the Scripture or himſelf, be uncertain that indeed his Faith is *ſincere*, and not ſuch as is common to the juſtified.

237. Some *Proteſtants* by erring in this point, and ſaying that juſtifying Faith is a *certain perſwaſion or belief that we are juſtified*, and that *it is Gods own Word that I or you are actually juſtified, or are ſincere Believers*, and that the believing it is properly *fides Divina*, have greatly ſcandalized and hardened the *Papiſts*, to our diſgrace.

238. And ſo have thoſe that ſay that in the *Creed*, the meaning of [*I believe the Remiſſion of Sin*] is, [*I believe that my ſins are remitted actually.*] And that all muſt thus believe.

239. Some ſay that the *Spirit within them ſaith, that they are ſincere Believers, and the Word of the Spirit is the Word of God, and to believe it is to believe God.* *Anſ.* This is the *Enthuſiaſts* conceit: which if true,

all such have prophetical Inspiration: For the Spirit to bring any new *word* from God is one thing, and to give us the *Understanding*, Love and *Obedience* to such a Word is another thing. The Spirit doth indeed assure us of our sincerity, but not by a *new Word* from God to tell us so; but 1. By giving us that sincere Faith it self. 2. By acting it and increasing it. 3. By helping us to know it. 4. By giving us the love of God, and other Graces. 5. By giving us the comfort of all. But the reception and perception of these internal Operations, is not properly called a *Belief of the Word of God.* Else when we make Gods Word the adequate Object of Faith, we shall be still at an uncertainty what that Word is.

240. Yet this *perswasion*, that we are *sincere and justified* is divine, where the *Spirit* causeth it; but not a *divine Faith.* Yea it is *participatively of divine Faith*, because Gods Word is one of the premises, though the weaker must denominate the conclusion. *

* Of this see *Albertinus's Disp.* at large.

241. Obj. *A Reprobate or Devil may believe all the Articles of Faith without application: but justifying Faith applieth Christ and his benefits to our selves. Ans.* It's true: But this application is not a *certainty*, nor a *perswasion*, nor a *believing that I am justified*, no more than that *I am glorified*, no nor that I shall be so neither: But it is an *accepting of Christ offered* that I *may* be justified and saved. So that here are all these applying acts in it. 1. I believe that Christ as the Saviour of the World, is *my Saviour* as he is all other mens, and is not the Devils; that is, that he hath done that for me which he hath done for all mankind. 2. I believe that he is *offered to me personally* in the Promise or Covenant of Grace, on condition of *believing-acceptance*; and that with and for all his purchased benefits, and so for my Justification. 3. I believe that if *I so accept him*, I shall be justified. 4. By true *consent* I do accordingly *accept* him to justifie, sanctifie and save me. But when all this is done, 1. I do not believe that God hath said in his word that *I am justified*, nor that *my Faith is sincere.* 2. And my Faith is so weak, that I may long doubt of that sincerity which I have, and so of my Justification. 3. And when I come to be certain of my *Faith*, it is not by *believing God*, as saying, that *I do certainly believe*; but by *experience* of its *sincerity*, upon just trial, by the *Spirits* help.

242. No man can be sure that his *Faith* is sincere and saving, who is not assured that it will help him to *love God as God* above all (yea already doth so) and that it mortifieth selfishness, and will prevail with him to deny even life it self, and all the world, for Christ and Salvation. So far as a man doubteth of any of this, he must needs doubt of his own sincerity.

243. So weak is Faith in most that are sincere, and so little kept in exercise, and so strong is sense, and self, and flesh, and worldly baits and interest, and Satan's temptations, that in my experience (who have conversed with as many that are careful of their Souls as most have done I think) it is a very small number that I could ever hear say, *I am certain of my Justification and Salvation*; But a great number who have lived in holy confidence, hope and peace, and some in great joy, but most in tollerable fears and doubting, and some few oppressed by those doubts. So that certainty of Salvation is very rare.

244. When *Bellarmine* saith, that our assurance more belongeth to *Hope* than *Faith*, and that it is but *moral certainty* by signs that we have of our Justification, Sincerity and Salvation, he so little differeth from the sense of almost all godly *Protestants*, that were it not through other distances,

diſtances, and partiality, we had never read in *Luther*'s days, that for this one point alone, we have cauſe enough of our alienation from the *Romaniſts*.

245. They err on one extream, who ſay, that all are commanded to believe that they are juſtified; (or any as if it were Gods Word): And they err on the other hand, who command *doubting* or commend it, as if it were a duty or a benefit. And they ſpeak the truth who ſay, that our doubting of our own Sincerity and Juſtification if we are ſincere, is a ſin of Infirmity, and a Calamity, proceeding from weakneſs of *Faith*, *Hope*, *Love* and *Self-acquaintance*, which we ſhould uſe all poſſible diligence to overcome. But they that are not *ſincere* are bound to know it; And firſt to ſeek and get *ſincerity*, and then diſcern it.

246. It is by the *Spirit* that all Chriſtians muſt come to their aſſurance: But not by the Spirit as ſpeaking this in us as a word from God, [*Thou art juſtified or ſhalt be ſaved, or art ſincere*]. But by the aforeſaid Acts: The Spirit in us is firſt *Chriſt's Agent, Advocate and Witneſs*, to aſſure us that he is the *Saviour of the World*: And next he is *our Witneſs* to aſſure us that we *are Gods adopted Children*; which he doth by being in us *Gods Mark*, and the *Pledge*, *Firſt-Fruits*, and *earneſt of our heavenly Inheritance*, by effectual habituating our Souls to the predominant love of God, and Holineſs and Heaven. Where-ever this Sanctification is, there is the Evidence and Witneſs of our Adoption. He that findeth by the Fruits that he hath the Spirit, findeth the certain proof of his Juſtification, and earneſt of Glory.

SECT. XVII.

Of Love as the end of Faith.

247. This predominant Love of God and Holineſs, is ſo proper a fruit of the Spirit, that it is the very heart of the New Creature, the ſum of Sanctification, as love is the ſum of the Law. So that to give the Spirit of *Adoption*, to cry *Abba*, *Father*, and to *ſanctifie*, and to work in us *the love of God and holineſs*, are three phraſes of the ſame ſignification in the Word of God.

Cui non unus idemq; vitæ ſcopus eſt, hic unus idemq; per vitam totam eſſe non poteſt. Non eſt ſatis quod dixi, niſi illud etiam adjeceris, qualis ſcopus hic eſſe debeat. M. Antoninus li. 11. ſect. 21. p. 113.

248. As Chriſt as *Mediator* is the *ſummary means* and *way* to the Father, to bring man home to his Creator; ſo *Faith in Chriſt* is a *mediating Grace*, to work in us the *love of God*: And as elſe-where I have oft ſaid, *The bellowes of Faith kindling Love, and Love working by holy Obedience, Patience, Mortification, Gratitude and Praiſe*, is the ſubſtance of all true Religion.

249. *Love* being the *final Grace*, and *Faith in Chriſt*, but a *means* to it, the *end* muſt needs be more excellent than the means as ſuch. And thus *Paul* giveth the pre-eminence to *Love*.

1 Cor. 12. laſt. & 13. 1. 2. 2.

Whether the habit of Love *in patria* be better than that of Faith and Viſion *in genere moris* only, or alſo *in genere rei*, the School-men are utterly diſagreed.

Cacere's ſum. Theol. 22. q. 5. a. 1. *Utrum in ſola charitate ſupernaturali ſit amicitia hominis ad Deum? Affirm. Quia Deus ut auctor naturæ non ea communicat, quæ ſunt propria ejus, ſed ſolum eſſe naturale & potentias quæ*, &c. The Reaſon is not ſo good as the Aſſertion.

Vid. Bradward. li. 1. c. 1. cor. 30. *Contra indoctos artis amandi, neſcientes Deum eſſe propter ſeipſum amandum, & cætera propter Deum, omneſq; alios humanos ad ipſum propter ſe finaliter ordinandos, ipſumq; eſſe ſuper omnia diligendum*: and his following proof that God is not to be ſinned againſt in the ſmalleſt of his Precepts, or in the ſmalleſt thing, to avoid the greateſt pain, or obtain the greateſt good imaginable.

250. And no wonder if he prefer it alſo for *duration*; For *Love* is Heaven or felicity it ſelf, yea ſomewhat higher than felicity as ſuch. For as God is our End for and in himſelf, above the *ratio fœlicitatis*, ſo God is our *End* as he is to be *loved:* And God the *Ultimate Object*, and *Love* the *Ultimate Act*, and *Gods Love communicated perfectly to us, and Gods Will pleaſed in all this*, are the inadequate Conceptions which make up the Ultimate End, ſuppoſing the perfection of Nature, and of the Intellect in the ſight of God, as ſubſervient hereunto.

251. Man therefore hath a *degree of fruition*, or attainment of his Ultimate End in this life, ſo far as he hath a *delightful love of God:* Though this be but the foretaſt and Firſt-fruits.

252. Therefore it is not by *Faith* only that we know what Heaven is, and are drawn to ſeek it and hope for it: but alſo by this *earneſt* and *foretaſt of love*; which worketh by a *ſpiritual guſt* and ſweet inward experience. The Intellect firſt hath *Faith*, and the *Will* hath *Love*; And a *promiſe* and *earneſt* is more a promiſe alone.

253. When *Faith* hath wrought this *holy Love* in the Soul, it doth *as much* if *not more* to keep us from Apoſtacy than Faith it ſelf. Therefore many unlearned Chriſtians, by the power of *holy Love*, ſtand faſt, when ſubtile diſputing Doctors may cleave to the world, and fall away.

254. Though it be an ill expreſſion of thoſe School-men that ſay, *Love is the form of every Grace*, that which I ſuppoſe they mean is true: that *love being the final Grace*, the reſt as they are *means* to it, or the *effects* and *expreſſions* of it, are what they are partly in that *Relation:* The means is a means only by its *Aptitude* to the *end*; And is never loved (as ſuch) for it ſelf, but for the end: And what the effect hath, it hath from its efficient Cauſe. And it is true, that no Faith, no Fear, no Obedience, no Praiſe, no Suffering is further accepted of God, and a part of true Holineſs, nor will prove our Salvation, than it participateth of *predominant love to God.* But this predominant Love is always an evidence of Life.

255. Qu. *What if a man ſhould by Faith in Chriſt be brought to the love of God, and after fall away from Faith in Chriſt, and yet retain his love to God, would that love ſave him? Anſ.* When you can prove that ever there was ſuch a man, I will anſwer you. Till then ſuch falſe ſuppoſitions are no otherwiſe to be anſwered, than by telling you, that if God ſhould permit a man to fall from Chriſt, that man would loſe the Spirit of Chriſt, and the ſight and ſenſe of all Gods Love and Goodneſs manifeſted in Chriſt, and in all the Work of Redemption; And therefore he would loſe the *love of God.*

256. How far *Holineſs* is the *deſign of Chriſtianity*, I have opened in a ſmall *Tractate* on that Queſtion; And how far Sanctification is to be preferred before *Pardon* as ſuch, and yet Chriſt's Glory in pardoning us, I have ſhewed there and in my *Confeſſion*, and therefore will not here repeat it.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII.

Of Perſeverance, and the certainty of it, in order to certainty of Salvation, and true Comfort.

257. No man can be further certain of his *final Salvation*, than he is certain of his *perſeverance in Faith and Love.*

258. Therefore it is a ſmall number of Chriſtians comparatively that ever were *certain* of their *Salvation.* For 1. No one that is uncertain of his *ſincerity* is certain of his Salvation. 2. No one that holdeth this Doctrine [That the Saints that are juſtified may fall away, and that we cannot be ſure of perſeverance,] can be ſure of his own Salvation. It's hard to conceive how he can be certain, who holdeth that no man can be certain: Now thoſe that hold this Doctrine are, almoſt all the *Papiſts*, the *Arminians*, the *Lutherans*, and as far as I can learn by their Writings, all the ancient Writers for a thouſand years after Chriſt. And the *Semipelagians* and *Pelagians* no man will put in as an exception, except *Jovinian* alone; againſt whom *Jerome* writing his ſecond Book chargeth him as holding that a man truly baptized by the Spirit, could not ſin: No doubt he meant, [to damnation or mortally]: But it's doubtful what his Opinion was. *Auguſtine*'s report of him is of no great moment, who as *Eraſmus* noteth (in his *Argum. in Hier. adv. Jovin.)* neither had ſeen *Jovinians* Book or *Hieorm*'s but ſpake by report.

And *Auſtin*, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius* thought that all the *Elect perſevered as Elect*, *being choſen to perſeverance*; but that *more were truly ſanctified*, *juſtified*, and in a ſtate of Salvation had they ſo died than were *elect:* That all theſe fell away and periſhed. That no man could be certain whether or no he were elect, and ſhould perſevere. So that they denied all certainty of Salvation by ordinary means. And that none of all the *Greek* or *Latin* Fathers, then, or long after, went further from the *Pelagians* than *Auguſtine* did, I think I need not perſwade any, that hath read them.

259. This hiſtorical Truth is uſeful to be known: From whence I infer, that it is poſſible for Chriſtians to live in ſetled peace and comfort, in reſpect to their heavenly Felicity, without a *certainty of perſeverance and Salvation.* For to think that no *Papiſts*, no *Greeks*, no *Arminians*, no *Proteſtant Lutherans*, nor any of the *ancient holy Doctors*, nor any of all the *Martyrs* or other *Chriſtians of their judgment*, did attain to ſuch *holy peace* and *comfort*, is unreaſonable, and contrary to all Church-Hiſtory, and to experience.

260. And though it were a far more joyful ſtate to have proper certainty, yet reaſon and experience in other caſes tell us, that without *certainty* a man may live a joyful and peaceable life, where *probability* is ſtrong enough to remove all reaſonable cauſe of fearfulneſs, though there be a *poſſibility* of the worſt. As we ſee that men in youth and health, though they may *poſſibly* die, or fall into torments the next hour, yet do not therefore caſt off comfort, and live in ſuch trouble as they would do if they had probable cauſe to expect it. There is no wife living is certain that her own Huſband will not murder her the next night; nor no Child certain that the Parents will not caſt them off or kill them; nor no Friend certain that his deareſt Friend will not do ſo; And yet few but melancholy people will therefore take up ſorrow, and caſt away

away all their comfort in life and peace, and in these Friends: Even these persons are their *trust* and *joy*. There is no man sure but he may be executed among Malefactors: And yet while there is no reason to expect it, a man may live a comfortable life. There is no man certain that he himself shall not fall into a particular crime of Murder, Theft, Perjury, or the like; And yet we live not therefore uncomfortably. For mens affections follow the powerfullest cause.

261. Hence also I conclude, that certainly the *denial of certainty of persevering*, and Salvation is not a thing that should *break the love, peace or concord of the Christian Churches*, or for which they should cast off or revile each other. For what sober man could do so by all those that I have instanced in.

262. It is a shameful self-delusion of some Disputers, who think when they have once believed that certainty of Salvation may be had, that they are then certain themselves, or next to certain of their own Salvation. But he that hath no more certainty to be rich, or healthful, than to believe that Health and Riches may be got, is far from having them.

263. Who was more full of confidence and joy than *Luther*, who speaketh more against the Papists, commanding men to *doubt* of the pardon of sin? who speaketh of a higher Faith than he on *Galat.* Yet he with *Melanchthon* and all the first *Protestants* in the *August. Confess. Art.* 11. saith, [*They damn the* Anabaptists, *who deny that those that are once justified can again lose the Holy Ghost.*]

264. If *Adam* in Innocency had neither solid comfort, or cause of such, the state that we fell from was not so good as we commonly believe. But *Adam* had no assurance of his perseverance in that state: For he fell from it.

Vid. *Judic. Theol. Palat. de persever. in Synod. Dord. p. 1. pag. 208. pr. 3.*

265. No man (as is said) is certain that he shall not fall into such a hainous sin, as *Peter*, *David*, &c. did.

266. The Synod of *Dort* saith, [*By such enormous sins, they greatly offend God, they incur the guilt of death, they grieve the Holy Ghost, they interrupt the exercise of Faith, they most grievously wound Conscience, sometimes they lose the sense of Grace for a time; till by serious Repentance returning into the way, Gods fatherly countenance again shine upon them.*

And the Brittish Divines in their Synodic. Explic. say, [*They contract damnable guilt, and lose their present aptitude to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.* Adding, [*So that while they remain in that state of Impenitence, they neither ought nor can perswade themselves otherwise, than that they are obnoxious to death. Rom.* 8. 13. If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die. *For they are bound in a capital Crime, by the desert whereof, according to Gods Ordination, they are subject to death, though they be not yet delivered to death, nor shall be, if we respect Gods fatherly love, but shall be pluckt out of this sin, that so they may be pluckt out of the guilt of death.* Lastly, *For their present condition, they lose their aptitude to enter into Heaven,* &c. And Thes. 4. p. 193. [*Gods unmovable ordination requireth that a Believer thus exorbitant, do first return into the way by renovation of Faith and the act of Repentance, before he can be brought to the ways end, which is the heavenly Kingdom. By the Decree of Election, the faithful are so predestinated to the end, that they can no otherwise be brought to it, than by Gods instituted means, as by the Kings high way. And Gods Decrees of the means, and of the end and order of events, are as firm and certain, as those of the end, and of the events themselves. If any man therefore go on in a way contrary to Gods Ordination, as the broad way*

of

of uncleanneſs and impenitence, which directly leadeth to Hell; he can never come that way to Heaven. Yea if death ſurprize him wandering in that out-way, he cannot but fall into everlaſting death. This is the conſtant and clear voice of the Scripture. ---*As* Paul *ſaid of thoſe in the Ship,* &c. Act. 27. 31. ---*It is certain that* David *and* Peter, *Gods Elect Servants, were to come to Heaven; But it is as certain that if one had remained impenitent in his Adultery and Murder, and the other in his denial of Chriſt and perjury, neither of them could have been ſaved. Providence and Mercy unty this knot, by providing that no elect perſon die in that ſtate, in which, according to any Ordination of Gods Will, he ſhould have been ſhut out of Heaven.*

Luk. 13. 3, 5. 1 Cor. 6. 9. Heb. 12. 14. 2 Tim. 2. 19. Act. 27. 31.

And Theſ. 5. [*In that interſpace which is between the guilt of ſin contracted by a grievous ſin, and the renewed act of Faith and Repentance, ſuch a Sinner ſtandeth a perſon to be damned by his own deſert, but by Chriſt's Merit and Gods firm purpoſe a perſon to be ſaved; but not before by excited Faith and Repentance, he hath obtained pardon, is he actually abſolved.* ---*But in ſuch guilt the condition of the Faithful and of the Wicked is not the ſame.* ---*To the Unbelievers is wanting the inward principle of Faith, without which the remedy is as far off, and cannot be made their own and applied.* ---*If any would know the very moment in which a man that had contracted guilt by a hainous ſin, is actually abſolved*, Cyprian *ſeemeth to have determined it clearly in theſe words,* [When I ſee thee ſighing before the Lord, I doubt not but the Holy Ghoſt is breathing on thee: when I ſee thee weeping, I perceive him pardoning.]

The like you have, *Judic. Theol. Bremenſ. de perſever. ib. pag.* 233. *n.* 9, 10, 11. *vid. & rejecta, pag.* 237.

267. The Britiſh Divines in that Synod, *Judic. de perſeverant. p.* 188. begin with this explication, that it is only *the perſeverance of the Adult that are actually Believers*, (and not of *Infants*) which is intended: For ſome of them (as Biſhop *Davenant* and Dr. *Ward*) have written that an Infant ſtate of Grace and title to Salvation may be fallen from and loſt.

Vid. *Davenant* and *Ward de Grat. Baptiſmati.*

268. They add, ibid. p. 108. Theſ. 3. [*This perſwaſion of perſeverance hath not that degree of certainty, which always excludeth all fear of the contrary: but is ſometime lively, ſometime languid, ſometime, as in greateſt Temptations, none----The firſt debility ariſeth from the fundamental dependance of this perſonal affiance, which ſeemeth to come below the certainty of dogmatical Faith. For the Articles of Faith do affect our aſſent as immediate and firſt principles. But the truth of ſpecial Faith is not thence deduced as a neceſſary conſequent, but is only ſubjoyned by way of aſſumption.* Ergo *the firmneſs of that concluſion which maketh this perſwaſion, cannot be greater, than that which is in the weaker of the premiſes. But that ſumption reſteth on experimental ſigns, weighed by mans private Conſcience: which being ſometime doubted of, whether they are true ſigns, and ſometimes hid by temptations, that they cannot ſhine out to our comfort, what wonder if Believers perſwaſion of their eternal Salvation be not always* vegete *and* valide. *Beſides that the very Principles of the Catholick-Faith, though by revealed light clear in themſelves, yet being not known to us, by certainty of evidence, but only of Adheſion,* * *they beget not in us ſo firm an aſſent, as mathematical demonſtrations, and common notions. But in beholding them, from the relicts of carnal diffidence, ſome vapors, as it were, ſometime ariſe, by which the light of divine immutable verity, ſeemeth to us to be refringed, and to waver. How much greater and daily is the errour of every Believer in the beholding of their own perſonal affiance.*

* Here I leave them with the School-men. Adheſion (as *Durand:* confeſſeth) ſuppoſeth, or is ſtrongeſt, where there is evidence: and ſuch we have, though not ſenſible *ipſius rei*, yet *veritatis teſtimonii.*

269. It

269. It is too certain, by ſad experience, that a true Believer may loſe much of the Grace which he once had, and may die in a worſe and weaker ſtate.

Luk. 12. 4, 5.
Heb. 4. 1.
1 Cor. 9. 27.
Heb. 12. 28, 29.

270. It is certain by Gods Word, that the juſtified have need of warnings, that they fall not away, and of threatenings if they fall; and that they are obliged to *fear* it, by a cautelous preventing fear that they may eſcape it.

271. It is certain therefore that if the thing be denominated *poſſible* in relation to our own *power*, it is not only poſſible that we ſhould fall away, but too certain that we ſhould.

They that are too favourable to the Dominicant predeterminants, ſhould remember how far their Doctrine of ſupernaturality of Grace hath carried them againſt all poſſibility of knowing not only our perſeverance and Salvation, but our preſent ſtate of Grace: For they ſay that nothing but Divine Revelation can aſſure any man that his acts are from a ſupernatural principle: yea that only by the beatifical Viſion which is by uncreated Species, can the true difference between the acts of acquired and infuſed habits be known. So *Alvarez, li. 6. diſp. 51. p. 232. Habitus virtutum Theologicalium ſolum divina revelatione cognoſcantur, certo & infallibiliter. Immo* Bannes *addit quod non poſſunt evidenter cognoſci ſecundam ſuam ultimam differentiam per ſpeciem aliquam creatam propter ſimilitudinem quam habent actus charitatis infuſæ & acquiſitæ, non poteſt quis, ſecuſa divina revelatione, cognoſcere infallibiliter actum charitatis quem habet in ſe eſſe ſupernaturalem, nec diſcernere certo utrum procedat effective ab habitu infuſo vel acquiſito, aut a nuda potentia.* Beſides *Bannes*, he cites as his Conſenters, D. *Thom. p. 1. q. 62. a. 1. c. & 1. d. 17. q. 1. a. 4. &* Soto *de Grat. li. 1. c. 22. corol. 2. Cajet. 22. q. 6. a. 1.* And by this it appeareth that their very Doctrine of *Infuſion* and *Supernaturality* in exceſs is the very ground of their denying all certainty of Juſtification and Salvation.

272. But if the event be denominated poſſible or impoſſible in relation to Gods meer Decree or Fore-knowledge, which as ſuch do nihil *efficere ad extra*, without reſpect to his *operative power*, ſo the Apoſtacy of the Elect is impoſſible logically, or their perſeverance *neceſſary neceſſitate conſequentiæ in ordine probandi*, it being impoſſible that both theſe ſhould be true, [*Paul* will apoſtatize] and [*God decreeth that* Paul *ſhall not, or fore-knoweth that he will not apoſtatize*]. But *poſita nulla operatione divina ad extra*, it would be nevertheleſs poſſible *in re & in cauſis*, that ſuch a one ſhould fall away. For all *poſſibles* are not *futures*: Therefore as God may both fore-know and decree the *non-furity* of a thing, (if a Negative needed a Decree) and yet decree that it ſhall be *poſſible*. So God may decree the futurity of a mans perſeverance, and yet decree that it ſhall be *poſſible*, as to all Cauſes, that he perſevere not. For he is ſuppoſed to decree only the determination of an undetermined Power, but not antecedently to take it away, and make it no free power.

273. But if the Relation of *poſſibility* be denominated from Gods *operative Grace effecting* perſeverance, then God hath various Operations: He can give his Grace by ſuch an Omnipotent inſuperable force, as ſhall predetermine the faculty ſo far as antecedently to take away the *moral power* (though not the natural) *ad contrarium*: And he can work in ſuch a compliance with the liberty of the Will as ſhall only *determine* the power (*natural* or *moral*) to act, and not antecedently take it away; (unleſs as determining it, is a taking it away as to the contrary act at the ſame inſtant, as every man taketh away his own power by acting) when God operateth the *firſt way* (antecedently taking away the power *ad contrarium*) then the apoſtaſie of a man is properly called *Impoſſible*, in relation to the *impotency of all other Cauſes to overcome God*, the cauſe of perſeverance. But when God only worketh the latter way (not taking away the *moral power ad contrarium*, but determining it and the natural) then it is no proper expreſſion to ſay that ſuch a mans *falling away* was impoſſible antecedently; but only that 1. It is *non futurum*. 2. And *logically impoſſible in order of arguing*, that it ſhould be ſo. And it is ordinary with high *Antiarminians* to ſay, That Gods *Decree* and his *Grace* too, are ſuch as only determine mans power, and that neither of them ordinarily make our Fall *impoſſibile*, but only *non-futurum*. But when God worketh by a greater force of Omnipotency, taking away the moral power *ad contrarium*, and how oft, what man dare ſay that he can tell? the difference being in the *effect*, and not in God.

274. Therefore though the diſpute of the *event* as *future* or *not future* have its place, yet the diſpute *de poſſibilitate* is uſually but vain, and darkening: eſpecially as managed by thoſe Confounders, who only ſay, *It is impoſſible that Gods decree or fore-knowledge be fruſtrate, and neceſſary that it be fulfilled*, not diſtinguiſhing the *neceſſity* of a *conſequence*

conſequence in a ſyllogiſm from the premiſes, and the *neceſsity* of an *effect* as from its neceſſitating cauſe. God can *cauſe* without neceſſitating the ſecond cauſe; much more *decree* and *fore-know*.

275. He that hath ſaving Grace in the *leaſt degree*, cannot loſe that degree, without loſing all the *ſpecies*, or all ſaving Grace. But it's otherwiſe with him that hath a higher degree.

276. There have many of our acquaintance gone ſo far in a life of mortification, and diligence of ſuffering like Chriſtians of the higheſt rank, who yet have fallen (to the death) to the denial of the very eſſentials of the Chriſtian Faith, that from the very Doctrine of *certain perſeverance* hath become a cauſe of doubting and trouble to ſome: who have ſaid, [*If a man could fall away from true Grace, I ſhould not doubt but ſuch and ſuch a man did ſo, and I ſhould hope that yet my heart may at the preſent be ſincere: But ſeeing no man ever had true Grace who apoſtatizeth, theſe men had none, who in all probable judgment of reaſon, were once far better than I now am: And I can never be ſure that I have true Grace, till I go further than ever they did, which I almoſt diſpair of ever doing, having intimately known them to be no diſſemblers.*] Thus *both ways* of this controverted Doctrine have their troubling difficulties.

277. If none cenſured the deniers of *certainty* herein, but only thoſe who themſelves ever *attain to a certainty* of their *ſincerity*, *perſeverance* and *ſalvation*, they would not be enough to make any great diviſion or breach about it. And could we but be impartial, and bear with the diſſent of Brethren herein, as well as we do of the *ancient Doctors and Churches*, our peace and concord would be leſs diſturbed by this Controverſie than it is. I have elſe-where cited ſome; *Tertullian* is too harſh in conceding a mutability in God, Contr. Marc. li. 2. cap. 23, 24. [*Si vero etiam circa perſonas levem vultis intelligi quum reprobat aliquando probatos, aut improvidum quum probat quandoq; reprobandos, quaſi judicia ſua aut damnet præterita, aut ignoret futura: Atqui nihil tam bono & judici convenit, quam pro præſentibus meritis & rejicere & adlegere*, &c.] Yet this may have a good interpretation.

Euſebius Præparat. Evangel. li. 6. pag. 289, 290. [*Yea theſe would fight* (or be a contradiction) *that the ſame man ſhould both become honeſt* (or good) *and certainly fore-know that he ſhall be honeſt.*] But I am not of his mind.

But among thoſe before *Auguſtine*, ſuch paſſages are not ſo ſtrange as theſe are in himſelf. De corrept. & Grat. cap. 13. pag. 539. [*Quis enim ex multitudine fidelium quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, in numero prædeſtinatorum ſe eſſe præſumat? Quia id occultari opus eſt in hoc loco: ubi ſic cavenda eſt elatio, ut etiam per Satanæ Angelum ne extolleretur tantus colophizaretur Apoſtolus---Nam propter hujus utilitatem ſecreti, ne forte quis extollatur, ſed omnes etiam qui bene currunt timeant dum occultum eſt qui perveniant. Propter hujus ergo utilitatem ſecreti credendum eſt quoſdam de filiis perditionis, non accepto dono perſeverantiæ uſq; in finem, in fide quæ per dilectionem operatur incipere vivere, ac aliquandiu fideliter ac juſte vivere, & poſtea cadere, neq; de hac vita priuſquam hoc eis contingat auferri. Quorum ſi nemini contigiſſet, tamdiu haberent omnes iſtum ſaluberrimum timorem, quo vitium elationis opprimitur donec ad Chriſti gratiam, qua piè vivitur, pervenirent; deinceps jam ſecuri nunquam ſe ab illo eſſe caſuros. Quæ præſumptio in iſto tentationum loco non expedit, ubi tanta eſt infirmitas, ut ſuperbiam poſſit generare ſecuritas.*

Et Epiſt. 101. ad Vitalem [*Utile eſt quippe omnibus, vel pene omnibus propter humilitatem ſaluberrimam, ut quales futuri ſint ſcire non poſſint---.*]

Et lib. 11. de Civit. Dei cap. 12. pag. 67. [*Quis enim primos illos homines in Paradiſo negare audeat beatos fuiſſe ante peccatum? quamvis de ſua beatitudine quam diuturna, vel utrum æterna eſſet incertos? eſſet autem æterna niſi peccaſſent. Cum hodie non impudenter beatos vocemus quos videmus juſte ac pie cum ſpe immortalitatis hanc vitam ducere, ſine crimine vaſtante conſcientiam, facile impetrantes peccatis hujus infirmitatis divinam miſericordiam? Qui licet de ſuæ perſeverantiæ præmio certi ſint, de ipſa tamen perſeverantia ſua reperiantur incerti? Quis enim hominum ſe in actione profectuq; juſtitiæ perſeveraturum uſq; in finem ſciat, niſi aliqua revelatione ab illo ſtat certus qui de hac re juſto latentiq; judicio, non omnes inſtruit, ſed neminem fallit.*

So Proſper Reſp? ad Gallor. cap. ſent. ad ſecundam. [*Qui dicit quod ab his qui non ſunt prædeſtinati ad vitam, non auferat percepta baptiſmi gratia Originale peccatum non eſt catholicus. Sacramentum enim baptiſmi quo omnia prorſus peccata delentur, etiam in eis verum eſt, qui non ſunt in veritate manſuri, & ab hoc ad vitam æternam non ſunt prædeſtinati.*

Et ſent. ad ſeptimum. [*Qui dicit quod Deus quibuſdam filiis ſuis quos regeneravit in Chriſto, quibus fidem,* ſpem, dilectionem *dedit, ob hoc perſeverantiam non dederit, quia a maſſa perditionis præſcientia Dei & prædeſtinatione non ſint diſcreti,* &c. Vid. cætera & ſent. ſup. 12.

Et Reſp. ad object. Vincent. 12. [*Prædeſtinatio Dei & ſi apud nos dum in præſentis vitæ periculis verſamur incerta eſt, apud illum tamen, qui fecit quæ futura ſunt immutabilis permanet.*

I need not tell the learned that *Fulgentius* is of the ſame mind with *Auguſtine* and *Proſper*.

If this had not been *Auguſtine*'s Doctrine, the predeterminant Dominicans had never maintained it as his againſt the Jeſuits, which you may ſee in *Alvarez* Diſput. 107. and many others.

Much leſs would *Janſenius* * the zealous Follower of *Auguſtine* (ſo perfectly acquainted with his Works) have ſo thought and ſaid, and ſo propugned it. See him at large in his *Auguſtin. de Grat. Chriſti, lib. 9. cap. 7. pag. 392, 393, &c. & lib. 3. c. 20. pag. 163, 164.*

Though I make no doubt but our Divines at *Dort* knew this to be *Auguſtine*'s profeſſed judgment, yet in their *Judic. de Perſever.* I find three Sentences cited by them out of *Auguſtine*, as making for the contrary, by which I ſuppoſe they intended to prove him doubtful or wavering. But 1. Three doubtful paſſages as to the ſenſe, are not to be ſet againſt a mans open frequently profeſſed judgment, thus expounded and followed by all his Diſciples. 2. Let us examine the Texts. 1. The laſt of the three is *de Correp. & Grat. cap. 9.* But though *Davenant* be that Divine whom I honour for judgment above all, or almoſt all ſince the Apoſtles days; yet I muſt ſay that in this they all dealt very negligently or partially: For in that place *Auguſtine* profeſſedly diſtinguiſheth of *ſons* of God, predeſtinate and not predeſtinate: and ſaith, [*Nec nos moveat quod* filiis ſuis *quibuſdam Deus non dat iſtam perſeverantiam. Abſit enim ut ita eſſet ſi de illis prædeſtinatis eſſent,*

* Yea and *Bradwardine* who ſpeaketh more harſhly than *Alvarez*, and yet aſſerteth falling away from true Grace, though not Predeſtination, or Gods Will to ſave. And *Janſenius*, *To. 1. li. 5. c. 22, 23. p. 126, 127, 128.* proveth that the difference between *Auguſtine* and *Pelagius* lay not about free Pardon, or infuſed habits of Grace, which *Pelagius* confeſſed (though many charge him with the contrary, who underſtand him not.) But that *Pelagius* confeſſed not the neceſſity of that actual *Adjutorium Gratiæ ſpecialis* to keep us from future ſin, and to do our duty, beſides pardon of former Sin and infuſed habitual Grace. By which it appeareth that *Auguſtine* and he agreed, that Remiſſion of Sin and infuſed habits may be loſt; and that *Auguſtine* laid perſeverance upon Gods Will or Election, and his actual help or *adjutorium conſervans.*

& ſecundum propoſitum vocatis, qui vere ſunt filii promiſſionis. Nam iſti cum pie vivunt dicuntur filii Dei: ſed quoniam victuri ſunt impiè & in eadem impietate morituri, non eos dicit filios Dei præſcientia Dei. And expounding *ex nobis exierunt ſed non erant ex nobis*, &c. *ait*, [*Quid aliud dicunt, niſi non erant filii etiam quando erant in profeſſione & nomine filiorum? Non quia juſtitiam ſimulaverunt; ſed quia in ea non permanſerunt. Neq; enim ait, nam ſi fuiſſent ex nobis, veram non fictam juſtitiam tenuiſſent, utiq; nobiſcum: ſed ſi fuiſſent ex nobis, permaniſſent utiq; nobiſcum. In bono illos volebat proculdubio manere: Erant itaq; in bono, ſed quia in eo non permanſerunt-----non erant ex nobis---non erant ex numero filiorum. ---Nam non perit filius promiſſionis, ſed filius perditionis. ---Filiis ſuis non prædeſtinatis Deus perſeverantiam non dedit.---Et rurſus quos dicimus inimicos ejus, vel parvulos filios inimicorum ejus, quoſcunq; eorum ſic regeneraturus eſt, ut* in ea fide quæ per dilectionem operatur, hanc vitam finiant, *jam & antequam hoc fiat, in illa prædeſtinatione ſunt filii ejus; & dati ſunt Chriſto filio ejus, ut non pereant, ſed habeant vitam æternam.---Quia ergo non habuerunt perſeverantiam, ſicut non vere Diſcipuli Chriſti, ita non vere filii Dei fuerunt, etiam quando eſſe videbantur & ita vocabantur.---Apud eum hoc non ſunt, cui notum eſt quod futuri ſunt, id eſt, ex bonis mali. Propter hoc Apoſtolus cum dixiſſet,* ſcimus quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia co-operantur in bonum, *ſciens nonnullos diligere Deum & in eo bono uſq; in finem non permanere, mox addit*, His qui ſecundum propoſitum vocati ſunt, *&c, vid. reliqua.*

Now the words which our Divines cite are theſe afore-cited, which ſay, *They were not the Sons of God that fell away.* When nothing can be plainlier uttered by the pen of man, I think, than that *Auguſtine* affirmeth them to be Sons as to their *ſincerity of Faith which worketh by love*, but not to be Sons by predeſtination; And that not all that are *ſincere in Faith and Love* are Sons in the moſt eminent ſenſe, but that part of them who are predeſtinated to perſeverance and the inheritance; and that nothing but *predeſtination* and *perſeverance* was wanting to their Salvation. He that doubteth whether this was *Auguſtine's* ſenſe, when he hath read him, may doubt of almoſt any thing which he is unwilling to believe.

The next Text is cited as *Cont. Adult*; (I ſuppoſe they mean *Adverſarios*, and it's falſe printed,) *Legis et Prophet. l.* 2. *c.* 2. But I can there find nothing of any ſuch Subject, much leſs ſenſe.

The only Text therefore of all cited by them out of *Auguſtine* remaineth, which giveth any ſhew of favour to their *Theſes*, and that is cited *contra Julian. Pelag. l.* 5. *c.* 3. In *cap.* 4. I find the words, *viz.* [*Iſtorum (reproborum) neminem adducit Deus ad pœnitentiam ſalubrem et ſpiritualem qua homo in Chriſto reconciliatur Deo.*] This is all that I find dubious in him. Now whether theſe few words better declare his judgment than whole Chapters and Diſcourſes, you may judge? And whether the conſtant tenour of his Doctrine do not direct us to conclude that this is here his ſenſe, *viz.* that he calleth that *pœnitentiam ſalubrem*, which effectually bringeth men to Salvation, and which endureth to the end (as ſuch.) And by [*a man in Chriſt*] means not as aforeſaid [*a man given to Chriſt with a decree to ſave him*]; and by [*reconciliatur Deo*] he mean not one that is ſo reconciled as to be a predeſtinate Son, decreed to Glory. Hiſtorical Truth muſt not be denied, nor doth doctrinal Truth need hiſtorical falſhood for its defence, nor can agree with it.

This undoubtedly was *Auguſtin*'s mind.

Only one more Text they cite out of *Ambroſe de Jacob & vita beata*, li. 1. cap. 6.

But *Ambroſe* is of his Diſciple (*Auguſtine*'s) mind: The words are, *Quis audeat accuſare quos electos divino cernis judicio? Nunquid Deus Pater ipſe qui contulit, poteſt dona ſua reſcindere, & quos adoptione ſuſcepit, eos a paterni affectus gratia relegare.* But 1. There *Ambroſe* expreſly ſpeaketh of the *Elect only*. 2. And if he had not, ſuch words as theſe are uſualy ſpoken by the Fathers, who aſſert *falling away*; meaning that *God will not* reverſe or reſcind his Grace; if you caſt it not away: As *Proſper* ſaith, *God forſaketh none that do not firſt forſake him.*

If any man would ſee more of *Auguſtine*'s judgment, the many Sentences cited by me in my *Tract. Of Perſeverance*, pag. 5, 6, 7. and all thoſe cited by *Voſſius Hiſtor. Pelag. li. 5. pag.* 559, 560, 561, &c. may eaſily put him paſt all doubt. See alſo *VOSSIUS*, *ibid. pag.* 563, 564. citing more of *PROSPER* to the ſame ſenſe.

That all the Fathers before *Auguſtine* were for uncertainty of Salvation, and falling away (*de facto*) of ſome that were in a ſtate of true Grace and Juſtification, in which had they died they had been ſaved, this great Hiſtorian throughly verſed in the Fathers, *ibid. pag.* 565, 566, 567. *& pluribus ſequent.* ſheweth. For brevity, if you doubt, turn to theſe cited places, *Irenæus*, *li.* 4. *cap.* 72. *Juſtin. Martyr. Dial. cum Tryphon. pag.* 206, 207. *Clemens Alex. Strom. li.* 2. *pag.* 162, 166. *Baſil. Homil. in* Pſal. 114. *& & homil. in Princip. Prov. Origen.* περὶ ἀρχ. *li.* 1. *cap.* 3. 13. *ad Rom. li.* 7. *cap.* 8. *Macarius Homil.* 14. 15. 24. 26. 28. *Athanaſ. Contr. Arian. Orat.* 4. *Greg. Nazian. Orat.* 40. *de Baptiſ. Cryſoſt. in Joh.* 1. *Hom.* 1. *& Epiſt.* 5. *& Homil.* 77. *ad Antioch.* (*ut vulgo*). Et *ex Latinis Tertullian. li. adverſ. hæreſ. cap.* 3. *& li. de pœnit. cap.* 6. *Cyprian. de unitate Eccleſ. cap.* 12. *& li.* 1. *Epiſt.* 7. *ad Rogat. & li.* 4. *Epiſt.* 7. *ad Mag. Ambroſ.* (*ut vulgo*) *in Rom. cap.* 9. *Chrysoſt. in Mat.* 5. Beſides thoſe after *Pelagius*, cited by *Voſſius*, *ibid. pag.* 567, &c. Among whom *Bernard* is large and earneſt againſt poſſibility and convenience of PERSEVERANCE and SALVATION.

Voſſius in his *Theſ.* 12. ſaith thus of thoſe that will deny this to be the ancients Opinion, [*Quid quod Antiquitas tota indefectibilitati adverſatur, nec quemquam quantum meminiſſe valemus, veterum invenire eſt qui fideles omnes omnimodam de perſeverantia ſui certitudinem habere arbitraretur. Fatentur quidem animos filiorum Dei dubitationis anxietate cruciari non debere cum ſpei fiduciam habeant, qua ſufficienti conſolatione, et lapſuros ſuſtinet et lapſos levet; At nihilominus negant poſſe quemvis exinde quod impræſentiarum fidelium ſe in numero eſſe ſciat, tantum ſibi de reliquo vitæ tempore favorem Dei certo polliceri*, &c.----*vid. cætera. Et addit* [*Communem fuiſſe antiquitatis ſententiam quam diximus, ſoli hodie negare poſſunt, qui cætera fortaſſe viri ſunt non inerruditi, ſed in antiquitate tamen plane ſunt hoſpites: vel animum habent unius et alterius ſententiis ita mancipatum, ut eorum oculis videre malint quam ſuis cumq; iis errare præoptent quam cum aliis bene ſentire.*

278. As I have cited this unanimous conſent of the Ancients only to prove that all that have the profeſſion of Chriſtianity and Charity ſhould be far from thinking this an intollerable error which may not ſtand with brotherly love and peace, ſo to the ſame end only I ſhall tell you, that not only Calviniſts have born herein with Lutherans, but alſo among the *Reformed* ſome have been of *Auguſtine*'s mind in this, whom yet the reſt very highly honoured. I will now inſtance only in *Muſculus*, than whom few have been eſteemed more *ſincere*, impartial and ſound in judgment. In his *Loc. Commun.* (for their great eſteem tranſlated into *Engliſh*) *C. de Remiſſ. peccat. §. 6. pag. (mihi)* 621, 622, 623. he ſaith [*Diſcernendum eſt inter eam gratiam Dei quæ nullas habet adjectas conditiones: qualis eſt quod ſolem ſuum producit ſuper bonos & malos, pluitque ſuper gratos & ingratos: & eam quæ conditionaliter confertur; ad quem modum Peccatorum remiſſio nobis contingit. Poſterior hæc licet in Deo ſit conſtans & firma (non enim ille mutatur ut homo) noſtro tamen vitio irrita redditur, dum conditionibus illius non ſtamus----Siquis igitur præterritorum peccatorum condonationem per gratiam Divinæ Clementiæ conſequutus, uſque adeo ingratus, & ſalutis ſuæ negligens evaſerit, ut inſtar canis ad vomitum reverſus, cæptam reſipiſcentiam rumpat palamq; oſtendat Deum ſe contemnere magis quam timere; plane dignum ſe eſſe declarat a quo præterritorum peccatorum a quibus fuerat abſolutus, pœnæ exigantur.---Hactenus igitur fieri poteſt, & merito accidit, ut ſemel accepta gratia reddatur irrita: Verum non debetur hoc Divinæ Clementiæ inſtabilitatis quæ locum in Deo non habet; ſed noſtræ pravitati----Poſſet mihi objici hoc loco, relapſum ejuſmodi per quem peccata ſemel remiſſa reddantur irrita, locum in electis habere non poſſe; immo ne in reprobis quidem; quod illi remiſſionis peccatorum, capaces eſſe nequeant, eo quod vera & viva fide per quam illa acquiritur, præditi non ſint; ideoque neminem eſſe prorſus, in quo peccata ſemel remiſſa irrita fieri poſſint. Verum eos qui hoc argumento ducuntur moneo, ut de reprobis quod dicunt diligentius perpendant; De Electis conſentio: De reprobis vero nulla ne illis unquam peccatorum remiſſio contingat, diſputari poſſe intelligo. Dantur illis in Ep. ad Hebr. 6. illuminatio per Chriſtum, guſtus doni cœleſtis, participatio Spiritus Sancti, guſtus item boni Dei verbi, ac virtutum futuri ſæculi; & cap. 10. Sanctificatio quæ eſt per ſanguinem Teſtamenti, & Spiritus gratiæ. Et 2 Pet. 2. Comparantur ſui, quæ ubi lota fuit, rurſus in cœno volutatur. Quomodo hæc illis ſine omni peccatorum remiſſione contingere poſſint, non immerito quæri poteſt in hac cauſa.*]

279. But *Alvarez* telleth us (*l. 10. de Auxil. Diſp. 104. pag. 419. §. 1.*) of ſome who hold that there is a Grace of *Confirmation* diſtinguiſhed only by the degree of the ſame helps, which none can fall away from; and that a *confirmed ſtate* is never loſt, is ordinarily held by the Dominicans, though they agree not what this *confirming Grace* is: And many of the Jeſuites confeſs ſuch a ſtate of *Confirmation*, making men impeccable as to *Mortal ſin*. So that ſome are *in ſtatu* and not only in *decreto*, ſecured from Apoſtacy, moſt confeſs.

280. And *Voſſius ubi ſupra* copiouſly laboureth to prove that the Ancients held three degrees of true Grace: One which men might fall from eaſily, and oft did, though if they had dyed in it they had been ſaved: Another which men may loſe as to the act at leaſt, but ſcarcely as to all ſeeds and habits. And another ſtate next to perfection, which none ſhall loſe. I refer the Reader to his Collections, though I do not clearly perceive by them, that many had ſuch diſtinctions of Believers: But the *weak* and the *ſtrong* or *confirmed* all diſtinguiſh.

281. But

281. But the other ſide had need as much to be perſwaded to pacifick moderation in their cenſures: And firſt, They ſay, that *it is an intolerable opinion which is confeſſedly contrary to all the ancienteſt Churches of Chriſt:* And by *Vincent. Lerinenſ.* rule, (*quod ab omnibus, ubique & ſemper*) ſuch ſingularity or novelty muſt be hereſie, or certain error at the leaſt. I anſwer, 1. They that aſſert this *certain perſeverance* of all the juſtified, do believe that the Churches planted by the Apoſtles, were of their mind; which they gather from the Scripture. 2. The foreſaid Rule holdeth indeed in things ſo univerſally received as *Eſſentials of Religion*, and *Neceſſary* Articles of Faith and Practice, without which men cannot be *ſaved*; But *Univerſality* of *Conſent* in a doubtful or *unneceſſary* opinion, or practice, may poſſibly be erroneous, and may oft lawfully be deſerted. It was once (and beyond the inveſtigation of its original) the practice of the Univerſal Church, that there ſhould be no Adoration by Genuflexion on any Lords Day, or on any Week day between *Eaſter* and *Whitſunday:* And this commanded in the Great Council of *Nice*, and the Canons of *Trull:* And yet the Papiſts themſelves have now forſaken it. To diſtinguiſh as is uſual, between ſuch *Canons of Practice*, and points of *meer doctrine*, and to make conſent of Antiquity more obligatory in the latter, is but vanity. For where a point of Practice is founded in an *oportet* or ſuppoſition of Divine or Apoſtolical authority, it muſt needs be at leaſt as obligatory as a meer Doctrinal ſo founded. For all *Precepts* include *Doctrines*, and all *Obedience* includeth *Faith*; Though all *Doctrine* be not *Preceptive*, nor all *Belief* for *immediate practice*. For every Divine Precept includeth this aſſertion [*This God commandeth*]. And that God commandeth it, is *de fide*; and then it muſt be *obeyed* for *Gods Authority*, as it is firſt *believed* for his *Veracity*. All therefore that can be ſaid is, that this *practice* was not taken to be by a *Divine univerſal Law*, unchangeable; but by univerſal Cuſtom of the Church: And ſo may there be a conſent in unneceſſary and queſtionable Doctrinals (as there hath been for the peripatetick Philoſophy almoſt). The opinions of the *Souls corporeity*, of the *Millennium*, of the *luſt* of *Demons*, that there were no *Antipodes*, (to ſay nothing of ſome that *Auguſtine* oppoſed) were little leſs than univerſally owned of ſome ages: And I doubt many *Texts* of *Scripture*, for want of perfect Tranſlations, and skill in the original Tongues, were *univerſally miſinterpreted*.

282. And the common objection which maketh the greateſt noiſe is a meer injurious pieviſh cavil or ſlander; *viz.* when they ſay [*You lead men to all wickedneſs, by teaching, that let them commit never ſuch heinous Sin, they are ſure that they cannot fall from Grace, nor loſe their Juſtification.*] For it's commonly acknowledged, that if any man ſhould fall into a ſtate of Sin inconſiſtent, with the love of God, he would loſe his juſtification and right to Heaven, and that without any change in God. And they conſtantly hold that Gods decree *de fine & mediis* is *one*, and that he decreeth of his Elect, that [*They ſhall perſevere in love and holineſs, and be ſaved;*] and not that they ſhall be ſaved whether they perſevere in holineſs or not: And that they are no ſurer to be ſaved, than they are to perſevere in holineſs.

SECT.

SECT. XIX.

Of Mortal Sin, or what Sin will not ſtand with Saving Grace.

283. But as to the queſtion, *How great the Sin muſt be which is inconſiſtent with true love to God, or holineſs?* that belongeth to the Controverſie about *Mortal* and *Venial* Sin: where the difficulty is as great to one ſide as another: ſo great, that not only Pious *Gerſon*, but many another have confeſſed it too hard for them well to ſolve.

284. In general, It is certain that all Sin is ſo far Mortal as to *deſerve Death* according to the *Law of Nature* and *Innocency*, and ſo far as to make us need a pardon: Though not ſo far as to be inconſiſtent with ſpiritual life and juſtification, and right to Glory, and to make damnation due to us according to the *Law of Grace*. And Proteſtants confeſs the diſtinction of *Mortal* and *Venial* Sin, under the name of *Wickedneſs*, or *Reigning Sin*, and *Sin of Infirmity* in this ſence; that *Mortal Sin* is that which is inconſiſtent with true Faith, Repentance, Love, Juſtification and right to life, and is never pardoned till the perſon be changed by true converſion: But *Venial Sin* or *Infirmity* is that which conſiſteth with all theſe aforeſaid, and is preſently pardoned by the Covenant of Grace, upon the *actual* or habitual Repentance or hatred of it in the Sinners.

Vid. *Le Blanc de Pecc. Mort. & Ven.* & 2 *Diſp.*

Vid. *Rob. Baronim de Peccat Mort. & Ven.* The beſt I know on the Subject.

Vid. *Epiſcopii Reſp. ad Quæſt.* 64. *q.* 18. *pag.* 19.

285. It is certain that the interruption of the *Act* of *Divine Love*, will not prove a Sin to be Mortal. For though I deteſt ſuch concluſions as the Janſeniſt gathereth from the Jeſuites Morals, that *loving God once or twice in a man's life*, or *once a month*, *may ſave him*, yet it is certain that the love of God is not always notably acted by any: It is interrupted in our ſleep, and in common ſtudies and buſineſſes which take up the whole man; And therefore if a Sin (as ſinful ſtudy) interrupt it, that will not prove it a Mortal ſin.

286. And it is certain that a ſin is not therefore *Mortal* becauſe it *diminiſheth* the *Habit* of *Love*. For that may be in thoſe that ſtill are the juſtified Children of God.

287. There are two *Degrees* of *Mortality* in Sin, as our Divines at *Dort* do more than intimate (and thoſe of *Breme* there): The one is, when ſin putteth a man into the ſame ſtate, as to the *Love of God*, which he or any other was in, in the *next degree* before true Juſtification, or Sanctification or Converſion: which is when the *Habit* of *Divine Love*, and all other ſaving Grace is ſo far loſt, as that *Habitually* the *Creature is more loved than the Creator*: If any do fall thus far (which is the controverſie) then it's granted that their Juſtification, Adoption and right to Heaven, is loſt. But while God is habitually deareſt to the Soul, and Sin is habitually more hated than loved, there ſin is *habitually repented of*; And for my part I do not think that perſon is unjuſtified, or ſhould be damned if he ſo dyed.

Davenant *de Juſtit. Actuali, cap.* 35. Saith that Sin may be called Mortal in three degrees. 1. Becauſe it is never pardoned, as the Blaſphemy of the Holy Ghoſt. 2. Thoſe which bring *novum reatum mortis ſed remiſſibilem* upon repentance. And ſuch he maketh all ſuch groſs Sin acted as is mentioned, 1 *Cor.* 6. and *Gal.* 5. which be they that the Papiſts call Mortal Sin. 3. The daily infirmities of the faithful, which in rigour of Juſtice deſerve death, but are pardoned by Grace.

288. And I believe that this was the caſe of *David* and *Peter*: And its very improbable that they loſt the very habits of love to God, and hatred of Sin.

289. The other degree of Mortality, the ſaid Divines take to be ſome heinous Act of Sin like *David*'s or *Peter*'s, which deſtroyeth not the habit, but is ſo great, that the perſon, though he loſe not his *fundamental*

That Grace and Mortal Sin (*habitual privative &c. Caietan Sum. Theol. 2. 2. qu. 24. &c.*)

mental Right, yet is put into an *immediate ineptitude* and incapacity of Heaven, and his Right so suspended, as that he cannot have possession till that *obex* be removed by true repentance.

290. If you ask them whether that man shall go to Heaven or Hell if he so die; they tell you that it is not to be supposed; for God hath decreed that he shall not so die, but shall repent (which *Austin* will say of all the Elect) and sometime he half dreamed of Purgatory for some such.)

291. The true reason why such a heinous sin must be *actually Repented* of before full pardon and capacity for Heaven, and the true note to know what sins must have such actual Repentance (and so are thus far Mortal) is this; there are some Sins so easily known to be Sins, and so notoriously calling the Conscience to Repent, that to lye in them unrepented of long (when the sudden violent temptation and passion is over, and a man hath opportunity to act according to his setled habits) will not consist with the truth of such a *Habit of love and holiness*, and of *hatred* of Sin: So that though *necessitate præcepti* the *Act* of Repentance be as necessary as the *Habit*, yet *necessitate medii ad salutem* it is the *Habit* that is *absolutely necessary in se*, and the act so far as the absence of it cannot stand with such a habit. This is my judgment of this difficult case: He that can open it better, deserveth all our thanks.

But here the difficulty is exceeding great, what love to God that is which mortal Sin or ungodliness is inconsistent with: or by which a man may know that he hath saving Grace. I have contented my self hitherto with saying that It is a *loving God above all*: But that is still dark and short of satisfaction: *Adrian* (after Pope 6.) *Quolib.* 7. *q.* 3. 4. *fol.* 45, 46. hath called me to distincter thoughts. He concludeth, 1. *A man that loveth a friend less than himself, may yet Sin mortally for that friend.* (But that is no wonder, because, 1. He loveth his friend and self more than God. 2. And thinketh that he hurteth not himself so much as he profiteth his friend by Sin) 2. He inferreth that a *Mortal Sinner doth not always love the Creature more than God; because he that loveth himself more may Sin mortally in love to his friend: For as a man may love himself more than the sole end for which he sinneth: So he may love God more.*

Ans. I suppose it is mis-printed, for the sence should be [*He may love God more*]. But, 1. I doubt of the antecedent: That Sinner *loveth himself* as the *End* of his sinning for his friend: For it is to gratifie that proud or selfish humour by which he loveth his friend for the *Likeness, Love* or *Usefulness* of that friend to *himself*; and so his love is finally *for* or *to himself*. 2. When he sinneth he doth not practically think that the hurt to himself or the wrong to God is so great an evil, as the pleasure of Sin is good.

But his instance more poseth me; *viz.* that *a mortal Sinner* (or *ungodly man*) may *choose rather to be annihilated, and his friend too, than Christ should be blasphemed by all the world, or than God* (per impossibile) *should perish, or lose his Omnipotency*, &c. (for some *Romans* dyed for their Countrys): Therefore he concludeth, that *Thus to love God above ourselves or all, is not enough to Salvation; but we must also love God above all ut finem ultimum & qui sit ratio & mensura diligendi cætera; Ita*, viz. *quod Omnia referat homo in Deum, nolitq; amare nisi quantum Deo placuerit, & eadem velit abdicare & perdere ut satisfaciat divino beneplacito & Sanctæ ejus voluntati, ut sit ei quantum ad amorem liberum attinet Deus omnia in omnibus, & dicat, vivo jam; non ego, sed Christus vivet in me*; against it, He must not only so love God as that he would die rather than God should

ſhould die or ſuffer (were it poſſible); but ſo as to love him as the end of all our lives, and to *love* the *pleaſing* of his *bleſſed Will* in the *glorifying* of *him*, *better than all things that can ſtand* in any competition:] And I think this to be a neceſſary truth: I dare not ſay that every man is Godly that had rather die than God, or the Sun, or the Earth, or his Country ſhould periſh. God's *Being* is not, as *ſuch*, our *End:* But his *Will* (or his *Eſſence* as it is his *Will*) is the *Beginning*, *Governour*, and *End of all*; And it is the *Pleaſing of this Will of God* (*in the Glory of our holineſs and obedience*, in which his holineſs and other perfections are reſplendent) which muſt be loved above all. As a man may chooſe to die, or at leaſt loſe all that he hath, rather than his Father ſhould *die* or be for ever tormented; and yet will not forbear fornication and drunkenneſs to pleaſe his Father's will; becauſe he practically thinketh that the bare diſpleaſing of his Father doth not ſo much hurt him, as his ſinful pleaſure doth himſelf good; ſo is it in the preſent caſe. (And I may add that, God is not loved as God, that is, as perfectly holy and juſt in governing the world and him, by any bad man: But as he is the God and Preſerver of Nature, Nature may love him; but not as he is a moſt holy Governour) which is eſſential to the Relative notion of our God.

He concludeth therefore truly [*That this true ſort of Love to God doth put us in a ſtate of Salvation, and Mortal Sin conſiſteth not with it.*]

But I agree not with him of the *Impoſſibility* of being *certain* that we have this Love, though I think his words worth the reciting to prove the *difficulty* of it: *fol.* 47. N. O. P. [*Dico quod licet poſſit probabilem conjecturam habere, quod actus ille dilectionis inſit; non tamen poteſt evidenter cognoſcere & pro certo: Quomodo enim ſcire poterit, quod ita Deo ſe totum infundit propter ſe*, i. e. *bonitatem & Sanctitatem ejus, ut nec Vitam æternam niſi in Deo & propter Deum diligat? animo paratus, & efficaciter volens, omnia & ſeipſum & alia, quum Deo placebit perdere, ut impleatur Sancta voluntas Dei? Quod etiam nulli creaturæ nec ipſiſbi libero aliquo amore adhæret in ſe in Deo & propter Deum; Quæ voluntas multo eſt purior & laudabilior quam voluntas perferendi pro Chriſto Martyrium pro ſpe aſſequendi vitam æternam. Et certe longe aliud eſt optare aut Velle, quam ſic Deum amare, & de facto ſic affectum eſſe, & ſic efficaciter velle, ſicut opto & deſidero efficax Velle Scientiæ, ſeu ad ſcientiam: Sed ubi efficaciter id vellem, manum ad aratrum mittens, labori, vigiliis & id genus operis non parcerem----Si ponatur per Revelationem certiorari, non nego ſic certum fieri poſſe----Nec expedit hominem niſi valde ſciens & doctus fuerit de his multum ſe tentare, quoniam difficilimum eſt proprias affectiones metiri.*

But ſure theſe fruits grow not on any common ſtock, and the Heirs of Heaven and Hell are not ſo like as to be undiſcernable, nor Gods promiſes ſuch as no man can be ſure that he hath a right to them. It is enough that theſe things do prove aſſurance difficult and rare.

SECT. XX.

What Repentance for particular Sins is neceſſary to pardon.

292. But the very Act of Repentance hath ſuch various degrees, that thoſe alſo here deſerve our conſideration. For he that hath the *habit of holineſs* no doubt hath ſome degree of *Repentance* ſecretly ſtirring in him before it cometh to *deep repentance*, and *open confeſſion*; I do not think that *David* was without *all remorſe* and *repentance* till *Nathan* ſpake to him, though his Repentance was not ſuch as the quality of his ſin required. And it is not every remorſe nor every degree of Repentance which is ſufficient to prove a Soul ſanctified, that is, habitually poſſeſſed with that love of God, and the hatred of Sin. And ſuch at leaſt the act muſt be.

293. In groſs known Sin, Repentance is not true unleſs it contain a *Reſolution preſently* to *forſake* it. He that is *unreſolved*, though he have much remorſe and trouble of mind, is not truly penitent: Nor he that is reſolved only to forſake it *ſometime hereafter*, or when he hath ſinned once more, but not at the preſent.

294. And as this is true of *actual Repentance*, ſo a true Habit muſt be ſuch as is the *Habit of ſuch acts*: even a habitual *love to preſent holineſs*, and a habitual *hatred to preſent Sin*; which in the courſe of our lives doth actually reſolve us and preſerve us, however a violent temptation do interrupt that courſe.

295. But whether every known Sin of the ſmalleſt ſort in it ſelf, have always ſuch Reſolutions of preſent forſaking it in all that are truly *penitent*, is a harder queſtion. Many a godly man is frequently angry ſinfully, and ſluggiſh ſinfully, and daily uſeth ſome idle words, and ungoverned and idle thoughts, and is ſinfully remiſs in the degrees of every duty, and knoweth all this to be Sin: And if he *reſolved preſently* to do ſo no more, he would not do ſo again ſo frequently as he doth. In ſuch a caſe it is exceeding hard to judge of a man's repentance: And yet alas, whoſe caſe is it not? we have a *diſlike* of the Sin, and a *wiſh* that we were delivered from it: But that is but a *deſire* that we *loved it leſs*, and *hated it more*; and proveth not that our hatred is ſufficient. For many a man that liveth in groſs Sin, doth wiſh that his heart *were turned* from it, and did not love it, when *it is not ſo turned*. And why will the ſame wiſh then ſerve about leſſer Sins? And yet if *preſent Reſolution againſt every ſmall Sin* be neceſſary to pardon (even of *known* Sins) alas, who is pardoned?

When *Petavius* out of *Aquin. Elench. Ther. Vincent. c.* 27. *p.* 109, &c. Diſtinguiſheth *Peccatum a Culpa*, and ſaith that all *Sin*, is not *Culpa*, it is but a trifling with an equivocal or analogical ſence of *Peccatum*: And his citation of *Auguſtine* there is upon a miſinterpretation; which the Reader may eaſily perceive.

296. And if the caſe muſt be reſolved by the *material magnitude* or *ſmallneſs* of the Sin, what bounds ſhall we ever be able to aſſign, and what underſtanding is able to diſtinguiſh between the Sin *ſo great* which muſt be *preſently reſolved* againſt *ex neceſſitate medii* to pardon, and the *Sin* ſo *ſmall* as may be pardoned without ſuch Reſolution? whether in ſpeech every idle word be ſuch? If not, whether every idle jeaſt, or every laſcivious word? or paſſionate word? or backbiting word (the ordinary Sin of many ſtrict Profeſſors) or every ſinful Oath, or Curſe, or Slander? who can ſay, it is this, and not that? And ſo in all commiſſions and omiſſions?

297. And it will ſtill remain exceeding difficult *what Reſolutions againſt Sin* will prove true Repentance: For as many a child under correction, ſo many an adult Sinner on his Sick bed, or under a terrifying Sermon, or conviction, not only *ſeemeth*, but doubtleſs *is*, as *paſſionately reſolved* at the preſent to forſake his Sin, as a Godly man is, if not more: and yet quickly loſeth all that Reſolution, and liveth in the Sin which he reſolved to forſake.

298. By this it would ſeem that it is not *true Reſolution* which cauſeth not the ordinary *forſaking of the Sin*. For to *Reſolve* to day, and Sin to morrow, is but to play with Sin, and not to repent or mortifie it. And yet if *actual forſaking* be neceſſary (of *All* Sin) who then is penitent or can be ſaved. For there is no man that doth good, and ſinneth not: And *in many things we offend all*. Who leaveth all the *idle thoughts*, and *words*, and *negligence*, &c. which he *knoweth* to be Sin? And the *moſt underſtanding* men then would be very hardly ſaved, who *know* almoſt all Sin, in compariſon of the ignorant, who know it not? Jam. 3. 2.

299. And yet no doubt, thoſe Sins which are *materially ſmall*, may have ſuch *circumſtances*, as may make them more malignant than ſome greater in the matter: As when they are committed through malignant contrivances and ends, or in groſs contempt, or negligence. So that this alſo maketh the deciſion of the caſe more difficult.

300. And it will be hard, not only to know which and how great the Sins muſt be which are unpardoned if lived in without forſaking, or without reſolving to forſake them preſently if *known*; but alſo *how great*, and *what* Sins *unknown* may ſtand with ſaving Grace. For ſurely if men ſhould *ignorantly* reproach or reject God, or Chriſt, or the Holy Ghoſt, or live in Murder, Adultery, Perjury, *&c.* not knowing them to be Sins, this would not ſtand with ſaving Grace: And yet to live in *ſome unknown Sin* may.

301. And it is as hard to know *how oft* a *groſs Sin* may be *committed* in conſiſtence with true habitual Grace? And how oft the *Reſolution* of the *will* may *change*, without the loſs of holy habits. The tempter will ſay to *David* or *Peter*, *If once, why not twice?* If twice why not thrice? And who but God can ſay, juſt how oft? And yet to ſet no *bounds* confoundeth the juſt and unjuſt, good and bad, and maketh Sanctification but a name. And to ſay that *Peter*'s Faith did totally fail, or that he was holy deprived of wholly love, or ſaving Grace, is raſh and an unlikely thing.

302. And it muſt be remembred that the *Will* is always in the time of ſinning, more for the committing the Sin, than againſt it, actually, or elſe it would not be committed; And in omiſſions, it is not prevalently for the Duty; elſe it would be done. And if it were *Habitually* ſo too, as to a holy or a ſinful life, the perſon were unholy. And when the will (known by the practice) is ſometime actually more for a groſs Sin than againſt it, and daily actually more for ſome *ſmall* Sins than againſt them, it is wonderous hard here to diſcern certainly that the contrary habit is our ſtate.

303. And it addeth to the difficulty, that it is hard to be ſure whether the *Habit of Love and Holineſs* may not be *predominant*, and yet the *very Habit* of *ſome one Sin* (as well as the act) be ſtronger than the *contrary habit*: For a daily uſe of the acts ſeemeth to prove a *prevalent Habit*. As a Habit of Anger, of vain jeaſting, *&c.* And if a very *Habit* of one Sin may be *prevalent*, though not of all *others*, it will be

hard to ſay either how *great* that Sin may be (and ſo whether a *Habit* of *Luſt*, of *Pride*, of *Covetouſneſs*, may ſtand with Grace, in that prevalency) or yet, how *many* Sins may be ſo *habitually prevalent*, in a ſanctified man. But if *no one*, what ſhall thoſe think of themſelves that live in the daily act of ſmaller Sins before-mentioned? And that they erre who tell us that all Sin is *equally mortified in the Habit*, common experience fully proveth. But ſuch men uſe not to diſtinguiſh between the *General habit of Love to Good and Hatred to evil* (which is as the trunk of the Tree to the branches (which may have their particular Cankers and Diſeaſes) and is indeed *Virtually* a Habit of all Good, and againſt all Evil); and the *particular Habits* of *Good* and *Evil* which are alſo found in every Soul.

304. Yea the difficulty is yet greater, by our ignorance of the very *nature* of a *Habit* of the *will*, or of that *Inclination* of it to *Good* or *Evil* which is antecedent to the Act: which, he that hath read the Schoolmen and Metaphyſicks, or ever well ſtudyed it himſelf, will diſcern to be *tantum non* out of the reach of our underſtandings. That it is a *Diſpoſitive promptitude to Act*, we feel: But whether that Diſpoſition be it ſelf a *ſecret unobſerved Immanent Act*, diſpoſing to the more open *perceptible Act*; (for the Soul is never out of Action, and certainly hath at one inſtant ſeveral Acts, of which that *de fine* is oft unobſerved, and yet moſt powerful? As a Traveller that is taken up with other thoughts and talk would never hold on his way if the end were not actually intended, though he feel it not); or whether it be the *Natural Inclination of the Will corroborated?* and what that *Inclination is?* whether it lie much in a Receptive diſpoſition of the acted faculties, by which they are ſtill ready to receive the Active motion of the Agent power; as the Receptivity of the fuel cauſeth the greatneſs and conſtancy of a flame; or the opening of the window, the ſhining in of the Sun, or the compoſition of the adapted wheels, cauſeth the Clock or Watch to be eaſily and truly moved by the poiſe or ſpring; or what elſe it is that we call a Habit, is not ſo eaſily known as unſtudied confident Diſputers think: So that judicious Mr. *Truman* (*Tract. of Impaten. Nat. & Mor.*) ſeemed to deſpair of clear underſtanding it.

And whether an *Infants Principle* of *Holineſs*, be *Quid morale*, which never came from any act, nor is the *particular Habit* of any act, any more than the *Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum qua bonum?* with abundance of other difficulties about Habits; Theſe all make our caſe the harder to be reſolved.

SECT. XXI.

The ſolution of all the former difficulties, in part.

305. Of all theſe difficulties, I have no better ſolution (beſides what is aforeſaid) than as followeth. 1. That a *Diſpoſitive Inclination of the Will to God and actual Holineſs*, is like to the *Inclinatio naturalis ad bonum & fœlicitatem*, ſaving that it is not ours *ab origine* in our lapſed ſtate, and that it is more moveable and ſeparable from the Soul; And ſo is *quiddam naturæ* though not *quædam natura*, called, *The Divine and new nature in us*; and is to the Soul what *Health* is to the man; And is the great *Moral Principle* within us; and is acceptable to God as being the

the *Rectitude* of his noble creature, * and virtually containing all good actions; and being the operation of the Spirit, by which he is said to *dwell* in believers.

306. 2. That this *Rectitude* or *Holy Nature* is first and radically active, in our *Complacency* or *Displicency*, *Love* or *Hatred*; And that what a man *Habitually loveth*, that his *Will* is habitually inclined to: And against that which he *habitually hateth*.

307. 3. That yet in *acting*, this inclination worketh freely, and always is *specified* by the conduct of the *Intellect*, which must tell us what is Good and Evil, Amiable and Hateful.

308. 4. That Love and Hatred being practical Habits, do ever engage the *will* in such *Practical Resolutions*, as are answerable to their nature and degree.

309. 5. That no *Resolution* will prove *Holy Love and Inclination*, but that which is *fixed* as proceeding from a fixed principle, which is like a *new Nature* in us.

310. 6. That this Resolution is first *de fine*: The Soul *loving God* and its *own felicity* in his *eternal Love and Glory*, is first *firmly Resolved* to adhere to God, and that felicity, and to prosecute it to the last, in all necessary means.

311. 7. That next the Soul firmly resolved of the use of means in general, is resolved also to choose and cleave to Jesus Christ, as the Head and Summary of all means, (as the Physician is as to Physick.) And so resolveth to adhere to all the Essentials of Godliness and Christianity.

312. 8. That all this is done by the Intellects discerning of those solid Reasons, which prove to us the excellency, necessity and possibility of all the foresaid ends and objects. And he that knoweth not *fixing* and *holding Reasons* for his Resolutions, cannot be expected to have *fixed Resolutions*.

313. 9. That these general *Inclinations*, *Love*, and *Resolutions* for God, for *Means* in *general*, for *Christ* and all the *Essentials* of *Godliness* and *Christianity*, are *constant* in the Godly; and *virtually* contain a *Love* of and Resolution for *every known duty*, and against *every known* Sin; but not *actually*: And these continue to shew themselves in adhering practically to these Objects, and in the Practice of a Godly Life.

* As to the Papists continual calumnies, that we call men just, whose continued wickedness is but hid and not imputed, and without inherent justice, we abhor both their confusion and their calumny, and distinctly give them this short account. 1. We hold a conditional universal pardon of all. 2. But no actual pardon of the destructive punishment, nor non-imputation of Sin, till men are truly converted from a wicked heart and life to the love of God, by Faith and Repentance. 3. And then all Sin inconsistent with the prevalent love of God, and a holy, just, and sober life is mortified and ceaseth. 4. But such infirmities as you call Venial Sins continue, and all our Goodness is culpably imperfect. 5. Though the destructive punishment be pardoned, the *Reatus culpæ in se* continueth for ever: that is, It is an everlasting truth that we once sinned. 6. Our pardon and our Renovation are freely given us by Grace for the sake of the satisfaction, merits, and intercession of Christ, whose perfect Righteousness fulfilled that Law that man had broken. 7. In which sense his perfect Righteousness is said by Protestants to be Imputed to us because he did it and suffered for us, in the person of a Mediator; and so it was the Meritorious cause of all our Justification, Grace and Glory. And what hath any Papist or other wrangler against any of this? Yet, we reject their loose Doctrine that say as *Pet. ab. Joseph. Theol. Spec. l. 4. c. 10. p. 511.* [*De potentia absoluta Gratia habitualis potest simul esse in eodem subjecto* (meaning in a predominant degree) *cum peccato mortali sive actuali sive habituali*: For as I said before against *Okam* and *Scotus* on that point, they are inconsistent contraries, as life and not-living, light and darkness; and their proofs of the contrary are frivolous. See *Scot.* in 4. *d.* 16. *Aliac. in* 1. 99. *Greg. Armin. in* 1. *d.* 17. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. *Gabr.* ibid. *Rada* 2. *p. Cont.* 19. *Suarez. in* 3. *p. To.* 4. *Disp.* 9. *Sect.* 3. *n.* 8. all for this opinion. And against it *Aureol: in* 1. *d.* 17. *Ruard. a. Sect.* 5. That a man cannot be just *sine Justitia inhærente per potentiam Dei absolutam: Pet. de Lorea* saith, in 2. q. 24. *a.* 12. *d.* 22. as the Protestants do, that *Peccatum Mortale actuale* (meaning some one act of a heinous Sin) may consist with Grace and the Habit of Charity, but not the *Habit* of such a Sin (that is in predominancy). See *Malderus* opinion, 1. 2. *q.* 113. *a.* 2. & 8. *p.* 574, &c. who saith, that *Deus remittendo offensam delet peccati maculam*] and that [*Macula* is but the privation of Grace *quatenus facit hominem Deo gratum*] that is, of Acceptability or Lovelineſs: And accordingly he expoundeth the nature of Remission of Sin, as I said before.

And *Brianson* in 4. *q.* 8. *fol.* 115. *C. D.* diligently enquiring what it is that remaineth after the Sin committed, can find nothing but 1. The Habit or privation of a good habit. 2. And the Guilt which he calleth *Reatum culpæ*, *quæ est quædam obligatio ad pœnam debitam illi culpæ. Illa* (2) *obligatio est quædam Relatio realis, non fundata super actum culpæ, sed super essentiam animæ non nisi ut culpa actualis est prævia*; which is just the Protestant opinion, who say that the Guilt is done away by forgiveness, and the Habit by Renovation, calling one Justification, and the other Sanctification: But we better distinguish *Reatum culpæ in se, & Reatum pœnæ seu culpæ ut ad pœnam*: One is the Reality of my being a Sinner, or one that did Sin. (This is never done away). The other is the obligation to punishment for that Sin. This is remitted.

314. 10. That

314. 10. That therefore *Sin as Sin* is *hateful* to every true Christian, and *Godlineſs as ſuch* lovely: And that in reſpect of this radical general Habit, every true Chriſtians *love* to God and Good is more than his *averſeneſs*, and his *hatred to Sin* more than his *love* or *Inclination* to the created Good for which it is loved (For no man loveth Sin as Evil).

315. 11. That the *Inferior* ſort of *Means and Good*, appear not always in their *worth* or *neceſſity* to the believer: Beſides his Ignorance the remnants of Concupiſcence may pervert his Judgment ſo far as to doubt of *ſome means* whether they are *abſolutely neceſſary*, or at leaſt, *mihi hic & nunc*. And this failing of the *Intellect* may embolden the *Will* to ſome degrees of negligence, even of known duties. And ſo we may doubt of ſome Sins whether they are Sins, and of others whether they are ſo great as to be inconſiſtent with Gods love and our Salvation; and by that failing of the Intellect to be emboldened to commit them, while yet we adhere to God and holineſs in the main as ſuch. And ſo *ſmall Sins* are ofter committed, and with leſs reluctancy than greater, becauſe we think that their *badneſs* and *danger* is not ſo great. And though at other times we be more ſenſible of both, yet in the time of Temptation that apprehenſion may be altered: For the mind of a Godly man is more mutable about the *Means* than about the *End*, and about the *ſmaller* ſort of *Means and Sins*, than about the *greater*. And when the *opinion* changeth not, yet the *practical judgment* may change; or when it is not *turned*, it may be *ſuſpended*: Or truth may be apprehended with leſs *quickening lively feeling*; and then it will not ſufficiently work: As a *loud call* doth ſuſcitate us to action, when a negligent *whiſper* is neglected. And upon ſome of theſe accounts *known ſins when ſmall* may more ſtand with Grace and be ofter committed, and more dully repented of, than *greater*.

316. 12. And as we muſt diſtinguiſh of Sins as more or leſs *dreadful* and *dangerous*, and of duty as more or leſs *neceſſary*, at leaſt in our apprehenſion; ſo alſo of *Sins* which are more or leſs within the *power of a willing mind* to leave them. Some Sins are ſuch, as that the *forſaking* of them requireth little more than a *willing mind*. As to forſake lewd Company, Taverns, Play-houſes, Harlots, Drunkenneſs, Theft, Oppreſſion, Perſecution, Perjury, Deceit, *&c.* *Meer will*, though inſtigated by *luſt*, committeth them; And a *will* that is but truly bent againſt them, may eaſily (as to *power*) caſt them off. Whoever committeth them, doth it becauſe *he will* do it. And to live in the frequent committing of *theſe*, is a greater ſign of want of *Holy habits*, or *Grace*, than of others. For there are other Sins which beſides *willingneſs* require *great power*, and *care*, and *labour* to forſake them: As to keep a *juſt order in our Thoughts*; to keep them from vain objects; to keep our tongues from accuſtomed *vain words*, to reſtrain *ſtrong paſſions* upon great provocations; eſpecially to forſake Sins of *privation* and *omiſſion*; ſuch as are *unbelief* as mixed with a weak Faith, and *fears* mixed with hopes and *coldneſs* of *deſire* and prayer, and *ſluggiſhneſs* of labour and endeavour, *&c.* A man may be truly willing to be ſtronger in all Grace, and to do all duty better, and to forſake all ſuch Sins as theſe, when yet through the meer weakneſs of his Graces or Spiritual life, he *cannot* ſo exactly watch, nor ſo diligently labour, nor ſo patiently hold out, as the caſe requireth. Though it be not a *Phyſical*, but a *Moral* power which he wanteth, and that *culpably*; yet *ſuch Sins* may *more* conſiſt

onſiſt with true Grace than the *former*; and therefore are called *ns of Infirmity.*

317. 13. When Ignorance of Truth, Duty, or Sin, cometh from an *willingneſs* to know it, or an *unwillingneſs* to uſe the known *means* help us to the knowledge of it, the neglect of ſuch an unknown ruth or Duty, and the committing of ſuch an unknown Sin, is to be dged of according to the meaſure of the foreſaid willingneſs, or willingneſs.

318. 14. For he is not ſincerely willing to know a Truth, to do a uty, to forſake a Sin, who is not willing to *uſe the known neceſſary eans appointed* for theſe ends. For he vilifieth God and Holineſs who inketh them not worthy the ſeeking by ſuch means. To ſay, would love God and pleaſe him and be ſaved, if I could do it ith a wiſh or without theſe means, is no ſaving deſire.

119. 15. And to deſire to be delivered from Sin, and to hate it Sin, and yet to love it for the pleaſure ſo much more, as that the tereſt of God and Heaven in us, is not ſtrong enough to make us ha- tually willing both to leave it, and to avoid the temptations, and ſe the pleaſure, but men had rather keep it than leave it on theſe rms; this is no ſincere repentance, nor ſign of a holy heart or life.

320. 16. Even the *Habit* of a *particular leſſer* Sin (as of jeaſting, le words, idle thoughts, *&c.*) may be ſtronger than the *contrary par- cular habit*, (I think) and thereby a man may *habitually* and *actually* live d die in the Sin; and yet that habit not prevail againſt the *radical bit of Holineſs*, of Faith, Hope, Love, and Obedience in the ain.

321. 17. A *preſent full Reſolution* againſt Sins that are *Great* and of *e deſertion* to a *willing mind*, is *eſſential to Repentance*; as is alſo a *eſent Reſolution* for *great* and *neceſſary Duties*, and to forſake *ſome aller* Sins, though it be neceſſary *neceſſitate præcepti*, I think is not ſential to ſaving Converſion and Repentance, and neceſſary *neceſſitate edii* to Salvation.

322. 18. He that committeth a *Groſs ſin*, (that is, a Sin evidently reat, and in the power of a willing mind to forbear) ſo often as oth ſhew that habitually he more loveth it than hateth it, and had ther keep it than leave it, doth ſhew thereby that all his profeſſed epentance for it is unſound, and his heart unſanctified, and that he ath yet no actual pardon from God.

323. Therefore thoſe among the Papiſts who abſolve ſuch from their ins, who commit Fornication or Drunkenneſs once a month (at leaſt) r once in many months, or often, and come between and ſay, *I Repent*, o but delude them. For the nature of thoſe Sins is ſuch, that he that converted to an habitual hatred of them more than he hath a love o them, cannot return to them ſo oft: And he that doth not ſo hate em doth not truly repent. And even their *Hildebrand* (*Greg.* 7.) a Council at *Rome* expreſly ſaith, that [*neither falſe Baptiſm, nor falſe* a feigned and unſound) *Repentance do put away Sin.*

324. 19. The chief tryal of a man's Holineſs and Repentance is by e main ſcope and buſineſs of his life, eſpecially in the *poſitive* part, nd next in the *oppoſitive:* when a man is conſcious that God, and Ho- neſs, and Heaven, are his great end, which are dearer to him and more owerful with him than all things ſenſible, and the intereſt of the fleſh, nd when he can and doth deliberately forſake all, when they ſtand in pposition to or competition with God and Glory, and ſo as to the courſe

course of his life, doth live by Faith, and not by sense, this is the true evidence of true Conversion; and no Sins are damning which consist with this.

325. 20. But because the truth of this must be discerned, not only by present *Sense and Resolution*, but by *practice* to prove that Resolution true, therefore no man can be certain of the sincerity of his own heart, and resolutions and repentance, but by the *practice of* willing *universal obedience*, forsaking *gross and wilful Sinning*, performing *necessary duty*, *striving* to overcome *infirmities*, and heartily desiring *perfect Holiness*, upon terms of Mortification, Self-denyal and diligent use of means.

326. Therefore much sinning will at least breed much doubtfulness and uncertainty of Justification and Salvation, and till it be forsaken no such certainty will be had.

SECT. XXII.

Few certain of Salvation: The Consequents of this in order to our Concord herein.

327. I conclude therefore that *certainty of Justification and sincerity* is not the lot of the *weakest* or *weaker sort* of Christians, but of the *strong confirmed Christians* only. By *weak Christians*, I mean not those that have *weakest natural parts* and *common gifts* (as Learning, Memory, Utterance, *&c.*) But those that have the *weakest Faith*, *Hope*, *Love*, *Humility*, &c. For *Grace* is not *certainly discernable*. 1. In the *least degree*. 2. When it is *little in action*. 3. When it is *much clouded* and oft *conquered by its contrary*: But only when, 1. It *is strong* and in a *good degree*, 2. And *much in act*, 3. And *conquereth opposition*.

I wonder that worthy *Deodate*, and *Tronchinus* in their suffrages at Dort say, *pag.* 49, 50. *Notitiam, sensum, certitudinem istius Decreti Deus electis in hac vita largitur modo, mensura, tempore quo ipsi placet: Nec ullus est electus, qui ætate rationis capace non ante mortem, certissimam istius decreti persuasionem per Spiritum Sanctum accipiat.* I hope they mean but an effect objectively certain. The many Texts cited by them, else prove it not.

328. Therefore few Christians have *Assurance at the first* (or of a *considerable time*;) because few are *strong at first*.

329. Yea, therefore *few ever attain* to *certainty* who are *sincere*, because *most* are *still weak*, and *few* come to *strength* and a great degree, and to much *activity*, and great *conquest* of all the contrary Sins, of heart and life.

330. This being the *case* about *certainty of Justification*; as to the *certainty of perseverance* might a man judge by the *conveniencies*, of the truth, it would draw us to think that the middle way of the Dominicans and some others were the right: *viz.* 1. *That the least degree* (or *first*) *of true saving Grace is sometimes lost finally and such perish*; But 2. *That they who obtain confirming Grace, by a greater degree do never lose it.* For so the *Angels* and *Adam* fell from the *first degrees* for want of *Confirmation*: And many think (though it is not proved) that had they overcome in the first (or some more) tryal, they should have had confirming Grace for a reward. And the *good Angels* are *confirmed* (whether by *reward* or *meer gift* or *nature* we know not). 2. This would save Christians from that uncomfortable thought [*I must go further than ever such and such a one did who fell away, and had lived strictly and suffered patiently, or else I cannot be saved.* For if this be true, a man may be saved who goeth no further, or not so far as some have done that fell away. 3. This will keep men from *security* and *presumption*, in a state of *weakness*, and keep them in a *necessary fear* of falling away; that

that they may avoid it. 4. And yet it provideth a *certainty of perſeverance* and *Salvation*, for *ſtrong Chriſtians* who are (and perhaps they *only*) *fit* for it and *capable* of it. 5. And it tendeth thereby to make men long for, and preſs towards a ſtrong *confirmed* ſtate. I only ſay that if this Doctrine be or were true, it hath or would have theſe *conveniencies*.

331. And I will boldly ſay, that (as I before ſaid, *The weakeſt Chriſtians* are not ordinarily capable of preſent certainty of Salvation, ſo) the *weakeſt* or *worſt* ſort of true Chriſtians, are *morally unfit* for it. 1. He that *ſinneth* as much as ever will ſtand with Grace, and as ever he dare for fear of loſing all, is under ſo great obligations and neceſſity to be humbled, to fear, to be penitent and deeply ſenſible of his great ingratitude that he is *not fit* for the joy of Aſſurance of Salvation; and therefore not fit for *aſſurance* it ſelf: He that is *certain to be ſaved*, muſt rationally be *full of Joy*; which is unſeaſonable to one that muſt lye in the tears of deep humiliation. 2. And ſuch a one that loveth God and Chriſt, and Goodneſs, in the *weakeſt meaſure* conſiſtent with Salvation, muſt have all other Graces and comforts proportioned hereto, or elſe there will be a monſtrous inequality: But *certainty of Salvation* is a degree of *applicatory Hope*, quite above that very *little Faith*, and *Love*, and *Obedience* of ſuch a one. 3. And this *certainty* muſt be the effect and product of *other Graces* (*Faith* and *Love*, &c.) And a *feeble Cauſe* will not bring forth an effect ſo much *ſtronger* than it ſelf. 4. Gods *Wiſdom* in Government will not encourage even a *child*; in fits of contempt, neglects or diſobedience by ſuch Aſſurance. How can he *more* Reward and Encourage the *beſt?* And if *every true Chriſtian* ſhould have *certainty of Salvation*, when he ſinneth as fouly, as frequently, as groſly, and liveth as ſlothfully as ever will ſtand with ſincerity, it would tempt ſuch to go on in Sin, and be no better. 5. God hath his caſtigatory puniſhments for ſinful Children: Even to death it ſelf ſometimes; and much deſertion. And who ſhould have ſuch corrections, but the *worſt* of his Children? But the *certainty* of their their *Salvation*, uſeth not to ſuit with ſuch correction and deſertion; or at leaſt is forfeited in ſuch a caſe. Laſtly, experience telleth us, that it is not Gods will that the worſt of his Children (no nor any but the better ſort) ſhould have ſuch Aſſurance: For, 1. *De facto they have it not.* 2. And in the nature of the thing it is quite out of their reach.

SECT. XXIII.

More neceſſary Conceſſions.

332. But yet all this is not enough to *prove* that any of the juſtified do totally or finally fall away. The controverſie muſt not be decided by arguments from *convenience*, but by Scripture aſſertion; where the difficulty is very great, becauſe no ſmall number of Texts ſeem to favour both the opinions, the reconciling of which is not the work of every ordinary underſtanding. Thoſe that are brought for the certain Perſeverance of all the juſtified may be ſeen in *Zanchy*'s Diſputes with *Marbachius*, (the firſt hot and high agitation of this controverſie as a matter of great moment and neceſſary determination,

which I remember to have found among us). And those on the other side, *Bertius*, *Thompson*, and the *Arminians* commonly have collected. My own opinion about it I have so largely shewed in a Book called *My present Thoughts of Perseverance*, before-mentioned, that I need not here again deliver it. Though between that and this last opinion, as wise a man as I may be in doubt when he hath done his best for a satisfactory resolution.

333. I take *Augustine*'s opinion so far as it is *for Perseverance* to be a *certain Truth*, viz. That *All the Elect shall certainly persevere*, and that the *Grace of Perseverance* is the *consequent of Election*, and not Election the consequent of *foreseen Perseverance*, (unless you mean only that part of Election which determineth of *Glorifying*, and exclude that which decreeth to give Perseverance.) But the difficulty is about the *non-elect*. And it is most probable that where God decreeth *Perseverance*, he decreeth to give Grace suitable thereto; As when he decreeth the Immortality of the Soul, he giveth it a Nature apt for Immortality. And therefore that such have *Confirming Grace*. But the controversie is, whether *all true Grace* do so *confirm*?

334. That an Argument cannot be fetcht for Perseverance from the meer *Nature* of the Grace received, seemeth plain, by *Adam*'s fall, and probable from the Angels.

335. Some* to avoid this, deny *Adam* to have been *Holy*, and suppose him only *Innocent*, and *Neutral*, and *capable* of Holiness (worse than those Papists † who feign his Holiness to be a *supernatural addition* to his *natural state*, thereby preparing men to believe that man was not made Naturally with an *Immortal Soul*, for *Immortal happiness*). But, 1. If *Adam* had an *immediate Moral disposition to love God as God*, and *acted* this, he was Holy: If he had not, it must needs be a *Privation* in him, and not a meer Negation: For a rational creature must needs be naturally obliged to love his Creator; yea, this is the first and summary Law of Nature to him: Therefore not to do it must needs be Sin, and the sum of all Sin: Therefore *Adam* thus is made a great Sinner *ab origine* before his fall. 2. If *Adam* loved not God in his weakest degree of *recovering Grace*, he was unsanctified: But if he did (as certainly he did) then it is not like that in his *least degree* of his *recovering Grace*, he was Holyer than in *Innocency* (though he might stand on surer grounds). 3. And this opinion maketh *unholiness* of Nature to be no part of Original Sin: Because it would be no *Privation*, but a Negation: For our Nature in Infancy is not obliged to have that holiness which it never had and lost in *Adam*. And so Original Sin is almost all denyed, and an unholy heart is made as innocent therein. 4. We are renewed according to the Image of him that created us, in wisdom, righteousness, and true holiness, *Col.* 3. 10. Therefore it was holiness which was the Image of God which we lost, and needs renewing.

336. The Argument for Perseverance from Gods *Immutability* will hold as to all the *Elect* as *such*, but not to all the sanctified or justified as such. For the Angels and *Adam*'s fall did not prove God mutable. And God can judge a thing or person to be *changed*, without being himself changed; but only *denominatione extrinseca a relatione ad mutatum*, is variously denominated.. And even his Law or Covenant which saith *He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned*, will not at all be *changed* if it justifie a Believer to day, whom it condemned as an unbeliever yesterday, and should condemn him again to morrow if he should apostatize; or if it conclude us

* Vid. Mr. *George Walker* of the Sabbath.

† *Petavius* in *Elenth. Tom. Vincent. Lenis c.* 23. p. 97. Saith that *Adam* had 1. Exteriour Grace, viz. his outward blessings. 2. Interiour: And that, 1. Permanent, which was *Bona voluntas, vel Justitia Originalis ex omnium virtutum, fidei, spei, charitatis, tum cæterarum quæ in mente aut Voluntate residunt, concursu concentuque collecta.* 2. Transient, that is, Actual influx or inspirations. But whereas he bitterly censureth *Vincent*: for saying that Grace was in some respect natural, it is but *de nomine* that he quarrelleth. And it is as if we disputed whether Health and Food were natural to *Adam*? They were not essential to his nature; but the rectitude of it concreated with nature, and given by the Creator for nature: And yet of *Grace*, because *sine merito*, though not as now, *contra meritum*. God made all very good. *In illa cum fecerat qui fecerat vellum.* August. *de Trin. cit.*

us guilty every day anew of every new Sin which we commit.

337. It is a very hard thing to confute an Anabaptiſt, without granting that *Infant Juſtification* may be loſt. For experience proveth that the Children of Godly Parents too often prove ungodly: And if they had *Juſtifying Grace* in Infancy, they *loſe* it: And if they *have not*, then the Covenant in which they are entered doth not *certainly Juſtifie them*. And if ſo, then it is either the *very ſame Covenant* which the adult are baptized into, or *another*. If it be *another* then their Baptiſm is *another thing*: For Baptiſm is but the celebration of our Covenant with God. And *another Covenant in ſpecie* maketh *another Baptiſm in ſpecie*. And if ſo, it ſeemeth to be *no Baptiſm of Gods appointing*: For he hath but *One Covenant of Grace* to be entered by us, and ſealed; nor but *one Baptiſm*: Indeed on *man's* part, there is a Covenanting with the *Heart* and with the *mouth*, an *outward* as well as an *inward* Covenanting, or Conſenting: But it is all to *one and the ſame Covenant* of God. It is the ſame *ſpecies* of *Faith* in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt which *baptized Hypocrites* and *true Chriſtians* do profeſs. And Infants have no Faith of their own to profeſs, but are dedicated by another's will; the title-condition of the Adult is their *own conſenting Faith*; but the title-condition of *Infants*, is nothing in themſelves, but *their Parents conſenting Faith* without them, which dedicateth them to God. Now we ſuppoſe the Parents to do this *ſincerely*. If then the Covenant aſcertain not preſent Juſtification to the Infant, who hath all the condition required by the Covenant, how can we ſay that it any more aſcertaineth Juſtification to the *adult*, it being proved to be the very *ſame Covenant* and not another. But if it do aſcertain it, then many loſe it. I run not into their error, who tell us (and would have none of us Preach Chriſt's Goſpel that will not ſay the ſame) that *It is certain by the Word of God that Infants baptized dying before actual Sin are certainly ſaved* without excepting the Children of any Infidels, Pagans, or Apoſtates, which I cannot prove of the Infants even of Hypocrites or unſound Chriſtians, or that the Child can he ſaved by that falſe Faith, which will not ſave the Parent or him that dedicateth him to God; or that the Children of Hypocrites or Infidels have the condition of Juſtification: And if that *Word of God had been cited*, that maketh the aſſertion *certain*, it would have been a great kindneſs to us from thoſe whoſe *Juſtice* muſt go for ſuch: (But we are thought unworthy of it.) For my part, I determine not the difficult caſe of Infants loſs of Juſtification. Their caſe is left dark to us in the Scriptures: But my judgment is fulleſt expreſſed by the words of the Synod of *Dort*, *Art.* 1. §. 17. And *Davenant's* Treatiſe on that point is very judicious, and conſiderable, if wherever he ſpeaketh of Baptized Infants, you will but ſuppoſe him to mean the *Infants of true Chriſtians*, and not *all*.

338. It ſeemeth a hard ſaying that any member of Chriſt ſhould be cut off, and become a member of Satan, and periſh, though he were but an *Infant member*. But we muſt not let the *Metaphor* deceive us: It is not a *Natural* member of Chriſt's *Perſon* that periſheth, as if part of Chriſt himſelf fell off: But a Metaphorical Myſtical Political Member. And Chriſt thought it no abſurdity, *Joh.* 15. to warn his *chief Members* that they fall not off, and to ſpeak by way of ſuppoſition of his branches as cut off, withered and burned. And *Adam* and the faln Angels, before their fall, were the Beloved of God, and his Children, and yet fell from that love. There muſt be therefore ſtronger Arguments than this, to turn the Scales.

* *Brianſon* in 4 q. 4. 1. *Corrob. fol.* 36. Handling the queſtion why the baptized Infants have infuſed Habits of Grace, and Virtues, citeth their opinions that hold the contrary, but inclining to the affirmative, he hath no better anſwer to them that object experience, which oftеſt findeth no ſigns of ſuch habits when they come to age, than that they are known to us only by Faith.

Matth. 28. 19, 20.
Eph. 4. 2, 3.

SECT. XXIV.

The ſum and end of this Diſcourſe of certain Perſeverance.

339. The end and ſum of all that I have ſaid of Perſeverance is but this, that the controverſie is neither, 1. Of ſuch *weight*; nor, 2. Of ſuch *facility* and *certainty*, as that it ſhould be made neceſſary to our charitable converſe or Church Communion to hold either this or that: But we ſhould number it with the *dogmata* not to be impoſed on others, nor fit to make any breach in the love and concord of Chriſtians; and for my part, I profeſs that I take him for the worſer Chriſtian *cæteris paribus*, whom I hear with diſaffection blotting the names of others with notes of unſoundneſs and culpability, for diſſenting in this point on one ſide or other, either as *holding* or as *denying* the certain Perſeverance of all the juſtified, than thoſe that differ from me in the point it ſelf, without any proud ſupercilious confidence. And that it is to be numbred with *Tolerable Opinions*, I have proved by theſe Arguments, in ſum, 1. That which is ſo difficult that very few of the Learned and Godly Teachers of the Church in all ages could diſcern a certainty of it, cannot be a point ſo great or clear, as to be made neceſſary for all Chriſtians or all Paſtors of the Church to agree in: But ſuch is this: For my part I profeſs that though my judgment incline more one way than the other, it is with no *certainty* that I am in the right, and I ſee ſo great difficulties after my hardeſt ſtudies and ſearch, that my inclination is not without much doubtfulneſs: And humility and modeſty forbid me, to profeſs a *certainty* or too much confidence for a Doctrine, which I openly ſay, I cannot prove or find that any one Chriſtian held of about 1000 years after the Apoſtles dayes, * I have not read all Books, and therefore there may have been ſome ſuch that I know not of: But I know of none, that I remember for a far longer time. I know the Learned Biſhop *Robert Abbot* and others cite *Auguſtine* as on that ſide; But it's paſt all controverſie, that it is not all the juſtified but only all the elect whoſe Perſeverance he aſſerted. And I am not he that would be ſeparated from the Communion of all the ancient Churches, and Doctors, and all the *Greeks* and *Lutherans* of theſe times. Methinks we ſhould learn of the *Papiſts* at leaſt to be moderate in our cenſures, when they who are ſo much for Impoſitions, do yet bear in part of this, with one another, in the controverſies between the Dominicans and Jeſuites.

* Unleſs *Jovinian* may be excepted, which is doubtful.

340. 2. My other reaſon is, as to the *comfort* of men's Souls, how little is the difference between theſe two concluſions. [*I am uncertain that every weak Chriſtian ſhall perſevere.*] And [*I am uncertain whether I my ſelf ſhall perſevere.*] The firſt is the *Arminians*, and the ſecond is all or almoſt all weak Chriſtians concluſion in the world: For I have fully proved elſewhere, 1. That the ſinfulleſt and worſt ſort of true Chriſtians have not a certainty of their own Sincerity and Juſtification, nor are they fit for it: Nay, that it is only *ſtrong*, *active* Chriſtians who attain to ſuch *Aſſurance*: 2. And that there are but few *ſtrong active* Chriſtians comparatively in the world. 3. Yea, but few that will ſay [*I am certain that I am ſincere and juſtified*] (excepting thoſe

those that speak it opinionatively or presumptuously, experience satisfieth us. 4. And that one that *is uncertain that he is justified at all*, cannot be *certain that he shall persevere* in Justification, I need not prove. So that by our own common Doctrine and Experience, it is few true Christians that are certain of their own Perseverance and Salvation: And what doth this comfort them more than their Doctrine, who say that it is not certain in it self, that any besides the strong confirmed Christians, and the Elect shall persevere? and that we can be certain of the Election of none but the confirmed and the persevering.

341. I confess it is a great comfort to doubting fearful Souls, if they can soundly thus argue, in their doubtful state, [*I am sure I had true Grace once, and I am sure none fall quite away that have it: Therefore I am sure I have it still.*] But, 1. Even this could be the comfort of none but those few that *were once of the stronger sort of Christians*: For no other can say [*I am sure that I had true Grace once*]. 2. And that present sense of sin which maketh them doubt of their *present sincerity* doth usually make them as much doubt of their *past sincerity*. 3. And though such a comfort I think be due to a causeless and melancholy doubter, (who feareth unjustly) which is fetcht from former perceived sincerity, yet it is not fit for *all Christians* that are faln into such doubts. For if a man be faln as *sinful*, as will stand with any sincerity, (even in gross Sin) it is not *safe* for that man to argue, [*I am sure that I once was sincere in my obedience; therefore I am sure it is so still*] for the reasons which I gave before But by Repentance he must make sure that *he is truly* obedient, that he may be sure he was so.

342. For my part I will labour as earnestly as I can to make sure both that I am sincere and justified and shall persevere, and I will be none of those that shall command, commend, or encourage *causeless troublesome fears*: But *preventing fear* is the *means* of perseverance: Heb. 4. 1. *Having a promise left us of entering into his rest, let us fear lest any of you should seem to come short of it*, Joh. 14. 4, &c. *Abide in me and I in you.---- 6. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered, and men gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. 7. If ye abide in me and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will-----As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you: Continue ye in my love. If ye keep my Commandments ye shall abide in my love----* Joh. 8. 31. *If ye continue in my Word, then are ye my Disciples indeed.* So *Col.* 1. 23. *& passim.* And I will never reproach, or censure, or disaffect such men as holy *Bernard* (though I am not of his opinion) who said *Serm.* 1. *de Septuages.* [*Quis potest dicere Ego de electis sum? Ego de prædestinatis sum ad vitam æternam? Ego de numero sum filiorum Dei? Quis hæc inquam dicere potest, reclamante nimirum, Nescit homo si amore dignus sit an odio? Certitudinem igitur non habemus: Sed spes fiducia consolatur nos,* &c.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

Degrees of falling, and danger.

343. Every degree of Grace that is true, is not to be ſuppoſed *proportionable* to the *ſtrongeſt Temptations:* But God preſerveth the weak effectually by keeping them *from Temptations* too ſtrong for them. And that which a ſtrong Chriſtian overcometh might overcome a weak one, were he aſſaulted by it. Therefore to avoid and pray againſt Temptation, is the way to be delivered from evil.

344. Yet the weakeſt true Chriſtian, in choice, reſolution and trial, *forſaketh all for Chriſt*, and loveth God, and preferreth Glory in Heaven before his Life, and is a Martyr in reſolution. And yet there are *Temptations* * which are *too ſtrong* for him: For 1. He that habitually preferreth God to the Creature and his life, may yet fall into ſuch an act as *Peter* did; And by *acting* contrary to his *habitual diſpoſition* and *reſolution*, may weaken the *habit*, and forfeit Divine aſſiſtance, and deſerve deſertion. 2. And he that valueth Heaven and the love of God before his life, may yet by the *nearneſs* of an alluring Object, by the violence of ſenſe and paſſion be drawn to a fleſhly ſin, and thinking that he may have the pleaſure of that particular ſin, without loſing Gods love, he may be drawn firſt to leſs, and by degrees to greater. 3. And he that is reſolved for God, and Glory, and Chriſt, and Holineſs, may meet with ſuch ſubtile Arguments of Infidels or Senſualiſts, which he is unable to anſwer, and conſequently unable to overcome. And his *Underſtanding* being deceived, his *Will* may follow; ſo that perſeverance muſt be by the avoiding of Temptations.

* What the Grace of perſeverance, and what confirmation is, is a great controverſie among the School-men. *Maldonat. in 1. Theol.* 69 *& Vaſ. d.* 1. mentioneth five Opinions: 1. That they are both one, and conſiſt in extrinſick Divine cuſtody. 2. That the confirmed are neceſſitated to good, but the meer perſevering do it freely. 3. That confirmation is only a more intenſe degree of the ſame Grace. 4. Meer perſeverance is by ordinary Grace with Gods cuſtody, and congruous means: but confirmation is by Grace of it ſelf moſt effectual, though not neceſſitating. 5. That confirmation is by a participation of the *Gratia & charitas patriæ*. *Maldonat* reſteth in this difference, that the confirmed have ſuch a meaſure of Divine help and heavenlineſs, as is ſtronger than the ſtrongeſt Temptations: But the gift of perſeverance only, is with ſuch a degree of Grace, as would not ſerve, if God did not keep ſuch from ſtronger Temptations. So that confirmation is a middle ſtate between meer Perſeverance and Glory.

345. The greateſt ſins after Converſion, which are truly repented of, are pardoned by God: And muſt be pardoned by the Church in order to Communion, if the manifeſtation of Repentance be ſuch as anſwereth the ends (the ſignification of its reality) and the removing of the ſcandal and the diſhonour of Religion, of the Church, and of Chriſt.

346. The Sin againſt the Holy Ghoſt ſeemeth unpardonable by the Text, though the *Papiſts* expound it by [*hardly pardonably*]. And it is [*an obſtinate infidelity and rejection of Chriſt as a Deceiver, upon a ſetled conceit that he did his Miracles by the power of the Devil, when they are convinced that they were actually done*; and ſo a *blaſphemous fathering of Gods great atteſtation upon the Devil, and a rejecting his laſt Witneſs to the Truth, which muſt convince thoſe that ever will be convinced.*] But I have wrote a *Treatiſe* of this Sin, and ſo ſhall paſs it by.

347. If a true Believer ſhould be ſuppoſed to fall quite away from the belief of Chriſt, it ſeemeth hard to imagine how he can do it without this blaſpheming the Divine atteſtation of the Spirit, by which before he was brought to believe. And it ſeemeth that therefore, *Heb.* 6. & 10. this Apoſtacy is made the ſame with the unpardonable blaſphemy of the Holy Ghoſt, which yet proveth not that it ever cometh to paſs, but what it would be if it did.

348. Repentance which cometh from fear alone, without the love of God and Holineſs, is no ſign of juſtification, nor conſiſtent with it: nor is ſuch *attrition* ſufficient to forgiveneſs: For the *heart* is not *changed* to God without love.

349. Though

349. Though where there is more *love* to the Creature than to *God*, there is no true Sanctification (ſpeaking of rational and not of ſenſual love); Yet where there is more *fear of God than love to God*, there may be Grace, though weak, ſo be it God be loved above the Creature.

350. A Death-Bed, or late Repentance, is then acceptable, and ſufficient to pardon, when it is the *Heart or Love* that is thus turned from the Creature to God habitually; ſo that if the perſon did recover, he would live to God: otherwiſe it is uneffectual; not becauſe *too late*, but becauſe *unſound:* But becauſe fear is uſually the principle of ſuch mens Repentance, it is much to be ſuſpected, though not diſpaired of.

351. The day of Grace is never paſt with any man while life continueth, ſo as that *if he truly repent, he ſhall not be forgiven:* For that is contrary to the Goſpel-Covenant. But it is ſo far paſt with ſome, as that after their obſtinate forfeiture, the *Means*, *Help*, and *Grace* of *Repentance* ſhall not be given them, nor brought ſo near them as they were.

SECT. XXVI.

Of final Juſtification, and how Paul *and* James *agree about Juſtification by Works.*

352. Having ſaid this much of *conſtitutive Juſtification*, and *the not-loſing* of it, and aſſurance of it and its continuance, and touched the ſecond and third ſorts of Juſtification, *(ſentential and executive)* as they are here in the way, I need not ſay much of them as after this life, becauſe it may be gathered from what is ſaid of Pardon and Juſtification conſtitutive: Yet a little I will add. And 1. At death a particular doom is paſſed on the Soul as ſeparated: But whether only by *execution* and ſelf-conviction, we know not.

353. The Reſurrection as ſuch is a *common effect* of Redemption, in right antecedent to mens well or ill deſerving: And therefore *all* are raiſed by Chriſt. Joh. 5 22, 25, 26, 27.

354. The Juſtification of Believers at the laſt day, will be that great Juſtification, to which all that went before were but means, and imperfect.

355. Chriſt will be here both Judge and Advocate, and as both juſtifie Believers: And he will be the condemning Judge of the Wicked.

356. All men ſhall be then judged according to their Works or Deeds done in the Body, whether Good or Evil.

* 357. To be juſtified then will not be to be *judged ſinleſs*, (as is aforeſaid) but to be judged one that by Gods Law (which muſt be the *norma judicii*) is not to be *damned to Hell*, but to be glorified in Heaven, or to be ſentenced to endleſs life, and acquit from this Accuſation that we are *damnandi*, or to be puniſhed in Hell. And in order

* It is a groſs over-ſight of D. *Petavius*, *Elen. Ther. Vincent. c.* 27. *p.* 110, 111. to acknowledge no other *Reatus* but obligation *ad pœnam*; when as there is, 1. *Reatus facti.* 2. *Culpæ*, which is the violation of the Precept. 3. *Ad pœnam*, which reſulteth from the threatning. And worſe, *p.* 110. that *non omne peccatum eſt culpa ſed hoc ſolum quod ex voluntate, id eſt libero arbitrio & electione committitur nec imputatur in culpam niſi ex deliberatione & libera voluntatis electione procedat.* A'as, that God's Law muſt be thus denied or depraved, that ſin may be made no ſin, and ſo to need no Chriſt or Pardon. *Cont.* 1. Analogically it is *peccatum* in an Ox to go out of the furrow: But properly nothing in man is *peccatum*, but *culpa*: And all breaking a Law is *culpa*, and nothing elſe is *peccatum*. 2. Not to deliberate is a great and uſual ſin. 3. The omiſſion of the Wills election or intention is ſin, as well as an ill election. Woe to him that repenteth not of theſe, and is not pardoned them.

to

to this, to be ſentenced ſuch as have the true cauſes and conditions of *Right* to *Impunity* and *Life:* which are, 1. Immediately the gift of this Right by God himſelf in his Covenant, with Chriſt the Fountain of it. 2. A true Right and Relation to Chriſt as our Head and Saviour, and the *only Meriter* of this *Covenant-Gift*, and *Juſtification*, and *Adoption*, by his habitual, active and paſſive *Righteouſneſs* and *Sacrifice*, advanced in dignity by Union with his *Divine* perfection. 3. True Faith and Repentance, with Love, Obedience and Perſeverance, as the *title-conditions* required by the donative and condonative Covenant.

358. As I have before ſaid, that a man muſt be juſtified at that Day from the charge of *Infidelity* by his Faith it ſelf (and not by Chriſt's Merits) and from the charge of *Impenitence* by his *Repentance* it ſelf; So I add, that he muſt be juſtified from the charge of *Hypocriſie* by his *ſincerity*, and from the charge of *Rebellion* by his *ſubjection*, and from the charge of *wickedneſs* by *final godlineſs* and *obedience*, and from the charge of *Apoſtacy* by *perſeverance*; But from the charge of his wickedneſs before Converſion, and his pardoned ſins and weakneſs ſince, only by Chriſt's Sacrifice and meritorious Righteouſneſs, and the Pardon purchaſed thereby, and given in the New Covenant. And from the accuſation that we *are Sinners* in general, we have no Juſtification at all.

359. *Judgment* is the *Genus*, and *Juſtification*, and *Condemnation* are the *Species:* Therefore to be judged according to our Works, is to be juſtified or condemned according to our Works.

360. As I ſaid, that it is God's Juſtice and Mercy, and Chriſt's Redemption of us, which are chiefly to be glorified at that Day; but it is our perſonal Goſpel-Righteouſneſs, or performance of the Conditions of the New Covenant, which is then to be tried, and *we*, and not *Chriſt*, that are to be judged; So I add, that the New Teſtament referring to this fore-ſeen, doth uſually ſpeak accordingly, of juſtifying us by *Faith*, by our *words*, or by our *works*, that he that doth righteouſneſs is righteous, &c. And it ſpeaketh of that ſame Righteouſneſs as conſtituting us juſt firſt, by which we muſt be judged juſt at laſt.

361. It is very eaſie therefore where prejudice blindeth not men, to ſee the concord of Chriſt's ſaying, *We are juſtified by our words*, and *Paul*'s by *Faith, and not by Works*, and *James* by *Works, and not by Faith only*. Chriſt ſpeaketh of a *particular Juſtification*, from a common great Crime, a wicked Tongue as the ſign or product of a wicked Heart; And this muſt be part of the perſonal material Righteouſneſs, by which we muſt be juſtified as true Chriſtians. * *Paul* ſpeaketh of our being juſtified by being Chriſtians, and not by *keeping* Moſe's *Law*, or doing any Works which will be to us inſtead of a Chriſt or a free-given Pardon, and Righteouſneſs by him. And *James* ſpeaketh of the full condition of Juſtification, as continued final and compleat, as it conſiſteth of its eſſential parts.

362. The Key of Underſtanding *Paul*'s Diſcourſes of Juſtification is, to know, 1. That the grand queſtion which he firſt manageth is, *Whether the* Gentiles *may not be ſaved without keeping the* Jewiſh *Law, as well as the* Jews *with it?* 2. To prove the Affirmative, he proveth that the *Jews* themſelves cannot be ſaved or juſtified meerly or primarily by the Law, notwithſtanding the divinity and great excellency of it; but muſt be juſtified by a *Saviour*, and free-given Pardon and Right to Life, and to which the ſincere keeping of *Moſe*'s Law was intended to be but ſubſervient. 3. That therefore it appeareth, that the *Jews* did ſo fondly admire

* *Tolet in Rom. 3. Annot 17. Eſtius in Rom. 3. 28. & Vega de juſtif. qu 3. p. 899.* ſay of Juſtification by Faith, as the *Proteſtants* do. *Vid. & Stapleton. de Juſtif. li. 8. c. ult. & Bellarm. de Juſtif. l. 2. c. 7, 10, 11. Suarez de Grat. l. 7. c. 7. p. 29. Tapper. art. 8. de Juſtif. p. 25, 26, 27. Vaſqu in 1.2. diſput. 202. c. 6. p. 45. Coſter. Enchir. p. 252.*

admire the Law, and their national priviledges under it, that they thought that the exact keeping of it was neceſſary and ſufficient to Juſtification and Salvation: And they thought the Meſſiah was not to be their Righteouſneſs, as a Sacrifice for Sin, and Meriter of free Pardon, and the Gift of Life, but only a great King and Deliverer, to redeem them by Power from all their Enemies and Bondage. 4. That it was not *Adam*'s Covenant of Innocency or Perfection which the *Jews* thus truſted to, or *Paul* doth ſpeak againſt as to Juſtification (though *a minore ad majus*, that alſo is excluded.) For the *Jews* knew that they were *Sinners*, and that God pardoned Sin as a merciful God, and that their Law had Sacrifices for Pardon and Expiation, with Confeſſions, &c. But they thought that ſo far as God had made that Law ſufficient to political ends, and to temporal Rewards and Puniſhments, it had been ſufficient to eternal Rewards and Puniſhments; and that of it ſelf, and not in meer ſubordination to the typified Meſſiah. Therefore they thought that he that kept the Law ſo far as to comit no ſin which the Law puniſhed with death or abſciſſion, and that for all his other pardonable ſins, performed the required Penances and Sacrifices, was by this, which is called *The Works of the Law*; that is, the keeping of the Law, a righteous juſtifiable perſon. 5. That the thing therefore which *Paul* diſproveth them by is, 1. That the Law was never made for ſuch an end. 2. That even then it ſtood in ſubordination to Redemption and free-given life. 3. That the free Gift or Covenant of Grace containing the Promiſe of the Meſſiah, and Pardon and Life by him, was before the Law, and juſtified *Abraham* and others even without it. 4. That their Law was ſo ſtrict, that no man could perfectly keep it all. 5. That every Sin deſerveth death indeed, though their Law puniſhed not every ſin with death by the Magiſtrate. 6. That their Law was never Obligatory to the *Gentile* world, who had a Law written in their Hearts; and therefore not the common way of Juſtification. * 7. That their Law, as ſuch, diſcovered ſin, but gave not the Spirit of Grace to overcome it: Inſomuch as though he himſelf deſired perfectly to fulfil it without ſin, yet he could not, but was under a captivity, that is, a moral neceſſity of imperfection, or ſins of infirmity, from which only the Grace of Chriſt could as to guilt and power deliver him. 8. That no man ever came to Heaven by that way of merit which they dreamed of, but all by the way of Redemption, Grace, free Gift and pardoning Mercy. Therefore their conceit that they were juſt in the main, and forgiven their ſins, and ſo juſtifiable by the meer dignity of *Moſe*'s Law which they kept, and by the Works of the Law, and not by the free Gift, Pardon and Grace of a Redeemer, and by the Faith and practical belief of that Gift, and acceptance of it, with thankful penitent obedient hearts, was a pernicious errour. But the true way of Righteouſneſs was to become true Chriſtians, that is, with ſuch a penitent thankful, accepting, practical belief or affiance to believe in God as the Giver of Salvation, in Chriſt as the Redeemer, and his Spirit as our Life and Sanctifier, and to accept Chriſt and all his procured Benefits, Juſtification and Life, as purchaſed by his Sacrifice and meritorious Righteouſneſs, and given in the New Covenant on this condition, and ſo to give up our ſelves to his whole ſaving-work, as to the Phyſician of our Souls, and only Mediator with God. This is the ſum of *Paul*'s Doctrine on this point.

363. I ſay again therefore, for any man to ſay that ſome one phyſical act, either aſſent, or conſent, or affiance, upon one particular Object

Petavius de Leg. & Grat. li. 1. c. 7. Well openeth the various ſenſes, in which the Law doth or doth not promiſe life eternal: And through his two Books is much worth the reading of the difference of the Law and Goſpel: See Mr. *Allen's Treat.* of the Two Covenants, with my *Preface*; And Mr. *Truman's Great. Propitiat.* with the *Append.*

* *Janſenius. Aug. To.* 2. *c.* 4. aſſerteth, That the chief difference between the old Law and the new, is, that the old was written in Stone and Tables, and the new only in memory and in the heart, and ſo maketh the *Creed* to be more properly this Law than the Scriptures, as being written only on particular occaſions. But though we thankfully confeſs that the eſſentials of Chriſtianity are ſo plain and few as may be remembred, yet the *Creed* is contained and explained in the Scripture, and without written Records, our Faith would have been but ill preſerved, as experience and reaſon prove.

(Christ's Righteousnes as offered us) is the instrumental cause of our Justification; and that to look to be justified by any other act of Faith on Christ, or on the Father, or Holy Ghost, or on Heaven the final Object (God in Glory), or secondarily as subsequent parts of the condition of Salvation, by Repentance, by praying for Pardon, by forgiving others, by Obedience to Christ, *&c.* is to look to be justified by *Works* in the sense that *Paul* excludeth them; this is but to abuse the Gospel and the Church, by a scandalous misinterpretation of a great part of the New Testament.

364. St. *James* therefore having to do with some who thought that the bare *profession* of Christianity was Christianity, and that Faith was a meer assent to the Truth, and that to believe that the Gospel is true, and trust to be justified by Christ was enough to Justification, without Holiness and fruitful Lives, and that their sin and barrenness hindered not their Justification, so that they thus believed (perhaps misunderstanding *Paul*'s Epistles) doth convince them that they were mistaken, and that when God spake of *Justification by Faith, without the Works of the Law*, he never meant a Faith that containeth not a resolution to obey him in whom we believe, nor that is separated from actual Obedience in the prosecution; But that as we must be justified by our *Faith* against the charge of being Infidels, so must we be justified by our *Gospel personal holiness and sincere Obedience* against the charge, that we are *unholy* and *wicked*, or *impenitent*, or *Hypocrites*, or else we shall never be adjudged to Salvation, that is, justified by God.

Leg. Placeum. in Thes. Salvin. de bosce. Vol. 1. & Conrad. Bergium in Prax. Cathol. & Le Blanc. Thes. de Just. and our Mr. *Gibbon*'s Serm. *Of Justif.* in the Morning-Exercises at *Giles* in the *Fields*. *Paræus de Justif. Cont. Bellarm. l. 2. c. 7. p. 469. Nos imputari nobis Christi justitiam ut per eam formaliter justi nominemur & simus, neq; diximus unquam, neq; sentimus, ut aliquoties jam ostendimus: Id enim pugnaret, non minus cum recta ratione quam si reus in judicio absolutus diceret, se clementia judicis donantis sibi vitam, formaliter justum esse*, &c.

365. All this then is past controversie among considerate understanding men, 1. That *Works* justifie us not as *perfect*, according to the Covenant of Innocence, because we have them not. 2. That the Works or keeping of *Mose*'s Law, as conceited sufficient, or as set in opposition against, or competition with a Saviour or free Gift, or any otherwise than as the exercises of meer Obedience under Christ (as *Mary*, *Zachary*, *Elizabeth*, *Simeon*, *John Baptist*, *David*, &c. used them,) could justifie no man. 3. That consequently no *other Works* set up either in the said *opposition or competition*, or as any thing of Merit, or worth is ascribed to them, which is proper to Christ, or any part of the honour of Gods free Gift, can justifie no man; nor any other way, than as *meer conditions*, and exercises of thankful obedience or acceptance, in pure subordination to God's Mercy, and Christ's Merits, and the free Gift.

But that Works are not excluded from being *conditions* of our justification, or the *matter* of it in any of these following respects: 1. That Faith it self, which is our *act*, and an *act* of Obedience to God, and is the *fiducial accepting belief* in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, for the benefits of the Covenant, is the condition of our first Covenant-right to these Benefits. 2. That this Faith is not *actual Obedience to Christ as Christ* (at first, but only to God as God). But it is the Souls *subjection to Christ as Christ*, which is our *Covenant-consent* to our future Obedience, and *virtually*, though not *actually*, containeth our *future Obedience* in it. 3. That there is somewhat of *love*, *consent* or *willingness*, of *Desire*, of *Hope*, of *Repentance*, which goeth to make up this *moral work* of *Faith*, as it is the condition; even our first *Christianity* it self. 4. That as the *making of a Covenant* is for the *performing* of it, and *subjection* is for *Obedience* and *Marriage* for *conjugal Duties*, so our said *first Covenanting-Faith* is for our future Faith, Hope, Comfort, and grateful Obedience and Holiness: And these are the secondary parts of the

he condition of Salvation: And ſo are the ſecondary parts of our Juſtifi-ations, condition as continued or not-loſt, and conſummate: For to uſtifie us, is, as is ſaid, to juſtifie our Right to Impunity and Glory. . That, as is ſaid, our own performance of the condition of the free Gift of Impunity and Glory, by the New Covenant purchaſed by Chriſt's Righteouſneſs, is the thing to be tried and judged in Gods judg-ent; And therefore we muſt *ſo far* be then *juſtified* from the charge of ot performing that condition, of being Infidels, unſanctified impeni-ent Hypocrites, Apoſtates, and ſo of having no part in Chriſt and the ree Gift, even by our perſonal Evangelical *Faith*, *Holineſs*, *Repentance*, *incerity* and *Perſeverance*. And all this juſtification by Works St. *James* s for, and it is undeniable by any thing but prejudice, ignorance, and iding pieviſhneſs. Let the *Reader* of quick underſtanding pardon my epeating the ſame thing, which others will not yet underſtand.

366. Chriſt's Sermons, *Matth.* 5. & 6. 7. & 10. & 13. & 18. & 21. nd *Luk.* 6. & 11. & 12. & 16. & 18. & 19. and *Joh.* 1. & 3. & 5. & 6, &c. with all the Sermons in the *Acts*, and all the Catholick Epiſtles of *Peter*, *ames*, *Jude* and *John*, and *Paul's* Epiſt. to the *Rom.* *Chap.* 1. 2. 4. 6. 7. 8. 2, &c. *Gal.* 5. & 6. and a great part of the reſt of his Epiſtles, are nade up of this Doctrine of * Grace which I have aſſerted; And the *eading* of them will better inſtruct you in the true ſenſe of *Remiſſion* and *uſtification*, than moſt *Treatiſes* written on that Subject which I have een.

367. The perfection of Juſtification and Pardon will be by the final xecutive act, the taking the juſtified into Glory.

* Me-thinks *Janſenius* greatly wrongeth his Cauſe, when he ſaith, *To.* 2. *c.* 13. that *Primus Auguſtinus intelligentiam divinæ gratiæ & novi Teſtamenti fide crediti a perunt fidelibus & eccleſia.* If we ſhould ſay, that [*Primus Lutherus*] they would take it for a note of novelty and errour: was the Church for 400 years ignorant of Grace and fundamental Verities? Contrarily I think that Chriſt's plain Doctrine in his Sermons, and the old Churches for 300 years in their plainer uncurious Writings, plainly delivered all the neceſſary Doctrine of Grace: yea even the *Creed* it ſelf containeth it.

SECT. XXVII.

Of the fewneſs of the glorified, and the many that periſh.

368. Though it be comparatively but a *little Flock*, and part of this world to whom God will give the heavenly Kingdom, yet the number will in it ſelf be *exceeding great*. And it's very probable that (this Earth being a very little *punctum* of the Creation) that taking all God's rational Creatures together, the number of the damned will be found a very ſmall number in compariſon of the bleſſed; even as the Malefactors in the Jailes are to the Subjects of the Kingdom. For the worlds above us are incomprehenſibly vaſt and glorious; And the Text telleth us, *Heb.* 22. 22. *That we are come to an innumerable company of Angels:* Though the proportions be unknown to us, I ſpeak this again, that miſtakes tempt not men to unworthy thoughts of the infinite amiable goodneſs of God, or of the Chriſtian Faith.

369. And what the Saints do want in number, they ſhall have in excellency, to glorifie the goodneſs of God. The little Flock which ſhall have the Kingdom, ſhall be all Kings and Prieſts, and ſhall *judge* the world (Judgment in Scripture is much put for Government): They ſhall be equal with Angels, and ſhining Stars in our Fathers Firmament, and ſhall ſit with Chriſt upon his Throne: And ſhall in a word, in the perfection of their Natures, perfectly know, love and praiſe, obey and delight in God, in a perfect ſociety in the ſight of Chriſt's Glory, and be aſſured of this to all eternity. *Amen.*

And we ſee in Gods Works of Nature, high Excellencies are rare. There are not ſo many *Suns* as *Stars*, nor *Stars*, as *Stones*, or *Leaves*, or

Trees; nor ſo much *Gold* as *Earth*; nor ſo many *Men*, as *Flies*, *Fiſhes*, and other Animals; nor ſo many *Kings* as *Subjects*; nor ſo many *Teachers* as *Learners*; nor ſo many men of *learning* and *wiſdom* as *ignorance*. And *we ſee* there are not ſo many *godly* as *ungodly*.

370. And, as I told you before, that as *Iſrael* was not *all Gods people* in the world before Chriſt's Incarnation, and that the *Catholick Church* now ſucceedeth them in their *high* and *rare* Peculiarities and Priviledges above the reſt of the world, and far exceedeth them in the greatneſs of our Mercies; and that Chriſt's Incarnation hath put the reſt of the world into no worſe a condition than they were before; and that all the world is under a Law of Grace, and none under the Law and Covenant of Innocency only: So I now add, that all ſhall be judged by that Law which they were under; *They that have ſinned without a* (written) *Law, ſhall be judged without that Law:* And what ſtate each particular Soul is in, the Judge only knoweth, and not we, who are inſolently arrogant, if we will ſtep up into his Throne, and judge his Subjects without his Commiſſion. But this we know that God hath *various degrees* of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments* (as to *Infants* and *Adult*, ſo to the *Adult among themſelves.*) And that he that gained but two Talents ſhall be Ruler of *two Cities:* And he that had but one might have improved one, though he could not have improved more than he had: *And that they that have done good ſhall go into everlaſting life, and thoſe that have done evil to everlaſting puniſhment.* And the *kinds and degrees* of their different puniſhments hereafter, how *great*, and how far *involuntary*, they are beyond the very miſerable caſe of their *ſinfulneſs it ſelf*, are things that are unknown to us. But certain we are, that the Judge of all the world will do righteouſly, and that all wiſe and righteous mens judgments, when they ſhall ſee what the number of Sufferers, and the ſorts and degrees of their puniſhment are, ſhall be fully ſatisfied of the *Goodneſs, Clemency, Wiſdom and Juſtice* of God, and never once wiſh it had been otherwiſe. And that the *Servant that knew his Lords Will, and prepared not himſelf, nor did according to his Will, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes: But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with few ſtripes. For unto whomſoever much is given, of him ſhall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him will they ask the more.*

Rom. 2.

Matth. 25. laſt.

Luk. 12. 47, 48.

371. It is little underſtood by moſt how much man by ſin it ſelf is effectively his own Tormenter, (which tempteth man to doubt of Hell, as if it were Gods too much ſeverity ſo to puniſh.) How Sin is a puniſhment it ſelf, and how God antecedently made mans nature ſuch, that if he would ſin, it ſhould torment him and undo him of it ſelf (like poyſon to the Body) I have opened in the firſt Chapter. See *Gabr. Biel in* 2. *d.* 36. that *Omne peccatum eſt pœna*, and the four Reaſons of *Bonavent.* recited by him.

372. The *Stoicks* and *Platoniſts* Revolution, and the *Pythagoreans* Re-incorporation, are ſo like the Chriſtian Doctrine of the Reſurrection, that (though we muſt not with *Origin* ſeek to make them liker than they are, yet) thoſe Infidels are unexcuſable who take this for incredible, and yet take the other for the moſt rational conjecture. *

* Such as are moſt of the ſober Heathens in the world. For the moſt religious and ſober of them are *Pythagoreans* to this day: *Lege Varenium de diverſ. Relig. poſt Hiſt. Japon.*

7 AP 53

Bleſs, Lord, thy own reconciling Truths, to the healing of thy Churches, or at leaſt of ſome diſ-joynted minds. And teach me with patience to bear the Obloquy and Reproach of miſtaken zealous Cenſurers: And forgive them that know not what they ſay or do. And wherein I err, forgive and rectifie me, and better inform both the Reader *and me.*

The Third Part:

OF

God's Gracious Operations

ON

MANS SOUL;

Their DIFFERENCE, and the

OPERATIONS

OF

MANS WILL.

For the fuller Decision of the Controversies about EFFECTUAL and DIFFERENCING GRACE.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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The Third Part:

OF GOD'S GRACIOUS OPERATIONS ON MANS SOUL: AND THE SUB-OPERATIONS OF MANS WILL.

For the *Ending* the Contentions about *Sufficient* and *Effectual*, *Common* and *Special Grace*, and *Free-Will*.

The Preface.

§. 1. THE *first Part* of this Treatise, though largest, and fullest of mens contentious Questions and opinions, is furthest from the true point of the difference and difficulty, which troubleth the Church. And is made large by accident, by way of disquisition and detection of the many ensnaring questions, and vain or hurtful wranglings of the Schoolmen.

The *Second Part* cometh nearer our chief Controversies, and resolveth many other on the by; and containeth the summ of that part of Theologie, which is most clear, and sure, and necessary.

This *Third Part* which cometh up to the main Controverſie, is ſhort, and troubleth you leſs with other mens opinions, and Schoolmens Wranglings about Grace and Free-will: Partly becauſe you had enough of them by the way before; And chiefly becauſe I would not by tediouſneſs, and recitation of Contentions, obſcure that which I moſt deſire to make plain, nor diſcourage the Reader by the length.

I think if I can manifeſt, that there is no real, or conſiderable difference among the Learned and Moderate on each ſide, (ſuch as are the Synod of *Dort* on one ſide, and even *Bellarmine*, *Suarez*, *Ruiz*, *&c.* on the other, beſides the moderate Lutherans and Arminians, (who may be aſhamed if they go farther from us than the Jeſuites) beſides abundance of Schoolmen that are of a middle ſtrain, between the Dominicans and Jeſuites,) few underſtanding Divines would then think that there were any conſiderable difference remaining about Predeſtination, or the univerſality of Redemption; Thoſe differences being but reſpective unto this.

But about Perſeverance I confeſs that there doth a real difference remain: But that it is of leſs moment than moſt on both ſides ſay, and ſuch as is no way fit to quench Chriſtian Love, or alienate Chriſtians from each other, or hinder their liberties or peaceable communion, I have fully proved in the Second Part, and formerly in a peculiar Treatiſe entituled, *My Thoughts of Perſeverance*.

If therefore I can truly diſprove our pretended difference about the operations of Grace, or at leaſt prove it to be but as it is, no greater nor more intolerable than that of Perſeverance, I ſhall think that all is done that is (thus) neceſſary.

The main difference (ſeeming or real) is about the *Power* of *Mans will*: Of which I have ſpoken much in the Firſt Part, and purpoſely leave much to the Reconciling *Praxis* in the *Second Book*; which ſhall diſſipate the cloud of ambiguous words: Till then it ſhall here ſuffice to manifeſt, 1. That we are agreed with them whoſe conciliation I endeavour, that it is not the natural Powers eſſential to a man which we are deprived of. 2. But that theſe Powers have by our common corruption, a ſinful Diſpoſition, unfitting them for a due exerciſe for God and againſt ſin. 3. And that all men (at leaſt at age) are not depraved in the ſame degree. 4. That this *ill diſpoſition* is called a *Moral Impotency*, when it is ſuch as while it remaineth, the ſinful Act is ever done, or the commanded act is never done. There is then no Moral Power. 5. That the vitious ſinful impotency of the will, and its *Habitual* or *diſpoſitive unwillingneſs* to *good*, and *proneneſs* to things forbidden, is all one. 6. That he is *Morally Able*, who without any other grace than he hath, can do the thing commanded, or forbear the thing forbidden. 7. That there is no Power but of God. 8. That *Nature*, *common grace*, and *ſpecial grace*, give ſeveral powers or diſpoſitions. 9. That a moral *power* is leſs than a good habit. 10. That every man hath a moral proper power to do more good than he doth, and forbear more evil. 11. That every man is commanded to uſe ſome means in order to his ſalvation, which he is morally able to uſe. 12. That God uſeth to bear long with the abuſers of their Power before he forſake them. 13. That many have many perſwaſions and helps to uſe their power that abuſe it. 14. That it's juſt with God to forſake ſuch. 15. And great mercy to the elect not to be ſo forſaken. All which will be made clearer in their due connexion, which I ſhall now here offer you.

§. 2. AS for the five Articles: I. The Article of Predestination, II. And the Article of Redemption, contain no difference between the parties, but only as they relate to the Articles of Free-will and effectual Grace, as is aforesaid. For all must agree that *God Decreed* and *Christ procured all that Grace or Mercy for men which he giveth them:* Of which the *Conditional gift* of the Love of the Father, the Grace of the Son, and the Communion of the Holy Spirit in the Covenant of Grace, with a Commission to his Ministers freely to offer it to all Believing Consenters, and to seal it and deliver it by Baptism, is a great part: And many mercies, teachings, perswasions, and motions tending to draw them to Consent is another part. God decreed not to deny men that which he giveth them; and Christs Death procured them all that he giveth them. To which add what elsewhere I have opened, that there is no necessity of ascribing to God any *Positive Decrees* of *Negations* or nothings. Else there must be a Decree against the existence of all the myriads of possible animals, atomes, names, words, &c. And remember that to *Permit* is not-to hinder, and so is a *meer negation*, or a *doing nothing*; and that *not-to-give faith, repentance, grace, the Gospel*, &c. is a negation, or a *nothing*, and so need no Decree, seeing a *not-decreeing to give*, &c. is sufficient: so that the whole of the Controversie about these two Articles is clearly devolved to the Controversies of *Grace and Free-will.*

III. And concerning Free-will it cannot be denyed, but that *Natural Free-will* is part of that excellency or Image of God, by which man is differenced from bruits; and that it is such a *faculty* by which *man can in some instances, determine his own will to this rather than that, without Divine predetermination*; which is certain in the *case of sin*, yea and of *some good*. For *Adam*'s will could without any other grace than he had, have forborn his sin. Or else still all is but resolved into Gods meer will. And it is agreed on (as is said before) that all men can do more good than they do, and forbear more evil than they forbear, and that without any more grace or help than they have when they use it not: so that it is not abhorrent from the nature of Free-will, for a man to make a good use or an ill, of the same measure of grace at several times, or for several men to make several uses of the same measure. Therefore it is no unjust answer to the question, [Why did he forbear this sin to day, and not yesterday] or [Why did this man forbear sin and not that, supposing them to have the same measure of assisting grace,] to say [Because, this man, at this time, used that power which God had given him, in stirring up his own will to concurr with grace; and the other man, or this at another time, did not what he could.] Not that this answer is good in all cases, (where more grace is necessary to the effect,) but in this forementioned. So that it is no Deifying of the will of a Rational free-Agent, to say that it is *essentially a self-determining faculty, made by God in the Image of his Liberty, and depending on him, and not able to Act without him as the first Cause, but yet on supposition of his Natural preservation and universal concurse, and of his directions and Laws, it is able to make choice* hic & nunc *to will or not will, to will this rather than that, without Divine necessitating predetermination, and without any more Grace or help than sometime it hath when it doth the contrary*: All which shewing the natural power of mans will, and its liberty, must be readily acknowledged by all sides, that will not say that *Adams* first sin, and every sin of all men else, are all resolved into Gods causation in case of commissions, and Gods non-causation in case of omissions, and into Gods will in both;

and that man can no more do any thing but what he doth, than he can be God, or overcome God, or live and act without God.

And as we must thus agree that natural Liberty consisteth in a self-determining power peculiar to Rational free agents; so we are all agreed except the Pelagians, that mans nature is vitiated by Original sin, and therefore that the will which is naturally free from force and necessitation (except from God, who never necessitateth it to evil,) is yet in servitude to our own concupiscence, and is not free either from the enticements of sense, or the erroneous conduct of a blinded mind, or from its own vicious habits, (aversèness to God and holy things, and proneness to things sensual, and seeming good:) And therefore that this Holy, or Moral Liberty of the will, must have the Medicinal Grace of Christ to heal it; (of which next.)

I speak not of Grace as it is Gods favour, but the effect: *de gratia data, non de gratia dante.*

IV. And as to the Article of Effectual Grace, it is agreed on (and cannot with sobriety be gainsayed without subverting the main doctrine of the Scriptures) that whereas besides the Preparatory or Promeriting Grace of Christs own performance, there is yet a three-fold Grace necessary for the application or conveyance of the Benefits purchased by Christ, in the *measure* hereafter *mentioned*, all this is common.

I. The first sort of Grace lyeth in the enacting of a *new Law of Grace*, called also in several respects, *The new Testament*, the *new Covenant*, and the *Promise*. And as to this it is agreed, 1. That God made this Law, Covenant or promise in the *first Edition* with *Adam* and *Eve* after the fall, *Gen.* 3. 15. (*the seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head,*) and did by *Actual Remission*, of their sin, and *not-punishing* them as the first Law threatned, yet more *plainly* manifest to them the *pardoning Grace* of this Covenant; And that he made this *new Law* or *Covenant* to all mankind in and by them: And that he again renewed the *same Covenant* of Grace with all mankind *in Noah* after the deluge. Those few inconsiderate persons that deny this, are not so valuable as to be an exception to our Concord. It is an intolerable conceit of any to think that the tenour or sence of the *Conditional Covenant* of Grace (for I talk of no other) extendeth not universally to all men, but that any men are yet left under no other Law or conditional-promise or Covenant, than that of Innocency. For if that were true, 1. Then God should be supposed to make men a promise of Life, on a condition of present natural impossibility; And to say to sinners [*If you be not sinners*, you shall live.] 2. And to oblige men to the same Impossibilities as the means of their salvation, saying still to sinners [I require you sinners that you be no sinners that you may be saved.] 3. Which is indeed to say that the case of all that are under the first Law of Innocency only is desperate, and they have no more hope or remedy than the Devils. 4. And then Christ had mistaken the matter himself, when he commanded his Ministers to Preach this Gospel or Covenant to all the world, and every (humane) Creature, and tell them that If they believe they shall be saved, and to offer them Baptism if they consent. 5. And either Preachers must preach an untruth to many, or else not know what man to preach to. 6. But the actual force and obligation of the Covenant, puts all out of doubt, that the world is under a Law of Grace: For what man, that by siding hath not his understanding utterly distorted, to look only on one side, can say that none but the Elect are bound to Believe in Christ, or to Repent of sin, or to turn to God? and this as a means of their salvation? What man dare say, that any Heathens in the World, are under no obligation, to use any means at all, for the pardon of their sins, or the recovery and saving of their

their ſouls? What man dare ſay that it is no ſin in them not to uſe any ſuch means? And what duty or ſin can there be without a Law? And what Law can bind men to accept of Grace, and to ſeek it, and uſe means for pardon, renovation and ſalvation, but the new Covenant or Law of Grace? Sure the Law of Innocency hath no ſuch obligation. 7. Laſtly, And Gods uſage of all the world, puts the caſe paſt Controverſie. For he uſeth no man according to the meer Law of Innocency: All the world have a great proportion of the Mercies of the New Covenant; and therefore are not under the Covenant of Innocency alone.

Yet we maintain that the preceptive part of the Law of Innocency as to the future, is ſtill in force to all men [Obey perfectly;] And that the penal part is ſo far in force as to make death in the firſt inſtant due for every ſin: But we add, 1. That the Remedying pardoning Law being in force with it, doth immediately diſſolve that obligation, and make it uneffectual to the puniſhment of believers: 2. And that the *Promiſing* part of the Covenant of Innocency is utterly ceaſed by the ceſſation of mans capacity: And therefore that the Preceptive part (for perfection) is now no Condition of Life to any man.

Two things I was wont in my Ignorance to ſay againſt the univerſal tenour of the new Covenant. 1. That God diſtinguiſhed and excluded ſome at the firſt making of it, under the name of the *Seed of the Serpent*: But 1. No Scripture giveth us the leaſt ground to think that men equally guilty, are ſome called the Seed of the Serpent, and ſome of the Woman, meerly as denominated from or diſtinguiſhed by Gods own will or decree, without any real difference in the perſons. 2. And if the Image of Satan in Original ſin, were it that denominated the Seed of the Serpent, then all the world ſhould be excluded, becauſe all are ſuch before they are regenerate. 3. Therefore it is plain that it is not meer Original ſin that denominateth any one, the Serpents Seed, in the ſence of that Text, but a conſequent rejection and oppoſition of the Mediator or Grace of the new Covenant.

2. I was wont in my great Ignorance in my youth to think, that All men were meerly under the firſt Covenant, till Converſion, and then they came under the ſecond only. But this was but Confuſion. To be under a Law or offered Covenant, as the terms of life or death, is one thing; And ſo all are under a Law or Covenant of Grace, and no man under the meer Law of Innocency; obliged to perfection as the ſole condition of life: And to be obedient to this Law, and a *Conſenter* to this Covenant, and ſo to be *in the Covenant* as *Mutual*, is another thing; And this is the caſe of *Conſenters* only.

So that I may take it for granted that we are agreed, that as to the firſt Edition of the Law of Grace to *Adam* and *Noe*, it extendeth or is in force to all the world, at leaſt, till by enmity againſt Grace, they have made themſelves deſperate as the Serpents ſeed: Yea then, the Law of Grace is in force to them, though they reject the Grace of it.

2. And as to the laſt Edition of the Covenant of Grace by Chriſt, 1. The tenour of it extendeth to all; as is viſible *Matth.* 28. 19. *Mark* 16. 16. *Joh.* 3. 16. 2. And Chriſt hath made it the office of his Miniſters by his commiſſion, to promulgate and offer it to all. 3. And whereas providence concurreth not to the univerſal execution, we muſt all confeſs, that Chriſt came not to put the world into a worſe condition than he found them in. If he did any no good by his Incarnation, he would do them no harm. Therefore they that never hear the Goſpel, are ſtill under the firſt Edition of the Covenant made with *Adam* and *Noah*, ſo far as

it is unaltered. I add that word, becauſe, that ſo far as the Promiſe was to give ſalvation by the Meſſiah hereafter to be incarnate, none is now bound to expect his future Incarnation, becauſe it is paſt. But the ſame benefits that were due to believers before Chriſts incarnation, are due ſince upon the true performance of ſo much of the condition as is ſtill in force, and not repealed.

3. And we muſt needs agree, that the Ignorance of the Apoſtles before Chriſts ſufferings, of his death, ſacrifice, and reſurrection, doth ſhew, that the faith of the Godly Jews then, was far more general, and leſs particular, than the faith now required of Chriſtians.

4. And alſo, that more was required then, to be known particularly by the Jews that had the Scripture and Tradition to acquaint them with the Meſſiah to come, than of the reſt of the world, that had not thoſe diſtinct diſcoveries, nor *Abraham*'s promiſes made known unto them: And how much *Gen.* 3. 15. might cauſe them to underſtand, we may conjecture by the words At leaſt this much was required of all, that they believe that their ſin deſerveth puniſhment, and miſery, and yet that God of his abundant mercy, by his Wiſdom ſecuring his Truth and Juſtice, will pardon ſin and grant ſalvation to all that truly Believe and Truſt in that his Wiſdom and Mercy, and repent of their ſins, and unfeignedly give up themſelves to God as their merciful Redeemer. Thus far we are agreed about the Grace of the Covenant.

II. And as to the ſecond ſort of Communicative Grace, that is, The *Promulgation of this Law of Grace*, and *offers* of the Covenant-Benefits to man, we are and muſt be all agreed, 1. That (beſides what Tradition ſacrificing did intimate,) the firſt Edition of the Covenant of Grace (as is ſaid) is univerſally promulgate by Providence. For whereas by the violation of the Law of Innocency, all bleſſings were forfeited, and all miſeries deſerved, and no man had any notice by that Law, of any hope or means of his recovery: on the contrary, all the world hath great abundant mercies, and are not puniſhed according to the firſt Law, and therefore have ſenſible forgiveneſs of ſin; and all have an inward teſtimony or conviction, that they are obliged to gratitude for theſe mercies, and alſo to the uſe of certain means (as Repentance, Prayer, *&c.*) in order to their farther pardon and ſalvation. And all this fully demonſtrateth that God hath ſo far promulgated the old Edition of the Covenant of Grace, as to make it notorious that the world is not under the meer Law of Innocency. And to believe in a Merciful pardoning God, (as he was *Exod.* 34. proclaimed to *Moſes*, is become even the Law of lapſed Nature.

2. And as I ſaid, the laſt Edition of the Covenant is commanded by Chriſt in his Miniſters commiſſion to be proclaimed to all the world: Yea Magiſtrates, parents, neighbours, all men, in their ſeveral capacities are bound to promote it. 3. And the world hath actually heard ſo much of the Goſpel, as that *Paul* in his dayes ſaid, That their ſound went into all the Earth and their words to the end of the world, *Rom.* 10. 18. when it had gone but a little way in compariſon of what it hath ſince done. Thus far we are agreed of the *Promulgation*.

III. The third ſort of Grace is the Internal operation of the Spirit of God upon mens hearts; And here it is that the heart of all our difference ſeemeth to lie.

SECT.

SECT. I.

The presupposed Principles.

§. 1. THe way of Gods operation on souls, yea, or bodies, or any creature, is so unsearchable, that I had rather silence, than pretend to decide abundance of the Controversies long agitated about it. And had not mens audacious decisions, and furious contentions (not yet allowing the Churches peace) made it accidentally necessary to repress their presumption and their error, I should reverently have passed by much that I must now meddle with. But the cure must be suited to the disease.

§. 2. So much as is *intelligible herein, is divine, and honourable, and amiable; and the prospect of Gods Providence is delectable to the wise. For his works are great, and wonderful, sought out of them that have pleasure therein.

* See a notable discourse of *Bradwardine* of mans little knowledge of God, *li.* 1. *c.* 1. *cor.* 32. *contra philos.* which excellently rebuketh audacity in this case.

§. 3. The nature or the *order* of them cannot be known by the single consideration of particular effects; but by beginning at the original, and proceeding orderly from the superiour Causes to the inferiour, and seeing how every thing worketh in its proper capacity and place: which man can do but very defectively; and therefore knoweth but little or in part.

§. 4. It is necessary therefore that I briefly look back to the Principles of Providence and Action; which were partly mentioned before, where UNITY in TRINITY shineth to us in God and in his works.

§. 5. *GOD is ONE INFINITE SPIRIT, in THREE ESSENTIAL VIRTUES or PRINCIPLES, LIFE (or ACTIVE POWER) UNDERSTANDING and WILL, † which are wonderfully ONE in ESSENCE, yet THREE we know not perfectly how, but as the *Scotists* say, *formaliter*, or rather as the *Nominals*, by *connotation* of their objects and operations *ad extra*, and so by *Relation*, and *extrinsick Denomination*. Not that *Life*, *Intellect* and *Will*, are formally the same in God as in the Creature, or can formally be conceived by us; But that while we must know God in a Glass, *mans soul* must be this *Glass*, and the Scriptures must be our *Onomasticon* and Logick Books, and we must use such *Notions* and *Names* of *God*, or *none*.

† Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor. 8. p. 5. *Deus est Substantia & Potentia rationalis, habens intellectum & liberam voluntatem, cognoscens actualiter & volens.*

§. 6. * These Principles as Transcendent in PERFECTION, are called GREATNESS † (or OMNIPOTENCE) WISDOM and GOODNESS (or LOVE) by names borrowed from their effects upon the creatures.

* *Bradwardins* language is, *Deum esse Omnipotentem activè, nullipotentem passivè.* li. 1. cap. 1. corol. 1. n. 7. p. 5.

† *Communiter antiqui Scholastici agunt de intellectu, Voluntate, & Potentia operativa Dei quasi de Potentiis rationi distinctis, instituuntque de illis peculiares tractatus cum Magist.* Thom. &c. Ruiz de Volunt. Dei disp. 14. §. 4. pag. 158. And he contradicting it saith as much, *Nihilominus intra easdem lineas & gradus intellectus & voluntatis distinguimus Potentiam executivam ut partem earundem Potentiarum:* But less aptly.

§. 7. This ONE GOD, is revealed to us in THREE PERSONS, The FATHER, the λόγος (Wisdom, Word and Son) and the HOLY SPIRIT. One in Essence: *incomprehensibly Three, ad intus*; but *discernibly* Three, in their *Operations ad extra*, and *Relations* thereto.

§. 8. As we must conceive of GODS ESSENCE by INADÆQUATE Conceptions, (as aforesaid) or not at all, so must we of his EXISTENCE as in the Creature we call it Modally; *viz.* His ESSENCE being *vita* (substance,) *VIRTUS & PERFECTIO* (which in the Creature, is MATTER (or substance) FORM and DEGREE): and his FORMAL *VIRTUS* being *Potentia-Vitalis, Intellect and Will*; so his *Existence* is considerable, 1. In VIRTUE it self, radically, (which is *Potentia Activa Inclinata.*) 2. As in *Act*, IMMANENT, objectively, (as Gods *self-living, self-knowing* and *self-loving.*) 3. And as in

in *ACTION ad extra*, either *objectively* or effectively TRANSIENT. And in this third reſpect Gods Eſſence is the Operator of all his works.

§. 9. The Three Divine *Principles* (*Vital-active Power*, *Intellect* and *Will*) and the Three Divine Perſons, (*Father*, *Word* and *Spirit*) do alwayes inſeparably co-operate; But ſo as that there is a Trinity alſo of their *Impreſſions* or *Veſtigia*, which are anſwerably to have a Trine attribution, each Principle being eminently apparent in his own impreſſion, though with the reſt.

§. 10. Gods WORKS are CREATION, GOVERNING and PERFECTING: And ſo he is 1. The firſt EFFICIENT OF ALL BEING *EX QUO* (by *creating* and *continuing*, which are as one;) 2. The DISPOSING or GOVERNING Cauſe *PER QUEM*; 3. The END, *AD QUEM*, *& IN QUO perficiuntur*.

§. 11. God having given a BEING to the Creatures, and their various *ſpecies* of being, is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as *Active* or *Paſſive* in their ſeveral Capacities: And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold *Paſſives*; *viz.* INTELLECTUAL, SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS (or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter) upon AIR, WATER and EARTH.

§. 12. GOD is ſo *Active* as not to be at all PASSIVE. All the Active Creatures are firſt *Paſſive* as receiving the Influx of the firſt Cauſe, and Inferiours from the Superiour ſecond Cauſes: But they are Naturally Active in that dependence, and ſuppoſing that Influx.

§. 13. The works of Providence about the Exiſtent Creatures, are MOTION cauſing *Motion*: GUBERNATION cauſing ORDER: and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination, ſatisfying their Appetites, and giving them their Ends. *

§. 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image, in *Vital-Active-Power*, *Intellect*, and *Free-will*, a Threefold *Virtue in One*, as the *formal Eſſence* of his *ſoul*, is peculiarly fitted for ſuch acts of Providence as he muſt be under.

§. 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. *Movers*, 2. *Governours* of the Inferiour; ſo alſo are they, 3. Their *Immediate* or neareſt *End*; having a *Goodneſs* in them fitted to *attract*, *terminate* and *ſatisfie* the Appetites of the Inferiour: God is not the only end of Appetites.

§. 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-exiſtent, are, 1. *Action* or *Motion*, 2. Special *Government*, 3. *Love*. From whence God is Related to Man (the fundamental Relation of CREATOR ſuppoſed,) † 1. As *ACTOR vel MOTOR*, 2. As *RECTOR*, 3. As *AMICUS*, *vel FINIS*, Lover, Benefactor and End. 1. ACTION as ſuch is from God in the firſt relation. 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the ſecond. 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection, is in him in the third.

§. 17. *Creation* inferreth *Propriety*; and making us *Good* and *inter bona* and *ad bonum* inferreth that God is our *Benefactor*: So that *ab origine* he ſtanding in theſe three Relations to us, from what is paſt, he is to *diſpoſe* of us by Providence accordingly.

§. 18. Gods *Omnipotence* is moſt conſpicuous in Creation (propriety), and *Motion*: His *wiſdom* in *Governing* and *Order*: and his *Good will* in our *Benefits* (efficiently) and our *Perfection* (finally) in mutual Love.

§. 19. MOTION is cauſed by *Moving* [illegible]*rce* impreſſed: ORDER (moral)

* Cyprianus *ſic explicat* Act. 17. *In ipſo ſumus, movemur, vivimus. In Patre ſumus, in Filio vivimus, in Spiritu Sancto movemur: Pater eſt fons omnis eſſentiæ; Filius eſt Vitæ; Spiritus Sanctus eſt agitator ſeu motor: unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah, quod ſignificat endelechiam, continuam & perennem agitationem*: Vid. Strigel. in Melanct. Loc. com. pag. 294.

† I hold with *Bradwardine* li. 1. c. 2. cor. 3. *Quod neceſſe eſt Deum ſervare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cauſa creata*: Et c. 3. cor. 3. *Quod nulla res poteſt aliquid facere, niſi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente*: Et c. 4. cor. 3. *eadem de Deo Motore*; taking immediation for proximity, and *facere & movere* for the action as ſuch, and not for the meer moral ſpecification and comparability.

(moral) by LAW or *signification* of Gods Will *de debito*: And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END.

§. 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called: From the second *Moral* RECTITUDE: In the third is FELICITY; as to single persons.

§. 21. From the first (*viz.* God as *Actor*) upon Many or the Universe, ariseth *CO-OPERATION* or Concurse; All things work together, as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second (Divine ORDERING) ariseth HARMONY: and from the third, UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and *Melody* of the whole Creation; and to man, *perfect Love*.

§. 22. *Motion* is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion, or passive impedition: and its effect as such not *free*, but *Necessary*. Government by Law is resistible, and obedience free. *Final Goodness* or *Love*, do perfect and felicitate, *necessarily and freely*, not *effecting*, (for so they are not now considered) but *satisfying* so far as they are enjoyed.

§. 23. The *Creation* being *past*, and *Beings existent* (except what Generation and Composition make, unsearchably,) and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled, we shall confound and be confounded, if we distinguish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them, and their foresaid differences in themselves.

SECT. II.

The Order of Divine Operations.

§. 1. GOD is the *Immediate Cause* of all *things* and *actions*, caused by him, as to the *Proximity* of God to the effect. For he is every where present in Essence, and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self. We must not conceive of Gods using means, as we do of mans, where the Pen, the Saw, the Knife, *&c.* is between the hand and the effect: God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth, as if he used no second cause.

§. 2. They that say God is thus *Causa Immediata Immediatione & Suppositi seu Essentiæ & Virtutis*, speak true, but not aptly, because it ill insinuateth as if Gods *Virtus* were not his *Essence*: when as in God they are all one: only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish *suppositum à virtute*, but not otherwise; And it is not as *quid creatum* that we speak of *Virtus*.

§. 3. Since the Creation, in the *Motions* of Providence, God who at first made the Universe to be *One* by conjunction and co-operation of parts (as truly as a Clock or Man is one) hath setled a course of second Causes, that one thing may act upon and move another; and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause, yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes: which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course, and some of them Voluntary and Free, and operate more mutably and contingently.

§. 4. The course of *Necessitating Causes* is commonly called NATURE, and the Influence of *Angels* and other *Voluntary Causes* distinguished from *Natural*: But they all operate as *second Causes* under the Influx and Government of God, upon us that are here on earth.

* *Bradwardine ib. p.* 172. seemeth to favour *Averrois* saying that God is *Forma omnis formæ, & forma maxime essentialis & principalis cujuscunque formati*: and so acteth all things: And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature, we mean that he is More and not Less. And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God, than that he is *eminently more than the soul of the world*. And *c.* 14. *p.* 210. he calleth [*Necessarium*] the most proper name of God. But when he saith *c.* 17. that Gods Essence, Omnipotence, Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge, and cause it, and so putteth Causes and Effects in God, he is too bold.

§. 5. There is no *Place* where any *Corporeal* being is, where ſome *Active created Nature* is not with it: ſo that conſidering the *proximity* and the *natures*, we may well conclude, that we know of no *corporal motion* under the Sun, which God effecteth by himſelf alone, without any ſecond Cauſe.

§. 6. *Joh. Sariſburienſis* and ſome Schoolmen liken Gods preſence with the Creature in operation, to the fire in a red hot Iron, where you would think all were Fire and all Iron: But the ſimilitude is too low. The SUN is the moſt Notable Inſtrument in viſible Nature: And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx; God and the Sun do what the Sun doth: and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth (that's corporeal) without it.

§. 7. But the Sun moveth nothing (as the *Carteſians* dream) by a ſingle *Motive Influx alone*; but by emiſſion of its Threefold Influx (as every Active Nature doth;) that is, *Motive*, *Illuminative* and *Caleſactive*; which are *One*-radically in *Three*-effectively.

§. 8. This Efflux of the Sun is univerſal and equal *ex parte ſui*: But cauſeth wonderful diverſity of effects, without diverſity in *God the prime Cauſe*, or *in it ſelf*. The ſame Influx cauſeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to ſtink, and the Flowers of the ſweeter Plants to be ſweet; ſome things to *live*, and ſome to dye; ſome things to be ſoft, and ſome hard, *&c.* In a word, there are few changes or various actions below (in bodies) which the Sun is *not* the Cauſe of, without difference in it ſelf: But not the ſpecifying Cauſe.

§. 9. The reaſon why one equal Influx cauſeth ſuch wonderful diverſity of motions, is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures. *Recipitur ad modum recipientis.* So one poiſe maketh various Motions in a Clock, *&c.*

§. 10. God operateth on ſecond Cauſes, as God, Omnipotently; but not *ad ultimum potentiæ*, but *Freely* as he pleaſeth.

§. 11. God worketh *by ſecond Cauſes*, according to the ſaid Cauſes aptitude; ſo that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the ſecond cauſe which God uſeth.

§. 12. There is a ſuperiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as *Bodies*; And whether God work on all our ſouls by *ſuperiour Spirits* as ſecond Cauſes, is unknown to us: It is not improbable, according to the order of his providence in other things: But we know little of it certainly.

§. 13. But certain we are that ſuperiour Voluntary Agents, Angels and Devils, have very much to do with our ſouls, and operate much upon them. It is a wonderful power, which wiſe obſervers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination, or Thinking faculty; (of which I could give ſome inſtances enough to convince a rational *Sadducee.*) And it is not like that good Angels have leſs *power*, *skill*, or *will*.

§. 14. And we are ſure that God hath ordained *One Great Univerſal ſecond Cauſe* to convey his Spirit and Grace by; which is JESUS CHRIST. As the Sun is an Univerſal Cauſe of Motion, Light and Heat, to Inferiour creatures, and God operateth by the Sun; So is *Chriſt* ſet as a *Sun* of Righteouſneſs, by whom God will convey his ſpiritual Influx to mens ſouls: and there is now no other conveyance to be expected.

§. 15. Chriſts Humane Nature united perſonally to the Divine and Glorified, is by the Office of Mediator Authorized, and by *Perſonal Union* and the *Fulneſs* of the *Holy Spirit enabled* and *fitted* to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind.

§. 16. Object.

§. 16. Object. *A Creature cannot be a Cauſe of the Operation of the Holy Ghoſt, who is God the Creator; Sending is the Act of a Superiour: But Chriſts humanity is not ſuperiour to the Holy Ghoſt.*

Anſw. 1. Chriſt as a Creature is no Cauſe of any Eſſential or purely Immanent Act of God (for that hath no Cauſe.) But 1. He is a Cauſe of the Spirits *operation*, as it ſignifieth the *effect*; 2. And ſo the cauſe why his Act is *terminated* on the ſoul; and 3. Of the *ordering* of theſe *effects*; why rather on this ſoul than on that, and at this *time*, *meaſure*, *&c.* And 2. This Chriſt doth not as a *ſuperiour ſender* of the Spirit, but a *Miniſterial*, and a ſecond cauſe: As a Maſter payeth his ſervants as his Steward determineth.

§. 17. It is certain that *Chriſt* is the *Political* Cauſe or Head of this ſpiritual Influx on ſouls: that is, As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the *Perſons*, *meaſure*, *time*, *conditions*, of the Communication of the Spirit: But whether he be a *Phyſical Head* of this Influx, by *proper efficiency giving* the *Spirit* from himſelf, as the Sun giveth us its Influx, is all that is diſputable. That is, Whether the Spirit be firſt given Inherently to Chriſt, and paſs from his perſon (as his) unto us, as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members?

§. 18. This queſtion may be put, either of all *Natural Being* and *Motion*, or only of *Spiritual Motion* in the ſoul of man. Whether Chriſt be ſo the *Head* of *Nature*, as that *all Nature* in *Heaven* and *Earth*, is ſuſtained and actuated by him as the phyſical efficient Cauſe? or whether this be true of *this Lower World* which was curſt for ſin? or whether it be true, at leaſt of *Humane nature?* or whether it be true *only of Gracious operations?*

§. 19. 1. That Chriſt hath the *Political* diſpoſe of the whole Univerſe (contained in the words *Heaven* and *Earth*) the Scripture ſeemeth to aſſert. 2. That he hath the *Political* diſpoſal of *humane nature*, and of all other creatures that belong to man, ſo far as they belong to him (Angels, Devils, Sun, Air, Earth, *&c.*) is paſt diſpute. 3. That the *real phyſical effects* (acts and habits) of the Spirit on mens ſouls, are cauſed by Chriſts Moral Cauſation by his Merit, and his Political Miſſion, is paſt diſpute. 4. That beſides all this, the Spirit it ſelf by Baptiſm is in Covenant with all the members of Chriſt, and that as they are ſuch, and is in a prior Covenant firſt Related to Chriſt himſelf, and ſo by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Chriſt, is paſt diſpute. 5. And that Chriſt himſelf doth make ſuch Phyſical changes on our ſouls by *Means*, and by the foreſaid Political Miſſion of the Spirit, by which we are made *Receptive* of more of the Spirits operations, is paſt diſpute. 6. But whether moreover, any Action of Chriſts own Humane ſoul glorified do phyſically reach our ſouls? or whether the Holy Ghoſt may in its own eſſential Virtue (which is every where) be ſaid to be more in Chriſt than elſewhere and communicated to us as from the root, or the Spirits effects on the ſoul to come by Reflection from the firſt effects on Chriſt, as Light and Heat from the Sun by a *Speculum* or Burning-glaſs, are queſtions not for me to determine.

§. 20. Chriſts ſpiritual Influx on ſouls is not ſingle, but is ever *Three* in *One* (as the *Sun*'s aforeſaid,) which are according to the Threefold Divine Excellencies Communicated, and the Threefold humane Receptive faculties; *viz.* LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE: or ſpiritual *Vivification*, *Activity* and *Power*, ſpiritual *Illumination* of the *Intellect*, and ſpiritual *Converſion* or *Sanctification* of the *will* by holy *Love*.

§. 21. It is certain that it is not *only on believers* that Christ operateth by the *spirit*: For he draweth men by it *to believe*: and many wicked men that are not his elect have common, even miraculous gifts of the spirit, * which are all communicated by Christ.

* Mat. 7. 21, 22, 23. Gal. 5. 1, 2, 3. Heb. 6. 5, 6. 2 Cor. 12.

§. 22. As *Nature* it self is in his *Political power*, and is delivered to him, so far as it is *reparable*, and belongeth to the reparation of man; so all *gifts* and *operations* Received by *any in the world*, which are *Mercies* contrary to *commerit*, are the effects of Christ: Even as the Sun shineth in the night by the Moon, and in the dawning of the day by it self unseen, and after by it self appearing; so Christ shineth to the Heathen world in abundance of natural and providential mercies, and by the help of many Creatures and experiences; and to some by nearer approaches, as well as to the Church by the manifestation of himself. All which is evident, 1. Because the whole lapsed world in *Adam* and *Noe* were brought under his own Covenant of Grace, according to which he operateth. 2. In that so much mercy after sin, will not stand with Gods regiment by the meer Law of Innocency, violated. 3. In that Christ is expresly called the *Saviour of the World*; and the *Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe; who dyed for all, in that all were dead, that they that live should live to him; who tasted death for every man*, &c. And Joh. 1. 9, 10, 11, 12. *That was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world* (or *coming* into the world, lighteth every man.) *He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.* And v. 4, 5. *In him was life, and the Life was the Light of man: and the Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not*, &c.

§. 23. This threefold Influx of Christs Spirit (for LIFE, LIGHT and LOVE) is not equally effectual on all, nor equally effectual on the same person at several times, nor each part of the influx equally effectual on the same person at the same time. The Reasons anon.

SECT. III.

Of the Operations and Principles as compared.

§. 1. THough *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Goodness* or Love, all co-operate by the spirit of Christ; yet in the work of *Mans* Recovery their Impressions are not equal. But as POWER with Wisdom and Love, more appeared in the CREATION, (as is aforesaid;) so WISDOM with *Power*, conveying *Love*, appeareth more in our *Redemption*; and LOVE with *Power* and *Wisdom* is most conspicuous and illustrious in our *Renewed* state, begun indeed by Sanctification, but perfect in our GLORIFICATION. * The Omnipotent Father (as is said) Createth Nature, with the *Son* and Holy Spirit. The *Son*, the *Wisdom* of the Father, is the Physicion of souls, and healeth them by SKILL with Power and Love. The Holy Ghost, called by the Schoolmen, The LOVE of God, dwelling and working peculiarly in us *to* and in *perfection*, with *power* and *Wisdom*, is the PERFECTION of the soul: And so *Natura*, *Medela*, *Sanitas*, are the various effects of the Divine operation.

* As to the Question between the Schoolmen *de fine & beatitudin*, undoubtedly the *Thomists* err in placing it chiefly in the Intellect (And *Medina* and others give fully reasons for it, and the *Scotists* (of whom *Vada* well handleth it) are far righter: And *Ovid. Romanus* briefly and clearly tells us the truth, *Quodlib.* 2. q. 18. p. 187. | *Beatitudo est in*

§. 2. Therefore the SONS operation in procuring and communicating the SPIRIT (of Love and Holiness) is *eminently fountial.*

§. 3. The

§. 3. The Impreſſions of all the Divine *Virtues* are excellent, in their ſeveral kinds: And it's hard for us to ſay that this is ſimply more excellent than that: But we can ſay, which is more ſuitable to the nature of man, to be *eſteemed* and Loved by him. And ſo we eſteem the *Impreſſions* of *Wiſdom* and *Love* as moſt ſuitable to us.

§. 4. A Horſe or Oxe excelleth Man in ſtrength, and a Bird or Hare or Dog in ſwiftneſs; and a Mountain and an Oak in Greatneſs: And yet we account the *Wiſdom* and *Moral Goodneſs* of man to be a greater excellency, and to make him the more noble Creature.

§. 5. And God ſeemeth to tell it us, 1. By calling *theſe his Image*. 2. And by making *man the Lord of theſe ſtronger* Creatures.

§. 6. And *among men*, we take him not for the moſt excellent who is the *ſtrongeſt*, but who is the *wiſeſt* and the *Beſt*. And therefore the *wiſeſt* and *Beſt* are by *Ariſtotle* ſaid to be born by Nature to *Rule* the reſt: and by all ſober men are thought to be the *Fitteſt* to *Guide* and *Rule* others; (how ſeldom ſoever it cometh to paſs:) while the Robuſter ſort are Labourers and Mechanicks.

§. 7. Yet I deny not but the *effect* is anſwerable to the Cauſe; And as Active-Power cauſeth Action, and *Wiſdom* and Government cauſeth the *Order* and *Rectitude* of action, and *Love* and *Goodneſs* the *Perfection* of it and the agent; ſo Gods *Vital-Power*, *Wiſdom* and *Goodneſs*, are *equal*, which are the Principles of all: As the Father, Son and Spirit are coequal: And God is indeed glorious in the *Motion* of Sun and Stars, *&c.* as well as in the *Wiſdom* and *Holineſs* of man. But beſides the foreſaid *ſuitableneſs*, this difference muſt be conſidered, that as *Life*, *Intellect* and *Will*, Power, *Wiſdom* and Goodneſs, are Inadequate conceptions of One God, ſo all together are a more perfect expreſſion of him, than one of them alone. Now in all theſe the former is ſtill implyed in the latter, as to the very ſenſe of the word, but not contrarily. *Power* doth not alway ſignifie *Wiſdom* or *Love*; but *Wiſdom* ſignifieth the *wiſdom* of one Potent, including *power*, (for there is *Potentia Intellectiva*.) And *Will* or *Love* include *Power* and Act. So *Action* may be without ORDER or Rectitude, and *Perfection*, but the *order* and *perfection* of *Acts*, include or ſuppoſe the Acts.

§. 8. It is therefore the glory of Gods SAPIENTIAL work of Government which *eminently* ſhineth forth in the communications of Grace by the Spirit of Chriſt: But not that Government which was fitted to the ſtate of Innocency; but that which ſtands nearer to the *End*, as more demonſtrating *Love*, and tending more effectually to it.

§. 9. Therefore it is much to be noted that all this frame of *Grace* as tending to Glory, is uſually called in Scripture, *The Kingdom of God*, and *The Kingdom of Heaven*, Matth. 13. 45, *&c.* which containeth the whole frame of Political Order and Government.

§. 10. This Kingdom is the ſtate of Relation between God and the Mediator as the Head or Ruler, and Man as the Subject, as he is to be guided by Grace to Glory. God who is Phyſically neither *Pars* nor *Totum* maketh himſelf here as it were a Relative Part, being the ſupream Head; and the Mediator the ſupream official Head, or general Adminiſtrator: who hath under him a courſe of Political means for the accompliſhment of this his work.

§. 11. As Chriſt himſelf is the Head Means or ſecond Cauſe, ſo under him are Prophets and Apoſtles, eminently qualified to make them fit to do this work ſo as tendeth to ſucceſs.

§. 12. Theſe

aliquo finaliter & in aliquo formaliter. Nam ſi ipſum objectum principale Voluntatis, prout habet rationem finis, ſit beatitudo, oportet quod beatitudo principaliter ſit in hoc objecto: —— & conſequenter formaliter in actu Voluntatis. Nam Voluntas in ſuum objectum tendit finaliter; ſed per ſuum actum tendit in objectum formaliter: Ex quo apparet quod beatitudo ſit magis in ipſo objecto Voluntatis, quam in actu: quia ratio finis eſt magis in objecto quam in actu.] This is clear truth, if you put but *finis* alone for *beatitudo*: For *Beatitudo qua talis* is not the principal end of man; but God as God in his perfect Goodneſs, and the fulfilling of his will next; and then our own beatitude with that of the bleſſed: And he maketh Viſion (and not Love) to be the ſecondary final object of all.

By *ſpecial Grace*, ſome mean two diſtinct things: *viz.* 1. Our Love to God and other holy Habits and acts, or an Inclination to them. 2. Gods favour to us, and acceptation of us, and that as relating to the Glory which he will give us: ſo that the firſt they call the *Habit* of Grace, *qualitas & qualitas*, &c. and the latter they call the *formal* nature of Grace, viz. *quatenus Deo gratioſi ſiu amati ſumus*. So *Alvarez de Aux. diſp.* 6. *p.* 275. [*Gratiam augeri in eſſe gratiæ, (& ſimiliter charitas in eſſe charitatis,) nihil aliud eſt quam quod per illam acceptetur juſtus ad majorem gloriam.*] By which he decideth the queſtion, whether Grace or Charity be increaſed by remiſs acts, or only by intenſe acts, ſaying that [1. *Gratia in eſſe gratiæ, & ſimiliter charitas in eſſe charitatis ſtatim augentur, etiam per actus remiſſos* (that is, We are made more acceptable to God, for greater glory:) But *augmentum gratiæ & charitatis in eſſe Habitûs, quod homo meretur per actus remiſſos, dabitur poſtea in primo inſtanti glorificationis.*] And it ſeems that

so they sometimes take *charitas* too, both for the Habit and Act of our Love, and for our *Amability* or Dearness to God. Now this is ill done: For these equivocal words signifie these not as one, but as two distinct things: *Amor & Amabilitas* or Dearness are two things: Though Love be materially our Lovelyness yet not formally: the latter being an objective relation resulting from the former.

¶. 12. These Prophets and Apostles were endued with that special infallible Spirit, by which they certainly delivered Christs doctrine and actions, and faithfully discharged all their trust.

¶. 13. They had the power of working Miracles many wayes to confirm their doctrine as the Truth of God. (Besides *Christs* Miracles.)

¶. 14. The Scriptures are Gods Record, which they left us to be the continual standing signifier of his will.

¶. 15. In these *Scriptures* are his *Doctrine* to *teach*, his *precepts* to *make duty* and *oblige*, and forbid sin (by prohibition;) his own and servants *examples* to *move*; his *threatnings* to drive; his *promises* to draw, *formed* into a *Covenant*, strongly to *engage*; the Recores also of his *Judgements* and *Mercies* upon others, that they might every way be fitted to their sanctifying use.

¶. 16. He hath also instituted his *Sacraments* by which the mutual Covenant might be celebrated the more obligingly for its effects.

¶. 17. He hath appointed his *ordinary Ministers* as his *standing* officers through all generations to *preach this word*; And he endoweth them with special gifts thereto; and chargeth them vehemently to *preach in season and out of season*, with *urgency* and importunity, even to all mankind, 2 *Tim.* 4. 1, 2. *Mat.* 28. 19, 20. whatever it cost them, and whatever they undergoe.

¶. 18. He hath appointed also *Prayer* as his Means to obtain Grace by preparing the heart to a due receptivity; by the excitation of desires after it: And *Praise and Thanksgiving* to sweeten it to us in the review when we have received it.

¶. 19. He hath commanded exercises of *humiliation*, *confession*, bringing down the body, to fit us to receive it by a due sense of our sins, unworthiness and wants.

¶. 20. He hath appointed the *publick assembling* of his servants, that concurse might augment the Sacred flame, in the performance of all this Sacred work.

¶. 21. He hath instituted the *Lords day*, to be wholly employed in such works and helps, that it be not neglected and lightly done.

¶. 22. He hath commanded every *private Christian* to be a helper to others, by *conference*, *exhortation*, and good *example*.

¶. 23. He hath made Pastoral discipline a great ordinance to promote the due performance of all the rest.

¶. 24. He hath commanded us by *secret Meditation*, Consideration, Examination, *&c.* to preach to our selves, and night and day to think on Scripture, God, Christ, Glory, *&c.* and to stir up all Gods graces in our selves, and to reprove our selves for all our sins.

¶. 25. He hath made it the duty of *Parents* to teach their Children diligently his word, lying down and rising up, at home and abroad, *Deut.* 6. & 11. and to educate them in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, having bound them first in Covenant to God and the Mediator.

¶. 26. He hath made it the duty of *husband and wife* to help each other herein, and of *masters* to help their servants, and all relations to sanctifie their places and opportunities to this use.

¶. 27. He doth by multitudes of *mercies* and *deliverances* further all this work, to make known the more his Love to win the hearts of men.

¶. 28. He greatly promoteth it also by *seasonable afflictions*, to humble the proud, and awake the sleepy.

¶. 29. He

§. 29. He maketh it mens great duty to *tame the body*, and *mortifie concupiſcence*, and *make no proviſion for the fleſh to ſatisfie the luſts thereof*, Rom. 13. 13, 14. & 8. 13. Gal. 5. 21, 22.

§. 30. He commandeth us to *avoid the company* of the *wicked*, and to joyn in the *Communion* of *Saints*, and walk with ſuch as will be our helpers toward Heaven.

§. 31. He commandeth us to avoid all *Temptations* of *Satan*, and the *world* and *fleſh*, and to live in a continual war againſt them.

§. 32. He maketh all the *world about* us, the *book* or *glaſs* in which we may ſee our *maker* and *his will*; yea even our *own natures*; and *every Creature* doth preach him to us; and all things muſt be ſanctified and uſed to this holy end.

§. 33. He ſetteth *Death* continually before our eyes, aſſuring us of the ſhortneſs of our lives, and ſhewing us how we muſt leave this world, that we may read *Vanity* upon all, and not be deceived by it.

§. 34. By all this we ſee that this *Kingdom of Chriſt*, is a *ſapiential frame of Moral Cauſes*, deſigned for the *Government* of *man*, in right *ordering* his internal and external acts, and glorifying eminently the *wiſdom* of our Ruler.

§. 35. And he that will think rightly of this excellent frame muſt have all theſe things in his conſideration: 1. That Chriſt himſelf is not only a *Juſtifier* and *Actor* of us, but a *Prophet*, *Prieſt* and *King*, and that the *Government* is *laid upon his ſhoulders*, Iſa. 9.6.

2. That we are not only *Patients* and *pardoned ſinners*, but alſo *Subjects*, and engaged *Covenanters*.

3. That Chriſts *Church* is not like a *Statuaries ſhop*, but a *Kingdom*, and a *School*, where all muſt *learn* and *obey*.

4. That Chriſt hath not only *Motive power*, but *Laws*, *Promiſes*, *Threatnings*, &c. to work by.

5. That his great bleſſings of *Glory* are his *Rewards*, and *Hell* at laſt after thoſe here, are his *puniſhments*, foretold to work on ſouls.

6. That he hath a day, in which as *Rector*, he will *judge the world in righteouſneſs, according to what we have done in the body*.

7. That *faith* is wrought by *Preaching*, and *Love* and *Hope* and *obedience* are the *ends* and *uſes* of *faith*.

8. That the *felicity* of *individuals*, and in them of the *Heavenly Society in one Glorified body with Chriſt*, is the *end* of all, where Gods *Remunerating Juſtice* is to be glorified, and his *governing Wiſdom* and *Love* for ever.

§. 36. From all this I conclude, That they that ſlight all this work of God, by the contemptuous name of *Moral Suaſion*, and take it to be a *diminutive term* as to the honour of it, to call it *Moral*, and *by Means*, and talk of Gods work of *Grace* on the ſoul, as if there were no more in it very honourable, than a *phyſical Motion*; and God Converted ſouls but as Boyes whip their Tops, or Women turn their Wheels, or the Spring moveth the Watch, are *Carteſian* blind Theologues, and overlook the very nature of that Theologie which they profeſs, which is the *Doctrine* of the *Kingdom of God over man*; And while they ſee little but *Matter* and *Motion*, they are fitter mechanically to treat of or deal with Stones, or Bricks, or Timber, than *men*; being unfit to treat of *humane Government*, much more of *Divine*.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

How far God useth Means.

§. 1. CHrist who is the *chief means* is used in all the Conveyances of Grace, to any one in the world.

§. 2. God hath a *double work* in Illuminating and Converting souls: *One* by *activity* of *exteriour appulsive* causes: The other *within us* on the *faculties* of the soul, without those causes. I cannot better illustrate it, than by the causing of *sight, hearing*, &c. The *Light* without us, is not only a *terminating object* (as some dream,) but an *Active thing*, or *Actus*, which operateth by *appulse* upon the eye: And the *Sun* and *Aire* are the *causes* of it. The *eye* is not only a *passive Receiver* (as some dream,) but an Organ where the *visive spirits*, and *soul* are *Active*: And *God* worketh *internally* on this *visive faculty* by *his influx*, to sustain it in its *activity*. And by a congress of these *two fires* or *Active causes*, the *sensitive soul* doth *see*. Now we all know that God giveth the *external light* only *per media*, by the *Sun*, &c. But how he sustaineth and actuateth the *Visive faculty* is more difficult. His *own influx* or *Causation* is undoubted: And that the same Sun *ut causa universalis* cherisheth and moveth the *visive spirits*: But whether God move the sensitive faculty or soul it self, by any *Superiour spirit*, or mediate cause; in its motion or action towards and on the *exteriour light*, is past our knowledge: (Though the order observed in other cases, maketh it not improbable.)

Even so in the *Illumination* of the *mind*, and *conversion* of the *will*, we are sure that beside the *terminative object*, there is an *external motion* which by the foresaid *means* is made at least on the *senses*, and *imagination*, whatever it do further on the *Intellect*: But in the *superiour Influx* on the soul it self, what use God may make of *Angels* or other *superiour spirits* or *causes*, we cannot tell. We are sure (as is said) that if there be a *second cause*, yet as to *proximity* it is never the less *neerly* from God: And souls being *Intellectual*, and for ought we know of the highest *nature* of *Creatures*, though not the *highest Degree*, neither is improbable, that God moveth us by a second cause, or that he doth it without.

§. 3. But as *Christs* fore-described *mediate Causality* is still supposed, so it is certain that God doth not only work (as some think) *concomitantly* with the word, but *by it* as his *Instrument*. Though his wayes of co-operation are past the reach of man: yet this much is sure, 1. That he adapteth the means to do their work, both word, Minister, *&c.* 2. And that his concurse maketh the due Impression on the sense and imagination. 3. And though no Philosopher certainly know whether the Images in the phantasie be *meerly passive* as to the Intellect, or what use is made of *them* and the *passions* to *Intellection* and *Volition*; yet such use as is naturally to be made of them for these ends, God maketh, and manageth them accordingly by *skill* and power.

§. 4. But here MOTION the effect of *Active force*, and ORDER of motion, as the effect of GOVERNMENT, must be well distinguished: For it is not so much the second *Causes* of the souls *Action*, as such, that we are now enquiring after: But of the ORDER and *Rectitude* of its Actions, which is done by *Government*.

§. 5. That God doth work Grace on man by *means*, *ordinarily*, (as ordinarily he causeth *natural effects* by *means*; and Miracles are rare) may be proved by all these following evidences.

§. 6. 1. In

; Agid. Colonn. Rom. Quodl. 1. qu. 2. p. 5. citeth *Dionys. de div. nom. l.* 3. as holding that every order of second causes is like a beam of light streaming down from God, as so many cords let down to men to draw them up to God: And if a man should take hold of one of them and ascend to Heaven, he might imagine that Heaven did bow down to him, when indeed it moveth not, but he would draw himself up to it: so when upon Prayer or other second Causes, God doth us good, he seemeth to incline and bend to us, but it is not so, but he is unchangeable and it's we that are drawn and moved to him, and by the use of means by us, we are conjoyned to Gods purpose, that the things may be done for us which he hath decreed: *Vid. ibid.* where he confuteth the contrary errours.

§. 6. 1. In that he hath made so *large provision* of means, and that in an admirable frame, which is as it were, a *Moral world.* Which he would never do in vain; nor if he ordinarily workt without them that work which he hath appointed them to do. It is the reason of the Brittish Divines in their suffrages at *Dort.* Had not God decreed to work Grace by means, he could have done it with a *fiat.*

§. 7. 2. The *Glory* of this *Kingdom* or *Sapiential Rule*, which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture, *Psal.* 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout; and *Matth.* 25. As the Ship-master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will, *Jam.* 3. 4.

§. 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to *their nature*: And this is suitable to the *nature* of man: And the Causation is answerable to the effect: And ORDER is a *moral effect*, which needeth not a *Creation* but a *moral ordering Causation.*

§. 9. 4. Experience telleth us that those *prosper best* in grace that most faithfully and diligently *use the means*: And we never knew of any man in the world, that came to *Actual knowledge*, *faith*, or *Love*, *without means*; but all by the causality of them. 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. 1. 20, 21. & 3. & 5. & 8. & 13. 4.

§. 10. 5. We find that the greatest *neglecters* and *despisers* of *means*, are every where most graceless, and the worst of men.

§. 11. 6. We have (Ministers and people) frequent and strict *commands*, to *use means* most diligently, constantly and carefully.

§. 12. 7. We have abundance of *promises* of Gods blessing upon the use of *means*: Act. 26. 17. *I send thee to open their eyes and turn them.* Rom. 10. *How shall they hear without a Preacher*, &c. Isa. 55. 2, 3. *Hear and your souls shall live.* Matth. 28. 20. *I am with you alwayes*, &c. Luke 10. 16. *He that heareth you, heareth me.* Psal. 19. 7, &c. *The Law of the Lord is pure*———*Converting the soul.* 1 Pet. 1. *It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us.* Heb. 4. *The word is powerful*——*and a searcher of the heart*, &c. *Licet omnis causa secundâ proprie dicta, causet effectum ex natura rei, tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei.* Alliac. in 4. q. 1. F.

§. 13. 8. When God *will save* a people he *sends* them the Gospel, and when he will *forsake* them he *taketh* it away. Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 18.

§. 14. 9. The *Devil* sheweth his *malice* to souls and grace, by *opposing the means*, depriving men of them, or keeping them from them, or from the faithful using of them.

§. 15. But it is none of my meaning that the *bare means* of it self doth change the soul, or that it is the *principal cause*: But only that God *operateth Moral effects* by *Moral means*, as he doth *Natural* by *Natural means*, being still the *prime Cause* of all himself.

§. 16. If we thus conjoyn all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoyned, it will help us the better to escape errour in this matter. But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to *second causes*, is a derogation *from God* and a dishonouring of him, they forsake the truth and injure him.

§. 17. For if this were true, that to *honour* the *means* or acknowledge second Causes, and their aptitude and efficacy, is to dishonour God, then God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself, by *making* and *using* such causes and means; And so many Creatures as there be in the world, so many dishonours are cast on God; and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most: which sottish conceit must needs be joyned with *Manichæism*, that an *ill God* was the *Maker of the world.* God is Glorious in all his works, and shineth to us in them all. Though God be *proximus* (not as in *loco*) in all his operations, yet seeing he operateth by second causes, he doth it according to them, as all experience tells us: Therefore to end these Controversies, we should consider more how those causes operate.

SECT. V.

Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means.

§. 1. ALl that is *Good* in the Difference between man and man, is *willed* by God, and *Caused* by him: But nothing that is *Morally Evil.*

§. 2. As in *Nature*, God seemeth to *Cause Motion in genere* by *an equal universal Influx* of the *Sun*, which maketh no difference *per se*, but *per accidens*; But the wonderful *variety* of *motions* and *effects* is otherwise caused: So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness, affordeth by his *Means* of *Nature* (which he Politically manageth) an indifferent influx or help for *Action* as *Action* to the souls of men: which as Dr. *Twisse* frequently saith well, is to be called *Nature* rather than *Grace* (except as the *repriving* of *Nature* is *Grace*) so far as it is *meer Power* to *Act*; because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad, and to do or not do.

§. 3. The *Power of Action* as such, being given by *an equal Natural Universal Influx*, it is the ORDER of Actions, where we must enquire of the difference and its Cause.

§. 4. *Action it self* is not a proper *substantial being*, but a *Modus Rei*. But yet it is such a *Mode* as (by the *Cartesians* leave) requireth *more Causation* to it, than a meer *non agere* doth. But *ORDO Actionum* is but a *modus modi*.

§. 5. *ORDO* is the *beauty of the World*, and *soul*; the *genus* of all Relation *in fundamento*, and of all *morality*, and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments: And yet we know not *what to call it*, whether *any thing* or *nothing*. The *ORDO Rerum* is not *Res*: And it is *Rerum status*; which we better know *in se*, than we know with what *Logical Notion* to cloth it.

§. 6. This *excellent Nothing* is the summ of *Morality* in its form; and the business of frail man on earth, and *much* of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven. It is *Gods* work and not *ours* to make *new substances*; It is *ours* to *keep ORDER in our selves*, as Gods work, yea, in the *Actions*, which God by Nature enableth us to. So vain a thing is man that can do *no more* than *this*, nor *this* but by the *Power* given him of God.

§. 7. Vainly therefore do the *Dominicans* pretend that it is a Deifying of the Will of man to say that God can enable it to Cause the various *ORDER* of mans Actions, by meer moral helps, without Gods predetermining premotion to that order. For this is to cause no Real being. And he that is moved to the Act *in genere* needeth no more premotion from God, to the disorder and sinfulness of the Act.

§. 8. And they that will call the production of faith, a *Creation* in the strict and proper sense, do not understand, that *Creatio est Rerum, non ORDINIS rerum jam creatarum, vel existentium.* An *Act* is of it self improperly said to be *created*, in a pre-existent Agent: That is not called *createa* which is educed *è potentia materiæ*; nor that which is produced by the *Potentia Activa præexistentis formæ*: Faith is an Act of the *same Natural Power* or faculty which we *had before*: And *Grace* (or rather *Nature* usually) suscitateth that *faculty* to the *Act as an Act in genere*: And

* *Gerhard. Tom. 2. de lib. arb. cap. 6. §. 1.* supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man, as being dead and vicious; but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will, but so work as leaveth it a power to resist: and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual.
And *Georg. Calixtus* was of the same mind, as you may see in his words *de Minist. Verbi. p.* 241. & in *Judic. de Controvers.* num. 33. See *Le Blanc Thes. de distinct. Gratiæ.*

And *Grace* doth cauſe us to ORDER that act aright, as to the due *object*, and other circumſtances. But if any will call it a *Creation*, I *contend not* about the name.

§. 9. But the whole ſtate of the *Man*, *Habitual*, *Relative* and *Practical* ſet together, is called in Scripture, a *New Creature*, and the *New Man*, tropically, but not unfitly: Partly becauſe we are *really new*, though not by another *Humanity* or *Species* of *Natural Eſſence*, yet by *many Accidents*: And partly, becauſe *thoſe Accidents* are ſo *great* and make ſo great a change of our ſtate, as that they emulate a *natural Eſſence*; and we uſe to ſay in common things, that when an unlearned man is made learned, and a poor man a Prince, and a dying man healthful, he is *another man*.

§. 10. Though *God* be one and the ſame, and Chriſt the ſame, and the *Law* and *word* and many Antecedent *means* the ſame to many on whom they have different effects, This difference may be cauſed many wayes. As 1. By the diverſity of other *inferiour* or *concomitant* ſecond *cauſes*: 2. By the diverſe *Diſpoſition* of the *Receivers* (a common cauſe of varieties in the World:) 3. By the diverſity of *Impediments* and *temptations*: And many other wayes. The Cauſes of difference.

§. 11. * The great queſtion is, *How far the diverſity of Receptive Diſpoſitions is from God?* Anſw. 1. *God made* all *equal* at firſt in *Adam*. 2. All were *equal in ſin* by his fall. 3. *Cain* and *Abel differed* from ſeveral cauſes, and not one alone. *Abel* differed from *Cain* in *faith* and *obedience*, by *Gods grace* as the *chief* cauſe, and his *own will* and *agency* as the *ſecond* cauſe. *Cain* differed from *Abel* by *unbelief* and *ſin*, by his *own will* and Satans temptations. 4. The ſins of *later parents* (as of *Cain*, *Cham*, *Eſau*, *Achan*, *Gehezi*, *&c.*) make a further *difference*, by depriving their poſterity of ſome means, helps or grace, which elſe they had been equally capable of with others. 5. It is certain that *man* hath *much to do* about his *own heart*, by which he is to be the *ſecond cauſe* of his own *Receptive diſpoſition*; and if he fail, is the *only cauſe* of his *indiſpoſition*.

* I know that *Bradwardine* li. 2. c. 32. Cor. p. 612. ſaith that *Deum non dare ſcientiam, gratiam aut perſeverantiam ſive quodlibet munus ſuum creaturæ capaci, eſt cauſa quare ipſa non accipit, & non habet: & non è contra.* Et (p. 614.) *Quicquid obex dicatur poteſt illa reſpenſio corripi, cum nullus poſſit hunc obicem tollere niſi Deus, vel per Deum prius pratollentem; & ſi ipſe eum voluerit tollere, irreſiſtibiliter tollitur, Auferam cor lapideum, &c.*

§. 12. *Difference* is but *Diſſimilitude*: And an alteration of *one* of the ſubjects which ſoever, will make it *diſſimile* or to *differ from* the other. When the good Angels ſtood and the evil fell, if you aſk, *who made the difference*, It was the *Devils by forſaking their firſt eſtate*: Though *Conſtitutively*, both their ſin, and the Angels obedience made the diſſimilitude. If you ſuppoſe *Cain* and *Abel* equally under grace at firſt, and aſk, Who made the difference, I anſwer, *Conſtitutively* Cains *ſin and* Abels *righteouſneſs maketh*, or *is*, the difference: But as to *Reputative efficiency*, *Cain* made the difference by *rejecting grace*. So if you ſhould ſuppoſe two *equally qualified* with *common grace*, and one of them to *loſe* it, the efficience of the difference is Imputable to *him*. But if you ſuppoſe *two equally loſt* in ſin, and *one converted* and not the *other*, the Conſtitutive Cauſes of the difference are *ones ſin* and the *others repentance*. But the *Imputable efficiency* is *Gods grace* and *mans repentance* or *will*, that is recovered.

§. 13. But when *Paul* doth aſk, [*who made thee to differ?*] he meaneth [*who gave thee that good by which thou differeſt?*] and expoundeth it by [*what haſt thou which thou haſt not received?*] And no doubt but *all good is received from God*: And this would have held true, if God had by *equal* operation done as much on the other which had been uneffectual by his indiſpoſition or *rejection*.

§. 14. Nature and Scripture perſwade us, that the *ſame meaſure* of help or influx is not enough to make *one repent* or *believe*, which is enough to make *another*. For the difference of *ſouls*, and *temptations*, and *impediments* plainly prove it. The ſame *ſtrength* will not move a *Mountain*, which will move a *Feather*: nor the ſame *Teaching* make an *ignorant Sot* to underſtand which ſerveth a prepared perſon.

§. 15. *Bodily aptitude*, or *ineptitude* do much to vary receptivities; which are uſually Gods puniſhments or rewards for Parents actions: And oft-times for mens own. Some by fornication, gluttony, drunkenneſs, ſports and idleneſs, make themſelves even next to Brutes.

§. 16. But we have great Reaſon from Scripture to believe that though Gods *Laws* be *equal*, and his *Judgements* where *men* do not make an inequality; yet as a *free Lord and Benefactor*, he dealeth *not equally* with all that are of *equal merit*: Though he do no man wrong, nor deny any what he promiſed in his Word, but keep *perfect Juſtice* as a *Governour*; yet he may *do with his own as he liſt*, and he will be *ſpecially good* to ſome, though others ſee it with an *evil eye*.

§. 17. Whether *all* that are *elect* have at firſt a *greater meaſure* of the *Divine help* and *impreſs* than *any* that are not converted, no man can ſay (of which more anon.) But certainly all the elect were fore-decreed by Gods will to that certain converſion, which others were not ſo decreed to.

SECT. VI.

Of the Limitations of Gods Operations on the Soul.

§. 1. THat which ſticks in the minds of many is, that God being Omnipotent, all his operations muſt be *equally unreſiſtible* and *efficacious*; becauſe none can conquer God: But they muſt conſider, that though he be *Almighty*, yet he doth not all that *he can do*: nor do his *works equally manifeſt* his Omnipotency. And there are theſe cauſes, for *Limiting* his operations in the effects.

§. 2. 1.* The chief cauſe is his *Wiſdom* and *Free-will*. It is his *will* to do what he doth, and to do no more: which hath no cauſe.

§. 3. 2. Another cauſe is, that God operateth by *Jeſus Chriſt*, whoſe *Humanity* is *finite*, being a *Creature*; and God worketh according to the *Inſtrument* or *medium*: As he ſhineth by the Sun, Moon or Stars, according to their ſeveral natures, and not according to his meer omnipotency, ſo doth he communicate Grace by Jeſus Chriſt.

§. 4. † And Chriſt by Office being *King* and *Prophet*, will operate upon certain *terms* which in his *Sapiential Government* he ſets down. And God will not violate thoſe terms.

§. 5. 3. Alſo under Chriſt there are many *ſubordinate Cauſes*; Theſe are his *word*, *Preachers*, and all the forementioned means and helps: and Chriſt will work according to *theſe means*. Though he tye not himſelf from doing more or otherwiſe. I have proved that this is his *uſual way*. And the *effect* will be *limited* according to theſe *ſecond cauſes*.

§. 6. As the Sun ſhineth on us firſt in and through the air, which abateth ſomewhat of its force; and then through the exhalations, and then through the

* *Gemina operatio Providentiæ reperitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis per occultam Dei adminiſtrationem quæ etiam lignis & herbis dat incrementum. Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera & hominum*; Vid. cætera. Auguſt. de Geneſ ad lit. l. 8. cap. 9. & plura li. 9. cap. 15.

† Mark 6. 5. *He* (Chriſt) *could there do no mighty work, becauſe of their unbelief*: and 7. 24. *He could not be hid*: and 1. 45. Jeſus *could no more openly enter into the City*: with many ſuch places, all ſpeak of an Ordinate power working not *ad ultimum poſſe*.

the glass window, and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us; so is it in this case.

§. 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver. Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate: But he that hath a suffusion, or he that winketh, hath a greater impediment to limit the effect: so is it with the various *degrees* of *Indisposition*, or moral incapacity, which yet be nothing if God did work *ad ultimum posse*, and did not as aforesaid, work according to his free will and second causes.

SECT. VII.

Of the Resistibility of Grace.

§. 1. TO *Resist* Grace signifieth, 1. Either Not-to *Receive it Passively* *; as a stone receiveth not the rain *ad intus*; or as oyl resisteth water; or hard things receive not impressions as the soft. 2. Or *Not-to-Receive-Actually*; which is *Receptio Moralis*; as a man receiveth not a gift who *consenteth* not; or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes: The bare *Not-Consenting* with the *will*, or not using the senses or organs, not opening the hand, *&c.* is such a *Resisting*. 3. Or an *Active opposition*, which is more. As a man resisteth an Enemy, (with heart or hand); or a man by *Nolition*, and not only *Non-volition* resisteth a suiter.

§. 2. Mans sinful soul Resisteth Gods gracious operations, all these wayes. 1. It is *Passively* become *undisposed* to *Reception*: And thus he is said to have a *hard heart* of *stone*, and a *seared conscience*, and to be dead and past feeling, *Eph.* 4. 18, 19. *&* 2. 1, 2. 2. It doth not do what it *can do morally* to receive grace, that is, it doth not *Conari* or *suscitare* it *self* to be willing of it. 3. Yea, it doth *Positively resist* by *Action*, and is *unwilling* of Gods gracious operations: And this is twofold, 1. By *willing* the *contrary*, and prosecuting carnal interest, over-loving the pleasures of the flesh, and so *turning away* from the motions of grace, 2. And therefore by an *enmity* to that *grace* and *work*, which would † convert him, and take him off his chosen Idols.

§. 3. No creature by resisting God, doth *abate* or *retund* his *essential Power* or *Activity*, nor make any thing properly *difficult* to him.

§. 4. All the *Elect resist Grace* before it overcome and convert them: And all our lives after we *resist* it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty, and draweth us from sin.

§. 5. He that repenteth not of his *Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace*, doth not understand and well repent of his sin.

§. 6. All *Resisting* is not *Overcoming*: *All Resist* grace, but *all overcome* it not, that is, do not frustrate it as to the due effect.

§. 7. There are several *Degrees* of *yielding* to Gods motions and operations, and so several degrees of *overcoming*. He is *fully* overcome by it, who yieldeth to it *wholly*; He overcometh it in *some part*, who yieldeth to it but *in part*. And because Gods grace moveth us to *more* than we ordinarily yield to, therefore we do ordinarily *overcome* it in too great measure, even when we are happily overcome by it.

§. 8.

* *Ruiz de Vol. Dei, disp.* 19. §. 6. *p.* 187. distinguisheth of Gods will, 1. As to its *ratio totalis* including not only the *vis aut causalitas effectiva*, but also the formal reason of *Volitio efficax*, which includeth the prescience of future contingents: And so he saith, It is never resisted. 2. *Secundum partialem & inadæquatam rationem præcise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum, & prout offert motiva, & confert causas secundas, & suum concursum, abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis, quæ quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem præscientiæ, &c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo, ut præcisus ab actu secundo, potest non sortiri effectum.*

† Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor. 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is *universaliter efficax nec impedibilis, frustrabilis aut defectibilis*: which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacire: But yet the Schoolmen that say, he is not *Omnivolus*, give reason for it.

§. 8. God worketh not alike on all: ſometime (as on *Paul*) he ſo ſuddenly changeth the mind and will, as that at once he both produceth the *Act* of *mans conſent*, and alſo taketh away even the *moral* (though not the natural) *power* to the contrary in the antecedent inſtant. So that no man ever *denyeth conſent* who is *ſo moved*. And ſometimes he procureth *Actual Conſent* by ſuch an operation, as in the antecedent inſtant *might* have been *reſiſted* and *overcome*, there being a *Moral Power* to the contrary. So that there is *Actually-Converting Grace* which *was ſuperable* in the antecedent inſtant, as to *Moral power*; and there is ſuch a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome.

§. 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth, doth not *take away*, but *determine* the *Natural power* in it ſelf, but by ſo doing *formaliter & relative* it maketh it *no power ad hoc* to the contrary, in that inſtant. Of which more anon.

§. 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his *Abſolute Will* or *Decree* of the due *Event*, is never overcome. For Gods decree is not fruſtrate.

§. 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any *contrary Act* but what he *himſelf* is the *Agent Cauſe* of, as *an Act*: For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cauſe of the *Inordination* of that act, by which it is ſet in oppoſition to Gods other acts: For God doth not militate againſt himſelf.

§. 12. The caſe lyeth thus: God antecedently to his Laws, framed *Nature*, that is, the *Being* and *Natural Order* of all the World; and ſo he became the *Head* or *Root of Nature*; the *firſt Cauſe*, who by his wiſe decree, was to concurr to the end with that *Natural frame*, and to continue to things their proper *forms* and *motions*: And *man* is *one* of his creatures, having a *Nature* of his own, to which God as the God of Nature doth *Antecedently* concurr. By this *natural concurſe* of God, the fornicator, the murderer, the thief, *&c.* are naturally *able* to do thoſe acts: But being *free agents* that *can* do otherwiſe, God maketh them a Law to reſtrain and regulate them. And when they break this Law, they reſiſt that *gracious concurſe*, which ſuitable to the organical cauſe, God conjoyneth with the means: But they do this by their *Natural power* and *activity*; not uſed as God requireth them, but turned againſt his own Law. So that if God would withdraw his ſuſtentation, and deſtroy *mans Nature*, they could not *reſiſt* his *grace*. But that he *will not do*, being his antecedent work: and ſo God is reſiſted by his own-given-power and act, diſordered and turned againſt his grace.

§. 13. The *Will of God* which is thus reſiſted, is only 1. His *Preceptive* or *Legal will, de debito*. 2. And his will of *purpoſe*, to *give man ſo much help* and *no more* by which he *can* and *ought* to believe and *Repent*, is ſaid to be reſiſted or fruſtrate ſo far, when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done.

§. 14. Gods *Grace and Spirit* are ſaid to be reſiſted when the *word* and other *Means* are * reſiſted which call him to his duty. For theſe themſelves are gifts and acts of grace.

§. 15. But it is not the *bare Word* or *Means alone*, but the *Spirit* working in and by thoſe means which is ſo *reſiſted*: For though no mortal man can clearly *know* juſt how the *Spirit* concurreth and operateth by the *Word* and *Means*; yet we may know, that God doth *limit* his own operation to the *aptitude* of the means ordinarily; and that he worketh with and by them, not according to his Omnipotency in it ſelf conſidered, but according to the means or organs. And as in *Nature* he operateth, not *quantum poteſt* but agreeably to the order and aptitude of *Natural*

Cauſes;

* That God doth govern *inferiora per ſuperiora*, and work by means, not for want of them, but from the abundance of his Goodneſs, ſo as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of cauſality, See *Aquin.* 1. q. 103. a. 8. & q. 104. a. 2. *Alexand.* 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. & 3. & m. 7. *Albert.* 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. *Richard.* 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. & d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. *Aegid. Rom.* 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 5. & *Gabriel* d. 1. q. 2.

Causes; so in *Grace* he operateth, *non quantum potest*, but according to the aptitude and order of the *sapiential* frame of *Governing-means* of grace.

§. 16. When the preaching of the Word, Education, Company and other visible Means seem *equal*, God hath innumerable means, supernal, internal, external, invisible and unknown to us, by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men: So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls, without any second cause or means at all: (though we cannot prove the *contrary* neither.) And therefore he that resisteth all *means*, for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul.

§. 17. *Whereas Dr. *Twisse* so frequently asketh, Whether Gods conditional will (and so his operation) be [*Volo te velle, modo velis*, or *credere modo credas*,] to give us faith *if we believe*, and so maketh *non credere* or *non velle* to be the only resistance; and the *Arminians* to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and it self: This *semi-subtilty*, though it beget voluminous confidence, must cry *peccavi*, if a *little more subtilty* do but detect the defectiveness of it. We are not now enquiring of the *Rationes fidem habendi*, but of the *Rationes non habendi*; nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal *Promise* of giving *faith* upon antecedent conditions; But whether he deny (or give-not) grace for actual faith (effectual or sufficient) to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform? even preparatory Volitions? Or if you will make the question to be *de rationibus fidem habendi* (not *de causis Actus donandi*) Whether God do not *ordinarily* give or produce the act of faith, in that soul, which doth not wilfully resist, and omit such preparatory acts as it could do? even Volitions? And so I answer,

1. It is not [I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe, or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing.] But it is,

[1. If by resisting common preparing grace, thou so harden thy heart, or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self, as that the same degree of grace, means, help, impress, will not change thee, which otherwise would have done it, and will change another not so self-hardened, thy gracelesness and destruction (both absolutely and as compared to others that are converted,) is imputable only to thy self.

2. And if thou be unwilling to use the Means as thou art able, to hear, read, or meditate on that which should affect thee, and unwilling (Privatively) to hear and receive the inward motions of my Spirit, which should convince and turn thee; and wilt not either by *previous Cogitation*, or *immediate conatus* and *suscitation* of thy *Intellect* to *Think*, and of the will to its act, actively concurr to receive my gracious motions and influx; thy gracelesness (absolutely and comparatively) is imputable, not to me, but to thy self.

3. Much more, if when thou canst do otherwise, thou run the contrary way, and turn thy thoughts and affections eagerly after vanity, and hate and oppose my help and grace, because it is against thy lusts.]

2. Or if you will take it in the form of a half promise, or encouragement from God; thus,

[1. If thou wilt not by wilful progress in sin, and custom, so increase thy

* I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your *Alvarez de Aux. l. 7. disp. 59. p. 264. Eadem contritio quæ est ultima dispositio ad gratiam & in genere causæ materialis antecedit illam; In genere tamen causæ formalis & efficientis, est effectus ejusdem gratiæ: & propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiæ, est tamen meritoria vitæ æternæ:* —— *Et* p. 265. *Contritio quæ pœnitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiæ habitualis, est meritoria vitæ æternæ, ut* Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. *Ergo est effectus gratiæ habitualis: Nulla enim operatio hominis est meritoria vitæ æternæ nisi procedat à gratia habituali, & ordine saltem naturæ sit ea posterior:* How can the Act be the *ultima dispositio* to the Infusion of that habit which it floweth from? Unless he mean *eadem specie*, and not numerically: which yet is false: For it is not *eadem*, or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace.

thy Privation, and obdurateneſs, as that the ſame meaſure of Gracious *Means* and *Impreſs* will not convert thee as would do one that hath not ſo abuſed common grace:

2. And if alſo thou wilt at the preſent do what thou canſt in ſtirring up thy own will to concurr, and thy Intellect to conſider, and wilt but *Conſent* that my *Grace* ſhall help thee, and that thou wilt wait for it in the uſe of means:

3. And if thou wilt not hate and reſiſt my motions, as enemies to thy luſts, and turn wilfully after vanity, in ſuch a degree as thou art even Morally able to forbear; Thou ſhalt find that I am gracious and merciful, abundant in goodneſs, and truth, and forſaking none before they forſake me, and have not appointed thee theſe means in vain. To whom thus prepared did I ever deny the grace of faith? Name him if thou canſt.]

So that [*Volo, ſi velis hoc*] is one thing, and [*Volo ſi velis aliud, & ſi ad hoc volendum quantum potes teipſum ſuſcites, & Gratiam non oppugnes, nec contraria proſequaris, quando pravas Volitiones frenare poſſis*] is another thing.

§. 18. That God giveth his gracious operations ſometimes in a *Reſiſtible limited degree*, beſides what is ſaid, is moſt evidently proved,

1. In that all Divines confeſs, that in making the World, he hath not done *quantum poteſt*, but *quantum voluit*.

2. In that there are innumerable *Poſſibilia quæ non ſunt aut exiſtentia aut futura*. God *could* have made the World *ſooner*, or made *more* Orbs, Earths, Trees, Men, Brutes, *in ſpecie*, *numero*, and done more acts, and made more alterations than he doth.

3. There is certainly *ſome* Divine *operation* with and by his inſtituted *means*, which is limited to their *inſtrumental aptitude*.

§. 19. And it is no diſhonour to Gods *Omnipotency* to work thus *limitedly* and *reſiſtibly*: For,

1. Elſe he ſhould be the Author of his own diſhonour; who freely diverſifieth Inſtruments, Receptivities and effects throughout the World in wonderful variety.

2. If the *total Non-Volitions*, *Non-operations*, or forbearing to do what he *could* (as in all the innumerable Poſſibles aforeſaid) be no diſhonour to him; then to *will* only *in tantum*, and to *operate hoc & hactenus*, limitedly and reſiſtibly, is no diſhonour: being more than not to *will* and *work* at all.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

What that Operation *of* God on the ſoul *is, which is the* ſubject *of our many queſtions: (as Whether it be equal on all? Whether it be reſiſtible? whether it be moral or phyſical? Whether it be ſufficient, when it is not effectual?* &c.) *And what the various opinions about it are, and how uncertain they are.*

YOU may think this ſhould have come firſt; but for ſome reaſons I have reſerved it to this place.

§. 1. I think the Ignorance of this in a great meaſure is common to all mankind: But the Ignorance of mens Ignorance, and preſumptuous contending about what we underſtand not, *pretending* (even to triumphant ſcorn of diſſenters) that we *do underſtand it*, is the very life of moſt of our contentions about theſe points.

§. 2. My own judgement is, that our *own Intellection* and *Volition* in the body, are Acts that take in ſo much of the *ſenſe, imagination*, and *corporeal ſpirits*, into that of them which we *perceive* and *denominate*, as that we cannot tell how far the Acts even of our own *ſeparated ſouls* will differ from *theſe* which we here perceive, and from perception call *Intellection* and *Volition*. And much leſs do I know the difference between *Gods Vital-activity, Intellection* and *Volition*, and *ours*. Some *likeneſs* there is, or elſe ours were not *his Image*: But all Schoolmen and Divines agree, that the names are not *Univocal*, and that it is not the *ſame Thing* in God as in man, which theſe names ſignifie; And that no man can have a *formal conception* of them. I am ſatisfied that a *glow-worm* or the *fire* in a *flint*, yea or in a *ſtick* or *clod*, is incomparably liker the *Sun*, than *Man's* poor *Life*, and *Intellection* and *Volition* is like to *Gods*. And if ſo, how unfit are we unneceſſarily to diſpute of theſe acts of God with curioſity? or at all ſo as implyeth a nearer *likeneſs*? The Lord knoweth that I would with reverence withdraw from this conſuming fire, and no further meddle with it, than the Glorifying of God, and the pacifying of the contentious, and the healing of diviſions, and calling off the preſumptuous, doth require.

§. 3. *By [*Divine *Action* or *operation*] muſt be meant, 1. Either ſomething in *God*, or ſomething cauſed or *Created* by him. 2. If cauſed or *created*, it muſt be either ſomething in the *ſecond Cauſes*, or ſomething in the *Recipient ſoul*. I think the diſtribution is ſufficient.

§. 4. I. *In GOD*, there is nothing but *GOD*: His *Life, Knowledge and Will* are no accidents, but his *eſſence*: And therefore invariable, and no ſubject for any of theſe queſtions. To ask whether *Gods Eſſential Knowledge, Will and Activity*, be *equal* or *unequal, phyſical* or *moral*, &c. is to dote.

§. 5. But yet this *Knowledge* and *Will* of God is *tranſient* or *terminated Objectively*, when it is not ſo *Effectively*. And ſo God is *ſaid* to know things *differently*, as they *differ*; and to *will* things *differently*, as they are *different objects*: But this ſpeaketh truly nothing *New* or *various* in God, but only a *Relative* and ſo *denominative connotation* of his ſimple eſſence, from theſe objects, whoſe diverſity giveth divers names to *Immutable, moſt ſimple Unity*. Of this all *Schoolmen* (for ſubſtance) are agreed, however the *Thomiſts, Scotiſts* and *Occamiſts* differ about the notions of *Ratio ratiocinata, formalitas, & denominatio extrinſeca*.

§. 6. II. If it be the operation of the *ſecond Cauſes, ex parte operantis*, and ſo of *God by them*, that we diſpute of, the diſputes would have

* The great difficulty is, what it is which we muſt conceive to go between Gods eſſence and mans act or inclination given. Dr. *Twiſs* accuſeth the Jeſuits for denying Intellection and Volition to be inſtantaneous Acts, *ſine motu*: And yet his friend *Alvarez* holdeth the Divine Act antecedent to be properly *motio*, and would have his predetermination ſo deſcribed *quâ præviâ motione actuali, cauſis ſecundis præſertim liberis inhærentis, illas applicet ad operandum*, &c. But it is either God or an effect of God which he calleth *motio*: If an effect, it is ſo called as it is in the receiver. And what *motio* antecedent to mans Act, can be imagined in man, when motion is an Act, though every Act be not motion? Therefore they voluminouſly diſpute *de non ente*, or of they know not what. If we muſt have a diſtinct conception of it, I think, *Vis impreſſa*, fitter.

the easier decision. But this is denyed by the *Dominicans*, and another *Infusing Immediate* operation is made the subject of these Controversies.

§. 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is *only the effect* as in the *soul receiving*, which we dispute of. And if so, this must be remembred, that we dream not of any Controversie about *Gods Action*, as *ex parte agentis*, in *Him*, or *between him* and the *soul*.

§. 8. In mans soul, we know of nothing, but 1. The *substance in the first notion* as answerable to *Matter* in *bodies*. 2. The *form*, which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One; *viz.* The *vital Power*, *Intellect* and *Will*: which is at once *Virtus*, *Vis & Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones*. All these are but Inadequate conceptions of the same simple essence, and not compounding parts. None of this is the thing in question, for the soul is presuppoſed to be a soul. 3. The *Accidental* and *mutable Disposition* of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The *Impressions* of *superiour Causes* (*God* and *means*) in moving to the Acts. 5. The *Acts* of the soul *themselves*. 6. The *Habits*. I know of no more.

§. 9. I. Though All Habits *are dispositions*, yet all *Dispositions* are not *Habits*: And before Habits, the soul may be many wayes predisposed to the Act: As 1. By *former acts* of *another sort*, which yet conduce to this. 2. By *other habits* that are preparatory. 3. By deliverance from many *Internal* and *External Impediments*. 4. And lastly, By the *Divine Impress it self* in the instant of Nature, though not of time, before the Act. For God so *disposeth* the soul to act.

§. 10. This predisposition, is sometime but a *Moral Power*, that is, in so low a degree, as containeth only the *Necessary power* to the act, with which alone it is sometime done. And sometime besides this *Moral Power*, it containeth some further degree of accidental *Inclination*, or *propensity* to the Act. And these degrees are various, in various instances and subjects.

§. 11. II. When God moveth the soul to *believe* or *repent*, we must conceive that in the *instant* antecedent to the Act, the soul receiveth some *Impress* or *Impulse* from the divine essence by which it is disposed or moved to act*. And though spirits (especially God) move not by such contact and impress as things corporeal, yet in an unconceivable manner, some spirit, some spiritual Impress, Influx, or motion must be Received, by which faith is caused. And this Impress and the Disposition to the Act, caused by it, perhaps are really the same.

§. 12. III. The Act it self by this, and by the soul disposed and excited, is next caused: not given as pre-existent, but given by causal efficacious suscitation of the pre-existent faculty or power.

§. 13. IV. The *Habit*, which is a *Promptitude* to facile acting, is caused by all the forementioned causes conjunct, and not by any one alone, *viz.* by God, and his Impress on a soul some way pre-disposed, and by the soul it self further disposed and excited by that Impress. But of Habits more anon.

And here because almost all our seeming difference dependeth on the question, *what it is that is between Gods essence and mans act*, which is the cause of our Act, or may be called grace (sufficient or effectual, more or less, *&c.*) I shall tell you how *Alvarez* handleth the question, and thereby further shew you, that it is a thing unsearchable, and past mans knowledge, and though I satisfie my self with calling it an Impulse or Impress, or a Received energie or force or Influx, yet these are but general notions, and tell us not as to a distinct *formal conception*, *what it is*; And you shall see that the boldest disputers know no more.

Alvarez

* *Auxilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impressa: quoniam hoc nomen significare videtur qualitatem, constituentem potentiam in actu primo: sed proprio vocabulo dicitur* motio Actualis, *qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera & expedita facultate qua potest illam non operari si velit. Alvarez de Auxil. disp. 23. p. 108. Motio* is the proper notion, he thinks, between God and the Act or Habit of man, as aforesaid; but unaptly, I think, so conceived by him.

Alvarez de Aux. l. 3. disp. 19. p. 77. tells you that there are these several opinions of it, (What is the *previous motion* by which God moveth "and applyeth second causes to operate?)

"I. Some *Thomists* hold that *It is a Quality, not permanent, but by "way of transient disposition with operation: Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar. 4. dub. "1. Conc. 4. n. 58.* For it must be some *Virtus*, and that must be a Quality: Imperfect supernatural acts, as attrition, fear of hell, *&c.* are before habits, and have only such transient virtues or qualities, *&c.*

"II. Others hold contrarily that Gods motion is nothing besides his "own will or essence and mans act, being simultaneous; Their reasons I "omit. *

"III. Others hold that Gods previous motion is somewhat received "in second causes in order of nature before they operate: and when they "are asked, What it is, they say, It is really the very operation of the second cause (*e.g.* man) it self, as it proceedeth from God —— And so "that Gods premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really distinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth it "self, but is the same; The same act being of God and man. (So that they make this motion to be somewhat received before we act; and yet nothing but our act; which is absurd.)

"IV. Other *Thomists* hold that It is somewhat really distinct from our "operations: and that is, *Quoddam complementum virtutis activæ, quo "actualiter agat.* (And he that knoweth what predicament this *complementum* belongeth to, and what it is, let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement.)

"And here they tell you that they speak not of Gods simultaneous concurse; for that *Alvarez* confesseth is nothing besides Gods essence and "mans act: But of his previous motion, which he saith, is somewhat more. (As if they differed in the nature of motion.) And he saith, "that this is "true both of supernatural acts which are from Infused habits, as faith "hope, Love: and of Imperfect supernaturals as fear of hell and attrition, "by which man is remotely prepared for Justification; which proceed "not from supernatural habits, but from the spirits special impulse, not "yet inhabiting, but moving. And *Alvarez* thus concludeth ——

"I. That which God doth in second causes, by which these act, is, *Aliquid "habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo colores sunt in aere, & "virtus artis in instrumento artificis* —— It is *Aliquid incompletum & "transiens cum ipsa operatione.* (Are you ever the wiser for all this?)

"II. *Hoc ens incompletum prævium actioni causæ secundæ producitur in "illa effective à solo Deo, & nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influxu ipsius causæ secundæ.* And therefore herein the will is passive, though not "in its own Act, (as he falsly affirmeth *Luther* to assert; for what can "act and not be active?)

"III. When second causes, natural or supernatural, have by their inherent form, sufficient Active virtue, *per modum actus primi*, proportioned with the effect, then Gods premotion is not a Quality but *proprio "vocabulo dicitur, Motio Virtuosa*, by which the universal cause maketh "the second actually operate, according to its proper mode: Therefore it "is not a *Habit* or *disposition* or *natural power.*

* So *Bradwardine* and many others. And this would cut short most of our present Controversies if it would hold. Dr. *Twisse* saith *Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9. p. 348. Probabile esse nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem; sed quia Deus vult Voluntatem creaturæ Velle aliquid, necesse est ut velit. Ratio hæc est, cujus solutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis: Sola Dei Voluntate factum est ut Mundus crearetur. Quis enim influxus Dei potest fingi præcedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum,* &c.
So *Amesius Antisynod. de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis esset apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle sine ulla Impressione intercedente certa posse efficere ut Voluntas consentiat ipsius Vocationi.* I now meddle not with the truth of this, and *Twisses* argument is easily answered; But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controversies are by these excellent men reduced, who yet most aggravate them. What now is the *Gratia efficax ad credendum*? Nothing besides Gods *esse* but *ipsa fides.* Is faith effective of it self? No. Is Gods essential will effective of it? Who ever denyed it? What place is there for Controversies of sufficiency and efficacy, when it is but Gods essence and the known effect of which they speak, and hold not (as *Alvarez* doth) any motion or Impress made by God upon mind or will at all? Gods will then is effectual, *quia vult effectum*; and it is virtually sufficient for whatever he willeth not, but could will. But then no man can possibly do any more good or less evil than he doth, because no more or less is willed of God, which volition is the first necessary Cause of all things. And is not all their Volumes *de Auxiliis Gratiæ*, and the several sorts, previous, simultaneous, operating, co-operating, *&c.* meerly vain, when there is no such thing as any Grace besides Gods meer will, and the Act of man: And yet Dr. *Twisse* elsewhere saith that Gods Decrees do *nihil ponere in objecto.*

"IV. Yea in Imperfect ſupernatural acts (as fear of hell) which go "before habits, and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts, it is not a "Quality, but *Motio Dei virtuoſa* by which they are done; and is of the "ſame ſort with that which cauſeth acts from habits.

"V. This previous Motion is Really diſtinct from the operation of the "ſecond cauſe——— and is not our act it ſelf; but is immediately from "God. (Which he uſeth many arguments to prove.)

And can all this give any man a formal conception, what it is, which he calleth, *aliquid incompletum*, and *Motio Virtuoſa?* We know not what the *Vis projectis impreſſa* is in *corporeals:* And can we tell how ſpirits, and how the God of ſpirits maketh his Impreſſions? or what the word *Impreſſion* or *Motion* here ſignifieth? We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not. And why is it called *Motio Virtuoſa? Virtus* he maketh a *quality:* It is no *quality*, and yet *Virtuoſa. Omnis motio eſt Actio.* Is it *Actio Increata?* Then it is *God himſelf*; which he denyeth, and ſpeaketh of ſomewhat between *God* and *mans Act.* Is it *Actio creata?* Then it is a *Modus Agentis*, for ſo is every *Action*, *as ſuch*, as diſtinct from its *effect in patiente.* And if ſo, it cannot be *modus Dei*; for then it is *Ipſe Deus:* And if it be *modus hominis*, it is either *hominis agentis vel patientis*; If the firſt, then it is *mans Action:* If the ſecond, it is formally *no action:* For *modus patientis* is *paſſio*; though many would confound *action* and *paſſion* with ſaying after their Maſters, that *Actio eſt in patiente*, which is equivocation.

So that the plain truth is, that mans underſtanding can reach no further than to conceive, 1. That our *ſouls* are the *termini* of *Gods Volition* and *Active power.* 2. That though God act not on us by *corporeal contact*, yet we muſt call our ſelves *Patients*, and think of the *Attingency* of his *Active eſſence* with its *effects*, by ſome *Analogie* of *Corporeal attingency*, *contact*, and *impreſſed moving force.* But truly to know *how* God *toucheth*, *moveth*, *operateth* on any Creature and by what *Impreſſions*, or what there is indeed *between Gods eſſence* and *mans Act*, we know not at all. And if Chriſt had never ſaid, Joh. 3. [*ſo is every one that is born of the ſpirit*] our own experience might have told us that we *know it not.*

Boldly then tell our Church-diſtracting wranglers, that contend about the nature, ſufficiency, efficacy, reſiſtibility of *this Act* of Grace, that they know not the very ſubject of their diſputes. And ſhall we ſtill fire the Church by ſtriving about words that profit not but ſubvert the hearers, and tend to the increaſe of ungodlineſs?

Yea and ſhall bold blind zeal uſe the Reverend names of God, and his precious Truth to colour and countenance theſe pernicious contentions? I grant that the nature of Grace, and the concord of it with Free-will may be ſoberly treated of. But when men have followed the controverſie beyond the ken of humane underſtanding, and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown ſuppoſitions, and perverſly contend for them againſt Love and peace, they do but ſerve Satan againſt God, under the colour of his ſacred *truth* and *name.*

And I think it not amiſs here to tell you what *Alvarez* ſaith to this Queſtion (de Aux. l. 12. diſp. 118. p. 481.) *An Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratia poſſit demonſtrari naturali ratione (vel, cum Infallibilitate Præſcientiæ, Providentiæ, & prædeſtinationis Divinæ?)* Where he tells you that one opinion of ſome *Catholicks* is, that [*It is certain by the do-*"*ctrine of faith that man hath Free-will, but it cannot be proved by na-*"*tural reaſon.*] The ſecond opinion is contrary, that [It is not only "evident to natural reaſon that man hath free-will, but alſo the concord "of

"of it with the infallibility of Divine preſcience and providence may ea-"ſily and clearly be made out by *Scientia Media*:] which is the *Jeſuites* way.

But the third opinion which he defendeth is, that ["Free-will may be "evidently known and proved by natural reaſon alone: But how the "actual uſe of it conſiſteth with the infallibility of the preſcience, pro-"vidence and predeſtination of God, and with the efficacy of the helps "of grace; cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by natural light "alone, and therefore the reaſon of it muſt be Believed and the under-"ſtanding captivated to the obedience of Faith.]

Where note, 1. That though he ſay [*perfectè*] he proveth that it cannot be known by that which is below a *perfect* knowledge. 2. And that he denyeth not only a *practical ſaving knowledge*, but a proper *theoretical* or dogmatical knowledge.

For this he citeth thoſe words of *Cajetan* at large (*in* 1. *p. q.* 22. *art.* 4.) which many others cite and commend, [*In ignorantia ſola quietem invenio*, &c.]

And there is no man beſides *Alvarez* higher for the *Dominicans* way of Abſolute predetermination, than D. *Bannes* who is of *Cajetans* opinion (in 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. & 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1.) ["*Siquis non intelligit* "*quomodo uſus liberi arbitrii ſit liber, & nihilominus ſit effectus jam præ-*"*definitus à Divina providentia, oportet eum credere*——— *& Primum* "*omnium debuiſſet credere quod aiunt ſe non poſſe intelligere: Credimus* "*enim Catholicum myſterium Trinitatis, etiamſi non intelligamus.*]

And *Alvarez* citeth *Calvin* (*lib. de ætern. Dei prædeſt. cont. Pigh. p.* 136.) ſaying ["*Siquis hoc mentis ſuæ captu ſuperius eſſe excipiat, idem* "*de me fateor. Sed quid mirum, ſi modulum noſtrum imcomprehenſibi-*"*lis & immenſa Dei majeſtas exſuperet? Atqui tantum abeſt ut pro* "*carnis ratione explicandum ſuſcipiam ſublime iſtud reconditúmque ar-*"*canum, ut quod initio præfatus ſum aſſiduè in memoriam redire velim,* "*deſipere qui plus ſcire appetunt, quàm Deus revelaverit. Quare nos* "*potiùs docta ignorantia delectet, quam intemperans & ebria plus quam* "*Deus permittit curioſitas.*]

What *Auguſtine* confeſſeth you may ſee a little in *Alvar. ib. p.* 482, 483. but more in himſelf often.

What *Suarez*, *Hurtado*, *Mendoz.* and other the moſt ſubtil philoſophical Divines confeſs commonly of the incomprehenſibility of theſe things, and the darkneſs and uncertainty of our conceptions, I have elſewhere partly cited; and any that readeth them may find.

Now all this being ſo notorious, and their ignorance commonly confeſſed, may I not confidently inferr, 1. That then (ſeeing all muſt be reconciled by Believing) we muſt have nothing obtruded on us herein, which is not to be proved by the Word of God. What the Word ſaith of Predetermination, of the manner of Gods operation on ſecond cauſes, and influx on ſouls, and of the nature of his firſt effect or *Vis Impreſſa*, &c. we will receive: But yet men muſt not ſnatch up a metaphorical expreſſion in one or a few Texts, and urge that againſt the frequent and plain expreſſions of the Scripture; of the ſpirits. Operation on ſouls, Chriſt himſelf ſaith (which is more than all forecited) [*The wind bloweth where it liſteth, and ye hear the ſound thereof, but ye know not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: ſo is every one that is born of the ſpirit.*] But as for the operations of God by the word preached and other means, and the Holy Ghoſts operation by and with thoſe means, and the Holy Ghoſts indwelling and operating after in Believers, theſe are frequently aſſerted

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in Gods Word: And that all Christs members have his Spirit, regenerating, illuminating, quickning, sanctifying them, both as he is in Covenant with them to be the sanctifier of their souls, and as the Love of God and all his Graces are by him caused in us: all this is sure.

But if men will go further with us, and give us as many distinctions of Gods Grace as *Alvarez* doth, and tell us that besides God himself, one of them (*simultaneous operation*) is nothing but mans act; and another (*previous motion*) is somewhat else, but no man knoweth what, but may be named [*motio Virtuosa*] though it be neither God nor a quality nor a humane act; And then will dispute how much of this [*some thing*] this *motio virtuosa*, will serve to such an effect, and how much to another, and how and by what reason it is efficacious; and will build on his assertions such a systeme of consequents, as shall make up the doctrines of a sect or party, which shall set up with this stock to militate against the Love and unity of Christians: this is the course that I oppugn.

Once more, Let the Reader note that the waies of reconciling Grace and Free-will, as *Alvarez* mentioneth them, are these four.

I. The *Jesuits* way by *scientia media*, which I need not recite to the Learned, but think it meet to recite *Alvarez* words of their description of Grace. [" *Supponunt gratiam prævenientem & excitantem esse sumaliter actiones quasdam vitales, quas Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur: "sine nobis, inquam, libere co-operantibus, non tamen sine nobis vitaliter "& efficienter concurrentibus; & consistere in illustratione & illumina- "tione Intellectus, atque excitatione & suasione voluntatis: qua efficienter procedunt ab intellectu & voluntate, non quidem ut Libera, sed "ut Natura est: quamvis antecedenter dependeant à Voluntate ut Liberum arbitrium est, quatenus* viz. *ex ejus libertate fuit dependens, quod "homo compararet notitias mysteriorum fidei vel eorum quæ facienda erant, "accedendo ad prædicatores, vel alio modo eos propriâ industriâ acquirendo, "quibus notitiis Deus se insereret, eas elevando suo speciali influxu, ut supernaturales sint, & quales ad salutem oportet; & sic sortiantur naturam gratiæ prævenientis. Supposità ergo Illuminatione, quâ Deus illuminat Intellectum, & proponit Voluntati bonum, ut sibi conveniens, affirmant, quod statim absque ulla libertate oritur merè naturaliter in "voluntate motus affectionis ad bonum sibi propositum: quo motu allicitur & quasi invitatur ad amandum illud bonum, & imperandum potentiis executivis, ut illud exequantur, ut* v.g. *ad imperandum intellectui ut assentiatur rebus fidei propositis & explicatis. In his ergo duobus motibus,* viz. *in illustratione Intellectus & affectione voluntatis à "Deo elevatis suo speciali influxu, consistere aiunt gratiam prævenientem & excitantem. Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiæ prævenientis adjutum & excitatum, liberam habet potestatem imperandi aut non imperandi assensum fidei: Quod si voluntas fidem amplecti velit, actumque credendi imperet intellectui, influente simul natu "gratiæ prævenientis quam habet, elicit in seipsa actum supernaturalem, quo "fidem amplecti vult, quòq; assensum imperat intellectui; simúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo supernaturali voluntatis, illustrationéque divinâ adjutus, elicit actum supernaturalem assentiendi revelatis, & "Gratia excitans seu præveniens novo influxu, quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in supernaturalem actum fidei, sortitur rationem gratiæ adjuvantis, cooperantis & efficacis. Si autem voluntas pro sua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti, gratia excitans & præveniens manet intra limites gratiæ sufficientis, nec est efficax, quia voluntas non voluit "fidem amplecti, cum potuisset.*

II. The

"II. The second is *Durandus*'s way [*Nullum esse necessarium Divinæ "voluntatis concursum ad actiones secundarum causarum, sed satis esse "quod Deus eas produxerit in esse, & ipsas naturas, earumque virtutes "postmodum conservet.*] But this is a partial recitation, for this sustentation of their Active Virtues is the same with an Universal Influx or Concurse to action as action, which *Bellarmine* is for. Read of this *Ludov. à Dola.*

III. *The third he saith, is attributed to *Greg. Arim. Scotus* and *Gabriel*, (great Wits, if any.) "*Cooperationem Divinam se tenere ex parte effectus, non Causæ*, h. e. *Concursum Dei non determinare Voluntatem nostram, nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari, sed immediate influere in effectum, eumque producere illo ipso momento quo à voluntate nostra producitur: Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntatem nec Voluntas Deum: Nam uterque concursum libere adhibet, & si alter nolit "concurrere, opus non fiet, sicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem—— "Et licet simul operentur, tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur, "non contra:* (But this is partially recited, and it is true only of the effect: And his confutation is that then *Gratia est pedissequa Voluntatis*: And why saith he not, God is *pedissequus hominis*, because he judgeth men according to their works?)

I have otherwise opened the matter than is expressed here of any of these. But can the sober Reader think that the IV^th^ way (which is that of the *Dominicans* predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad) is so much surer than these three, as that he dare venture on that supposition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the *Grace of God*, and to his *Providence*, who would gladly ascribe all to both which belongeth to perfection, and are only afraid to deny Gods holiness, and the Christian Religion, by resolving all sin and damnation into the meer Will and Love and Irresistible Omnipotent efficiency of God?

*So *Malderus* in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. dub. 1. [*Hic Dei concursus quod attinet ad identitatem realem ex parte termini (nam ex parte principii est ipse Deus, aut Dei voluntas) est ipsa actio Causæ secundæ quatenus est à Deo. Nihil ponit in ipsa Voluntate, sed est influxus Dei in actionem seu effectum.*] So many others.

SECT. IX.

Whether Gods Operations be equal on all?

§. 1. IF the question be *ex parte Dei*, it is absurd to make a question of it. For God is the same, whatever the diversity be in his works. And Gods acts as in himself, are God. And there is no *Virtue* or Efflux from God, but what is a creature, or effect of God.

§. 2. If the question be of *second causes*, and of Gods operation in and by them; I answer, 1. Some things God Giveth and Doth as *Rector* of the World, *by a Law*, or *according to a Law*: And herein God doth *equally*, till *man make a difference* (as is aforesaid) *viz.* in his *Legislation* (though not in the *promulgation*) and in his *Judgement*. 2. Some things God *Giveth* and *Doth*, besides, as *Owner* and *free-Benefactor*: and here he primarily maketh a difference. So that there is a *certain sort* and *measure* of grace given *equally*, till men make a difference: And there is a *sort* and *measure* given *unequally*, by the meer will of God, as he diversifieth Natural things.

§. 3. But if the question be of the *effects* on the soul, those effects are, 1. Mans predisposition, 2. The divine Impress, 3. The Acts, 4. The Habits, as is said: And as to the first; God equally disposed man at first: But two Causes have filled the World with very unequal dispositions: One

* Of Preparation for Grace, *Medina* noteth three degrees of it: one which Grace ever followeth (which is it that our Divines mean by effectual Vocation) and this he saith, is never had but by Gods special help: (the other two are distant and common.) But that the Schoolmen of the other parties think otherwise he confesseth, and saith, *In hac quæstione* Durand. Scot. *& propemodum omnes* Nominales, *quos sequitur* Adrian. Quodlib. 7. q. 4. *tenent partem affirmativam, scilicet quod homo per suas vires sine speciali auxilio Gratiæ, potest se ad Gratiam præparare, sic ut consequatur gratiam infallibiliter, & ex merito de congruo: D. Tho. tenet contrarium:* Medin. *ib. p.* 593. But then by *sufficiens præparatio ad Gratiam*, he meaneth Conversion it self, *dimovere animum ab iniquitate, & se in Deum convertere; sicut convertere faciem ad solem, ut quis illuminetur.*

One is *mans ſin*, corrupting themſelves and their poſterity more than as they are the ſeed of *Adam* (and this *God* is *no Cauſe of.*) The other is *Gods free differencing mercy* to ſome of *equal ill deſert*, giving them both *Greater outward helps*, and *Common Grace*, and *fewer impediments*, and ſo more *preparing* them for *ſpecial Grace*. But no man by *Indiſpoſition* is *deprived* of *ſpecial Grace*, but he that hath contracted *more* than he had from *Adam* only. And God doth not *equally repair* and *diſpoſe* all that have viciouſly *undiſpoſed themſelves:* Though while they are here, he giveth ſuch mercy to all, as tendeth to their recovery.

§. 4. If the queſtion be of the *equality* of Gods *Impulſe*, or *Influx* on the ſoul, 1. There may be a diverſity of further effects, where the *Impreſs* is the *ſame* in *kind and meaſure*; becauſe of mens various *Diſpoſitions* to receive it, and their various *concurſe:* That may convert one, that doth not another. But yet God doth not make *equal Impreſſions* on mens ſouls: For, 1. His own *free-will* as a *Liberal benefactor* doth *more for ſome* (as *Paul*) than for *others*. 2. Mens *ill deſerts* may ſo forfeit grace and quench the Spirit, as to make a difference. 3. The *means* much differ which ſeveral men have: And God uſually operateth according to the means, upon the ſoul.

§. 5. If the queſtion be either of the *Act* or *Habit*, it is no queſtion: For that were but to ask, Whether all men have *equal faith*, *love* and other graces? which common experience denyeth.

§. 6. Whereas ſome will ſtick at my mentioning a *Divine Impreſs on the ſoul*, in nature antecedent to *Act and Habit*, I would have them remember, that either *there is ſuch* a thing or *not*. If there be, I rightly mention it. If not, we are inſtantly at an end of all this ſort of Controverſies, and *Calviniſts* and *Arminians* cannot differ if they would. For then the queſtion muſt be only about that which is paſt queſtion, *viz.* 1. Either about Gods Act as in Himſelf, which is his ſimple Eſſence: 2. Or about the *Act and Habit* of Faith, Love, *&c.* in Man, which all the World knoweth is *not equal*; For all *men have not faith:* For as for *pre-diſpoſition*, the queſtion will be revolved to the ſame point; It is certain that all are *not equally diſpoſed*, and it is certain that Gods Acts as in him are his Eſſence.

SECT. X.

Whether the ſaid Operation be Phyſical or Moral?

§. 1. THis paltry queſtion is worthy but a few words, though it make too much ſtir. Of the ſenſe of the *words Phyſical* and *Moral* having ſpoken before, I will not repeat it here. 1. If the queſtion be *de operatione ut eſt actus agentis*, before the effect, it were but to ask, Whether *Gods Eſſence* be *Phyſical* or *Moral?* which is unworthy an anſwer.

§. 2. 2. If the queſtion be of the *Action* of *ſecond Cauſes*, as the *Preacher*, &c. if *truly Acts*, they are *both Phyſical* as they are *really actus naturalis*, and *moral* as they are the acts of *free intellectual agents*. But the *Acts* of *Laws* and other objects meerly as objects (on man) are called *Moral Acts*, becauſe they are but *nominal*; but indeed are *no Acts*, and therefore neither *Phyſical* nor *Moral*. For they are but *ſigna*; and *ſignificare* is not *agere*; but is only an *objective aptitude*, by which an *Intellectual*

Intellectual agent can edifie it self. All the Books in my Library teach me without *any Action*, by being *signa objectively* to my *active Intellect*.

§. 3. 3. If the queſtion be of the *Divine Impreſs* on the ſoul, it is *quid reale*, and therefore *phyſicum*: And it is *morale* as it is the *principium actus moralis*. The ſame is to be ſaid of our own Acts and Habits; They are *phyſical and moral* accidents. And they cannot be *moral*, unleſs they be *phyſical*.

§. 4. But it muſt be known that to be *quid naturale* and *quid morale*, *formally* differ; as *Actus qua talis*, and *ordo qua ordo*, do differ *ab ordine ſeu Relatione ad Legem & ad finem morum*: and *Moralitas eſt actus Phyſici, vel privationis Relatio*, viz. *ad Regulam & finem morum*.

§. 5. But if the queſtion be not of the *Morality of the Act*, but the *Morality* of the *Cauſe*, viz. *whether Grace or divine action do cauſe Phyſically or Morally?* I anſwer plainly, that There is no *true Cauſe* which is not *Phyſical*: A *moral* Cauſe, not *phyſical*, is but *Cauſa reputata vel nominalis*. Objects are uſually ſaid to *Cauſe morally*: But if they be *meerly objects*, they cauſe not *efficiently* at all; but by termination only *materially conſtitute* the Act *in ſpecie*. But ſome things vulgarly called objects (as *Light*, *Heat*, *&c.*) are *Active* and ſo *effect*. And he that doth *proponere objectum*, doth indeed *effect*, by ſpeaking or doing: But he doth not effect any thing by the *object* on the mind, as it is a meer *object*. But the *Vox loquentis* doth more than preſent an object: It doth by *agency ſuſcitate* the *Spirits* and operate on the organs of ſenſation. And many mercies, afflictions, and other means forementioned, have their ſeveral wayes of active operation. But it is readily confeſſed, that nothing corporeal can by any direct efficiency operate on a ſoul; but only *Active Spirits* like it ſelf. Remember therefore that I take the word Phyſical here as the Schools do, largely, as comprehending *Spiritual* or *hyperphyſical*: And I plainly ſay *de nomine*, that Gods operations of Grace are to be called *Hyperphyſical* in reſpect to God the Agent, and *Phyſical* as they are *Phyſical* effects on man, and *Moral* as the ſame are in *inſtanti ſecundo* alſo *moral* effects. And that they are called *Moral* in two uſual ſenſes: 1. In that it is Morality or Virtue that is produced by them: 2. And in that objects being much of the *Means*, the operation or efficiency of *objects* as *objects*, is properly none at all; They do but materially (as it were) conſtitute the Act, and terminate it, and occaſion it, as *ſine quibus non*, which many call a *Moral Reputative*, *Metaphorical* Cauſation. And yet diverſification is much by objects.

§. 6. If this ſtumble any who look not at the greater inconveniences on the other ſide, and occaſion them to think that it is *little efficient operation* which we own in the collation of faith and converſion: I deſire them to conſider well,

1. That it is *no new ſubſtance* at all that is to be produced; but a *preexiſtent ſubſtance* and *faculty* to be *actuated*.

2. That it is not *an Act* as *ſuch in genere*, that is to be cauſed by *Grace*; but the *due ordering* of acts as to *right objects*, *&c.*

3. That the ſoul as ſuch is an *Active Spirit*, not *indifferent* between *Action* and *ceſſation*; but as naturally *prone to Act*, as the *earth to reſt*, and as a ſtone in the air to deſcend, and as the Sun to move and ſhine: ſo that it is never one minute out of Action, even in this earthen tabernacle from its firſt being to the laſt breath, day or night: Though in different manner.

4. That God as the *God of Nature* doth *uphold* the ſoul in this *Active Nature*, affording it that *Concurſe* or *Influx* neceſſary thereto, which in Nature he made due to it: As he doth to the *Sun* in *its action*, and to the *ſouls* of *Brutes*. So that *Activity* as ſuch, diſtinct from the due *order of it*, is given by God in *Nature*.

5. And God hath placed the *ſoul* in the *Univerſe*, as a wheel in a Watch, where it muſt needs have ſome effects of the *co-operation* of *Concauſes*, or *ſuperiour agents*.

6. And *Angels* and *Devils* who have very much to do with our ſouls, do work as *Voluntary Agents*, in *Political Order*, though not without the regulation of *Gods Law* or *Will*.

7. And God can do *what he will* on ſouls without any ſecond cauſe, though whether he do ſo, or what, we know not.

8. All this being ſuppoſed for *Efficiency*, objects duly qualified may do much for the *Order of Acts*, though properly they *do nothing*: ſo that though they be but *ut Materia ad formam*, occaſions *ſine quibus non*; yet the *reaſons* of the great *alterations* in the World, being admirably fetcht from the various *Paſſive* or *Receptive diſpoſitions* of *matter*, no wonder if it be ſo with *mans ſoul* alſo.

Cum Thomiſtæ *dicunt, Deum ſuo auxilio efficaci phyſice prædeterminare Voluntatem ad actum bonum, non excludant Motionem efficacem, ſed tam præ- [illegible]* Alvarez de [illegible] *cap.* 23. p. 108.

A ſpark of fire which long was unſeen, if you put Straw, Gunpowder or other fuel to it, may burn a City or Kingdom, when yet the fuel is not an *efficient cauſe* (ſave the *fire* that is *in it*) but an *objective Matter*.

What work doth a Student find all his life among *Books*? What abundance of knowledge doth he learn by them, which he had none of in his Infancy? And ſo do Travellers by viewing the actions of the World. And all theſe are but *fuel* to the *fire*. The *ſoul* only is the *Agent*, and all theſe are *ſigns* and *objects* that *do nothing really* on the ſoul at all.

You may lead a Beaſt up and down, and govern them by *objects*; which yet *act nothing* on them.

So Satan doth by the Drunkard, Glutton, Fornicator, Gameſter, Covetous, *&c.* What *Reputed work* do objects make on them by *doing nothing*?

Thus *Verum & Bonum* are ſaid to work. And the caſe is this, The *Active Spirit*, is not only *Naturally Active*, but *Eſſentially Inclined to ſome certain objects* (*Truth and Goodneſs*): And this *Inclination* being their *very Nature*, when the *object* is duly preſented to it, and it ſelf delivered from all *falſe objects*, and *erroneous Action* on them, and *ill habits* thence contracted, it will *Naturally* work accordingly. And therefore duly (*externally* and *internally*) to bring *God* and *Holy objects* to the proſpect of the ſoul, is the way of working them to God.

And ſure the World would never make ſuch a ſtir about *Preaching*, to get fit men, and to perſwade them to diligence, and to keep ſound doctrine, *&c.* if theſe *objective cauſes*, as *fuel* to the *fire*, did not do much, by *occaſioning* the *Active ſoul* to do its proper work.

9. Yet ſtill remember (again) that Jeſus Chriſt is the *Political Head of Influx* (if not *more*,) who ſendeth forth the *Spirit*, as he pleaſe, but ordinarily upon his ſetled Goſpel terms, to work on ſouls, by his threefold fore-mentioned influx, with and by theſe means, according to them, but in an unſearchable manner; As God doth in Nature by the Sun and other Natural Cauſes.

SECT.

SECT. XI.

What Free-Will Man hath to Spiritual Good, &c.

§. 1. THe understanding of the Nature of the *Power and Liberty* of the *Will*, is the very key to open all the rest of the controverted difficulties in these matters: But having spoken of it so much before, in the former part of this Book, and more elsewhere, I shall no further weary the Reader with repetitions, than to note these few things following.

§. 2. If any like not the name of *Free-will*, *Libera Voluntas*, let them but agree about these two, the *Power of the Will*, and *Free-choice*, * *Liberum arbitrium*, and they need not contend about *Free-will*.

§. 3. 1. As to the first, It is the very Essence of the Will to be *a natural Power* or *faculty* of *Willing Good* and *Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect*; *and commanding the inferiour faculties, either politically or despotically, difficultly or easily, perfectly or imperfectly, according to its resolution and their Receptivity.*

§. 4. 2. The *Liberty* of *choice* is not only *Libertas Voluntatis*, but *Libertas Hominis*, when a man may *have* what he chooseth or willeth: Here the Act of *choosing* is the *Wills*; but the object is somewhat else; either an *Imperate act* of some inferiour faculty, or some extrinsick thing. So we say truly, that the unbeliever, or unconverted sinner, may believe, may repent, may have Christ and life, if *he will* (as Dr. *Twisse* frequently asserteth.)

§. 5. 3. But the *Liberty* of the *Will it self*, is but the *mode* of its *self-determination*, as without *constraint* it is a *self-determining* principle in its *elicite Acts*, considered *comparatively*.

§. 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold, 1. *Liberty of Contradiction*, or *exercitii*; 2. Of † *Contrariety* or *specification* in the *Act*: 3. Of *objective specification*, which is Liberty of *Competition*. 1. The first Liberty is *to will* or *not will*; to *nill* or *not nill*. 2. The second is Liberty to *will or nill this*. 3. The third is Liberty to *will This object* or *That*, or to *nill This* or *That*.*

§. 7. The *Will* hath not *all* these sorts of Liberty about *every object*: For it cannot *will known evil as such, &c.* But it hath *all these* about *several objects*.

§. 8. By this *power* and *Liberty*, the Will is made of God, to be a kind of *Causa prima secundum quid*, of the *Moral ORDER* or specification of *its own acts*: Not simply or strictly a *Causa prima*; For 1. It was *God* the *first Cause* that *gave man* this self-determining Power. 2. It is God that *upholdeth* it: And so it still *dependeth wholly* on his supporting will. 3. God concurreth by his *universal Influx*, to its acts. 4. God is still the *Lord of it*, and can turn it as he pleaseth, and over-rule it to his Ends, and hath put no act of ours from under his power. But he *willingly* so forbeareth his own further operation, as that he hath made the *Will* able,

* *Nolite esse adeo delicati, ut abhorreatis ab usu vocabuli* [Lib. arbit.] *Hypocritarum proprium est rixari de vocabulis. Nemo offendatur hoc titulo, quia* August. *in multis Volum. & singulis fere pagellis ad fastidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat.* Melancth. Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 1.

† Note, that the Papists confess, that by Christs Case it is proved, that *Libertas specificationis inter bonum & malum* is not necessary to merit: So *Pet. à S. Joseph. Thes. universs. pag.* 90.

* Of the real difference of these three, see *Rob. Baron. Mitaphys.* I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of *Complacence* to be another sort of Liberty: Though I distinguish Liberty of simple Complacence, from Liberty of election; as being a prior distribution: And I deny not, but that Liberty (of Complacency specially) may stand with necessity of immutable disposition, yea, and with some sort of necessitating operation of God; as is in Christ and the Glorified: And in this large essential sense *Liberum* and *Voluntarium* are all one, supposing *Voluntarium* to be the act of a self-determining unconstrained will. So that the word [*Free-will*] being so exceeding ambiguous (as my foresaid Scheme sheweth) we must be sure that we pretend not the Controversies *de nomine* to be *de re*. But it is the Indifferency of a *Vietus* will that we have now to do with, and not that state of perfect determination, or that Amplitude or advancement of the will, which *Gibieuf* and such others talk of: And note that by [*Posse agere vel non agere*] which we put into the definition of free-will, we must not mean that *Potentia moralis metaphorica*, which is nothing but the wills moral disposition or habit; but the *Potentia Naturalis*: And so it may be said of Christ and the glorified, that their *not sinning* or not willing sin, is not *ex impotentia naturali*, but *ex perfectione*.

on ſuppoſition of his foreſaid ſupport and univerſal influx, and rule, to *Determine it ſelf* to the ſaid ORDER of its Acts, without Gods particular predetermining premotion.

§. 9. As in the *Vital* and *Intellectual* faculties, it is Gods Image to be *Able to Act Vitally*, and *to underſtand*; ſo in the *will* this *ſelf-determining Power and Liberty*, and *Imperium* over other faculties, is part of the *ſame Image*. And it is Gods wrong and diſhonour to have his *Image* denyed and diſhonoured: And therefore to deny this *Power of the Will* is as much a diſgracing of Gods Image, as to deny *man* to be *Rational*.

§. 10. God made man ſuch an *Intellectual Free Agent*, that he might be a *fit ſubject* for *Sapiential Moral Government*: and accordingly he ſetled a *Kingdom* in the World: And as he governeth meer *Natural Agents*, by *Natural motion*, ſo he governeth *Man* as a *Moral agent*, by *Laws and Moral means* and motion: For he ruleth all things according to their Natures.

§. 11. Yet as *man*, even his *will*, is *quid Naturale* as the *ſubject* of his *morality*, and as *Aquinas* oft ſaith, *Ipſa Voluntas eſt quædam natura*; ſo God doth by *Natural agency* and *Cauſation continue* and *actuate* man *as Natural*, that ſo he may *govern him morally* in the reſt, even in the *moral ordering* of his Acts.

§. 12. When men ſay that the *will is free from co-action*, they mean not all the ſame thing. By *co-action* ſome mean nothing, but that *willing* is not *nilling*; or that God doth not *make it* to be *unwilling* and *willing* of the ſame thing, in the ſame reſpect, at the ſame inſtant, that is, God cauſeth not contradictions, it being Impoſſible: And ſo with the Predeterminants uſually *to will*, and *to will freely*, ſignifie the very ſame. And if this be all the Liberty of the Will, then to *move* it as *Naturally* as a Stone is moved, to *hate God*, to *will all ſin*, and *nill all duty*, ſo as that it can no more do otherwiſe than make a World, were no abatement of its Liberty, becauſe it is *Volition* and *Nolition* which are the acts that it is moved to, (whether by God or Satan.)

§. 13. But I yet ſee not why it may not as properly be called *Coaction*, to *move* the *will* by *phyſical neceſſitation* to *will* or *nill*, as to move the *Intellect* to *underſtand*, or to move *any natural* agent.

§. 14. If you ſay, that the word [*Coaction*] importeth reluctancy, or unwillingneſs, or oppoſition; I confeſs with *Scotus*, that *Potentia paſſiva* is well diſtinguiſhed, into *naturalem*, *neutram*, *violentam*: and that the word *Coaction* may be ſo *ſtrictly* taken, as to ſignifie no motion but of a *violated Patient*: and ſo it is but *lis de nomine*: But a *Neceſſitating motion* of a *natural*, and *neutral* patient is the ſame thing, what *name* ſoever you call it by. And they that acknowledge the *pravity* of the *will*, and its corrupt *averſneſs* to God and ſpiritual good, muſt needs, by this rule, make Gods *gracious change* by *predetermination* to be a *coaction*, as being the *motion* of a *contrarily diſpoſed patient*: *contrarily*, I ſay, *in inſtanti priore*; for the *motus* is ſuppoſed to change its *diſpoſition* and *act* at once: But if ſtill they ſay, that it is not contrary *in eodem inſtanti*, and that's its liberty; I ſay, then if the Devil had power as eaſily to effect by phyſical premotion a *hatred of God* and will to ſin, in all men, as I can move my pen, it were no loſs of *Natural Liberty*. And ſo *mans liberty* differeth not from a *beaſts*, or from a *plants*, indeed, but only in the *Nature* of the Act: one *willeth*, when the other doth but *appetere*, but all by the like phyſical unreſiſtible efficiency from other cauſes. This is but to play with the *name* of *Liberty*.

§. 15. We

§. 15. We take not *this Liberty* to be inconsistent with *all kind* of *Necessity*, as is opened before in the Table of Liberty.

§. 16. Nor do we confound the several sorts of Liberty, (as the said Table sheweth) 1. A *Political Liberty* from Restraint of Laws is one thing (not questioned in these disputes;) 2. And a *Moral* or *Holy* Liberty from *vice* or *sinful dispositions* and *acts* is another. 3. But it is the *Natural Liberty* of mans will on earth, that we speak of.

§. 17. So far as any man is *vicious*, he wanteth the *Moral Liberty* of his will, and so far as he is *virtuous* and *sanctified* he hath it: that is, His will is so far freed from sin.

§. 18. We take not *Liberty of will* to consist in *Neutrality* † of disposition or meer *Indifferency*: For the will acteth freely when it acteth according to its *Inclination* and *habits*, with the greatest *propensity*, yea, *constancy* of self-determination.

† See *Fr. Macedo* against *White*.

§. 19. We take not the *Indetermination* of the will to be its *perfection*; but its *Natural Imperfection*: But such as God hath made it in, in this World, where all his creatures have not the same perfection. *

§. 20. Therefore though God hath thought this *Indeterminate*, *self-determining Will*, to be fittest for a *Viator* in his tryal and preparation for felicity, yet *perfection* consisteth in the most *Determinate state of Love*, with the greatest *necessity* which proceedeth from the *perfected nature of man*, and the *full communication of Love from God*, which we hope to have in Heaven for ever. And he is best on Earth who is nearest to this state.

* Therefore we do with judicious *Strangius* distinguish the essential Liberty which is self-determination according to Reason, from that liberty of Indifferency, which is inconsistent with predetermination and necessitation.

SECT. XII.

Somewhat more of Predetermination; with an answer to Dr. Twisse.

§. 1. THough I remit the Controversie of * Predetermination to a peculiar full Disputation on that subject, yet this touch *in transitu* I shall give here.

1. It is not Gods meer Volition or Decree of the Event that we speak of; but his Physical Motion.

2. † The *Dominicans* (the Masters of the *Inquisition*, and Murderers of the *Waldenses* and *Albigenses* of old,) and therefore faulty as well as the *Jesuits*, though there are very Learned men among them both, do commonly hold, that *No Creature natural* or *free* can act, unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act, both in the act as such (which they call the *substance* of it,) and all the *modes*, *circumstances* and *order* of it.

3. *Augustine* and *Jansenius* after him, with their true followers hold not this necessity of *predetermining* premotion to *all acts*, *natural*, or *sinful*; but only to *spiritual good acts*: which is not from the *Nature*, but the *Corruption* of *man*; and therefore the *predetermination* is not made, say they, by *Gods Common Natural Motion*, but by *Medicinal Grace*,

* I remit the Reader to *Strangius* against the necessity of predetermination.

Percipere non possum quomodo statui possit Deum causas liberas, etiam ad actus intrinsice malos, physice prædeterminare, quin inde sequatur Deum esse peccati authorem, &c. Le Blank Thes. 56. de Concursu, &c.

† It's strange the *Dominicans* are for burning and tormenting men for that which they hold God doth do in them and by them, and necessitate them to. See *Bradwardine li. 3. c. 1, 2. Quod Deus quodammodo necessitat quamlibet Voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum suum, & cessationem ad quemlibet actum; & hoc necessitate naturaliter præcedente; & cor. p. 649. Omnia quæ sunt, fiunt aut eveniunt, sunt, fiunt & eveniunt de aliqua necessitate ipsa naturaliter præcedente.* This is just *Hobbs*.

So fo. 5. p. 654. that No creature hath simple Liberty of Contradiction, or Contingency, but only *secundum quid* in respect to second causes: but only Gods acts of will *ad extra* are simply free and contingent. As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good; but doing it or not doing it were from Gods necessitation, though not from the creatures!

4. *Durandus*

4. *Durandus* and his followers (as *Lud. à Dola*) and *Aureolus* partly, do hold, that if God do but *uphold all creatures*, as compaginate in the Univerſe, in the Nature he made them in, (and ſo *natural Inclination*, and *media* and *objects* all ſuppoſed) this *ſuſtentation* and *Influx* maintaining their *Active Natures*, and *means*, is ſufficient to cauſe *an Act*, without another particular predetermining premotion of God. As *e.g.* in Naturals, they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air, God continuing its *Natural Gravity*, and all other *circumſtant Natures* and *Concauſes*, this Rock if looſed *can fall down* of it ſelf, without another predetermining premotion of God. And that a *new* Act of God (ſuppoſing the ſaid *ſupport of Nature*) is more neceſſary to the *not-falling*, than to the *falling* of it: As it was to the *fires not burning* the Three Confeſſors, *Dan.* 3. And I am unable to ſee the error of this Opinion.

And ſo in *Free agents*, they think, that if God continue the *Nature* of a *free-will*, with all *circumſtants* and *neceſſary natures*, it can *freely determine* it ſelf, without *another* act of predetermining premotion; And doth ſo in each act of ſin: Though as *Janſenius* ſaith, by *accidental corruption*, for *Converſion* we need *Medicinal Grace*.

5. The *Jeſuits*, and all others explode this Opinion of *Durandus* as ſingular, but give ſo little and ſlender reaſon of their diſſent, as would draw one the more to ſuſpect their cauſe. Inſtead of it they ſcarce know what to aſſert: But *Bellarmine* and the chiefeſt of them, under a pretended oppoſition, ſpeak (I think) the ſame in other words, *Even an Univerſal Concurſe like that of the Sun*, which operateth *in ſpecification according* to the *nature* of *Recipients*, which ſpecifie the *effect*. Which *Univerſal Influx*, no doubt, *Aureolus* and *Durandus* include in *Gods ſuſtentation* of *Nature*: For to ſuſtain an *Active Nature* in all its *Active diſpoſition*, by a *ſuitable active Influx*, is *univerſally to cauſe* its motion. The difference they are unable to aſſign.

6. After theſe come *Hobbs*, *Carteſius* and *Gaſſendus*, with a ſwarm of *Epicureans*, (a Sect commonly deſpiſed even in *Cicero*'s time, and yet called *wits* in ours by men that have no more wit than themſelves); and ſome of theſe ſay, that Motion needeth no continued cauſe at all, any more than *non-movere*: But when a thing is in motion, it will ſo continue, becauſe it is its ſtate, without any other continued cauſe than the *motion* it ſelf. And ſo they may as well ſay (and ſome do) that when a thing is in *Being*, it will ſo continue till it be poſitively annihilated, without any continued cauſation of *its being*. As if *eſſe & exiſtere* were nothing more than *non eſſe*; and *agere* were no more noble a *mode* of Entity than *non agere*, and ſo needed no more (that is, no) *Cauſe*. (For *non eſſe & non agere* need no Cauſe:) When this diſtraction is worn out and ſhamed, the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it; And yet the *wits* of this delirant Age have not the wit to *underſtand* a *Confutation*.

Some of them ſay, that *Spirits* cannot move bodies for want of *Contact* (as *Gaſſendus*). Some ſay, that *Matter* and *Motion* are eternal, and that of themſelves; As if there were no God but Matter and Motion. Some ſay, that there is a God who gave matter one puſh at firſt, and ſo ſet it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end. And ſome ſay, There is no other *Intellect*; but the wonders of wiſdom and order in the World are done by ſuch fortuitous motion.

But *Hobbes* meeteth the Predeterminants and saith, that the *Will is free* in that its *Act* is *Volition*; but that this *Volition* is *necessitated* by *superiour* or *natural Causes* as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch, and that it is unconceivable that any *Act* or *Mode* of Act can be without a *necessitating efficient cause*. But he differs from them in his consequents, and in the Notion of a *Spirit*, acknowledging no *being* but *Corporeal*.

§. 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods *free-will*, but on the *Necessity* of *the thing*: As if it were a contradiction, which *God cannot do*, for God to make a creature that can Determine it self, *ad ordinem actionis* without his particular predetermining premotion; or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it self, unless he move it downwards, besides his sustentation of its natural gravity, and all other natures, by his Influx, or universal Concurse.

§. 3. But till they can *prove the Contradiction*, they must pass for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency, which is to deny a God.

§. 4. * Their chief argument is, that the moral specification of an Action is an *Entity*; and to say that any thing can cause any Entity without Gods first causing it, is to deifie that creature making it a first cause. *Answ.* 1. The *comparative Order* of *Actions*, (as the terminating them on *this object rather than that*, and at this time rather than that, *&c.*) is but the *modus modi entis*; and so is no *proper entity*. 2. Or if the *Name* be the quarrell, it is no other *Entity* than what God is Able to make a creature *Able* to *cause* without his predetermining Causality. 3. This *power* is the excellency of the creature, and the honour of its Creator.

§. 5. As for their argument, that there is no effect without a cause, nor difference in effects without a difference in the causes; and that an undetermined cause cannot produce a determinate effect; I answer, 1. God is the cause of all differences without any diversity in himself. And he is the *Free cause* of all things *necessary* in the World. 2. The *soul is Gods Image*. 3. The *Will* when undetermined hath a *self-determining power*. Therefore this is but *petere principium*. 4. But there are many sub causes that are a *reason* of the determination; As objects, opportunity, knowledge, the removing of competitors, *&c.*

§. 6. Therefore *Gibieufs*, *Guil. Camerarius*, *&c.* way of predetermination by the *Causa finalis*, is nothing to our question; that being no *efficient*, but a *Material*, *objective* or *Moral* Causation.

* Let the Reader note, 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value. 2. And that Dr. *Twisse* affirmeth that God is not alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good. Now if there be no such Entity in *Bonum conducibile*, *vel Bonum Jucundum*, as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them, tell us if you can, Why there is so much entity in *Malum morale*, as that man is not able to cause it, unless God predetermine his will? Yea, as to Entity, there is no more in *Bonum honestum*, than in the rest fore-named: His words are [*Nos tueri potuimus*, *Malum fieri*, *esse Bonum per se*: *nempe in genere Boni conducibilis*, *ad certum aliquem finem*: *sed arguit adversarius*, *Ergo Deus esset non modo permissor*, *sed & effector ejus mali*. *Prorsus invalida consequentia*: *Apparet enim non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis*: (N. B.) *Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum*, *quod non sit alicui conducibile* —— *Neque necesse est ut Deus sit author omnis boni jucundi*, *magis quam ut sit author peccati*. *Nam certissimum est*, *& extra omnem controversiæ aleam positum*, *peccatum esse bonum in genere jucundi*, *etiam in genere conducibilis*: *potest enim peccatum nobis cedere in salutem* ——] Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth *Arminius* for confusion in not distinguishing the three sorts of Good in this controversie, *An mali existentia bonum sit?* viz. the *bonum honestum*, *utile & jucundum*; I must desire the Reader to avoid also the Doctors confusion, and to be so much more accurate than he, as to remember that this distinction is but *de Bono Creaturæ*, whose pleasure, profit and honesty are distinguishable: But that above these God Himself is the absolute and simple Good, and that things are first Good as related to him, the Prime and Ultimate Good: And that the highest formal notion of Goodness in the creature, is none of those three, but the conformity of things to the Will of God, the absolute Rule of Goodness. And therefore when we ask, *An bonum sit ut sit malum?* we mean not *an sit bonum hominis secundum quid*, but *an sit bonum simpliciter*, viz. *conforme Voluntati Divinæ?* And if they can prove that *Deus velit peccatum fieri*, we will confess it to be Good. But 3. Yet I deny it to be *bonum utile*, seeing it doth the sinner no good. For *Bonum jucundum in genere* is not sin. God would have men have more Pleasure than sin bringeth, and not less. But it is *hoc minus jucundum sensibile* preferred before *hoc magis jucundum spirituale*, which is sin. Now the prelation of a Less Pleasure to a Greater is no Pleasure. So that sin is neither *utile* nor *jucundum*. And the Doctor is quite out, in calling *occasio* a *medium conducibile*: and confesseth that sin is no otherwise conducible to Gods Glory but as *occasio*. Whereas *occasio*, as such, is no *medium* at all, no more than *possibilitas est ens*; unless you take *Medium* very largely.

§. 7. When

§. 7. When they ſay, that elſe God dependeth on the creature, and is determined by it, (as to his Concurſe:) I anſwer, 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent, be his *dependence* on it, when it expreſly ſpeaketh its *dependence on him*, without whom it cannot *be* nor *act*? 2. No creature determineth Gods *Immanent acts*: nor his *tranſient*, as to the meer *Impreſs* and *firſt effect*; and ſo not *Gods Act* at all: unleſs *Terminating* be *Determining*. It is only *its own Act* which the creature determineth, which is a *ſecondary effect* of *Gods act*, as proceeding from the *ſecond cauſe*. Gods Influx maketh all that *Impreſs* on the ſoul which God *intendeth abſolutely*: But whether by that *Impreſs* the ſinner *will conſent*, the *will* determineth, and is the *chief* determiner in *Evil*.

§. 8. Saith Dr. *Twiſſe Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digreſ. 9.* [*The ſecond cauſe non agit in primam*, &c. *Hoc faceret vel volendo, vel aliud agendo, &c.*] *Anſw.* It's granted: God is not paſſive, nor doth any ſecond cauſe act on him as paſſive: Who is his Adverſary in this?

§. 9. He addeth [" *Neither on the Influx of God do we act: for an* " *Act is not the ſubject of an act.*] *Anſw.* 1. If by Gods *Act* and *Influx* he mean not the *Effect* on the ſoul, it is a falſe ſuppoſition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Eſſence: But if the ſaid *effect* be meant, I have ſhewed you that both *Indiſpoſition* in the *Recipient*, and a *contrary Act* may *reſiſt* it.

§. 10. Againſt our *Paſsive determination* of the effect, he ſaith, that [" *God is denyed to act by phyſical action on mans will*——*which if* " *he did, he would rather determine it, than be determined by it, becauſe* " *it cannot reſiſt him*, &c.] *Anſ.* 1. The will doth not *reſiſt* by *reaction on and againſt God*; but by *Indiſpoſition*, and by its own *not acting* when it can, *&c.* 2. Who dare deny all *Phyſical Action* of God on mans will, when it is *quedam natura*? 3. The will doth not *Determine Gods will*, nor reject his *Impreſs*, but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act *ad ultimum poſſe*, the will would never diſobey or fail of the due *effect*.

§. 11. He ſaith *ib.* [*Doth God move only to the Act* in genere? *or alſo to* " *this ſpecies of action? The firſt cannot be ſaid, For* Suarez, Hurtado, " *ſay that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act. And the* " *creature hath as much need of help to the ſpecies of motion* (*which is* " *perfecter than the genus,*) *as to the genus. And Gods Influx is ſingular,* " *and not determined to Generical nature*, &c.] *Anſw.* Gods univerſal motion (as the Suns) doth *neceſſarily* make its *Impreſs* on the *creature*, and giveth him *ſufficient help ex parte ſui* to *Act*; yea, neceſſarily continueth the ſoul in ſome Action. And that *Action* is *ſingular*, and not a *non exiſtent univerſal*. But it is only the *General Nature* of a *ſingular Act* which Gods *Natural Influx neceſſarily* cauſeth: And the *Moral ſpecies* (what need ſoever we have of help to it) is cauſed otherwiſe; not by this *common Influx* of God as the root of Nature, but by a ſpecial Gracious Influx with and by ſpecial ſupernatural means. And this it doth only to *Good* and not to *Evil*: and not alwayes with a *cauſally neceſſitating influx*, as to our act.

§. 12. He addeth [" *If the will need not Gods motion to its Act* in " ſpecie, *it is either* in genere entis, *or* in genere moris. *The firſt can-* " *not be ſaid: For the ſpecial Nature includeth the General and more.* " *And the ſpecies* in genere moris *are no ſpecies of acts, but only acci-* " *dents of humane acts, and that only by extrinſick denomination as to*

" *the*

the Law,] *&c. Answ.* 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions, is a wood for you to hide the matter in. You are not able certainly to define what *physically specifieth an Action*, and what not. To say that one is the *species* of an Act, and the other is but an *accident* and no *species*, is but to say that you will say what you list. We use to say that Acts are specified by their *objects*: And so when objects differ *specie physica vel morali*, the acts do so. But when the question is with *Judas*, shall I betray *my* Master or not? with another, shall I be perjured or not? with another, shall I commit this Adultery or not? with another, shall I pray in season or out of season? to another, shall I love God or the creatures more? shall I will or not will this? shall I will it or nill it? *&c.* Here you are so much at liberty that you may please your self with saying, that to betray and not betray, to forswear and not to forswear, to love more or less in degree, *&c.* are *physical species* of *entity*, and so make physical species of Action. But I will not say that *non agere & non ens* is a species of Entity physical: Nor do I believe that we need Gods Influx *ad non agendum* as such.

And as for your Accidents of Actions, if you mean *Relations*, it is their *fundamentum* that we are questioning. The *extrinsick denomination* is founded in *Relation*, or else it's *Causeless*. In a word, Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that, and also not to go, and this without a further physical predetermining premotion of God.

§. 13. But here let the Reader note, that when he maketh *Moral Good and Evil* no *species* of *Actions*, but an *extrinsick denomination* (which is true, abstracting the *relation* from the *fundamental* difference of the Acts), and maketh God the Naturally necessitating Cause of all that is physical in the acts, he maketh God equally the necessitating prime Cause of Good and Evil, which are but relations resulting from the specified acts.

§. 14. He addeth [*If God move the will it is to that same act which it doth, or to another. If to another, why should it be said that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done, when we speak not of moral, but necessary physical motion?*] *Answ.* The Particle [*To*] doth cheat you by ambiguity. 1. As [*to*] noteth, the *effect, of God alone*, it is [*to*] the *Impress* which he maketh on the soul; which effect he still obtaineth, which *urgeth* it towards its own act. 2. The same I say if [*to*] signifie an *absolutely intended end.* 3. But if [*to*] signifie the *natural tendency* of Gods Impulse as to an *effect possible and desirable*, yea, and *due* by command from the subordinate cause (mans will,) then it was [*to*] our act of repentance, faith, duty, that God moved us: That is, he gave us that Power, and necessary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us.

§. 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to answer all these fallacies and quibbles, founded in some false supposition or ambiguous word: else I would answer the rest of that Digression, and his *Digres.* 5. *li.* 1. *p.* 2. *contra Alvar.* Only here I must take notice, that in this *Digr.* 9. he himself rejecteth *Greg. Arim.* and *Hurtado*'s assertion of Gods Determining us to *this* or that *Numerical Act*, as distinct from another *ejusdem speciei, ut merum figmentum, & ad curiositati hominum nimium infœlici satisfaciendum duntaxat introductum.* Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader, I might shew, that the same Reasons will hold for or against this *numerical*, as are for or against his *specifical predetermination.* And the species having no existence but in the individuals, and himself saying, that

Gods motion is *ad actus ſingulares*, if he ſay that it is not to *that ſingular act* that *is done, rather than that which is not done*, he giveth up his whole cauſe.

¶. 16. But to this he hath an anſwer that it is a fiction and unſound to ſay, that [" *Poſſibilia quæ nondum exiſtunt* do *differre numero: cum differre numero eſt tantum exiſtentium.*] *Anſw.* 1. He may as well ſay, that *eſſe poſſibile* is a fiction: when *poſſibile* is *terminus diminuens ad eſſe*. And is not *poſſibile* as much a *fiction de ſpecie* as *de numero?* That which *is not*, neither *is in ſpecie* nor *in numero*. But there is a *Poſſibilitas numeri* as well as *ſpeciei*. Yet with this anſwer he oft inſulteth over the *Schoolmen*, when at another time he would have ſaid that *Poſſibile* hath an *eſſe cognitum* in both reſpects.

¶. 17. And I think the good man forgat that by this he quite overthroweth his Book *de Scientia Media*, and much of all his other Books, which are animated with the ſuppoſition of *Gods Will cauſing futurition from eternity*. For if only *exiſtentia differunt numero, futura non ſunt exiſtentia*: And if the *futurition* of *differentia numero* be not *decreed* nor *eternal* (as of this Sun, this Earth, *Paul*, *Peter*, and their ſingular acts, *&c.*) then *nothing* is *future* from eternity: And ſo we are brought to the *Arminian* election of *ſpecies* only, and not of individuals (*in primo inſtanti*) which is rejected. Sure God *electeth Individuals, or none*: And if ſo, it is *future individuals*. *Individuation* exiſteth not but *in exiſtentibus*. But if *foreknowledge* and *Decree* may be of *futures* and *non-exiſtents*, it may be of individuals that are ſuch, as well as of *ſpecies*.

¶. 18. Yea, he proceedeth to ſay pag. 412. [*Deum ſcire plura eſſe poſſibilia quam ſunt, non eſt ſcire multitudinem rerum poſſibilium; ſed tantum ſcire ſe præſtare poſſe ut detur major multitudo rerum exiſtentium quam actu ſit: Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum eſt tantum exiſtentium, ſive ea ſit multitudo actualis, ſive potentialis*, &c.]

And yet the ſoul of his Book *de Scientia Media* is [*Cauſa tranſitionis rerum è numero Poſſibilium in numerum futurorum.*] And my foreſaid oppoſition to his *Eternal Cauſation of futurity*, is hereby confirmed. 2. It's true, that to know *quid poſſibile*, is not to know it to be *exiſtent*, nor any more than to know what God (*e.g.*) can do; and ſo to denominate *Nothing*, *quid poſſibile*, as relating to *Power*: (And ſo *Ariminenſ.* ſaith *Nothing may be Related.*) But the like muſt be ſaid of *futurity*: And it holdeth equally of the *ſpecies* and *de numero*, *& poſſibilium & futurorum*; ſo that here we have *confitentem reum* about the dance and dream of *notions* and *nothings* which I have before ſhewed they beguile mens underſtandings with.

And hence alſo my former doctrine is confirmed, of the non-neceſſity of a cauſal decree of *Negatives* or *Nothings*, or of a Poſitive Volition of them.

¶. 19. The truth is, an Act of mans ſoul is ſuch a thing, that *de exiſtentibus* it's hard for any of their ſubtilties to make known the difference of *ſpecies*, *accidents* or *individuals ab objectis*: And to know what interruptions they muſt be, that go to cut one Immanent act into two, or hinder unity.

SECT.

SECT. XIII.

Of mans Power Natural and Moral.

§. 1. I Have ſaid ſo much of this alſo in the other parts of this Book, that a little here may ſerve.

1. Man hath no Power whatſoever but from God; and therefore doth not act as a prime Cauſe properly, becauſe but by a *derived* power.

§. 2. That which is a *Power* but *hypothetically* on Condition of ſomething not *exiſtent*, eſpecially not in our power it ſelf, is no *power properly* and *univocally*, but *equivocally* only. As to ſay, I am able to leap to *Heaven* if God will Cauſe it: I am able to lift a thouſand pound with ſufficient help which I have not: I am able to ſee if I had light: or to ſee a Phœnix if there were ſuch a thing: or I am able to will or move with Gods neceſſary predetermining premotion (ſay ſome) which I have not. None of this is a true *Power ad hoc*. But to conſtitute a *formal Power*, it is neceſſary that I have all things, without which I *cannot* do the act.

§. 3. It is a contradiction to ſay that when a man hath the true *Power to believe*, yet he *cannot do the Act*,* without further premotion: which is to ſay, *He that can believe, cannot believe*. The *Power* connoteth the *Poſſibile*.

§. 4. † The true *Natural Power* of *Intellection* and *Volition*, every *man* hath as a *man*: And when God, Chriſt, Heaven are brought to us with all the Conditions neceſſary to Objects of Intellect and Will, we have formal *power* to underſtand and will them, in this *Natural ſence*. What is neceſſary to the *Being* of an *Object*, and *Revelation*, I deſire the Reader to ſee diſtinctly opened by me, in a ſmall tract called, *The Certainty of Chriſtianity without Popery*.

§. 5. But the ſoul it ſelf hath a *vicious Indiſpoſition* to the *ſpiritual exerciſe* of theſe faculties or powers: And this is the *morbus facultatum*; And this *Indiſpoſition* is called a *Moral Impotency*; becauſe the ſoul is unfitted by it to the *exerciſe* of its *natural Power*.

§. 6. When this *Indiſpoſition* is ſo great, as that *no man in that caſe doth do the act*, we ſay he is *morally unable*: And when it is not ſo great, but that *under that Indiſpoſition ſome men do the act, in that ſtate of help* we ſay that ſuch a man is *morally able*. Therefore he that is yet *more diſpoſed*, is ſo *More able*, and it hath various degrees.

§. 7. But if a man have ſo great a *diſpoſition* (skill and will) as that he is *ready* to the *facile* and *frequent* performance of the act, that *Promptitude* is called a *Habit*, and is *more* than a *meer moral power* (though a *power* alſo.)

§. 8. It is certain that *men can do more than they do*: not only that they *could do more* if *God* would *predetermine* them, or give them *more grace*; but that *properly they can*. The worſt hath Power to *do more good*, and *forbear more evil*, than he doth; And ſo have the *beſt*.

§. 9. *Adam* had *true proper Power*, *natural and Moral*, to have ſtood when he fell: He ſinned not for want of neceſſary *Power* to have forborn it.

§. 10. They that deny this and reſolve *all ſin* into *Gods unreſiſtible neceſſitating operation*, or denying of power abſolutely and antecedently neceſſary, I think do make way for *Hobbes* his Theologie, or ſubverſion of Religion.

* As *Janſenius* and Dr. *Twiſſe* do, in making more abſolutely neceſſary to it.

† *Potentia rationalis naturæ humanæ non poteſt minui extrinſecè, & entitativè, per deſtructionem alicujus gradus ejuſdem potentiæ; poteſt tamen minui per appoſitionem impedimenti, quale eſt peccatum, vel per inclinationem contrariam ad peccata; quæ inclinatio generatur per actus malos: Neceſſe eſt enim ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, quod diminuatur inclinatio ejus ad aliud: Cum ergo peccatum ſit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipſo quod homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturæ, quod eſt inclinatio ad virtutem*: Alvarez de Aux. li. 6. diſp. 45. p. 210. 1a Thom. 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 1. in corp.

§. 11. *Moral Power* and *Impotency* are *primarily* such in the *will* (the first seat of *morality*) and *derivatively* or secondarily in the *Intellect* and *executive Power*. And therefore it is not originally and radically of *physical necessity*, but *Free*, as the *will* which is *free* is the Cause of it.

§. 12. * Nature teacheth all the world so much to difference between mans *Voluntary* and *Involuntary Acts* and *Habits*, as to take the *first* to be directly *laudable* or *culpable*, as being not only *virtuous* or *vicious*, but in their relations to the Rule, to be *Virtue* or *Vice* it self; and the more men have of *a vicious obstinacy* and *voluntarinesse* in evil, the more all mankind condemn and hate them. Whereas *involuntary necessity* is every-where taken for a just excuse: yea a *necessitas volendi* in a mad man or a phrenetick or melancholy person, maketh them the objects of mens compassion. And this Light and Law of humane nature is not to be rejected, because it may seem hard to answer the sophisms of those that would confound these sorts of Power and Impotency.

§. 13. Therefore of a man that is no otherwise unable to Love God (*e.g.*) but only because (or in that) directly or indirectly, he *will not*, that is, is *Dispositively*, *Actually* and *Habitually Unwilling*; it is more proper and intelligible to say that he *will not*, than that he *cannot*: Though we may also say *He cannot*, when we mean but that *he will not*: But the most explicatory words are best.

§. 14. No man shall be able so far to accuse God and excuse himself justly at last, as to say, I was truly willing to have Christ and Life as offered me, but I could not: or I was truly willing to leave my sins and worldly vanities, and to live a holy life to God, but I could not: Yea *Augustine* and *Twisse* say more, that no man can truly say, [I would believe *but cannot*] (which yet I think needeth some limiting explication.)

§. 15. Obj. *But though all men Can have Christ* (or faith) *if they will, yet the unregenerate are unable to be willing.*

Answ. By *Unable* you must 1. Either mean that they want the *Natural Power* or *faculty* of willing it; 2. Or that they want some *naturally-necessary concause* or *object*, without which this faculty is no *formal Power ad hoc*; 3. Or that the *will* is *not well Disposed* so to Act.

1. The first no man will say that taketh an unbeliever for a *Man*. 2. The second no man will say that will not by *Hobbes* his physical necessitation, turn Religion into a *name* or *nothing*, or the *natural motion* of an *Engine* called *Man*. 3. And the third (which is the truth) must be named as it is: In Controversies which exercise so great animosities and carnal zeal as this doth in the Churches, it is an injurious thing to use *seducing improper names*, when the *more plain* and intelligible are at hand. Hereafter speak plainly in your contendings, and instead of [*Cannot*] say, *An unconverted man will not believe, and his will is viciously undisposed to it, yea ill-disposed against it.* Hold to this that we may understand each other; or confess that you quarrel about a word.

§. 16. *Obj.* The Scripture useth the word [*Cannot:*] *Can a Blackmore change his skin*, &c.

Answ. 1. The text may as fitly (at least) be translated [*will a Blackmore change his skin*, &c.] Yet the word [*Cannot*] is brought in in the application; for here it is all one: That is, the meaning is, that some *custome* in sin doth cause such a *setled Ill disposition* or *Habit*, as without *special Grace* is *never* overcome: Which signifieth no more, than a *rooted wilfulness* and *Love* of sin, and *enmity* to Good. 2. But the meaning is not to affirm these *two sorts* of *Impotency* to be of the *same nature* [An *Ethiopian* cannot change his skin, were he never so *willing*] and [he cannot

* *Jansen. de Grat. Christ. l. 3. c. 15.* denyeth that without effectual Grace men have a compleat power to the Acts; but saith yet, They have power, 1. *Remotissime*, in that they have free-will. 2. By *faith*, not joyned with Love, as being the beginning, *&c.* 3. Yet more by Love as the root, *&c.* And he noteth a double Impotency, *una est ex defectu alicujus quod non potest quantumlibet magna voluntate, vel fortiter volendo suppleri. Talis est Impotentia illius qui caret rebus temporalibus ad largiendum*, &c. (This is natural Impotency.) *De tali Impotentia verissimum est quod Deus non jubet impossibilia: Nam hoc ipso quo talis oritur impossibilitas, vel præceptum extinguitur, vel certe ad illud implendum, in cui præcipitur non amplius obligatus est. Non est enim culpa Voluntatis quod non fiat*, &c. *Altera ex defectu ipsius Voluntatis seu Volitionis oritur, quæ si adesset, quanta adesse debet, præceptum facillimè impleretur: Tantummodo enim fortiter volendo impletur —— Hæc Impotentia nullo modo excusat eum qui non implet quod præcipitur: Posset enim implere si vellet. Quod si noluerit, & ideo non potuerit, quis non eum dixerit pro ipsa tam perversa obduratâque voluntate culpandum—— Velint, plenéq; velint; mox ut voluerint, implebuntur: si autem nolint, ideoque non possint, quis nolentibus vitio non vertat*, &c? *Nam revera defectus talis potestatis non est aliud quam duritia malæ voluntatis, à qua susceptâ recedere non posse, non est aliud quam tenaciter nolle.*

not

not be *willing* to change it, without Grace.] But you cannot ſay that an accuſtomed ſinner cannot learn to do good were he never ſo willing: nor yet that he can be as eaſily willing as the *Ethiopian*, nor as hardly made willing as the Leopard. 3. Figurative ſpeeches are frequent in Scripture, and may alike be uſed by us in the like caſes. But in Controverſies a trope is an equivocal till explained, and muſt not be uſed without neceſſity and explication. 4. Where the text once ſaith, *They could not believe* or *repent*, it ſaith many and many times *They would not*. 5. The phraſe [*They could not believe, becauſe* Eſaias *ſaith*, &c.] *Joh.* 12.39. notoriouſly ſpeaketh but of an *Impoſſibilitas Logica conſequentiæ*, and not of a phyſical diſability in themſelves, though it intimateth a *ſetled wilfulneſs*. 6. When it's ſaid, Act. 4. 14. [*They could ſay nothing againſt it*,] it ſignifieth not a want of phyſical power, but *mediate advantage*. It's ſaid of Chriſt, Mark 1.45. *He could no more enter into the City*——— 6.5. *He could there do no mighty work becauſe of their unbelief*. 7.24. *He could not be hid*. Iſa. 5.4. *what could have been done more to my Vineyard?* Jer. 15.1. *My mind could not be towards this people*. Mark 3.20. *They could not ſo much as eat bread*. 1 Theſ. 3.1. *When we could no longer forbear*, &c.——— 1 Joh. 3.9. *He cannot ſin*——— Heb. 9.5. *Of which we cannot now ſpeak particularly*. Act. 4.16. *We cannot deny it*. And 19. 36. *Theſe things cannot be ſpoken againſt*. Joh. 7.7. *The world cannot hate you*. Luk. 11.7. *I cannot riſe and give thee*, (and yet he did.) Luk. 14.20. *I have marryed a wife, therefore I cannot come*. Mar. 2.19. *They cannot faſt*. Neh. 6.3. *I cannot come down*. So *Gen.* 34.14. & 44.26. 2 *Cor.* 13.8. *Numb.* 22.18. & 24.13. *Joſ.* 24.19. 1 *Sam.* 25.17. *Pſal.* 77.4. and other places; I think you will not ſay it is *natural* and *utter diſability* that is here ſpoken of: No nor of God when it is ſaid that *He cannot deny himſelf or Lye*, 2 Tim. 2.13. Tit. 1.2. We muſt therefore explain ſuch doubtful words, before we draw controverted concluſions from them, as ſuppoſing them falſly to be univocal.

§. 17. The ſame *Natural faculty* may by the Alteration of *objects* and means, become *formally* a *Power* or *no power ad hoc vel illud*. And when *Nature* made it a *faculty*, *Grace* can make it a *formal power* to this or that *without changing it in it ſelf* at all, in many inſtances or caſes.

§. 18. Men have a *power* even *moral* to the uſe of many means which God hath appointed for the begetting of faith, before they have a *moral power* to *believe*.

§. 19. God hath appointed or commanded to all men, the *uſe of certain duties* and *means* for their *Recovery* by *faith and repentance* unto God: And there is no man that is not obliged to uſe ſuch means; nor any man that is to uſe them in *deſpair* of ſucceſs: The very *command* being ſome ſignification of Gods will, that obedience ſhall not be in vain. Whether the *name* of an *Implicite Promiſe* be apt for that command, I leave to thoſe that have a mind to contend about names.

§. 20. Though a *meer Indifferent faculty* be (as Dr. *Twiſſe* ſaith) rather to be called *Nature* than *Grace*; yet it is *Grace* 1. Which giveth a *gracious object* to that faculty, though thereby it be ſtill but an *undetermined Power*. 2. And it is *more Grace* which taketh *off ſome vicious Illdiſpoſitions* of the ſoul, and giveth it ſome *more Diſpoſition* to believe, though but ſo much as common grace doth give.

§. 21. It is not a *meer Power* that God giveth men to *Repent* and *believe*: But a *Power* accompanied with many *Gracious helps* and *means* to determine it aright (of which before.)

§. 22. He that *will not uſe* ſuch *Power* and *means* doth thereby forfeit further

further grace *: However God doth not always take the forfeiture, and will not of his elect to their deſtruction, but doth pardon them.

* *Briarſon in 4. q. 8. Cor. 3. fol. 152.* maintaineth, 1. *Quod ad obtinendam gratiam neceſſario ex parte hominis præeſſet aliqua diſpoſitio.* 2. *Quod talem diſpoſitionem homo per ſeipſum poteſt ſi vult in ſe inducere, præſuppoſitâ influentiâ generali Dei.* 3. *Quod talis diſpoſitio ex parte hominis nullam inducit neceſſitatem introductionis gratiæ ex parte Dei: ſed totum fit merâ gratuitâ Dei voluntate.* But the ſecond muſt be done by common preparing Grace.

q. 23. By all this it appeareth, 1. That all men have a *natural power* or faculties, enabled to all that is *neceſſary to ſalvation*, ſo far that it is not the want of a *proper natural power* that ſhall neceſſitate them to ſin and periſh; 2. That this *Power* is by vice *undiſpoſed* to *believe*, &c. 3. That it hath *ſome Indiſpoſition* to all that virtue or moral good which tendeth to ſalvation. 4. That it is not *equally undiſpoſed* to *all* ſuch Good. 5. That it's *Indiſpoſition* to *ſome means* of Recovery, is no greater than what may be overcome by *Gods commoner ſort* of Grace. 6. That this *commoner Grace* is not herein ever ſo effectual, as that all that receive it, do *all the good* that *they can do* by it, even in a *moral* ſence; nor all that ſome others do that have no more help: But the wilful negligence of the receiver, or his diverſion or reſiſtance frequently fruſtrateth it; though not always. 7. That the right uſe of this commoner grace, in the uſe of the foreſaid means, is a way appointed by God himſelf, and not in vain, by and in which men may be made fit to receive that ſpecial Grace which will call them ſavingly to believe. 8. That no man is denyed that *ſpecial grace* that deſerveth it not by the *abuſe* of *Common grace*. (How the caſe of Infants dependeth on the Parents I muſt not inſtance as oft as the exceptions of wranglers require it.) 9. And therefore no man is condemned for want of *natural Power* as ſuch, but only for want of ſtirring up his *natural power* by thoſe helps of grace, by which he might have done it, and for want of that *further Good* (*faith, love, obedience*) which by the helps rejected he might have been brought up to, had he not wilfully neglected the power and helps which he had. 10. Yea uſually God long waiteth patiently on ſinners with the tenders of mercy, while they reject it, before he utterly forſake them.

SECT. XIV.

Whether the giving of faith be an Act of Omnipotency? *and a proper* Creation? *and a Miracle?*

q. 1. THe Reader muſt pardon me for troubling him with ſuch frivolous queſtions about *names*, ſeeing unhappy Theologues have made it neceſſary. *An Act of Omnipotency* hath ſeveral ſenſes:

Creation is an ambiguous word: *Pet. de Alliaco in 4. q. 1. G.* telleth us of four Ordinary ſenſes of the word, 1. *Facere aliquod eſſe poſt non eſſe*: 2. *Facere aliquid eſſe poſt non eſſe ab illo agente quod poteſt hoc ſine cauſali influxu materiæ vel ſubjecti.* 3. *Facere aliquid eſſe poſt non eſſe, ſive concurſu cauſali ſeu influxu materiæ vel ſubjecti ſine ſubjecto præſuppoſito ex quo illud fiat.* 4. *Facere aliquid eſſe poſt non eſſe abſque agente ſe ſolo cauſante, & ſine concurſu alterius cauſæ efficientis.* Malderus 1. 2. qu. 113. a. 9. p. 578. ex Tho. & Auguſt. *Juſtificatio impii eſt maximum opus Dei. Secundum quantitatem tam magnum eſt Angelos juſtos creare: ſed ſecundum quantitatem proportionis majus eſt impios juſtificare —— quia major eſt diſtantia impii ad gratiam quam juſti ad gloriam; ſicut ex plebeio creare ducem quam ex duce regem.* Aug. Tr. 72. in Joh. *Juſtus creare & impios juſtificare, æqualis potentiæ, hoc autem majoris miſericordiæ eſt.*

1. If the meaning be Whether *Omnipotency* be the *Agent Principle*, it is paſt diſpute. For it's all one as to ask Whether it be an *Act of God?* God hath no *Power* but *Omnipotency*, that is, *perfect* power.

2. If the meaning be, Whether the *Giving of faith* be an *Adequate effect* of *Omnipotency*, it is alſo negatively paſt doubt. Though thoſe that take God to be but *Anima Mundi*, ſay that Either the *world* is *Infinite* or that *God* is not *Infinite*, as thinking the World to be his *adequate effect*; yet *Chriſtians* are commonly agreed, that God hath no *adequate effect*. Even the *making of the univerſe*, the *Giving of Chriſt*, and the *Glorifying of the Church*, which are the higheſt effects of his *Power*, *Wiſdom* and *Love*, are not *adequate effects*; For nothing but *another God* can be an *adequate effect* of God: And *another God*, is a *contradiction*.

q. 2. 3. But

§. 2. 3. But if the ſenſe of the queſtion be only *comparative*; As, 1. Whether *Omnipotency* be *more eminent* in the giving of faith than *wiſdom* and *Love* (or Goodneſs)? 2. Or whether *Omnipotency* be more eminent in giving *faith*, than *other works of God?* they are both needleſs queſtions. And to the firſt I ſay, No: To the ſecond, thoſe other works of God muſt be named, and compared, by the preſumptuous that have no ſafer work to do.

§. 3. 4. If the queſtion be, *whether the giving of faith be ſo great a work that no Power below Omnipotency could ſuffice to do it?* I anſwer, it is a preſumptuous paltry queſtion of raſh men. But yet if it muſt be anſwered, it muſt be negatively: Becauſe as *Omnipotence* is more illuſtrious in the *making of the world*, than in cauſing a man to *believe*; ſo Chriſtians agree that the world it ſelf (as I ſaid) is not an adequate effect of Omnipotency: Which maketh ſo many of the ſubtileſt Schoolmen conclude that God could not be proved to be *Omnipotent* by the *whole Creation* as ſuch, were it not further to be gathered from the notices of his *perfection*. Which were falſe if by *Omnipotence* they meant only a *Power that can do all that is done*: But they mean *An Infinite Power*; which they ſay muſt be ſo ſeen in an *Infinite effect*. But the world is *not Infinite*.

§. 4. As to the ſecond queſtion, it is either *de nomine* or *de re*. If the former, let every man ſpeak as he liſt for me, rather than I will contend with him, whether *Creation* of *faith* be a fit name. As to the *matter*, 1. It is agreed on, that faith is not a ſubſtance; 2. Nor an Accident con-created with a ſubſtance; 3. Nor a compoſition of ſubſtances into one, done by ſecondary Creation, Generation or Art. 4. But that it is the right *ordered Act of a ſubſtance*, whoſe natural *power* which performeth it, was pre-exiſtent, though without that act and the moral diſpoſition. Therefore it being a *Modus entis* or *modus modi* that we talk of, the common name is *Alteration* and *ſuſcitation*, *actuating* and *ordering*: But if men ſober ſometime call it a New *Creation* (as indeed the whole frame of holineſs together is called the *New Creature* in the Scriptures) and ſometimes the *Divine nature*, ſometimes *Regeneration*, ſometimes a *Divine Artifice*, *Alteration*, *Converſion*, *Sanctification*, &c. it is the *ſame thing* that is meant by all their ſeveral names.

§. 5. As to the third Queſtion, *whether it be a Miracle* *? 1. As a *Miracle* ſignifieth a *wonder*, a thing is *wonderful* either for the *Rarity* or for the *Great appearance* of *Gods power* in it. In the firſt reſpect, faith is not ſo *Rare* as to be a *miracle*: In the ſecond, the *Sun* and *Heavens* are a *greater wonder* than faith.

2. But as a *Miracle* ſignifieth that which is done by *ſecond Cauſes*, *but unknown to us*, and out of Gods *ordinary way* of working; ſo it is no miracle.

3. And as ſome men call that a Miracle which exceedeth the power of the ſecond cauſes, ſo *all things* would be Miracles that God doth: For they are effects of *his power* as exceeding the power of ſecond cauſes.

4. As a Miracle is that which is done *by God without any ſecond cauſes*, † ſo ſome think that the *propagation* of *ſouls* is a miracle: But of *ſouls* and *faith* it is much unknown to us, *how far* God uſeth *ſecond cauſes*; But that *Generation* as to *one*, and *Preaching* and all other *means* to the other, are ſome ſort of ſecond cauſes, * is ſure.

5. And laſtly, if by a *Miracle* be meant that effect, which God produceth both *above* the *power* of *ſecond cauſes*, and by a more glorious exertion of his own power than in his Courſe of *Nature* and *Government* he uſeth by and

* *Juſtificationem non eſſe proprie Miraculum, Vid.* Malder. ib. p. 578. Et *Brianſon. in* 4. *q.* 8. *Cor.* 2. *fol.* 144. confeſſing it above the power of a Creature to juſtifie us, but not properly a miracle.

† Many good people would never be ſo much againſt the acknowledgement of ſecond Cauſes if they underſtood the matter: But they ignorantly think it derogateth from God the firſt cauſe.

* We have no reaſon to think that God uſeth no ſecond cauſe in working faith. It is much to be noted which *Pet. de Alliaco* ſaith *in* 4. *q.* 1. *E. Plus facit Deus faciendo aliquem effectum mediante cauſa ſecunda, quam ſi faceret tantum effectum ſi ſolo: Quia in prima factione ſunt plures termini divinæ actionis quam in ſecunda.* For as he ſaid before, *Quandocunq; Deus facit aliquem effectum mediante cauſa ſecunda, ipſe non ſolum facit illum effectum, ſed etiam facit cauſam ſecundam eſſe cauſam illius effectûs.* Mark this well.

and with ſecond cauſes, ſo it is not a Miracle, becauſe in the way of his ordinate co-operation with his Goſpel, he ordinarily produceth it.

§. 6. So that as all Chriſtians muſt confeſs that we had never believed if God had not wrought it in us by that ſpirit of *Wiſdom* and *Love* which is *Omnipotent*; ſo to contend any further whether it be a *Miracle*, and a proper *Creation*, or an effect of *Omnipotency* as ſuch, *&c.* are ſuch queſtions as preſumptuous Schoolmen heretofore, and hot-headed Sectaries in our times, have uſed to afflict the Church of Chriſt with, and to tempt their ignorant zealous followers into ſuch employments, as moſt effectually deſtroy their charity, and injure others, and ſcandalize the world.

SECT. XV.

Of the ſufficiency and efficacy of Grace.

§. 1. I Have ſaid ſo much of this before as that, leſt I be tedious by repetition, I muſt be but brief. *I. By *ſufficient Grace* is meant that which is *neceſſary* to the effect, and without which it *Cannot be*, but with it, it may be, though it ſometimes be not.

§. 2. That there is ſuch a *ſufficient Grace* not alwayes effectual to mans act, is before proved by *Adams* Caſe. And that *no man* hath ſuch now for *any means* or *duty* in order to his recovery, as *Adam* had to *ſtand* when he *fell*, is not to be aſſerted or received. And that no *prepared ſoul* hath ſuch ſufficient Grace to *believe*, that yet believeth not, is a thing that is paſt our reach to know.

§. 3. This *ſufficient* Grace conſiſteth in a *Power* to the act: when the Indiſpoſition of the natural power, is ſo far altered, or repreſſed, as that by the means and helps vouchſafed by God, the act is Morally poſſible to be done. For he that truly *can do it*, all things conſidered, is well ſaid to have ſuch neceſſary grace.

§. 4. But God of his bounty uſually giveth men more than ſuch a meer moral poſſibility, by many additional helps and urgencies to the act, which I mentioned before.

§. 5. But by [*ſufficient*] is not meant [As much as is *uſeful*; yea or *needful* to the *Aſcertaining* of the Event, much leſs to the *meliority* of the act.]

§. 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect: And by the effect it muſt be deſcribed. *Efficacy* is *Aptitudinal*, which is the force and fitneſs of the *Efficient Cauſe*: Or *Actual*, which is *Efficiency* it ſelf.

§. 7. *Aptitudinal efficacy* is 1. In God; 2. In the means: And 1. In Gods *Abſolute Power*; 2. In *his Ordinate Power*.

§. 8. 1. Gods *Abſolute Power* is *Omnipotency*, or *Infinite*; and therefore was *aptitudinally efficacious* to make a *world* before it was made.

§. 9. 2. Gods *Ordinate Power* is the ſame *Eſſential Omnipotency* denominated from the Connotation of thoſe effects, which he hath decreed to produce, according to the limited aptitude of ſecond Cauſes and means, or the diſpoſition of the recipient, or at leaſt, as limited in the effects by his meer *free will*.

§. 10. In theſe reſpects, though ſtill Gods *power* in it ſelf be Omnipotency, yet in the limited way of operation, it is various, 1. As *Gods Will quoad terminos* is various, 2. And as the *means* are various, 3. And as

* *Maldonat* againſt the Synod of *Dort* and 1. 2. *q.* 111. *art.* 3. *dub.* 8. beſtirs himſelf with ſpecial induſtry to tell what *Gratia efficax* is: And he concludeth that it is *afflatus gratiæ prævenientis, & ſub genere gratiæ excitantis; & quæ non reſpuitur cum reſpui poſſit*; rather *præparans voluntatem quam adjuvans*: rejecting *Valentia* who placeth it in the Habit of Grace cauſed by excitation; and *à Lorca* who takes it to be *adjuvant*; and thoſe that make it *co-operant*; and thoſe that place it in *prædetermination* phyſical; of which he confuteth four opinions, *p.* 502. and ſaith *Probabilior ſententia eſt quæ negat omnimodam gratiæ infallibilitatem, adeóque efficaciam ſumi poſſe ex ſola reali aliqua differentia, conſiderata ex parte gratiæ prævenientis.* And that Juſt and unjuſt have effectual grace, and therefore it differeth not from ſufficient really. And he reſolveth all *per ſcientiam mediam*, that Grace is effectual becauſe *ex propoſito convertendi Deus ita hominem trahit ſicut aptum novit ut æquatur & certiſſime ſecuturam*: and ſo that Grace is effectual *ex natura ſua* and not ſo called only *ex eventu*.

as the *Receivers capacities* are various. To one, the ſame *operation ex parte Dei & mediorum* (though not from the *ſame Decree*) is abundantly *efficacious*, and to another not.

§. 11. And thus God ſo limiteth the *effect* of his *Power*, as that it ſhall be effectual ſometime on a *Condition* to be *freely performed* by man receiving it, even by a former help, and *not abſolutely*.

§. 12. Therefore all that is *Aptitudinally efficacious*, is not *actually efficient* of every *effect* to which it was thus apt.

§. 13. The *aptitudinal efficacy of the means* being of God, falleth in with *his ordinate power*, herein, and is not the thing in queſtion.

§. 14. The effects in reſpect to which Grace is called *efficacious* are, 1. The *Giving of the Means* themſelves. 2. The *firſt Impreſs* on the ſoul. 3. The *altering* of the *ſouls Diſpoſition*. 4. The production of the *act*. 5. And of the *Habit*. And it muſt be ſome of theſe *effects* which are called *efficacious* or *inefficacious* to others. So that by that time the ſtate of the Queſtion is truly opened, this which Dr. *Twiſſe* ſaith *Arminius* durſt never ſpeak out his opinion of, and which he and others make to be the very heart of all theſe Controverſies, perhaps will appear to be nothing.

§. 15. For what *is that Grace* whoſe *efficacy* you enquire of? Is it *Gratia operans* or *operata*? The *efficient cauſe*, or the *effect*? If it be *Gods Gratia operans*, it is either the *Prime Cauſe* or the *ſecond Cauſes*. If it be the *Prime Cauſe*, it is *Gods eſſence only*; Even his *Eſſential Power*, *Intellect and will*. And is that the Queſtion [*wherein conſiſteth the efficacy of Gods eſſence?*] Why it conſiſteth in it ſelf if you mean *Aptitudinal efficacy*; It is Gods eſſential Virtue. If you mean *Actual efficiency*, that ſpeaketh the effect; of which more anon. So that about Gods *eſſential efficacy* there is no Controverſie.

§. 16. But if you ſay that It is his *Potentia quâ ordinata* and not *quâ eſſentialis vel abſoluta* that you enquire of the efficacy of; Remember that the word *Ordinata* or *Limited* ſignifieth no alteration in *Gods Power* at all, but only *An effect which is Limited* and *ordinate*, from whence the *Power* cauſing it is extrinſecally ſo named. Gods *eſſential Power* is never *limited* but *Infinite*; and to be *Ordinate*, is but to have *ordinate effects*. So that ſtill either the Controverſie muſt be of *Gods eſſence*, (which is paſt Controverſie,) or of ſome *ſecond cauſe*, or ſome meet effect.

§. 17. And if you transferr the Queſtion to the *efficacy* of *ſecond cauſes*, 1. You will deny your ſelves, that *means* and *ſecond cauſes* have any power but from God; 2. And that the very *nature* of thoſe cauſes is ſufficient to the aſcertaining of the effect, becauſe they cauſe moſtly *morally*: And it is one of the acculations againſt the Arminians (right or wrong) that they lay all on *moral ſuaſion* or *cauſality*. 3. And *ſecond cauſes* are ſo numerous, and unknown to us, that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy. 4. But it is I think agreed between you, that the force of *Means* or ſecond cauſes in Converſion is not ſuch as neceſſitateth the will. Or if ſome of the *Schoolmen* and *Jeſuites*, which with their *Scientia Media* do joyn *Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem*, do make this efficacy to be the chief cauſe of the effect, yet they deny it to cauſe *neceſſarily*; at leaſt alwayes, when the effect followeth. And what if we add, that *objects effect not as ſuch?* And therefore this queſtion *de efficacia cauſarum ſecundarum*, muſt extend to ſome ſecond *effective Agents*, and not only to *objects as ſuch*, nor to thoſe that preach, preſent and offer *objects*, *as ſuch*: And what that *Agent Cauſe* muſt be, under God, by that time you are agreed, you will find that they are new Controverſies that will there riſe up before you. And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the

Vaſquez. in 1 Tho. q. 19. diſp. 80. p. 502. [*Voluntas libera Dei, ſi eſſentia Divina ſignificata per modum actus vitalis & affectus eliciti, cum revera ſit ipſamet ſubſtantia Dei; includit tamen habitudinem etiam quandam rationis ad res futuras, qua libere Deo convenit, ſicut etiam res libere futuræ ſunt: Cum enim hæc relatio conſurgat ex fundamentis non neceſſariis, nempe ex rebus ipſis, & objectis futuris; ipſa etiam habitudo libere Deo convenit; non intrinſecè, ſed extrinſecè ſolum denominationi; quam Deo convenire, & non convenire, non eſt abſurdum. Ergo cum Velle liberum Dei non ſolum includat eſſentiam, ſed cum tali reſpectu, tùmque libera Voluntas poſſit Deo adeſſe, & abeſſe, nihil ſequitur abſurdi, quod divinæ ſimplicitati & immutabilitati repugnet.*] This little is all that they can tell us, what Gods free Volition of extrinſick effects is. And can you tell us any more? *Bradwardine* denying in God any executive power beſides pure Volition (though he call him omnipotent antecedently to his ſelf-knowledge and Volition) doth make Grace *ex parte Dei* to be nothing but his *will*, that we ſhall do the act, and be ſuch and ſuch.

efficaciousneſs of *any cauſe* foregoing the firſt *effect* it ſelf on the ſoul, it muſt be of the efficacy of ſome or all theſe *ſecond cauſes*, or we muſt queſtion whether *God be God?* For I can find nothing elſe to queſtion.

§. 18. It remaineth then that the queſtion, *Wherein the efficacy of Grace conſiſteth*, muſt be meant of *Gratia operata*, even of the *effect it ſelf*. And then either you mean, that this *effect* is *efficacious to it ſelf*, or to *ſomething elſe*. The firſt is ſuch a contradiction as is not to be imagined, (that you ſhould think that an *effect* is its own *cauſe*, and ask How doth faith, *e.g.* cauſe it ſelf:) Therefore there is nothing left, but only to queſtion, How the *firſt effect* of God on the ſoul in its converſion is *efficacious* of the *ſecond?*

§. 19. And here 1. Some of you will grant that as motion cauſeth motion by contact of bodies, ſo the firſt effect on the ſoul can cauſe the ſecond. And others of you will deny it, and ſay that Gods Actions being diverſified only by the diverſity of effects and objects, that which cauſeth the *ſecond effect* is to be denominated a *ſecond Action*, and not the *ſame numerically* which cauſed the *firſt*; no nor *ſpecifically* if the effects *ſpecifically* differ. And ſo as ſcholaſtick wits here exerciſe their curioſity, without reſpect to *Arminianiſm* or *Calviniſm*, you will here fall into notional Controverſies in the way.

§. 20. 2. But granting that the *firſt effect* is that *efficacious Grace* which muſt *cauſe the ſecond*, how ſhall we know what the firſt effect is, and what the ſecond? Gods Grace like the Sun is ſtill ſhining though we are not ſtill receiving it: When it worketh but the commoner ſort of effects, theſe tend to more and more. The firſt *Gracious effect* may *be* forty years before Converſion. But this is not your meaning: But I ſuppoſe you will ſay that it is the firſt *ſpecial effect* or *gratia operata*, that is *proper* to the *ſaved*, which you mean. But to paſs by, that *Auguſtine*, *Proſper*, *Fulgentius* (much more their predeceſſors) held that ſincere *faith*, Love, holineſs, Juſtification, preſent right to Life if they ſo dyed, are not proper to the ſaved, but that ſome loſe all theſe, If you ſay but [proper to the *Juſtified* or *Sanctified* or *Converted*,] or, it be the firſt effect which is *proprium Juſtificandus* which you mean; Are we agreed what that is?

§. 21. Either the *firſt effect* on the ſoul, or the firſt *Gratia operata*, is the *Act of faith* it ſelf, or ſomewhat antecedent. If the *Act* (as many ſubtilly maintain) then it were a fooliſh queſtion to ask, Whether the Act of faith be Effectual to cauſe it ſelf, and How? Therefore it muſt be ſomewhat antecedent, or we can find no matter for our Controverſie *de efficacia Gratiæ ad credendum.*

§. 22. If ſomewhat antecedent to the Act, it is either a *Diſpoſition*, or *Infuſed Habit*, or an *Impreſſion*, *Impulſe* or *Influx* which is neither *Diſpoſition* nor *Habit.**

§. 23. 1. A proper *Habit* of *faith* it is not: Though Mr. *Pemble* ſingularly ſeem ſo to think, yet he meaneth but a *ſeminal diſpoſition*. And it's commonly held that the *Habit* is given by *ſanctification*, after the Act given in *Vocation*. 2. But if it were otherwiſe, the *Habit* is not alwayes *ſufficient* to *aſcertain the Act*. For holy men oft ſin againſt a *Habit*, and believers do not alwayes exerciſe it. Habits *Incline per modum naturæ*, but do not certainly *determine* to the act. 3. And of a *Diſpoſition* it muſt be ſo ſaid much *more*.

§. 24. 2. And if it be an *Impulſe* or *Influxus Receptus* (as I think we muſt affirm) this is but a *general notion*, of which our underſtanding is very crude or ſmall. A *meer Motus* it is not: For (as was ſaid in the beginning) the Divine Influx is threefold, *viz.* From *Vital-Activity* (or Power,) *Wiſdom* and *Love*, to *Life*, *Light and Love*, in man. Now, as I ſaid,

* *Dico* 1. *Non certo conſtare ex divinis literis eſſe hujuſmodi Habitus ſupernaturales.* 2. *At* (*baptizatis*) *infunditur Gratia eo ſenſu quod efficiuntur Deo grati & conſortes divinæ naturæ, & renati.* 3. *Conceditur Dei adjutorium ut credamus, velimus, diligamus, per inſpirationem & infuſionem ſpiritus ſancti.* 4. *Dei adjutorium diſuper infuſum eſt omnino neceſſarium ut credamus, diligamus, &c. & non tantum ut facilius credamus. Medina* in 12. q. 51. p. 282.

See many definitions of a Habit confuted in *Medina* 1. 2. *p.* 271. and that which he reſteth in is *Ariſtotles*, *Qualitas quâ aliquid vel malè afficimur.*

ſaid, if there be no ſuch Impulſe, beſides the *Life*, *Light* and *Love* produced, our Controverſie is at an end: For theſe are not *efficacious* or *efficient* of *themſelves*. But if ſuch a *different Impulſe* there be, it's hard to know what it is in man. I conceive it beſt expreſſed by all theſe inadequate notions conjunct: 1. An *inward urgency* to this threefold act; which is called in the Schools, both *auxilium*, *concurſe*, *and Influx*: 2. By which *Urgency* the ſoul is *more Diſpoſed* to *the Act* (*in hoc ordine*) than it was before: 3. Which *Diſpoſition* containeth in it a *Moral Power* to that Act (ſo ordered) and *ſomewhat more*; even ſome *Inclination* to perform it. If any man can tell me better what that *Divine Impulſe* is which is *antecedent* to *mans Act*, I am willing to learn.

§. 25. Now if this be the queſtion, *Whether this Divine Impulſe*, which is the *firſt effect* of *Gods ſpirit*, be of its *own nature efficacious* to produce our *Faith*, *Love*, &c. as the *ſecond effect*, I anſwer, 1. Sometimes *Gods Impulſe* is ſo Great, as *propriâ vi*, doth change mind and will and overcome reſiſtance, and procure our act. 2. Sometimes it is ſo ſtrong as that it prevaileth againſt the contrary *ill-diſpoſition*, ſo far as to give man a *Moral power* to the Act, with *ſome Inclination*, which yet contrary habits and temptations do overcome, and the Act doth not follow, which yet was not for want of *Power* to have done it: And this is called *ſufficient Grace*. 3. We have great reaſon to *believe* that as in ſome Inſtances Gods *greater Impreſs* is the chief *differencing* Cauſe, ſo in other Inſtances an *equal Impulſe* of God on *unequally diſpoſed* ſubjects, doth produce the *Act of faith*, &c. in one of them, which it produceth not in the other, through the incapacity of the recipient. 4. Therefore there is a double *degree* of *efficacy* or *Vis*, One which only ſo far moveth and helpeth the will, as that it *can* do the act, and ſometime *doth it* without more: Another which is *ſo ſtrong* as that the ſecond effect alwayes followeth it. 5. But whenever the Act of faith is produced (by *force* or *Impulſe more or leſs*) God is the firſt and principal cauſe of it, and man but the ſecond, and the praiſe of it is accordingly due. And I think this deciſion accommodateth both ſides of our contenders.

According to *Janſenius* the firſt Grace is Neceſſary Delectation or Love in act, before that which is free and full. And if ſo, then there is no grace cauſing this grace, and ſo none to be the ſubject of this queſtion, Whether it be more or leſs, ſufficient or effectual, operating or co-operating grace, which maketh one man love God initially rather than another? For it is no Grace, but Gods eſſencial will; if this Love be the firſt Grace, and no received Impulſe antecedent to it.

§. 26. The foreſaid *Impulſe* or firſt effect, is *only* the work of God (and the means) and not ours: But the Act of *Faith*, *Love*, &c. is *Gods work* and *ours*; and ours as *Free-agents*. Therefore that *Impulſe* of God which is *Aptitudinally efficacious* on ſuppoſition of mans due reception and ſelf-excitation, is oft not *Actually effectual* for want of that Voluntary Reception and ſelf-excitation.

* *Omne agens requirit de neceſſitate aliquam diſpoſitionem in ſuo paſſo: maximè ſi illud paſſum habeat diſpoſitiones actioni illius agentis contrarias, ut patet de igne* &c. *Ergo cum Gratia non ſit minus immo magis quam naturalis forma; Certum eſt quod Gratia requirit majorem diſpoſitionem in paſſo. Et voco illam diſpoſitionem, Libertatem arbitrii ſui Deo ſubmittere, & ſi ad alteram partem declinare, ſcilicet ad volendam Gratiam recipere, & dolere de culpa commiſſa voluntarie & libere per attritionem,* Brianſon in 4. q. 8. cor. 3. fol. 152. This is juſt the doctrine of our Proteſtant Preachers, ſuppoſing that Common Grace muſt make this preparation which the Papiſts grant.

§. 27. As to the *various effects* of Grace fore-mentioned, 1. As to the preparation of *Means* and *Gracious medicine* (*Chriſt*, the *Covenant*, &c.) Grace is *efficient* of *it ſelf*, and doth it.

2. As to the firſt *Impulſe* or *impreſs* on the ſoul, God certainly *effecteth it*, in ſome degree, wherever his ſpirit worketh on the ſoul.

3. Some *Urgency*, and ſome degree of *diſpoſition* to the act, is conſtantly contained in this *Impulſe*. And uſually it giveth a *moral power* to the Immediate Act-required.

4. The Act of *faith* ſometimes followeth this Impulſe through its *invincible force*; And ſometime it followeth it through its *ſufficient force*, and the due *Reception* * of the ſubject. And ſometimes it followeth it *not at all*, through the *Recipients indiſpoſition*.

5. The *Habit* of faith ever followeth a *ſpecial Act*, through the *powerful operation of the Holy Ghoſt*. But uſually it goeth not before the Act: Man hath not a *fixed Habit to promptitude* and *facility* of *believing* before he believeth, but after.

6. The Habit ordinarily procureth following acts, by the way of *Inclination*: but not *neceſſarily nor alwayes*. For by *ſtrong temptations*, Habits are oft born down.

§. 28. If the queſtion then be, *whence* Gods Grace is *Aptitudinally* and *Potentially efficacious* (able and fit to effect?) It is becauſe God is God that he is Able; and his *Impulſe* is ſuch becauſe *he maketh* it ſuch.

And if the queſtion be, *whence Grace is Actually efficient* of its firſt effect (the Impulſe?) It is becauſe God will ſo do; and his *will* hath no Cauſe, being the firſt Cauſe.

And if the queſtion be, *whence Grace* is *Actually efficient* of *mans faith*? It is by its *Impelling man to believe*.

But if you ask, *Whence faith it ſelf* is; or of *what cauſe* is it an effect? I anſwer, of *God* as the *firſt cauſe*, and the *Means* as his *Inſtrument*, and of the *Believer* as a *free ſecond Cauſe*.

And if the queſtion be, Why *ſufficient Grace* which is *Effectual ad Poſſe* is not *effectual ad agere*? It is becauſe (being but *ſufficient*,) mans *Indiſpoſition* and *wilful neglect* or *oppoſition*, maketh him an *unfit Receiver*.

§. 29. There being nothing then but *Gods eſſence* (and the *means*) antecedent to the *firſt effect* on the ſoul, and that *effect* ever following where God worketh: and the *ſecond effect* being the effect both of *God* (by the firſt) and of *man* as a *free agent*, the queſtions, *unde efficacia Gratiæ*, and *unde effectus*, are thus healingly anſwered.

§. 30. Obj. *But the will of God is the firſt differencing* and *effectual Cauſe: And that not as it is his eſſence, but as it is terminated on the Creature* and *decreeth ſuch an effect.*

Anſw. 1. It is *no will* but *his eſſence* which is *ſo terminated* or *decretive*. 2. That termination maketh no difference at all that's real in the *will* of God, but only in the effect or object. 3. What is the difference then between *Gods will ſimply in it ſelf*, and as *willing from eternity* a *thing not yet exiſtent*? None *really* at all. And that *which is not yet*, being *Nothing*; what *Relative*, *Connotative* and *Denominative* difference ſuch Nothings can make on the will of God, beſides the variety of imperfect notions in mans frail Intellect, let the wiſe conſider.

§. 31. From whence it is that School-divines after *Auguſtine* ſay, that with God there is no *futurum vel prateritum*, no *fore-knowledge* or *fore-decrees*, properly, becauſe no difference of time, but only *knowledge* and *will* of things as preſent.

§. 32. Yet Gods *Vital Activity*, *Knowledge* and *Will* as *he himſelf* is the object of them, have a Greater diſtinction; becauſe to be *ſelf-living*, *ſelf-knowing* and *ſelf-loving* are his Eſſential Acts on himſelf the eternal object (which made many Ancients account them the Trinity of perſons.) And alſo to *Will* an *exiſtent Creature* is an extrinſick denomination from *exiſtence*: But to will that *which is not*, (that *man ſhall be*, that *he ſhall believe* hereafter, *&c.*) as it is *nothing really* different from Gods eſſence, ſo it is but an extrinſick denomination of his eſſence, from *nothing*.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

Of Infused Habits, and the Holy Ghost Given us.

§. 1. EVery *operation* of the Holy Ghost is not the *Giving of the Holy Ghost*, which is specially *promised* in the Gospel to believers. For there are 1. Many *common* works of the Spirit; 2. And the special effect of *faith it self* before it.

§. 2. This gift of the Holy Ghost unto Believers, was formerly twofold, the Gift of *Miracles* or *wonders*, and of *special Holiness*; of which the latter continueth to the end of the world.

§. 3. The *Spirit* is Given to *Believers* in several respects conjunct. 1. In that he is Given to *Christ their Head*, with whom by *Union* they are Relatively one Body. 2. In that He is Given *to them by the Baptismal Covenant*, in *special Relation* to their *own persons*, to be *their sanctifier*: In which respect they are *Baptized into the name of the Holy Ghost*, as being now in *Covenant theirs*. 3. In that he worketh in them the *Acts* and *Habits* of *Holiness*, even of *Love to God* and to his *Image*; and helpeth them in all duties, and against all temptations, enemies and sins. But not that his *essence* is more in them than elsewhere, but his *Operations* from those *Relations*.

§. 4. This Gift of the *Spirit* is the great priviledge of believers, and of Gospel times in the eminent degree, and He is the great *Agent*, *Advocate* and *witness* of *Christ in us*, the *divine nature*, and *name* of God and his *mark* upon us: *our witness*, *earnest*, *pledge*, and *first-fruits* of life eternal; and the great difference between Christs living members and the unregenerate world.

§. 5. So powerful and fixed is this *Habitual Holiness* or *Love of God* (for that is the summ of it) that though it be no *substance*, nor alter not mans *species*, nor operate not by *natural necessitating determination*, yet it strongly and constantly *inclineth* the soul *per modum naturæ* to the *act* of *Love*; and so emulateth *nature*, that it is called in Scripture the *Divine Nature*, and the *new man*.

§. 6. The greatest *blessing* in this world is to have *more* of *this Spirit*, and the greatest *punishment*, to be *forsaken by the spirit*, and deprived of it: And believers themselves must fear most, lest they should *quench* and *grieve* the spirit, and be punished with any measure of its desertion: And their great work is to cherish it carefully, and obey it faithfully and constantly.

§. 7. The word [*Infusion*] as to Habits being metaphorical, is ambiguous. 1. If the question be, Whether *Habits* be *so Infused* as that they are caused *without Means?* we must deny it ordinarily.

2. If it be, Whether they are not at all procured by any *cogitations*, *desires*, or *preparatory duties* of our own, to fit us to receive them? It is to be denyed as to the *ordinary* way.

3. If the question be, Whether the *Act* of *faith* do ever go before the *Habit*, as a *cause* of it? It must be *affirmed* of the *ordinary* case.

4. If it be, Whether the *Habit* ever go before the *Act?* we must say, that some *Impulse disposing to it doth*. And God *can* cause a *Habit* before the *Act*: But we cannot prove that he ever doth so, much less that it is his ordinary way.

§. 8. Whence

The Schoolmen that speak most for the necessity of Infused Habits, cannot agree what use they are for; *Aurtolus* supposeth chiefly for the right circumstantiating of Acts, rather than for promptitude to them and pleasure in them. And when all is said, they give men but small comfort from them, saying (as *Aureolus*, *Brianson*, &c.) that no man can be sure that he hath them, seeing acquired Habits may do the same things that Infused do.

utrum Beatitudo supernaturalis hujus vitæ sit magis in Habitibus quam in operationibus, vid. Suarez Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 8. n. 18. & Molina 1. p. q. 12. ar. 5. disp. 2. ar. 2. *pro habitibus. Sed contra inquit Ægid. de Sancta Præsentatione* Li. 4. de beatit. q. 5. a. 3. p. 471. *His non obstantibus oppositum affirmant omnes Theologi qui hac de re scripserunt: nec videtur posse de hoc dubitari.* And yet Alens. 2. p. q. 104. m. 3. Aquin. 1. 2. q. 51. a. 2. ad 3. & q. 63. a. 2. ad 3. & Valentiane. To. disp. 4. q. 3. punct. 2. &c. are for preferring Habits.

Idem Ægid. de Præsentat. li. 4. p. 443, 444. tells us that by Grace God is *Present* in the soul as his Temple otherwise than by Immensity and sustentation; But his *præsentia Amicitiæ* can mean nothing but the special effects of Gods Love.

Nostrâ tempestate non solum est temerarium, & periculosum, sed ferè hæreticum habitus infusos negare; Nam Concil. Vienens. &c. *& universi Theologi uno consensu affirmant dari habitus infusos:* Medina in 1. 2. q. 51. a. 4. 282. But *Soto li. 2. de nat. & grat. c.* 17, 18. saith that the *Concil. Trid.* purposely forbore to define the case of infused habits.

Let the Reader note that *Jansenius* proveth that *Pelagius* himself asserted infused Habits given in baptism, and that without merit. *Jans. Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p.* 126.

§. 8. Whence it is plain that *ordinarily All Infused Habits* are so far also *Acquired*, as that they *follow means* and *the Act*: But *all Acquired Habits* are not such as are called *Infused*.

§. 9. The difference is in this, that *Habits* are said to be *Infused* when the *Holy Ghost* doth excite the soul to the *Act*, and by that *Act* unto a *setled Habit*, by such a special *powerful Impulse* as would not follow Gods ordinary operation by meer natural *second Causes*. As the seal set home on the wax by a strong hand maketh a deep impression, more than when it's laid on lightly by a child: so are sacred objects and means and motives when set home by the spirit (allowing for the differences of the things.)

§. 10. Whether in *every* true Believer a *fixed Habit* of *Love instantaneously* follow the *first act* of *true faith*, though *weak*: or whether in *many* God only give after the *first act* so small an increase of the *Disposition*, as is short of the true nature of a *habit*, till increased by frequent acts, is a case that I think more difficult than needful to resolve.

§. 11. That which God worketh in *Infants*, is a *seminal fixed disposition*: But I cannot prove that it is a *proper Habit*.

§. 12. Whether *Adams Natural sanity* or *sanctity* antecedent to his first Act, was to be called more properly a *Habit*, or only a *seminal disposition*, I leave to others. But if *his*, and *Infants* be to be *called Habits*, you must say that they are only certain *General Habits*, such as *Health* in the Body, and not those *particular Habits*, which are strictly so called.

§. 13. The *nature* of a *Habit* is not well known to mortal men. We know that it is a *strong and fixed Disposition* to *prompt and facile action* of *this* or that *special* sort. But what that *Disposition* is, we well know not: That is, whether it be the *robur* of the *essential virtues* or *faculties* of the soul, (*Intellection, Will, Activity?*) And if so, wherein that second *Gradus Virtutis*, which is *not essential* differeth from the *first that is?* And whether it be any thing else than a *secret constant Act*, in and by which the soul is excited to *more sensible acts*, it's hard to know. But certain I am that besides *those Acts* which taking in somewhat of *Imagination* or *sense* are ordinarily perceived by us (which are our ordinary conversation,) the soul hath also *some deep secret fixed acts*, which make no use of *sense* or *Imagination*, or none that is *observed*; and yet are the *ruling acts* of the man. Such commonly is the *Intentio finis* which operateth constantly without *memory* or *observation* in all use of means. As a travailer on his journey keepeth on his way, while he seemeth wholly taken up with the occurrences, company and talk of his way, and thinketh not sensibly of his end: And yet had he not an unobserved *Intention* of it, he would not go on. And *night* and *day* the soul hath this *secret insensible sort of Action*.

§. 14. As when a spark of fire is blown up to a flame, and the excited Act doth tend to more, and the more it burneth (*ceteris paribus*) the more it is strongly inclined to burn; And yet no man can say that here is any new *Matter* that was not before existent, nor that the second degree of fire is not of the same nature with the first, nor that there is any thing but *nature* and *action* which inclineth it to more action; And yet how the same essence before not perceived is suddenly blown up by Action to such observable appearance and effects, is past the power of man to understand aright: So some such thing there is in the present case, allowing for the difference of *natures*, and kinds of operation.

SECT.

SECT. XVII.

Whether man be meerly Passive as to the first special Grace.

Q. 1. *Answ.* 1. THe *Nature* of mans soul is to be an *Active Spirit*, and therefore what ever it receiveth, it receiveth it as it is in that nature.

2. But the same soul is *Passive* as well as *Active*, and that in the *prior instant* of nature; For it must receive from God the first cause: which made the *Greek* antient *Doctors* and many of the *Latines* say as *Damascene* in sense, (though in grosser words) that the soul in respect to *bodies* was *immaterial* (or incorporeal) but it was *material* in respect of God.

Q. 2. Not only in its Receiving the Spirits first Impulse to Believe, the soul is *Passive* before it is *Active*: but also in its Reception of every sort of Divine Influx, even to every natural act. So that in this there is no difference between Conversion and any common act. For the soul is *first passive* in all: even in receiving that Natural Influx by which we *Live* and *Move* and *Be*.

Q. 3. But the soul which is *passive* in Receiving *Gods Impulse* to believe, (the first effect,) is *Active* in the *producing* of its *own Act* of believing, (which is the effect of many Concauses.) And, as I said, It is not the Habit of faith properly so called, which it *passively* Receiveth before the *Act*.

* *Indifferentia Voluntatis in ordine ad auxilium prævium est indifferentia passiva: cæterum in ordine ad actum liberum, quem producit prædeterminata tali motione prævia, indifferentia Voluntatis est activa & libera.* Alvarez de Aux. disp. 23. pag. 115.

SECT. XVIII.

Whether the first Grace, and the New *and* Soft Heart *be Promised and Given Absolutely, or on any Condition on our part; And so of faith it self?*

Answ. Q. 1. BY the *first Grace* is meant, either *simply* the *first*, or the *first special renewing* Grace on the soul, proper to them that shall be Justified. Of the *first Grace simply* there is no Condition; for it is given *Universally to all*, (*viz.* a *Reprieval*, a *Law of Grace*, a *Redeemer*, &c.). And after this there is much *common personal mercy* given *conditionally*, and much *absolutely*, to all or some.*

Q. 2. It seemeth to me an error (which by oversight I was long entangled in my self) to think that by *the new and soft heart*, is meant the *first special Grace*. For most Divines agree, that it is *proper sanctification* which is meant by it, as distinct from antecedent *Vocation*. *Vid. Amesium Medul. de Vocat. Rolloc. de Vocat.* Bishop *G. Downame* against *Pemble*, *Hookers* Souls Vocation, *Joh. Rogers* of faith, and many others. In *Vocation* they suppose the *Act of Faith* and *Repentance suscitated* by the *Spirit*, and thereupon a *Covenant-Relation* to *Christ* and to the *Holy Ghost*,

* And as to the first moving inward Grace, see how copiously the Jesuit *Ruiz* (as *Vasquez* and others) proveth that it hath no *initium* in us, no not an occasion or disposition, much less merit, for which it is given: And he reasoneth from the Names, Creation, Generation by the seed of God, resuscitation and Gods being found of them that sought him not, and from the Cause of the difference between man and man. *De prædest. Tr. 3. disp. 18. §. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, &c. p. 227, 228, &c.* Even *Medina* 12. *p.* 596. is so hesitant as to say] *Esse probabilem sententiam Doctorum quod facienti quod in se est ex facultate naturæ Deus, ex sua misericordia nunquam denegat gratiam. Sed dico quod probabilius est & magis consentaneum sanctis patribus, præsertim* Augustino, *non esse Legem infallibilem quod homini peccatori facienti quod in se est, ex facultate naturæ, continuo conferatur gratia. Nam si esset lex infallibilis certè initium & bona pars justificationis esset à nobis, &c.*] Thus the Papists herein differ as much as the Protestants among themselves.

with

with Regenerating, Sanctifying Habits to be given. And I see no reason to be singular herein.

§. 3. That *faith* is by the *Law of Grace*, made a *Condition* of this *Sanctification*, and the *Spirit promised* us [*if we will believe*,] and so the Spirit given to us by *Covenant in Baptism when we believe*, is plain in Scripture, and the commonest doctrine of all Divines.

§. 4. Therefore if it be this *Spirit of Sanctification* that is meant by the *New*, the *Tender*, the *Circumcised* heart, it is not promised and given absolutely, but on *condition* of *faith*.

§. 5. Let us peruse the several Texts where it is promised. Deut. 30. 1, 2, 3, 6. [*When thou shalt call to mind among all the Nations——— and shalt return unto the Lord thy God and obey his voice, according to all that I command thee this day———thou and thy children, with all thy heart and all thy soul; that then the Lord thy God will turn thy captivity———And the Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart and the heart of thy seed to Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, that thou maist live.*]

Here it is a Grace consequent to a condition, even to *much obedience*, which is described.

And *Deut.* 10. 16. it is a command [*Circumcise the foreskin of your hearts, and be no more stiff-necked.*]

Jer. 32. 36, 37, &c. [*I will gather them out of all Countreys whither I have driven them———and will bring them again into this place, and I will cause them to dwell safely; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, and I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever.*] So *Ezek.* 11. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. And *Ezek.* 36. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. In all which, there is a promissory Prophecy, how great a deliverance God would give the Nation of the *Jews*, both for body and soul; And their temporal return and liberty is promised and propheſied in the same manner as a *new heart* is. But here is not a syllable to prove that this is the *first special Grace*; any more than *perseverance* is, which in the same manner is promised in Jer. 32. 40. [*I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not depart.*] To say nothing how far in the first sense this was *National* to the *Jews*, nor how the performance did expound it, (For doubtless it is performed,) the Text it self premiseth [*I will be their God, and they shall be my people*] with other mercies. And no doubt but *Faith* and *Repentance* go before this *Covenant-Relation to God*; and therefore before the following gift of the *Spirit*, ver. 9. and Ch. 11. 19. And Ezek. 18. 31. the same is *commanded*, [*Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby ye have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit———.*]

§. 6. The promissory Prophecy of *Jer.* 31. 31, *&c.* is recited by the Penman of *Heb.* 8. 8, *&c.* to prove the cessation of the old *Jewish Covenant*, and that a *better* should succeed. And this much is easily proved out of both, 1. That God would certainly have a holy people among the returning *Israelites*, 2. And especially that he would have such in the *Christian Church*, as should be sanctified to him by his *Spirit*, and have a *new* and *tender heart*. And Predestination is well proved from the Text. But there is not a word to prove this to be the *first Grace*, nor that *Gods promise* gave *any man right* to it, but upon condition of *believing*. For if Gods Decree, Prophecy, or general Promise saying absolutely [*I will do it*] did prove it to be the *first Grace*, it would prove *perseverance* such; which is false. The words prove no more but that *God will do it.*

§. 7.

§. 7. And as this is no *personal promise* giving *any man a right* to the thing promised, which he may claim; but only foretelling *what God will do*, or *give* to *some*: so he hath *other promises* which are *part* of his *Law of Grace*, and do *give men Right to these same Benefits*. And so the *Spirit* of *Sanctification* and a *new heart*, is promised *on Condition* of *believing*; which therefore is the *former* special Grace.

§. 8. If any therefore will prove that *faith* is given *Absolutely*, they must not do it by those Texts, which speak of *Sanctification*, which *faith* is a condition of.

§. 9. But as to the question it self, Whether *Faith be given absolutely or conditionally?* I answer, 1. There is no *absolute promise* of faith made to *any persons*; but only *promissory predictions* of some indeterminate unnamed persons, that God will draw them and give them to Christ, and they shall believe and live.

2. All men have means and duty appointed them, for the seeking of that Grace which may convert them.

3. They are hereby bound to believe, that if they so do, they shall not lose their labour. For God setteth men on no unprofitable work.

4. Those that do this most faithfully, and have most preparing grace, are the likest to become believers, and the ordinary receivers of special grace.

5. Whether *de nomine* this encouragement shall be called a *promise* or equipollent, let them contend that list.

6. God can and doth suddenly convert some without such preparations; or else give them both sorts of Grace immediately at once.

SECT. XIX.

How God may be said to Cause the Acts of sin?

I Have said of this also so much before, as that this Breviate here must serve.

§. 1. It must be well considered, that God made mans *Nature* before he made any positive Laws for him: And that the Law of Nature it self, is in order of Nature after *Nature* though not in Time: Man being first considerable as Man, before he be considerable as obliged to duty. And also that the Law, both Natural and Positive, is before mans *obedience* and *sin*. So that as man is first in order of Nature *Man*, and then *Gods Governable Subject*, and then (in order of Time) *obedient* or *disobedient*; so God is first his *Creator*, and then *Naturæ Motor*, and then his *Governour by Legislation*, and then his *Gracious Helper*, and lastly his *Judge* and *Rewarder*.

§. 2. Therefore as *Natural Being* (substance and faculties) and *Natural Motion* are antecedent to *Morality*; so Gods causation of both these is antecedent: and therefore to be *Creator*, *Preserver* and *Motor* is not to be the *Cause of sin*, or of *Virtuous acts*, as *such*.

§. 3. God as *Creator* was not pleased to make all his creatures of one *kind*, nor of one degree of excellence: but in such variety as is wonderful to our observation. Besides the innumerable *species* of beings, and the innumerable *parts* of every compound being, the dissimilitude of individuals of the same species is admirable: so that no two faces are perfectly like, no nor no two Stones in the Street, no two Trees, Birds, Beasts, *&c.*

It is ill said, * [*Profitemur incunctanter, prorsus impeditum iri quod universè* simpliciter *Bonum est, si impediretur peccatum: quoniam hoc pacto impediretur patefactio Divinæ misericordiæ parentis, & justitiæ vindicantis: Quæ quidem patefactio, non minus universè Bonum censenda est, quam quælibet alia cujuslibet Dei proprietatis, in ipso tanquam in speculo relucentis.*] Twiss. Vindic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. pag. 133.

It is dangerous to talk so boldly of these mysteries. Here seem to me many errors and confusions. 1. It is false that God could not make known to the world that merciful nature which now pardoneth sin, and that justice which now punisheth, if there had been no sin. His Laws, Promises and Threats

And therefore it is but consonant to the rest of his works, that MAN is neither perfectly like to *Angels* nor to *Brutes*: For as God made one sort of creatures *naturally* determined to things *sensible*, and another sort *necessarily* (though freely) *determined* to *things spiritual*; so it pleased him to make a *middle sort*, endued with *Reason* and *free-will*, *undetermined* as to their *choice*, and *able freely* to determine their own Volitions, without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other. That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life, by *Laws* and other moral means.

§. 4. God as *Creator* maketh *substances*, with their *necessary Accidents*, and as the *Natural Orderer* of them, placeth them in their *natural order*: and as *Motor* (or *Actor*) he causeth *Action as such*; But as *Moral Rector* he causeth only the *Moral Order* of *Actions*, as far as belongeth to a *Rector* (the rest being presupposed in *Nature*,) and leaveth it to man to *cause the rest*.

§. 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man (of a middle, defectible, undetermined Will, left to his free choice, with necessary helps,) it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified; He is not then to be blamed for any of the *sins* of such a creature, because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature, and is his first cause of Action.

§. 6. God could prevent all future sin, if he absolutely willed so to do, either by destroying the World, or disabling the sinner, or by withholding his Moving Influx, or by such a change of his nature, as should make him indefectible. But he that made man in this Middle state, will so continue him, and not make a change in the frame of Nature, to fulfil our wills.

§. 7. No *Act* as an *Act*, no *Vital Act* as *Vital*, no *Intellection*, no *Volition as such*, is *Virtue* or *Sin*; And therefore to cause it *as such* is not to cause either *moral good* or *evil*.

§. 8. As God is Related to us as our *Owner*, *Ruler* and *our chief good*, (*efficiently* as our *Benefactor*, and *finally* as our *End*;) so to *consent* to these *Relations*, and to the *Duties* of our *correlations*, and to *Practise* them, is the summ of all *Moral Good*; even *Dispositively* and *Actually*, to be *Resigned and devoted* to God as our *Owner*, to *obey* and *please* him as our *Ruler*, and to be *Thankful* to Him, and *totally Love* Him, as our *Benefactor* and our *ultimate End*. All Moral Goodness lyeth in this.

§. 9. By which it appeareth, that *Morality* consisteth in the *due* or *undue ORDER* of our actions and dispositions, as they are a *Moral Agent*'s related to *God himself* in these three Relations, and to his Actions therein, *viz.* his *Disposals*, his *Laws*, and his *Attractive final Goodness* with his Benefits.

§. 10. In these, the *Morality* consisteth as *simpliciter talis* in all three inseparably, (as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations:) But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them, is *Morality secundum quid*.

§. 11. And among them all, our Action, (submission, resignation, patience) to God meerly as our *Owner*, is Moral but in the slendrest initial sense. And our Actions as related to him as our *Rector*, are *Moral* in the *fuller formal* sense, (And therefore by most accounted the *only formal Morality*, as being a relation to a *Law*): But yet our Actions as Related to God our *Benefactor*, *Lover and End*, are Moral in the highest, most perfective notion.

§. 12.

do antecedently make them known. And God could cause blessed Spirits to know all his perfections before there was any sin. 2. Gods Holiness and Goodness is called Mercy and Justice by extrinsick denomination, and connoration of sin and misery. And if his Holiness and Goodness had been known as preventing all sin and misery, men will think that he hath not proved that this had been Evil in the Universe, or less Good. 3. *Posita Divina Volitione* as the rule of Good, it followeth I confess, that it were evil not to have that will fulfilled. But I deny, that God willeth sin or its existence. Therefore it is not Good because not *Volitum à Deo*. It is sufficient, that it is not so far evil as to be *Absolutè Nolitum*; but only evil, 1. As *prohibitum*, 2. As hurtful to the sinner, and to others. Methinks they that maintain that sin is *Privatio*, should not say, that it is *Positivè Volitum à Deo*. 4. All this dependeth on that curious question, Could not God have made the World better than it is? or at least as good with many alterations from what it is? They that hold the first, say that God freely made things no better than they are: But had there been no Devils, no Sin, no Toads, no disorder, the world had been better, that is, a perfecter demonstration of Gods perfection. But they that are more modest, are content with the latter, and say, that God freely made things as they are, and not necessarily. But it had been necessarily if no other way had been as good. And that if God had pleased to shew his Goodness by preventing all sin, it had been as Good, and no loss or disparagement to the Universe. 5. And he doth through all his Books beg the question, Whether a meer occasion be a *conducibile medium* and so good? If he will stretch the word

§. 12. It is not only *ſub ratione obedientiæ* as it is a thing commanded by a Law, that *Love to God* is *Morally good*, but alſo in that ſuperiour ſenſe, *formally* as it is the *Love of God*. And therefore *Love* is called the *Law of Laws*, and the *fulfilling of the Law*, not only as *commanded* by a *Law*, but as being the *End* of the *Law*, and the ſtate of perfection above it (as Chriſt is to the *Law* of *Moſes*;) and alſo as being a *Law eminenter* (ſomething greater) though not *formaliter*.

§. 13. But as there is an *Order* in theſe Relations, ſo is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them: So that the Laſt ſtill includeth the reſt foregoing. All *Love* is *Obedience*; and all *Obedience* is *ſubmiſſion* to our *Owner*: But all *Obedience* is not *Love*, nor all *Submiſſion* or *Reſignation*, formal obedience to a Rector: Though they muſt all concurr, and not be divided, when they are formally diſtinguiſhed.

§. 14. I have thought it neceſſary (though I be guilty of ſome repetition) to open here the *Doctrine* of *formal* Morality (Virtue and Vice,) becauſe we cannot underſtand how God is vindicated from being the Author of *ſin*, till we know what *ſin* is; which we cannot do till we know what *Virtue* is; which we cannot do, till we know what *Morality* is: And alſo becauſe the Schoolmens moſt ſubtile elaborate enquiries into this point (eſpecially *de natura peccati*) are generally too little ſubtile or accurate, as comparing it with this little, you may perceive.

§. 15. From all this it is plain, 1. That God as the meer *Author* and *Motor* of *Nature*, doth not cauſe us to *Obey or Love him*. And therefore that theſe muſt be cauſed by another ſuperadded operation.

§. 16. Yet when we *Obey* and *Love him*; the *Generical Nature* of the Act is from God as the God of Nature, *viz.* as it is Intellection, Volition, Action: But that theſe Actions are ſo duly *ordered* as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded, is otherwiſe cauſed: For though the Generical nature of Action, Intellection and Volition as ſuch, be ſeldom found but in ſome *Moral ſpecies*, and that be never found but in *ſingular* acts; yet can one cauſality procure the Generical nature, and another the Specifical, and another the ſingularity, in the ſame action. As the Sun is the Generical Cauſe, and the *Virtus Seminalis* the ſpecifying, and the *Individuatio ſeminis* the *Individuating*, of Plants, Animals, *&c.*

§. 17. As God is the God of Nature, ſo he hath ſetled Nature in ſuch a conſtant courſe of motion, as that we have ſmall reaſon to expect that he ſhould there make any ordinary mutations; And therefore (as the Sun aforeſaid) he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all *Specifying* and *Individuating Cauſes*, according to their ſeveral natures or receptivities.

§. 18. They therefore that ſuppoſe that God as the Cauſe of all Action, muſt (of natural neceſſity *ad eſſe*) by phyſical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free, to its object compared with other poſſible objects, and that in all its modes and circumſtances, do confound *Nature* and *Morality*, and leave nothing for God to do in cauſing Holineſs, but what he muſt needs do to cauſe all action that is cauſed, (allowing the difference of the ſecond effects,) yea, but what he doth in cauſing every ſin: (For his *Precept* is not with them the *Cauſing* predetermination.)

§. 19. Jeſus Chriſt, and his Goſpel with all the fore-deſcribed frame of moral means, and the Spirit to co-operate, are the proper *ſecond cauſes*,

Medium ſo wide as to extend it to a meer evil *ſine quo non*, or preſuppoſed, which hath not the leaſt cauſality, efficient, material, formal or final, I will not ſtrive for a word. But *conducibile* noteth ſome kind and degree of Cauſality, which ſin hath not to the glorifying of God: It is the deſtroying of ſin, that God is glorified by: Where the *malum amovendum* is not the *bonum conducibile*, but the ill ſtate of the matter, without which God had not glorified himſelf by this Act, but by ſome other as well.

by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily cause *Moral Good*, and hinder *Moral Evil*; and by which as our *Lover* and *End* he will draw mans soul to himself in Love.

§. 20. God as *Rector* (though he vary his *Laws* in some things to several ages and places, and promulgate the same Gospel, with inequality, on several accounts, yet) according to the respective Laws that they are under, dealeth with all men in a certain *equality*, which is called *Justice*: that is, His Laws antecedently to mans acts make not difference; and as *Judge* he maketh none, but what *mans different actions* require according to the said *Laws* and *Justice*. But yet as *Owner* and as *Benefactor* he is *free* (not *against*, but) *above* his Laws, to make *many inequalities*, which are *no injustice*; they being not acts of *formal Government*: and so he may do *with his own as he list*. And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace, yet he giveth to his Elect, such proportions of Grace, as he gave them no *antecedent right to* by *his Law*: (or at least to many of them, passing by the controverse now, whether he do so to them all.)

§. 21. God could cure and sanctifie all men, if it were his Absolute will; but he *doth not*, and *will not*; being no way obliged: And he will be no loser nor sufferer by the creatures sin.

§. 22. Gods *absolute will* is as fully accomplished by mans *free acts*, as if they were all necessitated and Natural: And *mans actions* are as *free*, as if God had made no *Absolute Decree* of their futurity (as in Good he hath done, if we may so ascribe *futurity* to his Decrees.)

§. 23. It seemeth that *all sin beginneth* in the *wills omission* of what it was able to have done. Even when *Adams* appetite was to the forbidden fruit, and some think that this was the first part of the sin, it seemeth that it was rather in the *wills not* restraining that appetite when it could have done it: And then positive sins do follow thereupon.

§. 24. There is more Brutishness in sin, and consequently more *privative* and less *positive* faultiness of the *Reason* and *will*, than many do consider (which *Paul* partly meaneth, *Rom.* 7.) For it is certain, 1. That a passion, *e.g.* anger or fear, may be forced on a man suddenly as on a Brute, without Reason. (As if you come behind one and affright him, or strike him suddenly: no Reason raised that passion, and consequently no Rational Will.)

2. It is certain that this *passion without Reason* can cause despotically a *corporal motion*; as the fearful will start, and run, and the angry strike without any reason or rational will, but as a Beast doth.

3. It is certain that it is the office of the *Will* to *Rule* this passion, and these motions.

4. And that it must have due information from the understanding, that so to do is good, and best.

5. If this information of the understanding did never miss of determining the *will*, then man would never sin, but when the understanding failed of its necessary office, before the will: which would resolve all *sin* into the *will of God* as much as if he directly moved the will to it by necessitating, unresistible predetermination. For the *Intellect* as such hath no *Liberty*, but is *necessitated* by objects, further than it is under the Empire of the *will*. And the *Objects* and *Intellect* are made by God.

6. Therefore it followeth that there *is a certain measure* of *Intellectual true apprehension*, according to which the *will can excite* and determine it self (without any thing which it hath not) and yet *can forbear*. And that this *not-willing what and when it should*, is the beginning of all sin.

§. 25.

§. 25. God is no *Efficient* or *Deficient* cauſe of this firſt *Omiſſion* of the will: For *efficient* it hath none: And *deficient* God is not, who gave man *power* to have done it. But man is the *deficient Cauſe*.

§. 26. Mans not believing, not knowing, not loving, not obeying, not deſiring, truſting, fearing, &c. being the far greateſt part of the *ſins* of his life*, we ſee by this are not at all of God.

§. 27. Though multitudes of poſitive Acts of ſin do follow ſuch omiſſions, (and go before ſome of them;) yet they being not ſinful as *Acts*, but as *Diſordered* (againſt the *Rule* and *End*, and upon *undue objects*, and eſpecially comparatively, preferring the wrong object before the right) it ſeemeth that in their firſt inſtances they are all *Omiſſive*, and *Poſitive* in the *ſecond* only: which maketh the Schoolmen ſo commonly ſay that ſin is a *Privation*.

§. 28. Yet the *Moral formal Relation* of ſin, is not only *Privative*, but a *Poſitive Diſobedience* or *Diſconformity*: And ſo as *Quid Morale formaliter*—ſin hath as much Relative being as *Duty* hath, viz. 1. As *contra Legem ſignificantem*, 2. *Contra Voluntatem Dei ſignificatam*; 3. *Et contra Jus Divini Dominii Imperii & Amoris*.

§. 29. If any be unſatisfied in this, it is certain that in the *Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperatum*, there is no more *phyſical entity*, than in the *Velle imperatum*, no nor than there is in the *Velle* indefinitely conſidered as on any object. Or if any deny that, it is certain that there is no ſuch *addition of Entity* (it being but *ordo modi*) *in any ſuch ſinful Act from which as ſuch the formal obliquity or ſin reſulteth, but what man* can do, and doth, without *Gods cauſing the Act as ſo ordered and terminated*. So that God is no way the *cauſe* of *formal ſin*.

§. 30. † They that ſay, *He cauſeth all that man cauſeth*, and that as the *firſt neceſſitating or inſuperable cauſe; but yet is not the cauſe of the form of ſin*, contradict themſelves; ſeeing *that form* is but a *Relation*, which reſulteth *ipſo facto* from its *fundamentum* and *terminus*, and *nè per divinam potentiam* cannot but do ſo; And hath no other cauſe but what cauſeth them.

§. 31. And they that ſay, that yet God is not the *Author* of ſin, becauſe he is *under no Law*, do but ſport with dreadful things. And they mean that *God is the chief Cauſe of all mens ſins in the world, but not of any ſin of his own*; which is none of the queſtion.

§. 32. God doth neither *Cauſe the ſin*, nor *the futurity or exiſtence of it*, as ſome vainly diſtinguiſhing, maintain: (eſpecially Dr. *Twiſſe* and *Rutherford*.) For (as *Eſtius* and others truly ſay) to *cauſe* the *ſin*, is nothing but to cauſe the exiſtence of it. And ſin as ſin, Dr. *Twiſſe* often ſaith, is not willed by the ſinner himſelf.

§. 33. So far as God *Cauſeth* not ſin, he *willeth it not*: and they that ſay that he *Loveth* and *Willeth* the *exiſtence* of it as a means to his glory, abuſe Gods Holineſs, and are confuted before, *Par.* 1.

§. 34. How God overruleth ſinners, and the effects of ſin, and procureth his own ends, not by the *Means* or *Cauſality*, but *Occaſion* of it, I have ſo largely there opened, that I muſt refer the Reader thither.

* Which made the worthy Biſhop *Uſher* dye with theſe words, as his laſt, [But Lord, in ſpecial forgive my ſins of omiſſion.]

† *Bradwardine* dealeth more plainly, and maketh Gods effectual Volition to be the total immediate cauſe that man ſinneth, though it be no ſin in God to do ſo; and ſaith that God willeth it for good uſes, (as the ſinner doth, or if he do not, it is becauſe God maketh him unavoidably do otherwiſe.)

SECT.

SECT. XX.

How far God, and how far Man himself, is the Cause of Hell and other punishments.

THough somewhat be said of this, in the Conclusion of the second Part, I think meet to say more here, because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief, and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God.

¶. 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature, before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being; so that if you can but forgive God for making you *men*, (that is, *Rational Free-Agents*) you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him: As will appear by these considerations following.

¶. 2. Mans *Body* and *sensitive soul* are of such a *nature*, as that things *inconvenient* will be his *pain*: He that will take *poison* shall be *griped* and *tormented* by it, and he that will eat unwholsome meat, or will surfeit shall be sick, and he that will cherish diseases by sloth, or excesses, or abuses of nature, will have the pain of them; And he that will *wound* himself, or *break his bones*, will be his *own afflicter*; And he that *cuts his throat* or *hangeth himself*, must *dye*. And all this without any *doing of God*, besides the *making him a man*, and continuing such a *nature* (under his Government) in and with the world.

¶. 3. Not only *positive hurting*, but *omissions* will bring mens *bodies* unto *pain* and *death*; As *not eating*, not *exercising*, not *keeping warm*, &c. And consequently such a life of *prodigality* or *sloth* as tendeth to such wants.

¶. 4. The *inward senses*, *Imagination* and *Passions* are so constituted as that their *inconveniences* will be a *pain* and *torment*, as well as the *inconveniences* of the *outward senses*. 1. *Cares* and *Melancholy thoughts* are distracting. 2. *Desires* breed such *care*, and are themselves like a *thirst* or *hunger* to the soul. 3. *Fears* are tormenting. 4. *Sorrows* if deep and long are as a living death. 5. *Anger* is a vexatious feaver of the mind: And *revengeful malice* and *envy* do prolong it. 6. *Despair* anticipateth eternity of misery, *&c.* 7. And *Love it self* (how pleasing soever at first) is the strength of them all.

¶. 5. The *superiour faculties*, as they are *more noble*, are capable of *greater misery*; and their *corruption* and *disorder* is the worst. To have an *ignorant erring mind*, that taketh *evil* for *good*, and *good* for *evil*; To have a *carnal, malignant, wicked, obstinate, froward Will* and *sinful Affections*, and by these to have mens *actions* misguided, and so the *sensitive soul* it self brought into the foresaid misery, through *bad government*, is a misery to man in the Nature, and immediate effects of the thing.

¶. 6. Man liveth among multitudes of *fellow Creatures* in the world, which will all be *tormentors* of him if he *will make them* such. As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it. The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it. The water will drown him if he will leap into it over-head. The Sun will scorch him, the frost will pain him, if he expose himself to them. A Lyon or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not. His neighbours will hurt him, (likely) if he hurt them, and cross their interest: Men in power will hurt him if he offend them: And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them.

¶. 7. All

Jo. Major in 4. sent. d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. *inquit* concl. 3. [*Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali, culpæ vel peccata, non patientur aliquam pœnam inflictam ratione illorum actuum: Quia non sunt in statu merendi & demerendi*] sed addit [*Signanter de pœna inflicta loquor quæ à culpa distinguitur, & ejus est ordinativa per cruciatum. De pœna enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam pœnam habeat annexam, eo modo quo idem potest habere st.*] *Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio, est pœnæ & miseriæ continuatio. Nec mihi probabile videtur, quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos: Præmium quidem mereri non possunt; At quare non Pœnam commereri sunt putandi? Nonne adhuc sunt subditi (etiam ipsi dæmones) & sub quadam Lege? ideique peccandi adhuc capaces? & nonne omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur pœnam? Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Concls. 1. Est,* [*Damnati habent multosmales actus in inferno libere.*] *An optabilius sit damnatum esse, an non esse, vide quæ ibidem sequuntur, ubi concludit* [*Itaque teneo si daretur vivo optio, vel non esse, vel esse in perpetua flamma, quod licitè posset vel alterutrum, eligendum est non esse: Nam minus malum habet rationem boni.*]

See *Aureolus in* 2. *d.* 31. *a.* 2. *pag.* 301. shewing ten wayes how one sin causeth another, and so multiplyeth and continueth it self in the wicked.

§. 7. All this being *Natural*, let us now conſider what ſin doth to the ſinner here, and you will find that almoſt all his calamity conſiſteth in his very ſin it ſelf, and the *natural* effects of it: But yet it is *ſin* as *mans*, and it is *puniſhment* as *from God*, when yet God is *no Cauſe of the ſin*.

§. 8. This is plain if you conſider that *Gods Act* by which he maketh ſin a *Puniſhment*, was *Before the ſin*, though the *Relation* of a *Puniſhment* come after the *relation of ſin*. Here are two Agents, 1. *God making Nature and a Law therein*; 2. *Man diſordering his actions* by tranſgreſſing. 3. Hence Immediately followeth *Guilt* or the *form* of ſin. 4. And with it, even in the change, or after it, the *natural pain*, of *loſs* or *hurt*; 5. And this is *Related* to man as a *puniſhment for the ſin*, in the *laſt place*.

For inſtance, God *made man*, and God made *meat*, *wine*, *and poyſon*; God telleth Man in *Nature*, [*I have made thee ſuch a Creature, as that exceſs of Meat will make thee ſick, exceſs of Wine will make thee mad, and Poyſon will torment and kill thee: I have given thee ſelf-love, and command thee that thou avoid all theſe; and I will not deny thee neceſſary help; But if thou wilt not, it will be thy pain, which I will that thou ſuffer for and by thy ſin.*] I need not further apply it here; the application is obvious.

§. 9. All this I ſpeak only of natural puniſhments which by the Law of nature follow ſin: what is ſupernatural is after to be conſidered.

§. 10. And 1. It is evident that the *Reatus culpæ* is either the *ſin it ſelf* or its *inſeparable effect*. He that hath once ſinned is *Related* to God as a ſinner. And an *infamous Relation*, ſuch as of a *Rebel*, a *Rogue*, a *Murderer*, &c. is no ſmall evil, in all ſound mens eſteem.

§. 11. 2. Sin is the *Deformity*, *diſorder*, and *diſeaſe* of the ſoul; and its *Habits* are a kind of *Vicious Nature*: It is the *Nature* of *Devils* to be exceeding *malignant*, *rebellious* and at enmity with God and ſpiritual Goodneſs: To have a *Nature* or Diſpoſition, which is averſe to that which ſhould be its own end, delight and happineſs. And a wiſe man would rather be annihilated, than turned into a Toad, a Snake or Adder, though their nature be not offenſive to themſelves. How much more would he rather be annihilated than become a *Devil?* Wicked men are liker to Devils than they are aware of: They Love not God and Holineſs: nay they have a malignant enmity to him: which maketh them ſo averſe to all that is Holy in their lives, and to be ſuch perſecutors and haters of good men. So that the Scripture calleth their wiſdom Deviliſh, yea and themſelves flat *Devils* in plain words, and the *Children of the Devil*, Jam. 3. 15. Joh. 8. 44. Joh. 6. 70. *One of you is a Devil.* And 13. 2. Act. 13. 10. *Thou Child of the Devil and enemy of all righteouſneſs*——1 Joh. 3. 8, 10. *He that commits ſin is of the Devil*—— Therefore they are adjudged to ſuffer *with the Devil and his Angels*, as the Saints ſhall be *equal with the Angels* of God. For the truth is, a *Saint* and an *Angel*, and a *wicked man* and a *Devil*, do differ leſs than is commonly thought on. Now what *ſober* man would not rather be *Nothing*, than be a *Devil?* To have a venemous, malignant, malicious, reſtleſs, rebellious nature, at enmity to Good and in love with evil? And who is it that maketh men to be ſuch? Not *God* but *themſelves*.

1. Is it not a great calamity to be *mad*? Wicked men are far worſe: and they made themſelves ſuch.

2. Were it not a great miſery to have a nature that had no Love to, or delight in, health, cleanlineſs, dwelling, food, friends, *&c.* but hated all of them, and ſet againſt them? How much more to have ſuch an enmity to God and holineſs and our own ſalvation?

3. Were

3. Were it not a misery to have a nature distrustful of all our truest friends: afraid of poison in all that we eat and drink, and still thinking that our own parents seek our death? How much more to have a distrustfulness of God?

4. Were it not a misery to be deceived with a thousand errours, and to take evil for good, and good for evil: and to spend ones dayes in bewildring perplexities or false conceits? How much more to be mistaken about God, and things of greatest excellency and consequence?

5. Were it not a misery to have a *will* that is perversely set against the wills of all our Governours and dearest friends? That must needs have and do whatsoever is forbidden us by the greatest, wisest and best of men? How much more, to have a *will* that is thus set against the will of God?

6. It is a misery to have a violent Appetite after that which cannot be had, or cannot satisfie. To have vehement hunger and thirst without meat or drink, *&c.* Wicked men have such a diseased appetite after things that God told them would neither be satisfactory nor continuing. All this and more is in sin it self, in the *Habits* or *Nature*, which God never made.

§. 12. The *exercise* of this diseased vitiated Inclination, is an actual torment: As it is more Joyful to *use Grace*, than meerly to *Have it*; so is it as *to sin more calamitous*. And 1. Mens wilful blindness and neglect of God, depriveth them of all the excellency and delights of holy knowledge.

2. Their Disaffection and malignity depriveth them of all that holy Joy, and unvaluable sweetness, which cometh in by the exercise of the Love of God; And of all the pleasures of a holy life. As a sick stomach doth loath a feast, and a malicious man hath not the pleasures of friendship: so how can that soul *delight* in God that *Loveth him* not?

3. Unbelief and distrust deprive the soul of all that quietness and content, which followeth faith and confidence in God.

4. A Rebellious will doth lose all that *Rest* which the obedient find in pleasing God, and in his blessed will.

5. *Luxury* and *carnality* and all sin deprive the soul of the pleasures of temperance, chastity, innocency, and a good and quiet conscience.

6. Wickedness and sloth deprive the soul of the pleasure of doing good to others, by works of charity, which is very great. Abundance such privations are in sin.

§. 13. And sin it self brings the contrary torments. 1. Sinful malignity against God and Good men maketh the wicked eat their flesh as it were with envy, and vex themselves with persecution and revenge.

2. Sinful anger is a sinners rage and pain: And though he have pleasure in revenge, it is a painful pleasure, like a troublesome itch.

3. *Self-willedness* maketh a man continual vexation and disappointment, while he *must needs have* that which he *cannot have*, or which will torment him when he hath it.

4. Carnal Love is the root of misery, while it Tantalizeth the soul, or longeth for its own vexation.

5. Sinful *fear* is a tormenting distraction.

6. Sinful *grief* is a continual sickness and self-vexation.

7. Sinful Desires engage men in self-afflicting labours.

8. Sinful *cares* are as thorns in a mans heart.

9. Sinful Impatience and discontent is torment it self.

10. Sinful, confused, unruly thoughts, are the annoyance and the shame of

Leg. Bradwardine l. 1. c. 1. cor. 31. *contra effrænes dicentes omnia bonis & malis æqualiter evenire; malum aliquod impunitum, vel bonum aliquod irremuneratum manere —— fingentes quoque divinæ pietati & misericordiæ infinitæ nusquam congruere punire quodcunq; delictum, sed totum semper dimittere misericorditer impunitum. Nonne (inquit) omnis peccans eo ipso fit malus & culpabilis, vel pejor, &c. amittitq; pristinam libertatem & innocentiam & fit Deo dissimilior & remotior ab eo? & nonne hoc est pœna & pœna quam magna? & unde hoc nisi à prima justitia, à primo retributore omnium qui est Deus?* See also his *Corol.* 38,39. *Lege Jansen. August. de stat. pur. nat. l. 3. c. 2. p. 358. Quod peccatum non potest non puniri à Deo: & c. 3. Quænam sint illæ pœnæ quæ tam arctè cum peccato cohærent. Et c. 4. Quod peccator in peccato manens non potest beatus fieri. ubi etiam Augustini sensum de hisce videre est.*

of the ſoul. And all theſe are mens own ſins, not Cauſed by God, but by themſelves.

§.14. Next Sin it ſelf, there is the *natural conſequent* of it, which is cauſed by the ſinner himſelf. As 1. That *God doth not complacentially Love him*: which is no *change in God*, whoſe *Nature* is to Love *Good* and Hate *Evil*; but in the *ſinner himſelf*, who hath made himſelf *uncapable*.

2. And that Gods *Hatred* is *terminated* on the *ſinner*, is his own doing: Even as he that would open his naked breaſt to the ſcorching Sun, or cold Froſt, is hurt by himſelf. When God hateth a ſinner and delighteth in a Saint, there is no *Diverſity* in *Him*, but in *Them*.

3. The loſs of *Right to Heaven* and all *Gods ſpecial benefits*, is their *own work*, and not by any change in God. God made a Deed of Gift of Heaven to the faithful: And if they be unfaithful, it is their own doing to caſt away or refuſe that right.

4. Abundance of *temporal mercies* mens ſins caſt away. For

§.15. Sin doth here torment even mens bodies. The ſlothful and the prodigal bring want upon themſelves: The glutton, drunkard, fornicator, and the idle, breed painful diſeaſes in their own fleſh: And moſt men dye by ſome ſinfully contracted maladies.

§.16. Beſides the Natural *conſequents*, and the *natural effects* on the *Body*, there are *natural* calamitous *effects* of *ſin* on the ſoul; As 1. The *conſciouſneſs* of a mans ſin, called An evil Conſcience.

2. The *ſhame* that ariſeth from the guilt.

3. The Conſcience and ſenſe of Gods diſpleaſure (a tormenting thing.)

4. *Sadneſs* for our folly in hurting our ſelves.

5. And *fear* of all the after miſeries. All hitherto mentioned, men *do themſelves* againſt themſelves.

§.17. Yea more, men themſelves make *other men* their tormentors. The angry ſtir up others to hurt them. The offenders ſtir up Magiſtrates to puniſh them. The fornicator chooſeth a filthy diſeaſe under the name of a pleaſure, and kindleth a putrid fevor in his own ſoul. The covetous and unjuſt make all men their enemies; and ſo do many of the proud, tyrannical and oppreſſours. The froward will not give themſelves reſt in their own families; but make Wives, Husbands, Children, Servants, and every thing to be their own vexation. And O what work do bloody Tyrants by *wars* and perſecution make to themſelves and others in the world? and what Calamities doth miſerable mankind bring, by folly and wickedneſs, on themſelves?

§.18. In a word, ſhall we not *believe* that there is a Hell, and know much of the *nature* of it; when we ſee a Hell already begun on earth? and the whole world walloweth in folly, filth, impiety, and woe? As Heaven is known here by its firſt-fruits of the ſpirit, ſo Hell may be (I think) *more known* by its *beginning*, as more notorious. *Men* are *almoſt Devils* already: conceive them but *all turned fully into Devils* by themſelves (and not by God) and you will know much of Hell.

§.19. And for the Life to come, conſider, that God made mans ſoul *Immortal before man made it ſinful*: And who can expect that God ſhould alter or deſtroy his work? *Live we muſt*, becauſe we have *Immortal ſouls*. And muſt not men look to Live as they are? Such then as the wicked make themſelves, no wonder if they continue.

§.20. And then *exceeding wickedneſs* will make them *Devils*; and all that they here initially brought on themſelves, will be there in *eminency*. Their Minds will be blind as to Good and Evil, though not as to meer no-

tional Truth. Their wills ſet againſt Gods will. Their hatred of God and goodneſs increaſed: Their Intellects, memories and thoughts, will be the treaſury of pain; Their wills and affections the ſeat of miſery; And their invigorated power, will make all lively.

§. 21. And a mind thus blinded cannot ſee God *as Good*, but only as *hurtful by Juſtice*. A *will* that hath no Love to God and holineſs, can take no delight in them. Heaven muſt be to them as a feaſt to a ſick ſtomach: They turn their own Hearts from God and Heaven, and deprive themſelves of all its joyes. They hate the Heavenly ſociety; and ſo can be none of their companions in delight. They deprive themſelves of Innocency, of Divine Love, of the Grace of the Holy Ghoſt, of part in Chriſt, of peace of Conſcience, by wilful diverſion, oppoſition and incapacity, as he that ſhuts his Windows againſt the Sun-light. It is themſelves that turn themſelves thus out of Heaven.

§. 22. And it will be their own Luſts that will tantalize or torment them. For God did let them know that this world and its pleaſure muſt ſoon forſake them: They cannot expect that God ſhould give them *wealth*, meat, drink, and carnal pleaſures, after this life: If they will needs contract a fleſhly thirſt, God is not bound to follow them with ſatisfaction.

§. 23. Even their malignity (like Satans) will be their torment, filling them with envy at the felicity of the Saints, or hatred of their holineſs. And when we are in Heaven, Devils and deviliſh men will be in ſubjection to the Saints, ſo low and baſe as will encreaſe their rage.

§. 24. It is likely that their very *nature* or *ſubſtance* will be much more baſe than that of the Glorified, as their *place* and condition will be: For God is not bound to make them Naturally Glorious. Devils dwell in the aire and earth: And inhabitants uſe to be connatural to their Regions and Elements.

However, it is a groundleſs fancy of too many that think that the ſenſitive faculties ſhall ceaſe. The Organs and manner or ſorts of ſenſation may be altered: But the ſoul will be ſtill ſenſitive as well as rational (notwithſtanding their vain objection about bruits.) And therefore the condition they put themſelves into, will as neceſſarily give them *ſenſible torment*, as *poyſon* will in the ſtomach, and as deſpairing men now torment and make away themſelves.

§. 25. At leaſt when they have *bodies*, they will have *ſenſe*.

§. 26. Devils and wicked men with them, will objectively torment them.

§. 27. I deny not but beſides all theſe there may be puniſhments more efficiently from God. But all this alone, which ſinners not only Deſerve but Inflict upon themſelves, will make a Hell of unſpeakable miſery.

The

The Concluſion,

Summing up the ſeveral wayes of the Contenders.

I Shall conclude with a further Explication, 1. What the Judgement of the Proteſtants was in the Synod of *Dort* about the nature of Grace (beſides what I have cited of theirs before.) 2. I ſhall give you ſome Animadverſions on the Epilogue of *Alvarez*, 3. And of the Jeſuites way of *Scientia Media*: 4. And of *Aureolus* and *Durandus*'s way: 5. And of the Scotiſts and Nominals *Cauſa Partialis*: 6. I ſhall fullyer give you the ſumm and Conſectaries of the Dominican Predetermination, and the reaſons which alienate me from their way. 7. I ſhall Epitomize *Janſenius*, with ſome Animadverſions on his way: 8. And ſumm up in few words what ſober minds may reſt in.

§. 1. AND that you may ſee how little difference there is even in this point of *Effectual Grace*, where all the difference ſeemeth to be founded, 1. See what the *Britiſh* Divines ſay in the Synod of *Dort*; *de art.* 3. & 4. *ſuffrag. p.* 124. "*Th.* 1. There are certain outward works, "ordinarily required of men, before they are brought to the ſtate of Re- Rom. 10. 14. Mat. 6. 20. "generation or Converſion, which uſe to be ſometime freely done by them, Act. 13. 46. Pſa. 58. 5. "and ſometime freely omitted: as to go to Church, to hear the Preaching "of the Word, and ſuch like.

"*Th.* 2. There are certain inward effects, which are excited in the hearts Act. 2. 37. "of thoſe that are not yet juſtified, previous to Converſion and Regenera- "tion, by the virtue of the word and ſpirit: ſuch as are, the knowledge of "Gods will, the ſenſe of ſin, the fear of puniſhment, the thoughts of de- "liverance, ſome hope of pardon. To the ſtate of Juſtification—— "Gods grace uſeth not to bring men by ſudden Enthuſiaſm, but prepared "and fitted (or diſpoſed) by many previous actings by the Miniſtry of 1 Cor. 4. 15. "the word. As in natural Generation there are many previous diſpoſi- "tions before the reception of the form; ſo in the ſpiritual we come to "the ſpiritual birth by many foregoing actings of Grace. If God would "*immediately* Regenerate and Juſtifie a wicked man, not prepared by any "knowledge, any ſorrow, any deſire, any hope of pardon, there were no "need of the Miniſtry of man and the Word Preached to do it——

"*Th.* 3. Thoſe that God thus affecteth by his ſpirit by means of the "Word, them he truly and ſeriouſly calleth and inviteth to faith and con- "verſion. We muſt judge of the helps of Grace by the nature of the of- "fered benefit and by Gods plain word, and not by the abuſe and event. "Seeing the Goſpel of its own nature calleth men to Repentance and Sal- 2 Cor. 5. 20. 2 Cor. 6. 1. "vation, ſeeing the excitements of grace tend to it, we muſt not think that Gal. 1. 6. Rev. 3. 2. "God here doth any thing diſſemblingly—— Nor can it be imagined "that that calling by the word and ſpirit can make men unexcuſeable, which "is given *only to that end* to make them unexcuſeable——

"*Th.* 4. Thoſe whom he thus affecteth, God forſaketh not, nor ceaſeth "to promote them in the true way to converſion, before he is forſaken by "them, by voluntary neglect, or the repulſe of this initial grace. The "talent of grace once given men of God, is not taken away from any man, Mat. 25. 28. "till he bury it by his own fault. Therefore we are oft warned in

Heb. 3. 7. Prov. 1. 24. 2 Chron. 24. 20.

"Scripture, not to reſiſt or quench the ſpirit, nor to receive the grace "of God in vain, nor to fall from God. Yea it is plainly given as the rea- "ſon of Gods forſaking men that they firſt forſake him———

Mat. 13. 19. Heb. 6. 4. 2 Pet. 2. 21.

"*Th.* 5. Many loſe theſe beginnings———

Joh. 6. 37. Jer. 14. 7. & 32. 39. Phil. 1. 6.

"*Th.* 6. The Elect do not ſo behave themſelves under theſe preparatory "workings, but that for their negligence and reſiſtance, they might juſtly "be forſaken of God: But ſuch is Gods ſpecial mercy to them, that though "for a time they may repel or ſuffocate this exciting and illuminating "grace, yet God doth urge them again and again, and ceaſeth not to pro- "move them, till he fully ſubjugate them to his grace, and place them in "the ſtate of regenerate ſons.

Rom. 5. 18. & 11. 35. Act. 28. 27.

"*Th.* 7. All men reſiſt Gods grace, and God might juſtly forſake all, ——but doth not——]

By all this it is evident that they took not man to be *forſaken of God* in the ſtate of *meer original ſin*, or the *corrupt maſs*, but as a *wilful reſiſter and refuſer of offered Grace*, and oft after the receiving of much preparing grace; and that God forſaketh none till they forſake his grace.

2. To the ſame ſence our Engliſh Divines commonly tell us how, ordinarily God prepareth, men for converſion before he convert them; and how far perſons unconverted may go in common grace: He that readeth Mr. *Hooker* of New *England*, Mr. *John Rogers* his *doctrine* of *faith*, Mr. *Boltons inſtructions* for *comfort*——— Mr. *Meads Almoſt a Chriſtian*, and abundance ſuch, will ſee that they were of the ſame mind.

3. Hence it is plain, that thoſe perſons that reſiſted this further work of grace, and forſook God firſt, had *true Power* to have done otherwiſe; and could have gone further than they did, without any other grace than they had: (Though *quoad neceſſitatem ſequentem vel conſequentiæ*, it might be inferred even from Gods *preſcience*, that *it could not be.*)

4. They here deſcribe Gods effectual grace by *moral titles*, of *Gods urging them till they yield*; though (as after they open it) Gods renewing active influx, maketh *new creatures*, and is not a *meer moral indetermining ſuaſion* leaving the will indifferent.

5. The truth is (as is aforeſaid) no mortal man can tell of any *difference* on *Gods part* between his *common* and *ſpecial agency* on ſouls, but only on the part of the *work done*; Nay it is againſt the doctrine of all ſorts of Divines both Papiſts and Proteſtants as to the generality, that *there is any difference at all.* For they all ſay that all Gods actions *ad extra* are nothing but his eſſence (*viz.* his *eſſential knowledge, will and power*) which is *undividedly one*, as *terminated*, *effecting*, *related* and *denominated* variouſly: *E. g.* by *one Volition* he willeth *divers products*, but not by *divers volitions ex parte ſui*, either conſidered *ſpecifically* or *numerically*; but the *ſpecification* and *individuation* is only in the *effects*, and in *Gods will* as *relatively denominated.* And if this be *all mens doctrine*, what an unhappy caſe is the Church faln into, that the very *ſame men* that ſay this, ſhould yet intolerably quarrel, Whether this *one Divine attingency* or *operation* ſhall be called *Creation*, *infuſion*, *urgency*, *excitation*, *perſwaſion*, *phyſical*, *hyperphyſical*, *moral*, or what elſe, when all are agreed that *all are one* and the *ſame ex parte Dei.*

See the Concluſion of the firſt Chapter.

And as to the *effects*, I do my ſelf think that a certain Impulſe received on the ſoul, is the firſt effect, and the Act of man (as faith) is but a ſecond, and that of both Cauſes: But we cannot tell well what that Impulſe is; And therefore muſt diſpute in the dark about the differences of it. And this is nothing to them that own nothing but Gods eſſence as the cauſe of our act, as the firſt effect: If their opinion hold true that as in Creation there

was

was no mediate Impulse between the Creator and the Creature (for there was no recipient,) so here there is no effect on the soul before the Act and habit of faith it self, then what is that Grace whose *Ratio efficaciæ* we can make a Controversie of? *Ad hominem* at least I may say that it is *common acts and habits*, overtopt by fleshly interest and concupiscence, which are wrought by *common grace*; and that it is *special acts and habits* overcoming the flesh and world, which are wrought by *special grace*. So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will, and implacably differ, and their adversaries shall be enemies of Gods Grace whether they will or not, are yet defective in that *acuteness* and *pregnancy of wit* which is necessary to *pretend* a *real disagreement*, and are forced to say that they *disagree* when they have not *wit enough* to *seem* to prove it to any but those that take their cholerick zeal and reproach for proof: For in this there is no difference among us.

6. Obj. *At least we can prove that we differ in this, about the effects, that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be such as may be lost and dye, and the other do not.*

Answ. That is *no difference*: You still want wit to make differences though you want not will. For both sides are agreed that *perseverance* ariseth not from the *meer nature* of the *Habit* of grace, but from Gods superadded sustentation. For *Adam* and the faln Angels had (as is commonly held) such kind of habitual grace as we (though *objectively* differing.)

7. Seeing there is no difference, *on Gods part* (as they all conclude,) *Resistible* grace and *irresistible*, *sufficient* and *effectual*, can have *no difference*, but in the very *effect* or *event*, and the connotation of mans *Power* or *impotency* to the contrary. I know (as I have said) that not only the *Dominicans* and *Calvinists*, but *Suarez* and other *Jesuits*, say that *Effectual Grace* is such *ex parte principii* as is forcibler for faith as the effect. But they contradict themselves, who confidently say, that besides that effect, it is nothing but *Gods essence* which hath no *degrees* or *real differences*. And mans *power* of *Resistance* and *frustration* is *none* as to Gods *will* and *essence*, but only as to the *effect*; When he *could* have done otherwise.

8. The same Vanity they declare in the question, Whether the same degree of Divine Grace, help, or operation, would Convert one man as doth another, or would Convert as doth not Convert. When they are agreed that the effect is not the same; and that the *cause* hath no degrees of difference.

9. And though it's past mans understanding to *comprehend* how all the *various effects* in the world should be produced without the least *diversity* in the *Cause* (*Will* or *Action*) *ex parte agentis*, and that *Velle salvare Petrum, & velle damnare Judam*, should be *perfectly* the *same Volition ex parte Volentis*; yet it is the *liker* to be true because man *cannot comprehend it*; as *long* as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true. For God is incomprehensible.

10. Seeing then that we must concent, 1. That God Decreed to *do all that he doth*, and properly and absolutely *no more*; 2. And that Christs death is the *cause* of *all that it effecteth*, and properly of *no more* (Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part,) And so that all the Controversie 1. Of Decree, 2. Of Redemption, is resolved into that of the *effects*; 3. And seeing all the *effects* are such whose difference we little differ about, if at all; and *ex parte Dei agentis* they agree that there is no difference: where then is the Difference among all the contenders?

§. II.

Alvarez *his* Epitome *in Twenty Propoſitions, conſidered.*

BUt that all this may more plainly appear, I will recite the Twenty Concluſions, which *Alvarez* in his *Epilogus* giveth us as the ſumm of all his Book (one hundred twenty one *Diſputations:*) And I ſhall tell you how far they are all to be conſented to.

* Thus *Bradwardine* concludeth his Book with thirty ſix errors, and as many verities, which he would have the Church, eſpecially that of *Rome*, determine. But leaving out the moſt unſavoury parts or expreſſions of his own judgement, Whether God be the chief neceſſitating Cauſe of all ſin, is none of them.

I. *Free-will in lapſed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work, which by co-operation of the ſupernatural End ſhall be truly good, and a work of Virtue; ſo as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved ſimply above all, as to the ultimate natural End.*

Anſw. It is granted, (and more) that though all natural men have one ſort of Grace given them, yet, I think, *thus* cannot be done without *ſpecial ſaving grace.*

II. *Man by the ſole ſtrength of nature cannot aſſent to all ſupernatural myſteries propounded and explained to him, as revealed of God, or becauſe revealed of God ſo as the formal reaſon of his belief is Divine revelation.*

Anſw. It's true: He muſt have *commoner grace* to believe them *dogmatically* and *uneffectually*; and *ſpecial ſaving grace* to believe them *practically* and *ſavingly.*

III. *Not only faith it ſelf, but alſo the firſt beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace, and not from the ſtrength of Nature only.*

Anſw. Very true.

IV. *The free-will of man in lapſed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all ſimply, even as he is the author of Nature.*

Anſw. It's true.

V. *Man in lapſed Nature without the help of Grace, cannot fulfil all the precepts even of the Law of Nature, nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation, even for any little time, which it is neceſſary to overcome, for the keeping of that Law.*

Anſw. True: Therefore they have *ſome Grace* that do it.

VI. *There is no Law, nor ever was made by God, of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace, to them that do all that is in them, by the ſole faculty of nature: nor hath Chriſt merited or would have any ſuch Law.*

Anſw. True: For he giveth ſome *common grace* to *all men antecedently*, without any condition on their part: And though he give to thoſe that uſe *their common grace* to the utmoſt (or near it) ſufficient encouragement to go on and hope that ſuch endeavour ſhall not be in vain as to the obtaining of *peculiar grace*, yet *de nomine vel definitione*, Whether this encouragement ſhall be called a *Law*, or a *Promiſe*, or *neither*, we contend not.

VII. *God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate, and alſo truly-efficiently together with the ſame free-will cauſeth its pious operation.*

Anſw. It's true: But all adjuvant grace produceth not the ſecond effect, which floweth from both Cauſes, (of which before and after.)

VIII. *When God by his exciting Grace, ſtriketh and toucheth the hearts of men, he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty, begin its motion,*

motion, by Conſenting: But God by adjuvant grace effecteth, that it freely and infallibly Conſent.

Anſw. It's true of all that do conſent: But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace, which are *Neceſſary* and give the *poſſe Velle*, which cauſe not the act, through mans defect: And though God *expect* not that effect, as one that is deceived, yet he *commandeth it*, and *requireth it* of us. But *exciting* and *adjuvant Grace* are all one on Gods part: And if you will difference the ſame things as connoting divers effects, you muſt denominate it more fitly from the effects, by words that notifie the difference.

IX. *Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Cauſes of ſupernatural Conſent, as two drawing a Boat, ſo as neither is premoved by the other, or maketh it co-operate with it.*

Anſw. True: For God premoveth the will of man, though through mans fault it be not ever effectual. And though Gods will and mans be two Cauſes of the ſame effect, the term *Partial* is ſcarce fit, while man hath his whole power and activity from God.

X. Scientia media *is not to be aſcribed to God,——But all preſcience of the future co operation of the will, even from the foreſaid Hypotheſis, preſuppoſeth* in ſigno rationis *the free decree of Gods will, by which abſolutely (or granting that Hypotheſis) he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good, and permit it if Evil.*

Anſw. Here come in your preſumptions of things unknown or falſe. 1. That God knoweth future contingents, and conditionals is certain: But I think this *ſcientia media* unfitly named, and an unneceſſary diſtribution, and inſufficient to the *Jeſuits* ends.

2. And your fiction of *ſigna rationis*, and the *neceſſary antecedence* of a *decree* of Gods, to his knowledge of every Volition of man, is a more ungrounded and perillous figment, which you have not proved. It ſeemeth a denyal of Gods *Omniſcience* or *perfection*, that he *cannot know* an *act future* as *future*, but only as *decreed to be ſo.*

3. You deceitfully talk of *permitting evil* while you plead for the *irreſiſtible predetermining premotion* of the *will by God* to every *evil act* with *all its circumſtances*: Is that but *Permitting?*

4. To *permit* is *Nothing*: no *act* of God; but a *non-agency*: *not to hinder.* And how prove you, that God muſt of neceſſity have a *Poſitive Decree*, for *every Nothing* or *non-agency?* Is not the *not-willing* or *not-decreeing* to hinder a lye, *e. g.* (ſuppoſing natural concurſe,) or to make more worlds, enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature? or to the *not-being* of more Worlds? We are in the dark, and God is infinitely above us, and theſe tremendous myſteries are not to be ſo preſumptuouſly handled by unproved aſſertions.

XI. *There is on our part no Cauſe, Reaſon or Condition aſſignable, for which Gods ſupernatural providence, in compariſon of this or that hath the formal reaſon of predeſtination, or retaineth the common reaſon of prvidence: but predeſtination is to be reduced into the ſole free-will of God.*

Anſw. Moſt of this is about meer words. The word *Predeſtination* connoteth various effects and objects: and ſo is called various Acts. There is no *efficient Cauſe* in the *Creature* of *any act of God*: But there are *objects* without which Gods Acts have not their *ſpecial denominations*; and theſe *objects* are the *termini*, and called *Material Conſtitutive Cauſes* of thoſe various acts as *denominated* various, ſpecially or numerically: And ſo Gods *Decree* or *Will* to *Juſtifie* and *Glorifie* man, hath ſome-

thing

* That is, of that object.

thing in the *object* as a *neceſſary condition of it* *, which is not in the object of his decree of *giving faith*; And that hath ſomething in *its object*, which is not in the *object* of the decree of *giving a Redeemer to the world*, or *making the world*, *&c.* if you will at all diſtinguiſh Gods decrees by their *objects*, or *effects*: But if not, there will be no matter for any Controverſie.

And Predeſtination is an ambiguous word: If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing, or all about man, or all of Good to us; then our *Being* is the firſt effect of it in us, and the making of the World a preparatory effect, *&c.* And ſo, no doubt, the firſt effect ſuppoſed us no men, before, and therefore *no condition* in us. But if you take *Predeſtination* for Gods decree of *Giving us Grace and Glory only*, then it is preſuppoſed that we are *lapſed ſinners*.

And the decree of damning men is exerciſed only on them as *foreknown damnable ſinners*; And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to ſinners for ſin, ſuppoſeth them ſuch *puniſhable* ſinners: But the bare *Negation* of a *Decree to give faith* to one to whom the *abſence* is *no privation*, is unfitly called *Reprobation*, (though men may talk at their own rates;) And we grant that ſome ſuch *no-decrees* have *no condition* in the objects, for they have *no objects*: *e. g.* If you will feign that God decreed from eternity, to give me *no faith before the Creation*, or *before I was born*; or to give Innocent *Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him*, this were no reprobating act. But when God hath given men a *Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept*, here if he deny them *neceſſary* grace to *believe*, it is a *penal act*. And note that *Chriſt* and *Common grace* as *abſolutely given* to mankind, and *offered* to *individuals*, ever goeth before *mens accepting* or *refuſing* him: And no man to whom he is *offered*, refuſeth him for want of *neceſſary help*, till by ſin againſt that grace he forfeit it.

XII. *God by an abſolute and efficacious decree of his Will, antecedently to the preſcience of the future good uſe of free-will, predetermined all good acts, which are done in time, ſpecially thoſe by which the predeſtinate come to eternal life.*

Anſw. The ſubſtance of this ſeemeth true: only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree *efficacious from eternity*, which effecteth nothing till the *Time*, I leave to them that diſpute of words.

2. You preſumptuouſly determine Gods Decrees to be *antecedent* to his *preſcience* herein; when they are *neither before nor after one another*.

3. If by *predetermining* you mean more than *predecreeing* or *prevolition*, as if mans will was predetermined, when it was not determined, or determined before it had a being, you ſpeak contradictions. But Gods own will was eternally determined (if we may ſo ſay of that which was never undetermined) to give all the grace that he giveth in time, and to cauſe all the good acts that he cauſeth, as he cauſeth them.

XIII. *The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace, is in the predeſtinate, an effect of predeſtination; and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate; and conſequently dependeth not on the ſole and innate liberty of the will.*

Anſw. I think ſo too.

XIV. *We muſt neceſſarily diſtinguiſh of a twofold help of Grace; one* ſufficient, *by which man* may be *converted to God, or work pioufly: The other effectual, by which God effecteth that he be actually converted, and act piouſly.*

Anſw.

Answ. Hold to that, and contradict not the terms in your description, and all's well.

XV. *The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act, not only by perswading, alluring, inviting, or other morally attracting, even inwardly; but also efficaciously and truly effecting, that the will moved and excited of God determine it self and act well.*

Answ. We know what *mans perswading* and *moral operations* are (a little): But the difference between these interiour acts of God named by you no man *knoweth*. You cannot prove that his *Interiour swasion* is not *truly efficient* of the act: nor know you how God procureth our determination, as to the mode of his interiour operation. Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter. This Controversie therefore is vain.

XVI. *The efficacy of the help of preventing grace, and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will, is totally founded and taken as from its first root, from the* Omnipotency of God, *and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously: nor doth this efficacy any way depend, no not as on a* condition sine qua non, *on the future co-operation of the created will; though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God.*

Answ. 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God. 2. But Gods *meer will* effecteth it not without his *Power*. 3. His *power* effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected. 4. You leave out one of the *causal Attributes*; The effect of Grace is as well from the *Wisdom of God*, as from his *will* and *Power*. 5. *Gods act* dependeth not on *mans will*. But mans *co-operation* which is his *own act*, you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the *neareſt efficient*. 6. The *non-efficiency* of *sufficient Grace* dependeth on the sinners will. It was not *meerly* nor *principally* from an *absolute efficacious Decree* or *predetermination* of God, that *Adams will omitted his duty first*, or committed sin first. And if any run to the common shadow that *sin hath no efficient cause*, and *man only is deficient*, I answer 1. He is the first *Reputative Deficient* (though not culpable, because under no Law) who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not: As if *Adams* body had never had a soul, God was the first Non-efficient Cause, that is, into whose will and non-agency the whole *ratio defectus* is to be resolved. 2. Forget not that *Alvarez* himself saith, lib. 6. disp. 45. p. 210. [" *Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum*; " *peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum, & causat in* " *anima habitum vitii* ——]

XVII. *Supposing effectual Grace in free-will, it infallibly followeth, that free-will will consent and act piously: so that these two are incompossible, that effectual Grace be in a man, and that he actually dissent.*

Answ. True, because it is not called properly effectual, unless either 1. Because it effecteth, 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting, 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect. And in all these cases it is true.

But such Grace may be eventually *uneffectual*, which had a *sufficiency ex parte sui* to *effect*.

XVIII. *The gift of perseverance, as such, and the efficacy of it, dependeth not, no not as on a* Condition sine qua non, *on the co-opera-*

tion of our free-will, but on the absolute decree of God, effecting mans perseverance.

Answ. This needeth no other explication or observation, but as aforesaid. Only that the *Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus*, is *given on condition*, in the *Gospel*, from how *absolute a decree* soever it proceed.

XIX. *Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting, are compossible in the same subject, and consist in the same will.*

Answ. True: And remember that a *true Power* is that *quâ verè possumus*; and not that faculty which *could do this* or that *if God will predetermine it*, and otherwise *cannot*; no more than the Sun *can shine* without him. When God withholdeth the *Influx necessary to action*, such a faculty is no *true power* as to that action in that State.

XX. *By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid, the Liberty of the will is not destroyed, nor the actual use of it hindered, but is wonderfully perfected and roborated.*

Free-will in *name* is owned by you all: I say as *August. Enchir. c.* 105. *Sic oportebat prius hominem fieri ut & bene velle posset, & male; nec gratis si bene, nec impune si male: postea vero sic evit ut male velle non posset. Quia ordo prætermittendus non fuit, in quo Deus voluit ostendere, quam bonum sit animal rationale, quod etiam peccare possit; quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit.*

Answ. There is a *Liberty* that is perfected by some even *necessitating predetermination* of God: And there is an *inferiour Liberty* of Imperfect Viators, which some *efficient Divine predetermination* (feigned by you) would destroy. And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx (which omnipotently moveth all things) predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done, with all the circumstances, and as respecting every object comparatively, so that no creature ever *did* nor *can* resist such a predetermination any easier than make a *World*, this were to *destroy the true Liberty of that Creature*, with his *innocency* and *felicity*: however you may at pleasure put the *name* of *Liberty* on, and deny the *name* of *Necessity* to, such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act; and then may say, that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely (or constrained to do it without constraint,) and so the liberty of the will is established. For I see not but *cogere ad Volendum* is as apt a phrase, as *cogere nolentem ad agendum*; when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency, to all those comparate circumstantiate acts, which are forbidden in Gods Law, and that on pain of mans damnation.

But note how wisely *Alvarez* left out the great difference, about predetermining to the acts of sin, from this summary of his disputations.

§. III.

Of the three other wayes, and I. *Of the* Jeſuits *way.*

Queſt. *AS you have paſt your judgement on* Alvarez *and his* Dominican *way, tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three wayes mentioned by* Alvarez, *and recited by you* ſect. 8?

Anſw. I. I have ſaid enough before to anſwer this: Briefly, as to the *Jeſuits* way *de ſcientia media*, 1. It is certain, that God knoweth all that is a capable object of knowledge: And therefore he knoweth what conditional propoſitions of future contingents are true.

2. Whether this ſhould be called *ſcientia media* or not, is a vain queſtion.

3. Gods acts *ex parte ſui* being but his Eſſence, and all one, can no otherwiſe be diſtinguiſhed, nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or poſteriority, than as the objects are diſtinct, and by their order of priority and poſteriority allow us by Connotation ſo to denominate the acts.

4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themſelves ſimultaneous, though from the order of humane operations, we ſay that things are firſt *Intelligible*, before they are *Amiable*. And ſo we may ſay of God after the manner of men; but not otherwiſe.

5. God doth not will the *form*, or the *act of ſin as circumſtantiated*, and as the form neceſſarily reſulteth from it: neither for it ſelf, nor *propter aliud*; the eſſence or exiſtence.

6. Therefore God doth not foreknow ſin as willed and decreed by him: nor therefore foreknow it becauſe he willeth it.

7. God fore-knoweth (or knoweth) the *formale peccati* as well as the *materiale*: yet almoſt all confeſs, that he *willeth not* the *formale*: Therefore he *knoweth* that which he *willeth not*: Therefore his Volition of it is not neceſſary to his knowledge of it.

8. There is *no effect in God*: for all that is in God is God; who is not *effected*: Therefore there is no *Cauſe in God of any thing in God*: Therefore *Gods will or decree* of *Good* is not the *cauſe* that he foreknoweth it, nor his foreknowledge the *cauſe* that he *willeth it*: But he both *knoweth and willeth* all that is Good, at once.

9. Gods inward operations on the ſoul are *real efficiencies*, and yet *moral*, and to us unſearchable: They cauſe the will to determine it ſelf to Good, when it doth ſo; but how we know not. But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means, and according to their aptitude.

10. God uſeth ſuch means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them; and ſetteth them in ſuch circumſtances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in: But his inward grace is the principal or chief cauſe: And he doth not *will* or *decree* to give them ſuch means and circumſtances, *becauſe* he *foreknoweth* they will prevail. That is, Gods will and decree as in him hath no cauſe.

11. But the word [*becauſe*] is in Scripture applyed ſometimes to Gods *Love or hatred*, and ſometimes to his *outward acts*: (as John 16. 27. *The Father loveth you, becauſe ye have loved me and believed*——) And in the *firſt caſe* that which is meant, is, that *the qualification of the object is the material conſtitutive cauſe of the act of God*, (not as it is *Himſelf*, but) *as relatively denominated* ab extra *from the object* in ſpecie vel indivi-

Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99. c. 6, 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord, 1. Gods preventing operating grace is *Vocatio congrua* with good cogitations, and the *primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum*. 2. Gods co-operating Grace *ad conſenſum liberum* is neither before nor after our act, but *concomitant & ſimul*. And ſo cauſeth no antecedent neceſſity, but concomitant (*exiſtentiæ*.) 3. This ſuppoſeth Gods *Scientia futuri conditionalis*. Againſt this Dr. *Twiſſe* hath ſaid much in a peculiar Digreſſion.

And ſurely God ever operateth as God, which is ut *Cauſa prima*. But how far he determineth is the doubt.

individuo. And in the *ſecond caſe*, It meaneth, that the *effects* of God *ad extra* called his *tranſient acts* as *in paſſo*, have their *proper uſes*, and we our *commanded ends* in uſing them: And ſo God is ſaid to ſend Miniſters, *e. g. becauſe* he would ſave the hearers; that is, the Miniſtry is a cauſe of mens ſalvation.

12. From all this it appeareth, that they err who think that their *ſcientia media* is *equally uſeful* in the points of *Election* and of *Reprobation*, and that they run *pari paſſu*. For *all Good* is both *willed* and *known*, and ſo *Election* ſuppoſeth not the *foreſight of our faith or obedience* as *cauſal* or *antecedent*, (if we ſpeak of that Act of Election which is *to faith and obedience.*) But Evil is *foreknown* and *not willed* at all: And therefore there is no ſuch Reprobation which is a will or decree that men ſhall ſin: And the *non-impedition* of ſin being *no act*, needeth *no poſitive act of will* or decree*. But *Reprobation* which is the *decree of damning*, ever ſuppoſeth the object to be a *foreſeen-ſinner finally rejecting grace.*

The reſt about this is ſpoken to ſufficiently before.

* Yet none of the ſtreſs of their differences lyeth on this; And the Jeſuits with the reſt aſſert a Poſitive Volition *de peccato permittendo*, without proof: which I leave to mens various opinions.

§. IV.

II. *Of* Durandus's *way.*

II. AS to the way of *Aureolus*, *Durandus*, *Ludov. à Dola*, &c. I conceive it is commonly rejected, becauſe not *underſtood*, or becauſe *the wording* of it ſoundeth *diſgracefully*; But it is a great matter that all confeſs, how eaſily it would end all theſe controverſies, were it true. And by *Lud. à Dola*'s Explication, and what *Capreolus* ſaith of *Aureolus*, I conceive that they are commonly miſtaken. *Durandus* thinketh, that to the motion of the Creature it is neceſſary 1. That God by his continued influx continue the *being* and the *nature* and *properties* of the agent; 2. And that he continue all the *circumſtant creatures*, *concauſes* and *objects* and the *media* of action; 3. And that no *powerful impediment hinder* the action. Now, ſay the *Jeſuits* and *Dominicans* and the reſt, God doth *moreover* concurr as the firſt cauſe to the *Act it ſelf*, by an *Immediate efficient Influx*, beſides that by which he upholdeth the *Power* and *ſecond Cauſes*. But I think that *Durandus* meaneth as much as they: that is, that God doth not only *uphold* the *creature* in its *meer eſſe*, but in its *Nature*, which is its *Mobility*, and its *principium motus*; And this *Nature* is not only a *Power* to *Action*, but alſo an *Inclined Power*. So that for God by *conſtant Influx* to continue a *Natural Power and Inclination* to *Action* or *motion*, with all *neceſſary concurrents*, *without impediments*, is truly by his *Influx* to *concurr* to the *motion* as the *firſt Cauſe*; while his Influx is not only as to *Being*, but as to the *Motive force*, *and inclination*: And no more than this doth ſeem to me to be *ſimply neceſſary* to *motion.*

Here the Reader muſt know, that the Controverſie is equally of *Natural* and *Free* agents and action. And firſt let us enquire of natural action.

I. *Fire* is an *Active nature*, as much *Inclined* to *Action* as *Earth* to *non-action* or reſt. Yea, its *Active Virtue* and *Inclination* is its very *Eſſential Form*, and this as to a threefold action, viz. *Motion*, *Light and Heat.*

* No doubt but God is *quoad præſentiam* Immediate in all his efficiency, and as Near to the effect, as if he uſed no ſecond cauſe: But yet he is not ſo immediate as to exclude ſecond cauſes, as *media*: And while he uſeth them, he operateth on us according to their kind of operations, even as if they were between him and the effect. And this is the ſenſe of *Durandus* and *à Dola*, and eaſily reconcileth all.

Amyraldus de lib. Arbit. c. 4. concurreth with *Durandus.*

It is conſiderable that all confeſs, that if *Durandus*'s way did hold, it eaſily ended all the controverſie. As *Lud. le Blank* noteth *Theſ. 3. de Concurſ. Juxta hos doctores nulla eſt difficultas in conciliando divino concurſu cum libertate, &c.* And this way is as conſiſtent with Gods certain diſpoſal of events as predetermination it ſelf.

Heat. If God then make *Fire* and continue its *Nature* or *Essential Inclination* to these acts, and continue *fuel approximate* with all *necessary concauses* and *media without impediments*, to say that this *Fire* yet *cannot burn* or *act*, without *another kind* of Divine *premotion* besides all this, even an Immediate physical impulse, besides the described *Influx*, is a plain contradiction: For *Fire* is essentially an *Inclined Power to act*. And that which hath a *true Power to act, can act*: It's a contradiction to say, *It hath power, but it cannot.* And a *Power naturally inclined to act, will act, caeteris paribus.*

The question then is, Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn, if God do but as the first Cause of Nature, continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses? or rather, Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors, *Dan.* 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace? If you say, that the Miracle was, in Gods withholding his *additional premotion*, you then imply that God as *principium vel causa prima Naturæ* doth *ordinarily* give that *additional premotion.* For that is *no Miracle* which is not dissonant from the common course of nature. But nothing can belong to God as the *Cause of Nature*, but to *continue Nature* as he made it, and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause, he continueth all its *Moving Nature*, both *Power and Inclination.*

In the *motus projectorum*, so far as the *moving vis impressa* continueth and prevaileth, the *motion* continueth accordingly; And who can prove that though the *vis impressa* continue, *e. g.* in a Bullet shot out of a Gun, and all concauses, yet there can be no motion, unless God otherwise thrust it on, or move it by some other impulse?

Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air *quasi per filum*, or by somewhat that hindereth its descent: If God continue the *Natural Gravity* of that Rock, which is not only a *power* but an *inclination* to descend, and if he continue all *concauses* and *media*, and if the *thred be cut* or the *impediment removed* that held up the stone, yet saith the *Dominican*, this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by *another action thrust* it down, or by an *efficient physical premotion predetermine* it; or as the *Jesuits* say, unless God concurr with a further *moving Impulse.* A plain contradiction: That a *Power of motion, strongly inclined* to *act*, so as a greater power is necessary in the *impediment* that will hinder it, and this in *genere Agentis*, continued by *Divine Influx*, yet *cannot act*, unless otherwise moved.

God worketh so constantly by *Natural Inclinations* of second causes, as fully proveth to us, that *ut prima Causa Naturæ*, he hath *decreed so to work.* And how is that then but by his *Influx into Nature as Nature?*

If my house *cannot fall* when the foundations and pillars are gone, unless God otherwise *thrust* it down; If I *cannot fall* though I leap down from the house top, unless God otherwise *thrust* me down; If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr, besides his continuation of *Nature*; why should we fear it; when we know not that *God decreeth* any more than the *continuation of natural causes* and that *action* which is by *them*, and by *him* as the *upholder of them?*

II. And the case of *Free-agents* is here confessed to be *the same.* The Influx into their *Natures and Virtues* is it that continueth them in *esse substantiali* and *in esse movente & moto*: An *Act* is but the *modus substantiæ.* And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is, for God

For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done.

The whole experience of the world sheweth, that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation; Therefore it more concerneth us here to know, what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions, than in these disputes is usually observed.

Adrian. Quodl. 3. fol 18. *Sententia Durandi & plurium aliorum certum tenet*, &c. *Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister* 37. *d.* 2. *judicium reliquens prudentis lectoris examini.*

God *physice influere in actum immediate, & non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem:* nor how he can be said to *move the faculties to act*, that doth *cause the act* and not *meddle with*, (and therefore *not move*) the *faculty*. Nor know I how an *Act immediately* (and not the *agent*) can be the *terminus* of a *physical motion*. Though it's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means. Therefore, as God moveth *things Natural* by his Influx into their *moving Virtues*, or into the *moving Virtues* of *second Causes*, which being *Active* operate on *passive* matter; so as the *Soul* and its *Will* is *quædam natura inclined* to *Action in genere*, and to *will good* in *special*, God as the *cause of nature* moveth it by his *Influx* into the *faculty*, as he doth other *natural agents:* But having made it a *Free self-determining Agent*, his *Influx upholdeth* and *moveth* it *as such:* And the same *Influx* is *upholding* and *moving*, and *moving* as *upholding*; seeing God as *Motor* also, doth *influere in naturam vitalem & liberam*. Besides which *supporting* and *moving* Influx, no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an *Act as an Act*, (that I know of.)

But the very *natures* or *dispositions* of lapsed man being depraved, the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions; And here also God operateth on the faculties, by *right disposing them*, and by that *grace* which *Augustine* and *Jansenius* well call *Gratia medicinalis*, (his *special Influx causing*, *maintaining*, and *actuating* it) he causeth the *holy* actions of believers.

I do verily believe, that *Durandus* and his followers, under the name of supporting the *natural and free faculties*, did mean inclusively that which *Bellarmine* pleadeth for, A *General Concurse* to the *Act as an Act*; And that they differ in words and not in sense.

And if his doctrine hold not true, I cannot see how God can be said to *Permit* mens sinful Actions, or any action at all. For if neither the *Inclination* of natural agents, (as of Fire to burn, a Stone to descend, *&c.*) nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature, would cause any act, unless God otherwise cause it by premotion; then there is no place for *Impedition*, (for we cannot be said to *Hinder* a *Stone from speaking*, or a *Mountain from walking*, nor any thing from any act which it *could not do*): And *permittere* is *non impedire*. And therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin, is not a *permitting* him to sin; Motion being one thing, and the *not hindering* of motion, another thing (or nothing.)

§. V.

III. *Of the* Scotists *and* Nominals *way.*

III. AND as to the third way, aſcribed by *Alvarez* to the *Scotiſts* and *Nominals*, I think that *de nomine* it is not a proper expreſſion to call God *cauſa partialis*. But if we agree of the *ſenſe*, we may bear with improper expreſſions about God, of whom we can ſay nothing without ſome impropriety. Doubtleſs God and man are not to be accounted *co-ordinate concauſes* of the *act*; but whatever man doth, he doth it in ſubordination to God. But God operateth 1. As the *prime cauſe* of *Nature*, in a ſtabliſhed way, by *natural cauſes*; And ſo he giveth man his *Natural vital power* and the *Liberty* of uſing it: and by this *Power* and *Liberty* a man *can do* more than he alwayes *doth*. So that Gods *natural cauſality* and concurſe doth not bring all the *Power* which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action: but men freely exerciſe the *ſame power* ſometime *more* and ſometime leſs. 2. And in the like manner God cauſeth *gracious* or *holy acts*: *Rectifying* our *Powers*, and *fortifying them* by *holy habits*, and *preſerving* and *actuating* them, by the Holy Ghoſt: Yet the *Spirit* is to *Grace*, as *God the prime cauſe* is to *Nature*: He giveth us *more Gracious Power* than *we uſe*, and than his own concurſe alwayes reduceth into adequate act: So that Gods operations in *Nature* and *Grace* are not *ad ultimum poſſe Dei*, nor *ad ultimum poſſe hominis*; but limited by his moſt wiſe and holy will: And man as a free agent is not only *Able*, but *obliged*, to uſe his *power* further, than by all Gods concurſe or premotion it is uſed.

And in this ſenſe I conceive it is that *Scotus* and others call God and man *Cauſæ partiales*, in that there is a certain *proportion* of *premotion* and *help*, which God as the *firſt Cauſe* of *Nature* and *Grace*, doth afford to man; And there is moreover a *certain uſe* of *Gods help and Grace*, *beyond what God predetermineth* man to, (as comparative to *this object* rather *than that*, &c.) which man *can do*, and is *bound to do*; Not *independently* or in *co-ordination* with God; but by the *Power* and *Liberty* which God only giveth and upholdeth, and affordeth him ſufficient help to actuate. Now if *man do this Part* which is *left to his liberty*, the effect alwayes followeth. If he do not, it may not follow, though God gave him that *neceſſary help* or *grace* or *premotion* which is commonly called *ſufficient*. And when *Scotus* likeneth God and man, to two drawing a Boat, where the ſtrength of both muſt concurr, I believe he meant no more than I have ſaid.

1. All the *Power* is of God as the *total firſt cauſe*.

2. All the *Grace* that rectifieth and diſpoſeth our faculties, is of God as the *total firſt cauſe*.

3. All the *Act as an Act in genere*, is of God as the *total* (though not the *ſole*) cauſe.

4. All the Holineſs or *Moral Goodneſs* of the Act is of God as the *total firſt* cauſe (though not the *only* cauſe.)

5. But all the *ſinfulneſs* or *moral evil* of Acts and Habits is *from Man*.

6. And that implyeth, that *mans free-will* is not ſo much freed from ſin, mutability and infirmity, but that it *can neglect to uſe well* the power and helps of grace afforded. But of *total* and *partial* Cauſality I have ſpoken

Vaſqu. (*ubi ſup.*) taketh *Alex. Al.* 1. *p. q.* 26. *n.* 7. *a.* 2. *ad.* 1. & *Bonavent.* 1. *d.* 40. *a.* 2. *q.* 1. to be for him, becauſe they ſay, *Actus noſtros eſſe liberos quia Divina voluntas non eſt* Tota Cauſa, *ſed cum libero arbitrio; quod cum ſit proxima cauſa modificatur concurſum primæ.* But if this be his opinion he joyneth with theſe *Scotiſts* and *Nominals de cauſa non-totali*. So *Pet. à S. Joſeph. Theol. univ. de Deo*, ſaith that God is *Cauſa totius effectus, ſed non tota Cauſa, ſed partialis.*

ſpoken more fully in the firſt Book. And of their opinion, that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will, but only is *ad actum ſeu effectum*, if it be true, it eaſily endeth the controverſie of the difference of ſufficient and effectual grace, as to that Act: But it is to me unintelligible, and the thing quite above all our underſtandings, and very unfit for bold diſputes, or mutual cenſures.

§. VI.

The true face or Scheme of the Dominican *predeterminant way, as to the ſenſe and conſequents.*

I Do readily confeſs that, as the ſumm of all the Controverſie is, Whether man have truly any *Free-will*, that is not moved as neceſſarily as any natural motions are cauſed; ſo the arguments of *Hobbes* and the *Dominicans* and Dr. *Twiſſe* are not eaſily anſwered. And had we not better proof of all that *Morality* and *Religion* which is inconſiſtent with this opinion, I ſhould my ſelf be inclined alſo to think, that we muſt be contented with the naked name of Liberty; there being nothing indeed, but *Volition neceſſitated*; and that man is an Engine moved by God and other cauſes, no leſs neceſſarily and phyſically than a Clock or Watch, but only by more inviſible cauſes and to us unknown, and therefore our Volitions are called *Contingent* and *free*, when truly there is nothing contingent in the World. We that converſe in the body with things corporeal, are ſo much ſtrangers to our ſelves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits, that we are very prone to ſuch groſs corporeal imaginations, and to think that all action is like the *motus projectorum*, *violent*, and *neceſſitated*; and that it belongeth to the perfection of the firſt mover that it ſhould be ſo, yea, that he himſelf ſhould be in all things the moſt *neceſſary* agent, and conſequently all things *neceſſitated* by him.

But as *Alvarez* confeſſeth, *Free-will* is proved by *Aquinas* and many others, by *natural proofs*, and no Predeterminant or *Hobbiſt* can give the tenth part ſo full and certain proof, of the *neceſſitation* of *all Volitions*, as we can give of all the contrary *principles in Morality* which are overthrown thereby.

And therefore (whatever ſome think of the *fatum Stoicorum*) the Light of Nature taught almoſt all the Philoſophers in the World, the *Freedom* of mans will, and the morality there founded: of which *Grotius* hath collected ſo full a Volume of teſtimonies in his Book entituled *De fato*, that it ſhall ſave me the labour of tranſcribing any.

Yet though I think *Chriſtianity* inconſiſtent with their opinion, I doubt not but many of the *Predeterminants* are *good Chriſtians*, and excellently *learned* and acute Divines, as not apprehending the inconſiſtency of their own thoughts: And I confeſs that *there is a Religion* conſiſtent with their *fundamental* error, which I ſhall therefore put into the Scheme, leſt any think that none but *Hobbes* hath made the right deductions from it.

And remember, that I charge them not to ſay all the words which I here lay down, but only that the reaſon why I my ſelf do above all others ſhun their principles, is becauſe I take this following to be the true ſenſe and complexion of them, which I muſt alſo believe, if I do believe them: And

I ſuppoſe

I suppose the Reader to be acquainted with their own words, and to have their Books at hand. *

I. Their fundamental Principle is, that "*It is naturally Impossible* "*for any agent Natural or free to do any act, or vary any, comparative-*"*ly or circumstantially, but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate* "*predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency, as the first Cause; be-*"*sides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and contanses,* "*and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an* "*act* in genere *only. And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermi-*"*ned by physical premotion, not to act in all the circumstances that it is* "*so moved to act in.*

"II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predeter-"mination to all the circumstances, or can forbear to act when so pre-"determined, is by consequence to say, that *such a creature, is God, the* "*first cause.* For it is as *impossible, as to be God, or to make a* "*world.*

"III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God so pre-"determineth him to, must be *stronger than God* and *overcome him*, or "do *contradictions.*

"IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical ef-"ficient premotion, he *could not have known any future acts.* No, "though with *Scotus* we say, that he *willed* all those Acts antecedently to "his prescience, it would not serve, unless he *willed so to predetermine* "the agent in causing them.

"V. Yet we will say, that the *will is free*: but we mean only that "to *will* and to *will freely* are words of the same sense. For a man "is said to *will freely* in that he *willeth*, and his *Willing* is not a "*Nilling.*

"VI. Free-will then is nothing but *Facultas Voluntatis & rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alte-rum: sed tantum prout à prima causa physice pradeterminatur*: That "is, it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he "will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or "passive, but also Active, because it is an Active Power of the will which "God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine "it self.

"VII. We will call this the wills *Power*, but it is but *hypothetically* "*a Power, viz.* It can act if God physically predetermine it: else not at "all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move "them, or rather, as the hand can move, if the *will* and the *Spirits* in the "Nerves do move it.

"VIII. The will is said to be free, partly by reason that its active "power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it self *ad* "*utrumlibet*, and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction.

"IX. The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently "predetermined by God, is not *constrained*, because it *willeth* not *un-*"*willingly*: that is, so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and re-"luctant.

"X. Yet the will that was one way enclined, habituated and acted in "the precedent instant, is oft physically premoved and predetermined by "Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant, which it could "not resist: As he that in this instant willeth Chastity, may in the next "instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipotency to will fornica-"tion; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by

* At least that he have read *Bradwardine* and *Alvarez*, and Dr. *Twisse* and *Rutherford. de Prov.* Better saith *Joh. Baron in* 1. *sent. d.* 40. *art.* 2. *Deus aliqua futura non vult velle efficaci; sed solum permittere: & respectu sic productorum voluntas divina est causa per Generalem, tribuens agenti particulari facultatem agendi sic vel sic: non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam istarum efficienter vult hanc vel illam: & isto modo Voluntas divina est causa actuum nostrorum quantumcunque deformium?* —— *Talium actuum est causa determinans Voluntas humana praesupposità influentiâ generali Dei: unde ideo pecco quia volo peccare: ità quod influs voluntatis meæ est jam determinans me ad peccandum.*

And *Gab. Biel post Scotum, Ità est causa efficiens rectitudinis quod quantum est de se dare illam actui, si voluntas cooperaretur. Universaliter enim quicquid Deus dedit antecedenter; dare etiam consequenter, quantum est ex se, si non esset impedimentum: Voluntas autem quantum est ex se non dat rectitudinem actui.* Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub. 1. *Ità &* Okam in 1. d. 46. & 38. *& fere illisdem verbis* Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. *& ita* Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. & q. 2. ad 4. & q. 3. concl. 4. & Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. & d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 12. *& alii quamplurimi.* *Bradwardine l.* 1. *c.* 34. *p.* 300, 301, *&c.* speaketh too plainly to this purpose, with *Hugo* 1. *de Sacr.* 4. *part.* 13. being more careful to make people think well of his [*Deus vult malum*] than to deny it; [*Non quia quod dicitur, non bene dicitur, sed quia quod bene dicitur, non recte intelligitur.*] And his mollification is that [God willeth sin only *secundum quid*; for Gods *Velle simpliciter*, as it's commonly taken, is to Love and approve it as good, and to reward it: And because the Vulgar so take it, we must not before them say that God wills

"God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irresistible "efficiency [*coaction,*] because it is *ad Volendum*, and so *in ipso actu* "there is no reluctancy or resistance.

"XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, "or not will, to will this or that, and also giveth him all necessary objects "and concauses, and also as the first cause of natural and free action "giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such, yet the "moral specification of that Act, to *this* proposed *object* rather than that "(as to hate God, rather than to hate sin,) or to this Act rather than to "that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to speak a lye, rather than "the truth) hath so much *Entity* in it, that it is a blasphemous deifying "man to say, that man can do it, without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion.

"XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth sin, and God made mans "nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and "ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauses; and God by the said "efficient, physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its "circumstances: (As when *David* was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God first by omnipotent motion determined "his will to it, or else he could not possibly have done it.) And *sin* in "its *formale* is nothing but the Relation of *Disconformity* to Gods Law, "which can have no cause but that which causeth the *subjectum, fundamentum & terminum*; nor can it possibly be, but it must exist *per modum resultantiam, hisce positis.* And yet though God make the man, "the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence *sin* "*resulteth* as a meer relation, we are resolved to say that God is not the "Author or Cause of sin.

"XIII. Yea, though the *Habits* of sin are certain *Entities*, and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature, according "to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity; yet we are resolved to say, that God is "not the Cause or Author at least of sin.

"XIV. Yet we will say, that he is an enemy to Gods Providence, "that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness, unless God thus "predetermine both Will, Tongue, Hand, and every active part, to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances.

"XV. Sin is caused by God as to the *circumstantiated Act* which is the "*materiale*, but not as to the *formale*: And yet we must confess, "that the Relation is caused by causing the *subject, foundation* and "*term*, (all which God principally doth,) and can be caused no otherwise.

"XVI. But the *formale* of sin is but a *defect* or *privation*, which is "*nothing*: Therefore man and not God is the cause of it; For God cannot be a deficient cause, nor have any privation. And yet we cannot "deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in *disobedience* "as in *obedience*, in *curvity* as in rectitude, in disconformity as in conformity. 2. Nor that God can be a *Cause* of *Privations* (such as death "is,) though not a subject of them; even such a cause as they can have. "3. Nor that some of ours (even *Alvarez*) say that sins of *commission* "(and habits) are positive in their *formale*. 4. And sin is such a *Nothing*, "as is mans misery, and he is damned for and by. And if it be such "a *Nothing* as can have no cause, man can no more be the cause of it "than God. 5. And that the Reason of non-existences, negations, or "privations, is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the "*first*

leth sin, because they too much abhorr it. No act is unjust simply, but all just, and all the consequents of it just, in respect of God the Author. Therefore simply in the Universe, there is no sin or deordination; God willeth sin as a Physicion doth poyson in his medicine, for the exercise of the good, the punishment of the evil, the contemplation of the beauty of the world. He is not the author of evil as he is of good; for of that he, is the sole giver of faith, charity, *&c.* creating it. And God constraineth not men to sin against their wills: nor doth he cause it unjustly and culpably, *&c.*]

Is not this meer *Hobbs?* 1. Doth God will any thing but good? Is not sin good then if he will it? 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it, a not willing it? What if he rewarded not men for loving him? You feign God to will and cause all sin, and then damn men for it, and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it, because he damned men for it. 3. Do you not make God as much the cause of evil habits and acts as of good, when you make him the total cause of all that is in them? 4. Do you not say that the sinner doth evil for good ends, and not for evil, as well as God? 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him? 6. Is it any better to make a man sinful and miserable by making him willing, than to make him so by force against his will? Nay, could a man be made a sinner by force without making him willing? Is it not a contradiction? 7. Why call you it poyson which God maketh a medicine of? You mean not that there is any evil in it which God caused not (as you say) more immediately than man: and so that God first made it poyson and then put it into his medicine. 8. And why are you afraid of speaking

"*first necessary cause* of the contrary, as existences and positives are re-
"solved into his will and agency. And if a man cannot think a good
"thought by any help that God can give him, unless he physically prede-
"termine him to it, then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously
"to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it, as the reason
"why he doth it into his predetermination: and as it is *night*, because
"the Sun shineth not.

"XVII. But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin, because
"he is under no prohibiting Law. Though it be true, 1. That his na-
"ture or perfection, the root of all Laws, is more than a Law: 2. And we
"know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of
"man, but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it: which is
"none of the question.

"XVIII. And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth, that
"all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in *not sinning*,
"is not at all caused by God, *e. g.* that we hate him not, nor his truth and
"wayes and servants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, steal not,
"lye not, covet not, blaspheme not, wrong none, do no evil, *&c.* we need
"no help of God for this; Because if he will not move our wills by efficient
"predetermination to do them, it is impossible for us to do them at all.

"XIX. And though we say that God willeth sin to be, by his *permission*
"only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as
"the first cause, is the principal efficiency: And properly we must say that
"God permitteth no sin at all; For we say that his permission proveth the
"consequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we must say that he
"permitteth no sin but what is done. And that which is done by commis-
"sion positively he effecteth by effecting the *fundamentum*; and therefore
"permitteth not: And men sin by *omission* because God doth not *make*
"*them sin*, and not because he meerly *permitteth it*. For permission is
"not *de impossibilibus*.

"XX. God willeth not sin, because he willeth it not *as sin*, in its *for-*
"*male*: which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not.

"XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future,
"but as he willeth or decreeth them, we must confess that the *formale pec-*
"*cati* as well as the *materiale*, was (such as it is) *quid futurum*, (if it was
"but *futura privatio*:) And therefore this would inferr that God willed
"and decreed the *formale peccati* also.

"XXII. Gods *Will* is his *Love*: and what he *willeth* he *Loveth*.

"XXIII. God willeth the *futurity* and *existence* of sin, not only of the
"*materiale*, but the *formale*, even of all the sin that ever is done.

"XXIV. The *existence* of sin is *Good* and *Amiable*, not only by *acci-*
"*dent*, but *per se*, as being very *conducible* to the *Glory of Gods Justice*
"*and Mercy*, and therefore is *per se* Willed and Loved of God.

"XXV. It is incomparably much more *sin* than *Holiness* which God
"*willeth*, and *Loveth*, and by predetermination causeth in mankind on
"earth: For it is much more *sin* than *Holiness* that *existeth* in man: And
"all that *existeth* God *causeth* as aforesaid (the circumstantiated act, and
"so the resultancy of the relative form:) And he willeth and Loveth the
"*existence* of all, and the *thing existing* so far as he *causeth* it.

"XXVI. God *willeth*, *Loveth* and *Causeth* sin incomparably more than
"wicked men do: For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable de-
"pendent will; but God with a Divine, primary, immutable will. Man
"causeth the forbidden act (whence the relation resulteth) with a Will

your opinion to the world? Is it not because you are conscious that you speak against the common principles of nature, in which the vulgar are sounder than your self? 9. And much of this is because you cannot tell how God punisheth sin with sin, unless he cause sin. What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton shall be sick, and that Arsenick shall corrode his bowels that eateth it, *&c.* and drinking too much Wine shall breed the Gout, *&c.* Doth he therefore cause men to eat and drink too much? or is not the excess from them? and yet the penal relation and consequents from God?

And suitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will; *viz.* *Grace effectual* (without which no one sin can be avoided) is Gods will that it shall be done: (And so no man can any more do any thing, than what he doth, than he can make a world.) And free-will (*li.*2.*c.*1.) is [*Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi, & voluntarie exequendi:*] so that to *will*, and *freely* to *will*, is all one. And so man is moved to every sin, by necessitating premotion to do it freely, that is, he is made willing, that is, sinful.

So *c.* 32. [*In omni non-actione Dei & creaturæ communi, prius naturaliter est Deum non-agere quam ipsam & quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit, ideo creatura illam non agit, & non è contra.*] So that all omissions (of faith, repentance, obedience, *&c.*) are fully resolved into Gods first *non-agency* p. 611. [*Quis nesciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum, aliam Stellam, cælum majus, ideo non facta sunt? Ità quicquid non fit à causa secunda Deus vult non fieri, & non vult positivè: Scilicet habet nolle illud fieri ab ea. Prius ergo naturaliter & causaliter est Deum nolle positivè, quare & non velle & non facere causam secundam agere, quam ipsam non agere.*] This is plain

dealing: All men that Love not God, and all that hate him, are such because God will have it so, and make them do as they do. It would save many tedious volumes and intricate disputes if all would speak as plainly. But what is the Christian Religion then?

"that is irresistibly moved so to do by God (as the pen writeth; only *sao* "*modo* with Volition:) But God causeth it as the *first omnipotent* unre-"sistible cause, of all that the Creature doth in sinning.

"XXVII. The same must be said of God and the Devil, who can no "more commit one sinful act, till God unavoidably predetermine his will to "it, by his premotion, than sinful man can.

"XXVIII. God by his Law, doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts "which he principally and unavoidably causeth: And he strictly command-"eth all those good acts, whose contraries he thus causeth us to do.

"XXIX. Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause, of "which God is not the Principal cause, and though he Willeth and Loveth "all that he causeth, yet the Scripture saith that *God hateth sin*, and *cannot* "*behold it*, and *hateth all the workers of iniquity*, and that it is *abomi-*"*nation to him*, that he is as one *laden with it*, and *wearied*, *provoked*, and "*offended* by it. And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness, "when he will not cause them, but doth cause and will the contrary.

"XXX. Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God, "to the Reprobate themselves, on condition, that they will believe and "repent, when God doth unavoidably as the first cause, determine their "wills to the contrary acts, even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God "and holiness.

"XXXI. The Law of God is, that all the Reprobates shall be damned "to hell fire, if they will not believe and repent, when his omnipotence "doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impeni-"tence: and if they will not give over those acts of sin, to which God "doth thus unavoidably move and determine them.

"XXXII. Gods executions are answerable to these Laws; and all save "Christians, and all professed Christians saving the sanctified, are to be "punished in hell fire for ever, only for not doing the acts of Faith, Love "and obedience, when God as the first cause predetermined them to the "contrary; and for doing the acts of sin, when God unavoidably moved "them to it, and made them do it: so that consequently all that are "damned, suffer in hell, for not *being Gods*, even the *first sufficient causes* "of their own acts, and for not *being above God* or *stronger* than he, that "is, for not overcoming or avoiding, his invincible and unavoidable pre-"determining premotion unto evil acts.

"XXXIII. The same must be said of the Devils, who sin and suffer on "the same terms.

XXXIV. *Q.* What kind of torment then will there be in Hell? Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency? and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world? or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to? that is, for not overcoming God? (when they know the case.)

Or must we not more congruously say, that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them, and a justifying of themselves? Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement?

XXXV. *Q.* Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice? and the exemplar of all humane Justice (allowing for disparities?) And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course? And how then would they be esteemed?

XXXVI. *Q.* Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love? And therefore *sin* better than *Holiness* in all that have *sin*, and

not

not holineſs, and in the Godly ſo far as they ſin? becauſe that it ſhall be ſo, is more (yea only) *willed* by God, and cauſed by his predetermination?

XXXVII. Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity, as to the Chriſtian faith, by making it ſeem to men incredible? Is it credible that God ſent his Son ſo wonderfully to expiate thoſe ſins which he ſo loved and cauſed as aforeſaid? and to ſave his people from their ſins, which God thus unavoidably moved them to commit? and to deſtroy the works of God, under the name of deſtroying the works of the Devil? Muſt Chriſt ſuffer, bleed, die and bear Gods wrath, for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination? And is it eaſie for him that believeth one of theſe to believe the other?

XXXVIII. Q. How will men preach and hear the Goſpel, if they do it in congruity with this doctrine? Will they ſay [God ſent us to beſeech and charge you, not to do that ſinful act, which you cannot do unleſs he make you do it by predetermination, and which you cannot avoid if he ſo make you do it. He beſeecheth and importuneth you to do all thoſe commanded acts, which you can no more do than make a world unleſs he predetermine you to do them, nor can forbear them if he do?]

XXXIX. Q. How will men Repent, confeſs, reſiſt temptations, pray, and uſe the means of Grace, if they believe that all ſinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Cauſed, and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory?

XL. Q. Whether they that teach (as Dr. *Twiſſe* often) that ſin is not *malum Dei ſed noſtri*, do not take it to be *no injury to God*, nor *diſpleaſing* to his will? Or is not *injury* and *diſpleaſing*, evil in reſpect to God as the *terminus*, though it be no *hurt* to him, nor *his evil* as the *ſubject* or *agent*? And doth not the opinion that it's *Evil only* to us, and *Good* to God as conducible to his glory, teach men to hate it *only* out *of ſelf-love*, and not *out of love to the glory of God*? yea to *Love* it as *conducible to Gods Glory*, more than to hate it as *evil to our ſelves*; ſeeing *Gods Glory* muſt be preferred above *our ſelves*?

XLI. Q. Is not ſin thus made a *coequal* with *Chriſt*? who is but a *means* to the glorifying of God, to which faith (Dr. *Twiſſe*) ſin is *ſummè conducibile*?

XLII. Q. Doth not this doctrine make the ſanctification of the Holy Ghoſt to be unneceſſary? when all that is to be done to ſave us from ſin, is for God not to make us ſin by his premotion? Or doth it not make ſanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God, which is made as neceſſary to ſin as to duty, and ſo natural and gracious operations made the ſame, and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good?

XLIII. Q. Is it not much worſe to man, if God by predetermination make him firſt a ſinner, (and wicked by ſinful Habits) and then damn him for it, than if he ſhould damn an innocent man for nothing? For ſin and pain is far worſe than pain without ſin. And to compel the will unwillingly to ſin, were it poſſible, is leſs than to make it willing.

XLIV. Doth not he that affirmeth that the *Devil* doth but ſin as efficiently predetermined by God, and doth not force, nor determine any mans will to any ſinful act, but that *God* predetermineth all men and Devils to every ſinful act committed, I ſay, doth he not deſcribe God as worſe than Satan (*horreſco quærens!*) if *ſin* be the *denominating evil*, and the *cauſing of ſin* be more than *tempting to it*? Had I not rather my will were *reſiſtibly*

ſiſtibly tempted to ſin, than *unreſiſtibly made* to ſin, by predetermining efficient premotion?

XLV. Is not the *objective Reaſon* in *Devils* of mans *implanted Enmity* againſt them, *Gen.* 3. 15. becauſe they are *Enemies to God and us*, as being themſelves *Lovers of ſin*, and *Tempters of us to ſin and miſery*?

XLVI. Doth not he take the directeſt courſe to root out the Love of God and all Religion from the World, and to tempt men to *hate* God, and ſo to begin a Hell on Earth, who deſcribeth *God* in *Satans likeneſs* and much worſe; as much as being the *principal cauſe* of *all ſin* in men and Devils, is worſe than *ſinning* when *predetermined*, and *tempting others* to it?

XLVII. I think that the Dominican Predetermination, directly and neceſſarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation, by man, or Angel, and conſequently all certainty of the Chriſtian faith: even by overthrowing the very *formal object*, the *Divine Veracity*. For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all *wills* and *tongues* and *pens* to all the *lies* that ever are made in the world, then 1. *To do ſo*, is not inconſiſtent with his *perfections* or *his will*; 2. And then we can never know *when he doth not ſo*, unleſs by the event. This is grounded on theſe ſuppoſitions,

1. That Gods revelations to us are not *Immediate* only by himſelf, but by ſome *Creature*, *Angel* or *Man*, or a created voice or ſign. 2. That the *Ratio certitudinis* of ſuch Revelations by a Creature, is becauſe it is *God* that is the chief author of them. 3. That it is not conceiveable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it, than by phyſical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumſtances. Call it by what name you pleaſe, Inſpiration, Viſion, Illumination, Impulſe, *&c.* it can ſpeak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Intereſt than this predetermination doth. 4. If it did do more, yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith: Becauſe if God can efficiently cauſe, and that as the total principal cauſe by predetermination, all the lies that ever were told in the world; we can never be *ſure* that the *other mode* of his operation ſo far differeth from this, as that he cannot be the chief cauſe of a lie in *this way* as well as of *all lies by predetermination*. I have driven many to ſay their utmoſt, and could never yet hear any ſuch difference aſſigned, as could prove any Inſpiration whatſoever, to have more of *Divine Cauſality* in it, than *phyſical predetermination* doth ſignifie and import: nor how this principle leaveth us *any certainty* that the *tongues* of all the *Prophets* and *Apoſtles* were not predetermined to ſpeak falſly, (*ab antecedente*; and ſo their pens.)

XLVIII. To ſay that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own, even as modified, comparate or circumſtantiate, without his efficient phyſical predetermination aforeſaid, ſayeth more againſt Gods *Omnipotency* (though on pretence of a *contradiction*) than I dare ſay or think.

XLIX. Yet after all this I grant that if all proper *free will* and contingency be denyed, and every act in the world (as comparate and circumſtantiate) made as neceſſary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock, yet a certain Religion is conſiſtent with it, and the Atheiſt that hence would nullifie all Religion abſolutely, would raiſe falſe inferences from this principle. Much more perſwaded am I, that many that hold it are very worthy holy perſons, much better than I am or can hope here

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to be, as not discerning the inconsistency of their opinions (as I said.)

L. The Religion consistent with it I conceive must be such as this:

1. There is a God who moveth all things by physical necessitation, even mans Volitions as well as any natural actions.

2. This God doth all that he doth himself by necessity, *viz.* of perfection, not of co-action: And there is no contingency *in rerum natura*.

3. This God hath made his Creatures of various ranks and degrees of excellency: And man a more knowing Creature than the Bruits.

4. Among men he maketh some wise, some foolish, some good and Godly, and some vitious and ungodly; And as he maketh the difference of men and beasts, of a Horse and a Toad, of the Sick and the sound, of Prince and people, rich and poor, so doth he of godly and ungodly, chast and unchaste, *&c.*

5. Yet man being Intellectual, God will move him by means and second causes; and therefore hath made him Laws, obliging him *de jure*, and commanding his utmost diligence to keep them; promising and threatning Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them: and appointing Ministers and Magistrates to perswade and drive him on.

6. And it's likely though not certain that God will do according to these Laws, in some considerable degree.

7. Man by his Nature, and by Scripture (which may be true) is bound to Love and serve his God above all other, as the Cause of all the being and good that is in the world, (whatever he do by us,) and of all our good.

8. There is another life of Reward for the good, and punishment for the bad, which must be our hope and fear.

9. Gods Laws are called *moral means*, but *Cause* only as *physical engines* or tacklings, to move mans will by the said necessitation.

10. Gods hatred of sin, is no true hatred or nolition (where sin is:) but only his prohibiting it to us, and his punishing men for it.

11. If God did send Christ and the Apostles, and Miracles, *&c.* it was only to be tacklings or parts, in this engine of physical operations.

12. God causeth and Loveth sin as much as obedience; but he maketh it not so *Good* and *Lovely* to us, it being our disease and misery.

13. As God no otherwise hateth sin than *sickness*, and *sinners* than the *sick*, and looketh on *good and bad* but as *modal physical differences* caused by himself; so must we do also: and hate that most that hurteth us most.

14. To mourn for sin, and confess it, and strive against it, or talk of Christs suffering or satisfying for it, any otherwise than as a Voluntary *disease* and *misery* of man, or to avoid any sin any otherwise than as a misery to our selves or others, is but the errour of superstitious men.

15. Men should do all that ever they can to cure their sins, and live holily, so far as increaseth not their misery, and no further; and this only as a physical Voluntary perfection, and as the avoiding of a natural misery to themselves and others.

16. God will punish man, not out of any hatred of sin (which he willeth and causeth) but out of a differencing will, as he maketh Toads and Serpents, and causeth Cattle and Fowl to be killed by us, and Horses laboured in pain: Therefore we have no reason to fear any other misery in Hell, than Gods arbitrary disposal bringeth on the more wretched sort of his Creatures, without any sinful commerit or provocation; and perhaps little more than we voluntarily here choose and bring upon our selves, or of

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the ſame kind, our ſin it ſelf being our puniſhment though it pleaſeth us, (As ſcratching is to him that hath the itch.)

17. Therefore the end of a mans life is the publick good and his natural felicity; beſides and above which to make God our End, as he is holy and to be pleaſed by Holineſs, is an errour; for all that cometh to paſs whether ſin or holineſs, do equally pleaſe and fulfil his will, as they are equally cauſed by him, according to their ſeveral natures.

I Have delineated this hypotheſis with its conſectaries as truly as I can. If any expect that I ſhould have given you their own words for all that I have ſaid. 1. Remember that I charge not all theſe words on them; but mention their judgement with the conſequents. 2. That I charge not theſe *conſequents* to be owned by the *men*, but upon *their doctrine*. And let any man diſcharge or juſtifie them that can. 3. But I deſire no more to prove that I wrong them not, than that the Reader be acquainted with their own writings, and not to impoſe too many on him, particularly, with *Bradwardine*, *Bannes*, *Holkot* and *Alvarez*, and with *Piſcator*, *Maccovius*, Dr. *Twiſſe*, and *Rutherford de provid.* And I deſire him firſt but to read the words which I have before cited and confuted of theirs in this Treatiſe; and the words of *Alvarez* and *Twiſſe* which I have cited and anſwered in my *Diſput. contr. Prædeterm. in Methodo Theolog.*

And I muſt profeſs that the Religion here deſcribed in the end, is all that I can prove conſiſtent with their opinion truly underſtood in it ſelf and its conſectaries; and that if I held their doctrine, I think I could have no other faith: Which I have annexed leſt the *Hobbiſts* ſhould think that their principle, were it proved, would juſtifie all Immorality and Irreligion. For *this much* they might be obliged to notwithſtanding it.

But he that can ſee ſo great evidence for the *Dominican* predetermination, above the other three wayes, and what I have here farther added, as for the ſake of it, to admit ſo great a change of his Religion, or ſo great a degree of the forſaking of true Religion, he ſeeth not with my eyes, and I hope I ſhall never ſee with his, though I am not a ſtranger to the pretences for their way, that make it ſeem plauſible to them that do *reſpicere ad pauca.*

And if any think that I deal too harſhly in clogging their opinion with ſuch odious conſequents, Let them prove them inconſequent, and I will recant it: But if they cannot, civility ſhall not make me hide and favour ſo great Impiety; and as little in Doctrine as in manners, (as Adultery, perjury, blaſphemy, *&c.*) becauſe he that thinketh he doth well, will not Repent, and an erring mind will juſtifie ſin, and fight againſt God and his truth in his own name; and it's more to *Teach men to break a command*, than *to do it*, and *confeſs the ſin.* They think it is *for God* that *they erre*; And I think it is *for God that I detect it.* And who it is that *erreth indeed*, the Light muſt diſcover, and the ſtudious impartial prepared Children of the Light muſt diſcern; and the Father of Lights muſt finally judge.

Note that in the firſt part I ſpeak as in the name of the Predeterminants; till I come to the Queſtions, and thence-forward I ſpeak as in my own name, which the Reader may eaſily perceive.

§. VII.

§. VII.

Of Jansenius *his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will.*

§. 1. BUt after all these cometh *Jansenius*, and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errours, which misled the Schoolmen, Jesuites and others, he goeth to *Augustine* alone (as *Lombard* thought he had well done before him;) and disgraceth his cause by saying that *Augustine* first taught it to the Church, (as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages:) And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume, I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand, and animadvert upon it.

I. His first *Tome* describeth the Heresie of *Pelagius*, wherein he proveth that *Pelagius* held all this that followeth concerning grace:

"1. The Remission of sins, containing 1. Conversion to God, 2. The "abstersion of the blot and filth, 3. Reconciliation, or remission of Gods "offence, 4. And of the eternal punishment. *Jansenius Aug. To.* 1. *l.* 5. "*c.* 22. *p.* 126, 127.

"2. That *Pelagius* owned the Infusion of habitual grace. And that "God in Baptism did blot out all sins, purge, cleanse and expiate them, save "and renew the soul, restore nature, deliver from the body of this death, and "from the contracted custome of sinning: He held that Grace doth Regene-"rate, Illuminate, cause Faith, Justifie, (even Infants,) Sanctifie, make us "new Creatures, incorporate us into Christ as his members, give us the "anointing of the Holy Ghost, not only restoring us to the state that we "were in in *Adam*, but to a better, and to be adopted sons of God, and "saved. *cap.* 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects, that Grace Recon-"cileth man to God, maketh him an adopted Son of God, and the Temple "of the Holy Ghost, an Heir of God, and co-heir with Christ: So that "they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace, but more; even in "Baptism: As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts, making "them possible.

"Also that after Pope *Zozymus* had condemned the *Pelagians*, they "went further, and that their design was but to lay mens salvation or dam-"nation on free-will. *lib.* 6. *c.* 7. *&c.*

And when he cometh to characterize *Pelagius*, he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants, and as Malignants do Religious persons, by presumptions: *viz.* that he was indeed as *Augustine* saith, Temperate and of a good life, but singular and very proud, (which he proveth by his opinion, and because he was against Swearing, and said, "that Gods servants "mouths should vent no bitter thing, but only that which is sweet; and "that Christians must be so patient as readily to let go what is taken "from them, and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God, and "that enemies must be loved as friends, and yet not believed, and that Riches "must be forsaken, *&c.*) as holding nothing mean and moderate: that he "affected novelty (and yet his errours were old, coming from *Origen*, "*Rufinus*, *Palladius*, *Evagrius*, *Jovinian* and the Philosophers) that he "affected fame, admiration, hypocrisie, pretending to more holiness than "others, under the garb of poverty, *&c.* over-valued Reason, Logick, "Syllogisms, Philosophers, *&c.* All which I mention, not to abate any

mans diſlike of any one errour of *Pelagius*, but to ſhew that it is ſo uſual for diſſenters to make one another ſeem odious, and to feign or aggravate faults, and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others, that he that would not be tempted into malice, uncharitableneſs and ſlander, muſt take heed what he believeth, even of men accounted moſt abominable hereticks. Doubtleſs *Pelagius* his denying original ſin, and his laying too much on mans will, and too little on grace, are things to be deteſted.

II. *Janſenius* aſſerteth that the Angels and *Adam* had ſuch *Free-will* as could obey or diſobey, and ſo could determine it ſelf to good, and perſevere therein, without any more grace than they had when they did it not: And that by this Free-will ſome Angels ſtood and ſome fell, and *Adam* fell when he might by it have ſtood, and thereby fell from a nobler ſort of Free-will, which conſiſteth in a due ſubſervience to God, and fell to the Love of Himſelf (not primarily of external things) inſtead of God, and to ſelf-dependency and dominion. De Grat. primi hom. c. 6. p. 40, 41, 42. & c. 7. [" *Nos hic aſſerimus tanquam ſine dubitatione veriſſimum juxta doctrinam* " *ſancti Auguſtini & eccleſiæ, omnia hujuſmodi opera adeoque & ipſam fi-* " *dem & dilectionem Dei, ab eo potuiſſe per arbitrii libertatem fieri ſic ut ea* " *non donaret ei gratia Dei.*] vid. c. 7, 8, &c. The reaſon of this was " *ſanitas Voluntatis Adami.* c. 9.

" III. Yet Grace was neceſſary to man and Angels both to perſeverance " and to every good act. *c.* 10, 11. And *c.* 12, 13, &c. this Grace ne- " ceſſary to all was not Habitual Grace, (for that they had;) nor general " concurſe, which none denyed: but it was *Actual Adjuvant Roborating* " *help.* But the Grace given to Angels and *Adam* was *Adjutorium ſine quo* " *non*, giving the will power to determine it ſelf, but not *Adjutorium quo* " which ever determineth it. One giveth the *Power*, and the other the *Act*. (The ſame that is meant by the common diſtinction of *Grace ſufficient* and *effectual* by the *Dominicans.*) " Yet this *Adjutorium ſine quo* " *non* did with free-will procure the Act in the ſtanding Angels, and *Adam* " while he ſtood: But that made it not *Adjutorium quo* becauſe it is not " ſo called (*efficax*) only *ab eventu*: but becauſe it ſo helpeth that *illo* " *præſente continuo fiat id propter quod datur; illo abſente nunquam fiat.* " *p.* 63. *c.* 14, 15. One is like Light and the viſive faculty *ad videndum*; " the other *ut ipſa viſio* (ſuch as all *formal cauſes* are, and Gods ſimulta- " neous efficiency.) The difference is (*c.* 15.) that *Adjutorium ſine* " *quo non* doth but perfect the power, and the chief honour belongeth to " the will that uſeth it and could chooſe: But contrarily the *adjutorium* " *quo* is the principal cauſe of the Act, and leaveth not the event to the " will, but u'eth it effectually to the act intended. Therefore merit and " perſeverance in Innocency were no ſpecial gifts of God.

" IV. That without or before faith no good work is done, but lies and " ſins: *l.* 3. & 4. *c.* 1. *p.* 223. no nor without true Godlineſs, *p.* 261. & " *paſſim.* To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue, is do- " tage. *c.* 17.

" V. The firſt ſin had no neceſſity, being meer ſin, and no puniſhment, " and ſo eaſily avoidable and wholly voluntary: Other ſins are alſo pu- " niſhments, and ſo partly involuntary and unavoidable and neceſſary: " Though a ſinner may forbear one ſin by another. *cap.* 22.

" VI. A rational Creature could not be made of God ſinleſs without " true Love to God, or at leaſt a faculty moſt ſufficient to love him and " cleave to him. *De ſtatu nat. pur. l.* 1. *c.* 17. *p.* 323, 324. nor can God " withdraw that grace of Love from the innocent. *c.* 18.

" VII. The

"VII. The grace of *Adam*, and of Christ, *Adjutorium sine quo non*, & *Quo*, do thus differ, that the first serveth the will, and is determined by it: The second (*Adjutorium medicinale*) giveth the *ipsum velle* to the unwilling, which else it could not have. *De Grat. Chr. Sal. Li.* 2. *c.* 4. and is more than *Lex, scientia, revelatio, remissio peccatorum, gratia sufficiens, habitualis, & per congruitatem efficax.* c. 5. Also 1. The *Adjutorium sine quo non* giveth not *Merit* to the will, but it meriteth it self: But the *Adjutorium Quo* giveth us the *ipsum opus & meritum.* 2. The former is *meritum humanum*; the second *meritum divinum*, as given of God. 3. To the first Life would be *merces meriti:* To the second it is a free gift; Reward and Gift are repugnant. Angels merited life. 4. By the first and free will Angels persevered: but we cannot but by the second. 5. The first (*sine quo non*) was given them that were to be differenced by free-will; The second to them that are to be differenced by grace. *c.* 6, 7, 8. One is *adjutorium possibilitatis*, the other *actionis. c.* 9.

"VIII. That since the fall no good can be in or of man, but by Gods gift, and is not laudable in any but God. *c.* 23. Man hath no part of the praise. This grace is, ever effectual, determining, rapeth the will so that it is scarce perceived to act: It useth the will as an instrument, which way God will: It is insuperable, irresistible, not meerly potential: It is never uneffectual, but in all that have it infallibly effecteth. *c.* 24, 25.

"IX. There is no grace of Christ but this (*quo*): None now *sine quo non*, or *ad posse. c.* 27. That ceased with innocency.

"X. This grace is ever effectual, but not *ad omnia:* It giveth some small degree to some, and more to others: And the weakest have not enough to produce faith, prayer, hope, obedience, but some Velleities and Complacencies only. *c.* 27. *p.* 86.

XI. He distinguisheth *sufficient Grace* into that *Prater quod nil aliud ex parte Dei per modum Principii necessarium est ut homo velit aut operetur*: And that *Quod satis est ut homo dicatur posse operari, quamvis aliud adhuc necessarium est ut de facto operetur.* The later he denyeth not: As to the former he saith, *Nullum jam dari hominibus lapsis gratia sufficiens, quin sit simul efficax. lib.* 3. *c.* 1. *p.* 102, 103. This *Gratia sufficiens* is but the *sine quo non*, the grace of innocency and not medicinal, and that which *Pelagius* and the *Massilienses* held against *Augustine*, yea, *ad gratiam naturæ pertinet, & Lapsorum reparationi inutilis & perniciosa. cap.* 2. *p.* 104. For it supposeth Nature to be sound. *Quid homini misero perniciosius, quam illa gratia abundare, qua nemo unquam, fatentibus scholasticis, nisi majorem damnationem assecutus est? Hoc ipso quippe unusquisque damnabilior est, quo magis sufficienti gratia abundavit, Nemo enim unquam sufficienti gratia usus est, aut utitur, aut utetur in aternum; qui mitius puniretur si tali auxilio caruisset; quo Deus neminem vel damnandorum vel salvandorum usurum esse præscivit.*

He concludeth *c.* 4. *Nullam Christi gratiam effectu operis ad quem efficiendum voluntati datur, ulla voluntatis pervicacia frustrari.*

XII. He maketh this to be the great doctrine of *Augustine*, that All Gods Law, both old and new, is given to convince men that they cannot keep it, and all written precepts are to shew men their sin, which maketh them the worse, because of the Laws restraint and commands: And that Law and Grace thus differ, that Christs Grace is only Gods making us *will and do*; and the Law sheweth that we cannot, and so driveth us from it to Grace; *c.* 4. That to Jews and Christians that have written Laws,

there is no ſufficient or adjuvant grace, but what maketh them do the act. *c.* 5. No potential grace (that giveth the power) is ſufficient to the act, unleſs it give the act. *c.* 6. Hence is the neceſſity of ſinning, *p.* 126. Unbelievers want Remote as well as Proximate ſufficient help and all its principles. *c.* 11. And the Commands are to them impoſſible, yet make them unexcuſable, *c.* 18, 19.

XIII. That impotency excuſeth a man, when he *ſtrongly would* do the act and cannot; but not that by which he *would not* do it, though he *cannot will* it without grace. *p.* 145, 146.

XIV. Chriſts dying for All, is meant only for all the Church, or all ſorts: yet as he giveth to others the grace of faith and Love without perſeverance and ſalvation, ſo far he dyed for them, and prayed for them. *c.* 20. *p.* 163, 164.

XV. The eſſence of the grace of Chriſt is a Heavenly Suavity or Delectation, given before our free act, by which the will is bowed to act what God will. It is a vital and indeliberate act of the ſoul, even of Love and Deſire before Conſent, and that Delight which is our Reſt and Joy. *li.* 4. *c.* 1. & 11. Plainly it is a neceſſitated complacency, which is the firſt act of Love; when God and Righteouſneſs, not for our ſelves, but for themſelves and as ſuch, are Pleaſing to the ſoul.

XVI. Chriſts grace is neceſſary only to Love God ſincerely in every act of obedience, and only this Love and Suavity is Chriſts grace, whatever other graces or acts as to the name it is found in. *li.* 5. *c.* 1. For nothing is good that is done only by Fear, and not in Love of Juſtice. The Juſtice Loved is not any habit or act of the ſoul, but God the Eternal Juſtice. *c.* 2. and the Juſtice of his Precepts. Virtue is nothing but the Love of God. *c.* 3. The four Cardinal Virtues are fourfold Love of God: And ſo all others. *c.* 4, 5.

XVII. By the Love of God is not meant only that degree by which we Love him above all, but true ſincere Love of God for himſelf, and not *ullius creaturæ intuitu*: which is either Imperfect, not Loving him ſo well as the creature, (but only to an uneffectual Velleity) which yet how remiſs and ſmall ſoever, is the true and chaſte fruit of the Love of God, *even amoris amicitiæ:* or more perfect, which juſtifieth. The firſt is *quædam dilectio juſtitiæ quaſi ſimplex ejus complacentia, quæ non eo uſque increverit, ut adverſantia iſti bonæ voluntati valeat ſuperare.* This goeth uſually firſt, and ſinners find a good will to goodneſs, and like it, and many years perhaps are wiſhing and purpoſing to leave their ſins for it, and turn to God, till at laſt Love prevaileth. And this though imperfect, is true ſincere Love, not from a perfect habit, but from the excitation of the Holy Ghoſt: It hath the ſame object as perfect Love, that is, Juſtice for Juſtice, or God for God, not loved on conſideration of any other reward: which proveth it ſincere Love. Such wiſh to live chaſtely, temperately, juſtly, but cannot come to it. Out of this imperfect love, ſprings faith; faith may be habitually many years before Juſtification: Juſtification is the grace of perfect Love to God above all: Hope and Perfect Love alſo come from this initial Love. *c.* 7, 8, 9.

XVIII. As Hope, ſo Reward and reſpect to it may ſtand with this grace of Love: For the Reward is not deſired *ex amore concupiſcentiæ* for our ſelves only; *cum enim charitatis proprium ſit & unica voluptas diligere Deum, non quia hoc ſibi ſuave vel utile vel glorioſum eſt, vel alia quacunque conſideratione redundat in ſe, ſed quia ita eſt ordo creaturæ ſub creatore, qui propter ſeipſum ſuper omnia (ex ſuperexcellenti bonitate) diligendus eſt——ita unicum præmium eſt, veritatem & bonitatem*

latem Dei facie ad faciem contemplando ardentius amare & laudare Deum; non quia utile est & beatificum diligenti, sed quia æternæ veritati congruum, dilecto debitum, &c. Amoris hic inchoati, Amor futurus consummatus unica merces. Præmium Dei ipse Deus est. Quisquis delabitur ab illa charitatis puritate, ut amore concupiscentiæ incipiat velle & concupiscere sibi Deum, totum dilectionis ordinem quem natura docet, & Lex æterna præcipit, diligendi perversitate perturbat. Nam & Deum ad se refert, & seipso fruitur, quorum utrumque æterna & indispensabili lege proscriptum est. c. 10.

XIX. The fear of punishment (and attrition) is good, being *fuga mali*; an Antecedent of wisdom: It is from a certain general grace, but not that properly called the grace of Christ: The Spirit of the Old Testament even of fear, is Gods Spirit: not that which Christ dyed to give men, which is contrary (delectation;) but another much inferiour grace, which after the firm belief of Gods judgement and eternal punishment, *fortassis Gratiam peculiaris cujusdam providentiæ & operationis non excedit.* They that have but the Righteousnes of fear by knowing the Law, have not Gods righteousnes but their own: Indeed they have faith and that radicated, but not Christs proper grace, but that which may come *ex proprii arbitrii viribus*, excited by providence, or, if you will, inspired fear: no sin can be avoided by it, but by other sin. *c.* 22, 23, *&c.* It is but of self-love. It is Legal righteousnes and our own. *c.* 31, 32.

XX. Liberty of will is either *meer Voluntariness*, whose contrary necessity is *involuntarii coactio*; or that free state which is the Love of God, consistent with simple necessity. *lib.* 7.

XXI. *Gratia Christi est Prædeterminatio voluntatis, sed non Dominicanorum prædeterminatio.* 1. *Prædeterminatio physica est motio nescio quæ virtuosa, habens esse incompletum, ut colores in aere, impetus in impulso: Gratia Christi est verissimus motus voluntatis, ineffabilis*, viz. *delectatio*, &c. 2. *Præd. physica non est eis actus Vitalis animi, sed aliquid cui voluntas tantum passive subjacet: Gratia contra*, &c. 3. *Prædet. physica in quibuscunque circumstantiis voluntas collocetur, omnem superat resistentiam & semper facit effectum: contra delectatio victrix, si alter ardentior est, in solis ineffacibus desideriis hærebit animus.* 4. *Præd. physica est instar concursus cujusdam generalis Dei in ordine supernaturali: Adjutorium Christi non ita.* 5. *Præd. physica necessaria statuitur omnibus agentibus ex vi causæ secundæ*, &c. *Christi adjutorium læsa tantum voluntati propter vulnus necessarium est.* 6. *Præd. physica propter naturalem indifferentiam voluntatis exigitur: Gratia non ita*——7. *Præd. physica statui innocentiæ necessaria dicitur: Gratia Christi non ita, ergo hi* (*Dominicani*) *magis Aristotelici quam Augustiniani sunt. Gratia tamen est Præd. physica:* And grace and free-will are reconcilable as Predetermination and free-will are. *l.* 8. *c.* 2, 3, 4. *Summa est, quod Gratia Amantem & Volentem facit: & non tantum posse velle dat.* In conclusion he belyeth *Calvin*, 1. As denying in man *boni & mali electionem*, and so in many other points. *cap.* 21.

XXII. His doctrine of Predestination as congruous to this I pass by, only adding that he denyeth Angels to be elected of grace or to perseverance, which was but foreseen, and they were made to differ, not by grace, but by merits: Man is elected to merits and glory, but to glory before the foresight of merits. The Reprobation of Angels was after the purpose of giving them sufficient grace, and the foresight of sin; Permission of sin was no effect of it: But the Reprobation of men was by Gods

positive

positive absolute will, of men in original sin, and the effect of it excaecation and obduration; but not the permission of the first sin. *lib.* 10.

This is the Epitome of *Jansenius* as far as concerneth our present business.

The Animadversions.

§. 2. I. IT seems *Augustine* and *Pelagius* were both pious men, that differed in the methodizing and wording those fundamental conceptions in which they agreed; by which *Pelagius* ran into errors. And I doubt, he was not so innocent as *Jansenius* intimateth, when he maketh *Augustine* to be the first true Teacher of grace, and *Pelagius* his Opinion to have been so antient. And if it were not too bold to say so against one that read over all *Augustine* ten times, and all his writings against the *Pelagians* thirty times, I would say that I think that *Austin* owned more universal grace and free-will, than *Jansenius* supposeth him to have owned. Of *Prosper* and *Fulgentius* it cannot modestly be denyed; who I think were of *Augustines* mind.

II. He confesseth that *self-determining free-will* and *sufficient Grace*, were the condition of the Angels and innocent man; and so that it is not alien to Gods government, or prerogatives, for subjects to be so Ruled and Judged.

III. He seemeth to me to ascribe far too much to innocent man and Angels in using sufficient grace, when he maketh their wills the chief laudable cause of the effect: I rather think that no Angel ever did any good, the chief praise of which was not due to God as the principal first cause. God giveth them all the power, liberty, help, means, motives, by which they do it; Besides that they did nothing but what he fore-decreed and willed they should (eventually) do: Therefore there is no good but of him as the first cause, though not as the sole cause.

IV. Whether the best actions of Infidels or ungodly men be properly to be called good, is but a Logomachy: Call them but a *Less evil*, or the abatement of evil, and actions that tend as Means to their repentance, and salvation, and I shall not disagree with you in this.

V. His concession that the first sin was not necessitated is of great moment: But it is a great mistake, that following sins are necessary, because they are punishments. It is not the existence of the sin that is a punishment, but the hurtfulness of it supposing the existence. If drunkenness, or gluttony be themselves noxious and penal, that is but a consequent of their existence, which was not necessitated by God as punishing them that caused them.

VI. The sixth I think sound, and the Schools [pure nature], as if *Adams* Love (in the principle) was not his necessary *Sanity*, is unsound.

VII. Here again, 1. I think he giveth too much to free-will in innocency, and too little to God. For Gods Help did not then serve mans will so much as Gods; and God fulfilled all his will while Angels used their power and liberty, and they did no good but what God willed and caused as he saw best. And while man and Angels used their liberty, they fulfilled Gods will in all their duty, as much as if they had been necessitated by natural predetermination.

2. And

2. And it is not true that their ſufficient grace gave not Merit to the will: For it followeth not, that becauſe they could have omitted a duty, therefore in doing it they did any thing of which God was not the prime cauſe: He that gave them all their power, diſpoſition, objects, helps and motives, did give them that which he calleth Merit.

3. It is his grand error that *Gift* and *Reward* are repugnant, and that Life would not have been to *Adam*, and was not to the Angels of free gift, though of Reward. For it is impoſſible that any creature can merit of God as a Proprietor in point of Commutative Juſtice; ſeeing God is the abſolute Owner of us and all things, and no creature can give him any thing but what is his own: Therefore there is a natural impoſſibility that *quoad valorem rei, aut ipſum beneficium* a creature can have any thing but of free gift: But God who is an *Owner* and *Benefactor* is alſo a *Rector*, and ſo the cauſe of *Moral Order* as well as of *real Benefits*; And ſo that which as a *Benefit* is a meer gift, yet *quoad ordinem conferendi* is given by God *per modum præmii* to thoſe that will *Accept* the *Gift* according to its nature, and denyed to thoſe that will deſpiſe it and refuſe it. As a Father will give a purſe of Gold to the Child that will thank him, and humbly take it; and not to the Child that will ſpit in his face.

Janſenius doth ſo weakly open the nature of *Merit and Reward*, as that alone would ſhew that he was not meet for his great undertaking: Though he excellently ſhew that *God is our Reward himſelf*, yet the *Rationes præmii* he ſaith little to, that can ſatisfie the judicious. Of which more anon.

4. Angels were differenced *inter ſe* by Gods will and their own: And we confeſs, that ſo far as ſin made the difference, it was by their own will and not by Gods: But was he ſure that no ſuch difference is made ſince the fall among men? He will confeſs, that when *Eve* ſinned before *Adam*, it was ſhe that made the difference: And how can he prove, that it was not *Cain* who by ſin firſt differenced himſelf from *Abel*? or the Prodigal, *Luke* 15. that by forſaking his Father, firſt differenced himſelf from his Brother? According to his *own principles* who holdeth *falling away* from Grace and Juſtification, doth not he that falleth away, difference himſelf from him that ſtandeth? He can never prove, that now two men may not have equal help from God to go to Church, or read a good Book, and one do it, and the other go to the Tavern, or read a Play-book.

VIII. 1. God doth not ſo uſe man as his Inſtrument in good, but that he giveth the Inſtrument its proper *aptitude* and *action* as to the effect: And that which it *is and doth* may be ſpoken of it: To ſay a thing is *good*, is to *praiſe it*; and *good* muſt be *called good*; And to ſay that you were the *Actor* of *Good* and that *Voluntarily*, is to praiſe *you*. Therefore the Actor of good *ex natura rei* deſerveth praiſe, ſeeing *Truth* muſt be ſpoken of all things.

2. God himſelf doth ſo often praiſe his ſervants, and promiſe to honour them that honour him, that to ſay no praiſe is due to them is to charge God with error.

3. To deny all Reward, and Merit as it ſignifieth Rewardableneſs, or Moral aptitude for Reward, is to deny the greateſt part of the Scripture; to deny God to be our Rector, and ſo to be our God; to deny the whole frame of his Sapiential Government, and his glory therein, and ſo to deny his Laws, Judgement and Execution, Sin, Duty, Heaven and Hell.

The ſumm of all is this, 1. No man or Angel can merit of God in Commutative Juſtice as Proprietor: But only as Rector. All is (as is before ſaid) of *free gift* from God as *Proprietor* and *Benefactor*.

2. The

2. The ſame God who is Omnipotent, is alſo *ſapientiſſimus & optimus*: And he that glorifieth his Power eminently as the Author of *Nature*, as Creator, Conſervator, and Motor, doth alſo glorifie his Wiſdom *in rerum Ordine*: And he *ordereth* Moral *Agents* eminently *per ſapientiam ut Rectorem per media moralia, viz. Doctrinam, Leges, Judicia*: And he glorifieth his Goodneſs and Love partly Antecedently (to mans Actions) and as a free Benefactor; partly conſequently, according to the order of his Laws. So that as his Attributes are inſeparable, ſo are (herein) the operations of them. And the ſame Benefit is *ut quid productum* the effect of Gods Omnipotency and Dominion; and *ut Bonum & Beneficium* the effect of the Benefactors Love; and yet *quoad ordinem conferendi* it is *Præmium à Rectore adjudicatum*. And between all theſe there is no repugnancy.

3. We grant that God Rewardeth no man now, according to the Law of Innocency, (for that condemneth every ſinner.)

4. Nor according to, or for the works of the Moſaical Jewiſh Law.

5. Nor for any ſincere obedience to the Law of Nature, or any other, without Redemption by Chriſt.

6. We are agreed that the Reward is now doubly and eminently a free gift, and the reward of Chriſts merits. It is not only *free* as all Benefits from God to man are, as to commutation: but alſo after forfeiture freely given to ſinners; and it is procured by the merits of Chriſt, who was freely given to be the Saviour of the world; and it is given us by Chriſt as free gifts are, upon condition of Acceptance; and an Accepting Will is Gods free gift; and they that have it not, want it becauſe they refuſed Preparatory grace, which they were able to have better uſed or ſubmitted to.

So that the Reward is only ſuch as a free gift, which *quoad ordinem conferendi, & rationes adjudicandi* is given by God as a Father, who at once uſeth Power, Love and paternal Juſtice, according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace, which is founded in Chriſts perfect merits, and is Chriſts own Law.

VIII. and IX. 1. That *quoad eventum* the good Angels grace was effectual, and *Adjutorium quo* as well as *ſine quo non*, he granteth. (And *Adams* till he fell.) Let us find out the difference then. To ſay that yet *They could have ſinned*, is a doubtful ſpeech: If [*could*] ſignifie *Potentiam naturalem*, it is not for want of *Natural Power* that Chriſt himſelf ſinned not; but becauſe *perfection* cauſed the *right uſe* of that Power. To be able to ſin, or not to believe, or not to love God, if it ſignifie any more than the Natural power which men abuſe, is an improper ſpeech: for ſin is from moral impotency, (or indetermination,) and not an act of (other) power. But a *Logical Poſſibility* of any event but what came to paſs, Gods very *fore-knowledge* will exclude, (and ſo his Decree.) And if the queſtion be Whether *Adam* could not have ſtood when he fell, it is agreed that he could.

It ſeemeth then that our Controverſie lyeth plainly in theſe two things, 1. Whether any man now (Holy or unholy) have any help from God by Chriſt by which he is truly able to do any one good action more or other than he doth, or to forbear any more evil? 2. Whether all Divine cauſation or operation be ſuch, as of it ſelf alone will *inferr* the certainty of mans Volition as the Effect? We grant that Divine preſcience doth inferr it, *ex neceſſitate infallibilitatis*. Divine Volitions ſome think are ever efficient of all that is willed, and that God hath no other operation but Volition (as *Bradwardine* and others.) Others deny this, and ſay both that God hath Power operative as much diſtinct from Volition as Intellection is, and alſo that God *willeth* more than he operateth or totally cauſeth. And of this opinion muſt *Janſenius* needs be, becauſe he held that

that the free-will of *Adam* before his fall, and of the good Angels caused more obedience than God caused as to the totality of causation: And yet methinks he should be loth to say that it was more than God *willed* or *decreed*. However the former is but a wordy strife: For if God operate only *Volendo*, yet his *will* as Immanent and a meer *will* (as mans;) must be distinguished from his will as transient and efficient by operation. So then the thing in question is, Whether Gods power or will so far only as it is operative be so total a cause, as that *hac posita ex vi causandi necessario sequitur effectum* (*viz. fidem, charitatem humanam*) *secuturum?* And we grant that as *ex perfectione Intellectus*, it followeth, *Deus præscit hoc futurum, ergo futurum est*: so *ex perfectione Voluntatis, & summo Imperio, & fælicitate Divina* it followeth, *Deus vult hoc futurum esse, ergo futurum est*: and that *ex necessitate existentiæ*, no doubt it is a good consequence, *Deus hoc fecit, ergo factum est*: But Whether from his meer *adjutorium*, or prime efficiency, limited by his own will, it be a good consequence, [God giveth as much help as is of necessity to mans volition; *ergo*, man will consent or will?] is the doubt. He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed, but he thinks that now it will.

We grant that God giveth not only the *posse velle*, but the *ipsum velle* to those that have it: His giving it being but a causing their faculties to Act: And we grant that wherever God absolutely willeth that his Help shall be successful, it is so: And also that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power, and Gods grace conjunct, God is the cause of both; And is ever the total cause *quoad effectum*, that is, *totius effecti*. And we grant that Gods causing Impress on the will is such on some, (and perhaps on all in the act of special sanctification) as *ex vi causæ* will infert the effect, and is unresistible, and doth not only determine the will, but so determineth it as overcometh all moral *power* or disposition to the contrary.

But yet that there is a *Grace* or *adjutorium* of Christ, which giveth a power either not necessitating the act, or when the act followeth not, such as he calleth *sine quo non*, I think for these reasons:

1. Because else no man *can do* any more good or less evil, than he doth: which I believe not.

2. Because else All men that perish are damned only for original sin, and its consequents which they had never power to avoid: which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture.

3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency: whereas he will judge them by Christ and by his Remedying Law, for rejecting the remedying grace.

4. And then the Conscience of the damned, would have nothing to torment them with, or accuse them for, but original sin, and its unavoidable consequents: And it would give them this excuse and ease, God never made it Possible for me to do otherwise.

5. Because it teacheth men great ingratitude to say, I never had any help of Christ.

6. And so it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their sin, if they do but find themselves wicked, and to say, I never sinned against any Grace of Christ.

7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival, and mercy which the reprobate have, from some other Cause and not by Christ; And so to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not, nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace.

8. Because God is Immutable, and too gross mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government: Therefore it seemeth

to me an injurious fiction to say as *Jansenius*, that God had such Laws as supposed mans self-determining will, and governed so as to use *sufficient Grace* or *adjutorium sine quo non*, to man and Angels, at the first, and that now he hath no such at all, but only a moving efficiency. I should sooner yield to the *Dominicans* and *Hobbes* that no other than necessitated Volitions are possible or ever were, than to hold as he, that there were other before the fall, and none ever since. For as to his great argument (vitiated nature) I answer it, 1. Man is man still; And therefore God ruleth him as man; And that *in via*. And if then man and Angels were supposed to have a self-determining free-will, that could do this or not do it, we have reason to think it is so still. Why is not grace meerly sufficient as consistent with Lapsed as Innocent nature? (supposing that it is not the same help that is now sufficient to salvation as then.) 2. Consider the great difference between perfect Innocency, and some one commanded act: And 3. Consider that the helps afforded by grace are very great, and that *Habitual Grace* doth in some measure heal lapsed nature, or else what is it? He that is *Habitually Prompt* to *Love* and *duty*, hath some cure, and some ability: For to be *prompt* is more than to be *able*. And therefore it is an incredible thing, and a reproach of *habitual grace*, that *Adam* was more able to live and persevere without any sinful thought, word, or deed, than a Holy soul is to think one good thought, or speak one good word, or restrain one blasphemy or other sin. Therefore it is as credible that Christs repairing habitual Grace enableth godly men (and his commoner grace common men) to think or do somewhat better than they do, as that Angels and *Adam* had no other grace, and could without other, live without any sin.

Therefore I take *Jansenius* to do well in opening Original pravity, and the power of Gods grace, and his special intent to save his chosen. But I think he so earnestly studied for that side alone, that he injuriously overlooketh the whole frame of sapiential Government, and the common grace which is presupposed to the special, and greatly wrongeth Christ and his grace, by denying him to give to men in common, that which our experience assureth us they possess.

Ad X. When he maketh uneffectual Velleities to be Christs unresistible grace, either he thinketh that men are saved with such only, or not; (for he speaketh not his mind plainly in that that I can find:) If yea, then he abaseth the grace of Christ, to think that many are saved by it, that love a Whore or any sin much better than God and Grace and Glory. If not (as I think he held) then he holdeth that most that have the effectual grace of Christ are damned, and had no possibility (properly) of escape. And why doth he make so harsh a thing of mens asserting a sufficiency of some uneffectual grace, and say to what purpose is it; and yet assert that to most men the grace of Christ had not so much as any sufficiency to save them, nor put them into any true possibility of life?

Ad XI. I. It seemeth to me a contradiction to say (as in the second branch of his distinction) that *Homo potest Velle*, and yet that *aliud adhuc adjutorium necessarium est ut de facto velit.* For *necessarium est sine quo res esse non potest*: Therefore the *non potest* is present wherever the *necessarium* is wanting. But if they talk only of a passive or obediential power, and say, [Man can believe because God can make him believe,] and so denominate man Able to do that, which they mean God is able to make him do, this is but to play with words.

II. His saying that now there is no sufficient grace, is before disproved, and by him not proved. That it is the same with that of the state of Innocency,

nocency, is vainly ſaid: It is the ſame in general, as man is the ſame; and Intellect and will the ſame: But to be able to live without ſin, and to be able to forbear one ſin or to hear a Sermon, or do one commanded act, are not the ſame. And to hold none but this with *Pelagius*, is not all one as to hold this with a more ſpecial grace.

And that it is pernicious to the lapſed is raſhly ſaid; For in the reprobate it doth them no harm but good; and in the elect it tendeth to higher grace. And he miſtaketh in ſaying that it ſuppoſeth *nature ſound*: For if it were proved that nature without grace hath no good inclination, yet why may not unſound nature, receive grace *ad poſſe*? Is not that grace ſome cure of its unſoundneſs? and tends to more?

III. But as to his ſaying that the more men have of it the more miſerable they are, and the more damnable, and that no man ever uſed ſufficient grace or will do, I anſwer, 1. The good man it ſeemeth forgot that all the ſame may be ſaid as truly of *his ſpecial Grace*, both in them that come ſhort of faith and Juſtification, and them that apoſtatize from it (as he holdeth many do.) 2. But it is not true, that having it maketh them damnable any more than having life, health and riches; but it's the abuſing it. 3. That *never any uſed ſufficient grace*, by his leave and the School-mens, is unproved: *viz.* that no man ſince the fall ever did any good, or forbore any evil, obediently, by ſuch grace as left him able to have done otherwiſe in the inſtant before the act, or as inferred not his volition as neceſſary *ex vi illius cauſæ*. 4. And that all that which cometh ſhort of the effect, is none of the Grace of Chriſt is unproved, unleſs he mean only the adequate immediate effect. The Law doth *make Duty*, and ſo hath its effect; And Gods *motions* make their various Impreſſions on the ſoul, and ſo have their effect: But whether a Godly mans will could not by that ſame motion have produced a better effect in his will than was produced by it, he muſt better prove.

Ad XII. I. Whereas *Paul* oppoſeth the Law of works, and the Grace of Chriſt, he oppoſeth, or too far diſtinguiſheth the *Law of Chriſt* and the *Grace* of *Chriſt*; Juſt as Sir *H. V.* in his Meditations. He taketh all *ſpoken* and *written* precepts or Laws, to be the Law, which is diſtinguiſhed from *Grace*, which is meer *Alteration* of the ſoul. But this is confuſion, and ſubverteth true Theologie. For the Law is the inſtrument of ſignifying Gods mind, and the Spirit worketh with and by it on our minds; And both go together both before the fall and under Chriſt: And both are Grace now even as body and ſoul are one man: The Goſpel is oft called Grace in the New Teſtament: It's true that a Law meerly as a Law may be diſtinguiſhed from the Spirits operations on the ſoul: And ſo *Paul* and *Auguſtine* oft ſhew that the Jewiſh Law as a Law could not make men righteous without grace. And we deny not but the Law of Chriſt meerly as a Law is inſufficient without the Spirits Grace. But to conclude hence that this is the difference between the Old Covenant and the New, and the Righteouſneſs of each of them (of men under them), that one is obedience to a written Law, and the other is the effect of the Spirit, is not ſound: For under each Covenant there was both Law and Spirit, though with difference. *Adam* had Grace as *Fanſenius* confeſſeth: And the Fathers before the Flood had Law and Spirit: And the Godly Jews had Law and Spirit: And all Chriſtians are ſubject to Chriſt their King, and obey his Laws, though by the Grace of his Spirit: And it is not two Righteouſneſſes that relate to Law and Spirit, but one as an effect of two concauſes: The doctrine of faith and Law and promiſes of Chriſt are the Means which the Spirit uſeth in operating our Faith, Love and Obedi-

ence. And it is not two Covenants that give these two: but as soul and body make one man, so the Word of *Christ* and his *Spirit* make up one total cause of our sanctification. The Spirit causeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth, and to love the good which it propoſeth, and to obey the Precepts of the Word: Therefore the Gospel is Grace, and the Spirit is Grace, that is, a free gift of God to miserable sinners for their recovery, and inward holiness is the effect of both. And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Christs Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit, or is our *own Righteousness* opposed to Christs, because our own reason and free-will is exercised in it, is Phanaticism, and subverteth the Gospel, and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Christ.

II. God never gave a Law, no not to the Jews, only to convince them that they could not keep it; but to be the Rule of their obedience; And the Just did keep it in sincerity. But the Law of *Moses* as separated by the ignorant Jews from the promise and grace of Christ could not be kept by any to Justification. To say that Christs Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them, is Antichristianity. Are we commanded to repent, believe, love God, only to tell us that we cannot do it? It's true, that without the Spirits help, we cannot. But it's as true, that the Command is the Rule of our duty, and all the Gospel and Covenant of Grace, is the means of exciting us to our duty, by which the Spirit worketh in us faith, repentance, love and obedience. But, saith *Jansenius*, the Law of Christ is to humble men in the sense of their disability, and drive them to seek to Christ for his grace. I answer, 1. Is not humbling men, and driving them to Christ, a good effect? If so, then his Law is the means of all that good. 2. Were the Gospel and all the Apostles Epistles written only to drive men to Christ, and not to edifie them and make them perfect to salvation? Were not the Precepts of Love and Holiness means of working Love and Holiness in men? Is not the Word the seed that begetteth men to eternal life? and is not the receiving of this seed into good and honest hearts, made by Christ the cause of holiness and salvation? Were not the Disciples clean by the word that Christ spake to them? and doth he not say, that his Word was spirit and life, as being the concause of the Spirits vivification? He that never received more benefit by Christs Doctrine, Law and Gospel, than to be convinced that he cannot believe, repent, obey or love God, hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for.

But suppose that by *Law* he had meant the meer *penal part* or threatning (as some words would make a man suspect:) 1. It's a strange description of a Law, to exclude the precept and premiant part, and include only the penal part which is the last and least. 2. As it is the same Man that hath Love and Hatred, Hope and Fear, so it is the same Law of Christ which hath precept and prohibition, promise and penalty: And it is the same Holiness, or New Creature which is a conformity to all together. Of which more anon.

III. He can never prove, that all unbelievers have no Power to use any means which tendeth to faith, by a preparatory grace; nor that the use of all such means is impossible to them.

XIII. His distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good: But then that Moral Impotency it self must not be made the same with the Natural: else there will be the same reason for excusing sin by it. If mans Will had been made by God such as could not possibly love him or holiness, it would not have left a man unexcusable in judgement, that his enmity was Voluntary: It is reason enough for a man to kill a Toad or

Serpent

Serpent as *malum ſibi naturale*, because it is a hurtful creature; But this is no Moral Evil in them, nor is their death their puniſhment: nor yet in any ravenous creature, which preyeth on the reſt that are innocent. And ſo would it be with bad men, if God had made them bad. Indeed if *Adam* have made them all bad, and God have given no Saviour, Grace or Remedy, they are condemnable and unexcuſable, as they were virtually in *Adam*, if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to *Adam*: But they are excuſeable if judged by Chriſt by the Law of grace, which condemneth no man meerly as not innocent, or a ſinner, but as a rejecter of grace. Theſe things are ſo plain and weighty, that *Janſenius* ſhould not joyn with the *Antinomians* in oppoſing them.

XIV. While he confeſſeth that Chriſt ſo far dyed for all, as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them, I have no further quarrel with him, but to prove that a Condition pardon of ſin and grant of Life eternal, with much means and help to make men perform the Condition, which is but a ſuitable Acceptance, is indeed mercy.

XVI. That Chriſts grace is Love, or Complacency in good, is a truth which I highly value: but with all theſe exceptions to his doctrine. 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature, and that which muſt communicate it ſelf to all the reſt, or elſe they are lifeleſs and unacceptable: For the will is the man in Gods account; And complacency, or love, or appetite is the firſt act of the will; which is it that he calleth with *Auguſtine Delectatio*: Grace lyeth principally in a *Placet*. But the man hath more parts than his Heart: And all other parts of ſanctification are graces of Chriſt, in their ſeveral places, and not love only.

2. Though no man is to love himſelf as God, nor inſtead of God, nor above God, nor as the nobleſt ultimate object of his love; yet all men are neceſſitated by nature to love themſelves; and therefore to deſire their own felicity in loving God, next to God as the final object of that love; And ſo our end is *finis amantis vel amicitiæ* which includeth mutual complacency and union, though not in equality. And to ſuch an end, grace cauſeth us to uſe the means: And Chriſt is propoſed to us as our Saviour, and all his grace as for our good, and all Gods commands as neceſſary for our happineſs, and ſin is deſcribed to us to be hated as our own evil and deſtruction, and againſt our good as well as againſt Gods will and honour. And with us this is denyed ſcarcely by the *Antinomians* themſelves: Much leſs by any judicious Chriſtians.

3. It is paſt the reach of any of us, to prove that our actual love is the firſt effect of the ſanctifying Spirit on the ſoul. I mean not only, Whether ſome other acts (as Intellectual perception, and belief) be not in order of nature before it, and in time with it, and real parts of the ſame new creature, but alſo, Whether as *Alvarez* and others ſay, there be not ſuch a divine *motion* or *Impulſe* on the ſoul tending to this love, and antecedent to love it ſelf, in nature, (love being an effect of Gods will and mans,) which *Janſenius* denyeth.

But 4. If it be not ſo, but really love be the firſt effect of God on the ſoul, then the controverſies are all at an end, about the difference of ſufficient and effectual, equal and unequal grace. For then it would be as *Janſenius* ſaith, and there is no grace but the effect it ſelf, and ſo there would be no queſtion, but Whether all men love God, and all alike. But I yet believe that there is ſome preparatory grace of Chriſt which tendeth to the love of God.

XVI. I believe that the will is the prime ſeat of Morality, and that love or complacency is as the ſpirit of all ſaving ſpecial grace. But yet

it

it is ill said, that Christs grace is necessary *only to* love or delight. For the soul of man hath three faculties, which must be conjunctly sanctified, *viz.* Vital active power, Intellect and Will; and sin is in all; And the Spirit reneweth them by a threefold effect, Vivification, Illumination and Conversion (or love.) And hatred of sin, and fear of sinning, and of God, are graces of Christ also, (as are obedience, patience, *&c.*) though below love.

2. There is an Analogical good that is done by self-love and fear, which hath a tendency to mans recovery, though not such good as is true holiness and hath a promise of salvation.

XVII. 1. Here we come to a difficult case: 1. Whether indeed any ungodly man or Infidel, do love God sincerely *amore amicitiæ & propter se*: The doubt is, because to love him less than sinful pleasures and the creature, seemeth to be a loving him as less amiable or good. And to love him as such, is not to love him as God, nor indeed to love God, but an Idol of the imagination. I think we must say, 1. That no man loveth God adequately; for no man hath an adequate conception of him. 2. But yet that there are some essentials of such true love as is necessary and suitable to our dark and weak condition, which all must have that will be saved (either distinctly or confusedly): As to know and love him as the Infinite Spirit the first cause and last end of all, most powerful, wise and good, our Owner, our Ruler and our Benefactor and chief good: Father, Word and Spirit; the Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier; the Author of Nature, Grace, Glory. 3. That no wicked or unholy person truly loveth God thus, *viz.* As his own Governour to make him holy, and save him from the Flesh and World: and as the Author of those holy Laws, by which he governeth, and a righteous Judge according to those Laws. 4. Therefore *Jansenius*'s *little sincere Love* in sensual men is but a love of *aliquid Dei*, somewhat of God, and not properly of God as God: speaking of God as the object of love it self. 5. Yet the same person may have all the foresaid Notions of a Deity, and may notionally call them all good and laudable; but his Practical Judgement is not such of God as his holy Governour, Judge and End, as to bring him truly as such to love him. 6. Yet this may be called a *Love of God* analogically, as he is said to love the King who loveth him as great and good to the Common-wealth, though not as a governing restrainer of his lusts. By this I would have that explained which I have said of this subject in my *Saints Rest.*

II. But here I am at a further loss. Did he mean that this love called sincere, is in none but those that are saved or not? As I said before, If he did, then a common Drunkard, Adulterer, *&c.* may have this love and be saved: But I suppose he meant Negatively: And if so, methinks hence all his opposition to *sufficient Grace* turneth back upon himself: And to him it may better be said, Why do you feign Christ and the Holy Ghost to give men such a Grace, such a Love to God, as no man ever was or will be saved by, without more? Is it any more dishonour to Christ, to give men some such Power to do some more good than actually they do, as *Adam* had to have continued innocent, than effectually to give so many persons sincere love which shall never save them? (Whether these be they that he will adjudge to Purgatory I know not: If so, he will stretch the rank of Venial sins to those that other men call Mortal.)

III. But yet my greatest difficulty remaineth: I am in doubt Whether he that denyeth common sufficient grace, and extendeth the grace of Christ seemingly but to few, do not really either make it the same thing with

with *Nature*, or extend it to all: For I ſuſpect that all or almoſt all men on earth, (till they have ſinned themſelves into diabolical deperate malignity) have this which he calleth *Amor amicitiæ* and ſincere imperfect love to God and Juſtice. For *Intellectus eſt Entis & veri intellectus, & Voluntas eſt Boni. Good apprehended ſuch*, is the *wills* neceſſary natural object. And a *ſimple complacency* in apprehended good, is the wills firſt neceſſary act. Nature telleth man, that there is created goodneſs; and that the Creator who giveth it, muſt needs have more than all his creatures: And nature tells men, that the World, or millions are better than one perſon; and their good to be preferred: And how can it be then, that he that taketh the World to be ſo much better than himſelf, and God to be *better*, that is, more *amiable* than all the World, ſhould not have the leaſt ſimple complacency in thinking of him? All men take Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and Beneficence for amiable: And they that believe that God hath moſt of theſe, muſt needs have ſome Love to him, not only as good to them, but as moſt excellent in himſelf: Inſomuch that as *Adrian* the ſixth before cited ſaith, in ſome ſort a bad man may love God better than himſelf; and he is ſcarce worthy the name of a man, that would not rather be annihilated, or wiſh that he had never been born, than that there were no World, or no God, (if *per impoſſibile* he ſuppoſed he could live without them.) And if you tell every man that he hath that ſincere love to God which is *Gratia Chriſti*, who hath the leaſt love to God and Juſtice *propter ſe*, though he have more love to his fleſhly intereſt and ſinful pleaſures, I doubt you will not much differ from *Pelagius*, and will have no way left but to ſay, that it is not of *Grace* by Chriſt that *Nature* is reprieved and ſupported: Or at leaſt that this is of a common ſort of grace. We may preſume of many things as received from our Teachers: but it is hard to prove, that *Adam* the next moment after his ſin was totally deprived of all degrees of love to God, and goodneſs, and ſo was privatively as bad as Devils; or that all mankind are naturally ſo: Though I believe that it was of grace, even Gods firſt pardoning act as our Redeemer, not ſo totally to execute the Law, nor take away his grace, and leave man to the utmoſt penalty of his ſin, but to keep nature from being as bad as elſe it would have been. But ſure Man is Man ſtill, and not a Devil: And I ſpeak with few or none that ſeem not to have ſome liking of God and goodneſs, or Juſtice as ſuch; though they love not God or goodneſs, as contrary to their fleſhly luſts, nor love God as their Sanctifier and Ultimate End. And thus the Carnal Mind is Enmity to God, being not ſubject to his Law, though this be conſiſtent with loving him *ſecundum quid*.

IV. I believe him that there is a faith, ſuch as the Devils, which may be without Juſtification, both in habit and act: But that the ſame Faith which after juſtifieth, can be many years Habitually before Juſtification (that is, Sanctification as he meaneth it) I believe not: Seeing God hath promiſed that all that believe (thus) ſhall be juſtified and have his Spirit.

V. *Janſenius* ſeems to me to ſet too light by *Habitual Grace*, as if it were ſome common thing in compariſon of the Act: Whereas I take a Habit of love to God to differ from an act, either as a Spring or Rivolet from a drop, or as Honeſty from an honeſt act, or Learning from a learned exerciſe, or as a fixed friendly Inclination which is like to Nature, differeth from a friendly action; and to be more excellent than a particular act.

XVIII. His

XVIII. His judgement of the Matter of the Reward (that it is but *God himself* seen and perfectly loved for himself) is of great use: But yet it is both lawful and *ex individuationis principiis & ex natura humana* necessary that we take and desire this as our own felicity, and so under God intend our selves. And *quoad rationem præmii* it is the Reward of a Rewardable state or work, and therefore of the free act of a creature not meerly necessitated: It may be a gift without Respect to our Liberty and Obedience, but not a reward: But it is both a gift and a Reward.

XIX. That Fear and its effects are good, and yet not of Christs grace; that they are of Gods Spirit, but not the Spirit given by Christ, but the grace of some other Providence; All this I take for unsound and injurious to Christ and grace. Where doth the Scripture tell us since the fall, of any grace given to the World but by the Redeemer, who is Head over all things to his Church? If you say, that God can give men the grace to fear him and depart from evil without a Saviour or Mediator, how can you prove, that he may not do so by the rest? Either he giveth this grace as Rector according to his Laws or not: If not, then on the same reason you may feign that most men are not his subjects, nor under any Law of God; and so sin not, nor are punishable: If yea, then it is according to the Law of Innocency, or of Grace, (For if *Moses* Law as *Jewish* be called a third, it is nothing to our case.) If it be by a Law of grace, it is Christs Law, either of the first Edition, called the Promise, or of the second, called the Gospel: The Spirit and grace (in various measures) given by both, are of Christ. It's a dangerous assertion, that there is any, yea, so much grace, which is not Christs: It prejudiceth me against *Jansenius*'s Opinion, that it should cast him on such absurdities, as to deny so much of the grace of Christ, while he pretendeth to honour it, and to set up such a feigned way and sort of grace without a Saviour, and yet speak so hardly of the *Pelagians* as he doth for wronging grace.

2. As Fear is one of mans natural passions, though but subservient to love: so the sanctifying of it is one part of the Work of Christs Spirit.

3. I am sure Christ himself commandeth Fear, *Luke* 12.4, 5. *Heb.*4.1. & 12.28, 29. & *passim.* And is it *our own Legal Righteousness* to obey the commands of Christ? Indeed if Fear were all, or had no conjunct hope and love, it would be Legal, and shew the Spirit of bondage, from which Christ delivereth us by the Spirit of Power, and Love, and a sound mind, which are the fruits of the Spirit of Adoption: For *Moses* Law separated by the Infidel Jews from the Law of Grace or Promise of a Justifying Mediator, could have no better effects than Fear: But *Abraham* that believed and foresaw Christs day, rejoyced in that Faith, and yet had a Law of obedience which had its penalty; and so hath the Law of Grace which we obey.

XX. Of Free-will I have said enough before: Natural Liberty as distinct from the Moral freedom from sin and ill disposition, is sure more than meer *Voluntariness*: And I think if God gave Satan or man power, to take away from a Saint all his Habitual and Actual love of God and goodness, whilest antecedently the person did hate such a change and pray against it, by making him *willing of evil*, and making a Devil of him remedilesly, he would take away or cross the *Natural* as well as the Moral Liberty of his will, though it were *willingness* that were caused. If any think otherwise, remember that it is but *de nomine*, for

for *de re* we are agreed, that such a change would be our great misery.

XXI. I take it to be the commendation of *Jansenius*, that he renounceth the *Dominicans* Physical Efficient Predetermining Premotion, as naturally necessary to all actions natural and free. But his habitation, converse and worldly interest tempted him factiously to calumniate *Calvin*, lest he himself should become odious with his own party, and so miss of his expected success; which hath prevailed also with *Gibieuf*, *Arnoldus* and most other Papists to do the like, when they differ from their Brethren.

XXII. He well saith, that Permission of the first sin is no effect of Reprobation: But his ordination of Gods acts into [this Before and that After] and so his differencing the Election of Angels and men, I fear hath somewhat in it presumptuous and unproved.

In conclusion, I much mislike in *Jansenius*, 1. His contempt of the Sacred Scriptures, as being not properly Christs Laws, but some odd occasional Writings, his Laws being only in the heart and tradition.

2. His slighting of Habitual Grace comparatively, which yet is indeed Christs Law and Gods Image in the heart.

3. His feigning a new or odd sort of grace (fear) which is none of the grace of Christ, no not preparatory to his higher work, but a grace of some other Providence.

4. Consequently that there are men (yea, most) who are no subjects of Christ, nor under any Law of grace by Christ, and yet not under the meer Law of Innocency; and therefore are under some other Law (who knows what?) or lawless.

5. His damning all that perish meerly for Original Sin; and its necessitated consequents, which no man had ever the least power to avoid.

6. His asserting that Angels and *Adam* had sufficient Grace, and Free-will, by which the Angels did, and *Adam* could have persevered in Innocency and never sinned: And yet that since the fall, no ungodly man hath such help and free-will to any one better act than he doth, nor the holiest person to any better than he doth; but the best Saint is less able to do one better act, than *Adam* was to keep all the Law.

7. And so his consequent, that it is properly impossible for any man in the World, good or bad, to do any better than he doth.

8. That all they love God sincerely *amore amicitiæ* who love God and Justice *propter se* as amiable in himself, though they love their filthiest sins so much better, and all their fleshly worldly interest, as that they have but an uneffectual wish that they could leave them.

9. That we must not say, that Christ giveth men either a Power to do better than they do, nor yet that Grace of *Fear* which they have, (as being below him); And yet must say that he giveth multitudes this uneffectually sincere love, which never saveth them.

10. That a Habit of true faith may be many years in a man before it justifie him: when as the word [true] must mean some *other faith*, or else that same will never justifie him which did not justifie him so long.

11. His Antinomian or Phanatick distinguishing Law and Grace, as if Christ had no Precepts or Laws, but Operations; or else his Gospel and Covenant *in signis* were no part of his Grace.

12. And thence his fiction that all that which is done by any Grace *ad posse*, and in obedience to Christs written Law, is a Legal Righteousness of our own, and no part of Christs Righteousness.

These with what else I have before disclaimed, I dislike in *Jansenius* his way: And yet think that a man that can well distinguish *words* from *things*, and will not be deceived by ambiguous terms, may shew that even he and his adversaries are not so far disagreed as they seem. *E. g.* Whether Christ dyed for all? They are agreed that he dyed to procure for all so much Grace or Mercy as he giveth them; and that among these a conditional Pardon, and Gift of Christ and Life, is one, *&c.* And they agree that he dyed not with any absolute intent of giving them any more than he doth give them. What remaineth then, but the Controversie *de nomine*, Whether this much be fitly called, his *Dying for all?* which Scripture putteth out of doubt. The like I might say of many of the rest of the differences.

§. VIII.

I Conclude with this summary determination of all these Controversies to satisfie sober minds.

I. GOD our CREATOUR is the *Causa prima*, the *spring* and *Master* and end of NATURE; and accordingly having antecedently made the creature in such variety as pleased him, 1. He Actively affordeth them all that general Influx by which the Being given them is supported, and they are sufficiently furnished for their several motions, operations or receptions.

2. And his *Infinite Goodness* and blessed *Will* is their common End in which they are all finally terminated; but variously thereby felicitated according to the variety of their capacities.

3. And as the *Governour* of the *Universe* he *sapientially* ordereth all things, and conducteth them from their *Beginning* to their *End*; but variously as they are various.

II. So GOD our REDEEMER, having in Christ made all necessary preparations, and Redeemed mankind as to what belonged to a Saviour to do in *Person* upon earth, and having antecedently made an Universal Law of Grace, 1. Doth Reveal his Mercy to lost sinners, commonly, but in various degrees as he pleaseth; And doth concurr with his Gospel, by vouchsafing a *Common Gracious Help*, which hath an aptitude and tendency to the recovery of lost sinners.

2. And as the *final Infinite Good* he *felicitateth* all that are by Grace conducted to him as *their end*; and on the rest will have *his absolute will fulfilled*, and will not be frustrate of his *End*, though sinners may be frustrate of theirs, and be unhappy.

3. And as *Rector* he *sapientially* conducteth man in the way to this felicitating *End*, *antecedently* by the Gospel, which is the *same* in it self to all that have it: and *consequently* as *Judge* by his *Rewards*; In which supposing his foresaid commoner *preventing* Grace, he *consequently* giveth men such further degrees of co operating grace or help and spiritual mercy, as in the use of former grace, they are fit to receive: and justly and penally denyeth that to others which they have made themselves immediately unapt for, or uncapable of in the way of this ordinary common operation.

But withall as a free *Owner* and *Benefactor* who may do with his own as he list, (as he diversifieth the works of *Nature*, though *Nature* keep a constant course, except in Miracles, so) he freely diversifieth the gifts of his

Grace

Grace (external and Internal;) though as Rector and the common Benefactor of loſt ſinners, he alter not the terms and means of Grace, which he at firſt determined of. And the *equality* and *conſtancy* of his Rectoral and Judicial diſtributions, is no way inconſiſtent with the diverſity which as a free *Owner* and *Benefactor* he maketh either in his *Decrees* or *Gifts*.

So that he is the Cauſe of *All Good*, though not every way *equally to All*; to make All Good and happy: And he hath made man capable of *Improving* his *Gifts*, to return him his own with Uſury, which he will require. But he is the Author of *no evil of ſin*; nor *puniſheth* any but *for ſin*, and as a *means to that Good* which is better than the *Impunity of the ſinner*: But he ruleth and cauſeth the *Effects* of ſin, when he cauſeth not the *ſin* it ſelf.

The *Order* of his *Productions* may be much perceived by man, and are fit for our obſervation. Of his own *Knowledge* and *Volitions* of them, we know no more, but that It is not formally the ſame thing as *Knowledge* and *will* in Man; that It is moſt perfect and incomprehenſible; that It is his *Eſſential Intellect* and *will* variouſly named as variouſly connoting the effects and objects: that To diſpute of any other *internal order, priority or poſteriority in God's Knowledge, or Will*, (as if he had *particular Thoughts, Ideas* and *Volitions* as man hath, or any thing in Him were Cauſed by the object,) and to vex the Church with contentions hereabout, is a preſumptuous arrogance and prophaneneſs, which God will puniſh, and good and ſober men ſhould tremble at and hate, and not become parties, in ſuch daring medlings with the Conſuming Fire.

Notes on ſome paſſages of Mr. Peter Sterries *Book of Free-will.*

§. 1. IT is long ſince I heard much of the name and fame of Mr. *Peter Sterry*, long Chaplain to *Robert* Lord *Brook*, and after to *Oliver Cromwel* when he was *Protector* (as then called.) His common fame was, that his Preaching was ſuch as none or few could underſtand: which incenſed my deſire to have heard him, of which I ſtill miſt, though I oft attempted it. But now ſince his death, while my Book is in the Preſs unfiniſhed, a poſthumous tractate of his cometh forth of *Free-will*: upon peruſal of which I find in him the ſame notions (for ſo far as he meddleth with the ſame ſubjects) as in Sr. *H. Vane*, and ſomewhat of what Dr. *Gibbon* ſeemeth to deliver in his Scheme; but all handled with much more *ſtrength* of *parts* and *raptures* of higheſt *devotion*, and *great candour* towards all others, than I expected. His Preface is a moſt excellent Perſwaſive to Univerſal Charity: Love was never more extolled than throughout his Book. Doubtleſs his head was ſtrong, his wit admirably pregnant, his ſearching ſtudies hard and ſublime, and, I think, his Heart repleniſhed with holy Love to God, and great charity, moderation, and peaceableneſs toward men: In ſo much that I heartily repent that I ſo far believed fame as to think ſomewhat hardlier or leſs charitably of him and his few adherents than I now hope they did deſerve. *Haſty judging*, and *believing fame* is a cauſe of unſpeakable hurt to the world, and injury to our brethren.

§. 2. But I find that it is no wonder that he was underſtood by few, For 1. His ſublime and philoſophical notions, met not with many Auditors, ſo well ſtudied in thoſe things as to be capable of underſtanding them. It is a great inconvenience to men of extraordinary diſcoveries and ſublimity, that they muſt ſpeak to very few. 2. And though he cloud not his mat-

ter with ſo many ſelf-made names and notions as *Behmen*, *Paracelſus*, *Wigelius* and ſome others, yet thoſe few that he hath, do ſomewhat obſcure it: 3. But above all the exceſſive pregnancy of his wit produceth ſo great a ſuperabundance of Metaphors or Allegories, that (about the deſcription of Chriſt eſpecially) they make up almoſt all his ſtyle; ſo that to any ordinary Reader his matter is not ſo much *cloathed* in Metaphors, as *drowned*, *buried* or *loſt*: And though I confeſs my wit, being to his, but as a barren Deſart to a florid Meadow, may be apt to undervalue that which it attaineth not; yet I do approve of my preſent judgement, in thinking, that (ſeeing all metaphorical terms are ambiguous,) he that exceſſively uſeth them befriendeth not the Truth and the hearers intellect, but while he is too much a Rhetorician, he is too little a good Logician: and as he is hardly underſtood by others, I ſhould fear leſt he ſeduce his own underſtanding, and can ſcarce have clear mental conceptions of that matter, which he utters by a torrent of ambiguous Metaphors, if he think as he ſpeaketh, and his words be the direct expreſſions of his mind. I had rather be inſtructed in the words of the moſt barbarous Schoolman, adapted to the matter, than to be put to ſave my ſelf from the temptation of equivocations in every ſentence which I hear, and to ſearch after that Truth (which is known only naked) under ſo florid a diſguiſe and paint.

§. 3. But I cannot deny, that though my temptations before were very great, to doubt whether the Doctrine of *Univerſally-neceſſary Predetermination*, as delivered by *Bradwardine*, the *Dominicans*, Dr. *Twiſſe*, *Rutherford* and *Hobbes*, were indeed to be rejected, the Reading of Mr. *Sterry* increaſed my temptation; not by any new ſtrength of argument which he hath brought, but by the power of his pious florid Oratory, by which, while he entitleth God to the neceſſitating cauſation of all *ſin*, and *miſery*, he ſeemeth to put ſo honourable and lovely a cloathing on them, from their relative order to *God*, to the *Univerſe*, and to *their End*, as that I felt my hard thoughts of *both* to abate, and I was tempted to think of them as part of the amiable conſequents of the Divine Love, and of the Harmonious order cauſed by the manifold wiſdom of God.

§. 4. And by this I ſee, of how great importance it is in the world, not only *what Doctrine* is taught, and with *what proof*, but *who ſpeaketh* it, and in *what manner*. For as I found the ſame things reverenced in Dr. *Twiſſe* and *Rutherford*, which were not ſo in *Alvarez*, or *Janſenius*, or *Thom. White*; ſo I found the ſame Doctrine of Predetermining Neceſſitation almoſt commonly brought into greater diſlike by *Hobbes* and *Benedictus Spinoſa*'s owning it, and applying it to its too obvious uſes, than all argumentations had ever before brought it; And I ſee it as likely to recover its honour by the pious and florid dreſs put upon it by Mr. *Sterry*, as if ſome new demonſtrations for it were found out.

In Tract. Polit. Theol.

§. 5. If I ſhould recite Mr. *Sterries* mind in his own Metaphors, the *Reader* may not underſtand it; If I Epitomize him and change his words, ſome may ſay that I miſunderſtand and wrong him: But I will not do it willingly; and if I do it neceſſarily, his ſtile is my excuſe. He that would be ſeen muſt come into the light.

§. 6. The ſumm of that which I am now concerned in, in Mr. *Sterry*'s Treatiſe is, That "the *Freedom of all things* is *to act according to their* "*natures*; and ſo is that of the will of man; and that in God and man, "Neceſſity and Liberty concurr, and that whatever we do or will, we do "or will it neceſſarily, as being moved to it by the firſt cauſe and a chained "connexion of neceſſitating cauſes; by which all things in the world are "carryed on: That a will not determined by God, but left to a ſelf-de-

"termination without Gods predetermining causality, is not to be asserted, "as contrary to Gods Goodness, Wisdom, power, *&c.* That sin is a pri- "vation formally; and all that is positive in it is directly and not by "accident of Gods positive causation (else with the *Manichees* we must "hold two first causes;) And that the formal privation is from the with- "drawing of necessary Divine causation of the contrary, and God is the "Negative necessitating cause of it: Even as he causeth Light by the "shining of the Sun, and causeth darkness by its setting or not shining: or "as he causeth substances and shadows, Life and death; And that all sin "thus as necessarily followeth Gods not giving the contrary, or his leaving "the defectible Creature to itself, as the darkness followeth the Lights "removal; And this was the entrance of sin into the world; the Woman "being Necessarily deceived, necessarily sinned; and all good and evil is "thus (as to necessity equally) to be resolved into Gods causing and not "causing Will; what he will cause cannot but be, and what he will not cause "cannot be: And this is the beautiful variety and harmony in the Universe: "In God himself is nothing but perfection, but the Creature being the "shadowy Image of God, defectibility and imperfection is essential to it: "so that he reduceth Morality to the frame, and necessity of physical mo- "tion, and maketh Moral Good and evil to be indeed as much natural good "and evil and of the same kind (except as in another subject) as Sum- "mer and Winter, heat and cold, day and night, health and sickness, life "and death, animate and inanimate, the unavoidable diversifications of the "will and work of God; And that every permission of his will is accom- "panied with a positive volition of the thing permitted, (And yet that *will* "is not properly in God, but so called after the manner of man:) That sin is "considered as related to the Principle of action, which is God, and so it is "good; or as in the *terminus* Man, and so it is horrid, deviliſh, odious, "evil, as blindness, death, darkness, caused all by Gods desertion, or not "operating otherwise than he doth.

"§. 7. To the quieting of the mind that cannot digest this, but thinketh "God is thus dishonoured, being made more than Satan the cause of sin, "and misery for sin, which the Scripture contradicteth; and that man is "excusable at the barr of Justice that could no more (in innocency) for- "bear to sin, than to make a world; To them that think it hard that no one "in all the world could ever possibly do more or less Good or Evil than "they do, but that is all done, by physical motion as in an Engine, *&c.* he "hath a great deal to say, and more than ever I elsewhere met with, and "with great modesty proposed.

"§. 8. As to the Law (whose transgression is sin) he supposeth, that "Whatsoever imposeth on us any thing to be done by us, as an antecedent "condition to any consequent good, is the Law opposed to the Gospel. Pag. 173. "Yea that the proposal or pressing of any Truth or Goodness on us, in a "literal or moral way only, or the word as written in Letters, is the Law; "and the *spirit operating* the thing it self on the soul is the Gospel; the "first is the old Covenant and the second the New: That the proper "and next ends of the Law (or letter) are sin, condemnation, death and "the Divine wrath: To let in sin, and heighten it that it might abound; "and to bring on us spiritual death; These flow not from the Law of it self; "but by accident, from the weakness of the flesh and creature: But both "Law and sin are brought in ultimately for good; *viz.* God having a "design which he intended to enrich with the fullest, the highest glories of "his Godhead, brings forth in the course of this design, a dark scene of "all evils, sin, death, wrath; The evil in this scene is carryed on to its ut-

"most

"most extent and height; Thus the variety becomes more full in the whole
"design, and the chief design is heightned in its greatest Glory; God in his
"Infinite wisdom so bringeth in this scene of sin and evil, that himself is
"perfectly pure and good in the contrivance and conduct of it. He setteth
"up a Law, good, holy and spiritual, but such that sin inevitably may take
"occasion from it through the frailty of the flesh and of the creature, to
"spring up as an overflowing flood, to display it self over all things in its
Pag. 175, 176. "fullest foulest birth. This Law is to convince us of the frailty and mu-
"tability in mans primitive state, *&c.* (*viz.* that he is a creature.) For
"man is composed of the light of God, and his own proper darkness; These
"two the Schools call the Act and Potentiality, the form and the matter,
"being and not being, which constitute every Creature; The darkness or
"nothingness, which is the Creatures own, is the proper ground of sin——
Pag. 177. "The Law comes and distinguisheth the Light from the Darkness——
Pag. 178. "(so that to see sin is to see that we are Creatures;) ——God withholds his
"Divine presence, appearances and influences from man, —— and so the
"darkness discovereth it self in man, and predominateth and captivateth
"him entirely, and becomes his choice and Lord. (so that sin is but an
Imperfect Creature, and the Law to cause and shew it.)

§. 9. *Pag.* 113, 114, *&c.* He saith ["The Immediate cause of the first
"change made in the understanding at the fall, was the Divine Glory with-
"drawing or withholding it self—— Darkness is the privation of Light:
"Privations have no proper Causes, but accidental only. Thus the Divine
"Glory retiring from the understanding, or ceasing to shine in it, is by ac-
"cident the cause of the darkness there; as the Setting or departing of the
"Sun is the cause of Night; which is not a blemish to the Sun, but its
"glory, that in its presence are all the beauties and joyes of light, in its
"absence all the disagreeableness and melancholies of night and darkness:
"*Pag.* 115. All evil is from the absence of God, *&c.* *P.* 117. The fault
"in man is the deficiency which ariseth from the defectibility or nothing-
"ness of the Creature, in its shadowy state, in the purity of its first
"Creation. *Pag.* 122. The fall springs from the Harmony of the eter-
"nal design in the Divine mind, being comprehended in it as a part of
"it.]

§. 10. And yet he makes man *Guilty* and *unexcuseable*, and God just in this; because ["Guilt is but our being really bad: And he that cannot de-
"ny himself to be bad, is unexcuseable: And the opening of this causeth
"shame: And Justice is to Judge and use all creatures as they are.]

§. 11. To be short, he maintaineth, "that man can have no freedom from
"necessitating predetermination; If he should it would cross the nature of
"God, of the creature, of the soul, and the unity and harmony of all
"things; But that God causeth all sin negatively as necessarily, as he cau-
"seth *darkness*, or any natural privation: But then he doth with a torrent of Rhetorick so Praise Gods design in it, and the beauty and harmony of all things made up of good and evil, *unities*, *varieties*, *diversities* and *contra-rieties*, and sheweth so largely the glory that cometh to God by sin, and the good to the Universe, and that it's but our narrowness and weakness of sight that maketh us take it to be any other than a part of the glory of the universe, though bad in and to the *person that sinneth*, that I confess I never found my self more tempted to Love sin, or to cease my hatred of it, than by his florid Oratory.

§. 12. And withall, as he resolveth all the rest of Morality into Physical conceptions, so he seemeth to judge suitably of *Hell* and of *Redemption*, supposing that all this *darkness* that God brings on sinners, is but to prepare for

their

their reſurrection to a life of *unity and glory*; and that it ſhall go well with them in the end.

§. 13. And as to the work of *Redemption*, his notions are too floridly or ambiguouſly delivered for me to undertake with confidence to unriddle: But this ſeemeth the ſumm: "1. That God is the *fountain of Being by* "*Emanation* as the Sun *of light*: And that his *eternal Wiſdom* is *Jeſus* "*Chriſt* in the *firſt inſtant* or *nature*. 2. That the *firſt creature* that he "made (or *emaneth* from him) is a *perfect univerſal mind*, the *plat-* "*form* of all *the reſt of the Creation*; (ſuch as the old Philoſophers called the ſoul of the world, or an univerſal Intelligence:) "And that this is *Je-* "*ſus Chriſt in his ſecond nature* and *notion*: which *Arius* knew, but did "ill deny his *divine nature*. 3. That this *Univerſal Spirit or Mind*, "*maketh all the world beſides*, and is *in them all*: And ſo the whole Crea- "tion elſe was *Chriſts firſt ſhadowy Image*, (or body.) 4. That the *An-* "*gels* are the *nobleſt parts* of *this*, and that the *Deity firſt*, and *Chriſts* "*ſuperangelical nature next*, is *one in them all*, and *they one with him*, as "the beams with the Sun, and as the lower part of the Sun-beams with the "parts next the Sun. 5. That the *ſoul* of *man* is the *next part* of Chriſts "*ſhadowy Image*, into which he deſcended. 6. And ſo into all Bodies. "7. And as into a *ſpecial Branch*, into that Body born of the Virgin *Mary*. "8. And *in that*, and in *other Bodies*, he *dyeth*, and *deſcendeth* to his *low-* "*eſt ſtate*; and 9. Then, as the Sun, doth riſe again, and bring all back "to the ſtate of *pure ſpirituality* in his *ſuperangelical nature*, whence all "*ſprang*: And this is their Redemption; which is moſt floridly ſet forth.

§. 13. This doctrine ſeemeth to reconcile Philoſophy (or Gentiliſm) and Chriſtianity: For what is it almoſt but *names* that are left in diffe- rence? That which a Philoſopher will call an *univerſal Intelligence*, or *ſoul of the world*, he calleth *Chriſt*: And if ſuch a ſoul there be, no one will deny but that it floweth into all particular ſouls and bodies, and is united to them, or is to individuals as the ſoul in the head to the ſoul in the hand and foot.

§. 14. And if I did believe that ſin, death, hell; and holineſs, life, Glory, are in the world but as Winter and Summer, Night and Day, and, as *Origen*, that the wicked are but in a ſtate of Revolution, and ſhall come about again into a ſtate of hope; or, as he here ſeemeth, that their ſin and miſery is but like the dying of a flower in the fall, that ſhall in the Spring again be as before, (or rather another in its ſtead;) and that it is but the retiring of Chriſt from the Creature, as the ſpirit of the Tree in Autumn from the Leaves, I ſhould then be ready to receive his *Neceſſitating Predetermina- tion to ſin*, and fit all the reſt of my opinions hereunto.

§. 15. There is (among many others) one *Joh. Jeſſenius à Jeſſen Doctor & Eques Hungarus*, who in a *Tract. de Anima & Corpore Univerſi* hath written much to the like purpoſe, ſave as being a *Peripatetick* he diſ- fereth from the *Platoniſts*; *viz.* The world is one Animal and hath one ſoul and body, which all Creatures are parts of: That Stars are Intelle- ctuals, or Angels, and all intuitively know each others minds, loving the good, and hating the evil here, and are our chief friends and Keepers: That Death befalleth only us lower Creatures; *Mors continua ſingulis, nulli tamen æterna: Nam poſt longiſſimum temporis excurſum, quem Plato tri- ginta & inſuper aliquot annorum millibus determinare auſus eſt, remo- vebitur, factâ iterum aliquâ ſecundùm naturam ſolutione, redintegrati- one.* And the *Intellectus Agens* he deſcribeth as Mr. *Sterry* doth *Chriſt* in his *ſecond* or *middle nature*, pag. 165. *Intellectum agentem ſubſtantiæ primæ atque Dei fulgorem eſſe; Non accidens, ſed ſubſtantiam Intelligen-*

tem;

tem; quæ primò propriéque Intellectus dicitur agens: ——— Prima substantiæ adhærens, ab ea excurrens, indivisus & indivisibilis, non aliter ac Lumen à Lucido emanat: and so in many other particulars.

§. 16. To all this my short time will allow me to give you but these short observations following: 1. The doctrine of Redemption is so much of meer supernatural Revelation, as that we must not easily receive that concerning it, which is not in the Scriptures; And where Christs person hath such a description in Scripture as he giveth, I am not satisfied: (*e.g.* in *pag.* 232. where he thus saith ["The Word made flesh, is the whole Tree of "Being, Uncreated and Created, the Root, the Body, with all the Branches, "putting forth themselves into one *little top branch*, now withering, that "through its death, they may renew all to a fresh and flourishing spring.] I am loth to say that the Universe is Christ: that his Divinity is the soul, and the world his body, and every Man and Beast and substance part of it, and that he dyeth in all that dye, and that his body born of the Virgin *Mary*, was but one top branch of the Tree, which Christ thus animateth, and so that all other bodies are as truly personally united to the *word*, as that.

§. 17. I will not deny that the Opinion of a Threefold nature in Christ, looketh very plausibly; *viz.* that the Divine eternal word (the first nature) produced and united it self to the prime created superangelical Mind (the second nature:) and that this second nature in the fulness of time produced and united it self to the humane (third) nature. 1. There are many texts which seem to countenance it. 2. It seemeth to give Christ the greatest honour, as being the most excellent of all Gods Creatures; which is not so easily believed of him as Man. 3. It seemeth to expound those texts of the Old Testament, which mention such appearances of God to *Adam*, *Abraham* and others, which many of the Ancients say was Christ: And it seemeth to some more probable that some pre-existent created nature should assume a *body*, than the Divine nature only and immediately. 4. And it smileth on us as an opinion likely to reduce and reconcile the *Arians*, (once too great a part of the Christian World, (as called Christians) as not only *Philostorgius*, and *Saudius* shew, but also *Petavius de Trinit.*) who holding the prime-created super-angelical nature, and denying the Divine, it's like would the more easily be brought to acknowledge the Union of the Divine Nature with the super-angelical, if the super-angelical it self were first granted them; For they might the sooner be convinced that the eternal *wisdom* or *word*, which made that first creature, was intimately united to it. I know some pious worthy persons who upon such reasons incline to this opinion of a threefold nature in Christ; (Though some of them think that this second nature, was the humane soul, assuming only a body, and others, that it assumed both soul and body.) I am not forward to take men for unsufferable Hereticks, that differ from me, or hold that which seemeth to me hard and strange; But I must say, 1. That I see no cogent proof of this super-angelical nature: 2. That seeming congruities and conveniences must not embolden us to take up a doctrine which is new and strange to the Church of Christ, in so great a matter as the Natures and person of Christ are. 3. And were it never so *true*, if it be not sufficiently revealed to us in Gods Word, it cannot be necessary to our salvation. 4. Yea presuming too boldly to conclude of unrevealed things, (so high) seemeth to me *dangerous temerity*, *curiosity*, and prophaneness, like the *Bethshemites* or *Uzzah*'s meddling with the Ark, and the Sons of *Aaron* offering false fire. Let them therefore here thus proceed that dare. For I dare not.

§. 18. But

§. 18. But this much I eaſily concede, 1. That as all Being is originally from God, ſo there is a continued divine cauſation of them, without which they would all ceaſe or be annihilated: which ſome call a continued Creation, and ſome an Emanation, and ſome a continued Action or operation *ad rerum eſſe*. And it is an intolerable errour to hold that God hath made the World or any part of it *ſelf-ſufficient* or *Independent* as to himſelf, as to *Being*, *Action* or *Perfection*. We grant therefore that all the world is ſo far *United to God*, as to depend on his continued cauſality: And that the Beams do not more depend on the Sun, or *Light*, *heat* and *motion* on the Sun and other fire, nor the branches, fruit and leaves more depend on the Tree, than the Creature on God.

§. 19. 2. I grant that thus far the world may be ſaid to *be one*, as all things are *united in one firſt cauſe* from which they flow, and by which they are.

§. 20. 3. But yet all theſe are no parts of God, as the *fruit and leaves* are of the *Tree*, and as the *beams* are of the *Sun*. But they are *Creatures*, becauſe Gods *emanation* or *cauſation* is *creative*, cauſing the whole Being of the effect: And it ſeemeth likeſt to the *Sun* (or fire's) cauſation of *Motion*, *Light* and *Heat* as they are in the Recipient, diſtinct *ab eſſentia & actione Agentis quà tali*.

§. 21. 4. I grant that (though as to proximity of eſſence God is no further from one Creature than from another, being intimate to all, *immediatione eſſentiæ*, yet) he uſeth one Creature as a ſecond Cauſe to operate on another; and that the Higher and Nobler, operate on the lower and more ignoble: And in that ſenſe we may conceive that ſome Creatures are *firſt* from God or neareſt to him, that is, of the *higheſt nature and eſſe*. And ſo we deny not, but that it is like that in the Creation God made *one nature* exiſtent, (*e. g.* the higheſt Intellectual) as more excellent, powerful, pregnant, active, and perfect than any of the reſt: that there was in the wonderful diverſity, ſome one that was *Beſt*, and *above* the reſt.

§. 22. 5. I grant that it ſoundeth probably that the firſt and nobleſt Nature in *ſpecie* ſhould be found but in one Individual; But of this there is not the leaſt certainty to us mortals: *viz.* Whether from one God firſt flow one perfect Created Intelligence or Spirit; or, *abuno plures*, two, three or millions in the firſt order flow from one God? Though in nature we ſee that from the trunk of the Tree few great members firſt ariſe, and multiplicity is in the extremities. And we grant that the greateſt multiplicity appeareth where things dwindle to littleneſs or baſeneſs: One ſound Sheep is better than a rotten one that hath a thouſand Worms in his Veins and Inteſtines: And a man that hath a thouſand Lice on his Head is not the Nobler: And when the one ſoul hath left a Carkaſs, it may turn to thouſands of contemptible Vermine: And a Looking-glaſs broken into an hundred pieces is not the better becauſe it will make an hundred images of the face. But yet we are ſtrangers to Gods unſeen works, further than he revealeth them, and therefore muſt confeſs our ignorance.

§. 23. 6. We grant that all Gods works have ſome Union, Concord and Harmony among themſelves; which yet conſiſteth with numerical diverſity: And though *Men* and other *Animals* walk about with *Bodies* that touch not one another, (and therefore the ignorant conceive of them as totally incoherent, and think that though Pears, Apples and other Fruit on the Tree, and Trees in the Earth, be both *Many*, and *Divers*, and yet parts of one *Tree*, and of one Earth, yet it is not ſo with animals, becauſe the union of ſpiritual beings is inviſible:) yet indeed it is not probable that the ſouls of Animals have no dependant coherence with nobler ſupe-

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3,4. It is a word which some pervert, *Gal.* 1. 7. and many sin against, *Gal.* 2. 14. 1 *Pet.* 4. 17. The rejecters of it are to speed worse than *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, and they cannot escape that neglect so great salvation. Whereas by his description, 1. No man ever yet sinned against the Gospel or Covenant of Grace: For it is not that Covenant or Gospel further than it is a physical effect on the soul. 2. And every Heathen that hath any good effect on his soul by Common Grace hath so much Gospel; 3. Yea, why is not then all Gods Creation, being a physical effect, the Covenant of Grace; if that he *doth* be it, and all that he *commandeth* as such be the Law of Works? 4. And how then can the Law of Works and Grace be two, if every proper Law be the Law of Works? For a Law is *sub genere signi*, and a produced event is another thing. 5. And what sense will be found throughout the Scripture, if we must hold, that It is the Covenant or Law of Works which telleth us, that the Law of Works is abolished, and calleth us to believe in Christ for free Justification, and not to expect Justification by the Works of the Law, and offereth us pardon and life in Christ? *&c.* But I will add no more, seeing the plainness of the matter makes it needless.

§. 35. The truth is, he distinguisheth between the Law and the effect of the Law and Spirit of God, and calleth one the Law of Works and the other the Gospel: whereas the Scripture only maketh it the excellency of the Gospel, that by it the Spirit effectually worketh on the soul more usually and more excellently; and no meer Law (of Works or Grace) will renew us without the Spirit.

§. 36. VIII. And if *Redemption* be nothing but Physical efficiency by Christ, (who as a creating Mediator first giveth all creatures what they have, and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness, as the Sun setteth, and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality, like the revolution of day and night, Summer and Winter,) it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it, which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise.

§. 37. IX. But let it be noted, that we hold, that as the *Almighty Father* is the glorious *Creator*, *Motor* and *Life* of *Nature*, and the *Eternal Wisdom*, *Word* and *Son*, the *Glorious Ordinator*, *Rector* and *Redeemer*, so the *Eternal Love*, and the *Holy Ghost* is the *final Perfecter* of believers, even of Gods Elect; and that this *Sanctification* and *proficiency*, is by more than *Moral Sapiential* Regiment, even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul, or by a Quickning, Illuminating, *felicitating* Communication of Divine Life, and Light, and Love, which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain.

§. 38. And as to *Free-will* I further say, that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is *Above God*, or *Independent* and as a God to himself, or that God is any way a defective or idle (as they call it) Spectator of mans sins, or free acts; But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own *wisely-chosen* work in which he is delighted. And that he doth truly attain his ends in all.

§. 39. Therefore as Mr. *Sterry* magnifieth the harmony which ariseth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God, so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works, which must not be dishonoured and left out.

§. 40. And more than so, we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect, it being their perfection to be suited to his own will. And the difference between us and Mr. *Sterry*, Dr. *Twisse*, *&c.* is not, Whether God

God be Glorious in all his works, or they be perfect: For we say, that though *mans sin* be *found* upon Gods works, and that sin be none of his works, nor any *means* (properly so called) of *Pleasing* or *Glorifying* him, nor at all willed or caused by him, but hated and punished; yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it, but notwithstanding its malignity, shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works.

§.41. Yea, more we say, that men sin under his Disposing power, and that he will make use of their evil unto Good, and sin shall become an *occasion* of that *Glory* to God (as sickness to the Physician) of which it is no Cause or proper *Means*, nor of it self conduceth thereunto. Yea, and that no Act as an Act, how sinful soever, is done, but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature, and prime *Motor*: Yea, more; that all the *Effects* and *Consequents* of *sin* that are not *sin it self*, are under the Causal Government and disposal of God, who will attain his Ends in all.

§.42. Therefore we differ but in this, *Whether God get not all that glory which Mr.* St. *floridly describeth, notwithstanding sin, or on supposition of it as barely permitted* (*negatively, but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it,*) *rather than by sin it self, as a willed, designed effect of his own necessitating Negations, and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated, of his determining premotion?* Whether mans permitted sin, be any of Gods works? And whether Gods glory be not rather *non obstante peccato*, and also by *occasion* of it, supposed to be mans work only; and by all the good consequents caused by God, than by the sin it self as a *Means conducible*, or a Cause?

§.43. For we deny not, that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved, and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion, or Privation, as Mr. *Sterry* would perswade us: To *make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will, and can be willing*, (with a decree to make many willing,) is much different from *making the creature bad*, and then condemning him to Hell for being so, as an act of Justice. Yet we doubt not, but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom, Goodness and Justice of God, in his Government of man, than yet the wisest mortals have.

§.44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he *can do*, or *not*. If yea, then you suppose that he *cannot* (nor ever could) make any one Creature, Worm, or Grass, more or less, greater or smaller, sooner or later, or otherwise, than he doth: which few will believe: (It being not for want of Power, but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more.) But if God can make one creature more, or one *Motion* more, and yet doth not, I ask Whether you dare call that *non-agency* by the name of *Idleness* or *deficiency*? If not, why should the *Non-causation* of *sinful Volitions in specie morali*, or the leaving free-will to its own determination, be so called? Not to make more creatures, or more physical motion, or not to give more Grace and Glory, is as much a *non-agency* as not to determine a sinning Will.

§.45. As to all Mr. *Sterry*'s Reasons against Free-will, they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered, that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them, or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered.

§.46.

§. 46. I conclude with this repeated profeſſion, that I am fully ſatisfied, that all the reſt of the Controverſies, about Grace and Nature, and Predeſtination and Redemption, as they ſtand between the Synod of *Dort* and the *Arminians*, are of no greater moment than I have oft expreſſed in this Book, nor worthy any of that ſtir and contention, which men that ſufficiently difference not *Words*, *Methods* and *Matter* have made to the miſchievous injury of the Church: And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties, is in this controverſie between the defenders of *Neceſſary Predetermination*, and of *Free-will*; that is, (not, What *free-will ſinners* have left, but) [*Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man, there was ſuch a thing, as a will that can and ever did determine it ſelf to a Volition or Nolition* in ſpecie morali, *without the predetermining efficient neceſſitating premotion of God as the firſt Cauſe?*] or as *Hobbes* ſpeaketh, Whether ever a created will, did act, without a neceſſitating premotion? And whether to *will* and to *will freely*, be all one? And whether the will (except as to the *kind* of action) be not as much neceſſitated to *will* or *not will*, as my Pen to write or not write? and we call not its acts Contingent or free, either becauſe they are what they are (Volitions,) or through Ignorance, becauſe we ſee not the moving Cauſes?

§. 47. And if this hold, for my part I muſt confeſs, that I think the Religion which agreeth with it, muſt neither be ſo good as Dr. *Twiſſes*, *Rutherfords*, *Bradwardines*, or *Alvarez*'s, nor yet ſo bad as *Hobbes*'s, or *Spinoſa*'s; but juſt ſuch as Mr. *Sterry*'s or the old *Platonick* or *Stoick* Philoſophers: I mean not ſuch as Mr. *Sterry*'s was, (for I hear he was an excellent perſon;) but ſuch as his Book (though obſcurely) intimateth. And if any of that judgement have a better or worſe, it is not in conſiſtency with his own principles.

7 AP 53

FINIS.

Catholick Theology:

The Second BOOK.

The { Synodists and Arminians / Calvinists and Lutherans / Dominicans and Jesuites } Reconciled:

OR,

AN END OF THE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT GODS DECREES and GRACE, and MANS FREE-WILL, MERIT, &c. If men are willing.

A RETREAT TO THE MILITANT DIVINES, WHO HAVE TOO LONG WARRED ABOUT WORDS, and UNREVEALED THINGS; and KEPT THE CHURCH OF GOD IN FLAMES, and DRAWN CHRISTS MEMBERS TO HATE, REPROACH and PERSECUTE EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT.

In a Dialogue between *C.* (a *Calviniſt*) *A.* (an *Arminian*) and *B.* (the *Reconciler*): and others.

By *Richard Baxter.*

Tim. 2. 14, 15, 16. *Of theſe put them in remembrance, charging them before the Lord, that they ſtrive not* about words, *to no profit, but to the ſubverting of the hearers. Study to ſhew thy ſelf approved unto God, a Workman that needeth not to be aſhamed, rightly dividing the word of Truth. But ſhun prophane and vain bablings; for they will encreaſe unto more ungodlineſs: and their word will eat as doth a Canker.*

LONDON:

Printed for *Nevil Simmons*, at the *Princes Arms* in St. *Pauls Church-Yard.* 1675.

Catholick Theology.

The Second BOOK.

The CALVINISTS and ARMINIANS
DOMINICANS and JESUITES
OF

A REPORT TO THE [illegible] DIVINES, WHO HAS
LONG WARNED ABOUT WORSE, and UNITY
and REPENTANCE OF GOD IN FLAME.
CHRIST MADE US TO HATE. REMOACH and FEAR
EACH OTHER FOR THEY KNEW NOT WHAT.

BRITISH MUSEUM

In a Dialogue between (Catholick) A. (an Arminian)
and B. (the [illegible]): and others.

By Richard Baxter.

Tim. 2. 14, 15, 16. Keep profane things in remembrance, charging them before the Lord, that they strive not about words, to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers. Study to shew thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of Truth. But shun profane and vain babblings for they will encrease unto more ungodliness. Their word will eat as doth a canker.

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Printed for Nevil Simmons, at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard. 1675.

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A DIALOGUE

BETWEEN

A. (an *Arminian*) and B. (the *Conciliator.*)

THE First Days Conference ABOUT PREDESTINATION.

A. I perceive by your Writings, that you would make men believe, that the differences between the *Arminians* and *Calvinists*, are matters of no such moment as they are commonly judged to be, * and that the distance is very small, if men understood themselves; and you would have it thought that you are the man fit for so great an undertaking, as the conciliation of these differing Parties is. But to deal freely with you, I take it to be but the effect of your own *Ignorance*, not understanding the Controversies; and of your *Pride*, in overvaluing your own Parts and Apprehensions: Or else you would never dream that you can come after such wits as *Augustine*, and *Pelagius*, and *Celestine*; such as *Aquinas*, *Scotus*, *Ockam*, *Gregory Armi. Durandus*, and their Followers; even such as *Cajetane*, *Bannes*, *Zumel*, *Alvarez*, &c. such as *Suarez*, *Vasquez*, *Molina*, *Fonseca*, *Ruiz*, &c. such Conciliators as *Ariba*, *Gibieuf*, *Guil. Cameranius Scotus*, *Pennottus*, *Petr. à* St. *Joseph*, *Ludov. à Dola*, *Jansenius*, and his Followers, with abundance such, and do that which none of these could do. But you are not the first Undertaker that hath miscarried.

B. If I have been guilty of vain boasting, cite my words, and I will retract them: If not, these expressions speak but your prejudice. But, I pray let us spend no time upon such Impertinences, but speak that to the matter which tendeth to edifie, that one of us may become the wiser at least. I first desire you to tell me, Q. *Whether the ending or narrowing this difference be not exceeding desirable, could it be attained?*

A. Yes, there is no man doubts of that.

B. Q. 2. *And is not despair the enemy of all endeavours, and will any thing be done without some hope?*

A. And it's as true, that vain hopes cause labour in vain.

B. The worst then will be but the loss of my labour: And I will tell you of what moment I judge the work.

* *Ista quæ nullus in dubium vocat, Christianis omnibus meo judicio sufficere deberent absque ulteriori & curiosiori investigatione, tum intima natura libertatis humanæ, tum modi quo gratia in nobis operatur, & quo ejus efficacia cum arbitrii nostri libertate conciliande sit, de quibus nulla disserta, clara & expressa extant in Scripturis oracula.* But if they will needs be medling, he wishes them modesty and moderation. *La Blanc de distinct. Grat. Thes.* 83.

1. In regard of the *ſinfulneſs* of the Contentions: 2. In regard of the Calamitous conſequents.

1. The ſinfulneſs I take to lie, 1. In the matter. 2. And in the manner of proſecution.

I. Theſe things I judge to be ſinful in the *matter*: 1. That many differences are pretended to be, where indeed are none. 2. Differences about *words*, and *ſecond Notions*, and rational Entities, are pretended to be differences about real Doctrines. 3. Little Differences are aggravated into great ones. 4. Unſearchable things are diſputed, which no mortal man can underſtand.

2. As to the *manner*s, it is done, 1. Prepoſterouſly, preferring theſe Diſputes before the greater buſineſs of the Miniſtry. * 2. Perverſly, waſting abundance of *time* and *ſtudy* about them, by which the Church might have been better ſerved; and writing ſo many great Volumes of them, in crabbed Scholaſtick ſtile, as muſt needs tempt multitudes to a lamentable loſs of their precious time, before they can come to know that they loſe it. 3. And, by ſidings, and factions, and ſharp reflections on each other, quenching Chriſtian Love, and deſtroying Concord, and weakening the Church.

II. The calamitous Conſequents are, 1. The long, and yet unhealed alienation of Contenders minds. 2. The foreſaid time and toil which thoſe Volumes coſt. 3. The abundance of idle talk, and loſt ſtudies about them, by the generality of Students. 4. The dangerous Factions made by it in the Churches. 5. The tempting each Party to cenſure, ſlander, and blot the Names of one another. 6. Multitudes of Prelates and Paſtors have been tempted by it into Perſecutions. 7. Yea, wars and blood-ſhed in more Countries than one hath followed partly by this incenſion. 8. And hereby the poor people on each ſide are kept in bitter uncharitable thoughts of one another; and eſpecially of thoſe Paſtors who are againſt their mind.

And becauſe things neareſt us are firſt diſcerned, begin at home, and try whether all this be true or not. 1. Hearken to the Miniſters and people on each ſide. Do you not hear that it ſeemeth enough to them to ſleight each other with uncharitable alienation, when it's ſaid, *O ſuch a one is a* Calviniſt, *or ſuch a one is an* Arminian; yea, perhaps the *Jeſuite* ſhall come in. Read over the many writings about *Mountague*'s time, on his part, and againſt him, by *Yates*, *Carlton*, *Watton*, *Burton*, &c. But eſpecially read *Peter Heylin* his writings on this Subject, and above all, his *Life of Arch-Biſhop Laud*, where he perſwadeth us that this very Controverſie was a grand part of the difference, which on both ſides was proſecuted, till it brought us to our doleful War.

2. Go but to the *Low-Countries*, and ſee what work it hath made there, from the days of *Arminius* to this day; eſpecially between Prince *Maurice* and the *States*, at the death of *Barnevelt*, the impriſonment of *Grotius*, &c. The Synod at *Dort*, and all the ſtrife and diſcontent before and after it.

3. Peruſe but the Volumes written on one ſide by *Suecanus*, *Arminius*, *Grevinchovius*, *Corvinus*, *Tilenus*, *Epiſcopius*, *Curcellæus*, *Grotius*, &c. with many *Lutherans*; And on the other ſide by *Gomarrus*, *Lubbertus*, *Macchovius*, &c. *Molinæus*, *Ameſius*, Dr. *Twiſſe*, *Rutherford*, *Spanheimius*, &c. and think how ſad ſuch Combats are.

4. Think what a lamentable diſtance to this day is kept up between the *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts* in all Countries, and much upon the account of theſe ſame Controverſies: And what bitter Books the *Lutherans*

* Read *in Procli Analect. pag.* 646. the Epiſtle of *Cyril Alex.* to *Proclus* againſt the cenſuring of *Theodor. Mopſueſt.* and his works, leſt it tend to diviſion and tumult in the Churches, *Et Ep.* 7. *ibid. Joan. Antiochini ad Cyril.* It would make one aſhamed of humane nature, to read how baſely the *Dominians* and ſome others (*Alvarez de Aux. Diſp.* 115. *p.* 468, 469. *& ſæpe Zumel*, and many more, and *Janſenius*, *Arnoldus*, &c. yea, *Gibieuf*, &c.) do abuſe *Luther* and *Calvin*, meerly to make other Papiſts believe, that they differ from them where they do not. And all through a carnal factious fear of loſing their intereſt in their own Popiſh Party; as if we differed not enough, but muſt perſwade the world, that we differ where we do not. See but *Alvarez*, *l.* 12. *Diſp.* 121. *pag.* 492. where he citeth ſix Errors of *Calvins*, as differing from him; whereas the four firſt are but one lye variouſly worded, and the two laſt no better; for in all of them *Calvin* ſaith not one jot more in ſenſe than the *Dominicans* do, what-ever harſh word he may find in him; and the generality of the *Calviniſts* (as they are called by ſcorners) ſay much leſs.

ans have written, comparing the *Calviniſts* to *Papiſts*, *Turks*, &c. and how little Mr. *Ducy* by forty years Labour did to reconcile them; and how ſmall ſucceſs all other Reconcilers have had, though excellent learned judicious men; ſuch as *Calixtus*, *Johan. Bergius*, *Conrad. Bergius*, *Ludov. Crocius*, *Mat. Martinius*, *Iſleburg*, *Teſtaidus*, *Amyraldus*, *Placeus*, *Capellus*, *Dallæus*, *Blondel*, *Davenant*, *Hall*, *Carlton*, *Abbot*, *Morton*, *Preſton*, &c.

5. Think of the great Conflicts in *France* and *Flanders*, between the *Janſeniſts* and their Adverſaries; and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the *Dominicans* and the *Jeſuites*: And of how many Ages continuance thoſe conteſts have been.

6. Then riſe up to the Time and Caſe of *Fauſtus Rhegienſis*, *Caſſianus*, and the *Maſſilienſes*, and their Adverſaries; and the hard Characters left by thoſe controverſies on the names of worthy men.

7. From thence aſcend to *Chryſoſtome* and his Reproaches, and *Auſtin's* Cenſures on the other ſide, with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius* had with the *Pelagians* and *Semipelagians* of thoſe times.

8. And laſtly, read and pity almoſt all the Fathers, eſpecially of the *Greek* Church, whoſe Names are now blotted with the cenſure of ſpeaking too like our *Arminians* and *Jeſuites*; and after all this, you will ſure think this Contention was a very ill work, if it be proved cauſleſs; and you will think that it's time to end it, if it be poſſible. To which end, an attempt is not diſcommendable, if it ſhould prove loſt as to the greater part of men. And ſome, I doubt not, God will bleſs it to, at leaſt to increaſe their love of peace.

A. I pray you tell me what is your *Undertaking*, and in what meaſure it is that you think this Work may be accompliſhed?

B. My Undertaking is this, [*To prove, that in the points of Predeſtination and Redemption, there is no difference between moderate men of each Party,* * *but what is reſolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will; and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference, but what is reſolved into the queſtion of the degree of Gods co-operating influx, compared with mans agency, and with it ſelf as on ſeveral Objects; which will prove either no difference at all, or elſe about a thing paſt mans Underſtanding: And, that only in the point of perſeverance, there is a real perceptible difference; but ſuch as is not worthy to be inſiſted on, to the breach of charity, or the Churches peace, but muſt conſiſt with toleration and mutual love.*]

* *Eadem enim difficultas fuit ſemper donationis in tempore, & præfinitionis aut prædeſtinationis in præſcientia. Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis (prima gratia) ſine ulla cauſa ratione, aut conditione ſine qua non, ſic etiam prædeſtinatur. Neq; ſolum negari debet ratio, cur unus prædeſtinetur, alii vero non, ut quidam dicebant, ſed etiam quare aliquis prædeſtinetur nulla facta comparatione, ſiquidem nulla ratio eſſe potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam, niſi per modum finis.* Vaſquez. in 1. Thom. Diſp. 91. c. 7. *You ſee how much a Jeſuits granteth.*

A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more ſmilingly on the *Times to come*, or *frowningly* on the *Times paſt*. For if this be true, what thoughts, what names do we deſerve for troubling the Chriſtian World, ſo perniciouſly and diſtractingly, with a feigned difference. But, I pray you, tell me in general, *how you will manifeſt all this?*

B. 1. You muſt give me leave to tell you *who they are that I undertake this* Reconciliation of. 2. And then, *how I ſhall perform it.*

I. It is not every *violent Contender*, that runneth into ſuch palpable Errors as the common cauſe needeth not, and will ſay any thing rather than agree, that I am ſpeaking of. About theſe matters, there are *two Parties* that ſtand on each extream, who are not to be called *Calviniſts* and *Arminians*; but by other Names, for their other Opinions. Theſe I intend to *confute diſtinctly*, inſtead of *reconciling* them, which is impoſſible, but by reforming them.

I. On the one side, I undertake not the Reconciliation of the *Predeterminants*, who hold, That [*Free-will is nothing but will as related to Reason*, Lubentia juxta rationem; *and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacious premotion of God, as is the motion of a Clock, or other Engine, or of a Bruit* (though they will needs call them *free*, because they are *Volitions*, as if *willing* and *free-willing* were words of the same signification:) *and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature, to say, that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another, without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God, as the first total Cause, notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power, and as the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse; and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act, is to deifie it also.*] They that think that God cannot make a Creature, whose *Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated, though God uphold all its powers, and all natural concurrents else, and that a self-determined, not predetermined by premotion is a God, or a Contradiction, I am to confute, and not to reconcile.*

A. *How will you confute them?*

B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point. It shall now suffice to mind you, that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity, if not all Religion. For when *Adam*'s sin, and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils, is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God, as the first total Cause, and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods, or to Conquer God; it's easie to perceive whether God *hate* such sin, and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it; and whether he will damn men for not being Gods; and whether he that is said *unresistibly to predetermine by immediate efficiency the thought, will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken, can have any word, delivered by man, which we can be sure is true.* In a word, if this Opinion hold, it will allow no other Religion in the World, but this much, [*To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil, which God doth cause as a free Benefactor, differencing his Gifts in various proportions, as he seeth meet; as he differenceth Stars from Stones, and Men from Dogs, and equally causeth the wisdom of Man, and the poyson of the Toad or Serpent; and so will make such differences in this World, and the next (if there be any) as pleaseth him, as he doth here between one Horse that's pampered, and another that is tired out with labour.*] Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way. It hath pleased God, by permitting *Hobbs* to reduce this Principle of the *Wills necessitation* unto its proper practice, thereby to cast more shame upon it in our Times for this Authors sake, than we could have expected, if none but such excellent persons as *Alvarez* * and his Brethren, Dr. *Twisse* and *Rutherford* had maintained it. But as *Davenant* well saith, It is an Opinion of the *Dominicans*, which *Protestants* have no mind to own.

* And more plainly, yet *Bradwardine* who maketh the necessitating cause of Sin and Hell, that God will have it so, and none can resist him.

And there are two sorts that thus subject the *Will* to *absolute caused necessity*: 1. Those aforesaid, the *Dominicans*, who assist the predetermining premotion of God, as necessary to every act natural and free. 2. Those that make the Will as much necessitated by a train of natural *second Causes*, which is *Hobbs* his way, (and alas, the way of great and excellent healing *Camero*). For they hold, That the Will is necessitated by the Intellect, and the Intellect by the Object; and God made both *Will*, and *Intellect*, and *Object*, (and *Law*). And so *Camero* hath nothing to resolve the necessitating cause of *Adams* sin into, but the Devil.

But

But who necessitated the Devil to sin? This will be all one, when it is discussed. And if self-determining freedom of Will in Man be impossible, it will be impossible in the Angels; for they are not Gods.

Therefore I now deal with none but those who confess, that God made Man's *Will* at first with a natural *self-determining power* and *freedom*, suited to this earthly state of government; and that *Adam's* Will by that same measure of Grace which he had, could have forborn his sin, at the instant when he sinned.

II. The other extream which I reconcile not, but confute, * is the *Pelagians*, who deny *Original Sin*, and acknowledge not the pravity of viciated nature; and consequently must deny the need of Grace in the same proportion, and so far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier. And how far this also subverteth Christianity, you may perceive.

* Yet I am not imitating the old way of anathematizing all the hard sayings or opinions of others, that being it that I write this against, of which course the Epistles of *Joan. Antioch.* 5. 6, &c. and of *Cyril, Alex.* to *Proclus* against his so using *Theodor. Mops.* in *Procli Actiol.* are worth the reading, besides the fore-named.

A. But both these Parties have a great deal of very plausible reason for their Opinions, as you may see in the *Dominicans* on one side, and *Hobbes* against *Bramhall*, and in Dr. *Jeremy Taylor*, his *Treat. of Repentance*, on the other; and therefore are not to be so slighted.

B. I do not slight them, but confute them. I confess that the cases are not without difficulty, yea not a little. But I am surer that Religion is not to be renounced, than they can be of the truth of their Opinions. And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cause of *Julian*, *Porphyrie* or *Celsus* against Christ, that they would not have spoken as plausibly, and made the case seem as difficult, at least to be argumentatively answered as they here do.

A. Now let us here your *way* or *terms* before-mentioned, what they are?

B. II. I suppose every sober man will allow me, 1. To distinguish *Names* and *Words* from *Things*, and * *nominal* Controversies from *real*; and to that end to open the *ambiguity* of *words* as I go along: And to shew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion, or an *ens rationis* only that men contend about, instead of a *reality*. 2. I may be allowed, when confusion lapeth up many doubtful questions in one, to distinguish them, that each may have its proper answer. 3. I may be allowed to cast by, as unfit for contention, all those unrevealed and unsearchable Points, which none of the Contenders know at all, nor ever will do in this World. 4. And I will take leave to lay by the *rash words* of particular Writers, as not to be imputed to *any others*, nor to the *main Cause*; or as that which I am not obliged to defend, reconcile, nor at all to meddle with. 5. And when all this is done, you shall see what Atoms the remaining differences will prove.

* *Vasqu. in* 1. *Tho.* q. 23. a. 3. d. 43. c. 1. *Bona pars hujus controversiæ (an reprobationis detur causa ex parte reprobi) de voce est.*

A. Begin then with the first Article of *Predestination*.

B. Remember my undertaking, that it is not to justifie every mans words that hath written on the Point; and therefore I will not lose time in citing or defending Authors: But produce you all your Accusations, as against the Cause of the sober moderate *Calvinists*, and suppose me to be the person with whom you have to do.

The

The first Crimination.

See the conclusion of the Canons of the Synod at *Dort*, where this very Charge is denied with detestation. And can you tell better what men hold than they themselves. *Episcop. Justit. Theol. l.4. Sect.5.cap.6. p. 412.Col.2.52. Sect.2. Statuitur, Deum eos secundum opera sua judicare—& ob rebellionem & contumaciam eorum dolere, irasci, &c. damnare, &c. cum tamen non modo absolute eos pervire & peccare voluerit, sed & originario tali labe infectos nasci fecerit, unde omnia ista peccata scaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter necesse erat. Quod quid aliud esse potest, quam histrionica quadam & scenica allio?*

A. 1. My first Charge is, That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greatest part of men, without respect to any fore-seen Sin, or cause in them, but meerly because it pleaseth him to do it: This is your Doctrine of *Absolute Reprobation.*

B. That *words* may not deceive us, let us in the beginning once for all know what you mean by the word [*Decree.*]

A. I mean the resolution or purpose of his Will *de eventu*, that this shall be.

B. And, I suppose, we are agreed; 1. That *Gods Will* is nothing but his *Essence* denominated with respect to some *Good* as its Object. 2. And there was no Object really existent from eternity but God himself. 3. That *Understanding* and *Will* are not *univocal* terms spoken of God and of man, nor of the same formal Conception. And 4. That our formal Conception of *Understanding* and *Will* is only of them as they are in man, and not as in God; and so this to us is the *prius significatum.* 5. And therefore that God doth not *understand* or *will* in our sence *formaliter*, but only *eminenter.* 6. And lastly, That Mortals know not just how Gods *eminent Intellection* and *Volition* differ from the *formal* in Man. All this you must grant me, or be singular and ignorant.

A. All this is past denial; but proceed to the Case.

B. Do you differ from us *de eventu*, whether there be a Hell, or yet of the *number* of those that are damned?

A. No: or if we do about the Case of Heathens, that belongeth not to this Point.

B. Do you differ from us about the *Cause* of *mens Damnation?* We say that God damneth no man, but for Sin; yea, for Sin impenitently continued in to the last, against all the mercy which tended to their Cure.

A. So far we are agreed: But it's not the *cause of damnation* which I speak of, but the *cause of the Decree.*

B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth, he *willeth* to do?

A. Yes, God doth nothing without a will to do it, at least consequently.

B. Do you think that God *willeth* any thing to day, which he *willed* not yesterday, and so from eternity?

A. No, we do not with *Vostius* make God mutable.

B. Good still: you grant then that God damneth men; that he damneth them for sin; that he doth it *willingly*; that he *willed it from eternity.* And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God?

A. No.

B. Then can that which *is not* be a *cause*; was there any thing but God himself to be the *Cause* of *Gods Will* from eternity?

A. Not *in esse reali*, but there was *in esse cognito.*

B. So: now the game begins: Thus the World is cheated and troubled by Logical Notions, and meer words. Is that *esse cognitum* any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is no Cause; If any thing, is it God or a Creature? It can be no Creature, because it is eternal: If God, you do but say, That *God caused his own Will.*

A. It is *Gods fore-knowledge of Sin*, which causeth his Decree or Will.

B. 1. Even *fore-knowledge* it self, say the Schools, is but the same with *knowledge*, and spoken (say they) but to the respect and sense of man. There being neither *prius vel posterius*, *before* or *after* in eternity. But this I now insist not on. 2. It is commonly taken for blasphemy, to talk of a *Cause* of God, or any thing in God. If Gods Will be his Essence, it hath no Cause. He *causeth* not *himself*, being no Effect. 3. If this were so as you say, yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his *own Will* by his *knowledge*. * For *Sin fore-seen* is no *Sin*, and *nothing* is no *Cause*; so that you your self resolve all into God. And indeed, what can be a cause of the first Cause, or any thing in him?

Use not tergiversation, and vain words now, and tell me what you have to say.

A. A thing not existent, but fore-seen, may be a *moral Cause*, though not a *physical*; and so fore-seen Sin may be to God.

B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cause of his Will, is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence; And shall so base a thing as Sin cause God? 2. We are still at the cheating Game, of playing with arbitrary Notions. What mean you by a *moral Cause*? If a true cause of *moral Beings*, that's one thing: If any thing that is not physically or properly, but by *moral imputation* only a cause of any event, that's another thing. The first you dare not own, as if any thing which is nothing (Sin not existent) were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called *Causa metaphorica*: It is really *no Cause*; but that, for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that is equivocally a Cause. 3. Therefore if you use not the word [*Cause*] equivocally, your rule is false. Nothing is no *moral Cause*. You will instance in *good desired*, *in fine nondum existente*, &c. But I answer you, *Good* and *amiable* are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an existent *entity* or subject. *A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis, & a negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii, valet argumentum.* That which *is not*, is not *good* or *amiable*: Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other *good*, but the *desire* of *good*, or the *apprehension* of the *futurity* of *good* which *causeth*; so that all the Cause is in the Agent. 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge, that when any man saith, That *sin which is no sin, and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will*, he must needs mean *no real cause*; Because *to be a cause*, is *tertium Adjectum*, and presupposeth *to be*: That which is not, is not a cause; much less of God, or of his Will.

A. I can shew you, that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick: For if this hold true, then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings, *&c.* was no moral true cause of Gods *Will* to pardon Sin, and save Souls, to those under the Promise before the Incarnation.

B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter, but advantageth you not at all. Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this, *that nothing can do nothing, nor cause nothing*. It was not Christ's *Body* or *actual* Suffering, not yet existent, that caused Gods *Will* to pardon Sinners. Nor had Gods *Will* any proper cause: But seeing God willed *one thing to be the means of another*, he willed that Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice, and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency,

* *Vasquez* in 1. Tho. d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree, *Divinae voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem & motivam, per modum objecti, sed etiam nullam esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud, sed solam suam bonitatem: Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem & causam alterius: & ita licet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud, velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam, quia una est causa alterius. Non ergo quaerimus an aliud sit ratio motiva Deo per modum finis, ut velit nos praedestinare, praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest.* Id. ib. disp. 91. c. 4. *Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujus gratia, & ratio volendi aliquid: sed propter quod cetera esse vult Deus.*

cency, and to pardon Sin: And therefore (not Christ's Death it self, but) God's *Decree* of the Death of Christ Incarnate, was the cause of the Promise, and of the New Covenant made with *Adam*, and of the Salvation of Believers then. Which Will or Decree is called by some *the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word.*

A. But at least Sin fore-seen is *causa sine qua non.*

B. Call it by what name you please, as long as you confess it to be no *Cause*, (for *causa sine qua non*, is called *Causa fatua*, and is none) But it is not *Sin* which is *Causa sine qua non*; for it is *no sin* from eternity.

A. It is the *futurity of sin* that is *Causa sine qua non.*

B. Yet more notions! what is *futurity?* any thing or nothing? nothing certainly: For *quoad ens*, it is *terminus diminuens*; and *nothing* is no cause. But it is Gods *knowledge* that *Sin will be*, which is to be called *the Cause of Gods Decree*, as *sine qua non*, if any be. But I must deal most about *futurition* with the *Calvinists*, when I come to save you from Dr. *Twisse* his *Ferula.*

A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self.

B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it; But not by making other mens worse, but by opening the reconciling truth. 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said to have an extrinsick cause, without change in God. 1. Know therefore that *Gods Essence* is his *Will*, but not *as Essence.* To say that *God is God*, and that *God willeth this or that*, are not terms of the same signification. 2. Gods *Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good* as the Object; and so there is ever *quid respectivum* in the notion of *Will.* 3. As God *willeth himself*, the Act being perfectly immanent, his Will is called *himself* much more properly, than his *Will* of things extrinsick (which is ever either *effectively*, or at least objectively transient;) Because it is God that *willeth*, and that is *willed* or *loved*, (which made many Ancients say, That this was the third Person in the Trinity.) 4. But as God *willeth* things *ad extra*, though it is his Essence that *willeth* them; yet it is unfit to say simply, that *this Will is God*; e. g. that to will *Peter's* Salvation is God, because the name *Will* here includeth the thing *willed.* 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion, as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts, it is less inconvenient to say simply, that this Will is God, than when we speak of his Will in act *ad extra.* By this time you may see, that though Gods *Will*, as his Essence, hath no *cause*; yet his *Will* as *denominated extrinsecally* from the Object, may have some kind of Cause that is * *objective*, which is *quasi materia actus*, and the *terminus sine quo non*; that is, *Gods Will* is not *denominated a complacency in Christ existent*, or in *Peter regenerate*, * or his understanding, *a seeing that the World was good*, before any of these things did exist. So that by extrinsick denomination, without any change in God, he may and should be said *de novo* to know things to be existent, to be past, to *will things* as existent with complacency, or will them with displicency: But not to will the futurity of mens damnation *de novo*; but yet his Will of the *futurity* of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause, from whence it is denominated: As *in esse cognito*, the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man, a subject, and then a Sinner, and a Despiser of Mercy, and then a damnable Sinner. And so these are indeed conditions in the Object, or *Causæ sine quibus non*, or *Objective material-constituent causes*; not in themselves, but the fore-sight of them; not of Gods Will as his Essence,

Praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2.

* *Alvarez* himself saith, that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act.

* This is all that *Ruiz* his Reasons prove *De Vol. Dei disp.* 115. *Sect.* 4. *p.* 102 Who saith, that there is more than extrinsick denomination; *Et relatio rationis cum reali formalitas.* But he doth but shew by his *quodammodo*, that he knoweth not what to say.

Essence, nor of his *Will* as a *Will*, but of his *Will* as extrinsecally denominated, a *Decree* to *damn Judas*; *e. g.* because no otherwise is *Judas* an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will.

II. Both you and I hold, and must hold, that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned. * But it is false, that we hold that he doth it without any respect *to fore-seen sin*. For 1. He fore-seeth *this Sin* as the only meritorious cause of their damnation; what he doth in time, that is it which he decreed to do from eternity: But in time he damneth no man but for Sin; therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin: For sin, I say, as the cause of damnation, which Dr. *Twisse* doth frequently profess. 2. And though this *Sin* can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree, yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object, as fore-seen in the Mind of God, and so, as aforesaid, is an Objective Cause as fore-seen.

* *Vasquez in* 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 3. p. 709. *Conclusio* (quod Deus aliquos reprobat) *ita de fide constat tanquam ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari.* Vid. Ruiz de præde fin. Tract. 1. *per totum.*

III. The execution of Justice, and glorification of it, and Gods Holiness thereby is good, and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree. But in the word *Reprobation* is in most mens sense included much, which we hold not, which is to be opened further anon.

IV. And as to the *absoluteness* of Gods Decree to damn those that are damned; I think you will not deny it your self, supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners. God doth not only *will*, that all the *finally impenitent shall be damned*; nor only that, *e. g. Judas shall be damned, if he be finally impenitent*; But also that *Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent, shall certainly be damned.* So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object; it is no longer a meer conditional Decree, but absolute, supposing that condition. In all this we are agreed.

The second Crimination.

A. II. But that's not all; But you hold, That God eternally decreed mens sin; yea, all the sin of Men and Devils; some say, That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act; and the moderatest, that he* decreed the event, that Sin should come to pass *ipso permittente quamvis non efficiente*; or at least, that he decreed his permission of it.

* *Vid. Episcopii Resp. ad qu.* 64. *qu.* 33. *pag.* 32. *ubi dicit, Deum decrevisse ut Judæi Christum e medio tollerent, ex præscientia quod id liberâ voluntate, facturi essent, atque inde præditionis certas natas esse.*

B. I. The first sort are those few, whom I in the beginning renounced; of whom the *Dominicans*, and good Dr. *Twisse*, and *Rutherford* his Follower (*de providentia*) are the chief. I easily confess to you, that God made the *Law*, and God *made man*, and God *maketh* the *Objects*, and God causeth the Act as a natural Act *in genere*, by a natural general concourse: And if it could be also proved, that God were the *chief efficient Determiner* of the Will, and that by *necessitation* to *this Act* or Object *comparatively rather than to that*, (*e. g.* that *David* willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery,) I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin. For the *formal reason* of Sin is *Relative*, viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God. And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent, *Posito fundamento & omni absoluto*: And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation. And Dr. *Twisse* and *Rutherford* so far saw this, that the up-shot of all their Vindication is; 1. That God causeth not sin as sin, but as a means to his Glory. 2. That God is under no Law, (as we are) and therefore can be no Author of Sin. But, to the first I answer;

It's one thing to *will Sin as Sin*, and another thing to *cause Sin as Sin*. We charge them not, with inferring that God *willeth Sin as Sin*; but if he *will* it and *cause* it for *another end*, he causeth the *formal nature of Sin*, (that we may not play with the ambiguity of *Quatenus*) and that's as much as man doth. For Sinners do not *all*, if any, *will sin as sin* under this formal notion, as it is a breach of the Law of God, and displeaseth him; but as it bringeth them some seeming good: And by doing evil for that good, they are Sinners.

To the second, we do not charge the *Dominicans* with making God a Sinner: But with making him the chief cause of the *sin of man*, even in its form.

II. But this is nothing to the *Calvinists* in general. Therefore, I say, that your selves hold the same that they do in this point. *Q.* 1. Do not all the *Jesuites* and *Arminius* hold, That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of. And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural, in the general. See but *Rob. Baronius* his *Metaphysicks*, and *Bellarmine* whom he followeth.

A. That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act.

B. And Dr. *Twisse* hath oft enough told you, where *Arminius* saith, *That God would have* Ahab *to fill up the measure of his Sin.*

A. That is not that he *willed the sin*, but that *Ahab* having made himself wicked, God decreed not to stop him, but let him go on.

B. Either you mean, that the Object of Gods Decree was but his *own permission* (as the *Arminians* use to say) or else, that it was the *Sin it self* (matter and form) permitted, (not because it is sin or evil, for so man oft willeth it not at least, but) as an occasion of Gods Glory. *Arminius* his words import the latter: And then you go as high as Dr. *Twisse* or *Rutherford*. But if you say, that it was *but a rash word* of *Arminius*, which you stand not to; to make plain and short work with you, I am so far from being liable to your charge, that I charge you as presumptuous, if not erroneous, in saying, that God decreeth or willeth *to permit Sin*. And I assert.

1. That God doth not Decree the *form* of Sin as Sin. 2. Nor yet the *event* of that *form* for any good end (For, *Ut peccatum eveniat*, is but *peccatum futurum*;) and what is it to decree Sin, but to decree that it shall be? Nor 3. Hath he decreed, that this Act which is the Sin, shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state, from whence it is, that Sin in its form resulteth. And so *Augustines* saying so much decantate by Dr. *Twisse* and others, * is not found, that *nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth, either effecting it, or permitting it.* It cometh to pass without Gods willing it or decreeing it; so that he permitteth it, but decreeth not that it shall come to pass. Not that it is against *his* contrary absolute Decree; but as *Lombard* from other places in *Austin* telleth you plainly, God neither willeth that it shall be, (because it is sin) nor properly and simply willeth that it shall *not be*, for his Will is not overcome. 4. Yea, he cannot be proved to decree his own *permission*; Because to *permit*, is but *not to hinder*, which is *nothing* but a negation: And we have no ground to feign, that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing, or of negations.

So that I say, that Sin cometh to pass without Gods Decree of the *event*, or of his permission. (Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it; of which more, when I speak to the other extream.) And of this also more anon.

Nullus est Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non esse effectum prædestinationis; etiam si prædestinatus occasionem ex eo sæpius capiat suæ salutis. Nam cum Deus causa peccati esse nequeat, efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione prædestinare possit. —*Neq; alius ipse peccati secundum esse naturale, non est effectus prædestinationis, quamvis sit hoc modo effectus divinæ voluntatis*, Vasquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. disp. 93.

* As *Bradwardine* who also tells us, That if God damn the Innocent, his Will is the rule of justice and equity: But I think they that so describe his Justice, do rather think that none are damned, than that the Innocent are; or may be, as an act of Justice, whatever a meer Proprietor may do.

The

The third Crimination.

A. III. You make God neceſſitate mens ſin and damnation by your negative decrees, as well as others by their poſitive: For you hold, That no man can believe and repent, but ſuch as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to: And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he ſhall do. And ſome ſay that God decreeth, Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them (which is a Decree objectively negative *de non dando*); And you and others ſay, That *he doth not Decree to give them more.* And ſo as a ſtone is not culpable for not flying, no more are Sinners, not elected, for not *believing* and obeying God. *

* Note what *Vaſquez* granteth in 1. *Tho.* q. 23. a. 5. *diſp.* 92. c. 2. *Certum eſt predeſtinationem gratiæ, & ipſam primam gratiam (quod idem eſt) non eſſe in noſtra poteſtate, ſicut & predeſtinationis & ipſius gratiæ nullam cauſam aut occaſionem ex nobis precedere.*

B. You wholly miſtake and miſreport us. If we differ from you, it is by going further from the matter of the Objection than you do your ſelves.

1. We hold, that God giveth many men *power* to do more than they do: And conſequently that he decreeth to give it them. Men do not do all that they can do. Indeed we hold, That no man *can* do any thing, which God doth not *give him power* to do, and *decree* to give it him. And dare any of you deny this. *There is no power but of God.*

2. I hold not, that God hath any *Will* or *Decree* in proper ſenſe, Not to give Grace, not to give Faith, not to give Repentance, Help, Means, *&c.* But only that he *doth not decree* to *give* it, where he giveth it not indeed; But as *Lombard* afore-cited, ſaith, He neither *Willeth, nor Nilleth it.* My Reaſons are, 1. Only Good is the Object of Gods Will, and Evil of his Nolition. But *nothing* is not Good, nor Faith, Repentance, *&c.* nor Grace, evil: Therefore God doth not *will nothing*, or *nill* the ſaid good.

Aquin. de Repub. a. 3. q. 23. ad 3. Reprobatio Dei non ſubtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati, unde cum dicitur quod reprobatus non poteſt gratiam adipiſci non eſt intelligendum ſecundum impoſſibilitatem abſolutam, ſed conditionatam.

2. *Fruſtra fit per plura*, &c. It is preſumptuous to feign needleſs Decrees and Volitions in God: But the Decree of *nothing* (of not *giving* Grace) is vain: For *nothing* will be *nothing*, without any Decree or Volition of God, as well as without any efficiency. If God neither make, nor *will* more Worlds, more Sons, more Men, there *will* be no *more*, though he have no Will or poſitive Decree that there *ſhall be no more.*

3. No man knoweth where to bound the Doctrine of Decrees *de nihilo*; And to make them infinite or boundleſs, foundeth ſo preſumptouſly and profanely, that common reaſon doth diſclaim it. It is poſſible that there be as many more ſands, pebbles, ſtraws, *&c.* made as are: It is poſſible to make every ſtone, or ſand, an Animal, or the choice of a thouſand other things: It's poſſible to give each man and Creature the choice of a thouſand other names, places, circumſtances: And muſt we feign in God a poſitive Will or Decree of every one of theſe poſſibles that they ſhall never be? That this Sand ſhall not be a Man, nor that Bird a Stone, *&c.* It is enough to conceive that Gods infinite Wiſdom knoweth what is fitteſt to be, and that all that he *willeth* ſhall be; and that he willeth no more; and therefore no more Creatures will be. But he willeth to give power to free Agents, to do or not do certain acts *in ſpecie*; and therefore they *can* do more than he decreeth they *ſhall do.*

Id. ib. ad ſecundum, Predeſtinatio eſt cauſa & ejus quod expectatur in futura vita a predeſtinatis, ſcil. Gloria & ejus quod præcipitur in præſenti, ſcil. Gratia: Reprobatio vero non eſt cauſa ejus quod eſt in præſenti, ſcil. culpa, ſed eſt cauſa derelictionis a Deo, eſt tamen cauſa ejus quod redditur in futuro, ſcil. pœna æterna.

2. And as to the *neceſſity* of mens ſin or miſery, you lay as much of it upon God as we; that is, no *cauſal neceſſity* at all, (as *Rob. Baronius* diſtinguiſheth it well in his *Metaphyſicks.*) To omit all the Diſtinctions

of neceſſity which *Hereboord*, and many others give us, that we need not, it is here ſufficient to diſtinguiſh between meer *Logical neceſſitas conſequentiæ* in order of argumentation; and Phyſical or *cauſal neceſſity* in order of Being. God's fore-knowledge (which you deny not) inferreth the former: For it is a good argument (what ever God fore-knoweth will come to paſs: But *God* fore-knoweth the ſins of all that ſin; *Ergo* they will come to paſs). The *major* is a neceſſary propoſition, and ſo is the *minor*; therefore ſo is the concluſion. But yet God's knowledge cauſeth not ſin; nor is it neceſſitated in any. Dr. *Twiſſe*, who goeth as high as predetermination, doth yet grant *Arminius*, that it is only *neceſſitas conſequentiæ*, and not *conſequentis*, which Gods Decree or Will doth infer as to mens ſin and miſery; and profeſſeth, that all the Schoolmen ſay the ſame; and blameth *Arminius* for pretending that we infer a *neceſſitatem conſequentis*: And the other *Arminius* owneth. And are they not then agreed whether they will or not? I doubt not but predetermination inferreth *neceſſitatem conſequentis* cauſally, though this be denied by them that hold it. But ſo doth nothing which we aſſert.

The fourth Crimination.

A. You will make either the pure maſs, or man as man, or the corrupted maſs, to be the Object of Predeſtination, (Election and Reprobation). And ſo make God deſert moſt men in *Adam*'s ſin, as he did the Devils in their ſin, without remedy, or hope. *

* *Vaſquez* holdeth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 9. q. 4. c. 2. that Chriſt merited our Election out of the corrupted maſs; not as Election is in God, but in the Effect: And that *Paul*, Eph. 1. [*Elegit nos in Chriſto*, &c.] *utitur nomine electionis, quæ eſt ſeparatio illa a maſſa perditionis in qua multi relicti ſunt.*

B. Theſe are words of confuſion, which, when opened, will appear nothing, and that we are all of a mind.

Either you will diſtinguiſh Gods Decrees by the Objects, or not. If not, you muſt not diſtinguiſh between Election and Rejection, willing and nilling, loving *Peter*, and hating *Judas*, &c. If yea, then you muſt not take up with the unexplained words, *Reprobation* and *Election*. 1. By Reprobation is meant either Gods Will to puniſh men. 2. Or his Will to give them no ſpecial ſaving Grace. 3. Or his *not-willing* to give it them. For the firſt, I told *you* before that the Object of Gods Will to puniſh men in Hell, is a Sinner fore-ſeen finally rejecting Mercy. 2. The Object of his Will to puniſh men with poſitive temporal puniſhments, is the Sinner fore-ſeen in his immediate capacity for them. 3. Whether puniſhment by not giving that Spirit for Faith, Repentance, and Holineſs, be decreed (being *nothing* but a *not-giving*) is before diſcuſt. But if it could be proved, yet the Object of Gods denying further mercy and help, is evermore one that hath abuſed former mercy, or refuſeth that as offered to him. 4. But Gods non-Volition to give Grace is no act, and hath no Object. But we judge that all mankind are now from under the meer Covenant of Innocency, and that none periſh but for the abuſe of mercy, which had a tendency to their recovery (The caſe of Infants muſt be ſpoke to in its place once for all.) But all this belongeth to the Caſe of Grace and Free-will.

Idem d. 95. 1. Ferrarienſ. *plane indicat Deum neminem damnare, aut rejicere a regno ſuo voluiſſe, quod ipſe appellat deſerere, niſi præviſa culpa.*

* And 2. As for Election, we ſay that 1. The Object of Gods Will to glorifie men, is man ſanctifying and perſevering in an immediate capacity for Glory in *eſſe cognito*. 2. The Object of Gods Will to give the Grace of perſeverance, is a fore-ſeen ſanctified perſon in the next capacity. 3. The Object of Gods Will to juſtifie, ſanctifie, and

* How *Auguſtine* diſtinguiſhed Election to Juſtification and to Glory. See him, *lib.* 1. *ad ſimplic. q.* 2. *Et quæ de eo habet*, Vaſquez in 1. Thom. diſp. 89. cap. 6.

and adopt, is a fore-seen Believer. 4. The Object of Gods Will, to give special Grace, which shall effectually cause men to repent and believe, is ordinarily a fore-seen disposed Sinner prepared by his common Grace; but sometimes an unprepared Sinner, whom, of his free will, he will suddenly convert, as it pleaseth him freely to distribute his benefits (all being unworthy.) 5. The Object of Gods Will, to give the highest degrees of common Grace, external (in the purest preaching of the Gospel, and other mercies,) and internal (in greater helps of the Spirit) is sometimes a Sinner *in esse cognito*, who hath not grosly rejected lower helps, and sometimes freely the worser sort of Sinners, who have abused former mercies. 6. The Object of Gods Will, to give the first common mercy which hath a tendency in its use to mens recovery and Salvation, is all mankind fallen in *Adam:* For all are under the New Covenant of Grace made with *Adam*, *Gen.* 3. 15. in some degree, (and with *Noah*) and all have much mercy tending to Repentance; and none are left as the Devils in dispair, without any offered remedy or help. 7. The Object of Gods *Will* to give man the Covenant of Innocency, was *Adam* fore-seen as meer man. 8. The Object of Gods Will to create man, was *nothing* in the sense that we now take an *Object* in; that is, for the *materia circa quam*. But if you will call the *intended effect* the *Object*, then the Object of Gods Will here (and in the rest) is the *thing willed*. But if you will needs presume to seek one higher in the Mind of God, * you must say that it was *man* as conceived *fit to be*, as well as *possible*. For we can think no otherwise of the Divine Conceptions and Volitions, but as we are led by the analogy of humane acts. And so we must say, that 1. Gods Power maketh it *possible* for all things to be. 2. Next God knoweth them possible. 3. He knoweth what is *convenient* or *fit* to be made, to his unsearchable ends. 4. He willeth that they shall be, and man among the rest, and so on. If you will needs have the order of Decrees, this is all that we can say of them.

* Man knoweth by Reception, and so hath Ideas: But God can be no Recipient.

A. All this pleaseth us well: but it will not please your own Party, or the *Calvinists*; that you make so many acts of Election, which they tell you is but one entire thing, as mentioned in Scripture: Nor yet that you lay every Decree or Will upon fore-sight.

B. You are mistaken: No moderate considerate man of them will deny any thing that I have said. For 1. As to the Scripture use of the word *Election*, it is not the *meer name* that we are now opening, but the *matter* in question: Nor is it the expounding of particular Texts that I am upon: And if I were, no man will deny but that the word *Election* is variously used in the Scripture: Sometime for Gods eternal Will to make us Christians of Infidels, and to save us by Christ; and sometime for actual choosing us by converting Grace in time; and sometime for actual choosing men in time by Vocation to some office or special work, &c.

2. And as to the distinguishing of all these Volitions of God, no man will deny the *effects* to be distinct; undoubtedly these are various effects of God; 1. To make man. 2. To give him the Covenant of Innocency. 3. To give him the Covenant of Grace, with all the common mercies of it. 4. To give some Persons and Nations the Gospel, and other mercies above the greatest part of the World, with answerable helps of the Spirit. 5. To give men special Grace, effectual for Faith and Repentance. 6. To give men Pardon, Adoption, and Sanctification. 7. To give men Perseverance. 8. To give them Glory. And if these are various works, either you will distinguish

of

of *Gods Will* by his various works, or not. * If you do not, our whole Controversie about the Order of the Decrees is quickly at an end (and I am content with the abreviation): For where there is no Distinction, there is no Order. And when I distinguish them never so much, I say, as well as any, that they are *all one* in regard of the *one Will* or *Essence* of God that *willeth them*. In God there is no real diversity; but his *Will* is thus variously *denominated* extrinsecally from its respect to the various objects to which it doth *transire*, and of the various effects which it produceth. And thus do all men talk of God. Else they could not distinguish his saving Will from his damning Will; nor Election from Rejection, in his Decree. So that no man can tell how to differ here.

3. And as to *fore-sight*, you as much mistake. For 1. I say not that God fore-seeth any good in any man, but what he *giveth* him, and *willeth* to give him; But we speak of the Order of those Volitions, in the way of execution. * 2. And all men that ascribe Intentions, Volitions, or Purposes to God, do and must make the Object of them as such to be *Quid cognitum*, or something which some call an Idea in the Mind of God; It is not a *prius Volitum qua tale* that is the Object of a Volition, but *bonum intellectum*. And therefore nothing but *fore-sight* or *apprehension* of the thing, needs to be put in the description of the Object.

Nor do I deny, but that we must in our ordinary Discourse speak comprehensively, and denominate *Election* eminently from the noblest parts: For as our full *Salvation* includeth all, or almost all, so our Conversion and Glorification presupposeth all that antecedeth. And therefore as we may and must talk of Salvation in general, and not always stand to mention all the parts of it; so must we eminently talk of Election to Salvation, as comprehending the rest, and not always stand to distinguish of the parts. But when you will make a Controversie of the *Order* and the *Object* of these acts or parts, we must distinguish.

* *Sive secundum nostram rationem distinguamus illud decretum in plura, sive dicamus esse unicum, non est multum curandum: Certum enim est apud omnes, Deum omnia & singula voluisse unico simplicissimo actu suæ voluntatis: Est enim ipsius voluntas, & voluntatis operatio idem quod sua essentia simplex & individua si aliquis contenderet esse etiam nostro modo intelligendi esse unicum actum simplicissimum voluntatis, ego non curabo.* Vasquez in 1. Tho q. 14. a. 13. disp. 65. And is not this a short end of many Controversies.

* *Altex. Alens.* is noted by *Vasquez* and others, as singular, for holding that Predestination to the first Grace was upon fore-sight of the future good use of that Grace as the cause: But he denieth that the first Grace is actually given on the same Cause: Therefore *Vasquez* thinks he changed his mind.

The fifth Crimination.

A. But you make Gods Decrees to proceed according to the Order of Intention, * *De fine & mediis*; and so you feign God to Decree mens damnation; yea, and the denying them Grace; yea, and their Sin, *sub ratione medii*, as a means to his Glory: And so he first decreeth to damn them, and then to leave them in sin to that end.

B. All this is your mistake: what any particular men say, I now mind not: But that which we hold is this; 1. I have told you, That *not to give men Grace, Faith, yea, and Heaven*, is *nothing*: And *nothing* needeth no Volition or Decree: Though both the *Threatning* and the *Sentence* of these Privations is *something*, and those are *willed* or decreed.

2. I have told you, That *God* decreeth no mans sin at all: It is no capable Object of *Gods* Volition; unless as *circa quod*, as he willeth what use to make of sin presupposed.

3. Sin is no *means* of the Glory of *God*; and therefore is not willed as a means: otherwise it should have the *rationem boni qua medium*, and be elegible. But it is an evil presupposed; the *curing* or *punishing* of it, and not it it self, being the *means* of *Gods* Glory: And therefore *God* doth not will it as a means.

* *Vasquez in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *disp.* 89. *c.* 7. saith, That the *duplex ordo alter intentionis, alter executionis, non sunt in mente artificis sed alter in mente & consultatione illius, alter in re ipsa.* But in man I suppose it must be said, that both may be *in mente*, the first *circa rationes operandi*; the second *circa ordinem operandi vel effectuum.* For the mind it self saith, I will do this first, and that next. But in God we know of no such Order, except Relative and Connotative from the effect, because there is nothing in God but God.

4. Do

4. Do not you your self say, 1. That *God* doth glorifie his Justice in the damnation of the Wicked? 2. And that he *willed* from eternity so to do? 3. And that he fore-knew who would be wicked? 4. And that he could have cured and saved them if he would? 5. And that he had no absolute Will or Decree eventually or effectually to cure and save them, but only *in tantum*, to do so much towards it, which he knew would be uneffectual through their fault? 6. And that therefore the Decree of damnation, upon this fore-sight, did pass upon the individuals, and not only on the Wicked and Impenitent in general? All this you hold, and must hold; and what hold we more?

5. For as to the *Order* of *Gods* Decrees, we further hold as followeth:

1. That though when there is need, we must *distinguish* them by their Effects and Objects; yet we dread the presumption of feigning those *Orders* in the Mind of *God*, which we know not of, and cannot prove. He had need to be better acquainted with the Divine Acts, that shall venture to tell us in what *Order* they lie in the Mind of *God*, than Mortals are, except where *God* hath plainly told us. *

2. We hold, that *God* doth not *intendere finem*, or *eligere media* thereto, in the sense as man doth; because he *wanteth* nothing, and therefore doth not *velle desideratum*, nor *seek* any thing which he wanteth. But that improperly *God* is said to *intend an end*, when he doth but *will to produce an effect*, or else still *perfectly enjoyeth* that which is improperly called *His end*. And in the first sense, every Creature is his *end*; that is, the *terminus* or effect of his operation. And in the other sense, He himself only is his own end; that is, the *complacency of his own Will*.

3. Therefore to undertake to delineate the Order of *Gods* Volitions or Decrees, according to the way of mental intention *de fine & mediis*, is a work unfit for us to meddle with, as being beyond our reach.

4. But those that will needs meddle that way, can go no further than to say, That *God* is his own end, (or the fulfilling or complacency of his Will) and therefore that *God* first willeth the complacency of his own Will, and then willeth all Creatures as the means thereto. And what is this to any of our Controversies? For the glorifying of his Justice, is but the means of the complacency of his Will. Or if you will say, that his Glory is his end, it is no created thing that you must mean by his Glory. For nothing created can be *Gods* Ultimate End. Or if you could prove that a created Glory were *Gods* Ultimate End; that is, the appearance or refulgence of his Image or Likeness on the Creature: yet you must confess, that it is the Glory of *God* in his Conjunct Perfections, Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and that the Glory of his Punitive Justice must be either taken as a *means* to that; or else that *God* hath his *End* continually in the Glory which is upon every Creature, and every man and act of man.

5. Though Dr. *Twisse* so frequently inculcate, *Quod prius est intentione, posterius est executione*; he saith, that it is but *de fine & mediis*, and not *de mediis inter se*; and that no *medium* is properly *Gods* End (and then nothing but himself is his End); and he glorieth as the discoverer of this Truth, that all the *means are one to God*, and therefore have but *one Decree*; so that he reduceth all *Gods* Decrees to two, 1. Of his Glory as his End. 2. Of all the means thereto as one.

6. And

* *Vasquez in* 1. *Tho.* q. 23. d. 94. c. 1. saith *Scotus in* 3. d. 19. q. 1. *Hoc ordine instantiæ rationis in Dei præscientia & providentia dispositiva primo Deum ipsum intelligisse, in secundo intellexisse omnes creaturas; in tertio quosdam ad gloriam & gratiam prædestinasse circa alios vero se habuisse negative: in quarto vidisse eos caduros in primo parente, in quinto providisse illis remedium per Christi passionem, &c.*

Scholastici omnes uno ore fatentur nullam causam reddi Divinæ voluntatis posse assignari, non solam efficientem, materialem aut formalem (id enim satis constat per se) sed nec finalem non solam rectè ordinatæ creaturæ sed nec summi boni ipsius, Vasq. 1. Tho. q. 19. d. 82. c. 1. (But by his leave, that which hath no *causa prædicta* is nothing.) But *cap.* 2. he maintaineth that Gods own goodness (only) is his *Ratio volendi, sed non causa*, which is held also by *Alens.* 1 *p.* q. 29. *m.* 3. § 3. *Gabri.* 1. *d.* 14. *q.* 1. *a.* 1. *Henric. quod.* 1. *q.* 19. *Dried. de concord.* 1. *p. cap.* 4. *dd* 4.

6. And other learned mens Writings I have ſeen, who come after him, and ſeek to prove that the Decree *de fine & mediis* are but one, and conſequently that there is no ſuch order to be feigned among them.

7. The plain truth is, Gods *Will* is the beginning and end of all: And all the World are the means of accompliſhing and pleaſing it: And it is always fulfilled and pleaſed, though not always by the ſame means: And God loveth no Creature finally for it ſelf, but for *Himſelf*, as his Perfection ſhineth in it, and as it fulfilleth his Will. And to feign any other Order of Intention and Election *de fine & mediis* in God, is preſumptuous; much more to lay our frames of them, and tye God hereto, and trouble the Church with contending for ſuch Models. But the Order of *Execution* is intelligible (in part) to man: And we are ſure that God eternally intended to execute his Will in that Order in which in time he *doth it*. And therefore this is the only *neceſſary* and the *ſufficient* method of Gods Decrees, which man can inveſtigate.

8. We deny therefore that God decreeth or willeth to damn any before he fore-ſeeth their Sin; or that he decreeth to damn any, but as impenitent Sinners; or that the damnation of any man is his End; or that he decreeth any mans ſin; or that he decreeth not to give them Grace; or that *Sin*, or *not giving Grace*, or *not believing*, &c. need a Decree, being *nothing*; much more that theſe are decreed as means to Gods Glory. But if you ſpeak *de fine*, 1. As that which man is bound to intend, 2. Or as a meer *effect*; ſo no doubt all things have their relation, uſe, and order to each other.

See this queſtion handled by *Vaſqu.* 1. *Tho.* q. 19. *d.* 82. c. 4. & 5. & 6. that *inſtantia ſecundum ordinem objectorum inter ſe aſſignanda ſunt, & non ex ſola Dei voluntate.*

The ſixth Crimination.

A. *You deny all conditional Decrees in God, and ſo make them all* abſolute, *and conſequently arbitrary, meerly becauſe God will do it.*

Lag. Twiſſ. Vind. Grat. li. 1. *Digreſ.* 1. *de Electi. p.* 151. *Et Epiſcopii Inſtit. Theol. li.* 4. *Sect.* 6. *cap.* 6. *pag.* 412, 413.

B. Do you think we differ in this? You dare not profeſs your diſſent from any of this following explication of our ſenſe.

1. Gods *Will* is the Cauſe and End of the whole Creation: And what ever pleaſeth him to do he doth; whatſoever it pleaſeth him ſhall *come to paſs*, it *ſhall* come to paſs; and what ever he is pleaſed to make our Duty by a Law, is made our Duty. All that God doth and commandeth is Arbitrary: His *Wiſdom* indeed and his *Will* concur; but his Ends are within himſelf; and his Will is the end of his Will, ſo far as it may be ſaid to have an end. Arbitrarineſs and ſelf-willedneſs is Gods Perfection, which is mans Sin and Uſurpation. If you will ſtretch to that impropriety, as to ſay that *He willeth it, becauſe his Underſtanding ſeeth it fitteſt to be willed*; and ſo make Cauſes and Effects in God; yet muſt you add, that the *fitneſs* or *goodneſs* ſo underſtood, is the *Aptitudinal congruency to his Will.*

* *Inquit Twiſſus Vind. Grat. li.* 1. *de tiſt. Dig.* 3. *p.* 163. *Aquinas diſerte aſſerit, Deum velle hoc eſſe propter hoc; ſed non propter hoc velle hoc, p.* 1. *q.* 19. *a.* 1. *c. & ad primam voluntatem Dei rationabilem eſſe, non quod aliquid ſit Deo cauſa volendi, ſed in quantum vult unum eſſe propter aliud, Et q.* 23. *a.* 5. *c. Eadem modo producuntur Bonaventura, Scotus, Durandus, conſpirantibus animis (adeo per omnia quod ad hunc apicem attinet) profitentes. Vide quæ addit ex ſuare ſio ibid p.* 164.

2. We affirm that God hath many Decrees which are *conditional* in reſpect of the *thing decreed.* * So Dr. *Twiſſe* frequently tells you. He maketh one thing a *means* and a *condition* of the *event* of another. And we ſay that *God* hath conditional Promiſes and *Threatnings*; [*If thou confeſs with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart*, &c. *thou ſhalt be ſaved*.] And we believe that Gods Will made theſe Promiſes and Threats, and that they are the true ſigns of his Will: And that he will fulfil them. And

ſo

ſo far he hath a *conditional* Will, and conditional expreſſions of his Will.

3. But as to the Act of *Volition*, we believe that his *Wills* are eternal, and have no proper *condition* of their *exiſtence*, or *not exiſting*; becauſe being exiſtent, they are *Neceſſary neceſſitate exiſtentiæ*; *e. g.* God never had ſuch a Will as this, [If thou repent, I will purpoſe or will to pardon thee if thou repent, or to make the pardoning conditional promiſe;] But [If thou repent I will pardon thee, and whether thou repent or not, I will conditionally pardon thee, or make that Covenant which ſaith, I will pardon thee if thou repent,] our Acts are the Conditions of Gods Gifts and Acts, but not of his *Will*, as ſuſpended on thoſe Acts.

4. Sure this is your own ſentiment: For you deny not that God knoweth from eternity whether the condition of each Event *will* it ſelf be or not; And if ſo, it muſt be only the condition of the Event, and not of his Decree: For he that *e. g.* willeth abſolutely that all ſhall periſh that repent not, and knoweth certainly that *Judas* will not repent, doth thenceforth *abſolutely Will* that *Judas* ſhall periſh, though only that he *periſh conditionally*. For that *Will* is no longer ſuſpended on a Condition, but it is the Event only that is ſuſpended. At leaſt you muſt ſay, that it is paſſed into a certainty, equal to an *abſolute* Will.

5. But we will come as near as truth will lead us. If by a *Condition* you mean only that *Condition* of the event which is not a *ſuſpender* of Gods Decree, but only a *conſtituent qualification* of the *Object*; ſo I grant to you, that though Gods *Will* as it ſignifieth his *Eſſence*, or his eſſential *Principle* of operation, in it ſelf, have no cauſe or condition; yet as it is extrinſically denominated, the *Volition* or *Nolition* of *this* or *that*, the Object hath its Conditions; that is, qualifications, without which Gods Will is not ſo denominable. And ſo Gods Will hath its Conditions of *complacency* or *diſplicency* in the Creature, without which he cannot truly be ſaid to be pleaſed or diſpleaſed in them; yea, I told you, that theſe may *oriri de novo*, without change in God. And whether his judicial Will to condemn men as Judge, have the ſame conditions, we ſhall enquire further hereafter. I have already manifeſted, that the Objects of it have their proper qualifications.

The ſeventh Crimination.

A. *At leaſt you make Election abſolute, if not Rejection; and ſay, that God electeth men to Salvation, without reſpect to any goodneſs in* * *them.*

B. I have ſaid enough to this already; 1. Do you think that men *are good* before they are elected? when they are not men? You do not certainly. 2. Do you think that God *fore-ſeeth* any good in men, when he willeth to them their *firſt good*? no doubt you do not. 3. Do you think that God fore-ſeeth in men any *ſecond*, *third*, or following degrees of goodneſs, before he intend to *give it them*? what need he purpoſe to give it them, if he fore-ſee that they will have it without his Gift? 4. Do you think that God fore-ſeeth any *power to do good* in men, but what he intendeth to give them? or any *good act*, but what proceedeth from that power which he giveth them, and from his concourſe, or co-operating influx? I dare ſay that you do not. 5. And do you think that we imagine that God giveth, or purpoſeth to give, any following mercy to him

* To the queſtion, *An electio ad beatitudinem præceſſerit prædeſtinationem meritorum.* The affirmative is held by *Cajet.* and moſt *Thomiſts*, by *Scotus*, in 1. d. 41. q. 1. *Durand.* q. 1. n. 8. *Aegid. ibid.* q. 1. a. 2. *Major.* 1. d. 4. q. 2. *Soto* in Rom. *Cordub.* li. 1. q. 56. *ſplendor inquit Vaſquez in* 1. *Tho.* q. 23. *diſp.* 89. c. 1. But *Vaſquez* holdeth the contrary, with *Oſorius*, *Turrian*, and many others, maintaining that *Auguſtine* held, *Electionem ad gloriam eſſe ex meritis gratiæ previſis.* And no doubt but God decreed Glory to be given *per modum præmii*, if that be all.

that hath not the necessary antecedent mercy? As to glorifie any that is not justified, or to justifie any that is not called. 6. You see then that it's necessary, if you will quarrel, that you distinguish of Election as before said. Though Gods Will in it self, as was now said, have no proper suspending condition; yet, 1. The effects of Gods Will have. 2. And the Objects of Gods Will have their necessary qualifications. 3. And some of Gods Volitions are thence extrinsically denominated *conditional.*

Now, 1. God giveth Salvation to no Unbeliever, but on condition of Faith. And God actually glorifieth none but penitent persevering Believers: And both these he accordingly *decreed* or *willeth.* And can you say then that Election hath *no respect* to the persons *goodness.* It hath not only respect to the good intended him, but to that good which is a necessary qualification found in him; that is, necessary to the benefit to which he is elected. God decreeth to give glory to none but persevering Saints, nor perseverance to none but the Holy, nor justification to none but Believers.

But I will confess to you, that we hold, 1. That God absolutely willed to give Christ and the New Covenant to the World; 2. That he absolutely *willeth* or decreeth to give the Gospel and common Grace in a greater degree, to many a one that is no more worthy of it than others that are past by, and to give it to none but the unworthy. 3. That he absolutely decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to many that have long resisted him, and are as great Sinners as those that have them not, and to none but the unworthy in proper sense. And dare you deny any of this your self?

The eighth Crimination.

A. Thus you bring presumption into the World, and encourage men to sin: If once they be elect, let them do what they can, they are sure to be saved; for they are certain that Election will not change.

B. 1. You are leading us towards the question of Perseverance, before the time.

2. Do you think your self that *Election* changeth? Is not this as much imputable to you as us? or do we differ here? Do not you say that God *fore-knoweth* who will be saved? And can God be deceived? or shall not all certainly be glorified that are so fore-known? Nay, do you not say that, at least, upon that fore-knowledge, God decreeth each persons certain Salvation that shall be saved? And can that Decree which is upon fore-knowledge be frustrate? Do not you then as much encourage presumption by a certain unchangeable Election as we.

3. It is factious perverseness (reflecting on your selves as much as us) which puts in that word, [*Let them do what they will, or live how they will, or sin they never so much*;] For it fallly intimateth that God electeth men to Glory, that live impenitently in wickedness; according to our Doctrine. Whereas we say, 1. That if the word *Election* be taken partially, for the act of Gods *Decree to glorifie them,* none but fore-seen persevering Saints are the Objects; And a *wicked Saint* is a contradiction. Or if it be taken for Gods Decree to *convert a man,* we say that this is true, that let the World live never so *wickedly,* God doth decree to convert some of them from that wickedness, but not all: Do you question

Marlorate, as from *Calvin,* saith, *in Joh.* 15. 2. *Certum decretum Dei a nemine infirmari posse: Stat igitur firma sententia, Quemcunq; Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, eum non posse perire: Quem vero rejecerit, eum non posse salvari, etiamsi omnia sanctorum opera fecerit.* (An ill supposition) which *Episcopius* citeth with distast.

But *Brentius ibid.* cited by the same *Marlorate,* saith, *Haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis, quae solet argute magis quam reverenter de praedestinatione differere, & pro suo ingenio colligere, nullum a domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi pessime vivat: nullum item a Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari, etiamsi optime vivat: ut haec velle pro sua libidine vivere.*

queſtion this? 2. But if the word *Election* be taken *comprehenſively*, then mens Holineſs, Repentance, and Faith is part of the Salvation which they are elected to: And to ſay that God abſolutely electeth *Peter* to live and die a Saiut, let him (after Converſion) live and die never ſo wickedly; this is a putid contradiction, ſuch paultry dealing faction cauſeth; what do you differ from us in all this? *

4. But as to *preſumption* hereupon, I anſwer you, 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuſe, even Chriſt, and the hopes of Heaven it ſelf. 2. As long as wickedneſs is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from; he that is *wicked* may be *ſure* that he hath not the *benefit* nor *mark* of Election, and cannot have the leaſt aſſurance that he is elect. 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to perſevere in godlineſs; this is no rational inducement to him to forſake *godlineſs*, any more than to renounce *Heaven*, but rather to conclude, *I am decreed to perſevere in holineſs*, therefore I muſt ſo do. 4. And to paſs by the Controverſie of perſeverance till we come to it, it is as all confeſs, ſo few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election, that this Objection can extend but to a few. 5. Laſtly, None are certain of their Election, but ſuch as have ſtrong clear active Grace and evidence; that believe firmly, and love God much, and obey him carefully: And ſuch as theſe are fit to improve aſſurance, and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude. Did you ever know what *love*, and *thankfulneſs*, and *delight* in God, and *holineſs* are, and yet can you think that they are the way to ſin? You know nothing in Religion, if you know not, that they are the life and ſoul of true Religion, and the moſt powerful principles of Obedience and Perſeverance. Nor do you underſtand the Goſpel-deſign, if you know not, that the greateſt manifeſtation of the love of God, is the greateſt means of *love*, and *thankfulneſs*, and *deſire*, and *delight* in God and goodneſs, unto man.

But *Brentius ibid.* cited by the ſame *Marlorate*, ſaith, *Hæc ſententia occurrit curioſitati carnis, quæ ſolet argute magis quam reverenter de prædeſtinatione diſſerere, & pro ſuo ingenio colligere, nullum a domino ad vitam æternam electum poſſe damnari, etiamſi peſſime vivat: nullum item a Domino ad ignem æternum deputatum poſſe ſalvari, etiamſi optime vivat: ſi itaq; velit pro ſua libidine vivere.*

* *Vid. Epiſcop. Inſtit. Theo. li. 4. ſect. 5. cap. 7. pag. 415. col. 1.*

The ninth Crimination.

A. *At leaſt thus* * Fate *is ſet up in the World, and all things are under* neceſſity, *and unavoidable.*

* *Suetonius* ſaith *Tiberius* was a neglecter of Religion, becauſe he thought that all things were ruled by *fate.*

B. You had this Objection about *neceſſity* before, and to the anſwer of it I refer you further, 1. Immutable Election doth ſet up but a *conſolatory quietting certainty* in the World, without which mans mind muſt ſtill be in troubleſome, unquiet, if not tormenting terrours. Is it a wrong to you, if you can be ſure to be ſaved? Had you rather live and die under theſe apprehenſions, [I know not whether I ſhall be in Heaven or Hell for ever?] If you have not certainty, or a hope that is ſomewhat near it; I think this concluſion, if you be awake, and in your wits, muſt needs make your life a conſtant bondage, and the fear of death your conſtant miſery, and muſt blaſt all the pleaſures of your fulleſt Proſperity. Thank God that his Foundation ſtandeth ſure, and the Lord knoweth who are his; and ſee that you keep his mark upon you, profeſſing Chriſt, and departing from iniquity. And do not cry out as if you were *fatally* carried to *Heaven* againſt your wills.

Kipping Philonatur. l. 9. c. 11. p. 431. voluntas iſta abſoluta hominem cum effectibus ſuis inſuperabiliter neceſſitat hoc eſt ad unum oppoſitorum neceſſario conſtringit & determinat omnia ejus acta & eventa, ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant: where he confuteth *Piſcators* Arguments for ſuch neceſſitating Decrees, *p.* 432, *&c.*

2. As for the word [*Fate*] it is ambiguous: Some by *fate*, mean but the certainty that God's Predictions ſhall be fulfilled; *Quod fatur eveniet.* Some mean only the certain connexion of Cauſes and Effects

under Gods ſapiential Government of the World. (As *Campanella* maketh *Neceſſity*, *Fate*, and *Harmony*, to be the reſult of Power, Wiſdom, and Love; but not accurately enough.) And ſome ſay, (but how truly I know not) That the *Stoicks* took *Fate* for ſome primary neceſſitating Cauſe, which did neceſſitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of; they that will play them with it may.

3. But as to *Neceſſity* again, I ſay, 1. Election maketh no mans *ſin* or *miſery neceſſary*, nor tendeth to it. 2. It maketh no mans Salvation *neceſſary* againſt his *will* in *ſenſu compoſito*. 3. The more it maketh our Salvation *neceſſary*, that is, *certain* and *inſuperable*, the greater is Gods mercy, the greater our happineſs, and cauſe of gratitude and Joy. The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their perſevering bleſſedneſs.

Thus *Fewrborniut in Faſcicul. Diſſer. de termino vitæ* uſeth 17 Arguments, *contra ſententiam Calvinianam de fatali & ſimpliciter neceſſario termino vitæ, (quaſi Deus ex abſoluto & ſimplici decreto & abſq; ullo ad cauſas ſecundas phyſicas, & voluntarias reſpectu, cuiq; hominum genus & horam mortis præfixerat.)* And all upon the encouragement of ſome ill and unſound words of *Piſcator*, who is moſt extream in this: whereas this is none of the *Calviniſts* ſenſe commonly, who hold that ſin is only fore-ſeen, and not decreed: but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree; therefore reſpected as decreed.

If you ſhall Object, That *it neceſſitateth the periſhing of all others, becauſe none can be ſaved who are not Elect.* Remember that this was your *third Crimination*, and is anſwered before. I ſay again, 1. *Neceſſity* and *Impoſſibility* are either *Logical in ordine probandi*; or *Phyſical in ordine cauſandi*. The firſt ſort followeth upon your own Doctrine: He that God fore-knoweth ſhall ſin and periſh, it *neceſſarily* followeth *Neceſſitate conſequentiæ*; and it is *impoſſible* but it ſhould follow, that he will ſin and periſh, but not by Gods fore-knowledge.

Cauſal neceſſitating either taketh away the true *power* of eſcaping, or depriveth of ſuch power by prevention: But ſo doth not the Election or Decree of God.

2. Though we hold ſuch abſolute Election as hath been opened to you, and that God *decreeth* to cauſe men to believe, before he fore-ſeeth that they will believe, (in order of Nature, according to humane Conception;) yet we hold as you do, that Reprobation doth not ſo proceed, but that God decreeth men to Hell only on *fore-ſight* of final *wickedneſs*, which he never cauſed or willed. And if in this we agree with you, you muſt accuſe your ſelves as much as us.

3. God doth both Decree to give, and actually give men *power* to do more than they do; And his decreeing that another man ſhall well uſe that power which he hath, doth ſure take away no power from you.

4. Yea, Gods *not decreeing* to cauſe you to uſe your own power well, doth take none of it from you; But includeth that ſuch power you have: much leſs his Decree to do more for others.

5. All the World acknowledgeth, that a Benefactor as ſuch is free to give his own benefits as he pleaſes, unequally. And giving more to one taketh nothing from another. Suppoſe that God had for 4000 years, till Chriſt's Incarnation, but *willed* and *given* his mercy equally to all the World, even ſo much as might leave the matter meerly to their wills; and after that had given *greater* mercy to the Chriſtian Churches, taking nothing from the reſt: Had this been any injury or diminution to the reſt? Suppoſe now God ſhould fetch half the damned out of Hell, is this any more hurt or wrong to the reſt than if he had delivered none.

But all theſe things are here anticipated, and cannot be fully anſwered till we come to the Article of *Grace*; where we muſt ſhew how God doth differ his Operations on mens Souls: For none can deny, but as he *differenceth* them, ſo he decreed to difference them, and no otherwiſe.

The tenth Crimination.

A. *At least you make Gods Decrees and Ways unequal, and make him a Respecter of persons, as decreeing to save one, and not* another; *or to give more Grace to one than to another, of equal demerit.*

B. You may shew your ignorance about this your self; but this is no difference between the parties. For, 1. No man can deny but that God standing towards us in a three-fold Relation, as our *Owner* and the *Lord of all*, as our *Ruler*, and as our *Benefactor*, so he is free in the first and *third Relation*. A *Proprietary* may do with his own as he list: And a *Benefactor* may unequally give his *benefits* as he seeth meet: For he is supposed to give only that which is no mans Right, till he give it them (by *promise* or collation). But as God is a *Rector*, and governeth Mankind by a Law, which hath *Rewards promised*, and *Punishments threatned* to promote Obedience, and as he is Judge according to that Law, and as he is a Benefactor already obliged by promise; thus God doth keep an equality in his Judgments and Executions, and ever proceedeth according to his Word or Law. He will in just equity and equality forgive, justifie and adopt all penitent Believers, and no others, how *great* soever. He will glorifie all persevering Saints, and no others, just according to his Word; Because his Law is *Norma judicii*, or that which he will observe in judging. If God forgive and save one *penitent* Believer and not another, you may say that he ruleth not in equity and equality. But in cases of other *disposals* and *benefits*, which no man hath right to by any Law or Covenant, the case is otherwise.

2. And full experience tells us this. God made not every Man an Angel, nor every Stone a Star, nor every Star a Sun, nor every Beast a Man, nor every Toad a Bird, nor the Dirt and Water Fire. Wonderful is the Variety of his Works through all the World: No two Birds, Beasts, Men, Stones, Trees, are perfectly equal and like. No two mens Faces, Constitutions, Parts, Dispositions, Virtues, are perfectly equal. With what various temperaments come we into the World? And is God a Respecter of persons for this? or are his ways unequal? As a free *Owner* and *Benefactor* he will diversifie his Gifts, and do with his own as he list, though Sinners quarrel at it. You dare not say that God giveth his *Benefits* equally to all, that are of equal demerit.

3. The sin of *respecting persons* belongeth to a *Judge*, obliged by rules to equal distribution: By a Judge, I mean any *judging* and *executing* Governour, or obliged distributer of Rights. And it consisteth in partiality and injustice, because of something in the person, (as Greatness, Riches, Learning, Relation, Flattery, *&c.*) which is no just cause of that inequality. But this is nothing to God, who regardeth no mans person for any such thing, nor denieth to any man his proper due.

Saith *Vasquez in* 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. *Nullam dari causam Reprobationis ex parte reprobi, dicunt Durand. in* 1. d. 41. q. 2. n. 14. *Greg. Arimi. q.* 1. a. 2. *con.* 1. *&* 5. *Marsil.* 1. q. 42. a. 2. *con.* 4, *&c. Driedo* 1. p. *de concord. c.* 3. *con.* 1. *&* 3. *Adam in c.* 9. *ad Roman. Ferrar.* 3. *cont. Gent. c.* 161. *Aquin.* 1. q. 23. a. 3. *ad* 3. *ex his tamen Doctoribus Thom. Driedo & Durand. non dicunt absolute, Reprobationis nullam dari causam ex parte reprobi: sed nullam esse causam ob quam hic potius quam alius reprobetur, aut quod idem est, cur hic praedestinatur et discernatur a massa perditionis, ille vero in ea relinquatur & reprobetur, vid. Latera.*

The

The eleventh Crimination.

A. * *You make God play the Hypocrite, to ſend abroad Miniſters to intreat men to repent and be ſaved, when he hath decreed that they ſhall be damned, and not repent. And you make all the preaching, and means that are uſed for ſuch mens Converſion, a meer mockery.*

B. No more than you do; For there is no difference as to this. 1. Do not you ſay that God fore-knoweth from eternity that *Judas*, *e. g.* will not repent, or be ſaved? yea, that upon ſuch fore-knowledge he hath decreed before he was born to damn him? And doth this make God play the Hypocrite, or his Word to be a mockery? We ſay but the very ſame of all that periſh.

2. To help you to reſcue both your ſelves, and us from this accuſation, conſider, that Gods Decree hath ſeveral parts. As, 1. That the lapſed World ſhall have a Covenant of Grace, and be intreated to be ſaved. 2. That *Judas*, one of this world, ſhall have his part among the reſt. 3. Whereas *Judas* will not receive this offered Grace, for rejecting it he ſhall be condemned: Theſe are the material parts of Gods Decree; And is there any hypocriſie or mockery in this? God decreed not to condemn *Judas*, but for rejecting offered Grace: And this preſuppoſeth the offer: He cannot reject that which never was offered him. What would you have had God rather ſay, [I fore-ſee if I offer *Judas* Grace, that he will not accept it, and therefore I will offer him none, but condemn him, becauſe he would have refuſed it, had it been offered.] By this rule, the ſin of all the World againſt mercy and means of life, ſhould have been prevented by offering them no means or mercy; and yet men periſh and be damned for that which they never did, becauſe God fore-ſaw that they would have done it. Are not theſe ways unequal, in compariſon of Gods, which vain men quarrel with.

2. But again, I tell you that your feigning to hold, that God *decreed that* Judas *ſhould not repent*, is not true of thoſe that you now talk with: It is enough that *God did not decree that* Judas *ſhould* eventually repent.

* Both ſides charge this on each other. *Malderus*, 1, 2. *q.* 111. *a.* 3. *p.* 519. *Vocaret illuſorie Deus ſi talem gratiam ſufficientem ſolum ideo daret quia non eſt efficax*, &c. It is prophaneneſs thus to venture on blaſphemous charges againſt God, if [illegible] done by him

The twelfth Crimination.

A. * *Though you ſay that God decreeth to give men more power than they uſe, yet you add, that none of that power will ever be well uſed, unleſs he fore-decree it; For you ſay that God abſolutely willeth or decreeth every good Act, as well as the Power. And ſo no ſuch Act followeth any Power, where God decreeth it not: And what good doth that Power do them.*

B. Still you anticipate thoſe Controverſies which belong to the point of Grace. But I anſwer, 1. You muſt anſwer this for your ſelves firſt, for it as much concerneth you as us. For you teach that what ever Power God giveth men, it will never be exerciſed, unleſs he fore-know that it will be ſo: Yea, unleſs upon fore-knowledge of mans due co-operation with God, it be decreed. For you ſay that God fore-knoweth all the Acts of Grace and Power that will be exerciſed; yea, and decreeth them on the ſaid fore-ſight, as your Doctrine *de ſcientia media* inferreth.

* The Jeſuites themſelves as well as the *Dominicans* deny as much as a poſſibility or power to unbaptized Infants (of being ſaved); And in their caſe are for as abſolute arbitrary Reprobation as the higheſt, not only *Calviniſt* but *Antinomian*, vid. *Ruiz. de prædeſ. Tr.* 3. *diſp.* 15. *ſect.* 1. *p.* 202, &c. And this upon the irrational Doctrine, that for want of baptiſm the Children of the holieſt perſons ſhall be condemned, though the Parents did their beſt to procure it, and ſo there is no *Will* or *ſin* the Cauſe: And yet godly perſons have Merits to ſpare for ſouls in Purgatory, and none for their own Children.

2. By

2. By this Objection there is no way to reconcile you to Gods Providence, unless he will be *ignorant* of all mens future sinful Omissions, or unless he will not be before-hand willing of all the good that is in the World, or at least not decree it, and be the Author of it; Or else unless he will cause all men equally to use their powers, and do good alike. Now you dare not say, that ever any of these shall come to pass. You see and confess that all men do not use their *power* equally, nor do good alike. And you know God will not be before ignorant of it. And you shall never abate Gods goodness so, as to keep him from *willing* and *working* too all the good that is the world. And will you therefore be unreconciled to him?

3. And where you say, *what good then doth such power*; 1. I pray you mark that you confess that we hold, that they *had power*. And if they had *power* to do good, they *could* have done it. For what else is *power*, but that by which *I can* do the Act. 2. The *power* given was a proportionable *demonstration of Gods Power, Wisdom and Mercy*, and therefore it did *good*. 3. That it was not used to their *own Salvation*, was their own fault for which they suffer. And in all this we are agreed.

And now I appeal to your considering Reason, whether there be any difference hitherto left in the point of *Predestination* between you and me? And I again mind you, that were it not for the importunity and prejudice of contenders, all that I have said of this had been needless. For it is obvious, that while we are all agreed of these generals, 1. That God decreeth to give all men just so much Grace or Mercy as at time he giveth them. * 2. And that he absolutely decreeth not to give them any more but what he giveth them. All this Controversie of Decrees or *Predestination*, depends on the Controversie of *Grace*, how much it is that God giveth unto men.

* *Apud veteres ecclesiæ patres eadem omnino fuit controversia, de causa gratiæ, & Prædestinationis ex parte nostra.* Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. disp. 9. pag. 658.

A. *I confess that you have indeed proved your self reconciled to me*; but that *is becauſe you are an* Arminian, *and do not know it: For you grant me all that I can justly desire. But the* Calvinists *will not be therefore reconciled to you, or give you thanks.*

B. Except the few Predeterminants afore-excepted, and some odd words that drop from passionate or injudicious men; I am past doubt that the generality of sober moderate *Calvinists* will stand to what I say, or may do it I am sure, in consistence with their main cause. And I am confident that these are the healing-terms that must unite us. And remember, that you confess, that thus far we differ not.

Had you but this following Doctrine from one of the greatest Jesuites, *Vasquez in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *disp.* 91. *c.* 11. *p.* 659. it might put you to your study to be able to disagree. *Catholica sententia est nullam causam, nullumve initium, aut occasionem ex parte prædestinati excogitari posse, ob quam Deus aut in tempore gratiam ipsi donaverit, aut in præscientia dare decreverit. Doctrina hæc non solum intelligenda est de initio fidei, orationis, aut voluntatis consequendi salutem; vel de aliis operibus quæ circa Deum versantur; qualia sunt religionis; verum etiam de quovis opere moralis virtutis, quod in ipsum solum bonum honestum referatur. Et non solum excludimus initium, quod sit meritum condignum, sed etiam meritum congruum seu impetratorium, aut dispositionem, & quamlibet causam & occasionem, ob quam Deus huic potius quam alteri gratiam donaverit, aut donare præfinierit; Ita ut tota ratio præparandi huic potius gratiam quam illi, fuerit beneplacitum divinæ voluntatis, nihil autem vel minimum ex parte prædestinati. Ita* Thom. Marsil. Gregor. Armi. *&c. And yet must we disagree.*

See all this largely proved by him to the end of the 18th Chap. *ibid.*

THE

THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION:

Between *C.* (a *Calvinist*) and *B.* (the *Conciliator.*)

C. I hear of your undertaking to manifeſt the ſmallneſs of our Differences in the long controverted Articles of Predeſtination, Redemption, Grace and Free-will. * *But theſe* Reconcilers *do but halt between two Opinions; and while they will be of neither ſide, they are liked and loved by neither.*

B. Bleſſed are the Peace-makers, for they ſhall be called the Children of God. We will ſeek to pleaſe all men for their good to edification; and yet ſeek to pleaſe no man before God, nor in ſin, nor place any of our happineſs in their favour, nor think much to bear their diſpleaſure or contempt: For if we (ſo) ſeek to pleaſe men, we are no longer the Servants of Chriſt. If Gods favour were not enough for us, he were not our God.

C. I am afraid your ſtudy of Syncretiſm or Concord will tempt you to warp and turn half an Arminian, *and forſake the Truth.*

B. I thank you for your care of me, and I wonder not at your fears, as long as you miſtake one another as you do. As all perſecution of Gods Servants is raiſed by miſ-reports, and miſapprehending them to be very bad and dangerous perſons, and as all ſinful Schiſms and ſeparations in Churches ariſe from mens thinking one another to be very *bad* and unfit for communion; Even ſo theſe *factions*, and Church-dividing Contentions, come from a falſe conceit that each ſide is ſo dangerouſly erroneous, as that all good men muſt ſtir up their zeal, and with all their diſputing-ſkill and contending-fervency muſt arm, to defend the Truth againſt them, and to ſave the Church and the Souls of men from the infection of their Errour. Since I ſaw the nature of theſe preſent Controverſies, it filleth me with ſhame and pity to think, what fierce and fiery work there hath long been, what hatred, ſlanders, ſcorns, perſecutions; what volumnious Contentions, what Snares laid for young Students; what factious Oppoſitions to each other among Paſtors and People, throughout much of the learneſt part of the Chriſtian World; and all in a dream, for the moſt part about meer names and words, or things, that none of them at all underſtood, nor ever will do in this World. O ſubtile Tempter! O fooliſh men! even wiſe and learned men! O lamentable Churches! O miſerable World!

C. I pray you tell me what good you look for by this attempt? Do you not know how many ſuch have come to nothing?

B. I

* *Le Blanc de diſt. Grat. Theſ.* 80, 81. *Tanta varietas ſententiarum & opinionum circa naturam & eſſentiam gratiæ efficacis & rationem ac modum, quo in animis hominum operatur quæ a tot jam ſeculis ſcholas Chriſtianas exercet, arguit rem eſſe perplexam, obſcuram & quæ undiq; multis difficultatibus ſcatet: Nec ſpes eſt fore contentionum finem, niſi curioſitati modus aliquis ſtatuatur, & omittantur quæſtiones arduæ & nonneceſſariæ. Ac profecto longe conſultius foret, & paci ac pietati Chriſtianæ conducibilius in totum ab ejuſmodi quæſtionibus abſtinere, quam ſine fine rixari de rebus quæ difficultate ſua ingenium humanum obruunt, & in quibus vix quiſquam ſibi poteſt ſatisfacere. Præſertim quæſtionis illæ apud plebem Chriſtianum in homiliis & concionibus non tantum nullo cum fructu, ſed maximo ſæpe cum damno proponuntur, dum ſimplicium animis injiciuntur varii ſcrupuli, quos diſputationum ars & eloquentia ſatis poſtea diſcutere non poteſt.* And he mentioneth the things which he would have us take up with, which we are agreed in, *viz. Quicquid boni nobis ineſt, & a nobis fit, Divinæ gratiæ deberi: Deum eſſe qui omne bonum in nobis operatur ſine Chriſto & ſpiritus illius auxilio in iis quæ æternam ſalutem promovent nihil nos quicquam poſſe,* &c. *Deum tamen ſic per gratiam ſuam in nobis operari, ut libertati noſtræ nihil decedat impio qui male agunt nullam occaſionem habere ad Deo quærendi,* &c.

B. I'le tell you what good I expect. I expect that here and there an impartial ſober Divine ſhould ſearch into and find pacificatory truth: And that divers Students, not yet engaged in any Faction, ſhould diſcern it: And that moſt of the idle, ignorant and factious, who find it moſt for their *intereſt*, *eaſe* and *honour*, to be fervent for the Opinion which that party holdeth, with whom they do embody, will reproach my ſelf and theſe attempts, and call me a *Calviniſt* or an *Arminian*, or one that holdeth dangerous Opinions, and ſelf-conceitedly over-valuing my own apprehenſions, do trouble the Church, and ſtrengthen the Adverſaries by pretended Reconciliation. But I look that thoſe that receive the Truth, ſhould themſelves be ſaved from the guilt of all that uncharitableneſs, faction and injury to others, which is cauſed by mens miſtakes: And alſo that they ſhould be a *ſeed* of Peace-makers, to propagate Truth to Poſterity, till the Age come when God will heal the Churches, and baniſh contentious Error from among them. And in the mean time, I look for peace of Conſcience in the Service of God, and in his approbation. And it will be reward enough to live out of the fire of Contention my ſelf, and to eſcape the Feaver of that zealous Wiſdom which is earthly, ſenſual, and deviliſh, and with envy and ſtrife doth bring in confuſion, and every evil work: And to feel the ſweetneſs of ſome of the Wiſdom from above, which is firſt pure, then peaceable, *&c.* *Jam.* 3. 14, 15, 16, 17.

And I am the more reſolved not to omit my Duty through diſpair, for the experience which I have already had. I remember the time when in the Country where I lived, Sacraments and Diſcipline were neglected, through the diſtances of the *Epiſcopal*, *Presbyterians* and *Independants*, about the way of Adminiſtration, and we looked ſtrangely at each other. I thought it our Duty to joyn in love and practice ſo far as we agreed, and paſs by the reſt till we could better ſee our way. But many years I thought I ſhould be but ſcorned if I attempted it, and ſo forbore it in diſpair. But at laſt attempting it, almoſt all conſented with whom I did endeavour this way of Concord, and I found no conſiderable oppoſition, and many other Countries began to follow our example.

After this I ſaw that whilſt Miniſters only preached publickly, and ſpake but now and then occaſionally with the people perſonally, they were ignorant of their own Flocks, and edified them but little, and occaſioned Diſputes about examining them before a Sacrament, and many other inconveniences; And I earneſtly wiſht that they would ſet up the courſe of Catechizing and familiar Conference with all, from Family to Family in order through each Pariſh. And I thought that if a few Miniſters ſhould attempt this without the conſent and concurrence of the reſt, they would but be contemned by the people: But if all the Miniſters of Reputation would conſent, it might happily go on: But to motion ſuch a thing I thought as vain, as to attempt that which ſeemed next to an impoſſibility. But when I did attempt it at laſt, I found little or no oppoſition; but the Miniſters readily conſented, and other Countries began the like; In ſo much that ſome Miniſters of *Helvetia* ſent to me their deſires, of ſetting on foot the ſame courſe there. Theſe inſtances confute diſpair, the great Enemy of all good, and make me reſolve to do my part in any good Work, and leave the iſſue to God. I confeſs, and its too well known, that ſome attempts ſince theſe for concord between Church contenders in *England*, were without ſucceſs: But they have afforded my Conſcience that peace, which doth abundantly compenſate

all my ſufferings. When I pray, *Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven*, I mean, *Let us with the moſt holy alacrity perform thy preceptive Will and do our Duty; and then with confidence expect, and with complacence reſt in thy diſpoſing Will, what ever be the event.*

" C. *I have read your Undertaking, and what you have ſaid to* A. *before,* " *and I think you favour them too much, and make their Errors to ſeem ſmal-* " *ler than they are.*

B. Do you follow the ſame method that he did. Begin with the ſame Point, and ſuppoſe me an *Arminian* for this time, and tell me the worſt that you have againſt their Opinions, (not medling with the *Pelagians*, who deny Original Sin; nor with the raſh or odd ſayings of particular men,) and let us try how wide you can prove the difference here to be, and whether all be not reſolved into the Controverſies of Grace and Free-will.

The firſt Crimination.

" C. I. *They deſtroy the comfort of the Faithful, by* * *denying that God* " *did certainly and immutably elect individual perſons to Salvation.*

* *Epiſcop. ubi poſtea, p. 414. Nullo modo ſequitur quod ad gloriam prius fuerant electi, quam credierent.*

B. You miſtake them: They hold that he did certainly and immutably elect particular perſons to Salvation. They hold that he foreknoweth what motions means and circumſtances will eventually take with mens Wills, without ſuch neceſſitation as is inconſiſtent with their liberty; and that to certain perſons he immutably decreeth to vouchſafe them all thoſe means and motions; and that he then fore-ſeeth that theſe will prevail, and that they will believe, yea decreeth that they ſhall thus prevail, and ſo decreeth that all thoſe perſons ſhall be juſtified: And in like manner that he fore-ſeeth what means and motions will prevail to their perſeverance; and that he decreeth to give them thoſe means and motions; and that by them they ſhall eventually preſevere, and ſhall infallibly be ſaved. The moderate *Jeſuites*, and *Arminians*, and *Lutherans* do maintain, and will grant all this. And all this is from eternity. And is not here then an eternal aſcertaining immutable Election of individuals.

De certo numero electorum & ſalvandorum & de hoc opinionem Catharini & Thomiſtarum, &c. vide in Vaſqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 101. c. 1, 2, 3.

The ſecond Crimination.

" C. II. * *They feign an election of* † Things, *inſtead of an election of* " Perſons; *and ſay that* Election *is Gods Decree to make* Faith *the condition* " *of Salvation: And ſo they bring in an indefinite Election of Univerſals or* " Species *of perſons; that God decreeth to ſave Believers, & damn Unbelievers.*

* *Qui habet gratiam efficacem ad converſionem aut fidem prædinatus eſt ad converſionem et fidem.* Malderus, 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 519.

† *Vid.* Epiſcop. *Inſtit. Theol. li. 4. ſect. 5. cap. 6. p. 413.*

B. Doth any Chriſtian deny any of this? * 1. That God hath *de facto*, made *Faith* the condition of life, is viſible in the Goſpel: And what God did in time, from eternity he decreed to do. Therefore he decreed to make Faith the condition of life.

* *Reſtat ergo ut voluntates eligantur ſed voluntas ipſa niſi aliquid occurat quod delectet, atq; invitet animum, moveri nullo modo poteſt: Hoc autem ut occurrat non eſt in hominis poteſtate,* Auguſt. lib. 1. *ad Simplician.* q. 2.

2. That God hath in his Covenant made a Deed of Gift of Chriſt and Life to all true Believers, and of Heaven to all that ſo perſevere, and that he hath promiſed to perform this Covenant, is viſible in the Scripture. Therefore God decreed to do this from eternity, even to juſtifie Believers, and glorifie perſevering Believers. Make not the world believe that any of us queſtion this.

But

But if you mean that they deny all other Decrees of Election, and extend it not to individual persons, you mistake them. Read but *Molina*, *Suarez*, *Vasquez*, *Penottus*, and other Jesuites, and you will see it: And so you may in *Arminius* himself. They hold an Election of Individuals, as I last described it, in the way of their *scientia media*, besides the Election of Believers in general. See also our *Playfaire* on the Point.

The third Crimination.

C. III. *They deny any Decree or Will of God to give men the first special Grace, effectually to make them believe and repent, but only that he decreeth to give them sufficient Grace, which their own Wills must make effectual.* *

* They commonly acknowledge a preventing operating Grace, *quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.* But the *Ratio efficaciæ* is controverted among them.

B. Did not I tell you that all the Controversie of *Predestination* is resolved into that of *effectual Grace?* Such Grace as he giveth men, such he decreed to give them. This all confess. But what it is that denominateth Grace *effectual*, we are to consider in its proper place. Only let me here tell you, that all will grant you (of whom I now speak) that God decreeth to give men that special Grace which shall cause them to repent and believe. But on what terms, and in what manner it so causeth it, is afterward to be handled. *

* See *Ruiz de prædest. d. 6. sect. 4, 5.* proving Faith, Perseverance, &c. to come from Gods Decree.

The fourth Crimination.

C. *Their Doctrine* de * scientia media *on which they ground their Opinions of Gods Decrees, is many ways injurious to God; and is a fiction not to be made good.*

* Of this see more in the first Book.

B. 1. I doubt all sides are over temerarious in their distribution of Gods Decrees and Volitions. But, 1. All are agreed that *ex parte Dei Volentis*, there is no real difference in his Volitions; nor *ex parte Dei scientis*, in his knowledge: For so his Knowledge and Will are his Essence. 2. All agree, that *ex parte objecti cogniti & decreti* there is a real difference. 3. All must agree, that in Gods Intellection and Volitions as denominated *ab extra*, viz. *ab objectis*, there is a relative or denominative difference. 4. *Ex parte objecti*, there is no man can question, but that this Proposition [If *John* have such and such means and helps, he will believe,] doth differ from this Proposition, [*It is convenient and good that* John *shall believe*] and from this, [*John will believe*]. 5. If you are against mincing Gods Knowledge into such scraps as these various objective Propositions do infer, you must be against the old distinction, into *scientiam simplicis Intelligentiæ, & scientiam puræ visionis.* For no doubt but God knoweth all things, how various soever, *una intuitu*, with one simple knowledge, *ex parte sui*, though it be by our weakness denominated many, even innumerable, *ex relatione objectiva, vel terminatione rei in quam transit.* Doth not God with one Act know *Convenients*, *Desirables* and *Futures?* And cannot I here copiously thetoricate against you for your *first* and *second* sort of Divine Knowledge, as well as you do against them *de scientia media.* 6. It is agreed that God knoweth all things to be what indeed they are, and not otherwise.

7. It is agreed that God knoweth not as man doth, by *Names, Propositions*, or *Syllogisms*; And yet that God *knoweth* all *Names, Notions, Propositions* and *Syllogisms*, with their modes; as they are the measures, organs or actings of Humane Understandings. 8. † It is therefore undeniable to all Christians, that the thing which they call * *scientia media*, is as certainly in God, as is the *scientia simplicis Intelligentiæ & Puræ visionis*; that is, [that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propositions, and knoweth what would be done, by such and such causes, or upon such and such alterations, if they were put]. Doth any Christian doubt of this? 9. Whether this should be called *scientia media* is a question *de nomine*, and that of no great importance, and not at all *de re*? 10. Whether it be of any necessity or use in this Controversie, is a question only about the order of argumentation, as long as the thing it self is confessed to be true. 11. Some that cashier it as an useless Engine in this matter, do go as far from you as the *Jesuites* and *Arminians* who use it; As you may see at large in *Ludov. à Dola*, and *Durandus* himself. 12. I am one that fear Presumption both in their and your distributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God, and dread the taking of his Name in vain; And one that think that we need not the notion of *scientia media* for our satisfactory explication of these matters. But as the *truth* of the thing is confessed, so if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation (as it is commonly called) and not (at least always) to the Doctrine of Election, I see no untruth that it inferreth, nor no real difference that it will prove between us.

† I refer the Reader to *Blank, de Concord. lib. cum decretis* 1. *Thes.* 25. &c. where by citing their own words at large, he proveth that the most famous and resolute *Antiarminians* were for this *scientia media conditionata*, viz. *Fr. Gomarrus* (*Arminius*'s chief Antagonist) *in Mat.* 11. —21. *Antonius Walæus loc. com. de scient. Dei, pag.* 160. *Paulus Ferrius Scholast. Orth. vindic. p.*203, 209, 210. Besides *Rob. Baronius Metaph. sect.* 12. *disp.* 2. *num.* 55, 56. (who in his last days was nearest to the *Arminians*, as appeareth in those Metaphysicks.) And *Jo. Strangius, l.* 3. *c.*13. *p* 675. nameth also *Lud. Crocius Dyodecad. dis.* 7.

* Could *Alvarez* and his fellows well prove, that the permission of the first sin is an effect of Reprobation, as the word is used (in a fit and ordinary sense) they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine *de scientia media circa malum*, than is yet done. But they fail in their attempts of proving this: Of which after.

The fifth Crimination.

C. *They deny absolute Reprobation at least, and say that God reprobateth no men, but upon fore-sight of sin; And so that he hath no Decree that men shall sin, nor that he will permit them to sin, nor that they shall do the act in particular which is sin: As if God had not decreed the hardening of* Pharaohs *heart, the sin of* Sihon, *of* Rehoboam, *of the* Jews *in killing Christ*, &c.

B. 1. I told you before, *Reprobation* is a word that signifieth several acts: You dare not but grant them, that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but *for sin*, and as a *Sinner*: And this is the same thing that they mean.

2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods *Decree* to give them no *Faith* or *Repentance*. 1. You must prove that God hath such a *Decree* or *Will*, for a meer *negation*, where *not-decreeing* or *not-willing* to give them Grace, will do as much. 2. All Christians must needs confess that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in *Adam* and *Noah*; And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency, which saith [Be perfect and live, sin and die for ever]: And that there is some *common* mercy extended to all the World, which obligeth them to *repent* in order to Salvation. He subverteth Scripture, and all experience, that denieth this. Therefore all must grant, that God denieth no special Grace to any, but the abusers of this common Grace. And he decreeth to do but what he doth. * Therefore the persons whom he decreeth to deny special Grace to, are none but the abusers of common Grace, or the rejecters of that special Grace, when offered. 3. If

* Thus our Brittish Divines at *Dort*, in their suffrage on *Ar.* 3. at large.

3. If by *Reprobation*, you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to sin and perish willfully; 1. You can prove no such Decree or Will: Because *permission* being a negation or *nothing*, needs it not, but will be as certainly without it, upon a bare *not decreeing to hinder them* from sin. 2. And you mistake in saying that *Arminius* denieth it: For he * saith with you, That *God decreeth his own permission.* 3. You must take the pains to distinguish between *negative* and *privative Unbelief*, and between negative and privative *not-hindring Sin*, or *not-giving Faith.* Negative Unbelief is meer *not-believing*: And so none of us did believe from eternity, or before we were born: He that is not, believeth not; nor yet in the first instant that the Promise and Law of Faith was given us. Our unbelief is not *sin*, or privative, but on supposition that we *are men*, and have *reason*, and have a *Law* and *Object* of Faith. And Gods *permitting* us in this negative *Non-belief* is not to be called a *privative*, but only a *negative permission.* For God did from eternity so permit me to be *no man*, and *no Believer*, and yet this was not Reprobation. So God did negatively *not hinder Adams* first sin, but not privatively; because not *penally* for any evil done, nor yet by denying him any thing that was *naturally* or *morally* his due: Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation. But when the New Covenant of Grace, and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men, and they are obliged to *believe*, then sometimes God *penally* denieth them Grace, and that is all which the *Arminians* put against *absolute denial*, because this denial is only for mens fore-going sin. But he also still negatively only, and not privatively or penally denieth *some Grace* to some, yea to all; And that is only such Grace as is neither *morally their* due, nor *naturally* due or necessary to them. And the denial of such is no Act of Reprobation.

* *Arminius* himself expresly professeth, that in case God permits a man *velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad volendum*: *Exam.* Perk. pag. 153. Dr. *Twisse* against *Hoord, li. 1. pag.* 70.

4. If by *Reprobation* you mean meerly Gods *Preterition*; that is, his *not-willing* or *not-decreeing* to give men Grace. 1. Not to Will or Decree, is nothing; And how can you call *nothing absolute* or *conditional?* These are the modes of *Acts*, and not of *not-acting*, or of *nothing*. All grant that Gods *non-agency, non-volition, not-decreeing* hath no *cause*, much less a cause in man, least of all in man when he is no man.

* [Though sin be acknowledged to be the cause of the Will of God in Reprobation *quoad res volitas*, that is, in respect of the punishment willed thereby, this hindreth not the absoluteness of reprobation *quoad actum reprobantis*: And unless we understand the Fathers thus, we must charge them with an Opinion, which *Aquinas* is bold to profess that never any man was so mad as to affirm, *&c.*] *Twisse* against *Hoord, li. 1. pag.* 49.

5. The word *Condition*, either respecteth, 1. The thing or event willed; 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with respect to that event; 3. Or that Will radically consider'd in it self. I opened this before, but think of it again; for the reason of the distinction is very plain. And, 1. God damneth no man but for sin, (nor privatively denieth any necessary Grace, but for sin.) Therefore the *event* no doubt is before-hand conditional; that is, dependeth on a condition: God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently, and not else. 2. The Act of Gods *Will* as denominated from the said Effect or Object particularly, may be called, *A conditional Act or Will.* But if any think otherwise it is but *de nomine.* 3. The radical essential Will or Act of God as in himself can have no cause or condition. * Dr. *Twisse* denieth none of this.

But, 1. The *actus reprobantis* as really distinct from the effect, is nothing but Gods Essence. And who saith that sin causeth Gods Essence? 2. And the effect of Reprobation, as it is said to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is *nothing*: and therefore that nothing cannot aptly so much as extrinsically denominate Gods Will or Essence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement? *Ruiz. de prædest. d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis & quantum ad permissionem peccati finalis, prædestinatus fuit reproborum numerus.*

6. That God *willeth* or *decreeth* not sin formally, all the Christian world almost confess. And what loveliness is there in that only odious thing, that should tempt good people to father it on God, or attribute the being of it to his Will, or to be zealous Reproachers of those that say otherwise?

7. And if God *will* and *decree* the Act not only as an Act in general, but with all its modes and circumstances, he undeniably willeth or decreeth the *form* of sin, or the immediate necessary cause of it; which in the case of efficiency will more evidently appear.

C. God

C. *God willeth not the Form, that is, ſin as ſin, and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumſtances.*

B. I have told you before that a wicked man may will *ſin* in matter and form, and yet not will it *as ſin*. To will it *as ſin*, is to take the *form* of *ſin* as ſuch to be *good*, and ſo to be the *ratio volendi*; which few if any Sinners ever do. But to will both *matter* and *form* in one, not as the *formal reaſon* of *Volition*, but making *total ſin*, the matter *choſen* as a means to ſome other deſired end, this is poſſible for a very wicked man to do: But I think the ordinary caſe of Sinners, is not at all to will the form of ſin, but caſt that by, and to *will* the *matter* of it, for the carnal pleaſure or inferior good which it ſeemeth to tend to. Now this excuſeth not their will from wickedneſs, that they will not *malum ſub ratione mali*, or ſin becauſe it is ſin, but for another end. And ſhall we charge God of *willing ſin* as the wicked do?

C. *God willeth it to a good end, and they to an evil end.*

B. As evil muſt not be done, that good may come by it, ſo neither muſt it be *willed* to that end. *Man* may need ſuch a * means to his ends, but ſo cannot God. Yea, men have oft good ends for evil Acts: Many lye to glorifie God, and ſin for his Cauſe and Church, and for their own and other mens Salvation. Much of the Blood, and Cruelties, and Superſtitions in the World, have had good ends; which yet excuſed not the things from ſinfulneſs.

C. *God is under no Law, and therefore cannot ſin: But man is.*

B. 1. That proveth God no Sinner; but not that he *cauſeth* or *willeth* not the ſin of man. 2. Gods natural eſſential Perfection is his Law, and more than a Law to him: And from that Perfection all Laws in the world, that are juſt and good, have their Original; that is, Gods own Laws are the *expreſſions* of his holy perfect *Will* and *Nature*; and Mans Laws are authorized by, and ſubſervient to, and derived from the Laws of God, in Nature and Scripture: So that when the Apoſtle would deſcribe a man beſt and likeſt unto God, he ſaith, That *the Law is not made for the Righteous*. 3. If Gods Holineſs and Wiſdom make man a Law, forbidding ſin on pain of Hell, the ſame Wiſdom and Holineſs, with his *Juſtice* and *Mercy*, will not will the ſin ſo forbidden, nor cauſe it; nor conſiſt with ſo doing.

C. *It is not the form or eſſence of ſins that God willeth, but the* exiſtence, *and* futurity *or* event; not ſin, *but that* ſin be.

B. I many a year ſtudied thinking to prove that true: But I doubt it is but a game at words, and groundleſs diſtinguiſhing, for a falſe concluſion. For, 1. Sin is a Relation formally; even a diſconformity of an Act or diſpoſition, and ſo of the perſon to Gods Law. It can no otherwiſe be cauſed, but by *making the Law*, and *cauſing the Act in the circumſtances* diſconform. God maketh the Law, and God maketh man and his faculties, and God cauſeth the Object, and God permitteth the tempter: If God alſo cauſe the *Act* in the prohibited circumſtances, he doth all that can be done in the cauſation of ſin: And ſo of his *Volitions* or Decrees. As for the *eſſence* of ſin in *notion*, without the *exiſtence*, more may be ſaid that God *indeed* is *ſome* cauſe of that, without culpability, yea by his Holineſs and Power. For as the Relations of *Curvitude* and *Diſſimilitude* reſult from the *Relate's fundamentum*, as compared to the *Correlate*, or *terminus*; ſo he that cauſeth any of them, hath ſome hand in cauſing the Relation as a Relation: And ſo God by forbidding Adultery, Lying, *&c.* by his Law, doth by Inſtitution *make thoſe acts to be ſin*; that is, He layeth down the rule from which they are ſo denominated when

* Sure *Arminius* granteth enough, and that which *Gibieuf* and many School-men deny, and for my part I cannot grant, when he ſaith, [*At per accidens bonum eſt ut malum fiat, propter Dei ſapientiam, bonitatem & potentiam, ſecundum quam Deus ex peccato materiam gloriæ ſuæ illuſtrandæ ſumit. Eſt ergo peccatum iſto reſpectu non meaum per ſe illuſtrandæ Gloriæ Divinæ; ſed occaſio tantum, non data in hunc finem neq; natura ſua ad illum accommodata, ſed a Deo arrepta, & horſum mira arte & laudabili abuſu uſurpata.*] *Armin. exam.* Perkinſ. pag. 508. An occaſion it is indeed: but I will not grant that *ex peccato* God ſetcheth matter for his Glory; nor that by accident it is good *ut fiat*.

Cæterum peccata etiam ſecundum rationem malitiæ moralis, objecta ſunt ſeu materia circa quam divina prædeſtinatio verſatur: eo modo quo verſatur pœnitentia, Vaſqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. d. ſp 93. c. 2.

when committed. That Adultery is *committed* is long of man: that it is a *sin when committed* is long of God and man; God by his Law, and man by his Act. So that when you say God causeth not the *essence*, but the *existence* or *futurity*, you are so far out, as that less of causality is to be ascribed to him, as to the *existence*, than the *essence*.

2. But what is the *existence* but the *essence existing*, or *extra causas*? And what is it to *cause sin*, but to *cause it to exist*? And what is it to cause it to exist, but to cause it, or give it a being? And what is it to will that sin shall *exist*, but that the *essence* of it shall *exist*? And what is it to will the *event* or *futurity*, but to *will that sin shall be*? And what more can man will or do about it, to shew himself to be bad, (as *Estius* and others fully manifest.)

"C. *I cannot but think that God may will that* Act which is sin, *so he do* "*not* will it * as sin, (*and so may cause it*) Quod peccatum, *but not* Qua "peccatum.

* *Twiss. Vind. li. 2. Digress. 4. p. 101. Falsum est peccatum fieri ab homine ut est peccatum. Licet fit peccatum ut fit ab homine, non tamen fit ab homine ut est peccatum, hoc est sub ratione peccati. Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit, —cum hoc ut in humanam voluntatem competat.*

R. Here are three things before us: 1. The common *subjectum* or matter of *the sin*, which is the *Faculty*, and the *Object*, and the *Act* only in *genere actus*, or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumstances. 2. The Act thus circumstantiated. 3. The Relative form of sinfulness.

1. No doubt but God doth cause all the first, the Faculty, Object, and the Act as an Act; *e. g.* In *David*'s Adultery and Murder, and *Peter*'s denying Christ, God gave them the Faculty by which they did it: He upheld their natural power; and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act; But, 2. The Act as thus circumstantiated he neither *caused* nor *willed*, but permitted only; that is, that *David* should *hic & nunc* lust after her that was another mans wife, that he should vitiate *her*, that he should choose out *Uriah* to the Sword, that *Peter* should speak those particular words, *&c.* In the first sense, God willeth the Act which is sin, and the Faculty which is sinful; but not in the second as sinfully circumstantiated.

And as for your *Qua peccatum*, I tell you again, few Sinners, if any, will it *qua peccatum*.

"C. *What say you to this undeniable Argument: If God will not that Act* "which is sin, he willeth almost nothing that men do; For we sin in all "someway or other. And so God hath little to do in the world.

R. The last answer fully serveth to this. If we sin in every Act, yet all that is in every Act, is not sin, or prohibited. All that is good in the Act is of God, and willed by him. But it is the prohibited circumstances of the Act, which God doth not cause or Will, which morally specifie it as sin. As when I pray, I sin in praying coldly, unbelievingly, with wandring thoughts: God causeth not these, though he cause the Prayer. Or to come from compound Acts to simple: Those wandring thoughts are not my sin as they are thoughts, but as they are upon an undue Object. A lye is not a sin as it is a word, but as *this word which is false*; And so in all others.

"C. *But some Acts are simply forbidden in themselves, and not only in* "*their circumstances: Therefore if God there cause the Act, he causeth the Sin.*

R. No Act as an Act is forbidden, but as circumstantiated, by Object, Time, Mode, Place, *&c.* Mr. *Capell* * chooseth *lying* only as an instance of *prohibitum per se*. But I answered before, that all the Act in lying is *Volition*, *Intellection* and *Speech*; And these as such are not forbidden: But only these *particular words which are false*. The common instance is *Odisse Deum*; But here *hatred* in it self is not the sin, but as unduly terminated on God as the Object. And this God willeth not.

* *Lib. of Tempt.*

C. *By*

" C. *By this you deifie man: For you make him the cause of something which* " *God is no first cause of. And so man is made a first cause, that is a* " *God. For the particularizing of the Object, and the circumstantiating of* " *the Act, is* aliquid, *something, and must have some first cause.*

B. The truth is, this one Objection is all that is considerable in the whole cause of the *Dominican* Predeterminants: Which I have answered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is * no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one, than in my choosing the commanded one. To hate God, and love sin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate sin: To speak an Oath or Lye, than to speak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as *rather this way than that way exercised.* And Dr. *Twisse* hence saith, That *moral specification of Acts, is no true specification of them*; And it's true that it is not a *Physical* specification.

2. If you say that we have a Liberty *ad exercitium* as well as of *specification*, or of *Contradiction* as well as of Contrariety; Even to *will* or *not will*, do or not do: And in this case to *do* or *will* when forbidden, is more than not to *do* or *will*; I answer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active *vital power*, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a stone to lie still; And the *Cartesians* will tell you, that *Action* needeth no more cause than Rest: But I rather say, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such, whether *Vital, Intellectual* or *Volitive*. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. *Adam* had this liberty of contradiction, to *will* or not to *will* this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to *will* or not *will* simply. Now for *Adam to will to eat that fruit*, instead both of *nilling* it, and of *willing* to please God by nilling or refusing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed somewhat else at the same time.

3. An Action it self is not properly *Res*, but *modus Rei*; and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature, that supposing God the cause of its Power continued, shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power, he saith that which no mortal man can prove. The Glory of Gods Works, is their likeness to Himself; And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness, we know not just how far God can go in such Communications. I see no contradiction in it, to say that *a faculty maintained by God* in its natural force, with necessary (though not determining) concurse, can determine it self without any more causation. And if it be not a Contradiction, God can do it.

4. But this is all prevented by considering, that mans Soul is never out of Act. Its active force is never idle; though it act not always the same way, nor with the same extension or intension: so that to reduce it into act, is not to reduce it from a meer *potentia in actum*, but from a power acting one way, or slowly, to act another way, or more intensly.

5. Yea, this is all answered by considering, that as I said, while God continueth the Soul in its nature, it continueth a *naturally active force or power*; *inclined* essentially to activity: So that though, I say, that Action needeth

* I have noted after, that Dr. *Twisse* saith, [*Non necesse esse ut Deus sit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis; Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non est alicui conducibile—neq; necesse esse ut Deus sit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi, magis quam ut sit author peccati:*] And these have as much entity as *Bonum vel malum morale, Armi. dic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. sect. 7. pag.* 133.

It is true that the Will is free *ad actum utile & jucundum*, in many instances: And God maketh the Object, *e. g.* Honey, or *Eves* fruit; and God maketh the Appetite: so that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity; that is, that if thou wilt eat Honey it shall be sweet or pleasant unto thee: But whether thou wilt eat it, he hath left free: so that if God also caused that determinate act, he caused all. And so it is confessed that God maketh the Law, the Object, and the man: and thereby maketh, that if thou wilt cause such an Act, so disordered, it shall be thy sin and misery: so that if God would as much cause the Act also he did cause all in sin. And they that ascribe the Act *in suo modo* to him, ascribe all to him. But as to *Bonum utile*, he ill nameth it *Bonum conducibile*: For it may be *Conducibile ad malum & interitum*: But it is not *utile*, unless it be *conducibile ad bonum*, yea *ad finem ultimum*. For all is not profitable that accomplisheth a mans ends or will. And God is the Author of all true profit to us.

needeth more cause than non-action, that is, here done, in God still causeth the active disposition. But supposing that upheld, I say, that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action, than to cause it to act. What ever the world talketh against *Durandus*, they are never well able to answer *à Dola* (though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he.) And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed (as a threed), supposing God to continue the *nature* of it, and all things else, there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling, than to make it fall, when the threed is cut. It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors, *Dan.* 3. and the Lions from devouring *Daniel*, *Dan.* 6. and the Sea from flowing on the *Israelites*, and the Sun from moving in *Joshuah*'s fight.

6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action, which is but *modus rei*, that is in question, but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action; so that it is but *modus modi rei*.

7. And lastly, The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved, overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion. Now whether any man should deny all our Religion, and certain necessary Truths, for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this, that God is not able to make a Creature, that can cause a *modus modi*, in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that, without Divine predetermination, let sobriety be judge.

"C. *But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts, without* "*Gods determination, as well as of the evil.*

B. *Jansenius* is in the right in this: we have more need of Divine help to the *willing* and doing of good than of evil. We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse: But we cannot do *good*, especially spiritual saving good, unless we have moreover his *medicinal* special Grace. To the specifying of good actions, there must ever concur Gods *natural* help, Gods *gracious* help, and *mans free-will* or self-determination. It is not two or three determinations of the Will, which are made by these several Causes; but *one determination*. So that under God, man is the *specifying determiner* of his Will to good; or else he were not a Believer, nor rewardable or punishable. And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil, proceedeth not from the *Original nature of the Will*, (for with that such a determination was consistent) but from its *Pravity* or *Corruption*. But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled.

"C. *Dr.* Twisse *Vindic. Grat. lib.* 2. *p.* 190. (*Vol. minorib*) *hath a full* "*digression* (4) *to prove that* [God willeth that sin shall come to pass, "he permitting it, and saith, *Nostri Theologi affirmant: Arminiani Bon-* "*nisci negant.*] *

B. I wonder not that Dr. *Twisse* holdeth that *God willeth it*, when he

* This Digression of Dr. *Twisse* is answered in the first Book. His Friend *Alvarez de Aux. li.* 11. *disp.* 110. *p.* 442, &c. discusseth the Qu. *An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis*: and concludeth that [*Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam æternam, et permittere peccatum eorum, non est conditionata sed absoluta, nec præsupponit in Deo præscientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi.* 2. *In Angelis qui ceciderunt nulla datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum*, &c. 3. *Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum comparativa: & ita de adultis.* 4. *Non solum comparative, sed etiam absolute loquendo, nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus.*] Where note, that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects, *viz.* punishment; For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition: For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God. And all his stress is laid on this, that the permission of the first sin, is the first effect of Reprobation, and this permission hath no cause in man: *Ergo* Reprobation *quoad omnes effectus* hath no cause in man. But the truth is, 1. A man may put such a sence on the word *Reprobation*, as to include what he please. But it's usually taken for *Gods Decree to damn men, and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation*; and so is, 1. A positive Act as a Volition, 2. And privative, objectively, and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative; 4. And some most inepely extend it to that which

is *negatio actus*, no Act, that is, to *nothing*. And so a man that will play with words, may say, that 1. Gods *non-agere*, *non-elegere*, is an Act. 2. That his *non-impedire* is an effect, which is nothing, and therefore *no effect*: And *Alvarez* utterly faileth in his proof, either that *non-eligere* is an Act, or *permittere vel non impedire* an effect; or that it is fitly called *Reprobation*, which hath no privation but a negation for its Object; *v. g.* that *Judas* shall not be an Angel, nor irrecoverable, nor have natural free-will, is no act of his Reprobation: And so of the permission of the first sin. *Arminius* himself, exam. *Perkins. pag.* 568. saith, [*Volisse Deum Israelem punire, & Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere—Propria, immediata & adæquata causa cur permiserit, at Achab hæc Deus Israelem punire, & Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere—Propria, immediata & adæquata causa cur permiserit, at Achab idem eadem perpetraret, est illa quam dixi; mensura scelerum implenda erat. Potentissimus Deus aliter peccatum hominis, per aliam viam Nabothum ad se evocare.*] Which Dr. *Twisse* useth through all his Writings against him *ad hominem*, in stead of argument. Methinks this concession should seem enough which is too much. And I conjecture, that *Arminius* wrote it by over-sight, and would have said, that God permitted *Ahab* to kill *Naboth*, because he would punish him to the measure of his sin: making permission the *res Voliti*. But all their assigning Causes of Gods Decrees are not to hold; God being above all causes.

holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act, clothed with all its circumſtances. That which God *cauſeth*, he muſt needs will. But when he ſaith, *Noſtri Theologi affirmant*, he muſt mean but ſome few, ſuch as *Maccovius*, *Spanhemius*, *Rutherford*, (and perhaps *Piſcator* or *Beza*,) of his own mind. But the generality of Proteſtants either are againſt him, or meddle not with it. He that will read *Davenant*, and ſuch others, ſhall find the difference. I remember but few Engliſh Divines at all that own it, beſides the forenamed and Mr. *Norton*. But having written both an anſwer to this Digreſſion of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and to his and *Alvarez*, and other mens Doctrine of phyſical predetermining premotion; I may pretermit that here.

" C. *But by this they make God an idle Spectator of ſin in the World, and ſo* " *deny a great part of his Providence or Works.*

B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation, but of Gods Works. 2. Take heed of ſuch unreverent words of God: *Who will not hold him guiltleſs that taketh his Name in vain.* Dare you reproach God as *Idle*, if he do not all that your ſhallow thoughts will cut out for him?

" C. *The blaſphemy is theirs that give the cauſe by their unſound Doctrine,* " *and not mine that do but denominate their conſequents.*

B. Let us try that. Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do? that he made the World as ſoon as he was able, and could have done it no ſooner? or that he is able to make no one Man or Beaſt, or Plant or Atome more than he hath made? nor to do any one action more than he doth?

" C. *No: I hold no ſuch thing: For God is* Omnipotent *and* Free.

B. I pray you then ſtudy it, and tell me, if God be not to be blaſphemed as Idle, for ſuch a *total Non-agency* or *Free-ſuſpenſion* of his own Acts as to *all ſuch poſſibles*; why ſhould you call him *Idle*, if by the ſame *Wiſdom* and *Free-will* he only ſuſpend ſome *degree* of his co-operation with man in the caſe of ſinning? And if God freely *decree* that man ſhall be made a free Agent, able (by Gods common generical concurſe as the cauſe of nature) to determine or ſuſpend his own Volitions, without any predetermining efficiency of God. If God will delight himſelf in making ſuch a Creature, will you dare to ſay that he is *Idle*, becauſe he moveth him not in another manner? you will not ſo reproach a Watchmaker, for not moving the Watch all day with his finger.

" C. *I confeſs I cannot anſwer that: But how then is God the Governor of* " *the World, if ſo much ſin be done without his Will and Operation.*

B. The Work of a Governor, as ſuch is only, 1. By Legiſlation, *to make the Subjects Duty.* 2. And by *Judgment* to try and decide the caſe of each Subject, whether he do that Duty. 3. And to ſee to the execution of that Judgment. But not to be the determining cauſe of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions.

" C. *It is ſo with man, becauſe he can do no more: but not with* " *God.*

B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits, by phyſical motion, as Engins are moved (as a Clock or Watch) by natural neceſſitation: And ſo he doth the meer naturals of man; (As his Concoction, Pulſe, circulation of Blood, generation in the Womb, *&c.*) But God having made man an *Intellectual free Agent*, ruleth him *as ſuch*, agreeably to his nature; even by *moral Agency*, by *Laws* and *Judgment*: And this is that Regency of which we ſpeak. If you believe not that God

God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind, or King of the World; you deny him to be God, and overthrow all Religion and Morality.

"C. *But what ſay you to all the Texts that tell us, that God* willed *and* "*cauſed that which wicked men did; as in the caſe of* Pharaoh, Sihon, Re- "hoboam, Abſolom, *the death of Chriſt, and many others.*

B. One of the greateſt over-ſights of them that thus Object, is, that they diſtinguiſh not between the *ſin*, and the *effect* of the *ſin*; or the forbidden *Will* and *Act* of the Sinner as of him, and the *reception* of this Act *in paſſo*, in the recipient. God can many ways concur to the cauſing of the *reception* and the *effect*, without cauſing the *Volition* or *Act* as *Agents* by a ſpecifying determination. Eſpecially when Cuſtom comprizeth *both* in one *name*; dull wits are eaſily here deceived: As the words, *Murder*, *Theft*, *Adultery*, *Drunkenneſs*, &c. do ſignifie both the *Volition* and *Act* of the Agent, and the *Reception* or *Effect*. Now God can many ways make the ſinful *Volition* and *Act* of every ſuch Sinner, to produce that effect which the word *Murder*, *Theft*, *Adultery*, *Drunkenneſs*, &c. connoteth or includeth, without cauſing the Volition or Act forbidden determiningly.

"C. *I pray you ſhew me how?*

B. 1. He can by Providence order or ſet the Object in their way. 2. He can fit the *Receptive diſpoſition* of the Patient to the effect: Moſt of the wonderful Varieties in the World are *à diverſa recipientium diſpoſitione*. That Act will produce an Effect on a *diſpoſed matter*, which will not on another. 3. He can rule the Sinners *Inſtruments* of Action. 4. He can remove *other Objects* out of the way. 5. He can remove *Impediments*. 6. He can put in ſome *good thought* or *deſire* into the Sinners mind, which ſhall determine the Effect. 7. He can ſuſpend *ſome concurſe* of his own, which will tend to this effect rather than another.

"C. *Give me ſome Inſtances to make it plain.*

B. You need no other than the inſtance of the Murder of Chriſt: 1. When his time was come, he that before oft retired into the Wilderneſs, and lived in *Galilee*, came up to *Jeruſalem* in their way. 2. He was willing himſelf to die for man, and ſo did not avoid it. And he went into the place where *Judas* could find him. And he ſpake the words which he knew that they would call Blaſphemy, *&c.* 3. God directed the Souldiers Spear to the Region of Chriſts heart, which their intent or aim alone elſe had not done. And he provided a Croſs, and a *Simon* to bear it, *&c.* 4. God did not open to them effectually thoſe Reaſons which ſhould have moved them more to deſire the death of *Barrabbas*. 5. Abundance of Impediments God could have ſet in their way (as the peoples tumult, *Pilate's* reſiſtance, *&c.*) which yet he did not. 6. God put into their minds (by moral means at leaſt) the true apprehenſion of the probability that the *Romans* hearing of a King of the *Jews*, would turn their jealouſie and fury againſt them, and take away their place and Nation. 7. He ſuſpended that preſerving operation by which he could have kept Chriſt alive on the Croſs, and healed his Wounds, and cauſed him to come down from the Croſs, when they promiſed him then to believe in him; and he reſtrained the Souldiers from breaking his bones, *&c.* And in all this, there is no Decree, Volition or Cauſation of their ſinful *Wills* or *Deeds*.

So in the caſe of *Abſalom's* Inceſt (or any ſinful Generation,) 1. God order'd it ſo, that his Fathers Concubins were juſt in his way. 2. They had an inviting pulchritude; and an impotency of reſiſting. 3. The ſtate of his affairs was ſuch, as that the action had an appearance of

tendency to his ends, by making him seem unreconcileable to his Father. 4. And for *Achitophel* and *Absalom* to know the truth of this, was no sin. 5. Other diverting Objects and occasions are kept out of the way, *&c.* Yet in all this God neither *willeth* nor *causeth* that *Will* and *Act* of *Absalom in specie*; but the *effect*.

"C. *But by all this you do describe God as* plotting *and* doing *the same* "*thing that they do. And (but for different words) this cometh all to* "*one.*

B. 1. If you think this enough, why doth it not satifie you? while it is granted by them that you oppugn. 2. It is not the same thing. Is it the same thing for Christ to be killed, and for the *Jews* to *will* and *perform* his Murder? Is *mans Will* and *Act*, *and Christs Death* the same thing? 3. God did fore-know their sinful *Will* and *Action*, and permit it only, but did not cause it, but was a concause of the Effect.

So God may to a Drunkard, 1. Cause strong Drink or Wine to be in his way. 2. And remove some smaller Drink, that would have satisfied him. 3. And remove Disswaders and many impediments. 4. And give him money, and facility of obtaining it. 5. And cause him truly to know that the Drink is pleasant to the tast, exhilerating, spiritful. 6. And cause it when he hath drunk it, to make him drunken. And none of this is *quid prohibitum*, or sin in man: But his sinful *Will* and *Act*, which are forbidden, are presupposed or fore-seen.

"C, *I cannot see but that it cometh all to one, for God to* permit *that* "*which he fore-seeth, and could easily hinder if he would.*

B. 1. Your conceits that *it cometh all to one*, must not over-rule our certain knowledge of Gods Holiness, and his true and holy Word, and all the certainty of Religion in the World. 2. We are *sure* that God is Holy, a hater of all sin, and a righteous Judge, *&c.* And are you as sure that *it cometh all to one?* And must all men else say that they are sure of it too, or else be back-bitten, and called *Arminians*, *Jesuites*, &c. 3. Do you consider what Gods *permission* is? It is far from a full permission. He doth all that belongeth to a Rector to hinder it. He strictly forbiddeth it by Laws: He openeth the malignity of it. He threatneth misery here, and everlasting damnation hereafter to them that will not forbear it or forsake it. He promiseth all blessings in this life, and endless Glory in Heaven hereafter, to them that will. He sendeth his Ministers, first with Miracles, after with sealed Doctrine and Gifts, to proclaim all this to the World, and to perswade them: He gave his own Son to condemn sin in the Flesh, on the Cross, and by his holy Life, and Doctrine, and Suffering, to declare the malignity, and hatefulness, and hurtfulness of it to the World: He sets up all his Ordinances, Magistracy, Ministry, Sacraments, Worship and Discipline to this end: He warneth the World by many Judgments; and especially by the Messengers of each mans death; and the constant Afflictions which are the fruits of Sin: He obligeth them to Obedience, by multitudes of Mercies: He sets Heaven and Hell before them daily; and is this *permitting* it? He doth indeed in this sense *permit* it, in that he doth not all that he can against it, or doth no more than as aforesaid. 4. If this *permitting* be all one as *loving* or *causing* it, then when God made man a *free Agent*, and resolved to rule him by moral means, and leave *Adam* to his own Will, it was a *loving* and a *causing* sin. And is every King or Parent a *lover* of Vice, who doth not all that he could do to restrain it?

"C. *We do not hold that God* loveth sin, *though he* will *the* event, *and* "cause *the* act *circumstantiated.*

B. I know you ſay that neither God nor man loveth ſin as ſin: But whether Dr. *Twiſſe* & *Rutherford* ſay not in equipollent terms, that God is the greateſt Lover of Sin in all the world, judge by their confuted words in the former Book. 1. They deny not (nor can do) that *Love* and *Volition* in God are all one. Gods *Love* is not a *Paſſion*, but his *Will*. 2. They ſay, that God *willeth* that ſin exiſt. 3. And that as *ſummè & unicè* conducible to his Glory. 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good. 5. That God is pleaſed finally in what he *willeth* antecedently. 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being, ſo is he in the greatneſs, and power, and efficacy of his Volitions. 7. And that man loveth not, nor willeth not evil as evil, or ſin as ſin; but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory, for which he willeth its exiſtence. And is not this to ſay that he is the greateſt Lover of it that is?

"C. *Yet it ſticks with me, that God ſhould be the Omnipotent Governor "of the World, and all Sin which is the common work of the World, ſhould "be* without *or* againſt his Will: *Providence is wronged by this.*

B. You miſtake the matter: 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their *Free-will*, under moral Government, was not from impotency, as if he could have made man no better, or more neceſſary an Agent: But of his *Wiſdom* and *Freedom*, by which he made the Bruits without Reaſon, and Stones without Senſe.

2. All ſin is done againſt the Law or commanding Will of God, which determineth only of *Duty*, and not directly of Event. But it is not done againſt his abſolute Will *de eventu*: For God is not overcome nor fruſtrate of his Decrees.

3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the firſt Book, that Gods Providence doth about mans ſin, and then you will not ſay that he is Idle, or neglecteth his Government, unleſs he cauſe it.

I. It is God that made man an *Intellectual free Agent* in his own Image, and the Lord of his own Acts, as a Creature morally governable by Laws: And ſo all his *free power* is of God, who ſtill upholdeth it.

II. As God is the *Fons Naturæ* he is the *Principium motus*, and he concurreth as the firſt cauſe to all *Action* as *Action* in *genere*, and ſo to all that hath a phyſical entity and reality in ſin: And I do not believe that *Aureolus*, *Durand*, or *Lud. à Dola* thought otherwiſe, though they differ in expreſſing the mode of concurſe.

III. God giveth men all the *mercies* which they turn to ſin, and is the cauſe of all thoſe Objects which they inordinately love and abuſe.

IV. God himſelf concurreth with Sinners, in cauſing the *ſame effects* which *they* cauſe alſo by *prohibited Volitions* and *Actions* (as in generation, &c.) even when cuſtom giveth *one name* to the *ſin* and the *effect*: And that by all the ways fore-named, and many more.

V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor, maketh mens ſins the *occaſions* of much good, and ordereth and over-ruleth all *Wills* and Events, ſo as not to miſs of any of his ends: But will attain all his ends, while the Sinner ſeeketh his own.

VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do. And all that Sinners do he fore-knew. And neither his *Wiſdom*, *Goodneſs*, or *Power*, is ever over-come by ſin, or defective in any thing about it. And is not all this enough for you, but yet God muſt be the chief *willer* of ſin.

"C. *I confeſs that God can govern the ſinful World by this much.*

B. Take in but one thought more, which I afterward ſuggeſt. *Ockam* laborioufly endeavoureth to prove, that the outward Act hath no peculiar

liar ſinfulneſs in it ſelf diſtinct from that of the Will. I have told you my Opinion of his tenet: But this is granted him, that no outward Act hath any ſinfulneſs, but *ſecondary* and *participative*, as *animated* by the *Will:* and that ſin is *primarily* in the Will alone. Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. *Twiſſe* and *Rutherford*, it is not the *Will* of the Sinner that God is made the Author of, but ſeemingly of the Act, (indeed of the Effect.) Now God cannot be the cauſe of any mans ſin, unleſs he cauſe the ſinful Volition.

But I have anticipated our Diſpute of Providence in all this, becauſe it is here uſually handled as the *matter decreed*. And therefore when we come thither, you muſt excuſe me from repeating it, or pardon what you put me to do.

The ſixth Crimination.

"C. *My next offence againſt them is, that they make Gods* Will *and* De- "crees conditional, *and ſo make God dependent upon man.*

B. This is opened in the Second Book. * Indeed they differ not from the *Synodiſts* (or Dr. *Twiſſe* himſelf, I think,) in this. That is, 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations, Promiſes and Threatnings in his Word. 2. And that God may truly be ſaid to *Will* and *Decree* his own Word, and all that is in it, with its conditional mode. 3. And as *Aquinas* and *Twiſſe*, and all ſay, *Deus vult, hoc eſſe propter hoc; ſed non hoc vult eſſe, propter hoc.* Gods *Will* doth not depend on the Condition; but Gods Will is, that the *Effect* or *Event* ſhall depend on the Condition. When the Condition is performed, it is not a *medium* of Gods Volition, but of the Effect. 4. But yet this all muſt confeſs, that as to the bare extrinſick denomination from the Object, as Gods Will is variouſly denominated from things *paſt*, *preſent* and *future*, ſo it may be from *abſolute* and *conditional Grants* and *Promiſes:* which you will not deny but God hath made. 5. And in caſe of ſin and damnation, *ſin fore-ſeen* is an objective condition, diſpoſition or qualification *ſine qua non*, of ſuch as Gods *velle damnare* is immediately terminated on (as they confeſs at the Synod at *Dort*, and *Molinæus* there openeth in his judgment at large.)

"C. *But this decreeing upon fore-ſight of ſomewhat in man, maketh God* "*to follow the Creature, and depend upon it.*

B. It maketh him no way dependant at all: For the Creature neither cauſeth any Act of God, nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do. It is his own Will that this ſhall be the Order. But as to Gods Acts or Volitions *following* mans, 1. They no way follow mans but as Objects; which Objects in their *natures* and *qualifications*, relatively terminate, or by connotation denominate Gods Volitions. 2. And do you or any man deny that? Doth not Gods *Knowledge Præteritorum & Exiſtentium* ſuppoſe the *preterition* or *exiſtence* of Objects. Doth not Gods complacential Volition of the holineſs and glory of his Creatures, preſuppoſe that holineſs and glory? Doth not Gods hatred of paſt or exiſtent ſin preſuppoſe it?

"C. *But what can God fore-ſee in man, till he firſt decree to cauſe it, or at* "*leaſt decree that it ſhall exiſt?*

B. Sin: He decreeth neither, and yet fore-ſeeth it, (of which, *lib.* 1.)

The

* *Vaſquez in* 1. *Tho. diſp.* 91. *c.* 1. [*Cum quæritur an divinæ prædeſtinationis detur cauſa? quod non eſt de actu divinæ voluntatis, quatenus eſt ipſa eſſentia divina, & res increata: ſic notant ſcholaſtici omnes --- clarum enim eſt divinæ prædeſtinationis hoc modo non eſſe cauſam ſed eſt de effectibus. Et perinde eſt quærere cauſam prædeſtinationis ex parte noſtra, atq; cauſam aliquam totius effectus prædeſtinationis in nobis quæ effectibus illis non ſit annumeranda. Nam ſi quidpiam ponitur effectus prædeſtinationis nequit illud ulla ratione eſſe cauſa totius effectus. --- In Deo,* 1. *Ipſa eſſentia Dei.* 2. *Reſpectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas: Hic naſcitur ex objectis: Ejus igitur poſſunt eſſe cauſæ.*

The seventh Crimination.

"C. * *But some of them say, that the Gospel it self, yea and the first special* "*Grace, is given to men upon merit of congruity, though not of condignity,* "*and so is decreed on that fore-seen.*

B. 1. We mind not what some odd persons say, but what the moderate and sober say, whom we are reconciling. 2. But I pray you wherein do you differ from these? Is it in *words*, or sense also.

"C. *In both: I hold no such merit, fore-sight, or decree.*

B. Do you hold that there is such a thing as common Grace, distinct from special?

"C. *Yes: so do all Protestants.*

B. Is it not every mans Duty to make a good use of the common Grace or Mercies which he hath, as in order to his Repentance and Salvation?

"C. *Yes: He that had but one Talent should have improved it.*

B. Is not a man that doth this as far as common Grace will go, more disposed and prepared to receive special Grace, than one that hath long abused it, and derideth God and godliness?

"C. *Yes, no doubt some such are not far from the Kingdom of God.*

B. Have not * Mr. *Jo. Rogers*, Mr. *Tho Hooker*, Mr. *Rob. Bolton*, † and abundance of other Protestants written much of *Preparation to Conversion?* And is it not our common Doctrine?

"C. *Yes: but what's that to Merit of Congruity?*

B. What do you think they mean by it more than you by Preparation?

"C. *They mean such Merit as it is decent for God to reward.*

B. The greater part, I think, by far of the School-men say, That the first special Grace is not given upon any Merit at all. And the learned and sober that thus talk of Merit of Congruity and Decency, mean no more but this, 1. That God who commandeth men such use of his common Grace, as a means to special, doth command no Duty, and appoint no means in vain. 2. That such prepared persons are fitter for special Grace than the unprepared, and malignant Enemies of it. 3. That it is Gods usual way to prepare men by common Grace, before he give them special Grace. 4. And many say that we cannot prove that God useth to deny special Grace, where he giveth the highest degree of preparing common Grace. And which of these are you against?

"C. *But doth not God give special Grace also without such prepara-* "*tion?*

B. 1. Our foresaid practical *Protestants* seem to think not (to men at age.) For they oft say, that it cannot be conceived that a man can value Grace, and come to Christ truly, that hath no preparatory sense of sin and misery. 2. But I find not that the *Papists* usually deny it, but that God may give special Grace to the unprepared on a sudden. 3. But *Papists* and *Protestants* are agreed that this is not his ordinary way. And where do we differ in all this?

"C. *But we say not that there is any* Merit *in all this.*

B. Phy on that word *Merit!* I thought it was but the *name* that we differed about. 1. And many of themselves dislike the name, and say, it is unapt: And I think so do the *Lutherans* and *Arminians* more commonly. 2. And others say, that by *Merit* they mean nothing but a *moral*

* *Aliqui scholastici minus caute de gratia Dei loquuntur. Patres negarent omne meritum causam & occasionem ex nobis praedestinationis nostræ, ut ostenderent gratiam in tempore omnino gratis sine aliquo horum nobis donari*, Vasq. in 1. Tho. qu. 23 disp. 91. c. 10.

* Doct. of Faith.
† Instruct. for Comfort. Consc.
Read *Vasq. in 1. Tho. qu. 23. a. 4. disp. 9.* throughout, proving that Predestination to the first Grace is not upon fore-seen Merit, no nor upon any fore-seen Cause *sine qua non*, no nor Condition *sine qua non*, &c. and against *Cassianus*, and the *Massilienses*, and the Greek Fathers, that the *initium primæ gratiæ & prædestinationis* is not from our free will: *Yea, c.* 10. opposing *Scotus, Grabriel, Cajet. Richard. Durand. Paulus.* &c. as coming too near the *Massilienses*: *Yea*, and all that hold that *facienti quod in se est ex viribus naturæ, Deus non denegat gratiam.*

moral aptitude for *Reward*. And they say, that they can find no one fitter *name* for that than this, which all Christians without known opposition used for many hundred years after the Apostles. And that the Scripture word ἀξιος, *worthy*, is the same in sence. 3. And they usually say, that *special Grace* is called a *Reward* to the *prepared*, (if not unaptly, as many or most say, yet) but in a lower Analogical sense, and not as Heaven is the *reward* of Holiness: Because, of the latter, there is a flat *Promise*, and *premiant Law* or Covenant made by God; but of the former they can say no more than as aforesaid, that God appointeth no Duty and means in vain.

The eighth Crimination.

C. "*They make many Elections or Decrees where God maketh but one.* * "*As an Election to Glory, and another to Justification, and another to Faith* "*and Conversion, and another to have the Gospel, and another to be re-*"*deemed by a sufficient satisfaction of Christ, and another to be made men.* "*And so vary the Objects.*

B. Some of these are Decrees of common Grace, and not called *Election* by any that I know of, except, as some say, God *chose Men* and not *Devils* to have a Saviour. But all that I speak of are agreed with you, that Gods decreeing *Will* is his *Essence*, and that it is but *one God or Will* in the notion of Essence or Principle, or Act as it is meerly *Agentis*: But they say, that if we distinguish not Gods Decrees by connotation of the various Effects or Objects, our Controversies are at an end. And I ask of you, Do not you distinguish them when you dispute of their Order, Priority and Posteriority?

C. "*Yes: There is no Order without distinction.*

B. Will you not distinguish Election from Reprobation?

C. "*Yes: Though both be Gods Decree.*

B. Will you not distinguish the Election of *Peter*, both from the Reprobation of *Judas*, and from the Election of *Paul*?

C. "*Yes, as connoting various Objects and Effects.*

B. Is there not then the same reason for distinguishing Gods Volitions about one and the same person, as to various effects? As Gods Will that *Paul* be born, that he be redeemed, that he be endured in his sin, that he be converted, that he suffer, persevere, be glorified?

C. "*Yes: But though these be various Decrees, yet not Elections.*

B. These *names* and *words* are our unhappy Difference. 1. Remember then that you agree to call them divers *Volitions* or *Decrees*; and, I think, no sober man will fall out with you for the name *Election*. 2. But what reason is there in the nature of the thing, why you may not as lawfully and decently say, that to choose *David* to be a Saint, a King and a Prophet; to choose *Paul* to be a Christian, a Preacher, and a Martyr, are various *Elections*, as well as various *Decrees*? 3. But my own Opinion is, that the denomination should follow the Object: And therefore where the Objects elected, or the *Termini* of the Relation are various, we may call them various Elections: But when they are diversified but as *parts*, we should call them various acts and parts of one Election. And no doubt but our election to have the Gospel, to Conversion, to Justification, to Perseverance, to Glory, to the Ministry, to Martyrdom, &c. may in several respects be named *many*, and *parts* of one *Election*.

C.

* These are but contentions *de nomine*; as *Vasquez* truly saith about *Durandus* Opinion, who 1. *d.* 41. *q* 2. *n.* 11. concurring with other School-men, that the question *de causa prædestinationis*, is meant only *ex parte effectus, & de toto effectu, an scilicet totius effectus detur aliqua causa* opposeth *Ockam* & *Gabr.* therein, on the supposition that glorification is no effect of Predestination, but the means to it. And that because Predestination is as prudence in a man, which is only *circa media*, which saith *Vasquez*, *dis.* 91. *c.* 4. *non tam rei, quam vocis quæstio est.*
So also *Bonaventure* and *Jave* differ from others, and say, that *Prædestinationis (quoad effectum) datur meritum congruum ex auxilio gratiæ.* But its a meer strife about a word, while they take Predestination as reaching only to Justification, Perseverance and Glorification; and others take it as extending also to preparatory Grace, as *Vasqu.* also noteth, *disp.* 91. *cap.* 5.

C. "*I confess I am convinced that it is a shame to make a quarrel of this: "because it is about* a word, *and* really *there is no difference. But why "make they various Objects in one man of these Decrees?*

B. What is it but diversity of Objects that doth diversifie them? In the execution the case is plain. *Paul* uncreated and *creandus* was nothing, or no man. 2. *Paul* before he heard the Gospel, was a Pharisee that had not heard it. 3. *Paul* before Conversion and *convertendus*, was a persecuting Infidel. 4. *Paul jam justificandus* was a Believer. 5. *Paul jam vocandus ad sacrum Ministerium* was a Christian. 6. *Paul* persevering, and ready to overcome finally, was a faithful holy Christian and Apostle. 7. *Paul jam justificandus per judicem finaliter & glorificandus*, was a persevering over-coming Christian, Saint and Apostle.

The ninth Crimination.

C. * "*But that's my next offence: that they order Gods Decrees ac- "cording to the order of Execution, and not according to the order of Inten- "tion: when as* Quod prius est intentione, posterius est executione.

B. Dr. *Twisse* hath that word, I think, many score, if not hundred times: But it is no fit matter for contention. Do you believe that in God himself there is *Priority* and *Posteriority* of *Decrees*?

C. "*Not in time: but in order of Nature or Intention.*

B. How can there be difference of *Order*, where there is no *diversity*?

C. "*Though in God there be no diversity, yet you confess there is the Re- "lative connotation and denomination from the Objects?*

B. True: Therefore the *Order* also must not be denominated from any feigned diversity in God, but from the *Order* of the divers Objects, as one is first or last, in time, or nature, or use. That which is first, God decreed should be first: That which is *propter aliud*, God decreed should be *propter aliud*: And that which is the *end* of another thing, God decreed should be its *end*.

C. "*But even in God himself, we must, as men, conceive, that his* velle finem, *and* velle media *are not all one, but must distinguish them.*

B. As men, we must not judge falsly of God, when we know that it is false. If *velle finem & media* be certainly one without any diversity in God, saying what is in the connoted Objects, and the relation or denomination; how can we without sin destinguish where there is no difference? But I pray you tell me, what mean you by Gods *intendere finem*?

C. "*I mean that as every wise man doth first* will *an end, and then do all "for it, so doth God.*

B. We call nothing to man an *end*, but something which he wanteth, or at least is *without*: But God wanteth nothing, nor is ever without his end, or the accomplishment of his Will. But of this I crave leave to refer you to the first Book, where I have fully shewed that God *willeth* an end improperly, and not as man doth. But tell me, what take you to be strictly Gods end?

C. "*His Glory.*

B. What mean you by his Glory?

C. "*Our Knowledge, Admiration and Praise of his Perfection.*

B. * These are Acts of men, and can mans Acts be Gods chief end?

* *Bannes in* 1. 4. 23. *a.* 2. *pag.* 264. *Jactendum nobis est fundamentum necessarium, viz. quod in divinis omnia sunt simul & nihil prius aut posterius in aliquo genere causæ, nihilq; realiter ab alio distinctum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. At quia non simplici conceptu sed multis & imperfecte nos cognoscimus, necesse est distinguere,* you may see a multitude of Authors and Reasons to prove that Gods Will to all Objects is but one most simple Volition, *in Ruiz. de Volunt. Dei disp.* 5. *sect.* 6. *p.* 34.

* *Constat totius effectus prædestinationis non esse causam per modum finis aliquid ex parte prædestinati, cum Gloria quæ possit esse finis inter effectus annumeretur*, Vasqu. in 1. Thom. disp. 91. c. 4.

C. "*I know some say, It is the* objective Luster, *or* Demonstration *of* "*Gods* Perfections: *Take that if it please you better.*

B. That Luster or Demonstration objective is a Creature: And can a Creature be Gods Ultimate End?

C. "*No: God who is the Beginning is the End alone.*

B. God is no efficient Beginning of himself or any thing in himself: For in God there is no *Cause* or *Effects*; how then can he be his own End or final Cause? *

C. "*He is neither* Beginning *nor* End, efficient *nor* final Cause *of him-* "*self; but of his Works or Creatures only.*

B. Therefore not of his *Volitions*, or Decrees which are himself, nor of any of his Actions meerly as *Agentis*; because they are himself: but as they are in the effects. But how can God be the *Creatures end?* The Creature is no *means*, either that God be God, or that he be perfect, or that he be glorious in himself, or that he be just or merciful: It is the highest blasphemy to say it.

C. "*You know all our Divines say, That Gods end in decreeing, is the* "*Glory of his Mercy in the Salvation of the Elect, and of his Justice in the* "*damnation of the Reprobate.* †

B. Here are a multitude of Errors or Ineptitudes together. 1. That the name of the *means* (Salvation and Damnation) is put into the end. 2. That one little parcel of the means only is put, as if it were the whole. If we must speak so low, as to ascribe an *End* to God, we must say, that Ultimately he hath but *one:* And that *one* must needs be more than the glory of his *Mercy* and *Justice* towards man. Is all the rest of the world Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth, and Christ himself, no means in which he will be glorified? 3. That *quid creatum* is made Gods *Ultimate* End: For this *Glory* of his *Mercy* and *Justice* is no other, but a created *demonstration* or *apprehension* of it. 4. And why are *Mercy* and *Justice* only named, as though the glory of his Power, Wisdom and Goodness it self were here no part?

C. "*If you like none of this, tell me your own sense of it.*

B. 1. I suppose that *Intendere finem* is spoken of *God* only in a transcendent sense, and not at all as it is of man. And, 2. I suppose that *Gods Being* hath no Beginning or End, nor any thing in him. 3. I suppose that *Gods Free-will*, by communication of Essence, and of Perfections, is the Original *free Cause* of all things. He necessarily is what he is: but he *freely* made what he made. 4. Therefore I suppose that the same *Will* which is the *Beginning of all*, is the *End of all:* So that Gods Will as efficient is the Beginning, and *Gods Will* as *fulfilled* and *pleased* is the *end* of all his Works. 5. This may be called *finis Dei* improperly after the manner of men, but tollerably and with the least impropriety, and such as we must use. 6. This is more properly the commanded and appointed end of the Intellectual Creature, and analogically the end that all things tend to. 7. God is never without his end: For his Will is ever fulfilled and pleased; For *pro hic & nunc* he willeth nothing but what is. 8. But there are degrees of Perfection in Gods Works, and

* If any man will say, that to be generated, and to proceed in the second and third persons, are effects, I account it presumption to enter into a dispute of it: But it's certain, that nothing in God is effected by a a Creature, nor his Essence by himself.

† *Bannes's* order is thus, 1. *q.*23.*a.*2 *pag.*266. [*Actus quos nos possumus imaginari esse in mente divina tam communes quam proprios circa prædestinatos hi sunt: Cognovit Deus omnes homines possibiles; ex quibus quosdam dilexit quantum ad esse naturæ, & hos voluit creare: ex quibus adhuc quosdam dilexit ad finem supernaturalem, quæ divina electio dicitur; quatenus ex aliis quos creare volebat istos seperavit sibi; & demiq; hos electos prædestinavit; hoc est, providet & ordinavit ut per quædam media supernaturaliter efficaciter pervenirent in finem supernaturalem*].

That nothing but God himself can be the *objectum formale* of Gods Volition, see *Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp.*15. *sect.*6. *p.*165. *Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp.* 22, 23, 24. pretendeth to more accurateness than others in ordering Gods Decrees, and other Acts. Denying with others all real distinction, but asserting a distinction *secundum rationem ratiocinatam*, and would perswade us that he knoweth what that is (what the *fundamentum in re* is) he refuteth many others Opinions *de ratio ordinis* (*Molina's Vasquez, Zumel, Driedos*, &c.) especially *Aurtolus*, and concludeth (*sect.*5.) that *inter divinas operationes ordo prioris & posterioris ex eo est, quod unus actus sit requisitus ad alium, vel sit, alterius ratio vel conditio*: He confesseth all these to be fictious, and that there is no real diversity, (and *disp.*11. *sect.* 1. on the qu *An in Deo sit proprie libera Voliti effitax*) *dicit (Nullius animus tranquilla pace quiescit solutionibus hac usq; inventis, nec alibi se satisfacisse putat, qui nec sibi satisfecerit.)* Yet against *Ockam* he would have these fictions thought to be of very great use: when as all his prophane tremendous presumptions are but enquiring after a cause of the first cause, under the name of *Ratio vel conditio*, while he denieth that indeed there is any cause. Their question is, why Gods Will is terminated on this Object rather than on that? And is not this to ask a cause of it (of the first cause)? say but that *Deus volitione unica vult diversa diversimode ordinata*, and you have said enough? Had they meant only the *Ratio receptiva increatis, & ratio constitutiva actionum divinarum ut in effectis vel posse & ut extrinsecus denominatarum*, it had been sense. But in God himself there is *diversitas rationum volendi.*

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the narrow Creature hath lower ends beſides the Ultimate, inſeparable from it. And ſo man muſt intend his own felicity, and above that the perfection of the Univerſe, and above that the complacency of Gods Will. 9. And becauſe all the parts are to contribute to the perfection of the whole, and ſo all the parts of the *means* do make up one perfect Univerſe, in the ſtate of Glory, and there and then the whole world ſhall bear the livelieſt impreſs of the Divine Perfections, this *Impreſs* or objective Splendor and Image of God, together with the active Viſion, Love and Praiſe of the glorified (which is part of the ſaid Image or Impreſs) is called *Gods Glory:* which ſhineth in part in every part, and perfectly in the whole perfected world. 10. So that in a word, the perfection of the Univerſe being the *medium* compleated, is called *Gods End* in the lower material notion: And the fulfilling and pleaſing of his Will in the perfected world, is called his *End* in the formal and higher notion. And we can ſay no more of Gods *Velle finem.*

C. "*I confeſs your explication of Gods End and Intention ſeemeth to be* "*moſt agreeable to the Principles of Theology.*

B. And do you think that it is wiſe and Chriſtian-like dealing to fill the Church with Contentions, and make others odious to the people, about the Order of Gods Decrees *ſecundum intentionem*, while men know not whether God do *Intendere finem* or not? or what his End is? or what his Intention is? or while they miſtake all?

Will you make as many *fines operantis* and *Intentions* in God, as there are *fines operis*, and as the *means* or *Creatures* are made for one another as an End? or will you aſſign to God one End alone?

C. "*You know that in that our Divines do differ. Some that write of the* "*Order of the Decrees, make Gods Glory the end of Salvation and Damna-* "*tion, and theſe the end of Grace and permitted Sin, and theſe the end of* "*Creation*, &c. *But Dr.* Twiſſe *writeth againſt them* (*even* Perkins *and* "Beza, *&c.*) *maintaining that God hath but two Decrees; one* de fine, *and* "*the other* de mediis; *and that his End is but one.*

B. If you are no better agreed, bear with others that differ from you. But either you diverſifie Gods Decrees by their connoted Objects, or as divers intrinſick real Acts in God. If you ſay the latter, your own Party, and all the School-Divines, will ſay you blaſpheme, by making *God* diviſible or compounded, and will call you *Vorſtians.* If the former, how innumerable muſt you make *Gods* Decrees? And why may not the *Order* as well as the *ſpecies* and *number* of them be ſo denominated from connotation? And then you will ſay that *God* firſt intended to make man as the end of inferior Creatures, and after decreed to make them for man. And he firſt decreed that there ſhould be *fruit*, and then that there ſhould be a Tree to bear it, and then that this Tree ſhould be rooted in the Earth, and then that it ſhould be planted, and then that there ſhould be Earth and Water to nouriſh it, *&c.* And if poor man be but a little part of *Gods* Creation, unleſs we could anatomize the whole frame of the Univerſe, how ſhould we know juſt what place and order our own intereſt hath in ſuch a frame among ſo many millions of millions of Creatures, of which Angels and the ſuperior World are nobler than we? Is he to be numbred with the Churches Friends, who will make us ſuch work, and lay mens love and peace upon it?

C. "*But what have you againſt the ſimpler way of two Decrees?*

B. In *God* thoſe are not *two* but *one:* But I ſee not, but ſpeaking after the manner of men it may paſs, as the ſafeſt diſtribution by connotation and extrinſick denomination, if he had but rightlier deſcribed thoſe two. Of which I ſaid enough before.

C. "*How would you then denominatively order the Decrees according to* "*the order of Intention?*

B. According to Dr. *Twiſſe*'s own rule and method, all that you can by that Order infer, is but this, that the infinite Creator firſt intended the pleaſing and fulfilling of his own *Free-will* as his Ultimate end, and next decreed to produce all things as he produceth them to that end, and ſo is pleaſed in all things in their proper time and place; but further to bring all this Univerſe finally to perfection, and in that perfection his Glory or Image ſhall be perfect, in which he will finally be pleaſed: And the glorification of man is a little part of that Perfection. And what will this do to the promoting of your Opinions?

But I further aſk you, Is it not certain that God decreed to make all things in the Order in which he maketh them in time?

C. "*Yes: If you ſpeak of the Order of Execution.*

B. And is not this Order of Execution needful to be obſerved?

C. "*Yes, no doubt.*

B. And is not this Order of Execution eaſier to be underſtood?

C. "*Yes; for we are little diſagreed about it.*

B. If then this Order be plain, and ſure, and needful, and that which we are all agreed in; and your Order of Intention be either none, or uncertain, and paſt the reach of mortal man, judge you what Order we ſhould treat of, and who are the wiſe and peaceable men?

C. "*Yet the School-men before us have treated of that Order.*

B. *Davenant* tells you, That *Scotus* was the firſt Artificer of that Invention. Whether that be ſo or not, it's ſure that you uſe to declaim againſt the School-mens prophane curioſity and audacity: And where (except about the Trinity) hath it been greater than in this? And you know that few of them that give you the *ordinem ſignorum*, as they call it, do agree in the ſame Order; (As I have ſhewed in ſome inſtances, *lib.* 2.) And if you will condemn your ſelves in condemning them, why ſhould we think that you have hit of the right Order any more than they? We have ſeen *Beza*'s, *Gilbie*'s, *Perkin*'s, and we have ſeen *Twiſſe*'s (much better,) and we have ſeen the *Lutherans* and the *Arminians*, and we ſee little agreement. Do you think that the Synod of *Dort*, that leaveth out ſuch things, was not as wiſe as any of you all? Or was not *Davenant* as judicious as any of you in theſe Controverſies, who openly and largely profeſſeth, that he is not one of thoſe Privy-Counſellors of God, who know in what Order things lie in his Mind, and can aſſign each Act its proper place; but he thinketh this Order of mental Intention in God to be utterly unſearchable, and the Order of Execution only fit for us to treat of. See his *Diſſert. de Prædeſt.*

The tenth Crimination.

C. "*They ſeem to err much, in that they deny the eternal Cauſe of eternal futurition*; (*while they make* ſin *that is eternally* future, *yet not to* "*be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future.*) *How can things paſs* "*without a cauſe* e numero poſſibilium, in numerum futurorum?

B. Alas! what men, and what Engines muſt the poor Church ſuffer and be tortured by? ſure *Paul* fore-ſaw theſe things, when he *feared leſt as the Serpent beguiled* Eve, (with a promiſe of being as God in Knowledge) *ſo he ſhould draw us from the ſimplicity that is in Chriſt.* And when he warned us to *beware leſt any begnile us with vain Philoſophy, according to the rudiments of the world*: And when he telleth us of a *Wiſdom* which is *fooliſhneſs with God*; and of ſome who *profeſſing themſelves wiſe, became Fools.*

Your Doctrine ſoundeth ſo unlike to Chriſt's and his Apoſtles, that I muſt crave your Interpretation of it, that we may underſtand before we wrangle. I pray you what is it that you call *Futurition?*

C. "*The name tells you what it is. You know what we mean by it.*

B. I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Subſtantive, but doth it ſignifie *ſomething* or *nothing?*

C. "*It ſignifieth that* ſomething *will be hereafter.*

B. Now you turn it to a Verb: But is *futurity anything* or *nothing?*

C. "*Suppoſe, I ſay, It is ſomething?*

B. If it was *eternally ſomething*, it is God: For nothing elſe was eternal.

C. "*Suppoſe, I ſay, It is nothing?*

B. If it be *nothing*, it is no *effect*, and therefore hath no cauſe, and therefore no eternal cauſe.

C. "*Suppoſe, I ſay, that it is* neither ſomething *nor* nothing: *You know* "*there are five ſorts that* Burgerſdicius *placeth between* Res *and* Nihil, *and* "*futurity may be one of them.*

B. Five ſorts of what? You cannot tell. If you take *Ens* or *Res* limitedly for *leſs univerſal* than *Aliquid*, or a Species of it, you may ſay that *Datur medium inter Rem & Nihil.* But ſure *eſſe* and *non eſſe* are *contradictories.* And taking *Aliquid*, *Ens* or *Res* in the moſt univerſal notion, it is a contradiction, and a denial of the firſt principle of Knowledge, to feign a *medium: Burgerſdicius's* five *Non-entia quæ non ſunt nihil*, are *Privatio*, *Denominatio externa*, *ens Rationis*, *Relatio*, *modus entis.* And all this cometh from the pittiful narrowneſs of mans mind, that can know nothing at all by one *ſimple Conception*, but by *parts*; And then it frameth ſeveral names, according to all its inadequate Conceptions, as if they all ſignified ſeveral ſomethings. 1. *Privatio* is it ſelf a *compound notion*, including, 1. The abſence of the form. 2. The *debitum ineſſe.* 3. The *matters capacity* of it. The firſt is *Nothing*: the ſecond is a *Relation* (of which after): the third is the *nature* or *mode* of the matter, which is an inadequate Conception of *Ens.*

Vaſqu. 1. Tho. q.14.d.65. c.4. vainly ſaith, *Ens quod in univerſum eſt objectum intellectus non tantum eſt præſens, ſed etiam futurum, præteritum & poſſibile & quod futurum eſt aliquid*, contrary to common reaſon: For theſe are all *termini diminuentes* as to *ens reale*: That which only *was* or *will* be, Is not indeed, 1. The *Idea* in a mans mind *de futuro, & de præterito* is ſomething. 2. And ſo is the Propoſition, *Hoc fuit, vel erit.* And hence men falſly ſay, that *futurum* is *aliquid*; when it is only an aſſertion that *aliquid erit.*

So alſo *Aquinas* ſaith, 1. *diſ.* 38.*a.*4. & *de verit. q.*1.*a.*8. That *quæ non ſunt actu, aliquo modo ſunt, in potentia Dei vel creaturæ ſunt, vel ſunt in potentia opinandi vel imaginandi, vel quocunq; modo ſignificandi*: which is but to abuſe men with words, & play with the equivocation of [*ſunt*]. *Poſſe vel potentia, opinio, imaginatio*, &c. are ſomething: But muſt nothing therefore be *ſomething?* His queſtion is, *utrum ſcientia Dei ſit non-entium*: And if he had no better way to prove the affirmative, than by ſaying that nothing is *ſomething*, it's equal to ſilence.

Vaſqu. ibid. confeſſeth, *Intellectui Divino ſecundum ſe, nunquam res objicitur niſi ſicuti eſt: unde quod non eſt, non objicitur ſicuti eſſet.*

And here the Schoolmen contend, *An Deus cognoſcat actu infinita poſſibilia & futura*: *Aquin. Cajet. Ferrar. Bonav. Richard. Walden. Vaſqu.* &c. affirm it. *Durand. Almain.* and many later deny it. *Blank de concurſ. lib. & decret.* 1. *n.*58. well noted that futurity may be without a Decree to predetermine the Agent: For ſin is ſo, *e.g.* hating God,

blaſphemy. And that Dr. *Twiſſe* ill maketh Gods Decree the ſole cauſe of futurity. As to the preſumptuous queſtion, how God knoweth future things, beſides that there is no time to meaſure Gods Acts by, there need no other anſwer than that Gods infinite Underſtanding knoweth all that is intelligible. But futures as ſuch are intelligible. — *Quia divinus intellectus infinitæ virtutis eſt: quicquid intelligibile eſt neceſſario debet ampleCti & intelligere. At futura contingentia intelligibilia ſunt, eo quod ſunt determinatæ veritatis*, Vaſq. 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. cap. 4. But whereas he himſelf alſo defendeth that futures are known *in decretis divinis*, he is forced to ſay that ſin is known in Gods Decree of the *materiale peccati*: where yet in his Doctrine of Simultaneous Concurſe, he maketh Gods concurſe to be but part of the determining cauſe, which would not without mans free co-operation do it. Therefore the Decree of a half cauſation is not enough to infer the effect.

2. *Deno-*

2. *Denominatio externa*, signifieth, 1. The *Denominabilitas.* 2. Or the *actual denomination.* The first is considerable, 1. *Qua talis.* 2. Or *in causa vel ratione.* Denominability *in se* is nothing else but an inadequate Conception of *ens rationis:* For I can call *nothing* by a *Name.* But the *Ratio denominandi* may be *something*; and as now intended is *Relation.* 2. And the *actual denomination* is *Res*, that is, *Verbum vel mentis vel oris.*

3. *Entia Rationis* taken *effectivè & subjectivè* are confessed to be *real Entities:* but *objectivè* it is denied. All Objects are so called, 1. As *aptitudinal.* 2. Or actually *apprehended.* 1. As *aptitudinal* they are not *entia rationis*, but *something antecedent.* 2. As *actual*, they are *quid reale:* For they are *conceptus humanus inadæquatè expressus, sub ratione materiæ.* A *thought* or *conception* is an Act which is *quid reale:* And every Act consisteth of the *modus agentis* and the *Object*, which as such is *quasi materia*, and is essential to the Act: so that even *Genus* and *Species*, as in mans *thoughts* are *quid reale.* And *out of mans thoughts*, they are Relation or nothing.

4. *Relation* is a *something* or *nothing*, which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences. But when anatomized, it is considerable, 1. As in extrinsick Objects. 2. As *in the mind of man* considering them: 1. In the Object there is, 1. *Quid absolutum*, that is, the *subject*, the *terminus*, the *fundamentum*, *cum ratione fundandi.* 2, The *formal Relation.* The first is *quid reale*, as is confessed. The second is *nothing* besides the first. It is nothing but *rerum comparabilitas:* And that *comparability* is *nothing*, besides the *quid absolutum*, or *thing it self.* When an Egg is new laid at the *Antipodes*, an Egg here is newly related to it *ut simile:* But *nothing* is added to this Egg; But only now the *mind* of *man* can *compare* it with that at the *Antipodes*, and consider, that in quantity, figure, colour, *&c.* they are like: which likeness as *in ovo* is *nothing* besides the same *quantity*, *figure*, *colour*, &c. themselves. But by those Realities, it is capable of being *compared*, and the mind can raise an *universal* notion of *both*, as compared. 2. But this *comparing Act* of the *Understanding* is *quid reale.* So that *Ockam* in his *Quodlibets* hath well proved in many questions, that *Relation* is *nothing* besides the *quid absolutum in re & in mente humana.* And though his *Gregor. Armin.* at large dispute that *non-entia* may be related, yet it is on this supposition, that *non-entia* may be imagined, and be the matter of a *thought* or *conceptus*, and as such they are *entia rationis realia*; that is, that *conceptus* is *quid reale.* But besides that, the *Relatio non-entis* is nothing but *non-ens*, and a meer *nihil.*

Yet I confess that *Rerum ordo* is the sum of *Relations* and of *morality*; and that this *Ordo* is existent whether we think of it or not: But this *Ordo* is *nothing* distinct *ab absolutis & rebus ordinatis, cum omnibus suis modis & circumstantiis realibus.* Things are wonderfully *diverse* by diversity of quantity, quality, distance, *&c.* But this *diversity* is *nothing* besides the said absolute quantity, quality, distance, *&c.*

But I must not write a Logick for you: I am by this much remembred, that, as *David* saith, *man walketh in a vain shew or Image*; when multitudes of *nothings* go for *somethings*, and fill up so much of his thoughts and life, and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in.

C. " *But you have said nothing yet of the fifth, which is* Modus Entis. " *And* futurition *may be reduced to that.*

B.

B. A true *modus entis* is *quid absolutum & reale*, and the same that we call an Accident: And *Gassendus* chooseth to call Accidents, Modes or Qualities: And they are not really distinct from the *ens cujus modi sunt*, if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents, (as quantity, quality, action, &c.) But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified: not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part, but yet conceptions of *quid entis*, so that an *entire* perfect conception of *the thing*, would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident. So that they that deride the name of *Pars accidentalis* as put for *Accidens*, speak not always so good sense as they think they do.

But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing, (as Cloaths to the Body, Servants, Lands, Riches, Honours,) are not properly *Modes* and *Accidents* at all, but *Adjuncts*.

C. " *Apply this to the point in question, (of Futurity.)*

B. If *Futurity*, as is said, be an *eternal Being*, it is God: If *nothing* it hath no *cause*. If it be called *Quid medium*, the very *Quid* is a contradiction to it. To begin backward, 1. If it be *Modus Entis*, from *eternity*, it must be *Modus Dei*: For there was no *ens ab æterno* but God: If it be *Modus Dei*, it is *Deus*: For all in God is God.

2. If it be *Relatio*, it is *absoluti alicujus relatio*. If so, either of some real Being, or of *nothing*. If of a Being from eternity, it must be a Relation of God to the thing *future*, in that he either *willed* or *fore-knew* it. For nothing was eternal but God. And if so, that Relation of God to the thing future is *something* or *nothing*. If *something*, it is *God* himself, and so hath no cause. If *nothing*, it is no effect, and so hath no cause. But if it be the Relation of *nothing*, *viz.* of the *thing future*, (to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future) than it is *nothing* it self: For the *Relation* of *nothing* cannot be *something*, a real accident without a real Subject.

3. If *futurity* was from eternity *ens Rationis*, it was *Rationis Divinæ*; for there was no created Reason *ab æterno*: And if so, either *Aptitudinal* or *Actual*. If *Actual*, it was God: For all his *Idea's* and *entia rationis* (for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm *entia rationis* to be in God,) must needs be God himself, and so have no cause. If *Aptitudinal*, and not yet *in mente divina*, but *objecta possibilia*; either they were *something* or *nothing*. If *something*, then there was something eternal besides God, which is not said by any of us. If *nothing*, to call them *future*, signifieth no more, but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were, which is true: But *futurity* it self being *nothing*, hath no cause.

4. If you say that they are *extrinsical Denominations*, it is *something* or *nothing* that is *denominated future*. I know you will say, It's *nothing*. If so *quatenus* extrinsical to God, it was from eternity *nothing*, which you call a Denomination. But if you mean the Act of God *denominating*, it was *quid reale*, that is God *himself*, who hath no cause. But yet this is the true foundation of the notion. Because Gods Knowledge of *all things*, and his Will of all *good things*, extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity; therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that *knoweth* what *will* be, and a *Will* which willeth all that he will do; And thence we say that the thing was *future* from *eternity*. And so from an extrinsick Denomination of Gods *Mind* and *Will* we run on to give names to numberless nothings, and then talk, and write, and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams, as if they were *somethings*. And this is the work of the fantastical World. And then

we

we confound poor Scholars with the names of *Entia Intentionalia, & Species, & Entia rationis, & Universalia.* And with *Aristotle, Themistius*, &c. say that *the Intellect is all things that it knoweth*, &c. O what work have vain notions, and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World, but in the Church, and among those that call themselves Orthodox, and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures! (The notion of Privations, I need not here apply.)

C. "*But things* future *are future, whether any one think of them or* "*not.*

B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others, what-ever is said to them. It is certain, that *possibile* and *futurum* are *termini diminuentes & negantes quoad existentiam.* That which only *will be* is not. Therefore the name signifieth nothing, but that the *thing will be* without any connotation of any cause of it; but it implyeth that there is some *fundamentum vel ratio*, which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say, It will be. And there needs no more to that, but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect. But I have said more of this *lib.* 1. and therefore here will add no more.

C. "*But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be, unless* "*he first* Will *or* Decree *that it shall be (by his permission)?*

B. I abhor the question and supposition. That such worms as we, who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is, should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin, unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it; yea, unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it. When it is a wiser way of arguing, to say, [*This is the way that man knoweth by, and that man can comprehend:* Ergo *it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge.*] But remember one thing, that here you plainly make God to *will* the *form* of *Sin* as well as the matter? For is not the form future?

C. "*Yes.*

B. And is not Gods Will his Love?

C. "*Yes.*

B. And do you not make God then to love the very *form* of Sin, which yet you say that no wicked man loveth?

C. "*No: It is but the existence of the* form *that he willeth or loveth.*

B. O excellent distinguishing! He willeth not the *form* of Sin, but only willeth that it be, or exist. The *form* is the Essence: He willeth that the Essence exist; but willeth not the Essence, which is nothing, but as existing! But do wicked men will any more, or so much, as that the form exist?

C. "*Dr.* Twisse *saith, No.*

B. And if it were but the Act that existed, doth not Gods Law make it sin, by forbidding it, and so cause the Essence?

C. "*Yes.*

B. And if you say that God *willeth* the existence of the form of Sin, why say you that he doth not cause it? Is not his Will effective? or is it any more contrary to his Holiness to cause it, than to will or love it?

C. "*He causeth the existence, but not the form or existence.*

B. What jugling is this in such tremendous matters? 1. What is it to cause the form, but to cause that it exist. To cause it to be, is all the causing that it can have. 2. And you confess that Gods Law, by forbidding it, maketh it sin *in specie* when it existeth. Remember that you say that it is not only the matter, but the form of sin, which God willeth and causeth to exist. And is it not a contradiction to call it *evil*, and

yet

et say that God *willeth* it? when his Will is the Rule of Good-

ess?

C. "*It is not evil to God, but to us.*

B. So Dr. *Twisse* saith: And to be evil to us (even mans sin or damna-
on) is not evil to God. And so God is the great Lover of Sin and
amnation. But why then is he said to hate it? And is it not an Ene-
y to God, and contrary to his Holiness? Why did Christ die for that
hich God so loved?

C. "*Sin is nothing, and therefore God causeth it not.*

B. 1. Relations and Privations have their Causes, and so hath Sin.
2. Else man cannot be condemned for causing it.

The Synod of *Dort* and Reformed Churches teach no such Doctrine:
but it is such as you that tempt the *Arminians* to revile them, and say,
that you describe God in the shape of the Devil, and much worse, as
loving and causing sin and misery more than he: that so the love of God
may be extinguished.

C. "*I think we must leave these Mysteries to God.*

B. But, good Brother, though I have stopt your mouth and censures
of your Brethren, in this and such matters, do you expect that every
honest Christian must be able to discuss all your Logical Fallacies, or else
go with you for unsound and heterodox? And have you dealt fairly by
the Church of God, to borrow from the School-men such snares for
mens Consciences? And must every man be perswaded that God is the
greatest lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act, that is not
able to answer your smoaky Sophisms about *futurition* and its eternal
cause, with such like. I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as *Eve*,
and turned men from the simplicity that is in Christ.

C. "*I pray briefly give me the sum of what you drive at.*

B. The sum is, That though every Party, and almost every person of
each Party, have odd notions of his own, and peculiar weapons, to
wound his Brothers Reputation with, and militate against Love and
Concord, and manifest the Pride of his self-conceited Understanding;
yet all sober Christians, I think, are agreed in all this Controversie of Gods
Decrees, in all that is truly necessary to our brotherly love and peace.
That is, *All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth*, and to give all
the *Grace* and *Mercy* which at any time he giveth, whether to all or some.
And that he absolutely and properly decreed no more. (But improper-
ly he may be said to *will* an *event in tantum*, when he *willeth* only to do
so much, or so much which naturally conduceth towards it, though he
know that it will never come to pass.) But what it is that God actually
doth or giveth in time is all the controversie, which is to be spoken of in
the third Chapter. And were it not for your tenaciousness of contenti-
ous notions, I needed to have said no more than these few words here of
Gods Decrees.

THE

Third Days Conference

(With an *ARMINIAN*

Of Universal and Special

REDEMPTION

A. "*The second Article of our Difference is so fundamental and momen-*
"*tous, and our distance so great, that I cannot believe that you can*
"*say any thing sufficient to reconcile us.*

B. They that study Controversie as such, are apt every where to find matter of Quarrel, and weapons of Contention; but they that seek *peace* do find out the terms and means of peace, as *sure* and *easie* in themselves, which Contenders cannot see.

Tell me, in a word, *Are not all Parties agreed*, that *Christ* by his *Merits* and *Sufferings*, procured for *men* all *mercies* which he giveth them; and *no more*, (but as he may be said to procure them that which he offereth and bringeth to their choice; which is properly to procure them that *offer*, or the *benefit as offered?*)

A. "*Yes, I think both sides will grant this, that he purchased all that*
"*he giveth, and absolutely or fully no more.*

B. Why then all the Controversie is, what he *giveth* men: and that *belongeth* to the third and fourth Articles: And so I might dismis this at the beginning, but for your expectations.

But what is it that maketh you think the difference so great?

The first Crimination.

A. 1. "*The* Calvinists *and* Synodists *deny Christ's very Office, as he is*
"*the Saviour of the World, and the second* Adam, *the Redeemer of*
"*Mankind, and the Mediator between God and Man. And all this they*
"*confine to a small part of the World.* *

B. Have you never read what *Musculus* hath written in *Loc. Commun.* and *Bullinger* in his *Decades* for universal Redemption? Have you not read the plain words of *Calvin*, cited by *Amyraldus* in *Defens. Doct. Calvin.* (though *Petavius* rail at him for it most furiously)? Have you not read the writings of *Joh. Bergius*, *Conrad. Bergius*, *Lud. Crocius*, *Calixtus*, of *Camero*, and his Followers at *Saumers*, of *Testardus*, *Dallæus*, *Blondel's Preface*, &c. for Universal Redemption? Have you not read in the writings of Bishop *Rob. Abbots*, Bishop *Carelton*, Arch-bishop *Usher*, Bishop *Hall*, Dr. *Sam. Ward*, &c. their judgments for it? Have you not read Bishop *Davenant's* excellent *Dissertation* for it, *de morte Christi?* Know you not that it was the judgment of Dr. *Preston*, Mr.

* *Malderus in* 1. 2. *q.* 111. *a.* 3. *d.* 5. *m.* 1. *p.* 487. *Non existimo opinionem illam Calvinisticam, quæ negat pro omnibus & singulis Christum mortuum esse, tolerandam esse: nec inter studiosos veritatis debere obtinere locum opinionem qui non perinde admittunt quod omnibus in Adamo lapsis---iterum sit via (salutis facta possibilis per Christum & quod habeant per Christum in actu primo paratum, vel in actu secundo datum sufficiens auxilium gratiæ, quo saltem mediate salvari possint, &c.*

Mr. W. Whateley, Mr. *W. Fenner*, and many excellent Divines among us? Know you not that Dr. *Twiſſe* himſelf, I believe twenty, if not forty times over in his Works, ſaith, That Chriſt ſo far died for all, as to procure and give them Pardon and Salvation, on condition they will repent and believe; but he died moreover for the Elect, to procure and give them Faith and Repentance alſo? Know you not that *Paræus* in his *Irenicon* ſaith, That the Sins of all the World lay on Chriſt on the Croſs, as the cauſe of his Death? Know you not that it is the commonеſt Doctrine of the *Proteſtants*, That Chriſt died for all men as to the *ſufficiency* of his death, but for the Elect only as to the *efficiency* of Salvation? And what can you ſay more or leſs than thoſe few words ſignifie? Know you not that the Synod at *Dort* it ſelf ſaith, "That Chriſt's "ſatisfaction is of infinite value and price, abundantly ſufficient to ex-"piate the Sins of all the World; and that the Promiſe is, *That whoſo-"ever believeth ſhall not periſh.* And this is to be preached to all. And, "that many yet repent not, believe not, but periſh, is not through any "defect or inſufficiency of Chriſt's Sacrifice; but by their own default. *Muſculus* his words for Univerſal Redemption, are (*Loc. Commun. c. de Redemp. Gen. hum. p.* (*mihi*) 326. *&c.*) [*Redemptio eſt generis humani: Genus humanum Complectitur non unam aut alteram Gentem, ſed mundum univerſum, omnes* viz. *totius orbis nationes, cunctos homines à primo uſq; ad noviſſimum. ---Generaliter eſt omnium. ---Scimus non omnes Redemptionis hujus fieri participes: Verum illorum perditio qui non ſervantur, haud quaquam impedit,* * *quo minus Univerſalis vocetur Redemptio---Reſolutio illa telluris qua paſſim omnia ad germinandum æſtate ſolvuntur, recte Univerſalis dicitur, etiamſi multæ arbores---non germinent---&c. Anno Jubilæo Generalis omnium ſervorum liberatio erat, etiamſi multi in ſervitute manentes, gratiam liberationis reſpuebant. Ad eum modum habet & Redemptio ipſa generis humani---- Quod illam homines reprobi & deploratè impii non accipiunt, neq; defectu ſit Gratiæ Dei, neq; juſtum eſt ut illa propter filios perditionis Gloriam ac titulum* UNIVERSALIS REDEMPTIONIS *amittat, cum ſit parata cunctis, & omnes ad illam vocentur, &c.---ſic enim cavebimus ne Catholicæ Gratiæ Gloriam obſcuremus & in arctum Conſtringamus, vel cum phanaticis hominibus neminem prorſus damnari dicamus---*]. Bullinger---

"*A.* You may ſpare your labour of citing *Bullinger* and *Muſculus*, "or *Melanchthon*, or *Bucer*, or ſuch moderate men: But what are they "to the rigid *Calviniſts?* ----

B. *Calvin* ſaith, in *Rom.* 5. 18. [*Communem omnium gratiam facit, quia omnibus expoſita eſt: Non quod ad omnes extendatur reipſa: Nam & ſi paſſus eſt Chriſtus pro peccatis totius mundi atq; omnibus Indifferenter Dei benignitate offertur, non tamen omnes apprehendunt.*]

And in 1 *Cor.* 8. 11. [*Dictum memorabile quo docemur quam (Chara) eſſe debeat nobis fratrum ſalus; nec omnium modo, ſed ſingulorum, quando pro unoquoq; fuſus eſt ſanguis Chriſti.*]

And in 2 *Pet.* 2. 1. [*Non immerito dicuntur Chriſtum abnegare à quo redempti ſunt,----*].

And in 1 *Joh.* 2. 2. He ſaith, That *qui dicunt* [*Chriſtum ſufficienter pro toto mundo paſſum eſſe, ſed pro electis tantum efficaciter,*] ſay true, and that which commonly obtaineth in the Schools, though he otherwiſe expound that Text.

"*A.* You need not cite *Calvin: Grotius* ſaid truly that he had his *Lu-"cida intervalla*; and though *Amyraldus* ſeek to defend him from ſelf-"contradiction, *Petavius* calls him all to nought for it: But what can

* It ſeems there were but few in *Bradwardin's* days, who were of his mind, in confeſſing the antecedent natural impoſſibility of any ones Salvation, or any good act, which cometh not to paſs; ſeeing (*li.* 3. *c.* 29. *p.* 735.) he anſwereth them that ſay, [why ſhould the Opinion of a few, trouble the Church, and the far greater number that is againſt it], by referring them to the paucity of wiſe men and Believers, and ſaying that truth muſt be preached for the few (Elect) that will receive it. And *p.* 737. tells us how *Ariſtophanes*, contrary to the ſix Judges, appointed by *Ptolomy*, did adjudge the Crown to that Poet that the people liked worſt.

" you say for your high *Antiarminians*, such as *Paræus*, *Molinæus*, " &c.

B. *Paræus*, (let all mark it) saith, *Irenic. cap.* 24. *pag.* 142. [*Quod Christus pro solis electis satisfecit,* λογομαχία *est, vel falsa accusatio: Omnium peccata Christus portavit, dissolvit, expiavit, si magnitudinem pretii, seu* λύτρου *sufficientiam spectemus: Non omnium sed tantum fidelium, si* λύτρου, *efficaciam, fructum, applicationem.*] To which he citeth *Ambrose*, *Innocent*, *Lyra*, adding [*Juxta hunc intellectum nulla est dissensio.*

Art. 6. *itidem* λογομαχία *est vel falsa accusatio. Promissiones Gratiæ sunt Universales, pertinentq; ad omnes, quoad prædicationem, invitationem, & mandatum credendi.*]

And on 2 *Pet.* 2. 1. [*Erant Redempti respectu sufficientiæ* λύτρου, *&c.*]

Molinæus Anatom. Arminianis. saith, *cap.* 27. *sect.* 8, 9. [" When we " say that Christ died for all men, we take it thus, that the Death of " Christ is sufficient to save whosoever do believe; yea, and that it is " sufficient to save all men, if all men in the whole World did believe " in him: And that the cause why all men are not saved, is not in the " insufficiency of the Death of Christ, but in the wickedness and incredu- " lity of man. Finally Christ may be said to reconcile all men to God " by his Death, after the same manner that we say the Sun doth enlighten " the eyes of all men, though many are blind, many sleep, and many are " hid in darkness, *&c.*]

" That most methodical acute Divine, *Georg. Sohnius*, saith, *Tom.* 1. *Thes. de Justific. (mihi) pag.* 104. [*Satisfactio illa & justitia pro omnium temporum hominibus, & omnium hominum peccatis, & peccatorum omnium cum culpa tum pœna sufficit, quia ab infinita persona dependet,* Matth. 18. 11. & 12. 31. Rom. 5. 18. & 8. 32. 2 Cor. 5. 15. 1 Tim. 2. 6. 1 Joh. 1. 7. & 2. 2. Tit. 2. 14. *Errant igitur qui Christum pro omnibus hominibus passum esse negant.*]---

" *A.* But such violent men as *Zanchy* (the grand Patron of the im- " possibility of falling away) talk not at this rate.

B. *Zanchy* saith, (*Thes. Vol.* 3. *fine*, *Thes.* 13. 16. *de Volunt. Dei*) *Eadem de causa dici non potest Dei voluntatem proprie & simpliciter fuisse, ut Christus pro salute omnium moreretur, id est, ut omnis per ejus mortem servaretur, ac proinde Christum secundum* propositum *patris pro salute omnium mortuum esse; sed tantum, ut loquuntur, sufficienter. --Cæterum damnari etiam illi non possunt, qui spectata revelata voluntate Dei docent, & Deum velle omnes homines salvos fieri, & Christum pro salute omnium hominum mortuum esse, & neutrum velle peccatum; cum hæc omnia sint verissima.*

And de Relig. Christ. fid. cap. 12. Thes. 2. [*Credimus* (Mar. 16. 16.) *licet omnibus hominibus per Evangelii prædicationem Gratia Redemptionis, salus ac vita æterna à Deo dispensanda serio proponantur,* (*quod enim pervulti hujus non fiunt participes, ipsorum sit vitio & culpa reipsa tamen non communicari nisi---electis, vocatis----*]

" A. *What ever these hold, I am sure your English* Calvinists *hold other-* " *wise.*

B. Have you not read Bishop *Usher's Tract*, for *Universal Redemption?* Have you not read *Davenant's Dissert. de morte Christi*, so oft mentioned? Have you not read the *Life of Dr.* Preston, and how in the Dispute with Dr. *White* he maintained Universal Redemption? Mr. *William Fenner* in his *Hidden Manna* brings in *Cain* saying, [Christ died not for me, *&c.*] and answereth, [*Mentiris Cain*, Christ died for thee.] It would be too long to cite all.

Dr.

D. *Rob. Abbot de Verit. Grat. Chriſti, pag.* 35, 36, 37. [*Huic diſputationi dabit initium--- Ambroſis Sententia in Luc. c.* 7. *l.* 6. [*Etſi Chriſtus pro omnibus paſſus eſt, ſpecialiter tamen pro nobis paſſus eſt---*] *Quibus verbis apertè ſignificat ita Chriſtum pro omnibus mortuum, ut tamen in morte Chriſti, haud omnes pares exiſtimandi ſunt. Communiter quidem pro omnibus mortuum---* viz. *pro omnibus ſatisfacere voluiſſe dignitate pretii---eſto Chriſtum in promiſcuo ſenſu generis humani, ſe aliquo modo pro Judæ dediſſe,* &c. *--Neq; enim Chriſtus qua homo partitionem hominum vel diſcretionem ullam inſtituit ut quemquam dici poſſit à mortis ſuæ beneficio excepiſſe, qui hac quidem ratione pro perſequentibus & crucifigentibus promiſcue patrem rogat, noſtro quod ſit exemplo--- Quod certe dolere non potuiſſet, niſi pro illis quoq; quantum ex homine, crucem obire ſtatuiſſet---*]

I told you before what Dr. *Twiſſe* ſaith twenty times over, That [Chriſt died to purchaſe Pardon for all if they will believe (conditionally) but for the Elect to purchaſe them alſo Faith it ſelf.]

"The *Annotations* called *the Aſſemblies*, ſay, on *Heb.* 10. 29. [*Sanctified by the Blood*] [By which their ſins were pardoned in regard of "that meritorious ſufficient Satisfaction purchaſed by it.]

Abundance more I could eaſily cite.

"A. *But they do but juggle and cheat the World with the Vizor of a Doctrine that cannot endure the Light: For by* ſufficiens pretium *ſome ſay "they mean but* ſufficiens ſi pretium fuiſſet, *and no price at all.*

B. Thoſe be but a few odd conceited perſons, driven by you into extreams: They profeſs that Chriſt hath *ſufficiently ſatisfied* for all, and purchaſed them effectually a conditional Pardon. They call not that a *ſufficient price and ſatisfaction* which is none at all.

A. *But we agree not as to Gods intent of the beneſits to all.*

B. 1. That concerneth the Decrees. 2. The ſober * Papiſts agree, and ſay juſt the very ſame as the Synod. See *Eſtius in* 3. *Sent. d.* 19. *ſect.* 3. *Tapperus, Art.* 6. *Malderus Antiſynod. p.* 23, 24. *Fr. Sonnius de monſtr. Relig. Chriſt. l.* 3. *c.* 19. † *Rivet* citeth theſe, *Diſp.* 6. *de Redempt.* And he himſelf makes Chriſt's death even partly effectual for all. And will *you* be more contentious and violent than all the ſober *Papiſts* and *Calviniſts*?

Know * you not how excellently our *Britiſh* Divines in the Synod of *Dort* have opened this, and as well the three *Breme* Divines, but above all, moſt clearly and briefly the learned *Matthius Martinius* there? But I will name no more, when it is the whole of the famous *Dallæus* his *Apolog. Cont. Spanhem. Part.* 4. *To.* 1. to ſhew the conſent of *Proteſtants* herein: And when his whole Second *Tome* is to cite the very words of an hundred and twenty Fathers and Councils, for Univerſal Redemption and Grace, (*Theophylact* being the laſt) and ſixty three *Proteſtant* Churches and Writers that ſpeak for it, to whom I could add many more.

"A. *If this be ſo, how cometh it to be a Controverſie?*

* [*Quod ad magnitudinem & potentiam pretii, & quod ad unam pertinet cauſam generis humani, ſanguis Chriſti eſt redemptio totius mundi: ſed qui hoc ſeculum ſine fide Chriſti & ſine regenerationis ſacramento pertranſeunt, Redemptionis alieni ſunt. Cum ergo per unam omnium naturam, omnium cauſam a Domino noſtro in veritate ſuſceptam, redempti recte omnes dicantur, non tamen omnes captivitate ſunt eruti Redemptionis proprietas haud dubium penes illos eſt---qui ſunt membra Chriſti.*]

This of *Auguſt. Rivet* approveth of *diſp.* 6. *de Remp. p* 100. But it's clear that by Redemption in the laſt part. *Auguſt.* meaneth actual liberation from Captivity, which no doubt is proper to the Elect.

† *Vid.* Vaſquez *To.* 1. *in* 1. *diſp.* 97. *c.* 2. & 3.

* Saith *Vaſquez in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *a.* 8. *d.* 95. ¶ *c.* 3. *Cum omnes ſimul eſſemus eodem modo in primo parente damnati & eandem ſententiam, ſubituri, non omnes ſed quidam ex illa communi maſſa ſumus ſeparati, gratia congrua & efficaci uſq; ad finem vitæ: ergo quidam ſumus præ aliis electi: ſed gratia qua ſumus ſeparati ne cum aliis damnati maneremus fuit per Chriſtum: ergo per Chriſtum a communi maſſa electi ſumus. Quod ſi ita in tempore factum eſt, nemo ambigat in præſcientia eodem modo fuiſſe decretum.*

Neq; vero ut quiſpiam ſit cauſa eligendi aliquem ex multis damnatis, apus eſt ut ipſe ita ſit cauſa relinquendi alios obnoxios pœnæ, &c. *--Chriſtus cauſa fuit noſtræ electionis, ut non-nulli potius eligerentur quam alii: Quia peculiari ratione merita ſua ipſis applicavit, & pro nis oravit---ex iis qui poſt incarnationem ejus fuerunt ego non dubito Chriſtum peculiari oratione & voluntate merita ſua illis applicaſſe qui predeſtinati & electi fuerunt, ac propterea eos potius quam alios electos & predeſtinatos fuiſſe.*

De quibuſdam hoc certiſſimum eſt Luc. 22. *Chriſtus oravit pro Petro,* &c. Et Joh. 17. *Non pro mundo rogo, ſed,* &c. *Quis autem negare audeat Chriſtum hac oratione vere meruiſſe Apoſtolis gratiam congruam & efficacem, qua uſq; in finem perſeverarent,* &c.

B. A few particular men on each ſide that run into extreams, when once engaged run on further, and make a great noiſe, while ſober men in ſilence pity them; And ſo with ſome the greateſt and the lowdeſt are taken to ſpeak the common ſenſe. And thus *Spanhemius*, *Maccovius*, and a few much inferior to them in learning here in *England*, have kept up the Contention. And ſeveral of the *Jeſuites*, *Lutherans* and *Arminians*, have run out into the contrary extream; and ſo the difference hath been made and maintained. So that with moſt Chriſtians, the controverſie is not whether Chriſt be the Saviour of the World, or died for all men; but how far, and in what ſenſe he did ſo, that this Article may agree with the reſt of our Theology.

A. "*The ſenſe is all: If we agree not in ſenſe, we agree in nothing.*

B. The few extream Contenders agree not in ſenſe: But the generality of Chriſtians, much more may I ſay *Proteſtants*, do, in all that is neceſſary to our common concord. If really you differ, tell me your ſelf, *What do you hold that Chriſt purchaſed for all men, more than the Synodiſts do?* Name me one benefit if you can.

A. "*You would perſwade me that we differ not indeed.* 1. *We hold that* "*Chriſt procured and made the firſt Covenant of Grace with all Mankind in* "Adam *and* Noah: *and ſo do not the Synodiſts.*

B. I think you can name few *Proteſtants* that deny it. *Beza* himſelf in that *Edit.* of his *Annot.* in *Eph.* 2. 12. which *H. Stephanus* printed 1588. ſaith, [This *Covenant was made* in the beginning, *Gen.* 3. 15: with *Adam*, and all that ſhould be born of him; and afterwards, *Gen.* 9. 10. with *Noah*, the other Parent of Mankind; as we have elſe-where noted,] plainly, they ſay that it is made to all men as a Law, then promulgate to *Adam* and *Noah*; even a Law of Grace, which Mankind was put under; And as an offered Covenant, and conditional Promiſe: But as, 1. A *mutual* Covenant. 2. And as *giving right to Life*, it is made, only with Conſenters. Tell me whether you differ from this ſenſe?

A. "*No; this ſenſe is according to the Scriptures. But moreover,* 2. *We hold that the ſecond Edition of the Covenant alſo is made to all.*

B. It's granted you, that it's made to all that hear it, as far as aforeſaid; and that Miniſters ſhould do their beſt to preach it to all: And do you hold any more?

A. "*No: But,* 3. *We hold that this Covenant pardoneth all mens ſins,* "*on condition of Faith and Repentance, and not only the Elect.*

B. So do they, unanimouſly: I told you *Twiſſe* twenty times over ſaith the ſame. No man can deny that which is the very plain ſcope of the Covenant it ſelf, to pardon all if they will repent and believe.

A. 4. "*But, We hold alſo that Chriſt purchaſed for all men ſufficient Grace* "*to enable them to repent and believe.*

B. I told you that is the Controverſie of the third and fourth Articles; what Grace Chriſt giveth all, he procured for all, which is not here to be anticipated, but opened in due place: And if I then manifeſt that in that point alſo you differ not, I ſhall prove that you differ not at all in theſe Points of Chriſt's Death and Univerſal Grace.

A. "*But they ſay, That Chriſt died only for the Elect, effectually and* "*with a purpoſe to ſave them, and purpoſed to ſave no other.*

B. You carry back the Controverſie to Gods Decrees, which we diſpacht before. Tell me, 1. Do you hold that all are ſaved by Chriſt?

A.

A. " *No; that's none of the Controverſie.*

B. Why then quarrel you with them that ſay, He died but for the Elect effectually, when they mean but that he ſaveth no other?

A. " *But his death* effected *ſomething for them*; viz. *the new Covenant* " *and common Grace, though it effect not their Salvation.*

B. Who denieth any of this? not the Synod of *Dort.*

But, 2. Do you hold that God abſolutely purpoſed to ſave any by Chriſt that never are ſaved?

A. " *No: but conditionally he purpoſed it.*

B. Have we not before proved, that your quarrel about conditional Decrees, is but a ſtrife about words in the dark.

A. " *But they ſay Chriſt died not* equally *for all.*

B. Do you, or dare you, ſay otherwiſe your ſelves? 1. You confeſs that his Death doth not equally ſave all: 2. You confeſs that from eternity God fore-knew who would believe and be ſaved, and who not. Now the queſtion is of *equality* of benefit (before denied) and *equality* of *Intention:* And can you think that Chriſt, as God, at the time of his Death (or before) did equally *intend* or *decree* to ſave thoſe that he fore-knew would neither *believe nor be ſaved*, and thoſe that he knew would believe and be ſaved? You cannot, you do not imagine this.

A. " *We do not: But we ſay that as to Gods* antecedent Will, *he both* " *elected and redeemed all alike; and the inequality is only in his conſequent* " *Will. But the Synodiſts ſay otherwiſe.*

B. 1. If you underſtand the diſtinction aright, they ſay the ſame as you: that is, If you thus diſtinguiſh only of the Will of God as Rector, or his governing Will, and by the *Antecedent Will* mean only the *Legiſlative* which *making* our *Duty*, goeth before our *doing* or *not-doing* it, and by the *conſequent Will*, mean only the *judicial* which followeth *Duty* and *Sin.* God dealeth equally by all men in the firſt, (as to the tenour of his Law, though the different promulgation make a difference of Obligations,) but unequally in the ſecond.

2. And if you diſtinguiſh thus of his *eternal Decrees*, either they reſpect *Damnation* or *Salvation.* And by his *Antecedent Will*, you mean that which goeth before the *fore-ſight* of *mans Will*, and by the *conſequent*, that which followeth this fore-ſight. Now, 1. Have I not ſaid enough to convince you that as it is *Actus Agentis* in God, we cannot prove any *diverſity* or *priority?* But only *ex connotatione objecti.* 2. And as to *Damnation*, I have proved that they commonly agree with you, that God *decreeth not Sin*, but *fore-ſeeth* it, and *decreeth Damnation* only as *for fore-ſeen Sin.* What-ever *Piſcator* and a few more ſay, this is the common Doctrine of *Proteſtants* and Fathers. 3. But as to *Election* dare you ſay your ſelf, that God *decreeth* to change no mans *Will*, but upon fore-ſight that the perſon himſelf will *firſt change* it? * If man change it firſt, God need not to come after to change it: If God change it firſt, then he decreed firſt to change it, and did not firſt fore-ſee it changed.

A. " *Neither: But he fore-ſeeth mans concurrence or not-concurrence* " *with his changing Act of Grace.*

B. But can you think that he equally operateth on all, and that all the inequality is in *their concurrence?* Doth he do as much on every Perſecutor (equally prepared) as he did on *Saul?* Doth he call all to follow him as effectually *ex parte ſui*, as he did *Peter, Andrew*, &c. who preſently left all and followed him? Did Chriſt himſelf preach to all Nations? or

* *Vaſqu.* and many *Jeſuits* profeſs, that Gods firſt Grace is given without any cauſe, condition or occaſion in man. And ſaith *Malderus in* 12. *Tho. q.* 110. *a.* 1. *pag.* 469. *Deus non præſupponit in creatura bonum, quo ad ipſius dilectionem moveatur, ſicut voluntas hominis benefactoris: ſed bonum creaturæ provenit ex voluntate Dei, qui vocat ea quæ non ſunt tanquam ea quæ ſunt.* That is, Gods efficient Will of Beneficence is firſt, and then his final Will of complacence; firſt God maketh us good, and then loveth us as good.

or only to the Circumcision? Were not the sins of the *Jews* as much aggravated as those of *Tyre* and *Sidon*, *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*? or the *Indians*? why else should it go worse with them in the day of Judgment? and why else would *Tyre* and *Sidon* have repented if they had but had their means, were they not then as much prepard for mercy? Doth God equally send the Gospel to all Nations and Persons equally unworthy? Can you confute St. *Paul*? *Rom.* 9. Or can you give any reason why God must shew equal mercy unto all?

A. "*Yes: because else he is a respecter of persons.*"

B. I fully confuted this before, 1. *Respecting persons* is the *fault of a Rector* as such, especially as *Judge:* And so God dealeth equally; his Law being *Norma officii & judicii* as to all. But no man ever yet took either, 1. A *Proprietor* (*Dominus absolutus*); 2. Or a *Benefactor*, to be obliged to equality to all. Must you needs use all your Grounds, Trees, Goods, Cattel, *&c.* equally? Must you needs make all men equally your bosom-Friends, your Heirs, your Beneficiaries, who are equally worthy in themselves? Must you needs give equally to all the poor, that are of equal need and merit? All this is contrary to the common sense and usage of Mankind.

2. And in a *Judge*, respecting persons, is the vice of them that deal unequally with men for some by-respect unworthy of such a difference; As for Birth, Beauty, Wealth, Power, Eloquence, Parts, Wit, Kindred, or any selfish interest, to pervert Justice, or deal partially. But God maketh no difference on such accounts. Yea a Judge himself, or a King, when he acteth not as a Judge, but as a King above Laws, or as a Benefactor, may reprieve or pardon one Thief rather than an other, yea and choose that which is the most learned, strong, wise, and capable of future Service to the Common-wealth.

A. "*This seemeth a wrong to the rest that are not so used?*"

B. Would it do the Thief that is hanged any good, to have the other unpardoned? Would it ease their pains in Hell, to have the company of all those that be in Heaven? If it be no wrong to them to suffer themselves, nothing but envy can call it a wrong to them, to have others escape. Had they love to others as themselves, it would be some comfort to them to think that others are in Joy and Glory?

A. "*At least this is a real difference between the Parties.*"

B. 1. The School-men and many learned *Jesuites* (as I have proved, *Lib.* 1.) make it not a difference. And will you called *Arminians* or *Lutherans* go further from your *Protestant* Brethren, than the learned *Papists* and *Jesuites* themselves go? Are you not ashamed of this?

2. The *Papists* can bear with one another in these Points, and live in communion in one Church, (though the *Jansenists* Case hath had more than ordinary heats and stirs;) And yet the *Dominicans* go higher and further in the Controversie of Predetermination from the *Jesuites*, than the *Synodists* do: And are you more fierce or unpeaceable than they?

3. But remember here once for all, that you were not able to name any one benefit which Christ's death procured for all, other than the *Synodists* hold as well as you: But only you charge them as asserting *more* to the *Elect*. They give more (you say) to some, but not less to *all*.

4. And all this lieth in the point of *Intention* and *Divine* Decrees, which was sufficiently reconciled before.

But you have by all this entised me to mingle various Controversies, and to anticipate that of *Grace* and *Free-will*, which is to be handled by it self in due place.

But

* *Raig* a Jesuite confesseth *de Vol. Dei disp.* 20. *sect.* 6. *p.* 226. That according to *Augustine* Christ so died for all, as that he had a special intent of saving his Elect, for whose sake as being among the rest, it is that he died and prayed for all in common: *Aug. in Tract.* 31. *in Joan. c.* 7. *Non debebant desperare, pro quibus Dominus in cruce pendens dignatus est orare: videbat quosdam suos inter multos alienos. Illis jam petebat veniam a quibus adhuc accipiebat injuriam: Non enim attendebat quod ab ipsis moriebatur, sed quia pro ipsis moriebatur.* He that would know *Augustines* mind herein, may find it fully in *Jansenius*, or in the *Tritas Patrum de gratia*, &c.

But I have a word more to give you, by way of caution, if you will think on it.

A. "*What's that?*

B. What will you say if *Episcopius*, *Arminius*, *Corvinus*, are the men that deny most Universal Redemption, while the *Synod* maintaineth it? How can Christ die for the sins of *any Infants* in proper sense, if they have *no sin*, and deserve no punishment? Or be a Saviour to save them from sin and punishment that have none?

The second Crimination.

A. "*By denying common Redemption, they deny the expres words of* "*Scripture, which saith, That* Christ tasted death for every man, *Heb.* 2. 9. "*That he is* the Saviour of the World, *Joh.* 4. 12. *That he is* the Lamb of "God, that taketh away the sins of the World, *Joh.* 1. 29. *That* he "died for all, that they which live, should live to him that died for "them, 2 *Cor.* 5. 14, 15. *That* God was in Christ reconciling the world "to himself, 2 *Cor.* 5. 19, 20. *That* he is the Saviour of all men, espe- "cially of them that believe, 1 *Tim.* 4. 10. *That* the Grace of God which "bringeth Salvation to all men, hath appeared, *Tit.* 2. 11, 12. *That* he "is the Propitiation for our Sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins "of the whole World, 1 *Joh.* 2. 2. *with much more to the same purpose.* "*And do these men deal sincerely with God and the Scripture, that can* "*distort all this to their own sense? And do they not use such violence with* "*Gods Word and their Consciences, as that on these terms they may make* "*their own Religion, and believe what they list? Do they not plainly shew* "*that they take not their Faith from God, but from their Teachers, and be-* "*lieve as the Church believeth which they joyn with? Had it been but* one "*or* two *Texts, or had they been obscurely uttered, a good man might have* "*thought that he must reduce their sense to the* many *and more* plain. *But* "*to oppugn the plain Gospel it self hath no excuse.*

B. You are sharp against other mens Errors, and other men against yours. But I have proved to you that the Synod, and the generality of the Protestant Churches in their Confessions, deny not any thing which these Texts say. They hold a common Redemption as well as you: our very Children are taught in their *Catechism* distinctly to believe, [1. In God the Father, who made them and all the World, 2. In God the Son, who redeemed them and all Mankind. 3. And in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth them and all the Elect People of God.] This is the good old Doctrine, plain and true, and that which *Austin* taught.

A. "*I am sure many of their Writers expresly oppugn common Redempti-* "*on; and even* Jasenius *the* Papist *who joyneth with them denieth it, and* "*saith, that* Augustine *denied it: Therefore we stand not to his autho-* "*rity.*

B. 1. As for *Augustine* and some *Protestants*, they oft deny that Christ redeemeth any but the Faithful, because the word *Redemption* is ambiguous, and sometimes taken for the price or ransome paid, and often for the *very liberation* of the captive Sinner. And when ever *Austin* denieth common Redemption, he taketh Redemption in this *last* sense, for *actual deliverance*. But he asserteth it in the first sense, that Christ died for all. Yea, he thought his death is actually applied to the true Justification and Sanctification of some Reprobates that fall away and perish, though the

1 *Joh.* 4. 14. [illegible] guish of the phrase of *dying for us*, that we may not cheat our selves by confounding things that differ. To *die for us* or *for all*, is to *die for our benefit*, or for the *benefit of all*. Now these benefits are of a different nature: whereof some are bestowed only conditionally, (though for Christs sake) and they are the pardon of sin and Salvation: These God doth confer only on the condition of Faith and Repentance: Now I am ready to profess, and that, I suppose as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who heareth the Gospel, without distinction between Elect and Reprobate, is bound to believe that Christ died for him, so far as to procure both the pardon of his sins, and Salvation, in case he believe and repent: But there are other benefits that Christ merited for us, *viz.* Faith and Repentance, *&c. Twisse* against *Hord, li.* 1. *p.* 154.

Elect only are ſo redeemed as to be ſaved. Read your ſelf *Auguſtine*, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius*, and you will ſee this with your own eyes.

2. I have oft told you, it is our *Proteſtant* Confeſſions, and not ſome ſingular or private Writers, that you muſt know their Doctrine by.

3. Even thoſe few Writers differ more from you in terms than in ſenſe. For, 1. Many of them will confeſs all the ſame benefits by Chriſt to men in common which you aſſert. Few of them will deny that Salvation is tendered to all mens *acceptance*, and brought to the *chooſing* or refuſing of their own *Wills*. And you ſeem to them to ſay no greater matters as for the Elect. But they ſay that Chriſt purchaſed Faith it ſelf for the Elect only, of which in due place. 2. And ſo with them the Controverſie is, 1. About Gods Decree or Intent of ſaving men by Chriſt. 2. And of giving them Faith.

Tell me one word that you except againſt in the Synod in this Article.

A. "*I except againſt* ſect. 8. *where they ſay that* [*Fuit hoc Dei patris* "*liberrimum conſilium, & gratioſiſſima voluntas atq; intentio, ut mortis* "*pretioſiſſimæ filii ſui vivifica & ſalvifica efficacia ſeſe exereret in omnibus* "*electis, ad eos ſolos fide juſtificante donandos & per eam ad ſalutem infal-* "*libiliter perducendos: hoc eſt, voluit Deus, ut Chriſtus per ſanguinem* "*crucis, quo novum fœdus confirmavit, ex omni populo, gente, tribu & lin-* "*gua, eos omnes & ſolos qui ab æterno ad ſalutem electi & a patre ipſi dati* "*ſunt, efficaciter redimeret, fide donaret, ab omnibus peccatis ſanguine ſuo* "*mundaret, ad finem uſq; fideliter cuſtodiret, tandem abſq; omni labe &* "*macula glorioſos coram ſe ſiſteret.*]

B. Very good: This is all in the Canons that you can except againſt. And, 1. You ſee that this is only about Gods *Intention* or Decree: And ſo you differ not at all by your own confeſſion, in the Article of Redemption, as diſtinct from that of the Decrees.

2. Is it the *incluſion* of the Elect in this Intention that you except againſt? So will no ſober *Jeſuite*. Do you think that Chriſt was reſolved certainly to juſtifie and glorifie no man at all? The *Semipelagians* will not ſay ſo. You ſay not ſo your ſelves. Only ſome of you ſay, it is but upon *fore-ſight* of Faith, and by the conſequent will, of which I have ſaid enough before. But do you think that Chriſt when he was on the Croſs had no full purpoſe to ſave thoſe infallibly * who he fore-knew would believe, yea and to cauſe ſome men to believe? Thoſe that come to him are drawn by the Father, *and Faith is the Gift of God*, Ephe. 2.8. *Who giveth us all things pertaining to life and godlineſs*, 2 Pet. 1. 3. *Even to will and to do of his good pleaſure*, Phil. 2. 13. *To ſome it is given to believe*, Phil. 1. 29. But of this enough before.

* *Epiſcopius in Inſtitut. Theol. li. 4. cap. 5. pag. 410.* confeſſeth that the opinion of Election may conſiſt with that of univerſal Grace, which he propugned.

3. But, I ſuppoſe, it is only the word [*Solos*] in all the Canons that you except againſt. And dare or will you ſay, that God did abſolutely intend and decree to ſanctifie and glorifie all men by Chriſt? or any one that is not glorified?

A. "*But their meaning is, that all the reſt which are moſt of the World,* "*are left out of Gods Election, even unto ſin and damnation, meerly becauſe* "*God would ſo have it, and not from any ill deſert of theirs any more than* "*was in the Elect: which appeareth in that* (as Epiſcopius *noteth*). † *They* "*that ſay the Fall or Sin is* quid prævisum, *fore-ſeen in Reprobation, yet* "*deny that it is any* * cauſe *of Reprobation: And then all cometh to one,* "*whether God reprobate a Sinner or an innocent perſon, as to the* "*cauſe.*

† *Inſtit. Theol. l. 4. cap. 5. ſect. 5. p. 410.*

* The *Jeſuites* themſelves, (as *Vaſquez* and many others) ordinarily ſay, that nothing in man can be any cauſe of Gods Decrees.

B. You

B. You have nothing about Redemption, I perceive, ſtill to controvert, but about Gods Decrees: If we muſt go back to them, review your words, and ſee how you cheat your ſelves into diſtaſt of you know not what, by meer confuſion, for want of accurate Scholaſtick Heads, (I except not *Epiſcopius* himſelf, notwithſtanding men of his own meaſure think otherwiſe.)

1. Whereas you talk of [*leaving out*] either you mean *non-Election*, or *poſitive excluſion*. If the laſt, it's falſe: not only the *Scotiſts*, but ſome *Proteſtants* (as *Ferrius* in *Scholaſt. Orthodox.* and others,) aſſert but a negation here; And *Davenant* and the Synod aſſert but a negative Decree *quoad objectum*; which is but as much as *Arminius* propugneth, who while he maintaineth that God decreeth not ſin, but only his own *permiſſion* of ſin, (which is the Synods ſenſe) yet hereby confeſſeth that he *willeth* or *decreeth* that *permiſſion*. You ſay then that he decreeth to permit mens unbelief, and this is all that the Synod ſaith of *non-Election*, or leaving men out of the number of the Elect.

2. If you your ſelves believe all this, with what face can you oppoſe the ſame in others? If you do not, either you believe that none are Infidels and damned, or you believe that God doth not *permit* it to be ſo, but it is done by conquering his Omnipotency, or elſe you know not what you believe: chooſe which you will.

3. Do you really differ (as *Epiſcopius* pretendeth) about the *cauſe* of Reprobation? As to the cauſe of Damnation, all are agreed that ſin is the true meritorious cauſe. The queſtion is only of Gods *Will* or Decree of it. And it is not of his *ſententia prolata*, or Decree pronounced by Chriſt in Judgment: for of that alſo it is agreed that ſin is the meritorious cauſe. Your oft recurring to your Objections, when they have been fully anſwered, puts me on the tediouſneſs of repeating the ſame Anſwers. Gods * *Will* is conſidered either *ex parte volentis* eſſentially, or as extrinſically denominated from the connotation of the Object. In the firſt ſenſe, you have not yet declared your ſelves to deny the common Doctrine of the Chriſtian World, that Gods Will is his undivided moſt ſimple Eſſence; and that God hath no cauſe, and ſo his Will in it ſelf hath no cauſe; that in God there is nothing but God. Dare you ſay that a Creature made God? yea, that ſo baſe a thing as Sin made him? How then doth it cauſe his Will which is himſelf? Is Gods Will ſuch a mutuable thing as mans? And is it not the firſt cauſe of all things? And ſhall men pretending to Learning reproach others, for not aſſigning a cauſe of the firſt cauſe, and that Sin, which is baſer than a Creature, cauſeth the Creator?

* The cauſe of Gods Will in reprobating.

But if you ſpeak of *Gods Will* as denominated by connotation of the Object; mark what we grant you, *viz.* that as thus only Gods Will or Volitions are denominated *diverſe*, ſo are they denominated to be of this or that *ſort*, and numerically alſo diſtinguiſhed; And ſo they may be ſaid to have a *cauſe*, but not an *efficient cauſe*, but only an * *objective cauſe*; And what *Cauſe* is an *Object?* To let paſs the Error of many *Logicians*, it is only (as an Object) a *material conſtitutive cauſe* (at leaſt here:) And ſo ſin is the *objective material cauſe* of that extrinſical denomination and relation of Gods Will, called Reprobation to damnation. It is that *diſpoſitio objecti* which is eſſential to the Object. And ſo as Gods Will may *any way* be ſaid to have a *cauſe*, we will ſay freely, after the manner of men, that ſin is the *objective cauſe* of the Decree of damnation. And ſpeak now with ſhame, can you ſay more or leſs? Do you or any of us that are ſober and underſtand our ſelves, differ at all in this?

* *Arminius* and *Arnoldus Corvinus* frequently affirm, that Faith is not the cauſe of Gods Election to Glory, but only a condition in the object.

4. And you cheat your ſelves and others more, in ſaying, [*Not from any ill deſert of theirs more than others*]. When if you would ſpeak congruouſly, you ſhould only ſay, that when all deſerved to be utterly forſaken, [*God effectually prevaileth with the Wills of his Elect, not for any good deſert of theirs above others.*] You would inſinuate, that God muſt puniſh no man, unleſs he deſerve worſe than every man whom he forgiveth; which is falſe. Do you not your ſelves believe that all have ſinned, and come ſhort of the Glory of God? and that God might juſtly have let them periſh? Do you not hold your ſelves, that all men are guilty of reſiſting or ſinning againſt Grace it ſelf as well as againſt Nature? and that God may juſtly with-hold his Grace from the Rejecters of it? and if he did ſo by all he did not wrong them? If God then leave not all, as he might do, but reſolve to prevail with ſome infallibly, do you repreſent this mercy as if it were cruelty to others?

What if it be apparent that you your ſelves charge God with as much of that which you call cruelty to all the World, as the Synod doth to the Reprobate alone? (or as many of us do?) For they do but ſay that God leaveth the Reprobate to their own free Wills: And you ſay that he doth ſo by all the World. You ſay that God giveth all men that hear the Goſpel ſo much Grace, as that they may have Chriſt and Salvation, if they will; And they ſay ſo too as confidently as you do. Tell me if you can then what Mercy or Grace you plead for as common more than they? you cannot tell me: And will you wrangle as if you differed when you do not. Only they ſay and think that they give more to Gods Grace as to the Elect than you do, which is to be examined anon.

And then you will quarrel about the *Cauſe* of the firſt *Cauſe*, the *Will* of God, and dream of it as if it were like the Will of Man, which is an effect and that of many Cauſes. Is it not enough for you that ſin is the cauſe of all puniſhment, but it muſt alſo be the efficient cauſe of Gods Will which is God? Yet again I tell you that all ſober men will agree with you, that Gods *Volitions* of *extrinſick Objects*, *viz.* Reprobations, denominate not Gods Eſſence *as ſuch*; (for we uſe not to ſay, [God is Reprobation or Election:] but only his Eſſence as terminated *ad extra.*) And (to gratifie you to the utmoſt) we diſtinguiſh an *operating efficient* Cauſe, from a *recipient* Cauſe; And we maintain that a *Sinner is the recipient Cauſe* of Gods damning Volition or Reprobation: As ſhutting the Windows is the cauſe that my Room is dark, and opening them is the cauſe that they are light, not by cauſing the Sun to ſhine, but by receiving (or not receiving) it; ſo man is a receiving Cauſe of the Effects of Gods Will and Operation, and of the Will and Operation it ſelf, as extrinſically denominated and diverſified by the Effects. But this *recipient* Cauſe, is nothing but *cauſa materialis objectiva*, which hath two parts, the *ipſa materia* and the *materiæ diſpoſitio*. Take not on you ſtill to differ, where you do not.

The

The third Crimination.

A. "* *By denying Universal Redemption, they deny that Universal* "*Grace, which is the very expres Covenant of Grace it self, that all men* "*are already through Christs satisfaction reconciled to God, and par-* "*doned if they will believe; or that a conditional pardon is already given* "*to the World. And to deny this, is to deny the Gospel, and Christianity it* "*self, and to be no Christians.*

B. You would make your selves and others believe that they deny that which they never dreamed of denying. Like him that dreamed that he was wounded, and call'd out for something to stop the blood. Do not all *Protestants* profess to believe that Covenant and conditional Pardon as well as you? Do they not preach it constantly, and administer Baptism in the same terms as you do? who denieth that all are reconciled, if they will believe?

A. "*But by that they mean only exclusively that all are not reconciled or* "*pardoned, because all believe not; And not* inclusively that all men are "conditionally pardoned already.

B. You mistake and slander them: Do they not read the very expres pardon made already in Gods Word? That [*Whoever believeth shall not perish,*] &c. *Joh.* 3. 16. *Mark* 16. 16? Do they not all acknowledge that this is a Law of God, an Act of Oblivion, Enacted long ago by God? And is not this visible written *Promise* or Law of Grace an existent *conditional pardon of all?* No man of sense, and understanding, and faith denieth it.

A. "*But they say that in making it Gods secret intent, was, that none but* "*the Elect should have any saving benefit of it.* *

B. 1. Still you are returning to the dispatched Controversie of the Decrees; which is a confession that you differ not otherwise about Redemption. 2. Do not you your selves hold the same which you quarrel with? 1. Inclusively they hold that the Elect shall be saved by Christ. And do you deny it? 2. As to the *exclusion* of others, they hold that God decreed not any mans Infidelity and Sin, but fore-seeing their Infidelity and Sin, decreed that they should not be saved by Christ, but perish. And do not you say the same? Away with these contentious dreams.

A. "*I am sure I can name you divers that say otherwise.*

B. It is the Synod still, and the common Confessions and Doctrine of the Churches which you have to do with: Tell not me of singular men.

The Doctrine of the Church of *England*, I told you out of the Catechism. The Synods words I recited. And remember (as *Dallæus* tells *Spanhemius*) that *Davenant* with the rest of the *British* Divines, *Martinius* and the other *Breme* Divines, who all gave their suffrages, and writ for Universal Redemption, did yet all subscribe in the Synod; And therefore undoubtedly understood that no words of the Canons were contrary to their sense of Universal Redemption. The later famous *Helvetian* confession saith, [*We teach and believe that this Jesus Christ our Lord is the only and eternal Saviour of Mankind, yea and of the whole world,*] (upon which words the *English* Collector of the Confessions giveth us a ridiculous Observation, that he thinks they *meant the restoring of the world at last*; contrary to the context: As if he had not known that *Musculus*, *Bullinger*, &c. were for Universal Redemption.)

But

* Of that *Deus vult omnes salvos fieri*, saith *Aliaco* 1. q. 14. F. 1. *Potest exponi de voluntate signi: vult, id est, præcipit, vel obligat*, &c. 2. *Si exponitur de voluntate beneplaciti potest intelligi de Vol. antecedente*: 3. *Si de Vol. beneplaciti proprie dicta, debet intelligi, ut dicit Magister, i.e. nulli salvantur nisi quos Deus vult salvari*: 4. *Vel de generibus singulorum sed et singulis generum.*

* What say others less? *Malderus in* 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 5. p. 486. *Cum de Redemptore dando Deus constituisset, ut secerneret illos quos elegit, —cum rerum ordinem elegit, in quo certi quos voluit homines a reliquis discernerentur, eosq; pro beneplacito suo ad nullum bonum usum liberi arbitrii respiciens, ad vitam æternam prædestinavit; talemq; his gratiam decrevit cum qua certissime & infallibiliter ad regnum pervenirent: Reliquos autem qui ex illo numero non sunt, reliquit non quidem sine omni auxilio Gratiæ, sicut juste potuisset propter Adæ peccatum, sed cum auxiliis gratiæ secundi Adæ ad ipsos derivandis in ordine ac cursu rerum jam electo: Et videns scientia visionis hos in peccato vitam finire, reprobavit eos & statuit in æternum punire & a regno excludere.* Thus the *Jesuites* ordinarily: And what is here considerably different from the Synod of *Dort*? If the *name* of *sufficient* Grace be the quarrel, call it *Gratia efficax ad posse*, and all is ended.

But that I be not over-tedious, I pray you peruſe in *Dallæi Apolog. To.* 2. the citations out of the Confeſſions and Catechiſms, and Liturgies of the Reformed Churches, *viz.* Of *Berne*, *Auguſt. Bohem. Helvert. Saxon. Anglic. Palatin. Synod. Dord. Colloq. Torun.* with a multitude of *Proteſtant* Divines.

The fourth Crimination.

A. "*They make it impoſſible for any man to believe in Chriſt at firſt,* "*by a rational and true Faith: For his dying for men, being the Object of* "*Faith, muſt be before the Act. And no man by their way can know that* "*Chriſt died for him till he is a Believer; and yet they ſay that our firſt* "*ſaving Faith muſt be a believing and truſting in Chriſt, as one that died for* "*us. So that men muſt ſtay till they believe that Chriſt died for them, that* "*they may have reaſon to believe that he died for them. For before the firſt* "*Faith, or belief of it, they can have none.*

B. You ſtill make the world believe that men hold that which they do not. This concerneth not the Churches, but ſome ſingular men. The common *Proteſtant* Doctrine is, That Chriſt by his Death hath procured the univerſal conditional Gift of Pardon and Life, contained in the Covenant of Grace, *Mark* 16. 16. *Joh.* 3. 16, *&c.* And that his death was thus far *efficient*, by which it is *ſufficient* for the actual Juſtification and Salvation of penitent Believers. And that this is it that men muſt firſt believe, and ſo accept of an offered Saviour for Juſtification and Life, and give up themſelves to him in the baptiſmal Covenant: which when they do they are juſtified and adopted, having right to and union with Chriſt, and in him right to the Covenant-benefits. And then Chriſt's death which was *ſufficient* by its *efficiency* of *Satisfaction*, *Merit*, and the *Covenant-grant*, becometh *efficient* of *Juſtification*, &c. And are not you and they agreed in this? I confeſs that many ſingular Divines have given you this occaſion: But what's that to the Churches?

The fifth Crimination.

A. "*They tell men that they muſt believe a Lye, or an unrevealed thing,* "*that by believing it, it may become true, and they may be ſaved, and elſe* "*they ſhall be damned. For they ſay that Chriſt died for none but the* "*Elect: And yet that others alſo are bound to believe that he died for them:* "*And becauſe they believe not this Lye God will damn them: But if they* "*did believe it, it would be true: As if the Objective Truth were not be-* "*fore the belief of it.*

B. This alſo is but your quarrel with ſingular men, and not with the Churches, unleſs you wrong them. Their common Doctrine is, that no man in his firſt act of Faith is bound to believe that he is Elect, or that Chriſt died for him any more than for loſt Mankind. But that he muſt firſt believe that Chriſt by his Death hath ſo far ſatisfied and merited for Mankind in general, as to procure the univerſal conditional Gift of Chriſt, Pardon and Life; And that they muſt believe that this is procured for, and offered to, themſelves as well as other Sinners. And hereupon they are to accept this free Gift, and ſo it is theirs. What *lye*

or *unrevealed* matter is in this? or what difference about it, among the Churches.

The sixth Crimination.

A. "*They disable Ministers rationally to preach the Gospel. For if Christ* "*died for none but the Elect, and no Minister know the Elect, they know* "*not whom to* offer *and* preach *Christ to; For the objective Gift must go* "*before the offer: And that which is to be* offered *to every Sinner is, A Christ* "*that hath already died and satisfied for him; and not one that is to die and* "*satisfie for him yet, if he will believe. Therefore the very* offer *is as much* "*as to say,* [Accept Christ as one that hath satisfied for thee]. *And so* "*they make the very preaching of the Gospel, a lye, to most.*

B. I will not answer you as some that say, they tell not men that they are Elect, and that Christ died for them; but that if they will believe, then it is a sign that they are Elect, and Christ died for them: And they may offer him *to all*, that *some* may accept him. For I say as you do, that it is a Christ that hath already made satisfaction, and thereby is become a sufficient Saviour, who is to be offered to men. And the being of the Gift is before the offer of it in nature. But I say again that you fight against straglers, in a Cause which the Churches are not concerned in: They say that it is a Christ who died for all as to *sufficiency*, who is to be offered to men, that he may efficiently save them.

The seventh Crimination.

A. "*They leave most men in the World as remediless as the Devils, who* "*had no Redeemer: whereas God judgeth the wicked at last as Rejecters* "*of his remedying Grace. If Christ died not for them, what differ they* "*from the Devils in point of hope?*

B. I will not answer you as some, that though Christ died not for them yet they *know it* not, and the *offer* differenceth their Case: For still, I confess, that none is to be *offered* to men, but a Christ that was already offered to God for them, and hath made satisfaction. But again I tell you, that you fight with a shadow, and feign the Churches to differ from you, because some singular persons do so.

The eighth Crimination.

A. "*They harden men in impenitency for the most damning sin; even* "*denying the Lord that bought them: For they tell all the Reprobates that* "*they never sinned against a Christ that died for them.*

B. All this is the old fiction; and concerneth only some singular men.

The

The ninth Crimination.

A. "*They would exempt the Infidel World from much of the torments of* "*Hell: For he that in Hell knoweth that Chriſt never died for him (eſpeci-* "*ally adding that God unreſiſtibly predetermined him to ſin and unbelief,)* "*cannot rationally have an accuſing Conſcience for his not accepting a Gift* "*that never had a Being.*

B. I will not repeat the ſame anſwer as oft as you call for it by the ſame falſe ſuppoſition. Let them anſwer it that are concerned.

The tenth Crimination.

A. "*They teach the World abominable Ingratitude, and* reproachfully "deny *a great deal of the Grace and Mercy of Chriſt, and the fruits of his* "*Death and Sacrifice. For they teach men, that all the Mercies given to* "*any beſides the Elect, were no fruits of the death of Chriſt for them, nor* "*were at all by him purchaſed for them; yea, that they are no Mercies to* "*them at all, becauſe God eternally decreed that they ſhould turn them into* "*ſin, and ſuffer the more for the abuſe of them for ever. And ſo all the* "*reſt of the World may ſay that they are not at all beholden to the death* "*of Chriſt, for their Lives, Liberties, offers of Grace, and all other* "*Mercies.*

B. Let them anſwer you that are concerned in the Charge. The Reformed Churches hold, That Mercy is to be judged of by its nature and tendency in it ſelf, and not by mans abuſe; and that God decreed no mans abuſe of it; and that all the Mercies given to Mankind, ſince the forfeiture of all by *Adam*'s ſin, are procured and given by Chriſt as the Interceſſor and Redeemer of the World; and that wicked men juſtly are deprived of life for rejecting it, and ſuffer Hell for abuſing Mercy and refuſing Heaven.

The eleventh Crimination.

A. "*They are Anti-chriſtian half-Infidels. For they deny Chriſts* "*Kingdom as to its far greateſt part: For when the Scripture telleth us,* "*That* to this end he both died, roſe and revived, that he might be Lord "both of the dead and living, *Rom.* 14. 9. *And that* the Father hath "committed all Judgment (*that is Government*) to the Son, *Joh.* 5. 22. "*And* given him all power in Heaven and Earth, *Matth.* 28. 18. *And* "*that* his dying for all, obligeth all men not to live to themſelves, but "to him that died for them, 2 *Cor.* 5. *And ſo that he hath by his death* "*acquired a* jus Dominii & Imperii *over all Mankind; they deny him his* "*Crown and Dignity, even this Right of Dominion and Empire as Redeemer,* *and deny the World to be* obliged *to* ſubjection *to him as their Redeemer:* "*And ſo make that Rebellion for which they ſhall periſh* (Luke 19. 27.) *to be* "*no ſin.*

B. The *Proteſtant* Churches hold all that you charge them with denying. It's a pitiful work to caluminate that you may divide: Tell thoſe ſingular men of all this, that are guilty of it.

The

The twelfth Crimination.

A. "*They make Christ to come on so narrow a design into the World, as if "they would tempt Unbelievers to despise him: Even to die for none in all "the World, for 4000 years, save a very few of the little Country of* Judæa, "*(which was mostly wicked); and even since the Church was Catholick, but "for a few called the Elect.*

B. 1. If you and they differ about the conditions of Salvation, say so, and tell the World the difference: If you do not, but are agreed that it is *Faith*, Repentance and Holiness, what are all these Objections, but fighting by fictions against Concord and Peace? They never held that none out of *Judæa* were saved. And how many in the World are holy Believers, they pretend not to judge. They believe that all that are holy are saved by Christ, in all Ages and Nations of the World: And that all the Order, and Government, and common Mercies of the World, with the offers of Grace and Salvation to them that wilfully refuse it, are all to be ascribed to the death and procurement of Christ: And that his common Redemption is presupposed to our Faith and special Grace. *

And now if this be all you have to say, review it and tell me, what disagreement you have found out, about the commonness of Redemption.

* See my *Direction to sound Conversion*, Dir. 6.

THE

Fourth Days Conference

(WITH a CALVINIST)

Of Common and Special

REDEMPTION.

B. We are now to try what difference you can find between the *Lutheran* and *Calviniſt* Churches, or the *Synodiſts* and the moderate *Arminians*, in the Article of *Redemption* by the death of Chriſt. Name all that you have againſt them in this Point alone.

The firſt Crimination.

C. * "*They make Chriſt to have ſhed his Blood in vain; even for them* "*that he knew were to periſh for ever.*

* Theſe Objections are anſwered by *Dallæus*, *Amyrald*, *Camero* and *Davenant*, (*Diſſert. de Morte Chriſti*) at large. And I have a full diſputation on this Subject by it ſelf.

Lege Ephrem Syri Sermon. de Paſſione Salvatoris.

Ambroſ. in Pſal. 118. Serm. 8. *Sol juſtitiæ omnibus ortus eſt, omnibus venit, omnibus paſſus eſt & omnibus reſurrexit: ſi quis autem non credit in Chriſtum, generali beneficio ipſe ſe fraudat. ut ſi quis clauſis feneſtris radios ſolis excludat.*

Proſper de Vocat. Gent. l. 2. c. 16. Nulla ratio dubitandi eſt Jeſum Chriſtum pro impiis mortuum, a quorum numero ſi aliquis liber inventus eſt, non eſt pro omnibus mortuus Chriſtus: ſed prorſus pro omnibus mortuus eſt Chriſtus.

B. How prove you it to be in vain? and that God can have no end in it, but actual Salvation *de eventu* to each perſon for whom Chriſt died? 1. When the Scripture moſt clearly telleth us *de facto*, That Chriſt died for all, even for them that periſh, and that he bought them that denied him; be afraid of blaſpheming God, by telling him, [If Chriſt died for any that periſh, he died in vain.] I accuſe you not, but *ex naturarei* warn you. I durſt not tell God ſo.

2. God made man in *Adam* capable of Salvation, as the very perfection and end of his faculties and nature, and put him under a conditional Covenant accordingly. And will you ſay that God made *Adam in vain* in this capacity, and made the firſt Promiſe of Life, and the Tree of Life alſo, in vain; becauſe *Adam*, and all of us in him, did ſin, and come ſhort of the Glory of God? Nay, God made not the Devils in vain in a ſtate of bleſſedneſs, or the way thereto, though he knew that they would forſake that ſtate and periſh. It is dangerous reproaching the Counſels and unſearchable Works of God.

3. By your own reckoning it is not in vain: For you ſay that Gods Juſtice is glorified on Unbelievers, and that this is his end. And what is that Juſtice, but the puniſhing of men for rejecting a Chriſt that died for them, and Grace that was procured and tendered to them?

4. But if you add all the other benefits and ends, you will ſee that it was not in vain. God demonſtrated and ſo glorified his Love and Mercy to loſt Mankind, in the very greatneſs of the Gift (of Chriſt, Pardon and Glory,) which the Impenitent do refuſe. And Mercy is glorified notwithſtanding the refuſal. God giveth the Covenant aforeſaid, or the conditional Grant of Pardon and Life to the World. He reprieved them, and gave them time of Repentance, and exerciſed Patience toward them to that end, *Rom.* 2. 3, 4, 5, 6. *Act.* 17. *Rom.* 1. 19,

19, 20, 21, &c. *Joh.* 3. 16, 18, 19. He governeth the World on terms of Grace. He giveth all men abundance of Mercies and Means of recovery and life. He keepeth the World in order hereby; and maketh the wicked ſerviceable to the Salvation of Believers. In a word, he will loſe nothing by any mans ſin againſt Nature or Grace. Where then is the vanity of the Death of Chriſt, if in a common degree it be for all?

The ſecond Crimination.

C. "*They make Chriſt an imperfect Saviour; by pretending that he died* "*for ſome, to ſome lower ends, whom yet he ſaveth not.*

Cyril. Hieroſol. Catech. 18. *Multas æternæ vitæ januas aperuit, ut omnes quantum in ipſo eſt abſq; impedimento illo potiri poſſent.*

B. This needeth no other anſwer than the laſt. Is God an imperfect God to *Adam*, becauſe he ſaved him not by the way of Innocency, at firſt made by God the way of Life? Or was he an imperfect God and Salvation to the Angels, becauſe they kept not their firſt Eſtate? Or is the Holy Ghoſt an imperfect Sanctifier, becauſe he giveth ſome but ſuch common and temporary Grace and Faith, as is mentioned in *Heb.* 6. 5, 6. *Matth.* 13, &c. Or dare you ſay that no man that periſheth had any Grace or Gifts of the Holy Ghoſt, when ſome propheſied, and caſt out Devils in Chriſt's Name? Muſt Chriſt do all that our muddy brains will dictate to him, or elſe be reproached as an imperfect Saviour? O take heed!

The third Crimination.

C. "*They caſt that abſurdity on Chriſt, as to die for thoſe that were in* "*Hell when he was dying for them, and to make a Medicine for the dead* "*and deſperate.*

Auguſt. de Symbol. ad Catech. l. 2. *c.* 8. ſaith, Perhaps Chriſt keepeth his wounds to ſhew the wicked at the day of Judgment, and ſay, *Videtis vulnera quæ infixiſtis: agnoſcitis latus quod pupugiſtis: quoniam & per vos & propter vos apertum eſt, neq; tamen intrare voluiſtis.*

B. 1. As you would ſtate the Suppoſition, it would be as liable to your charge of abſurdity, to ſay, That he died for them that were long ago pardoned and ſaved, and to purchaſe Heaven for them that had poſſeſſion of it long before. 2. But when we ſpeak of Chriſt's Death as a Sacrifice for the Sins of all the World, we mean no more, but that in *eſſe cognito & volito*, the *undertaking* was ſo far for all, as that all ſhould have the conditional Promiſe or Gift of Life by the Merits of it. And ſo as all that were ſaved before Chriſt's Death, had actual Salvation by it before-hand, as undertaken; ſo all that periſhed had a Gift of conditional Pardon and Salvation, and periſhed for refuſing it. But at the time when Chriſt was dying, we ſay that he was not then intending to offer the ſecond Edition of his Covenant, either to thoſe in Hell or in Heaven: But only that he purpoſed to do what he from the beginning undertook, for the undertaken ends.

The fourth Crimination.

C. "*They make Chriſt to die for thoſe that he would not pray for,* Joh. 17. "I pray not for the world, but for thoſe that thou haſt given me out of "the world---

B. He maketh himſelf to die for them. It is ofter and plainer ſaid that he died for all, than it is, that he prayed not for all. And many plain Texts, yea the ſcope of the Goſpel, muſt not be reduced to your feigned ſenſe of one obſcurer Text.

2. But doth the Text tell us, that he died not for the world, as it tells us, that he prayed not for them? Or doth it tell us, that he died for no more than he then prayed for? Or rather are not theſe your own Inventions?

3. But where doth the Text ſay, that Chriſt never prayed for any but the Elect? yea, or that he prayed not at all for the world, though he put not up that *particular* prayer for the world? Look on the Text, and you will ſee that he ſpeaketh there only of the Diſciples that followed him on Earth; And that he prayed not in that Petition for all his Elect only; And therefore he after addeth, verſ. 20. *Neither pray I for theſe alone, but for them alſo which ſhall believe in me through their word.* And what was the prayer? [*That they may be one, and kept from the evil of the world,*] which is a bleſſing peculiar to his Diſciples. But it is manifeſt, that Chriſt had other prayers for the world, even for many ungodly men; yea, for Reprobates. For, 1. On the Croſs he prayeth for his Perſecutors, *Father, forgive them:* And it is mens own invention to ſay that he meaneth none but the Elect: We muſt not unneceſſarily limit where the Word limiteth not. And *Stephen* made Chriſt his Pattern. And it is groſs fiction to ſay that *Stephen* prayed for none but the Elect.

C. "*Doth not Chriſt ſay, That his Father heard him always? and can* "*you imagine that he prayed for that which God denied him?*

B. 2. My next Anſwer ſhould have prevented that Objection, which is, that what God giveth to the World for Chriſt's ſake, that Chriſt may well be ſaid to *pray for*; For it is the fruit of his Mediation. But God giveth much Pardon, and many Mercies to the World, for Chriſt's ſake. 1. He giveth them an Act of Oblivion of conditional pardon of the eternal puniſhment; which Chriſt purchaſed, and therefore prayed for. * 2. He giveth them much *Actual pardon* of temporal puniſhments for Chriſt's ſake. All the Life, Health, Time, Goſpel, Means and Mercies, which ever he giveth them, are ſuch as deſerved full puniſhment would have deprived them of: And therefore they are all acts of executive pardon of that puniſhment.

3. And this very Chapter containeth a prayer for the World, *viz.* verſ. 21, 23. *That the World may believe, and know that thou haſt ſent me, and haſt loved them.*--- If you ſay that by the *World* here is meant only the *Elect*; I anſwer, 1. Your word is no Proof. 2. That they are prayed for, to *believe* and *know*, &c. is no proof: For many did *believe* that God ſent Chriſt that yet were not ſaved. This ſoundeth but as a common Act of Faith. 3. And note, that here the *world* is contradiſtinguiſhed, not only from Apoſtles, but thoſe (after-mentioned) that ſhould believe by their word; and it is prayed, That *the world may know that God loveth thoſe that believe in him:* which may extend both to the Converſion of ſuch as then are unconverted, and to the conviction

* *Ambroſ. de Paradiſ. c. 8. Venerat Dominus Jeſus omnes ſalvos facere peccatores, etiam circa impios oſtendere ſuam debuit voluntatem: & ideo nec proditurum debuit præterire, ut advertrent omnes, quod in electione etiam proditoris ſui, ſervandorum omnium inſigne prætendit---Quod in Deo fuit oſtendit omnibus quod omnes voluit liberare. Nec tamen dico quia prævaricationem neſciebat futuram: immo quia ſciebat aſſero. Sed non ideo pertuntis proditoris invidiam in ſe debuit derivare, ut aſcriberetur Deo quod uterq; ſit lapſus.---*

Chryſoſt. Tom. 3. hom 9. de laud. Pauli, [*Ipſe quidem vult omnes ſalvos fieri; at non omnium voluntas ejus voluntati obſequitur: neq; ab eo aliquis cogitur: unde ad* Jeruſalem, *&c. Deus paratus eſt ad ſalvandum hominem, non involuntarium, neq; non volentem.*]

viction of others, such as are the common members of the visible Church (at least); As the Spirit is sent to *convince* the world of Sin, and Righteousness, and Judgment.

4. And it is not to be granted you without proof, that by the *World* is meant all Reprobates as such: For *Judas* is before distinguished from the World (as one given to Christ) when yet he was a Reprobate: But either it may be the *World* of present Unbelievers, whom Christ prayeth for else-where, though not there: Or the World of *final* professed Infidels and Enemies of the Church, as distinct from both Elect and Reprobate in the Church. And several expressions of Christ's before of the Worlds hating and persecuting his Apostles, seem not applicable to every Hypocrite, who prophesieth and casteth out Devils in his Name, and perhaps suffereth for his Truth, and excellently defendeth it, and hath some love to Believers.

The fifth Crimination.

C. "*They make Christ to merit only Pardon and Salvation to Believers, "but not to have purchased* Faith it self *for any man. And by that way, "no one that he died for would be saved; For* Faith *is the necessary Gift of "God: And if Christ purchased not that, all the rest would be in vain.*

B. 1. Let us not here confound the Controversie *de nomine & de re*: That *Christ died to purchase the Act of Faith* for us, is no Scripture-phrase, so far as I know. If therefore it be only the phrase which they refuse, you may well bear with them. But as to the matter, they do not deny any of these things, 1. That Christ is the Author and Perfecter of our Faith, as Faith signifieth the Christian Religion, or the Objects and Doctrine of Faith. 2. That our own actual and habitual Faith is the Gift of God; (Though the controversies about the manner of giving it are to be afterward decided). 3. That all that Christ giveth, his Sacrifice procured; and therefore it procured Faith. All this is commonly granted by most School-men, *Papists*, *Lutherans*, and moderate *Arminians*.

But, 2. It must be considered that Christ did not die to purchase Faith as immediately, and on the same account, as to satisfie for Sin, and purchase us impunity or Redemption. The proper direct reason of his Sufferings, was to demonstrate the Justice of God against Sin, instead of mans own suffering for it; and thereby to procure Pardon. We may well conceive Christ promising to the Father as it were, [I will suffer for Sinners, that they may not suffer!] But you will hardly describe his Undertaking thus, [*I will die, if thou wilt give men Faith,*] or [*I will give thee so much of my Blood for so much Faith.*] But because he knew that without Grace no man would *believe* and *accept* his Gift, therefore he whose Sufferings were primarily *satisfaction* for *Sin*, were secondarily *meritorious* of the means to bring men to the intended end; that is, of the Word and Spirit, by which Christ causeth Sinners to believe: so that Faith is a fruit of the Death of Christ in a remoter secondary sense. And in all this Name me any Christian Churches that are disagreed.

C. "*To bring it only to a mans free will whether he will believe or not, is "not to give him Faith; and to purchase no more is not to purchase it.*

B. Do

B. Do you not perceive that here you divert to the Controverſies of the Decrees, and of effectual Grace? Of the firſt we have ſaid enough already: of the other after in due place.

The ſixth Crimination.

C. "*They feign Chriſt to purchaſe only a conditional Pardon, Juſtificati-*
"*on and Salvation, and ſo to leave it uncertain to the corrupt Will of man,*
"*whether any ſhall be ſaved or not.*

B. This alſo concerneth the Decrees, and is fully anſwered before. 1. That Chriſt hath purchaſed, and God given a conditional Act of Oblivion, or Pardon and Life to all, is the very Goſpel it ſelf, and to be queſtioned by no Believers. 2. None of them all do ſuppoſe Chriſt to die at uncertainties as to the ſucceſs: for they ſuppoſe that he fore-knew the ſucceſs from eternity. 3. They ſuppoſe not that the ſucceſs was undecreed: For they that preſuppoſe fore-ſight of mans concurrence, yet aſſert an * eternal Decree of his Converſion upon ſuch fore-ſight. And it is not on the fore-ſight of Faith, that they ſay God decreeth to give men Faith; but on fore-ſight that the will of the Sinner will concur or not obſtinately reſiſt the Spirit that is drawing him to believe. And the *Jeſuites* and *Arminians* by their *Scientia media* do hold God to be the chief cauſe of mens believing: For they ſay, That God foreſeeing that man will believe if he have ſuch a meaſure of help, and ſuch means and circumſtances, doth freely decree to give him that help of the Spirit, and thoſe means by which he knoweth it will be done. So that here is no uncertainty, but different thoughts of the aſcertaining decrees and ways. 4. And *lib.* 1. I have ſhewed you, that not only the School-men, but *Bellarmine*, *Ruiz*, *Suarez*, and many of the moſt famous *Jeſuites*, do aſſert effectual Grace, to be ſuch both *ex voluntate operantis*, and *ex vi operationis*, abſolutely. And where then is this feigned difference?

* *Epiſcop. Inſtit. Theol. l. 4. ſect. 5. cap. 6. Certum eſt poſito decreto conditionato omnes ac ſingulos qui vel ad vitam electi ſunt, vel ad mortem reprobati, recte ab æterno prædeſtinatos dici poſſe & debere.*

The ſeventh Crimination.

C. "*They make Chriſt to do no more for* Peter *than for* Judas; *for thoſe*
"*in Heaven than for thoſe in Hell, while they ſay that he died equally for*
"*all.*

B. * *Equality* here is meant either of his *Intention*, or of the *benefits* given: Thoſe benefits are of ſeveral ſorts. 1. No doubt but they err, who feign God equally to decree, and Chriſt to intend, the eventual abſolute Salvation of all. 2. And they err that ſay, that he beſtoweth *equal benefits* on all, even in this life: yea, antecedently to mans Will. But the New Covenant or conditional Promiſe, doth equally, as to the tenor of it, give Pardon and Right to Life, to all.

But who is it that holdeth this *equality* of *Intention* or *Benefit*? Not the greater part of the School-men, or other *Papiſts*, no not the learneſt *Jeſuites*. Not the *Lutheran* Churches; But ſome few *Arminians* that run into one extream, as you do into the other. Nay, how can they hold an *equality* of Intention, when they confeſs, that upon fore-know-

* *Vaſq. in* 1. *Thom. q.* 23. *a.* 8. *diſp.* 94. *c.* 2. *Peranticua Theologorum ſententia quam ego Catholicam exiſtimo eſt, non ſolum Chriſtum nobis meritum ut a Deo diligeremur, & prædeſtinaremur per gratiam ejus ad gloriam, ſed etiam ut eligeremur ex maſſa perditionis electione gratiæ ſuæ.* Note that he ſpeaketh only of the effect of Gods Decree; and ſo it is all one as to ſay, that differencing Grace is merited by Chriſt: which is that which you would have.

knowledge of their Unbelief, the condemnation of many was eternally decreed?

C. "*Yes: they hold that antecedently to fore-sight, Gods Intention is* "*equal.*

B. 1. That fore-sight it self is from eternity. 2. Who can frame out Orders of antecedency in the mind of God, between his *fore-sight* and his *Will*, without confessing great darkness and impropriety of Speech. 3. And he that first giveth man to believe and will, doth not first foresee that he will believe and will, before he decree to give it him.

The eighth Crimination.

C. "*They make Christ's sheep to know him, before he know his sheep: that* "*is, to believe before he decree to give them Faith.*

B. This is but the same in sense, with what is before answered; And it belongeth to the controversie of Gods Decrees. They all say that God decreeth to give them sufficient Grace to enable them to believe, before he fore-seeth their belief: And most say more, as is aforesaid.

The ninth Crimination.

C. "*Some of them say that Christ's Death did actually deliver* * *all* "*men in the World from the guilt of Original Sin, and so that none perish* "*for Original Sin; because what* Adam *did, Christ undid.*

* *Vid. Episcop. Resp. ad qu.* 64. qu. 38. supposing the Salvation of all that die in Infancy.

B. You can name no Church that doth hold such Doctrine: And we have nothing to do with singular odd Persons. 1. Millions were unborn when Christ died, and were not guilty of Original sin till afterwards, and therefore were not capable of Pardon. 2. The *Papists* who damn unbaptized Infants cannot be of that Opinion. 3. What *Adam* brought upon us, Christ did deliver us from, upon his terms, and in his way, and by his degrees, but not immediately. He hath given all men a conditional Pardon of Original Sin, as he hath done of Actual, and no other. The Unregenerate are under the guilt of all Sin whatsoever. 4. But it is certain, that no man, except Infants, doth perish for Original Sin alone; For all men at age have other sins: And it being certain, that God offereth all men a recovery or remedy (mediately or immediately;) it is certain, that Infants perish not meerly for *Adam's* sin imputed, as a remedilesse evil: but that their non-liberation, or not being pardoned and saved, is long of their Parents Unbelief, and not entering them into the Covenant of God, who is the God of the Faithful and their Seed.

The

The tenth Crimination.

C. "*They make Christ to have died for the Serpents Seed, against whom "the enmity is proclaimed, when the new Covenant was first made*, Gen. "3. 15.

B. 1. If by the Serpents Seed, you mean such as are Gods Enemies, no doubt but Christ died for them, *Rom.* 5. 1. *to* 12, *&c.* What need reconciliation else? 2. If by the Serpents Seed, you mean Reprobates as such, you can never prove it to be the meaning of the Text. 3. If you mean fore-seen final Enemies and Unbelievers, Christ died not for them as such, but as in their antecedent recoverable pardonable sin and misery.

THE

THE Fifth Days Conference WITH AN ARMINIAN Of mans *natural ſinfulneſs* and *impotency* to good, and of FREE-WILL.

A. "*You have hitherto perſwaded us, that all the Controverſies of the* "*Decrees and Redemption, between the Synodiſts and Remon-* "*ſtrants, being reſolved into thoſe of the* Execution, *we ſhould* "*there expect the ſolution of all: To this therefore we are next to come. And* "*firſt about* mans Sinfulneſs, Impotency *and* Free-will; *And there all* "*theſe things following offend me.*

The firſt Crimination.

"*That ſome of them deny all true* Free-will, *and others deny all* Free-"will *to* good, *and others to all* ſpiritual good, *by which man is made* "*uncapable of being a moral Agent, and ſo uncapable of moral Good or* "*Evil, any more than a Tree or Beaſt; ſeeing Free-will is the ſeat of moral* "*Virtues and Vices, which neceſſitated Natures are uncapable of.*

B. I hope you are willing to underſtand your ſelf, and to be underſtood. Tell me then, what mean you by *Free-will?*

A. "*I know that the true nature of* Liberty *is much controverted; but I* "*mean that* Qua poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poſſumus agere "vel non agere. *

B. 1. Do you mean by *agendum, imperate Acts* only, or alſo *Volitions?*

A. "*Both: All moral Acts of Body and Soul.*

B. That which is requiſite to extrinſick moral Acts, is, that they be *commanded* by a *determined will:* You mean then that it is *Liberty* for the Tongue or Hand to be *able to Act* when the Will *forbiddeth* it, and *not to Act*, when the *Will commandeth* it.

A. "*I mean it only of* imperate Acts *as* voluntary; *for it is the* Will "*and not the* executive power *that is the ſeat of* Liberty.

B. 2. By *Agere* what Action of the *Will* do you mean? you know that mans Soul is an active nature, and can no more ceaſe all action than ceaſe to be. You may as well ſay that fire with fuel can forbear to burn, as a Soul to be active.

* *Alvarez* hath theſe concluſions hereof, *de Aux. l. 12. d 115. p. 469.*— [1. *Ad liberum arbitrium neceſſario requiritur quod poſitis omnibus antecedenter ſecundum ordinem rationis vel temporis, ad actum prærequiſitis, poſſit operari vel non operari; Ita* viz. *ut cum iiſdem prærequiſitis, ſtet ſimul in libero arbitrio facultas & potentia qua poſſit operari ſi velit, vel non operari ſi velit.* (But the queſtion is, *de poſſe velle.*) 2. *Non eſt de ratione aut definitione liberi arbitrii quod poſitis omnibus ſecundum ordinem cauſalitatis, antecedenter prærequiſitis ad operandum talem actum, poſſit eundem actum non operari, in ſenſu compoſito; ſi compoſitio fiat, inter hujuſmodi requiſita, & carentiam talis actus, ſeu actum contrarium.* 3. *Legitima liberi arbitrii definitio, ita ſe habet lib. arb. eſt facultas voluntatis, & rationis ad utrum libet agendum, vel non agendum, & ad agendum unum vel alterum.*] But I ſuppoſe his predetermination inconſiſtent with his *potentia ad contrarium* in the firſt propoſition: Becauſe it is antecedent to the wills ſelf-determination and the Will is not able to determine it ſelf againſt the predetermining cauſality of God, nor as he holdeth without it neither, and ſo hath no true power, but on ſuppoſition of the premotion of God predetermining.

A. " *I mean only* moral *Acts, of* Virtue *and* Vice.

B. All that a man doth by *Reason* is *Actus humanus*, a *moral Act*, either good or bad; And a man at the use of Reason liveth among thousands of intelligible Objects, necessarily presented to his Intellect by sense; and among thousands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, desireable or hateful; And is it possible for such a sensitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with *intelligible*, *amiable* or *odible* Objects, and to suspend all rational apprehensions, Volitions and Nolitions of them?

A. " *I mean it not of* all moral Action *in* general, *but of this or that* " *singular Act* hic & nunc.

B. I will not entangle you with an enquiry; whether he that can do *every particular good act*, cannot do *all* universally; and whether he that can forbear every singular evil (or good) act cannot forbear all, when *all* is nothing but *all singulars*. But, 3. What mean you by [*requisitis?*] All things of meer *necessity* to the Act *sine quibus non?* Or also all things that *can possibly be put to ascertain the Act?*

A. " *Of the first I am most fully resolved: Of the second there is much* " *doubtfulness. If I include it, I know you will ask me, whether it be* " *impossible for God so to determine the Will, as to make the contrary act im-* " *possible, without taking away its Liberty? And whether Christ could commit* " *every sin? or else was not free? And whether Heaven take away all Liber-* " *ty, if it make sin impossible? But briefly I answer you, that the* Libertas " Viatoris *differeth from that in* Heaven; *and that* Ours *still supposeth a* " *possibility of the Contrary, but* Theirs *doth not.*

B. But if it be their Liberty to be past a *posse peccare*, why should it not be ours to come as near it as may be? especially when we have the fore-tasts and first-fuits of Heaven on Earth, and Grace is the seed of Glory.

A. " *It is our Liberty to be as far from sin as may be: But this is another* " *kind of* Liberty, *and not to be confounded with that which is a meer power* " *of* doing *or not* doing.

B. 4. But that a man can act *positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis* is no wonder; so can a Stone, or Bruit: but how say you *potest non agere*, when *non-agere* is not an effect or exercise of *Power?* There needs no *Power ad non agendum.*

A. " *Yes; when Nature, or Vice, and Temptation draw us to a forbidden* " *Act, it is a work of* Power *to resist them and forbear it.*

B. But sure *Nature*, *Vice* or *Temptation* do not so draw us to *love God perfectly*, to *hate all Sin perfectly*, to be *heavenly-minded*, to consent to suffer Death for Christ, *&c.* as that we should need any *power* to resist such drawings, or forbear such acts. How then do you make this a part of your *power?*

A. " *But when the* Spirit of God *draweth us to* love him, *it is an act of* " natural abused power *to resist him. And also in this and the former case* " *I say, that by* [possumus] *here, we do not mean a* moral *or* physical " *power always, but in this instance only a* logical power: *And our mean-* " *ing only is, that we are not necessitated to Act or not Act; to love God, or* " *to hate him, or not to love him. As Privations are reduced to Entities,* " *in Descriptions, so are Impotencies to Powers.*

B. The word [*Posse*] then in your definition is equivocal, and signifieth both *Power* and No-*Power*. What a definition is that? But, 5. What maketh you call it by the name of *Liberty*, to be *impotent?* or, if you will, to be *able not to love God?* not to live to God? not to know God? not to *trust* God? not to repent of Sin? not to be heavenly-minded?

minded? what Liberty is this? yea, or to be able to hate God, and Sin, and damn your ſelves?

A. * "*It is not Liberty ſpecifically as it is for ſin or againſt God; and* "*ſo not* Libertas moralis; *but it is only* Libertas naturalis, *or the* inde- "termination *of the* Will *with a ſelf-determining power, which is the na-* "*tural ſeat of morality, and may be uſed to good or evil.*

B. Now you ſay ſomewhat, and come into the Light; Therefore having thus prepared the way, I add, that there is *Libertas à malo*, and *Libertas ad bonum*; both properly: But it is improper to ſay, *Libertas à bono (naturali vel morali) vel Libertas ad malum qua tale.* 2. As there may be a three-fold *Reſtraint* or Compulſion, *Phyſical*, *Ethical*, or *Civil*; So there is a three-fold Liberty, 1. *Natural*, which is a Liberty from *natural neceſſitation* from *God*, or our *own faculties*, or *things extrinſick*, unto any *evil*. 2. *Ethical*; which is a Liberty from *vicious inclination*, or *neceſſitation* by it at leaſt. 3. *Civil*; which is a Liberty from the reſtraining or conſtraining Laws, of any that would or might draw us to evil, or keep us from good; and ſo of penalties by thoſe Laws. To which is reducible Liberty from the ill commands and puniſhments of Parents and Maſters, and from the violence of enemies or wicked men. And Liberty is either from *ſin*, or from *miſery*. But the diſtinctions about Liberty are ſo many, that I have given them you in a Table in the Second Book, and refer you thither, that we may agree on the ſtate of the queſtion, What *Liberty it is that you mean?* But firſt I ſhall aſk you a few more queſtions.

Queſt. 1. Do you think that Liberty conſiſteth in the *greateſt indifference* of the Will, when it is meerly *in æquilibrio?*

A. "*No: For then every virtuous or vicious habit ſhould take away* "*Liberty.*

B. I pray you think on it then, Whether if ſtrong habits which do *tantum non neceſſitare*, do not at all abate or take away any part of Liberty, it be like, that if ſuch a habit were ſo ſtrong as *per eundem inclinandi modum* to neceſſitate, it would not yet conſiſt with Liberty of Will?

Queſt. 2. Do you think that a man is *not neceſſitated* to will his own felicity by a ſimple Volition? Is he free to deſire miſery as ſuch?

A. "*No: This is not an act of Election, and therefore not of Liberty.*

B. Do you think that this certain conſtant neceſſary act of the Will, is not a more perfect or excellent act, than that which you call *free*, which ſometime is done and ſometime not done, and is before uncertain? * Or, is it not a more excellent *ſtate* of the *Will* to be conſtantly and certainly well determined, than to be undetermined, and defectible? I would know as we go on, whether the Liberty which we plead for, be good and deſirable, or evil?

A. "*I cannot deny but it is incomparably more deſireable to be certainly* "*and neceſſarily determined to good, than not: But it is better to be* free "*and left to our own choice uncertainly, than to be* determined to evil, *or* "*to be ſo determined to* inferior good, *as ſhall keep down the Soul from the* "ſuperior. *I do not take this indetermination and free power, for our* "beſt ſtate, *but for a middle condition, fit for a* Viator *that is tried here in* "*order to his end. Beaſts are neceſſarily determined to things inferior:* "*The glorified Angels and Saints (its thought and hoped) are neceſſarily* "*determined to things ſuperior; and ſo was Chriſt: But our undetermined* "*ſtate of Liberty is better than one, and worſe than the other, and fit for* "*our trying life on Earth.*

* *Arnold. Corv.* deſcribeth it to be that without which we are not men.

Formalis Libertas arbitrii creati, non conſiſtit formaliter in indifferentia objectiva, nec in indifferentia paſſiva; ſed in indifferentia Activa ipſius facultatis liberæ, quæ indifferenter ſe habet ad oppoſita: quamvis adjunctam habeat vel præſupponat aliquam indifferentiam paſſivam ipſius potentiæ & indifferentiam objecti. Alvar. de Aux. l. 12. d. 116. p. 473. c. 2.

* *Poſſe male agere non eſt aliquid quod ad Libertatis perfectionem pertinat: ſed potius quædam eſt imperfectio libertatem comitans in perſona creata, & quæ Libertati accidentaria eſt: Nam Deus, &c.* Blank *de lib. in genere,* n. 33.

B. You ſay well. Therefore remember, that our Liberty is no further *good*, than as it is a *Liberty to good* and *from evil*, * not from *all determination*: but that the nearer we draw to *neceſſary love* to *God* and *goodneſs*, the *better we are*.

Q. 3. I further aſk you, Do we not *neceſſarily will* alſo *bonum ſenſibile*, *ſenſible good* as ſuch, with a ſimple Volition? and ſo are not at Liberty in that point?

A. " *What mean you by a* ſimple Volition?

B. That by which we will a thing by *ſimple complacence*, conſidered as *ſimply good*, before the underſtanding *compare* it with *any other good*, and call the Will to an *Election*.

A. " *No doubt but we have an* Appetite *to* ſenſible good; *but whether it* " *be* only *the* ſenſitive Appetite, *or always the* rational Appetite *alſo? I am* " *in ſome doubt.*

B. When *ſenſe* perceiveth *ſweetneſs* by *taſt* or *ſmell*, light and pulchritude by ſight and fantaſie, ſenſual joy by internal ſenſe, doubtleſs in an Intelligent Creature, the Intellect preſently perceiveth *ſuo modo*, that theſe are ſuch indeed as ſenſe perceiveth, and alſo that they are *bona ſenſibilia*, and that *bona ſenſibilia* are *verè bona* in their proper order. And therefore as *ſenſible good* is apprehended by the Intellect, and made volible, ſo the Will muſt needs have a *complacency* or ſimple volition of it, though it may refuſe it comparatively.

A. " *I grant it you: Becauſe I take not any* ſimple complacency *to be a* " *free act whatſoever: but only* comparative Elections.

B. It's true, *quoad ſpecificationem actus, vel libertatem contrarietatis*: But how prove you it true *quoad exercitium actus, vel libertatem contradictionis?* May not the Will ſuſpend a *ſimple complacency*, or diſplicency, by not acting therein?

A. " *Not while the Intellect apprehendeth the appetible good.*

B. But becauſe the Will is *principium exercitii*, may it not firſt ſuſpend the act of the Underſtanding, either by diverting it, or by its own omiſſion in not exciting it to cogitation? But, to be ſhort, I grant you, that about ſenſible Objects, ſenſe may neceſſitate the firſt ſimple apprehenſion of the Intellect, and thereby the firſt ſimple complacency of the Will may be neceſſitated? But, 1. The *comparing* act of the Intellect. 2. And the very *firſt apprehenſion* of things *altogether inſenſible* or *ſpiritual*, are ſo far under the power of the Will, that the Will may ſuſpend them. And ſo the VVill hath a liberty of *exerciſe* or *contradiction* as they call it, as to its ſimple *complacency* about things inſenſible or ſpiritual, ſo far as it can ſuſpend the Intellects apprehenſion of their goodneſs (at leaſt.) The arguments of *Camero* and others to the contrary I know are conſiderable; but I muſt not now digreſs to anſwer them.

Queſt. 4. But further, If the Intellect perceive that there is *but one means to a mans felicity*, and that *abſolutely neceſſary*, is it not neceſſitated to will *that means*, by its neceſſary willing felicity it ſelf?

A. " *It is commonly ſo concluded: But I am doubtful of it.*

B. And well you may, without limitation. For, 1. *Felicity it ſelf* is conſiderable either in the *complex notion*, or in the *incomplex matter*; I do not think that the firſt is it that is *neceſſarily deſired*, but the latter; even *good* it ſelf, as exiſtent or deſired to exiſt: 2. And this *good* that is *felicity* is not *neceſſarily* known by the Intellect: One taketh it to be *ſpiritual good*, and another to be *ſenſible good:* One taketh it to be God, another to be the Creature: One ſeeketh it hereafter, and another here. Therefore the ſame man may be in doubt of this, both as he doubteth of

* *Poſſe peccare non pertinet ad rationem formalem liberi arbitrii: ſed potius eſt quædam imperfectio arbitrii creati, competens illi, eo quod factum eſt ex nihilo*: Alvar. ib.d.115. p.470. *Et hanc rationem aſſignat S. Auguſtinus, l.2. de vitiis & concup. c.28. & l.12. de civit. Dei, c.1. unde Thom. 1.p.q.62.art.8. ad 3. ait quod Liberum arb. diverſa eligere poſſit, ſervato ordine finis, ut hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis ejus; ſed quod ligat aliquid divertendo ab ordini finis, quod eſt peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Idem dicit de ver. q.24. art.3. ad 2. Voluntas noſtra vere libera eſt, comparatione volitionis aut nolitionis, quam elicit, quolibet momento, —non ſolum quia prius natura quam ſe determinavet ad alteram partem, poterat ſeipſam non determinare ad eandem partem, ſed ad oppoſitam: nec ſolum quia poteſt continuare, vel aceſſere ab operatione, quam producit in inſtanti præſentis temporis: ſed etiam quia in inſtanti temporis quo elicit ſuam operationem, veram retinet poteſtatem & facultatem qua poſſit eam non elicere, ſi velit, aut etiam elicere, contrariam operationem: Alvar. diſp. 116. p. 476.* Here is a power *Volendi ſi velit.* But 1. Is it *per eandem volitionem, vel aliam?* 2. Hath he *qui non vult, Potentiam volendi pro hoc inſtanti?*

of the *Truth*, and as he doubteth of the *ſuitableneſs* of inviſible things: And therefore though he knew that, *e. g.* Chriſt and holineſs be the *medium unicum* to that end and felicity, which he thinketh or believeth predominantly to be the only felicity; yet as he hath ſome doubting of it, ſo he may have ſome deſire of a ſenſible inferior felicity, though not predominant; and theſe may alſo make him the more uncertainly to chooſe the means to the former. 3. And if a mans underſtanding were fully ſatisfied, that the only true felicity is in God and Heaven, yet he cannot but both feel (ſenſibly) and know (intellectually) that there is alſo a preſent *ſenſible good:* And therefore he muſt complacencially will it: And his perception and will may grow inordinate, and be entangled by it, by undue adheſion and delight: And ſo he may be diverted from things ſpiritual; yea and oppoſe the means of his true felicity, as oppoſite to his lower beloved good.

A. "*By this, you ſuppoſe that the ſame man may have two Ultimate* "*ends.*

B. 1. If by an *Ultimate end* you mean that only which a man habitually *eſteemeth, loveth* and *ſeeketh* above all reſolvedly as his felicity, ſo no man hath but one. 2. But if you mean that which is his Ultimate end, either in a lower ſenſe, or as to a particular act, I doubt not but he may have two: That is, he may ſometimes by intellectual doubting waver towards one ſide to day, and towards another to morrow, though not equally; And he may alſo have an inordinate complacency in things ſenſible, and ſo uſe means to pleaſe his ſenſe, while he knoweth that other things are better. 3. And the School-men oft ſay, that *bonum ſenſibile* or the pleaſing of ſenſe, is oft made to be *finis* in this ſenſe, in that it is not *medium*, nor referred to any thing elſe: As a holy perſon when he ſinneth by ſenſuality, doth not love and uſe that Meat, and Drink, and Eaſe, and Honour, and Luſt, only as a *medium* to God and Glory. But it is not *finis*, ſay they, properly, ſo as that other things are referred to it. But the truth is that even holy perſons, may chooſe and uſe ſinful *means* for their fleſhly *pleaſure* as an inordinate end; and Meat, Drink, *&c.* are ſuch means: And ſo their Pleaſure is properly an Ultimate end; But not the predominant chief end, and ſo not to be denominated *finis hominis, quoad vitæ Curſum*, but only as to his odd inordinate act: And ſo *Paul* ſaith, It is not I, but indwelling ſin.

So that we may ſay that *medium unicum ad unicam fœlicitatem vel bonum amatum, & ubi eſt omnimoda ratio boni, & nihil repugnat, is neceſſarily willed*; (For this is no Election:) But otherwiſe not.

Queſt. 5. But I alſo aſk you, Whether you think not that ſome *habits* (to evil at leaſt, if not to good) are ſo ſtrong and like to nature, as that the *Will* till it be changed by an exterior power, is always, or almoſt always determined according to them.

A. "*Ordinarily it is, as all experience telleth us: but not neceſſa-* "*rily.*

B. You ſee then that it is but a very little *Liberty* (from neceſſity) which is left in caſe of ſuch fixed Habits. And indeed, though you may truly ſay that they neceſſitate not by compulſion at all, nor yet by *inclination* ſo conſtantly to every evil act, but that ſome evil acts may be avoided where ſuch evil habits are; yet you never knew the tenor of a mans *Will* and *Life* go contrary to a ſtrong and rooted habit: ſo that ſo far they *neceſſarily incline.*

A. "*It ſufficeth that no* inclination neceſſitateth *to every act of Sin, nor* "*from every Duty: For by one* good act, *they may be prepared for more.*

B. 1. It

Fatetur Arminius, *hominem ſub ſtatu peccati nihil quod vere bonum ſit poſſe intelligere, velle, facere, & hinc quidem eum neceſſario peccare, niſi Deus iſtam neceſſitatem gratioſe tollat: ſed quia ſtatuit Deum fœdere ſuo gratiæ, quod cum hominibus iniit, oſtendiſſe nolle ſe hominem praciſe ſecundum primum paſſum tractare, ideoq; neq; propter peccatum originis condemnare, ſtatuit etiam Deum paratum eſſe quoad ſe, tollere iſtam peccandi neceſſitatem & hoc ipſi declaraſſe*, Arnold. Corv. cont. Tilenum, cap. 11. pag. 394.

B. 1. It is true that you ſay, as to your concluſion. But, 2. You miſtake the Antecedent. There is an *inclinatio naturalis* antecedent to adventitious habits, which is inſeparable and neceſſitating, yea eſſential to the Soul (which I am not now to handle.)

But *Queſt.* 6. I further aſk, Do you think that any man is *free* from Gods Government, and ſubjection to his Laws and Judgments?

A. "*No: His Service is perfect freedom.*

B. Queſt. 7. Is it *freedom* to be from under the over-coming *power* of heart-melting Love, and infinite attractive Goodneſs?

A. "*It is only an unhappy Imperfection, not to be overcome by Love.*

B. Queſt. 8. Is any Creature *free from* Gods Propriety or Dominion, and from his diſpoſing Will, by which he doth as he liſt with his own?

A. "*No: But God as a Governour hath told us what he will do with us.*

B. Queſt. 9. Is the Will *free* from the directing power of the Underſtanding?

A. "*No: That were no* freedom, *but bruitiſhneſs: But it is not determined neceſſarily by the Underſtanding.*

B. I will not now diſpute that. *Quoad ſpecificationem actus* in many caſes, at leaſt, it cannot go *againſt it:* But ſuppoſing the Underſtanding well informed, Is not that the moſt perfect and happy *Will*, that never goeth againſt it?

A. "*Yes: For to go againſt it, is to ſin.*

B. Queſt. 10. Are we at Liberty from under the over-ſight of Angels?

A. "*No: That were an unhappy Liberty: But they neceſſitate not our Wills.*

B. Queſt. 11. Are we at liberty from the rule and doctrinal Education, Admonition, Reproofs and Corrections, of Parents, Maſters and Tutors?

A. "*No: All this is our Good, which we are not free from.*

B. Queſt. 12. Are we at liberty from the Laws, and Judgment and Puniſhments of Kings, and their ſubordinate Magiſtrates?

A. "*No: This is Gods Order; and they are His Miniſters for our good.*

B. Queſt. 13. Is any Child of *Adam free from Original Sin*, and pravity, inclining them to evil, and making them averſe to holy good?

A. "*What ever* Epiſcopius *and Biſhop* Jer. Taylor *ſay, I muſt ſay No: For I will not ſide with* Pelagius *againſt the Univerſal Church.*

B. Queſt. 14. Is any unſanctified man *free from* the Dominion of this Original pravity, together with contracted habits of ſin?

A. "*No: For that is the very ſtate of an unſanctified perſon.*

B. Queſt. 15. Is any regenerate perſon perfectly *free*, from theſe ſinful Diſpoſitions and Inclinations laſt mentioned?

A. "*Not till he attain to Perfection, which is not in this life.*

B. Queſt. 16. Is any man *free* from all *actual ſin?*

A. "*There is no man that hath not committed actual ſin heretofore; And no man that will not commit it again if he live long in the world; And no man that is free from the* Reatus culpæ; *nor yet from the* Reatus pœnæ *till remitted. But,* 1. *There are many that live not in any mortal reigning ſin.* 2. *And there are ſome hours in which a man doth not actually ſin at all: As in a deep and dreamleſs ſleep,* &c.

B. Queſt. 17. Is any man (or all at leaſt) wholly free from the crafty and violent Temptations of Satan?

A.

A. *No: but they neceſſitate us not to ſin.*

B. Q. 18. Are we wholly *free* from the temptations of falſe Teachers, Flatterers, Tyrants, Perſecutors, Enemies, and other wicked men?

A. "*No: But they cannot neceſſitate us to ſin.*

B. Q. 19. Are we wholly free from a multitude of objective ſnares, of Proſperity and Adverſity even in every Creature and way?

A. "*No: but neither do they neceſſitate us to ſin.*

B. Q. 20. Are we any further *freed* from the ſtrong temptations of our own *ſenſes*, *appetites*, and *fleſhly Concupiſcence* than Grace delivereth us?

A. "*No: But neither do theſe neceſſitate each particular ſin.*

B. Very good! Let us come to the Application. * If we are agreed in all theſe twenty particulars; and that in ſome of them we are under *neceſſity*, and in ſome *next* to it, and in others are under *no ſmall danger*, and that none of all theſe denied is the *Liberty of Will* which you contend for, we are very unhappy, if we do not all agree of the neceſſity *of Gods Grace*, and if yet there remain any other ſort of *Liberty* about which we muſt needs contend.

I pray you now tell me, What *Liberty* it is that you accuſe your Brethren for denying? Is it a Liberty to good, or unto ſin?

A. "*Both*, 1. *They make mans Will neceſſitated to ſin; and good to be* "*impoſſible to it. And*, 2. *They make Gods Grace to work ſo irreſiſtibly as* "*to take away the liberty of ſinning.*

B. 1. What *neceſſity* is it that you mean? Is it more than in all that aforeſaid your ſelf hath granted. 2. And who thinketh that man obeyeth Grace, and forbeareth reſiſtance, or committeth ſin, for want of either Power or Liberty? O that we could be ſo happy as to take away our own and other mens Liberty to ſin, and to reſiſt God, and to undo themſelves!

A. "*Tell me firſt what* Liberty *of* Will *you maintain, and then I ſhall* "*beſt tell you in what in we differ: even as I have told you what Liberty we* "*deny.*

B. The method is convenient, I. We grant that we have a *Will* which is naturally a ſelf-determining Principle, and Lord of its own acts, able to determine it ſelf with due Objects and helps, without extrinſick predetermining phyſical motion either of God or Creatures.

* *Quod ſpectat naturam libertatis non minor eſt in utraq; ſchola ſententiarum varietas.---Quidam docent libertatem arbitrii oppoſitam non eſſe neceſſitati, ſed coactioni tantum: Verum qua hic eſt controverſia aut mere verbalis eſt, aut non magni momenti. Hi enim concedunt ad libertatem non ſufficere immunitatem a coactione, nec libertatem in ea proprie conſiſtere: ſed in eo quod agens liberum ſeipſum movet & agit, ratione agenti intellectuali propia.---Et agnoſcunt agentia libera in pleriſq; ſuis actibus non ſolum immunia eſſe a coactione, ſed neq; eſſe ad unum neceſſitate quadam determinata. Adeoq; ex eorum ſenſu nonnulli eorum actuum neceſſarii ſunt; ſed pleriq; tamen contingentes.---Quum autem Libertas extenditur ad actus neceſſarios et immutabiles, fatentur illam latiori ſignificatione ſumi: Libertatem vero ſtrictius acceptam verſari tantum circa contingentia---Qui contra pretendunt libertatem opponi, non coactioni ſolum, ſed etiam neceſſitati, concedunt voluntatem ſuorum quorundam actuum rationes habere ſe neceſſarie, quamvis plerorumq; reſpectu contingenter---Et in illis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter & neceſſario determinata eſt eſſe quandam libertiam & complacentiam unde patet contentionem eſſe verbalem & non realem. Nempe utriq; conſentiunt quomodo res ſe habeat. Quæſtio ſolum remanet, An actus neceſſarii, Liberi dicendi ſuit?* Blank de Lib. abſol. Theſ. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12.

And Th. 14. he citeth *Eſtius* his words, confeſſing the ſame of *Bonaventure*, that taking *Voluntarium* for *Liberum*, it is but a difference *de nomine Libertatis.*

And *Strangius* de Vol. Dei l. 3. c. 14. p. 687. *Neq; nobis videtur hac de re litigandum, quia alioqui tantum eſſet λογομαχία: Non enim negamus, ſic vocem liberi arbitrii recte uſurpari, quamquam in alio ſenſu illas actiones diximus eſſe liberas.*

See *Blank ibid. n.* 17, *&c.* proving alſo that the quarrel among Proteſtants herein, is but about the *Names* of *neceſſity* and *liberty*, and that they are agreed of the matter.

And *Theſ.* 22, *&c.* That their difference about neceſſity, and indifferency in the matter of Liberty is but about the name, and eaſily reconcilable. And the ſame *Th.* 25. he ſaith of the [*Poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poſſe agere vel non agere.*]

And *de Lib. arb. in genere Theſ.* 15. he ſaith the ſame, (with *Strangius*) that it is a meer Logomachy between them that ſay, All voluntary acts are free, and thoſe that deny it: while they take Liberty in ſeveral ſenſes; one *pro libertia ſecundum rationem*, the other *pro indeterminatione & indifferentia*, &c.

That Liberty is conſiſtent with neceſſity, in many Caſes many of the chief School-men hold. For which let the learned Reader peruſe the Citations of them in *Janſenius*; and ſee ſpecially *Alex. Al.* 2. *p.* 9. 72. *mem.* 3. *a.* 3. & *Aquin. qu.* 10 *de Potent. a.* 2. *ad* 1. & *ejus ſequacem Vigerium Inſtitut. c.* 3. *ſect.* 3. *verſ.* 1. (*Cum pluribus aliis* Thomiſtis) & Bonavent. *in* 2. *d.* 7. 9. 3. & *d.* 25. *q.* 2. And the *Scotiſts* and ſome *Nominals* I have elſe-where cited. Eſpecially *Reader*, if you would ſee more on the Subject, *Ripalda* nameth you enow, *Expoſ. Magiſt. l.* 2. *d.* 5. *qu.* 12. that go ſeveral ways.

But note (with *Janſenius de Grat. Salv. l.* 6. *c.* 37.) that the neceſſity of voluntary acts, as *Scotus* ſaith, is not previous to the Will, that the Will ſhould be thought to fall under neceſſity as impelling it to, and fixing it in the act: For if it were ſo, *Voluntas ageretur & non ageret: nec ſtaret in tali actu libertas: ſed eſt neceſſitas conſequentiæ, tanquod ipſa intelligatur cadere ſub voluntate: ſic quod voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis ſuæ, ſibi ipſi neceſſitatem imponit, in eligendo actum, & in perſeverando.*

II. We

II. We grant that this Will hath the command of other faculties, respectively; that is, of some *politically* (as they use to say) and indirectly, or imperfectly, and of others *despotically* or directly and more perfectly.

III. We hold that this *Will* is directly and properly subject to none but God.

IV. For instance, neither Angels or Devils can determine it antecedently to its own self-determination, to its hurt, though Angels may *help* it, and Devils may *tempt* it.

V. No *men* by the greatest Power or Violence, nor by the subtilest Oratory or Deceit, can necessitate or predetermine it, though they may do much to induce it to self-determination.

VI. No Objects (though they necessitate the sense and appetite, and the first apprehension of the Intellect,) can necessitate the Will to Election, or comparative self-determination; nor do Objects carry us by necessity as they do the Bruits.

VII. Neither our external or internal senses, or imagination, can predetermine or necessitate the said *elective* or *comparative Will*.

VIII. Though our passions and motions of the Spirits may much molest and hinder the Will, they cannot necessarily predetermine it in the said election and comparative acts.

IX. Though the *Intellect* may direct it to that which it will *determine it self* to, (in some cases necessarily *ex principiis naturæ*, and in others not necessarily;) and being it self *deceived*, may mislead it to mischoosings and refusings, yet is it not the commander of the Will, but the guide, (as the eye to the Body, which causeth us not to *go*, but to *go the right way*): And being it self under the *Wills* command *quoad exercitium*, doth not efficiently predetermine it, nor can *necessitate* it to *sin* or misery, unless it be first the culpable, unnecessitated cause it self.

X. And as none of these can necessitate the *Will* originally to evil *Acts*, so much less can they necessitate it to any evil *habits*, or *inclinations*, nor take away those that are good.

XI. I hold that this *Free-will* is joyned with *necessity* (not *constrained*, but *convenient*, by its *nature* or *inclination*.) 1. In the specification of *simple Volition* of *our own felicity*. 2. In the specification of simple Volition *or Love* to *sensible good* as such. 3. In the specification of the Volition of that which is fully perceived to be the *only means* of our *only felicity*, and to be *only good*. But that it is separated from natural necessity, and such necessitation as is before denied. 1. In its subjection and love to God as its Creator or first efficient of good. 2. In its love to and simple Volition of God, as our Ultimate end. 3. In the election of any end, where divers things are Competitors to be our end (besides our felicity), whether God or the Creature. 4. In the election of means, where divers are offered. 5. In the *exercise* of the act of intending our end. 6. In the *use* of the means, and commanding the imperate faculties therein.

XII. I hold that this Liberty of the *Will* is of three sorts (though but two are commonly held.) 1. *Contradictionis*, vel *exercitii*; viz. *Velle* aut *non velle*, *nolle* aut *non nolle*. 2. *Contrarietatis* seu *specificationis*, *quoad Actum*; viz. *Velle* aut *nolle hoc*. 3. *Competitionis*, vel *comparationis*, i. e. *Contrarietatis* seu *specificationis*, *quoad Objecta*, viz. *Velle* aut *hoc* aut *illud*, *nolle* aut *hoc* aut *illud*, vel *hoc potius quam illud*.

XIII. Out of all these *freedoms* of the *Will* it self, resulteth the Liberty of

of the PERSON, usually called, largely, *Liberum Arbitrium*, or *Free*-choice: which is, 1. That no man can be compelled to moral good or evil against his Will. 2. No man can *deserve Rewards* or *Punishments* of God, against *his Will*. 3. No man can be happy against his Will, nor unhappy unless it be the Cause.

XIV. All this that I have hitherto named is but mans *natural liberty* as a *man*, which all men have, and is part of that common natural Image of God, which differenceth us from Bruits, and is mentioned *Gen.* 9. 6.

XV. Besides this there is a *political* or *civil* Liberty, according to which no Man or Angel hath power to command us to sin against God, or to cast away our Innocency or Happiness, or undo our Souls.

XVI. And God as our Governour doth not only give all men *leave* and *liberty* to be holy, but offereth them Life, and giveth every man his *choice* whether he will repent and live, or refuse Grace and perish; And much more then Liberty he giveth them, by Commands, Threatnings, Promises, Mercies, Means, Helps, Intreaties, Afflictions, *&c.* urging them to repent and live.

XVII. And this political Liberty containeth a freedom from all punishment from God, to those that cause it not by wilful sin: And more than so, a certainty of the Reward of Glory.

XVIII. Besides these fore-mentioned *Liberties natural* and *political*, there is also an *ethical* or moral Liberty from sinful *Habits* and *Acts*: And of that we hold, that every man is delivered from these sinful Habits and Acts, so far as he *hath* and *useth* Gods Grace: And so that the sanctified are delivered from the *reign* or servitude of sin.

XIX. And we hold that yet the habits of Grace do not *necessitate* this or that *particular* act of Obedience or Love, but it is too possible to sin by Omission or Commission notwithstanding these habits.

XX. And we hold that the ordinary *habits* of Vice in the wicked do not absolutely necessitate them to this or that sinful Commission in *particular*, at least not to very many sins, but that it is possible for them to do some Duties, and forbear many sins, notwithstanding Original and superadded pravity.

XXI. I add to the XI. Sect. before as an instance, that *mans Will* is not by any natural necessity, determined to *will* its *own felicity* by the *comparate electing Act of the Will*; but hath Power and Liberty to refuse or nill it. This many will think strange, but I am *sure* that it is true. For man was made and redeemed, and is sanctified for a higher End than his own felicity; yea more than one, even the Glory and Pleasing of God, and the common Good. And reason telleth me undoubtedly that I ought to love that best which is best in it self, and that if my annihilation would conduce to the saving or happiness of the World, or of one Kingdom, or of thousands of Persons, I ought to consent to it for such ends; yea were it but to keep the Earth from perishing, and the Sun from being useless to this World. And though God in mercy hath so united my felicity with his Glory and the common Good, that there never will be *use* for such an option or choice, yet it followeth not thence that I may not say, that *hypothetically* (if I were put to it) such a thing is *possible* and would *be due*. And as *Paul* said, *I could wish my self accurst from Christ for my Brethrens sake*, the *Jews* (not *I do wish it*, but would this save them, I *could* wish it, because the salvation of thousands, and their Service to God, is better than *Ours*;) even so may we. Annihilation is inconsistent with Felicity: But Annihilation might and

ſhould be choſen before the Annihilation of the World, or the perdition of millions, if God had called us to it. Yea Chriſt that ſaith, [It were good for that man that he had never been born,] implyeth, that a damned man would *chooſe* it as a *minus malum*; yea many a one that I have known my ſelf, deſired it. Therefore it is a thing that the Will may do.

XXII. And as another Inſtance, I need not prove, that the *bonum ſenſibile* which is neceſſarily loved or willed by ſome complacency or ſimple Volition, is not neceſſarily *choſen*, but may *freely* be *rejected*. Otherwiſe no ſin ſcarce could be avoided.

All theſe ſorts or Acts of *Free-will* we hold, and are agreed on. And are we yet unfit for concord and coalition for want of acknowledging the freedom of the Will?

A. "*I muſt confeſs that you have acknowledged much.*

B. And I confeſs that ſo have you on the other ſide. I pray you now tell me, where lieth our diſagreement?

A. "*You overwhelm me with Diſtinctions and numerous particulars, ſo* "*that I ſuſpect you do but by this duſt intend to blind our eyes. A man may* "*make any thing good by ſuch minute diſtinguiſhing, and atomizing matters* "*to make them imperceptible. Did you deal plainly, I could anſwer* "*you.*

B. Is this an anſwer fit for a learned or ingenuous man? Is *confuſion plainneſs* with you? ſuch plainneſs too many *plani* have deceived the Church with, and ſet well-meaning Chriſtians together by the ears; ſo that the Chriſtian World hath long pleaſed the Devil, and found him ſport, as fighting-Dogs and Cocks do to men, and all by the cheats of ignorant confuſion; Kingdoms and Factions fight about *words* which they never underſtood. Like the conſulting Phyſicians who could not agree, whether their Patients Iſchury ſhould be cured by *Succinum*, or by *Electrum*, or by *Carabe*, or by *Ambarum*, and the poor man died becauſe they could not conſent.

If I diſtinguiſh *vainly* or *falſly ſine differentia*, cannot you ſhew where the *vanity* or *falſhood* is? How can you tell it is *falſe* or *vain*, if you know not *where* the *falſhood* or *vanity* is? Will you ſay, It *is ſomewhere, but I know not where?* Let that anſwer from others then to all your reaſonings ſeem ſufficient, [*Your reaſon is falſe, and your argument naught, but we know not were the falſhood lyeth.*] A ready confutation, fit for our Church-troublers. I have purpoſely in the Firſt Book, given you all the diſtinctions about *Liberty* which I uſe, in an orderly Table, that you may eaſily underſtand them by ſeeing them together: ſo that if there be *falſhood* or *vanity* in them, they are open to your eaſie ſearch and view.

Tell me what *freedom* is denied you, or elſe for ſhame contend no more.

A. I. "*They hold that* Original Sin *doth* neceſſitate *all the unregenerate* "*to do evil, and to forbear good, ſo that they cannot poſſibly forbear Sins of* "*Commiſſion or Omiſſion.* II. *They hold that Grace doth irreſiſtibly neceſ-* "*ſitate the Elect to believe and love God, and forbear Sin, ſo that they cannot* "*do otherwiſe.*

B. I. Stay a little. 1. You muſt diſtinguiſh of ſeveral ſorts of Good and Evil: 2. And of ſeveral ſorts of Neceſſity.

1. I hope you will not think it *falſe*, *vain* or curious, to diſtinguiſh between, 1. An ungodly courſe of Life, and ſome one particular act of Sin: 2. The omiſſion of the predominant Love of God, and a courſe of

of holy living, and ſpecial ſaving acts, and the omiſſion of this or that commanded act.

2. And I hope I may adviſe you to diſtinguiſh between, 1. A *conſtrained* Neceſſity againſt our Will, and a *voluntary* Neceſſity, of diſeaſed vicious inclination. 2. And between a neceſſity *in ſenſu compoſito* and *in ſenſu diviſo*. 3. And between an *uncurable* and a *curable* neceſſity. And then I anſwer.

I. We hold that an ungodly man by his Original and ſuperadded pravity, is ſo ſtrongly and fixedly inclined to a ſenſual ungodly life, that *in ſenſu compoſito*, while he is ſuch, he will certainly live ſuch a life in the main courſe of it. And do not you think ſo too? I pray you tell me?

A. "*It is an idle queſtion: For that is but* neceſſitas exiſtentiæ. *He* "*that is ungodly is neceſſarily ungodly while he is ſo.*

B. II. We hold moreover that the ſame man will certainly, all that time, omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly.

A. "*That's but the ſame: elſe he were a godly man.*

B. III. We hold alſo that yet this man may forbear many acts of ſin, and do many things commanded: and ſo is not under a vicious neceſſity of committing *all Sin*, or omitting *all Duty*.

IV. We hold alſo that his vicious neceſſity of diſpoſition is curable, and not remedileſs and deſperate.

V. We hold alſo that it is not curable without Gods ſaving ſanctifying Grace, proportioned to his diſeaſe or pravity.

VI. We hold alſo that God hath appointed every man certain *Duties* and *Means* to be uſed in order to his cure.

VII. We hold that he giveth much outward help, and ſome inward commoner Grace antecedent uſually to ſanctifying Grace, by which much of theſe Duties and Means may be uſed.

VIII. And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain, nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty, or which man hath not ſufficient encouragement to uſe, with hope of ſucceſs, and is not unexcuſeable if he neglect.

Do you differ from us in any of this? Or is there any thing more that we muſt have to be capable of your love and concord?

A. "*Though I granted you a* neceſſitas exiſtentiæ, *that a wicked mans* "*life while ſuch be wicked in the main, (for that is but to ſay that a wicked* "*man is a wicked man), yet I grant you not a* neceſſitas effecti, *as if his* "pravity made *his wicked life unavoidable or neceſſary as a neceſſitating* "*cauſe.*

B. His wicked life is conſiderable, 1. As to his inward actings, or to his outward: 2. As to the immediate or next Acts, and as to the remote. 3. And the neceſſity is voluntary or involuntary. And ſo I ſay,

1. He is under no *natural* or *involuntary neceſſity*; but under a * vicious inclination or habit, which will produce ſome effects *certainly*, and others *uncertainly*.

2. The *certain* effects of the habitual privation of the love of God, and enmity to him and to holineſs, is, that his Soul will not *in ſtatu præſenti* immediately, (nor till it be cured or over-ſwayed by a ſuperior cauſe,) love God above all, nor love holineſs, nor live a holy life: Becauſe the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination, without ſomewhat to over-power that habit. An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cauſe.

* *Etſi Amor ille non excedat vires phyſicas voluntatis humanæ per ſe ſpectatæ; eas tamen ſuperat, ſi ſpectentur difficultates quæ occurrant. unde fit, ut ſine ſpeciali auxilio non poſſit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio Deum ſuper omnia diligendi. Non poteſt homo credere myſteria fidei ut oportet ad ſalutem, ſine gratiæ auxilio, etiam quum ſufficienter ſunt propoſita, & probatum a Deo eſſe revelatum. Non poteſt homo ſervare quoad ſubſtantiam ullum præceptum affirmativum ſupernaturale de interno actu, ſine auxilio gratiæ etiam de ſingulis*, Per. a S. Joſeph. Theſ. general. de aux. p. 81. 82, 83.

3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to ſenſuality, is, that it will live a ſenſual life, conſtantly as to the bent of inward Volitions, and ordinarily as occaſion ſerveth in outward actions.

4. But being not ſo neceſſitated to every Sin, nor againſt every Duty and means of Cure, this Soul is not under a neceſſity of ſo continuing uncured.

Now if it be the preſent voluntary *aſcertaining Diſpoſition* which you deny, then, 1. You muſt hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all, and live a holy life: 2. And that there is ſome cauſe in a man moſt habitually ſenſual, by which he can forbear both the inward deſires and outward acts of ſenſuality; which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is. 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cauſe that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without Gods Spirit or Grace; or elſe have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an inſtant at command. And if all a mans Original Sin, and contracted habits, be ſo eaſily laid by at any minute, the cure ſeemeth much eaſier than the depravation, which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that ſtrength: which is contrary to all the Worlds experience: As it is eaſier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it, and to catch the Plague or any Diſeaſe than to cure it, or to wound the Body than to heal it, or to pull down a Houſe than to build it, to drown a Ship than to make it, &c. So all Miniſters, Tutors, Parents, Chriſtians; yea, perſons find how wofully hard it proveth to cure one Sin; To cure the Ignorant, the Unbelieving, the Hard-hearted, the Proud, the Luſtful, the Covetous, the Paſſionate; much more the malignant Enemies of God and holineſs. What need of the ſanctification of the Holy Ghoſt, or the medicinal Grace of Chriſt, if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of it ſelf, and depoſe its enmity.

A. "*You ſpeak to me as if I were a* Pelagian: *I am not for any of this.* "*But will rather yield to what you ſay.*

B. II. And as for your ſecond Charge, * that they aſſert unreſiſtible neceſſitating Grace, I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article, which is its proper place to avoid repetition. But here let me remember you by the way. 1. That not to love God, not to believe, not to repent, not to live holily, are no Acts, and therefore no Effects of *power*, but a *privation*.

2. That therefore Gods cauſing a man to love him, to Believe, to Repent, to be Holy, is not to deprive him of any power, but to give him act and power.

3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty: For true Liberty is the Liberty of ſome faculty or power.

4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciouſneſs by the name of a *free-power*, then God taketh away ſuch Power by giving us *Power*, and ſuch *Liberty* by making us *free*. But proceed to the next *Crimination*.

* *Vid. quæ habet* Ruiz *de prædeſin. tr.* 2. *d.* 8. *per tot. de neceſſitate vaga conſiſtente cum libertate ſecundum quid. Et d.* 9. *p.* 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God, proved and multitudes cited that defend it.

The

The second Crimination.

A. * "*They deny the Unregenerate to have any* power *to* believe, *repent* "*or to do any good: And so they feign God to command men things im-* "*possible, and to condemn men for that as Sin which they could not possibly* "*avoid, and for not doing that which they could no more do than make* "*a World; and so to put men under a necessity of sinning and being* "*damned.*

B. This is in sense the same with that about Liberty fore-going, though under the other notion (of Power.) But the truth is, it is the very core and true sum of all our Controversies, and if I prove this to be nothing but *words*, I shall prove them all so, about the four first Articles.

I will here take it for granted that you speak not of any meer *Passive* or *Obediential Power* (as it's called) but of a *proper active Power*, and that truly so called, and not only *hypothetically* on supposition of things to make it up, which are not existent, nor to be supposed.

I know of nothing in the Soul of man for our enquiry, but 1. The natural-faculties, or virtues, inclined naturally to their necessary Objects. 2. The right disposition, or adventitious inclination or habits of these faculties. 3. And the Acts. Tell me first, Do you know of any more?

A. "*Not that I can remember.*

B. It is therefore the *Faculties* or *Dispositions* that we differ about, or nothing: (For it is not the Acts). Tell me then, *Quest.* 1. Do you know of any that deny all mens Souls to have the three faculties of Active, Power or Life, Intellection and Volition (which the *Thomists* say are Accidents immediately and inseparably emaning from the Essence; and the *Scotists* better say, are the very formal Essence of the Soul it self,) without one of which a man is no man?

A. "*No, none doubt of this in sense, though some number them as three,* "*and some but as two.*

B. Do we differ about the second? Do you believe that a Drunkard hath the habit of Sobriety, or a Fornicator of Chastity, or at least, that an ungodly man hath a holy habit or disposition to love God, and trust him above all, and to believe in Christ, and repent of Sin, and live in Holiness.

A. "*No; no man saith that he hath such a habit: But he hath a* power "*to do them, though not a habit.*

B. Is it any thing that you call a *power* besides the natural *faculties*, and their habits or dispositions?

A. "*No: but the* natural faculty *is still a* power *to believe, love God,* "*live holily*, &c. *without a habit.*

B. Do you not believe that an ungodly man is disposed, yea habituated to the contrary, *viz.* To a fleshly and worldly mind and life, and against a life of Faith and holy Love?

A. "*Yes: at least some are: And I will not deny Original Sin, and* "*therefore grant such a dispositive pravity in all, though not so much as in* "*some is superadded: But yet these ill* dispositions *and* habits *are not so* "*strong, but that the Sinner* can *for all that believe and repent*, &c.

B. No doubt but if he believe not, it is not for want of *natural faculties*. He hath an *Intellect*, a *Will* and a vital and executive power; And

* The *Arminians* say that God giveth a supernatural power, even to the Will it self, and that by immediate operation, *Synod. art.* 3. & 4. *p.* 15, *&c.* And they add, [*Mente illuminata & voluntati concessa supernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem, partim per virium immediatam infusionem; Dum quoq; Affectus nostros & partem illam sensitivam corrigere, & bonis desideriis quorum objecta monstrat intellectus, actus vero imperat voluntas, efficere: Quibus affectibus magis magisq; correctis, castigatis & in ordinem redactis, promptior & facilior, ac minus impedita postmodum redditur voluntas ad exercendos pietatis actus, non usq; adeo ut ante reluctantibus affectibus, & lege illa in membris belligerante.*]

Qui asserunt tum quem Deus movet ad actum hunc necessario aut illum necessario agere, Alii vero pertendunt nulla propriè dicta necessitate illum ad agendum impelli.

Verbis quidem discrepant, idem autem reipsa sentiunt, Blank de Libertat. Absol. Thes. 22. See his proof following.

And these all have that force or strength of *natural activity* which is necessary to Faith, Love, and every holy Duty: For these are the unalterable Essence (or Properties) of man as man; And if *Sin* deprived us of them, it should change our Species; And if Grace gave them, it should restore our Species, and we should be men by Grace only, and not by Nature. But you confess that these *powers* want their right disposition to act.

A. "*But yet I say that this undisposed ill-disposed Soul*, is able *to act contrary to its accidental disposition.*

B. I tell you once for all, that the *shaming* and *ending* of all the Controversies between the *Synodists* and moderate *Arminians* (or *Jesuites*) lieth in the true opening of the *ambiguity* of this one syllable [*Can*]. And unhappy is the Church when its Pastors have neither *skill* nor *love* enough, to forbear torturing and distracting it, by one poor ambiguous syllable, not understood by the Contenders. But to compel you to conviction,

Quest. 1. Do you mean by [*Can*] or [*Able*] or [*Power*] any thing besides the *natural faculty* and the *disposition*?

A. "*No: I mean the* natural faculty *as related to this Act or Object now* "*in question*, e. g. *believing and loving God.*

B. *Quest.* 2. Is not *natural strength* or *power* a thing belonging to man *as man*, which Sin destroyeth not, and *Grace* restoreth not. And have not all the Churches disowned *Illyricus* * though a very learned, laborious, godly Divine, for making Original Sin the substance of the Soul it self?

A. "*All this is granted you.*

B. *Quest.* 3. Therefore if *Adam* had *natural power* to *love* God, and if the sanctified have it yet, doth it not follow that all men have it? Because it belongeth to man as man, and is not changed by Sin and Grace, except in its *Dispositions and Acts*?

A. "*Thus you make all the wicked able to love God.*

B. Yes; As to that sort of *Ability* which is but the natural faculty they are all *able*; but there is somewhat else they want.

A. "*But the* Name [Power] *you confess your self is Relative to* "*something that is* to be done, *or to an* Act *with its Object*; *And when* "*the natural faculty is not changed, but is the same in all men, yet the Re-* "*lation of* [Power] *in it may be changed*; *as by a change of the Object,* "*medium, helps, concauses*, &c.

B. You say true: But remember still that this is from no change in the natural *faculty*, as you confess: For it was never in any man a power, e. g. to act without dependance on God, nor to act without an

* *Beza* angrily calleth him *Turpis iste Illyricus*, and *Peucer*, and *Strigelius*, and other Disciples of *Melanchthon* have defended the moral causation of Grace against him and such *Lutherans*, who went too much the other way.

Casp. Peucer Histor. Carcerum against the *Lutherans* physical motion, asserteth *pag.* 720. That *Concurrentibus in conversione his tribus causis, verbo, spiritu S. & voluntate hominis, agentibus suo loco & ordine viribus in homine, quamquam ex se & natura sua prorsus invalidis ad spiritualia, rationalibus tamen & inter se differentibus, eaq; ordine quo conditæ sunt a sp. sancto per media verbi & sacramentorum in ordinato & Legitimo singulorum usu, ut in auditu verbi cum attentione & meditatione virtute sua efficaci singulis excitis liberrime, sine coactionis impulsu & rapta, & nova luce accensa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata*, &c.

Qui assentiuntur & obsequuntur spiritui sancto virtute ejusdem id faciunt, non tamen sine actione, motu & annixu, Id. p. 712. Still note that the Grace called sufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act: Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able, so do they to sufficiency of Grace: *Maldrus in* 12. *qu.* 111. 4. 3. *d.* 3. saith, [*Recte quidam eruditus annotavit, non prædicationem, aut excitationem externam, neq; internam illuminationem intellectus simpliciter esse gratiam sufficientem, quamvis in suo genere quæq; sufficiens dici potest*, &c. *sed voluntas per boni affectus aspirationem supernaturali motione excitanda est.*

Our *Bradward.* shorteneth all the Controversie, *li.* 13. *cor. p.* 208, 209. telling us that Gods Will is the cause of every future, (and so of the future form of sin) and that if there were no God, there would be no *Impossibile*: Whereas I think there would be nothing but impossible. For it would be impossible that any thing should ever be. But there would be no propositions *de impossibili*: Nay, he talks of a *non-posse esse impossibile*, and calls this *mirum corrollarium*. *Adrian Quodl.* 3. *fol.* 16. [*Quis duplicitur potest credere se a peccatis abstinere non posse*: 1. *Quod non posset sine speciali Dei gratia & adjutorio & sic non errat.* 2. *Absolute credendo se non abstinere posse a peccato, aut non posse ad vitandum peccata a Deo sufficiens auxilium impetrari, etiamsi fecerit quod in se est. Et hic error est species infidelitatis opposita fidei, ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juste, pie & misericditer mundum gubernare*: *Illi enim manifestissime repugnat, apud nunquamq; sanæ mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit, nec dare paratus est sufficientem facultatem; homini inquam facienti totum quod in se est.*

Object

Object in Specie, nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object, nor without a due *medium*, and neceſſary concauſes. Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties, but on the Objects, Medium, Cauſes, *&c.* that men do not love God while unholy, you are notoriouſly miſtaken. For it is *Sin* that hindereth. And God is the ſame God, and Chriſt the ſame Chriſt, and the Word the ſame, and oft the preaching the ſame to a Believer and an Unbeliever. So that though outward helps and hinderances do much, the inward cauſe is moſt conſiderable. And if all were right within, it were no ſin in us to be diſabled by outward changes: It is no ſin not to hear without a Preacher, or not to ſee that which is inviſible, or not to underſtand that which is not Intelligible, or not to love that which is not Amiable, or that which is by *diſtance* or *unfit mediums* made no Object of our Acts; no more than not to touch the Moon, or not to ſee into the bowels of the Earth. Therefore though it's true that the *Will* is related as a *power* to capable Objects, and not as a *power* to things that by incapacity are no Objects; yet the change that is made on it ſelf by *Sin* and *Grace*, doth not make it *no power* and a *power* in this natural eſſential ſenſe. It is one thing that is called *natural power* or *faculty*, and another thing that is called, *A right diſpoſition* or *habit*: Therefore as to the firſt, the Soul of every man hath a true *natural power* to repent, believe and love God, and they omit it not for want of *natural power*, but of ſomething elſe.

A. "*Call it then a* moral power *if you will.*

B. We muſt ſo call it: But you muſt know what that is. It is not a *power* of the ſame ſort with the natural power. The very word [*Power*] is equivocal or analogous to them. Elſe Grace ſhould increaſe the Eſſence of the Soul, or make a man to be more a man, than he was before. And Dr. *Twiſſe* derideth the *Arminians* for ſaying that *potentia fundatur in potentia*, viz. *Moralis in naturali*, which were very juſt if it were *powers* of the ſame kind that were ſpoken of; but now being otherwiſe it is unjuſt: for no doubt but *potentia moralis* is in *potentia naturali*, as health is in the Body.

Queſt. 4. But I further aſk you, Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate ſtate love God above all, and live a holy heavenly life, yea or effectually and ſavingly believe, by the meer *power* of their natural faculties, till they are changed?

A. "*No; that's a contradiction; to be unholy and holy. I am none of* "*thoſe* Pelagians *that make Grace unneceſſary to mans cure.*

B. Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is exiſtent, ſomething is wanting without which the acts of Holineſs will not be performed? Tell me then what that is?

A. "*That which is wanting to a man that* hath ſufficient Grace, *is no-* "*thing but his own Concurrence or Will; For without any ſpecial Grace* "*differing from ſufficient he can believe. But that which is wanting to* "*them that have it not, is ſufficient Grace it ſelf for believing, which they* "*want for abuſing the antecedent Grace ſufficient for preparation.*

B. We ſpeak not now of Grace as efficient, *ex parte Dei agentis*; But of Grace as it is in us, or an effect of the former: what is it in man that is wanting to believing? Is it a natural Power, or a right Diſpoſition, or what?

A. "*Till a man have ſufficient Grace to believe, it is proper* ſtrength *or* "power *it ſelf that he wanteth, and ſufficient Grace is ſuch a power: But* "*when he hath it, he wanteth nothing but the Act, which he can excite and* "*doth not.*

B. I confeſs I find *Arminius*, *Arnoldus*, *Corvinus*, and others granting, that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them, and more than ſo, ſaith *Arnoldus*, There is more ſtrength or power neceſſary now to believe in Chriſt, than was neceſſary to *Adam* to keep all the Law, partly becauſe of the myſteriouſneſs of Faith, and partly becauſe we muſt firſt be reſtored to a new ability, which requireth more power than to keep what we had. (A ſly equivocation, turning the queſtion from the *potentia operata* to the *potentia operans*: If it did require more power in the *efficient* ſo to renew us, it followeth not, that he thereby putteth more *power into us* than *Adam* had: But Gods Power hath no degrees.) But that which I aſk you, is, whether this new *power* given by ſufficient Grace, be of the ſame *Species* with our *natural powers*, or of ſome other.

A. "*What if I ſay, It is of the ſame ſort.*

B. Then (as I have hinted) you muſt make the Soul to have either two orders of natural powers of the ſame Species, one founded or ſubjected in the other (which is it that Dr. *Twiſſe* derideth;) or elſe indeed to have two Souls, (For I have elſe-where at large proved with the *Scotiſts* that the faculties are eſſential to the Soul;) or elſe you muſt make the ſpecifick powers of the Soul to have degrees, and Souls to be augmented, and ſo that they have more Soul that have Grace than they that have none, and ſo Grace is a kind of generation or augmentation of Souls.

A. "*What if I ſay that it is of another Species?*

B. Then we muſt conſider *what it is.* Is it of a ſuperior *Species* or ſubordinate, or co-ordinate? If you ſay with ſome Fryers and Fanaticks, that it is the Spirit of God in Eſſence, or God himſelf, it would be Omnipotency. If it be not any created Spirit or Subſtance, (which would alter our Species, or make each one two) it muſt be an *Accident* (as all confeſs it is, and therefore not *ejuſdem ſpeciei* with the faculties that are eſſential:) And if ſo, tell us what this *power* is?

A. "*The Soul of man is it ſelf ſo little known to it ſelf, that we cannot* "*eaſily tell what its natural powers be (as the difference between* Thomas "*and the* Scotiſts *ſheweth:) much leſs can we tell how to conceive aright* "*of the quiddity of the Accidents of a* Soul, *who know ſo little of the Ac-* "*cidents of* Bodies, *or of* Bodies *themſelves. Let me hear what your own* "*conceptions are of the matter, if they tend to elucidate or reconcile.*

B. He that will take up with the bare words, [*Can*] or [*Cannot*] and confeſs that he knoweth not what they ſignifie, ſhould not with the blind confidence of too many Contenders, trouble the peoples ears in Pulpits, and ſet them on fire againſt one another, and by raving diſtract the Churches of Chriſt, with ſuch [*Can's*] and [*Cannot's*] [*Able*] and [*Unable.*] And yet this one poor word is the Granade or Fire-Ball. If I pretend to underſtand it no more than you, yet I will be aſhamed to vex and enſnare mens Souls with what I underſtand not; but will uſe the eaſieſt intelligible words. But to anſwer your deſires diſtinctly.

I. The Soul is, as you ſay, ſo little known to it ſelf, that no man living, I think, hath a true formal conception of, that firſt accident or effect which it receiveth from Gods Spirit, nor yet of the true nature of a *habit* or *diſpoſition* following it. He that readeth but what our *Metaphyſicks* and *School-men* have ſaid of Habits, will find this to be true; and that their *quiddity* is paſt his underſtanding. To ſay that they are qualities by which we are *prompt* to act, is but to name a

general

general notion no better understood than the *quæsitum*, (Quality); and to name the effect (promptitude) and not the *form* or thing it self.

II. The nature of *fire* seemeth to be a kind of likeness to Spirits. And in this sensible thing we cannot tell what it is that is added by excitation and incension. And they that talk of generation of fire, know not what generation signifieth: whether the production of a new simple substance that before was nothing? or the introduction of a new form into a pre-existent substance, by mixture, or how? or only a new motion? or if they say, It is a generation of new *Qualities*, they know not what the word [Quality] signifieth. But this much is apparent, that whether it be done by *Collision* or however, to kindle a spark or latent fire into a flame or *incendium*, is to *excite* a *pre-existent active nature*; And this excitation is by *motion*. And as we have some (very defective) conception what *motion* received is, in Bodies, and how by contact when it cometh from *force*, *motus motum causat, & vis per motum vim quandam imprimit*; so by some Analogy, we may conceive how Spirits move Spirits: and such as is the (unexpressible) action of one Spirit on another, such is the thing thereby imprinted and received; A kind of spiritual *motus*. And as in bodily motion the first thing received is the very *thing moved by contact*, *qua talis*, as it self in motion, or act; so Spirits *suo modo* seem, *qua agentes & attingentes* transcendently, to be the first received by the *moved Spirits*; And the second thing the *vis impressa*, and thence followeth the *ipse motus*. But if it to this day (most certainly) surpass the wits of the greatest Philosophers, formally to conceive what it is that adhereth to the *res mota* to continue its motion, and what that is that is called *Vis impressa*, and in what subject it moveth the *projectum*, &c. (For the *Cartesian* fancy that *motus inceptus nunquam cessabit nisi impeditus*, either tells us nothing of the continued cause, or supposeth *moveri* to be no effect, and to need no more cause than *negatio motus*, which is unworthy a confutation), what wonder then if it surpass the conception of all mortal men to know what that spiritual *Vis impressa* on a Soul is? But what-ever it is, this much is the best notion that we can have of that which the Divine Action first communicateth, that it is *influxus Dei Receptus*; vel *excitatio facultatum excitata*, as distinct from *excitatio Dei excitans*; It is passive *excitation*, or a *spiritual Vis impressa*, whence Action followeth.

III. But it hath also a similitude to the Agent in more than simple motion, Even as the Sun or Fire doth kindle fire on combustible matter (which had also a latent fire before, or else it's not combustible); which is not (as the *Cartesians* feign, by *motion* alone, but by the operation of a three-fold *virtue* in the Sun, *viz.* the *motive*, *lucid* and *calefactive*, producing the same in the Receiver: so the Spirit of God doth in this excitation at once communicate to the three faculties of the Soul, an impressed force for *Vital-activity*, *Intellection and Volition*; so that the three natural faculties by this received impress and excitation are *suscitated* to *holy Activity*, *Knowledge* and *Love*; the habit of which is *holy Life*, and *Light*, and *Love abiding*.

For it is certain that it is not *one* only, but all the faculties of the Soul that are vitiated by Sin, and therefore *all* that must be repaired by sanctifying Grace. The *Vital-active-power* (as it is a faculty of the *rational Soul*) is as it were *sleepy*, *dead* and *impotent*, and must be *quickened* with *spiritual life* and *strength*. The *Intellect* is dark, and must be *illuminated*. The *Will* is *carnal* and *unholy*, and must be *turned* from the *Flesh*

to God by *mortification* and by *holy love*. And all this the Holy Ghost doth by *Action*, but not *meer Action* in *genere*, but by a suitable communicative Action, *quickening*, *illuminating* and *converting*, or touching the Soul with love.

IV. The first effect of this received Influx * or *vis impressa* that we know of, is, The *Act excited it self*. It is *Action* that God doth suscitate the Soul to, and *Action* next followeth.

V. As there is a difference between a *Spark*, or *Candle*, and a great *incendium* or *flaming-fire*; so is there a marvellous difference between the Souls *Actions* (upon the same Object and of the same kind) in the *degrees:* As we perceive by daily experience. In a dream, the same thoughts stir us not up to execution, as when we are awake will do it. And a man that heareth a cold Preacher, and coldly thinketh over all the same Truths, and mentioneth them, and subscribeth and professeth them (as of the evil of particular sins, the need of Christ and Mercy, *&c.*) yet feeleth no power in them; nor will all his knowledge overcome a small Temptation, or set him upon Duty; but he knoweth, and thinketh, and talketh, as if he did it not. And at another time, when his Soul is *suscitated* or awakened to *seriousness*, the same thoughts wholly take him up, and make him wonder at his former stupidity, and command his life with great facility.

VI. Experience telleth us that usually this effectual suscitation of the Soul to more *powerful lively* apprehensions and Volitions is done by a *suitable external means:* As by a more clear and lively awakening Ministry, by some notable Providence, especially by surprizing sufferings and distress. A Thief when he is taken, or judged; a Fornicator when he is found in the shame of his Sin, a Prodigal in Jail or want, a Drunkard

* It is a great dispute among the School-men, whether *Grace* & Theological Virtues (Faith, Hope and Love,) do really differ? saith *Malderus in* 1. 2. *Tho. q.* 110. *a.* 3. *p.* 472. [*Non distingui, opinio est magistri —quem sequuntur* Scotus Alexand. Alber. Richard. Gabr. Durand. Vega, Bellarm. *alii. Inter quos tamen ea est diversitas, quod Durandus teneat distingui solo nomine Gratiam & Charitatem: Alii dicant, distingui sola ratione, non realiter aut formaliter, aut secundum speciem: Alii dicant formaliter distingui, ut sint species qualitatis diversæ; ita tamen ut non sint duæ res—Realiter autem ut duæ res distingui est opinio* Thomæ, Bonavent. Valent. Suarez, *&c.* *Et ipse* Malderus *opinatur Gratiam esse Donum spir. sancti Charitati prævium: Et non potentiis sed in ipsa animæ essentia immediate implantatum: & quod virtus postea disponet potentias secundum inclinationem naturæ: & ita antequam Charitatis virtute elevetur voluntas stabiliter ad hunc amorem consentaneum est ipsam animæ substantiam prius natura elevari ad ejusmodi inclinationem per habitum aliquem non voluntati, sed sibi proxime inhærentem.*] Here is a venturous Conjecture, and such as may tell you that these men make not Grace to be natural; when besides all the habits of Faith, Hope, Love, and other Virtues or Graces in the Mind and Will, they hold a general habit or holy inclination in the Essence of the Soul, and not in the faculties, which differeth from Love and other such Virtues, as (they think) the faculties of the Soul differ from the Essence (as he after explains it): and is it that is called, The Holy Ghost and the Divine Nature in us: which is the same that Mr. *Pemble* held: An influx received from God before our Acts I acknowledge: And that this received impress some way disposeth the Soul to the following Act; and that Infants themselves may have such a holy disposition, and that this is some reparation or sanctification of nature: and if there be more I oppose not what I understand not: But the word *Habit* most properly belongeth to particular habits of this or that Act: (as Faith, Love, *&c.*) And whether you will call this Grace a general Habit or a Nature, I contend not: But I think that the founding it in the Essence and not in the Faculties, falsly supposeth the Faculties not to be the Essence; And I think that it differeth from the particular Habits or Graces, but as the natural power or ingenious disposition of an Infant doth differ from his said ingenuity when it is improved into habits; which I think are not another thing, but the same disposition advanced and perfected. But of this let each man think as he can.

Bradwardine cuts short all the Controversie, and saith, [That as without Gods special Grace, Free-will cannot over-come any Temptation at all, so that special Grace is (besides all that is created) *Gods own Will* that he shall over-come it. So that by this no man can do any more than he doth, or than God willeth or decreeth that he do. And so by his Opinion, *effectual Grace* is Gods Essence as decreeing, willing the effect; *Lib.* 2. *c.* 4, 5, 6, 7. Yea he saith, that no man that is not tempted can avoid any sin, without this special Grace, which is Gods Will that he shall avoid it.] But this opinion is rare: Gods Will is his Essence and in it self simple and unchangeable. Indeed no good will be done but what he willeth: But the question is, whether he doth not both will and give much true proper power to do that which is never done? and so whether he that willeth not Good, or hateth it, do it always for want of power to do better. Gods Will as immanent, and considered in it self only a Will, doth not create or cause *ad extra*: But his Will as productive or really causing, which we call his active or executive power (and he denieth it not to be productive, though he deny it to be any thing but Volition, *de nomine*). And if this be all, then the questions of the nature and efficacy of Grace are ended; and Grace *ex parte Dei* is nothing but his Will, what shall be, and a production of it by willing it; and in the effect it is nothing but the being of what he so willeth (Act or Habit).

So *l.* 2. *c.* 13. he saith, [That the *Auxilium sine quo nullus perseverat, & per quod quilibet perseverat, est spiritus sanctus, Divina Bonitas & Voluntas,*] (where he seemeth to hold that *Dei Bonitas & voluntas* is the Holy Ghost, the third Person.) And *l.* 2. *c.* 9. *p.* 498. he laboureth to prove that no Angel or Man (in Innocency) can by the greatest Grace before his Fall persevere a moment without Gods special help, that is, Gods Will that he shall so do. So that the necessitating cause why one Angel stood and another sinned, and why *Adam* sinned, is, because God *willed* it. And though he hold that *Adam* could not stand because God willed it not, yet he holdeth also that God positively willed it; not seeing that he had made that needless. Read but *Ruiz de Vol. Dei* copiously, proving that God willeth the Salvation of them that are never saved, and you will see that no *Protestants* more differ herein than the *Papists* do among themselves. And there is no reconciliation with them that hold that nothing is possible but what is future, or no man can do any thing but what he doth.

or

or Glutton when he is brought by it to the Gout or other pain and ſickneſs, *&c.* have quite other apprehenſions uſually of the folly of ſinning, than ever you could bring them to before, by any other the certaineſt convictions.

VII. As we are certain by experience that the Acts called *Intellection* and *Volition* now, are ſuch operations of the Soul as ever ſtir and uſe the *Spirits*, and we perceive both together as if it were a compound operation, and know not by experience what any *Knowledge* or *Volition* is which uſeth not the *Spirits*; ſo we find by true experience, that the *ſuſcitation* of the ſaid *Spirits* (or *igneous particles*) in us, much conduceth to the ſuſcitation of the faculties of the Soul: By which fervent ſpeaking, and awakening Providences do much: And alſo that they that have clear and quick Spirits, are eaſilieſt awakened.

VIII. We find alſo by experience, that the *internal ſenſitive faculty* hath a great ſhare in theſe effectual operations: For the certaineſt apprehenſions of the Intellect, work but defectively on the *Will*, unleſs they are accompanied with, or ſtir up ſome *Senſe*, *Affection* or *Paſſion*; either *Fear*, *Hope*, *Love*, *Deſire*, *Delight*, *Anger*, or ſome other proper paſſion. And *Volitions* themſelves are but ſluggiſh uneffectual Acts, as to the *imperium* or command of the *executive Powers* or *Thoughts*, unleſs they ſtir up ſome Paſſion to their aid; And therefore lifeleſs *wiſhes* are common with ſluggiſh and unreformed men.

IX. The Spirit of God can, and we have reaſon to think, ſometime doth ſtir up the faculties of the Soul to holy Cogitations, Apprehenſions and Volitions, without any other means, known to us, than what the perſon before uſed uneffectually: And when *means* are effectual to ſanctifying Acts, it is principally by the operation of the Holy Ghoſt, and leſs principally the aptitude of the means.

X. The firſt received influx *ad actum* is not it which we call a *Habit*: For a *Habit* is a *fixed promptitude* to *act*.

XI. An habit in the Intellect is *skill*, or *intellectual promptitude* to *Act rightly* and *eaſily*. An *habit* in the *Will*, is *inclination*, and *love* it ſelf radicated, or *averſation* and radicated hatred. And a habit in the *vital executive Power*, is a promptitude and vivacity to the right executing of the *Wills commands* (and firſt exciting it to act).

XII. A *habit infuſed* is of the ſame *Species* with *acquired habits*, though it be otherwiſe cauſed, and of a more excellent uſe. And in both we have reaſon to think that the Act goeth before the Habit; Though the Holy Ghoſt can fix a Habit by one Act, when acquired Habits are cauſed but by *cuſtom* or *many* Acts.

XIII. In the ſtrict ſenſe, as *Acts* ſo *Habits* are *ſpecified* by their *Objects*, and are not found but in ſuch *Species*: But in a *larger ſenſe* and leſs proper we may ſay that there are more *univerſal Habits*, not denominated at all from any ſort of Objects, that is, the right Diſpoſition of the Soul to its due operations: But this is but an inadequate univerſal conception of the ſame Habit, and not another thing I think.

XIV. A *habit* of the *Intellect* about *Principles* is a *Diſpoſition* to the knowledge of *concluſions* or conſequents: And a *habit* of the *Will ad finem*, is a *Diſpoſition* to the *choice* and *uſe* of the known *means*; but not ſtrictly *a habit* to them.

XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul diſpoſeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is ſet in motion, floweth ſtill the ſame way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; ſo the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that courſe of action.

XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it *underſtandeth* and *willeth*, ſo at once it operateth on and towards the *end*, and on and in the *means*. But *one* of them (ſpecially *ad finem*) is uſually *deep*, and not obſerved ſenſibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermoſt, and uſing the ſenſe and fantaſie more, and the Spirits, is eaſily perceived. And ſo a man in his travel, hath a deep unobſerved but moſt *conſtant* and *ruling Knowledge* and *Volition* of his end or home; though yet he ſeem to himſelf ſeldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way.

XVII. By all this its eaſie to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have preſuppoſed all this before-ſaid, 1. That the Soul is eſſentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averſe to ceſſation or non-action as a ſtone is to action: 2. And that it hath inſeparably in its *nature*, an inclination to *Truth* and *Goodneſs* as ſuch, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, ſpecially dangers and ſufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the uſe of the ſenſe, and ſenſitive paſſions, which things ſenſible are apt to excite, by which it may be it ſelf excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of neceſſity of *knowing* by ſimple perception things received by the ſenſe and fantaſie; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehenſions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always neceſſarily:) 7. And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the ſame ſort: 8. And that a *curſus actionum* with the fore-ſaid inclinations, is like a courſe of corporal motions, which ſtrongly tendeth to continuation; (ſo that they that are accuſtomed to do evil, hardly do well:) 9. And that the *potentiæ ſecundæ*, the ſenſitive powers, and the Spirits by *cuſtom* attain the ſame propenſity to that way of action in themſelves, and ſo become to the active Intellect and Will, what the *Chanel* (worn by courſe) is to the Torrent or River, which with the *natural gravity* cauſeth the continuance of its courſe that ſame way: Or as a *Horſe*, trained by cuſtom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider: 10. And that the Soul hath its profound, or not noted Action which is conſtant, and maketh ſo little uſe of the *ſpirits*, *ſenſe*, *imagination* or paſſion, as that it is unobſerved, while it is predominant, (ſuch as is the aforeſaid intention of the end in the uſe of means: And doubtleſs the Soul is never unactive an inſtant, no not in ſleep; but hath this kind of deep inſenſible action. It is *knowing it ſelf*, *loving it ſelf*, *intending its own Felicity*, *deeply*, *ſecretly*, *inſenſibly*, *without uſing the memory* and *imagination*, to the Act; and this deep inſenſible Act is ſuch, as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit:) I ſay now, all theſe ten things being preſuppoſed (which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace,) How hard is it to us to know, what *a habit is indeed* beyond all theſe, and what it is that it addeth to theſe? We are ſure that it is a *Diſpoſition*, *Propenſity* and *Aptitude* to holy Action *in Specie*; But what that *Diſpoſition* and *Propenſity* is, beſides all this fore-named, it is not eaſie to underſtand. And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghoſt.

XVIII. How hard then muſt it be to know how much *Power*, or what *kind* of *Power* (and in what ſenſe ſo called) it is that this ſuperadded

habit

habit containeth, beſide all the ten fore-mentioned excitations and propenſities? And whether it be properly called *Power*, and how it differeth from the *potentiæ naturales*?

XIX. But yet our great Diſputes being more about the firſt act of Faith, which anteceedeth the habit, than about any of the acts that follow the habit, the caſe will be yet harder, what that *Power* is which the Holy Ghoſt giveth before the habit of Faith, as to the performance of that particular act. That it ſuſcitateth the natural faculty to act is certain: Therefore in order of nature it muſt be *diſpoſed* or inclined to that act, before it act. That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain: But no mortal man knoweth what that is. We commonly conclude that *ex parte Dei* it is nothing but God himſelf. By God himſelf is meant his Act; By his Act is meant his *Eſſence* as in Act: But how his Eſſence is always immutably in equal Act, and yet produceth a world in time, which it produced not from eternity, and how the equal Act or Agency of the Eſſence is natural, neceſſary and eternal, and the Effect free; How the Volition is neceſſary *in ſe*, and yet free in every termination and effect *ad extra*; How a natural-equal-eternal Agency, can produce ſuch wonderful diverſity of Effects; And how Souls are ſaid to receive Gods Influx, if it be nothing but his *Agent Eſſence*; All theſe are paſt the reach of Mortals.

XX. And it addeth to theſe difficulties that we are uncertain what uſe it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul. They are miniſtring Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation, about the matters of their Salvation. It is abſurd to think that Devils (whoſe very powerful Operations on our imagination we ſurely feel,) have more power to put evil thoughts into us, and ſtir up evil paſſions in us, than Angels good ones. And ſeeing a Spirit is more active than a Body, they that take the Sun to be a Body, and perceive that its Beams and Virtue, of Light, and Heat, and Motion, is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minuite, ſhould not take an *Angel* to be like a ſtone or ſtaff, that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth, and *is* no where, but where it moveth.

XXI. And all Motion and Action hath ſo many impediments in the world, and all *Active Natures* (as *fire*) have ſo ſtrong a natural inclination to act when they are not *hindred* by a greater *Power*, that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by *removing impediments*, internal and external: As they that dam up the water all ways ſave one, do force it to riſe, (if it be a ſtream) till it flow that one way. Embittering all other things to a Soul, doth much to turn its thoughts towards God; and diſpair of any delight or felicity on Earth, maketh Heaven regarded.

XXII. Seeing all naturally-neceſſary *Concauſes*, *Objects*, *Media* are ſuppoſed to the *Ratio formalis* of *Power*, (which is *Relative ad poſſibile*) he that *giveth* or *taketh* away any *one* of thoſe *neceſſaries*, doth *give* or *take* away *Power*, though he never *change* the Soul or faculty at all. And this is called *A moral collation or cauſation of Power* (not a *moral Power*). As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room, he enableth us to ſee; or if he bring in a Book, he enableth me to read that which elſe I could not have read: If he open the Windows, or if he cure me of blindneſs, by cutting a Suffuſion, *&c.* So he that preacheth the Goſpel to them that had not heard it, and God when he gave Chriſt and the Goſpel to be an Object of Faith, did make the natural faculty to be more *in ſenſu naturali*, *potentiam ad hoc*, to which before it was no power, but hypothetically only.

XXIII.

XXIII. The *Will* is not a *Power* of *chooſing* or *willing* an *unknown good:* Therefore it may be truly ſaid to be *naturally unable to will* that which the *Intellect perceiveth not* to be good. And he that giveth knowledge to ſuch a Mind, doth truly give more *power* to the *Will*, as the loſs of knowledge is its loſs of *power*. Though the *Will* it ſelf ſhould receive no habitual alteration by it.

XXIV. We muſt not conceive of the ſuſcitation of an *active* nature, as we do of the *motion of dead matter*, which is meerly paſſive: But as of that which is *paſſive indeed* from *God* and *ſuperior Cauſes*, but active in it ſelf, and on inferiors; (And I think like the Sun beams, paſſive from no *lower nature*, ſave by *ſtop* or *reſiſtance* of its own activity.)

XXV. As the *Scotiſts* diſtinguiſh *Paſſive* (*Receptive*) *Power*, into *natural* (which is naturally diſpoſed to the form received), and *violent* (which is *averſe* or oppoſite to the form) or *neutral* (which is indifferent), and affirm the Soul to have the firſt ſort of *paſſive power* (natural) to the love of God and ſupernatural felicity; ſo the diſtinction is ſound, and their aſſertion is true as to the *nature* of the Soul in it ſelf conſidered, (for it was made to love God). But accidentally by reaſon of adventitious pravity, it is but *potentia paſſiva violenta:* for the the carnal mind is enmity to God, and neither is nor can be ſubject to his Law. So that it is both *natural* and *violent* in ſeveral reſpects.

XXVI. As for the great queſtion, what is a *moral Power?* I anſwer, 1. Power may be called Moral *ab objecto*, becauſe it is *ad mores*, and ſo our *natural power* is moral, and *actus humanus* and *actus moralis* are oft put for *Synonima's*.

2. Power may be called *moral* from the way of *effecting* it. And ſo our *natural Powers* alſo are *moral*; not in the Eſſence of the Soul, but in the Relative form of the *power in ſpecie vel individuo ad hoc objectum:* For he that *cauſeth* or *revealeth* the Object, doth by moral cauſation give us a natural power *ad hoc*.

3. Power is called *moral*, *formally*; In that of it ſelf it is a *moral Virtue* or *Vice*, Good or Evil: which yet could not be true if it were but *meer power:* For *morality* conſiſteth formally and primarily in the Will or *Voluntary:* And to be *able* to do *Good* or *Evil*, as ſuch, is not formally any moral Good or Evil, (but natural): But *Diſpoſition* is.

4. *Power* is called *Moral*, Analogically and Reputatively, as *cauſa finalis* is ſaid to *cauſe*, when it is called a *moral cauſe*, and the operation *metaphorical*, or as he is called a moral cauſe who perſwadeth to the End or Object. And ſo we take the word [*Moral Power*] in our queſtion. And ſo the received *Impreſs* or *Influx* of Divine Agency, as alſo the habits of Grace in the Soul, are an *Analogical Power*; becauſe they are *neceſſary* to the natural powers performance of the Act: And ſo the ſuſcitation (as received) of a dormant active power, may be called Analogically a *Power:* And the right *diſpoſition* of a *power* may be called a *power:* And the *deep* fore-deſcribed *Action* of the Soul, may be called *a power* to other ſenſible Acts.

XXVII. Next to this *moral power*, is *potentia logica* which is but the *name* of *Power given extrinſically* from ſome other thing, without which the effect will never be, though it be poſſible, and the Cauſes have power ſufficient. And the name of *Impoſſibility de effectu* is oftner and more tollerably here uſed, than of *impotency* as in the *cauſe*. So we ſay that whatſoever God *willeth* or *decreeth* is *poſſible*, and what he *nilleth abſolutely* is impoſſible: And thence ſome ſay, That *God can do it becauſe*

he

he will, and he *cannot do what he will not*: And ſo we ſay, that in *ſenſu compoſito* an *undiſpoſed* or *averſe Will cannot love* or *will aright*; when perhaps no more than a Logical *impotency* is meant, *viz.* That theſe two Propoſitions cannot poſſibly be both true [*Judas* is undiſpoſed to Love and Juſtice] and [*Judas* at the ſame time doth exerciſe Love and Juſtice] ſpeaking of a predominant *diſpoſition*. And this is but a denomination of the ſame ſenſe, as *neceſſitas conſequentiæ vel logica* is, as diſtinct from *neceſſitas conſequentis vel effecti*. And ſo we ſay, that he that is *fore-decreed*, yea or *fore-known* to be *good cannot be bad*: The meaning is not that he wanteth true *power* to be *bad*: But that *in ordine dicendi* theſe two cannot poſſibly be true, [*Peter* is decreed by God, or fore-known to be a Saint,] and [*Peter* will not be a Saint]. And this logical impoſſibility is meant oft in Scripture, as *Joh.* 12. 39. *Therefore they could not believe, becauſe that* Iſaiah *ſaith*, &c. not that this hindered them: but logically *de conſequentia*, both theſe could not be true [that *Eſaia's* Prophecy ſhould be true, and yet that the Perſon propheſied of ſhould be Obedient]. And ſo the words [*the Scripture muſt be fulfilled*] and [*that the Scriptures might be fulfilled*] are oft uſed, as to the inference.

XXVIII. Thus by *extrinſick denomination* and *connotation*, *impotency* is oft imputed to the *Agent* from the *incapacity* of the *Recipient*: As it is ſaid, *Mark* 6. 5. That *Chriſt could do no mighty work there, becauſe of their unbelief*: When as this was not from a *diſability* in *Chriſt* to have done it, if he would: But here it is firſt ſuppoſed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no ſuch Works, but where the perſons were ſo qualified as to be capable of them; And then that the perſons there were unqualified: And ſo the *Effect* was *logically impoſſible*, *in ſenſu compoſito*. Thus we ſay, That [*God cannot ſave Unbelievers, he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked, he cannot forſake the Faithful*]: that is, [His Ordination and Decree ſuppoſed, *logically* ſuch a thing cannot conſiſt with it in verity.]

XXIX. When *ſomething elſe*, and not *impotency*, doth aſcertain an event, by *omiſſion*, or ſomething beſides *Power* aſcertaineth the contrary *efficiently*, yet the *effect* is oft denominated *poſſible* or *impoſſible*, and aſcribed to *Power* or *Impotency*, by a conjunction of this *moral* and *logical* denomination. So we ſay, That [*Gods pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity*, that *God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity* as ſuch.] Not for want of *Power*, but by reaſon of his *perfect Will* and *Nature*. So God *cannot lye*, *Tit.* 1. 2. And it is *impoſſible for God to lye*. God *cannot deny himſelf*, 2 Tim. 2. 13. God *cannot be tempted with evil*, Jam. 1. 13. So *Joh.* 10. 35. The *Scripture cannot be broken*. *Iſa.* 1. 13. Your *Aſſemblies I cannot away with*. No wonder alſo if this be ſaid of men: As, 1 *Joh.* 3. 9. *He cannot ſin, becauſe he is born of God*. Not for want of *power*, but partly *he will not*, and partly *logically* theſe cannot conſiſt. So of the wicked, *Joh.* 7. 7. *The World cannot hate you*——.

XXX. Oft times the word [*Cannot*] is taken *politically*, *I cannot*, that is, *I muſt not*, or I *cannot lawfully*: *Quod turpe, impoſſibile*. Gen. 19. 22. *I cannot do any thing, till thou be come out*. Act. 10. 47. *Can any man forbid water*, &c. that is, lawfully. 2 Cor. 13. 8. [*We can do nothing againſt the Truth*,] that is, by Authority from God.

XXXI. Oft times in Scripture the word [*Cannot*] is meant only of that which a man *cannot* do *without ſuffering*, or loſs, or difficulty. So

Act.

Act. 4. 16. *We cannot deny it,*] that is, without the ſhame of falſhood. *Luk.* 14. 20. *I cannot come,*] that is, without ſuch inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear. Jer. 29. 17. *They cannot be eaten,*] that is, *without loathing.* 1 Sam. 25. 17. *He is ſuch a Son of* Belial, *that a man cannot ſpeak to him,*] that is, without inconvenience by it. 2 Sam. 23. 6. *They cannot be taken with hands,*] that is, without hurt. Gen. 34. 14. *We cannot do this thing,*] that is, without God.

XXXII. Oft times this inconvenience procuring *unwillingneſs, this unwillingneſs* is named like *impotency,* and it is ſaid, Men *cannot,* becauſe they *will not.* And ſo it is in divers of the laſt cited inſtances. Joh. 3. 9. *They cannot ſin,*] that is, *They will not.* Luk. 14. 20. *I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come,*] that is, *I will not, becauſe I cannot without this* inconvenience. Neh. 6. 3. *I cannot come down,*] that is, *I will not.* Gen. 44. 26. *We cannot go down.* Joſh. 24. 19. *Ye cannot ſerve the Lord; for he is a holy God:* that is, you are not diſpoſed to do it holily, and then he will deſtroy you. Joh. 6. 60. *This is a hard ſaying, who can hear it?*] that is, willingly. Iſa. 49. 15. *Can a woman forget her ſucking-Child?*] that is, *will ſhe* forget it? Jer. 2. 32. *Can a Maid forget her Ornaments?* Mar. 2. 19. *Can the Children of the Bridegroom faſt?* &c. Mar. 9. 39. *Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of, and be baptized?* &c. 39. *They ſaid unto him, we can,*] that is, Have you *Wills* diſpoſed for ſuch ſufferings, and will you go through them?

And this *unwillingneſs* when it is *habitual* and prevalent, is it that is commonly called *mans moral impotency,* as to believe, love, obey, *&c.*

XXXIII. This impoteney which is the moral pravity of the Will hath divers *degrees:* And the ſame degree of received help from God, will not cure it in one that will in another. The godly have ſome of it, and the ungodly more, and ſome of them more than others. But we uſe to call it abſolutely a *moral impotency,* when the indiſpoſition of the Soul is ſuch, as that *none ſuch ever do believe and conſent without more help of Grace than yet they have received.* And we uſe to ſay that he is *morally able,* or hath *power,* whoſe indiſpoſition is not ſo great nor Grace ſo ſmall, but that *ſome* in that *caſe* by that *ſame help do believe* and conſent, though it be rarely. But that *power* is morally called impotency, which no man ever reduceth to act.

XXXIV. This moral Power is yet ſhort both of *Act and Habit;* For a Habit is not only a *power* to Act, but to Act *promptly,* and *eaſily,* and *aright.*

XXXV. By all this you may partly ſee how to anſwer the common queſtions about mens power or impotency to believe, and to love God.

Queſt. 1. *Is every man able to believe, and love God?*

Anſw. Every man hath that *natural faculty,* which hath ſufficient of that *ſort of power* called *natural,* to do it, ſuppoſing neceſſary concurrents.

Queſt. 2. *Is any man naturally able, without Divine ſupport and concurſe, and without neceſſary Objects, Concauſes and Media?*

Anſw. No: no more than to make himſelf an Angel. He never had ſuch power in Innocency.

Queſt.

Queſt. 3. * *Is a man able to ſin, if God Decree he ſhall not; or able to forbear ſin, or obey, if God fore-know that he will not?*

Anſw. Yes: for God is not ſuppoſed to decree or fore-ſee that he ſhall not *be able*; nay, if God fore-ſee that he *will not do what he can*, it infereth that *he can*. But the event is a *logical impoſſibility*; that is, it is *not true* that it *will be*.

Queſt. 4. *Is the Intellect truly informed, able to ſet right an habitually undiſpoſed Will?*

Anſw. It is able to do that towards it which on a better diſpoſed Will would be effectual: But not to produce the effect.

Queſt. 5. *Is a power not excited to Act, able to do that act?*

Anſw. The queſtion is, Whether a *power not excited be a power?* Yes, It is a *Power*, but ſuch as will not act till excited.

Queſt. 6. *Is that Grace which exciteth our Powers, another ſecond Power?*

Anſw. It is the *excitation* of a *Power*; or a *received impulſe*: Call it *Power* or what you will, ſo you trouble not the Church with a needleſs wrangling about a *Name*, when there are others as fit.

Queſt. 7. *Is a Habit a Power?*

Anſw. It is ſomewhat not well known by man; But we know that it is *leſs* than the *natural Power*, in point of ſubſtantiality, as being but an *Accident*: But it is *more* than both *natural and moral power*, in order of *perfection* to the act: For to be *able* and *prompt* is more than to be *meerly able*.

Queſt. 8. *Is a hindered Power truly a Power?*

Anſw. If the hinderance be ſuch as the faculty is not *able* to overcome, it is not formally a power *ad hoc*: But otherwiſe it is.

Queſt. 9. *Can God make a man able without any change on himſelf, to do that which he was unable for?*

Anſw. Yes: If his diſability lay in the want of extrinſick Concauſes, Objects, or *Media*.

Queſt. 10. *May a meer change of the Underſtanding enable the Will to do what it could not do?*

Anſw. Not what it had not a *natural* Power to do: But what it wanted but a *moral* power or diſpoſition to do; it may in two caſes, 1. If God do powerfully illuminate the Underſtanding, and by the Underſtanding powerfully operate on the Will: Or in ordinary caſes, if the underſtandings acts be clear and ſtrong. 2. If the Will it ſelf be not obſtinately before ill diſpoſed.

Queſt. 11. *Is an unwilling Will able to excite or change it ſelf?*

Anſw. Even in the point of *believing*, it hath *natural power* and *liberty* to act otherwiſe than it doth, even to turn it ſelf from the act of Unbelief to the act of Faith: But being *undiſpoſed and ill diſpoſed*, it *will not do* that which it hath a natural ſelf-determining *power* to do; till God aſſiſt it or turn it by his Grace.

Queſt. 12. *Can any man believe that Will?*

Anſw. 1. A man that knoweth not the Goſpel, or what to believe, upon a general rumor of it, may wiſh that he had it, knew it, and believed it: And yet cannot believe it indeed, till he know what to believe. 2. A man that perceiveth not the evidence of verity or credibility in the Goſpel, and therefore believeth it not to be true, may for the *end*

* That Potentia peccandi is of God, ſee *Aureolus in* 2. *d.* 44. *art.* 2. *pag.* 327. 328.

utrum præcepta ſupernaturalia poſſit homo ſervare ſine ſpeciali auxilio gratiæ? Reſp. Quod non: quia ipſa nequeunt ſervari niſi eliciendo actus infuſarum virtutum, &c. Carera ſum. Theol. 2. 2. c. 1. And what would you have higher than his, *q.* 4. *a.* 1. *An lumen ſupernaturale infuſum fidei ſit tota virtus agendi actum fidei? Reſp. Aff. Quia actus fidei eſt quoad omnem rationem modum, ſubſtantiam, denominationem, quidditatem, ſupernaturalis: ejus vita in actu ſecundo ſupernaturalis, Deum & authorem ſupernaturalem attingens, nec continetur intra vires & ordinem naturæ, & intellectus creatus ſuapte natura eſt ad illam improportionatus*, p. 38. 39. So other *Thomiſts*. But here wanteth ſome explication of ſupernaturality.

Yea they aſſert (*ut idem ibid. p.* 39, *&c.*) That the Intellect hath not ſo much as a *potentia obedientialis activa*, but only *paſſiva* to the act of Faith; but conceive that the ſupernatural infuſed Grace of Faith is as neceſſary to enable the faculty to that act, as the faculty to the Eſſence of the Soul therein. Though yet they grant that the Intellect is *cauſa fidei principalis*, as the eſſence is which yet can do nothing but by the faculty: And thus they make *potentiam fundari in potentia*, which Dr. *Twiſſe* denieth.

But a hard queſtion troubleth ſome of the School-men, ſeeing faith is wholly ſupernatural, and Gods work, and it was ſo in the *Jews* that believed that Chriſt *was to come*; if that Faith continued in any ſome time after (as in *Nathanael*, &c.) Whether God ſtill cauſed it when it became falſe as he did before? which muſt needs put them upon ſome exception: They ſay, How it is *fides humana*, but *per potentiam divinam, & Deus omnium dominus efficere poteſt ut quis eliam occidat ſine peccato* (*Idem, ibid.*) But a further anſwer may and muſt be given; which will be uſeful to the Caſe before us, when conſide ed. Of which in due place.

and *matter* wiſh he could ſee evidence of truth and believe it; And yet is not able, till he ſee it. And a Believer that believeth it weakly, may wiſh to believe it more ſtrongly than he can. 3. One that conſenteth not to leave his luſts for Chriſt, may know ſo much of the wiſdom and happineſs of thoſe that can conſent, as to *wiſh* he had ſuch a *Will* himſelf, and that he were one of them: And yet may be morally unable, that is, unwilling ſo to do. For it's one thing to *will Chriſt* and *Holineſs* for it ſelf and God, and it's another thing to *will* to have ſuch a Will. A mans own *Will* may be the Object of his *Will*, for fear of puniſhment, and ſo he may wiſh that he had a better heart, leſt he be damned; when yet he loveth not Holineſs for it ſelf. In a word, 1. He that willeth God, Holineſs, Chriſt, as they are, as better than all the World. 2. And that with a ſerious effectual Will, ſhall have what he willeth: And he that *willeth* ſuch a *Will*, as part of Gods holy Image, and for it ſelf, above the pleaſures of his Fleſh, ſhall have it, yea already hath it. But a man may *will* ſuch a *Will*, yea and Chriſt, and God himſelf, in a falſe notion, as *minus malum*, as not ſo bad as Hell, but leſs amiable than ſinful pleaſures, and yet be graceleſs, and undiſpoſed to believe.

The reſt I pretermit.

XXXVI. The Intellect as ſuch underſtandeth *neceſſarily per modum naturæ:* And therefore as ſuch, its *diſpoſition* or *indiſpoſition* is not morally good or evil; And as it hath no freedom, ſo theſe *habits* or diſpoſitions are but the accidental perfections or imperfections of a natural power, and participate of the natural neceſſity of that power: But the ſame Intellect, ſo far as it is under the power of the *Will*, and imperate, is the ſubject of moral acts and habits; and ſo as ſecondarily moral, they are ſecondarily free.

XXXVII. To conclude, as *Auguſtine* ſaith, We *uſe* in common ſpeech to diſtinguiſh *Power* and *Will:* and from one we ſay, *Men are able*, and *can* do this or that: and from the other we ſay, *They will or will not.* And both *habitual* or *diſpoſitive* and *actual willingneſs* or *unwillingneſs* is not called uſually *Strength* or *Power*, but *Will:* The *Will* it ſelf hath its proper *power* to *will*, for it is a natural *faculty:* But its *habits* and *acts* are better known by the name of *willingneſs* and *unwillingneſs*, than of *power*. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, uſually expreſs moral habits and acts by theſe their beſt known names, and when we uſe the terms of *Power*, *Can* and *Cannot*, would do it ſo *rarely* and *explainedly* as to be underſtood, that it is nothing but *moral willingneſs* and *unwillingneſs* that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controverſie. For he that is puzzled with the queſtion (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever *can believe*, and have *power* to *repent:*] would quickly be ſatisfied if the queſtion were [*Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.*] And he that is ſtalled with the queſtion, [*Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodneſs?*] would eaſily anſwer, [*Whether he be willing to do it?*] Yea and [*Whether he be diſpoſed or inclined to it?*] Yea and [*Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwiſe?*]

A. "*You have been ſo* tedious *and* numerous *in your Diſtinctions and* "*Obſervations, that no plain man is able to follow you. Do you think that* "*poor Chriſtians muſt be puzzled with all this, and loſt in a multitude of* "*diſtinctions, before they can know the truth,* Whether a man can believe "and repent, or not?

B. I expected to hear your own mouth condemn you. *Queſt.* 1. Is there any of theſe diſtinctions which are unneceſſary to the deciſion of the preſent Controverſie? If there be, name it and lay that by. 2. Is a *general* and an *ambiguous* term better underſtood by the bare ambiguous name, than by opening the particulars contained in it, and the ambiguities? Than Catechiſms, and Commentaries, even on our baptiſmal Covenant, the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue, are hurtful. Do you underſtand your ſelf what you mean by your [*Power*] and [*Can*] and [*Cannot Repent*] without conſidering of the ambiguity? 3. Will it ſatisfie you, if we uſe your words [*Can*] or [*Cannot*] what ſenſe ſoever we take them in? Is that all that you contend for? Muſt the Church be fired about a word, which neither Side much ſtick at, could they have their ſenſe of it? 4. But the truth is, You open your own ſhame: that muſt trouble the ears of honeſt plain Chriſtians, with words which cannot be underſtood without all this ado; and will chooſe ſuch terms as have ſo many meanings, to confound, or bewilder men, and that without explication; and even in ſtrict diſputes, and not only in Oratory; when as there are plainer enough at hand, which ſpeak the matter as we are agreed.

A. "*You tell us a great deal of* habits *of the* Will, *which are more than* "Power *(in order to Action). But I find that ſome men of our Party* "*hold, that there is no ſuch thing in the Soul as an* habit *or* diſpoſition "*which is not meerly a* Power *or an* Act: *They know no more.*

B. The truth is, too many on the other ſide, who know not how much they deſtroy their own work by over-doing, and uſe to fear but one extream, do harp ſo much upon this ſtring, that *no wicked man is able to repent*, or hath *power* to believe, or *can* forſake his ſin, that they have ignorantly given you the advantage which you lay hold on, 1. To call Grace ſtill by the name of a *meer power*, and 2. Then to diſgrace their Opinion, who ſay that God damneth men for doing that which they are utterly *unable* to do.

A. "*What is the advantage which you think we take by this?*

B. * The greateſt that you have againſt your Adverſaries. 1. By the firſt you make *Grace* to be no *determiner* of the *Will at all*, *habitual* or *actual*: For Grace, you ſay, giveth men but a *power* to *believe* and *repent*: And ſo whether a man will *uſe* that *power* or not, and will actually *repent* and *believe* or not, is never the more aſcertained for Grace, if it give men but a *power*. For you leave it ſtill to Free-will to *uſe that power* or *not uſe it*. (I ſpeak but of ſome of you.) 2. And hereby you contrive Grace into this conception, that it is but ſome common thing *like nature*, and as a man that hath *power* to ſit, or ſtand, or go, may uſe that power as he will himſelf; ſo all men where the Goſpel cometh have a *power* to obey it, which they may uſe as they will: But to the *Will* it ſelf Grace giveth but this power: And if that were true that a habit of the *Will* were but a *power to will*, fair fall *Pelagius*.

A. "*It's well you charge us not all with that Opinion; But I confeſs I am* "*not yet ſatisfied that it is falſe, and that the Will hath any thing but* power "*and* act: *But power facilitateth the act.*

B. You may ſay it *facilitateth*, becauſe it maketh it *poſſible*, which is eaſier than that which is impoſſible? Is that facility? But mark.

1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not ſuitable to his outward means: For his means are *Perſwaſions*, and *Exhortations*, and *Mercies*, and *Corrections*, which are not only to make men able,

* Mark what *Pet. a. S. Joſeph* ſaith, *Theſ. Univerſ. pag.* 236. *de Charit. Dare facilitatem agendi ſpectat ad virtutes acquiſitas, non autem ad infuſas, quæ ſolam agendi potentiam tribuunt.* So that proper habits by this are nothing but acquired, which yet at other times he denieth.

Herveus in Quodlib. 1. *q.* 13. undertaketh to ſhew the difference *inter potentiam & habitum*, though *habitus* be *potentia* in a large ſenſe as it is taken *pro omni principio activo & paſſivo*: And he taketh the *ſubſtantia actus* (as it's called) to be more reducible *ad potentiam*, and the *modus* to the habit. But he leaveth the difference ſtill in the dark. And *Quodlib.* 3. *qu.* 7. he is larger of it, and ſaith that a habit is [*Diſpoſitio potentiæ per quam diſponitur ad actum*] and that it ſuppoſeth a Power not ſufficient to determine it ſelf to prompt and facile action.

able, but *willing:* And if they make them *willing*, they do *in primo instanti diſpoſe* them to be *willing*, and then procure actual willingneſs, and then fix the *Will* in an habitual *propenſity*.

2. If that Doctrine be true, then a *habit* hath no *moral good* or evil in it, it is no *Virtue* or *Vice:* And then there is no *Virtue* or *Vice*, that is, no ſuch thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man ſhould call *meer power* or *impotency*, which is neither habitual, diſpoſitive or actual *willingneſs* or *unwillingneſs*, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not *goodneſs* meerly to be *able* to do good, nor *evil* to be *able* to do evil; unleſs as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, ſo far as voluntary.

3. If that Doctrine be true, the *Will as a Will* ſhould be an unſanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in *action*. For its diſpoſition is its holineſs and rectitude.

4. And a man ſhould have no Grace in his ſleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unleſs you will ſay, as I hinted before, that *ſleeping* and waking he hath ſtill a Latent inſenſible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge ſuch a habit, (even a fixed latent deep conſtant act inclining to other holy acts) the ſtrife then is but about a name.

5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it beſides *power* and obſerved acts, a *natural* inſeparable *inclination*. The form of the Soul is not only *potentia*, but *potentia ſeu vis vel virtus inclinata*; Man is not only *able* to love good as good, and felicity as ſuch, and ſenſible Pleaſure as ſuch, but he is *inclined* to it. And if there be ſuch a thing as *natural inclination* or *propenſity*, beſides *power* and *act*, then 1. It is poſſible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be ſanctified, muſt not its *inclination* be ſanctified?

6. Why elſe are we ſaid to be New Creatures, and have ſoft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature? Nature in active things, is a *principle inclined to action*, and not only *able* for it. And ſurely a Divine Nature can ſignifie no leſs than an inclination to holineſs and the love of God.

7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man ſhould riſe every morning ſo ready to go on in wickedneſs again (that ſleep doth not end his ſin,) yea that he is ſo obſtinate in ſuch acts, if beſides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil? If you ſay that it is alſo a diſability to do better or forbear; 1. You will extenuate his ſin, by ſaying that he can do no better. 2. Experience telleth you that his ſin is ſenſuality: And *Appetite* (inordinate which ruleth him) is more than Power, Impotency or Act; It is alſo an inclination to that Act.

8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace ſuited to its nature and uſe: And therefore as the *potentia vitalis activa & executiva*, hath its power and vivacity, ſo the Intellect hath Illumination, and the *Will* holy Love, in diſpoſition and in act.

9. Laſtly, The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the *Spirit* of God, (and I would the Church would hold to that name, and ſay, Men have or have not the Spirit of holineſs:) But the word *Spirit* cannot be judged to ſignifie nothing but *power* and *act*. Yea it is expreſly named in reference to our three ſanctified faculties, the *Spirit* of *Power*, and of *Love*, and of *a ſound Mind*, 2 Tim. 1. 7. And the Spirit of Love or Adoption (*Gal.* 4. 6. *Rom.* 18. 16, 26.) is not only a *power* to love: A Child hath more than a *power* to love a Father; It is a filial loving nature which is called our regenerate ſtate. And if it were only the Act alſo, why is it called a *Spirit* and *Nature*.

A.

A. "*To confeſs the truth you have ſaid much to prove that we have ill* "*managed this Controverſie about* Power *and* Impotency, *to* repent *and* "believe: *And for my part I mean hereafter to uſe moſt the* common *and* "Scripture *phraſe, and ſay as to the efficient, that men* have *or* have *not* "*the Spirit, and as to the effect, that* Power, Diſpoſition, *or Inclination,* "Act *or* Habit, *are things to us obſervable in the Soul, and that* cannot *and* "will not, *muſt not be confounded. And if it be* moral *or* logical *Power* "*that I ſpeak of, I will mention it properly as it is in the* effect *or event,* "*called* Poſſible *or* Impoſſible, *rather than as it connoteth the faculty called* "Potent *or* Impotent *thereto, leſt I deceive men: And I will let them per-* "*ceive an* impoſſibility *of* conſequence, *from an* impotency of ſufficiency: "*For I know that when it's true, that logically* in ordine dicendi *it cannot* "*be,* (*that is,* be true,) *that* [*God fore-ſeeth or decreeth that* Peter *will* "*not ſin,*] *and yet that* [he will ſin]; *yet it is not true that* [Peter "*had not* power *to ſin*]. *But I proceed.*

The third Crimination.

A. "*They make man ſo corrupted, and that by* Adam's *ſin without his* "*own conſent, as that there is no good in him; But he is dead in ſin: And* "*ſo all men ſhould be utterly and equally wicked.*

B. * The anſwer to the former might ſerve to this: But ſtill I ſee that Names muſt be our quarrel. Is the queſtion of the *Thing*, or of the *Name*, whether it be to be called *Good?* 1. As to the *thing*, they deny not that there are *firſt notices* and common principles of morality in all mens underſtandings. 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth. 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good. 4. Nor that natural Conſcience doth ſomewhat for God and Duty, and againſt Sin in bad men. 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth ſome of them to have had, as *Antonine*, *Alexander Severus*, *Cato*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Epictetus*, *Plutarch*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Goſpel cometh may prepare them for ſpecial Grace, and make them almoſt ſanctified Believers. In a word, almoſt all agree, that 1. Nature, as now upheld by Mercy, may have all the good aforeſaid. 2. That common Grace with the Goſpel may go further. 3. And that it prepareth for ſpecial ſaving Grace. If you deny this, you accuſe them contrary to the fulleſt evidence that you could expect, whilſt our *Britiſh* Divines at *Dort* tell you ſo largely how far univerſal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work; and when there are ſuch a multitude of Treatiſes, written by the ſtricteſt *Engliſh Antiarminians* on two Subjects, 1. Of preparation to Converſion. 2. How far an Hypocrite (or unregenerate Perſon) may go in Chriſtianity, (the Title of one of *Perkins*'s Books.)

2. But if it be *de nomine*, whether this may be called *good*, it is a queſtion unfit to trouble the Church with. All are agreed that is materially ſomething commanded by God, partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture, and that it tendeth towards the well-fare of him that hath it, and of others; and is better than its contrary. But if we muſt ſet up a *metaphyſical* Theater to diſpute *de ratione Boni*, by that time (on as good reaſon) we have proſecuted our diſputes *de ratione entis, unius & veri* alſo, we may fall out with all that agree not, in *Suarez* his Metaphyſicks, or at leaſt in *Aquinas* or *Buridanes*'s Ethicks. I pray you begin your ſelf, and tell me what is *bonum*, goodneſs, in your queſtion?

* Melanct. Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 7. *Etſi peccatum Originis vitiat naturam, non prorſus aufert eam, nec delet nec mutat eam in aliam ſpeciem. Et ſp. ſanctus non abolet, ſed adolet naturam, non deſtruit, ſed ſanat.* Et Ambroſ. de Voc. Gent. l. 1. c. 3. *Nec quia ſpiritu Dei agitur, ideo putet ſe libero arb. carere: quia nec tunc perdidit, quando diabolo voluntate ſe dedit, a quo judicium voluntatis depravatum eſt, non ablatum: Non enim homo voluntate, ſed voluntatis ſanitate privatus eſt: cum a diabolo ſpoliaretur: cum igitur homo ad pietatem redit non alia in eo creatur ſubſtantia, ſed tacta quæ fuerat labefactata reparatur.*

A:

A. "*You ſhall not tempt me into ſo difficult a metaphyſical or moral diſ-*
"*pute, which I know the learned are ſo little agreed in: For you would but*
"*make uſe of it to inſult over me.*

B. And yet is this one of your Accuſations of your Brethren, that they agree not with you in the ſenſe of ſuch a word, as you dare not definitively tell your own ſenſe of?

Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God, by reſignation of our ſelves to him as our Owner, ſubjection to him as our Ruler, and love to him as our *End*, or perfect Good, with all the exerciſe of theſe. Now, 1. In the ſtricteſt ſenſe, men ſay, *Bonum eſt ex cauſis integris*, and ſo where there is any ſin, there is not good in that ſenſe; that is, unmixed *perfect good:* And in that (with a more tranſcendent) ſenſe Chriſt ſaith, That *none is good ſave God only:* I hope you will not quarrel with him for it. And yet the *Papiſts* commonly reproach the *Proteſtants*, as teaching that all that we do is ſin, and no good, becauſe we ſay that all is mixt with ſin, and imperfectly good. I profeſs for my ſelf, that I never loved, truſted, feared, obeyed God in all my life without imperfection: And I take that imperfection of my love to God, *&c.* to be the great and grievous ſin of my Soul; ſo that I groan out all my days; the laſt dying-words of Arch-biſhop *Uſher*, *Lord, forgive my Sins of Omiſſion*; And if the School-men almoſt agree, that moral evil is *privatio boni*, me-thinks a *Papiſt* ſhould hardly dream that his greateſt Faith and Love have no degree of ſuch privation.

2. But as the word [*Good*] ſignifieth that which is *ſincerely* ſo though imperfectly, being more predominant in heart and life, than the contrary evil, and proveth the perſons acceptation with God, and right to Salvation, and is the imperfect Image of Gods holineſs repaired, ſo all and only the ſanctified are good.

3. But in the third ſenſe, as *goodneſs* ſignifieth, ſuch Inclinations and Actions as are *good* but in a low degree, and *bad predominantly*; ſo none deny but *bad men* have ſome good Inclinations and Actions. And *de nomine* here Divines agree not, either *Proteſtants* or *Papiſts:* ſome (and moſt commonly) call all ſuch Actions *good* in their degree; Others ſay, That *quia finis deeſt*, none of it is to be called properly good. It may end all, to ſay that it is *good analogically*, as *accidens* is *ens:* or *ſecundum quid*, though not *ſimpliciter*.

The fourth Crimination.

A. * "*They damn multitudes of Infants for Original Sin, which they could* "*not avoid; yea and the Adult too as* necessitated *by it* to sin, *for the pre-* "*vention or cure of which they have no remedy; especially all the Heathen* "*World, in comparison of which, from* Adam's *days till now the rest are very* "*few: so that they make the World to be made or born purposely for unavoid-* "*able damnation in Hell fire.*

* So do the *Jesuits*, as you may see in *Vasqu. in* 1. *Tho.* 4. 23. *& passim.*

B. Here are several things which must be distinctly spoken to, I. Of Infants. II. Of the state of the Heathen World. III. Of the necessity of sinning. IV. Of the necessity of punishment for sin. Of these in order.

1. For the case of *Infants*, there are three questions to be handled, 1. Whether they have Original Sin? 2. Whether they are worthy of punishment for it? 3. Whether they are punished for it, and how many, and how?

1. For the first, I have proved in a peculiar Disputation, that Infants have Original Sin, that is, *moral Pravity* in disposition, with their participation in the guilt of *Adam*'s sin, as being seminally and virtually in him. And I find you not yet denying it.

2. For the second, no Christian doubteth, I think, but that all sin deserveth punishment; But the *desert* of Actual Sin and of Original Sin are as different as the nature of the sin. Habitual or Dispositive Pravity is a Dispositive preparation or worthiness of punishment: And actual Sin, is an actual preparation for it, but all deserve it; that is, are Subjects morally fit for it, to demonstrate holy Justice.

3. For the third, Scripture and experience put it past controversie, that Infants *suffer*: For, 1. They are deprived of the Spirit of Holiness, as quickly appeareth by their early practice. Which privation is the greatest punishment here. 2. They are hereupon left to the power of their own Corruption; which desertion is a grievous punishment. 3. They have pain and sorrow. 4. And they die.

And if they have all this suffering here, it is unlikely that they are wholly free hereafter, if not pardoned: Because, 1. They have immortal Souls that are capable. 2. And future as well as temporal death or misery is the wages of sin.

And that their suffering is for sin, is undoubted, from *Rom.* 5, *&c.* And the *Pelagians* scarce deny but that *Adam*'s sin caused it. And if it be proved that they have moral pravity, or sin of their own, then it is for their own sin. And if so, it is their own punishment.

All the doubt then is, Whether all Infants are forgiven. And for that, 1. We see that the temporal punishment is not forgiven them. 2. We see as soon as they come to action, that to many at least, the foresaid penal desertion and privation of the Spirit of Sanctification is not forgiven them: And 3. Without holiness none can see God. 4. They that affirm it must prove it: which they neither do, nor can do. There is no word of Scripture which telleth it us. How then should that be part of our Faith, which is no part of Gods Word?

If you say that Christ, being the second *Adam*, saveth the World from all the sin and misery brought on them by the first *Adam*; I answer, 1. Conditionally he doth: He hath purchased Salvation to be given men on the terms of the Covenant of Grace, and all that perform the Con-

Conditions ſhall have Salvation. But 2. His bare Sacrifice it ſelf without ſuch application ſaveth none, any further than to bring them under the terms of the ſaid Covenant. It is apparent by experience, that Chriſt doth not undo all the hurt that *Adam* did; immediately to all, or any one in the world, no not till death, no nor till the Reſurrection. Sin and miſery is ſtill upon us. Infants ſhew as ſoon as they come to the uſe of reaſon, that they were not brought to the Innocency that *Adam* had before the Fall. You your ſelves diſtinguiſh the Impetration from the Application of Salvation as to the adult, and the reaſon is the ſame as to Infants, though the condition be not the ſame. Shew us a promiſe of the Salvation of all Infants, and we will believe it.

5. Indeed they are ſaved conditionally as the adult are; and the condition is expreſſed in Scripture, [That they be the Children of the Faithful, dedicated to God.] The Parents and their Seed are in the ſame Covenant. And this is all that God revealeth of them. *

But whether God do alſo, without a Promiſe, ſave any of the Children of the Heathen World, or of wicked Parents? and how many? and with what Salvation? and alſo what degree of puniſhment they have in the life to come, we take for unrevealed things, which we are ſo far from making Articles of our Faith, that we take it to be preſumptuous arrogancy to diſpute it, and meddle with the Secrets of the Almighty. The *Papiſts* themſelves are not agreed whether Infants have only the *pœnam damni* as ſhut out of Heaven, or alſo *pœnam ſenſus*? *Janſenius* and many more (yea moſt) have written for the firſt; and *Petavius* and others for the latter. But ſecret things belong to God.

A. "*We cannot prove that all Infants are ſaved, nor do we preſume to* "*tell you what Salvation it is that they ſhall have; But we hope the beſt:* "*And I am glad to find that you take the Salvation of true Believers dying* "*Infants to be ſure (by the ſame Covenant which pardoneth their Parents),* "*and that you do not peremptorily condemn all the reſt.*

B. You know that the Synod of *Dort* have ſaid the ſame that I do of true Believers Children, *Art.* 1. *Sect.* 17. and the reſt they meddle not with.

A. "*But I pray you tell me your thoughts, Whether Infants themſelves* "*do periſh for* Adam's *ſin alone? And what remedy is provided for* "*them?*

B. The whole tenor of the Scripture putteth me paſt doubt, that Divines have ſtrangely erred, by over-looking the common Intereſt and Communion of all Parents and Children, and appropriating our Original Guilt to *Adam*'s ſin alone: But this requireth a larger Diſputation by it ſelf. At preſent conſider, 1. That no Text of Scripture doth ſo appropriate it, or make *Adam* only the Corrupter of our Natures: But only maketh him the *Original* of our *Guilt* and *Pravity*, as he was the Original of our Nature: And ſo he only is the Original of our Death and Puniſhment.

2. That the whole ſcope of Scripture containeth *Promiſes* and *Penalties* to Children with the Parents, for and by the Parents ſins, more plainly than any was antecedently expreſſed of *Adam*'s Poſterity as his: Yea the very Moral Law in the Second Commandment, and in the Proclamation of Gods Name and Nature to *Moſes*, *Exod.* 34. 6, 7. which nothing but prejudice and partiality can deny to be a valid proof, of a ſecondary Birth ſin derived to us. And he that will read the Sacred Hiſtory from the Curſe on the Seed of *Cain*, and *Cham*, of the Caſe of *Iſhmael*, *Eſau*, *Moab*, *Amnon*, *Sauls* Grand-Children hanged, and ſo on

* Saith *Twiſſe Cont. Corvin. pag.* 136. *c.* 2: *De Infantibus infantia ſua morientibus falſum eſt quod nobis obtrudit: Neq; enim dicimus ullos Infantes credentium & fœderatorum Dei in infantia decedentes ad exitium deſtinatos: Sanctos enim eos pronunciat Apoſtolus. Et una cum parentibus fidelibus in fœdere Dei comprehenduntur.*

But I doubt he befriendeth the *Anabaptiſts* more than he was aware of, when he addeth, [*Obſignant* (*Sacramenta*) *credentibus remiſſionem peccatorum & vitam æternam: At Infantibus quoties adminiſtratur* Baptiſmus, *non tam credentibus quam crediturîs obſignat promiſſiones iſtas: Non crediturîs autem nihil obſignat:* If ſo, then to them that die in Infancy, or yet are Infants no pardon is delivered and ſealed by Baptiſm: which is not ſound.

Of our guilt of nearer Parents Sin.

Let them that reject me in this, hear *Auguſtine*, in *Enchirid. c.* 46. *Parentum quoq; peccatis parvulos obligari, non ſolum primorum hominum, ſed etiam ſuorum de quibus ipſi nati ſunt, non improbabiliter dicitur: Illa quippe divina ſententia, Reddam peccata patrum in filios, tenet hos utiq; antequam per regenerationem ad teſtamentum novum incipiant pœnitere.—Reperiuntur plura peccata & alia parentum quæ etſi non ita poſſunt mutare naturam, reatu tamen obligant filios, niſi gratuita gratia & miſericordia divina ſubveniat.*

on to *Matth.* 23. 38. [*On this Generation ſhall come all the righteous blood*, &c.] And [*His blood be on us, and on our Children,*] with all the Promiſes to the Seed of the Righteous only, and Threatning to the Houſes and Seed of the Wicked, with the reaſon of Infant-Baptiſm it ſelf, 1 *Cor.* 7. [Elſe were your Children unclean, but now are they holy]; will ſoon be convinced that we are born under more *guilt* and *puniſhment* than what we derive from *Adam*.

3. And even *Adam*'s ſin could not be, or is not made ours immediately, but as we derive it from our nearer Parents: For our *nature* is no otherwiſe from him. Why am I guilty of what *Adam* did, but becauſe I have a nature that was ſeminally in him? And was it not proximately in my nearer Parents? And can they convey their part of *Adam*'s guilt and pravity to me, and no other?

4. And few ſober men can deny, but that the Children of ſome Gluttons, Drunkards, Fornicators, *&c.* derive extraordinary diſeaſed, and vitiouſly-inclined *temperaments* from their neareſt Parents.

5. And no peculiar reaſon can truly be given for our guilt or pravity from *Adam*, which reacheth not to prove the derivation of the like from our nearer Parents, ſave only, 1. That *Adam* only was the Original. 2. And in *Adam* we ſinned under a Covenant that gave no pardon: But now under a Covenant of Grace.

A. "*If this hold, it will make eaſie the Doctrine of Original Sin, which* "*I confeſs to you that I have been inclined to doubt of, by your Divines* "*faſtening all upon Gods Arbitrary Imputation, rather than from the Chil-* "*dren ſeminal in-being.*

B. Doubtleſs they have much tempted *Arminius*, *Epiſcopius*, *Arnoldus Corvinus*, Biſhop *Jer. Taylor*, and others, to ſay ſo much againſt Original Sin as they have done, by feigning an (unproved) arbitrary Covenant of God made with *Adam* and his Poſterity, which was no Law of Nature, nor is made to any other ſince, (according to the change of the Covenant), and by which God imputeth *Adam*'s ſin to us, not becauſe we were in his Loins (for then it would extend to others), but becauſe it was his *Will* to do ſo; As if it had been God and not *Adam* that defiled our Natures, and made us all Sinners, by an unneceſſary, if not ungrounded imputation. By which alſo they have kept men from knowing their ſecondary birth-ſin. * The Church of *England* prayeth not for the Dead, but for the Living, when it ſaith, *Remember not our Iniquity, nor the Iniquity of our fore-Fathers:* And *Nehemiah* and *Daniel* were of the ſame mind.

* Dr. *Twiſſe* frequently ſpeaketh rightlier of the reaſon of the imputation of *Adam*'s ſin.

A. "*But they ſay that then our Sins would increaſe as Ages go on, and* "*the laſt Age would be the moſt ſinful.*

B. Men will ſay almoſt any thing in their partiality, while they look but on one ſide. 1. The Covenant is now changed which men ſin under: Not ſo as not to extend to Children: But it is now a *pardoning Covenant*; And when the ſins of the Fathers are pardoned to themſelves, they are pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God in the ſame Covenant, even by the ſame. 2. But where they are unpardoned, there is a certain ſort and degree of guilt increaſed on the Poſterity; and ſo no wonder if many Kingdoms of Heathens and Infidels feel it. 3. But as it is not ſo much to have a nature eſſentially derived from Parents, and to be ſeminally in them, as it is to be a ſinning perſon, ſo the guilt proportionably differeth. 4. And there is a pardon of ſome temporal puniſhments which God giveth ſome bad men in this life. 5. And as to the puniſhment in Hell, there is a certain degree, that God will not exceed in his

execution, and that humane nature, as it is, is capable of no more. And a man may have many Obligations to one and the ſame puniſhment, as he may to the ſame duty; and ſo a man is but hanged or put to death that hath deſerved death ſeven times over among men: For the *ends* of puniſhment ſet the bounds in all executions.

A. "*Well, but what ſay you to the ſecond; The periſhing ſtate of Hea-*
"*thens.*

B. II. I have ſaid ſo much in the Firſt Book, that I muſt refer you thither; Now only ſaying, 1. That it is firſt to be conſidered what Law they are under; 2. And next how they keep it; 3. And then how they are judged by it.

1. Undoubtedly all the World is now under the Law of Grace, as to the eſſentials, as it was made with all men in *Adam* and *Noah*, though not as to the mutable part, which bound men to expect a future Meſſiah. That Law was made with all Mankind, *Gen.* 3. 15. and is never repealed to Mankind. The World was under it (as to Obligation) before Chriſt's Incarnation; And Chriſt took no benefit from them which they had. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and other Fathers, erred not in this ſo much as ſome have charged them to do: No man is now under the Covenant of Innocency alone.

2. But how all men keep or break their proper Conditions of this Law of Grace, as they are under it, he that knoweth every man in the World, and all their hearts and deeds can tell, but not I.

3. And no doubt but they are judged as they kept or kept not the Conditions of that Law of Grace which they were under. What difference there is, 1. Between the Conditions to the Chriſtian-Church now, and the Jewiſh of old. 2. And between the Conditions to the Jewiſh of old, and the reſt of the World, I have ſhewed partly, *Lib.* 1.

But becauſe many ſelf-wiſe perſons are bitterly cenſorious againſt me, or any man that ſpeaketh of any poſſibility of the Salvation of any, ſave *Jews* formerly and Chriſtians now: I beſeech the ſober but to think of this one thing, that *Abraham* thought there had been fifty righteous perſons in *Sodom*, even when God had told him how much worſe it was than other places. How many then proportionably did he think there was in *Canaan* and all other Countries of the World. By which *Abraham's* judgment about the Salvation of others is manifeſt, though he was miſtaken in thinking *Sodom* better than it was. And I deſire to be a Son of *Abraham*, and am not wiſer than he.

A. "*This ſeemeth plain truth, however the World take it: And it is a*
"*wonder to me that any good man ſhould take it ill to have ſo much of Gods*
"*certain Grace acknowledged. But what ſay you to the third point,* The
"neceſſity hence of ſinning.

B. I have anſwered it to you before: I now add, 1. It is not a *phyſical neceſſity* from the *principles* of Nature, but a *moral neceſſity* from the *pravity of Nature*. 2. It is not cauſed by God, but by ſinful man. 3. It is not a neceſſity of committing *all ſin*, or every particular ſin, nor of omitting *every duty*. 4. It is not an *uncurable neceſſity*. 5. God of his free Grace hath provided the remedy himſelf, and tendered it in ſome degrees to all. 6. And he appointeth to all men certain duties and means to be uſed to this end, which they can uſe. 7. Therefore it is no neceſſity of being damned.

What cold comfort the *Papiſts* give to Infants, and what inſufficient Grace they have that die unbaptized, they ſeriouſly declare. See *Bellarmin* 12. *q.* 111. 3. *Tom.* 7. *p.* 496.

A. "*This anſwereth the fourth Queſtion as to the Adult. But what remedy*
"*is there for Infants, eſpecially among Heathens and Unbelievers?*

B. The

B. The ſame that is for their Parents: They have no ſin but by their Parents, and God hath told us of no remedy, but that they be the Children of Believers dedicated to God. It is meet that their remedy come as their ſin did. They have no *Wills* of their own, but be at the will of others. They are in Infancy, as if they were members of their Parents: And as the Hand and Heart doth fare as the Head conducteth them, ſo may Infants here.

A. " *But it's ſad that all Infants ſhall be unſaved, if the Parents conſent* " *not.*

B. It is ſad that men deſtroy themſelves: And it is ſad that they corrupt their Infants. But what way elſe would you wiſh God to ſave them?

A. " *Certainly to ſave all dying in infancy.*

B. 1. And why not as well all at Age? 2. Then men would be tempted to think it the greateſt act of mercy in the World, to go with an Army and kill all the Children of Infidels and Heathens, certainly to ſave them.

A. " *So you may ſay by the Children of Believers then, if they be* " *ſaved.*

B. No: for they have holy Education, under Gods Promiſe, Ordinances and Bleſſing, and ſo are in great hope of being publickly ſerviceable to the Church, and alſo of attaining a greater degree of Glory. But it's an hundred to one but the Children of Heathens and Infidels, are bred up to be alſo ſuch themſelves.

The fifth Crimination.

A. " *They ſuppoſe that no man* can do any more *good than he doth, nor* " *forbear any more evil, than he forbeareth; Becauſe he is not only* predeſti- " nated *to do juſt what he doth, and no more or leſs, but alſo* predetermi- " ned phyſically in the practice, *ſo that he cannot poſſibly do more or leſs* " *than God predetermineth him to; And* 1. *Gods Decrees having fixed all* " *future events, all that man can do will not alter them:* Beverovicius " *may tire the World of Divines with his queſtion* de termino vitæ *before he* " *will ever get ſatisfaction, how Phyſick can prolong a predeſtinated term* " *of life. And* 2. *By this means God who ſet man upon a courſe of impoſſibilities* " *or vain means, with great and urgent exhortations, is made a diſſembler,* " *and his revealed Will and his ſecret ſuppoſed contradictory, and the latter* " *falſe: And how then can ſuch a God be believed?*

B. Theſe are but the bold effuſions of a miſunderſtanding contentious temerarious paſſion. Here are ſet together ſeveral things, which muſt diſtinctly be conſidered: I. Whether man can do no more good, and forbear no more evil than he doth? II. Whether means to lengthen life or ſave Souls be vain? III. Whether Gods ſecret and revealed Will be contrary, and the revealed falſe.

I. As to the firſt, this unhappy ſyllable [*CAN*] by its ambiguity is the cauſe of all our filly quarrels. 1. If by [*CAN*] you mean [a phyſical power or faculty] man can not only do more good than he doth, but he can *repent* and *believe* who doth not. 2. If you mean a moral power, that is, ſuch a degree of diſpoſition to good as may be excited, or ſuch an indiſpoſition as may be overcome as to the act, without any more ſupernatural Grace than he hath; ſo all men *can do*

* *Quod Reprobi non poſſit gratiam adipiſci, non eſt intelligendum ſecundum impoſſibilitatem abſolutam ſed conditionatam, quia reprobatio non ſubtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati: Idem dicendum eſt de predeſtinato quem ſalvari neceſſe eſt.* Carbo Thom. Compend. 1. q. 23. a. 3.

Bradwardine and ſome *Dominicans* are liable to this Objection, but ſo are few *Proteſtants*, and the Synod of *Dort* rejecteth it.

more good and leſs evil than they do. And therefore the Synod of *Dort* rejecteth your accuſation as a calumny. And men ſhould know their own minds beſt. 3. If by [*Cannot*] you mean only a logical impoſſibility that theſe two Propoſitions be both true [*Judas* will believe and be ſaved] or [*Herod* will not be eaten with Worms.] And [God decreeth that *Judas* ſhall not be ſaved] and [that *Herod* ſhall be eaten by Worms] I confeſs your charge; and ſay that *Arminius* ſaith the ſame upon the ſuppoſition of Gods fore-knowledge. And how are you concerned to prove God to be either *fallible* in his *fore-knowledge*, *falſe* in his *Predictions*, or *mutable* in his *Purpoſes*. By this rule all *Propheſies* take away mens power, and make it impoſſible to do the contrary. But you miſtake: For they aſſert mans power: He that *fore-knoweth* and *fore-telleth* that *Judas* will abuſe his power, and decreeth to damn him only for abuſing his power, doth imply that he hath ſuch power---. But ---*Ergo.*]

Aſid. Col. Quodl. 1. q. 2. Precibus ſanctorum poteſt juvari prædeſtinatio: Non tamen ſic, ut hæ Divinum propoſitum immutent: ſed quod eædem velut mediа illud ipſum propoſitum adimpleant mediantibus enim talibus orationibus, fit de nobis quod Deus diſpoſuit.---Si Divina prædeſtinatio dicat Divinum propoſitum in ſe acceptum, non juvatur precibus; quia nullum æternum juvatur per aliquod temporale: ſed ſi dicant divinum propoſitum, non abſolute, ſed ut impletur mediantibus cauſis in effectu, ſic prædeſtinatio juvatur precibus & operibus ſanctorum.

II. *Beverovicius* (and other mens) queſtion, *de utilitate mediorum* need no very learned Pens to determine it. He did well to make that learned and pious Lady *Maria Van Schurman* one of his *Caſuiſts*. What can be plainer, than that means are made moſt *neceſſary*, and alſo the *liberty* of our *Wills* in the uſe of *means*, when God doth make this *one Decree*; e. g. [*Peter* ſhall hear, believe, repent freely but certainly, and be ſaved.] [*Noah* ſhall make an Ark freely, but certainly, and be ſaved from the deluge.] [*Noah* ſhall plant a Vineyard, and water and dreſs it in due ſeaſon, freely but certainly, and it ſhall bear him fruit.] And [fore-ſeeing that *Judas* will freely betray his Lord, I will condemn him.] [Such a Sluggard will not plow and ſow, and therefore ſhall have no crop.] [Such a man will not uſe any meet remedy againſt his Diſeaſe, and ſhall die by it.] It's ſtrange that nothing can pleaſe you unleſs God be *ignorant*, or *mutable*, and over-rule not all the World.

III. I have made it plain, that there is no ſhew of contradiction between Gods *ſecret* and *revealed Will*. What contradiction is it to ſay, [*Judas*, I command thee do not murder thy ſelf,] and [I know that *Judas* will betray his Lord, and will diſpair, and do that which tendeth to his own murder, and for his ſin he ſhall be ſo ſelf-murdered]. Or [*Judas* will betray Chriſt, and ſhall be damned for it,] and [I forbid *Judas* to betray Chriſt.] Plainly, 1. About *puniſhment*, Gods revealed Will in his *Law*, ſpeaketh only *de jure* (*vel debito*) in forbidding it. 2. Gods revealed Will by Propheſie ſometime fore-telleth that this Law will not be kept; and Gods *Decree* is, that the puniſhment *eventually* be inflicted: ſo that one ſpeaketh only *de debito*, and the other *de eventu*. And about *ſin* it is but Gods *fore-knowledge de eventu*, and his *Law de debito*, that ſeem to you contradictory, without any reaſon.

But this belongeth to the firſt Articles, where you had enough of it before: And *mans true power to do more good, and forbear more evil than he doth*, is ſo far from being denied, that it is aſſerted in all, and your charge denied generally by the *Calviniſts*, unleſs perhaps by ſome raſh contentious Diſputer of a ſhallow brain, who cannot diſtinguiſh between *phyſical*, *moral*, and meer *logical impoſſibilities*. You may read the Synod of *Dorts* expreſs renunciation of it, that man can do no more good than he doth, nor forbear more evil: And do you know their judgment better than they know their own? And will you go on to charge them with that which they abhor?

THE

THE Sixth Days Conference OF *Natural Corruption and Impotency, and Free-will.* BETWEEN *B.* (the *Reconciler*) and (*C.* a *Calvinist.*)

B. We come now ſomewhat nearer the heart of the Controverſie: Try here your contending ſkill, Whether you can make this breach ſeem wider than you did the former, about *Predeſtination* and *Redemption.*

The firſt Crimination.

C. "*Some of them deny Original Sin, and ſo make man need no Savi-*
"*our to pardon it, no Sanctifier to cure it, no Means or Duty on our part*
"*for the cure, no true Baptiſm for Infants, no true Repentance for ſuch*
"*Sin*; *and ſo are true* Pelagians.

B. 1. Thoſe [*ſome*] I undertook not to prove of the ſame mind with you and me: But let us charge no more with it than we can prove guilty. That's nothing to all the reſt: The *Jeſuites* and *Lutherans* differ not from you herein as far as I can find, nor the generality of the *Arminians.* Thoſe that are chiefly charged with it, are *Arminius*, *Arnoldus*, *Corvinus*, *Epiſcopius*, and Biſhop *Jeremy Taylor*: *Arminius* expreſly owneth it: Theſ. privat. 31. n. 9, 10, 11. pag. 299. *Quoniam vero ratio fœderis a Deo cum hominibus primis mihi hæc fuit, ut ſi ipſi in favore Dei & Gratia,* *De modo & ratione*, many School-men and other *Papiſts* open it better than thoſe that lay all upon Gods meer Will. *Vigurius Inſtit. c.* 18. *v.* 11. maketh our meunberſhip of *Adam*, and natural derivation to be the reaſon of Imputation, as the act of the Hand is to the Man. So *Joan. a Bonon: Paxorm. de peccat. Orig. Non enim cenſetur quis facere quippiam in alio niſi quod alius faciat, facit & ipſe.* So *Contarenus*, ſo *Eſtius* truly in *Rom. c.* 5. 12. *Dicuntur omnes peccaſſe in* Adamo *tanquam in principio & radice, generis humani, quoniam in lumbis ejus erant quando peccavit*:] that is, ſeminally: All which, and many more ſuch, *Rivet* citeth, as concordant to us.

Chamier To. 3. *Pauſtr. l.* 1. *c.* 2. *ſect.* 9. proveth that *Bellarmine Peltanus, Delphinus, Cuſanus, Alvarez, Vaſquez*, &c. are of the ſame judgment with the *Proteſtants.*

See *Drelincourts Synopt. Controv. Art.* 64.

Sed quid tibi in mentem venit, ut Infantes ſola imputatione reos eſſe profiteariſ? Cum non modo in Adamo *dum peccarit omnes fuimus, a quo naturam noſtram accepimus, at ratione naturæ pluſquam imputatione Dei, peccaſſe merito dicamur in* Adamo, *ſed & conditionem miſere corruptam & vitiatam ab iis hauſimus*: Twiſ. Contr. Corvin. p. 269 c. 2. & ib. p. 343. *Certe peccatum Originis, ex primo Adæ peccato (ſed & ex noſtro quippe qui in eo peccavimus omnes) fluit.* Et p. 344. *At ſic* Adami *peccatum imputari poſteris—noſtri ad unum omnes negandum contendant,* (i. e. *mera imputatione*). *In* Adamo *peccavimus omnes tandem contagionem contraximus—Itaq;* Adami *peccatum nobis imputatur ſed non tantum imputatur, ſed & noſtrum fuit, hoc eſt naturæ noſtræ*, &c.—*Ita ſæpiſſime* Twiſſus *recte.*

And *Rivet* in his *Dictet. Syn. National. de Imputat. Primi peccat.* Adami, by expreſs citations proveth the concord of *Proteſtants* and *Papiſts* about the very Imputation of *Adam*'s ſin, and among the Concordant numbereth *Arminius*, *pag.* 87. As alſo *Baldwin, Brochmand, Dietericus, Hunnius, Index, Meiſner, Spangenbergius*, and other *Lutherans*: And *Gell. Suecanus*, the Anceſtor of *Arminius*: And of the *Papiſts*, as *Ægyd. Rom. Dion. Carthuſ. Gab. Biel, Caſet. Clarius, Tolet. Sathout, Joan. a Bonon. Paxorm. Contaren. Bellarm. Perrerius. Soto, Muſcus, Vigner. Eſtius, Betanus a Lapide, Catharinus*, &c. Beſides the concurrence of the *Auguſtane* and other Confeſſions: And though with the *Socinians* he cite the *Apol.* and *Corvinus* for the contrary, it is no more: And it is but this part of Original Sin, and not the Corruption that he citeth them as denying. And it is like that other mens ill expoſition of it, is that which they mean, or at leaſt which tempted them to it.

per

per præcepti iſtius & aliorum obſervationem permanerent, ad poſteros dona in illos collata tranſmitterentur, eadem gratia divina quæ illis obligat: ſi vero illi eorum ſe indignos facerent per inobedientiam, poſteri quoq; ipſorum iis carerent, & contrariis malis obnoxii eſſent: Hinc accidit ut omnes homines qui naturaliter ex ipſis propagandi fuerint, morti temporali & æternæ obnoxios evaſerint, & dono iſto ſpiritus ſancti ſive juſtitiæ originali vacui: quæ pœna privatio imaginis Dei & peccatum originale appellari ſolet. An vero præter carentiam juſtitiæ Originalis aliqua contraria qualitas conſtituenda ſit, tanquam peccati Originalis pars altera, diſquiri permittimus: Quamquam arbitramur vero ſimilius illam ſolam carentiam ipſum peccatum Originale eſſe, utpote quæ ſola ſufficiet ad quævis peccata actualia committenda & producenda.

C. " *Mark that he ſaith, but* peccatum Originale appellari ſolet.

B. 1. But he diſowneth it not. 2. He owneth the name in the next *Theſis*. 3. While he confeſſeth the *thing*, the *lis eſt tantum de nomine*, if he had denied the name.

Alſo in *Diſp. privat. Theſ.* 67. *de Baptiſ.* p. 334, 335. he is for Infants Baptiſm to waſh them in the blood of Chriſt, and give them the Holy Ghoſt. And he maketh this to be a waſhing from ſin. What elſe ſhould it be?

C. " *But he taketh it to be but* Privatio Juſtitiæ Originalis.

B. 1. He taketh it to be doubtful. 2. Remember that he calleth it not *Negatio*, but *Privatio*. 3. Almoſt all the School-men, and moſt or very many *Calviniſts* ſay the ſame (though I do not).

C. " *But in his* Articuli perpendendi in fine, lib. p. 780. col. 2. *he* " *ſaith, that* Peccatum Originis non eſt illud actuale peccatum quo *Adam* " legem de arbore ſcientiæ boni & mali tranſgreſſus eſt, & propter quod " nos omnes peccatores conſtituti ſumus & rei facti condemnationis & " mortis.

B. 1. Mark that he expreſly maketh us by *Adam*'s ſin to be *Peccatores & rei conſtituti*. 2. So in the next *Theſis*. *An peccatum Originis ſit tantum carentia juſtitiæ Originalis, & ſanctimoniæ primævæ, cum inclinatione ad peccandum, quæ & antea in homine fuit, licet non ita vehemens, æque & inordinata ut nunc eſt, propter amiſſum favorem Dei, maledictionem ejuſdem, & amiſſionem ejus boni, quo in ordinem redigebatur; An vero contrarius quidam habitus juſtitiæ & ſanctimoniæ infuſus (vel ingreſſus, acquiſitus) poſt peccatum perpetratum.* Dub. Here he confeſſeth alſo a poſitive Original Sin in the inordinateneſs of the ſenſual inclination. 3. When he denieth *Adam*'s Act to be our *Original*. 1. He denieth not (for no Chriſtian denieth it) to be the *Original Sin*, that is, the firſt ſin and the cauſe of ours. 2. And he ſeemeth but to mean that *Adam*'s *Sin* individually was not ours: which is moſt certain: For the ſame Accident cannot be in two diſtinct Subjects: If our perſons be not every one *Adam*'s perſon, it is impoſſible that the ſame individual ſin or guilt ſhould be his and ours, any more than the ſame individual Soul. If God did arbitrarily (meerly becauſe he would do it) impute *Adam*'s fact to all Mankind, and to every one perſonally, this would make it as many ſins as there be perſons; One mans Original Sin would not be anothers, and none of theirs the ſame *quoad formam numericam* with *Adam*'s. *Adams* is *Adams*, and yours is yours, and mine is mine. We cannot therefore be heretick men for ſuch doubtful forms of ſpeech, in which we differ among our ſelves.

The plain truth is, the matter is not ſo well opened commonly among us, as to allow us to condemn others till we have better done our own parts.

parts. My thoughts are these: 1. That we were *seminally* and *virtually* really in *Adam*; having the very essence of our Souls derived from him; not being in him only as the *House* is in the head of the *Architect*, but as an *essential form* is in the *generater*; though we call both, *esse in causa*. 2. That we were not *personally in Adam* (though *seminally*) that is, we were not *natural persons* in him, when he sinned. 3. God supposeth no man to have been what he was not, or *done what he did not*: For he erreth not. 4. God is not the Author of Sin: Therefore he doth not by arbitrary imputing of *Adam*'s act, and reputing us to have done what we did not, make all men Sinners, which *Adam* could not do. 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been *seminally* in *Adam*, and to have no Essence but what is really derived from his Essence: And as when a man is guilty, no part of him is innocent, *neq; semen neq; sanguis*, though they have not a distinct guilt, but *participative qua partes rei*; so we were Sinners in that act, and guilty of that act, so far as we were *partes Adami*, and in him. 6. This was not to be at that *time* guilty as *distinct persons*; for we were not such. 7. But we that were then only seminally inexistent, after became *real distinct persons*, and then that *guilt* even of *Adam*'s fact, adhering still to us, became *reatus personæ*, because the Subjects of it are *personæ*. Even as if *Eve* had been made after the Fall, of *Adam*'s Rib, that Rib at first was guilty, not by *another*, but the same *numerical guilt* that *Adam* was, as part of a Sinner: For it was a capable Subject of no more: But when that same Rib was made a *person*, it would be a guilty person; For it lost not the guilt by that change. But then it is not only or chiefly our Bodies which are from *Adam* (which are from the elements in our daily food) but our *Souls*. And therefore the adherence of the guilt to a *rational spirit essentially* flowing from anothers essence, is more easily understood and defended than that of the corporal Rib could be. 8. I do (contrary to excellent *Jos. Placeus*) suppose that *in primo instanti*, this our participation in *Adam*'s guilt is in order before our qualitative pravity: And that God doth therefore deny us his Spirit first, to make us originally holy, not only because *Adam*, but because we in *Adam* (as aforesaid) did forfeit and expel it. 9. I think that mens assertion of a *Decree* or *Covenant* of God, that if *Adam* fell, *any more* should be *imputed* to his Off-spring than they were thus *really guilty of* themselves, is the bold addition of mens invention, of greater audacity than the addition of Ceremonies to the Worship of God, which yet some are more sensible of. 10. I think that if *Adam* had not sinned that same first sin, but had sinned another sin the next hour, or day, or moneth, or year, or any time before Generation, it would have been equally ours, as this first was, because we were equally in him, and no Scripture-Covenant makes a difference. 11. I think that whereas *Adam*'s sin had twenty particular sins as parts of the whole, we were guilty of all, as well as of the first act or part; else we should not be guilty of his eating the forbidden fruit; for doubtless that was not the first: His incogitancy, and non-Nolition and sinful Volitions were before it. Yea I doubt not but we are guilty of all the sin that *Adam* committed, from his first sin till the making of the New-Covenant, at least. 12. I doubt not but if *Adam* had never sinned, yet (supposing the same Covenant to stand) if his Sons after him had sinned, we should have been guilty of it as we are of his sin: yea had it been but our neerest Parents. 13. I doubt not but that we are still so guilty of our nearer Parents Sins, further than as the introduction of the *new pardoning Covenant*, and the oft pardons by it,

and

and the incapacity of nature, to bear any more puniſhment, may make a difference. This is not a place voluminouſly to prove all this. But if any *Arminians* be tempted to ſpeak doubtingly of this Original Guilt, while they confeſs Original ſinful pravity, 1. Blame your own additions to Gods Covenant, and your obſcure writings of the thing; 2. And ſay not that they deny Original Sin, but expreſs the matter as it is. It ſeemeth that *Arminius* by *Peccatores & rei conſtituti ſumus* meaneth as we do.

C. " *I muſt confeſs your explication is rational and concilatory: But how* " *can you excuſe* Corvinus?

B. See but how he defendeth *Arminius* againſt *Tilenus*, as holding our Original Sin to be truly Sin, and a puniſhment for Sin, and you will think that he denieth it not himſelf: See alſo what *Twiſſe* ſuppoſeth him to grant, *Cont. Corvin. p.* 253, 254. Indeed he doth two much obſcure and extenuate the *formalem rationem peccati* in compariſon of the *ratio pœnæ* in it. But I much ſuſpect that there is much *Logomachie* in the controverſie, and that it is moſtly *de nomine peccati non de re.* For I perceive ſome of them conceive of *peccatum* as a word that hath only an *active ſignification* from *peccare:* And becauſe an Infant doth not *peccare actualiter*, therefore they ſay that Original Sin is not ſtrictly called *Peccatum*, meaning that the *Name* properly agreeth only to an *evil Act.* And can a Controverſie *de nomine* make a hereſie? Aſk them theſe Queſtions? 1. Whether an Infant be not *animal rationale liberum*, as having the ſame natural faculties with the Adult? 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Diſpoſitions? 3. And whether theſe are not *bonum & malum morale?* If he be not capable of *malum morale*, than neither of *bonum morale?* And if ſo, then not of *Holineſs*, nor any *moral* aptitude for Heaven, any more than a Beaſt. This they all deny: and therefore muſt needs ſay that their *vicious inclinations* are *malum morale*, adapting them not only phyſically for phyſical evil, but morally for puniſhment. And truly if they will call *Sin ſuch a moral evil*, I will not break communion with them about the ſenſe of *Peccare.*

C. " *But* Ameſius *tells* Grevinchovius, *that it may be proved by good* " *witneſſes that he denied Original Sin: which Dr.* Twiſſe *many times over* " *and over reciteth* contra Corvinum.

B. As the inſtance of three or four ſingle perſons is nothing to my buſineſs, ſo I am no judge of any ſuch Reports, unleſs I had heard the witneſſes my ſelf. I have had ſo many notorious lyes confidently reported of me by men not contemptible, that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accuſations, and judging before I hear the accuſed. Eſpecially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings, than by Back-biters Reports.

C. " *But* Epiſcopius *is no way to be excuſed, Nor Biſhop* Jer. Taylor, *who* " *copiouſly plead againſt Original Sin.*

B. Therefore they are not the perſons that I have now to do with; but have elſe-where as copiouſly proved Original Sin, and confuted ſuch Arguments as they uſe; But the chief of my Arguments they touch not.

The ſecond Crimination.

C. "*They ſay that man before regeneration* can *do that which is ſpiritu-*
"*ally good; and hath power to uſe his naturals well, ſo that by degrees he may*
"*thereby come up to a ſtate of ſaving Grace, or be fitted to be a Believer:*
"*And that ſome* can believe *and repent that do not. Whereas the Scripture*
"*maketh men* dead in ſin, and out of Chriſt we can do nothing.

B. This unhappy [*C. A N*] I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love; and pardon me if I tell you as I did them, that I doubt whether you underſtand well what it ſignifieth. Tell me,

Queſt. 1. Have not wicked men *natural life?* Or are they dead?

C. "*No man doubteth of that.*

B. *Queſt.* 2. Have they not *natural powers* or faculties for natural Acts?

C. "*Nor is that denied by any man.*

B. *Queſt.* 3. Is it not the ſame natural faculty of Intellection by which we underſtand and believe things *common* and ſpiritual? And the ſame natural faculty of *willing*, by which we love or will them both?

C. "*Nor is that queſtioned by any.*

B. *Queſt.* 4. Is there not ſuch a thing as common Grace, diſtinct from, and ſhort of true Regeneration or Sanctification?

C. "*Yes, we are all agreed of that.*

B. *Queſt.* 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World, that are not obliged by God to uſe ſome means towards their own Converſion, and to forbear their Sin?

C. "*No doubt of it, but they are obliged to perfect Obedience, and they*
"*are ſpecially obliged to repent, and uſe ſome means thereto.*

B. *Queſt.* 6. Is there not ſuch a thing in the World, as a *true power* to do ſomething that never is done, and forbear what is not forborn?

C. "*I know not what to ſay to that: An hypothetical power, and* ſecun-
"dum quid *ſo called there is: But of proper power I doubt.* Dr. Twiſſe *againſt*
"Hord, li. 1. p. 71. *ſaith,* [*Suppoſe all men had power to do any good:*
"*If God will not give them* velle quod poſſunt,---*is it poſſible that they*
"*ſhould* velle bonum, *if God will not work it in them.*]

B. It is a logical impoſſibility of conſequence (nothing to the purpoſe) which alſo fore-knowledge would infer: But as to real power, denominating the Object poſſible, it is a palpable contradiction, to ſay I have true power to do an impoſſible thing: when to ſay I have *power to do it*, and to ſay, it is poſſible to me, are all one. Elſe-where Dr. *Twiſſe* can ſay, that Gods *velle eventum* is not neceſſary *ad poſſibilitatem, ſed ad eventum.* Do you doubt whether *Adam* was *able* to have forborn the ſin, and ſo ſinned for want of *power* to do otherwiſe?

C. "*An obedientiall and paſſive power he had, and faculties that were*
"able hypothetically *if God had predetermined them by premotion and*
"*effectual Grace: But of the reſt I doubt.*

B. We will not be diverted with empty words: A dead man hath an *obediential paſſive* power (as the School mean it). An hypothetical or conditional power is no *power* when the condition is not exiſtent. If you ſay *Adam* could not but ſin, you make his ſtanding a natural impoſſibility, and God the cauſe of all his ſin, whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World: And will men then believe that God

hateth that ſin which he unreſiſtibly cauſeth, and ſent Chriſt to die for it? and will damn men for not doing natural impoſſibilities?

C. "*Well! ſuppoſe (as commonly we do) that* Adam *was able to have* "*ſtood? and conſequently that there is a true power in the World that's ne-* "*ver acted.*

B. Queſt. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth, and forbear more ſin?

C. "*No doubt, he can if he will; But the doubt is of his Will.*

B. Queſt. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to *will* the doing of more good, and forbearing more evil, than he ſo *willeth.*

C. "*His* Will *hath* natural power; *but it is contrarily diſpoſed.*

B. Queſt. 9. *Can* no man by Nature and common Grace, notwithſtanding the undiſpoſedneſs of his Will, yet ſo far reſtrain or prevail againſt his undiſpoſedneſs, as actually to *will* and *do* more good and leſs evil than he *willeth* and *doth.*

C. "*If* Adam *could have forborn all ſin, I muſt think common Grace* "*to be no Grace, if by it a man could forbear no ſin, nor do any good.*

B. Queſt. 10. Cannot every man deſire to be happy? and to eſcape Hell?

C. *Yes: For all do it in ſome ſort or other.*

B. Queſt. 11. Cannot ſome men without Holineſs, forbear Murder, Treaſon, Theft, Adultery, and paſs by a Tavern-door when they go in?

C. "*Yes; for we ſee many forbear ſuch ſins: and therefore more might* "*do it.*

B. Queſt. 12. Cannot ſuch a one go to a Sermon, and read good Books, when he goeth to a Tavern or a Play-houſe?

C. "Hobbes *will ſay* no, *who thinks that every Volotion is neceſſitated* "*as the motion of a Watch is by the Spring: but ſo will not I. He cannot* "*be willing to attend Gods Ordinances as the godly do; but he can* will *to* "*uſe them ſometimes in his manner.*

B. Queſt. 13. Cannot he by common Grace *underſtand* the meaning of the *words* heard or read, and remember them?

C. "*Yes; and be a famous Expoſiter and Preacher too.*

B. Queſt. 14. Cannot a man by common Grace know that he is a Sinner, and miſerable by ſin? and that he needeth Mercy and a Saviour?

C. *Yes; or elſe he could not deſpair with* Judas?

B. Queſt. 15. Cannot he think of his own ſinful and miſerable condition? yea and think how to get out of it and be ſaved?

C. "*Yes: diſpairing men cannot forget it: And a wicked Preacher, for* "*common ends, can force his thoughts, moſt of the year, to meditate on Gods* "*Word, and holy things.*

B. Queſt. 16. Can he not *wiſh* and *deſire* that he had *mercy* and a *Saviour*, and ſo *much* Grace as to keep him from Hell, and ſo make him happy when he muſt go hence? And can he not by ſome earneſt prayers ſpeak out theſe deſires?

C. "*Yes: All men have not ſaving Grace, that go but ſo far.*

B. Queſt. 17. Cannot a man by common Grace do all that which our Divines commonly ſay, an Hypocrite may do, or a half or almoſt-*Chriſtian?* ſuch as Mr. *Perkins*, *Bolton*, *Rogers*, *Hooker*, *Mead*, *Biſield*, and abundance more deſcribe.

C. "*Yes; they that have ſo much common Grace can go ſo far.*

Præcipitur nobis bene agere; non quod poſſimus ex nobis illud facere, ſed quia ſi faciamus totum quod in nobis eſt, ſemper Deus paratus ſit facere quod in ſe eſt. Ægid. Colum. Quodl. 1. qu. 30. p. 121, 122.

Noſtrum eſt enim ſecundum Damaſcenum ſequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem; vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam: unde Damaſ. l. 2. c. 30. *Ipſe eſt omnis boni principium & cauſa, & ſine ejus co-operatione & auxilio impoſſibile eſt bonum velle vel facere: In nobis autem eſt, vel permanere in virtute & ſequi Deum vocantem, vel recidere a virtute quod eſt fieri in malitia & ſe qui diabolum. Idem ibid.*

B. Queſt. 18. Are not the beſt of theſe men, by common Grace, more prepared for Converſion than ſome others?

C. "*Yes: elſe what good did that Grace do them? and why ſhould we* "*write* (*as Mr.* Hooker) *of the* Souls preparation for Chriſt? *and Chriſt* "*told one*, Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God.

B. Queſt. 19. Doth God command all theſe men to uſe the means of their full Converſion and Salvation utterly in vain?

C. *No: it is not in vain, if he bleſs them to whom he will.*

B. Queſt. 20. Laſtly, Then tell me, if you acknowledge all theſe [*CANS*] or *Powers*, what is the *power* which you deny?

C. "*A power to things* ſpiritually good.

B. Ambiguous words muſt not deſtroy Love and Churches. What mean you by [*Spiritual?*]

C. "*That which is done by Gods Spirit, to ſpiritual ends, and in a ſpiri-* "*tual manner.*

B. Here are three things: The Efficient, the End, the Manner. 1. Is not the Spirit of God the Author of common Grace?

C. "*Yes, that is not denied by any.*

B. 2. If by a *ſpiritual end* you mean, the foreſaid ſaving of the Soul from Hell, you confeſs common Grace may give it. If you mean loving and intending God above all, do not the *Arminians* ſay as well as you, that none but the Regenerate can do it?

C. "*I confeſs they do.*

B. 3. What mean you by a ſpiritual manner? If you mean it, of doing all from that love to God, and intention of that end, the anſwer is the ſame.

C. "*Man can do nothing of himſelf, without God.*

B. Did ever man in his wits think otherwiſe? Was it ever a controverſie, whether we have any power that is not both given and ſtill maintained by God? All the queſtion is, but *how* God giveth it? and not whether we have it without him. One thinketh that he giveth more by the way of *Nature* than others do: And another thinks that he giveth more by the way of *common Grace* than others do: Miſtake not your ſelf: you aſcribe no more to God, than any even *Pelagian* doth; but only he aſcribeth more to God by the way of natural conveyance than you do. I only except the *Dominican* Predeterminants, that aſcribe all mans circumſtantiated Volitions to God. Lay therefore the controverſie where it is.

C. "*But we can do nothing without Chriſt and Grace.*

B. I am more for that than you are. I doubt you think that we can do the works of *Nature* without Chriſt; For I find that many of you will not have ſo much as Magiſtracy to depend upon him derivatively. But all things are now delivered into his hands, and Nature is reprived and continued by ſome degree of Grace, that is, of Merey contrary to Merit. But tell me, do men do that *without Chriſt*, which they do by his common Grace?

C. "*The words ſignifie,* [*Joh.* 15. Out of me ye can do nothing.]

B. And do you differ about that? Do not you before confeſs how far men *out* of *Chriſt* as to regeneration may go? Come to the point, and tell me where you differ?

C. "*We differ here; that they think that God hath promiſed ſaving Grace* "*to men prepared by common Grace, and we ſay, No.*

B. Very good: Is all come but to this? Tell me what is this to the queſtion of mans *power* or impotency? This is only about Gods Word.

Quum actus ille fidei non ſit in poteſtate hominis naturalis, carnalis, animalis, peccatoris, tumq; nemo præſtare poſſit niſi per gratiam Dei, omnis autem Gratia Dei ſecundum voluntatem Dei adminiſtretur, & voluntatem quam apud ſe ab æterno habuit, &c. Armin. Diſp. Privat. Theſ. 41. Sect. 1. p. 309. Ægid. Colum. Quodlib. 2. qu. 29. pag. 121. *Cum bona habeant duplex eſſe, ſcil. Naturale & ſupernaturale: Dicendum eſt quod ſine gratia habituali poſſimus bona agere quoad eſſe naturale; non quod ſupernaturale: Secundum ſanctorum ſententiam etſi ſint Gratia poſſimus facere bona non tamen bene: nec mereri per illa,* &c.

Queſt. 1. Do you not believe that God hath made it the duty of all the Unregenerate, to deſire, and beg, and ſeek his ſpecial regenerating Grace? and uſe means to get it? and avoid impediments?

C. "*Yes: it is their* duty; *otherwiſe the omiſſion of it were not their* "*Sin.*

B. Queſt. 2. Hath God commanded them to do all this in vain?

C. "*I told you, that it is not in vain, if he convert but ſome few of* "*them.*

B. My queſtion was not, whether the *command* be in *vain*, but whether the *duty commanded* be in vain. And how doth *one mans* good uſe of common Grace, prepare *another man* for converſion, and not himſelf. It is *for himſelf* that God *commandeth* and earneſtly exhorteth men to be reconciled unto God. And is this in vain to themſelves if they do it? If they repent when commanded it is not in vain? If they uſe common Grace in ſeeking God, how prove you that it ſhall be in vain? If you ſay to your Servants, [Come and aſk me for your Food and Raiment when you want them], they would think that Command did not ſet them upon a vain aſking. If an able Phyſician that could cure a Diſeaſe at his pleaſure ſhould ſay, [Take this Medicine for the cure of your Diſeaſe] or [this preparative] it would be ſuppoſed not in vain. In this Command God is both *Rector* and *Benefactor*: As *Rector*, the right government of mankind is his end; which is not done by ſetting them on vain duty: As *Benefactor*, the good of his Creature is his end (as we may call it, under his Glory therein). And *vain duty* is an *evil*, and not a benefit to any. If the King ſent to you to come and aſk him for preferment, you would take it to ſignifie half a promiſe. Now Gods Promiſes are not ſtrictly Obligations, any further than the notification of his *Will*, and giving the ſubject a right, is an Obligation; where Gods Perfection is inſtead of an Obligation. And is ſuch a Command [Aſk, Seek, Accept,] no notification of his Will that our labour ſhall not be loſt? I do not call it a *Promiſe*: But is it not a ſignification that God the Rector and Benefactor of the World, will not let the performer loſe his labour.

He that readeth the Doctrine of the greater part of the *Papiſts*, of ſupernaturality, and infuſion of Charity or Grace, will have little reaſon to ſay that they bring them too much into the power of man: eſpecially the *Dominicans*. Doth not *Alvarez* ſet Grace far enough out of mans power, when he ſaith, *li.* 7. *diſp.* 69. *p.* 306. *c.* 1. *Impoſſibile eſt quod Gratia habitualis ſit connaturalis alicui ſubſtantiæ creatæ vel creabili: Ergo etiam eſt impoſſibile quod Charitas, vel ejus actus, ſit ei connaturalis, aut ex ſolis viribus naturæ procedens. Prob. antecedens, Quia contra rationem Gratiæ eſt quod ſit debita naturæ; ex eo enim gratia dicitur, quia gratis datur & non ex debito*—. And is not a mans *Being* and *Nature* given him *gratis & non ex debito*? Indeed had he defined Grace to be *quod datur contra meritum*, the contradiction in the terms would have allowed this game at words to be true: But words it is, and to no purpoſe, or elſe I cannot excuſe it from blaſphemy, to ſay that God is not able to make an Angel or any Creature in whom the habits of Grace or Love ſhall be connatural? *Proclians* hold on the contrary, that ſome degree of habitual Love was connatural to *Adam* and the Angels, though not as eſſential to their Natures, and ſo unloſable: And that Love is now called ſupernatural, becauſe medicinal ſupernatural Grace muſt reſtore it to corrupted Nature. *Rada* the *Scotiſt*, *Cont.* 1. ſpeaks better of ſupernaturality: For my part, that which I fear in theſe high ſtrains of ſupernaturality, in theſe *Papiſts* Doctrine, and Sir *Henry Vane's* is, leſt it ſhould produce Infidelity and Saduceiſm; And he that to day holdeth that the Love to God is ſo exceeding far ſupernatural to perfect Nature it ſelf, may to morrow hold that mans Species is changed by Grace; And the next day that it is more credible that mans Nature was never made to love God, or to be glorified, than to believe that God will either make him of another Species, or give him another Nature, beſides the perfecting of the Nature created: Yea that God cannot make a Creature that ſhall naturally love his Maker.

C. "*He loſeth not his labour if he get by it but temporal mercies, and an* "*abatement of his pains in Hell.*

B. Do you thus paraphraſe Gods Command, [Seek for Grace, and thou ſhalt have Health or Riches; or ſeek for Converſion and Salvation, and thou ſhalt have an eaſier Damnation.] This is ſtill a duty that's vain as to the *commanded End.*

C. "*I confeſs it were not in vain if they could do it as he commandeth:* "*for God commandeth them to do it in* faith, *and ſpiritual* ſincerity, *which* "*they cannot do.*

B. Do you thus paraphraſe the Command, [Seek Faith in Faith, and ſeek Sincerity in Sincerity] that is [You that have not *Faith* and *ſincerity*, if you have them already, ſeek that you may have them.] Did not you confeſs that they that have not ſpecial Grace are bound to ſeek it in the uſe of certain means?

C. "*They are bound to do it, but they are not able.*

B. Did not you confeſs that they were able by common Grace to do the works of common Grace? and that in abundance of inſtances? What is common Grace for, if they can do nothing by it?

C. "*It is equal to nothing, for it is not acceptable to God.*

B. Did not you confeſs that it is a *preparation* to ſpecial *Grace*, and may bring them nearer to the Kingdom of God?

C. "*But without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God.*

B. But there are ſeveral ſorts of Faith, and ſeveral degrees of pleaſing God. We grant that without *ſpecial Faith* it is impoſſible ſo to pleaſe God, as to have Juſtification, Adoption, or any Title to Heaven, as the members of Chriſt have. But by a *common Faith* men come to be leſs diſpleaſing to God than groſſer Infidels and Rebels; and are more prepared for converting Grace. You know that this is the common Doctrine both of our *practical* and *polemical* Divines, as you may ſee in their Books, and the Synod of *Dort*.

C. "*But our Divines againſt the* Arminians *oft ſay, That a man that hath* "*but* nature *and* common Grace, *cannot uſe them well.*

B. I am reſolved not to be cheated by ambiguous words. To uſe them well ſignifieth, 1. To uſe them in love to God as the Ultimate End, and ſo none but the godly uſe any thing: And do not all the *Arminians* grant you that? 2. Or it is to uſe them ſo much better than worſer men, as that they draw nearer God, and are more prepared for ſpecial Grace? And do not all our Divines grant that they may ſo far uſe them well? where then is the difference?

C. "*The prayer of the Wicked is abomination to the Lord.*

B. By [*wicked*] is meant, either one that is yet unregenerate as ſuch, or one that is actually ſet upon wickedneſs, progreſſively, and is not about returning to God. And by [*abomination*] is meant, either that which God accepteth not ſo far as to pardon and ſave him that doth it, though he judge him more prepared for Grace than others; or elſe that which he totally abhorreth as being no preparation to his Grace. A man that is unregenerate may ſo far ſeek mercy in a returning degree yet ſhort of ſaving Grace, as that it ſhall not be in vain. Even an *Ahab* had experience of this; And ſo had *Nineve* and many others: And why elſe do you ſtill confeſs a ſtate of preparatory Grace? Is Gods preparatory Grace *abominable* to him? Doth Chriſt give abominable Grace? or is preparation to Converſion an abominable thing? 2. But the Text ſpeaketh of a *wicked* man as *wicked*: He that goeth on in a wicked life, and thinketh by *Sacrifice* and *Prayers* to pacifie God, and make him amends, his *Sacrifice* and *Prayers* are abominable. But wicked men may have ſomewhat in them that is better than wickedneſs: They may have ſuch a *belief that God is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him*; yea ſuch a Faith in Jeſus Chriſt, as ſhall move them to that ſort of repentance and reformation as that they ſhall be *almoſt* true Chriſtians, and not far from the Kingdom of God. And the wicked man that doth this, doth it not *as wicked*, but by common Grace. And though it be ſo far abominable as not to prove him juſtified, it is not ſo far abominable as to be all in vain.

C.

C. " *But when you have ſaid all, yet they have no Promiſe.*

B. 1. You know, I ſuppoſe, how hard it is to underſtand certainly many Texts of Scripture, whether they be Promiſes to ſuch or not! Matth. 7. 8. *Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that ſeeketh findeth,* &c. Lam. 3. 25. *The Lord is good to the Soul that ſeeketh him.* Amos 5. 4. *Seek me, and ye ſhall live.* Luke 11. 13. *God will give the holy Spirit to them that ask him,* &c. I only ſay that there is difficulty in theſe and ſuch other Texts. 2. But you confeſs that God hath formerly made Promiſes of Church-Priviledges, and of temporal things to unſanctified men: Therefore if he did make a Promiſe of further helps of Grace, to them that well uſe former helps, it were no more incongruous. And 3. Truly I underſtand not what it is that moveth ſome men to be ſo much againſt ſuch a conception, that God ſhould make any Promiſe of further Mercy, to the obedient uſe of former Mercy, when it is ſo agreeable to his Rectorſhip and Bounty, and to the common intereſt of Mankind. 4. But yet I aſſert no ſuch Promiſe: All that I plead for is, that you will ſtate the difference aright as it is, and not miſreport it, as if it were greater.

C. " *How is it that you would have it ſtated?*

B. 1. You are all agreed, that by *Nature* man *can do natural actions*; and by *common Grace*, he can do the *actions of common Grace*; and by *ſpecial Grace*, he can do the acts of ſpecial Grace. Are you not all agreed of this much?

C. " *Yes, this cannot be denied.*

B. 2. And you are agreed that the *acts* of *common Grace* are ſuch as conſiſt in a *commanded ſeeking* of, or *preparing* for ſpecial Grace.

C. " *Yes, that alſo is agreed on.*

B. 3. And you are agreed, that the *beſt ſtate of common Grace* is in the *nature* of the thing, certainly and always, a ſtate of preparation or greater moral aptitude for ſpecial Grace, whether it certainly follow or not.

C. " *Yes, that is not denied neither.*

B. The difference then is but this. One Party ſaith, That [" God " hath ſignified certainly his Will, to give ſpecial Grace to them that " ſo ſeek it by common Grace, as to come up to the higheſt degree of " preparation: And that this ſignification of his Will is a Promiſe]. " The other Party ſaith, [That God by commanding ſuch to ſeek his " ſpecial Grace, and beſeeching and exhorting them thereto, and giving " them abundant means and helps, doth ſignifie his Will, that they ſhall " not labour in vain if they do it: and giveth them ſo much encourage- " ment and hope, as that none hath cauſe of remiſsneſs by diſpair, but " all are unexcuſable that ſhall neglect ſuch means and hopes. But " that this is not a proper Promiſe, becauſe it giveth them not a " right.]

C. " *You have truly ſtated the difference: And I confeſs that if I were* " *comforting an afflicted Conſcience ready to diſpair, I ſhould tell ſuch, that* " *a Command to ſeek Mercy, implyeth a certainty that he that ſo ſeeketh it* " *ſhall find it; And if we could but ſay to men, as the people to the blind* " *man,* Behold he calleth thee, *It would be near to a promiſe that he will* " *heal them.*

B. But forget not that all this is but your anticipation of the Controverſies about Grace, or Gods Promiſes, and is no part of the Controverſie about mans *power* or corruption.

C.

C. "*But there is a further difference yet. For they ſay, That* mans "Will hath power to reſiſt the Grace of God, and fruſtrate it, which elſe "would be effectual, if man did not overcome it.

B. You have brought the Controverſie now to a ſtrange kind of *power*, and further confirm me that this empty [*CAN*] is the ſum of the Controverſie, which is nothing but a ſound. This which you call *power* is nothing but *natural power* as morally *corrupt* and *impotent*. If it be *non-agendo*, that you mean they *can* reſiſt, as by *not-believing*, not *loving God*, &c. What *power* is neceſſary to it? Is it an act of *power*, not to *love God?* Next ſay, that a dead man hath *power* not to live, and a dumb man hath power to be ſilent; and a blind man is able not to ſee. If it be *agendo* that you mean that they *reſiſt*, the act as an act *in genere* is an act of that natural power which God himſelf giveth, upholdeth, and by univerſal concurſe acteth: and ſo far it is no reſiſtance. But as that act hath the *prohibited Object*, rather than another, ſo it is *ſin:* And your meaning is that they ſay, *Man can ſin.* And indeed is this the Controverſie? Have you been blaming the *Arminians*, advancing mans natural Power and Will, and now do you become the advancers of it? Who advanceth or praiſeth man more? He that ſaith, *He can ſin?* Or he that ſaith, *He cannot ſin?* Even now you pleaded, *that men cannot believe*, and will you now plead, that they *cannot chooſe but believe?* Is it a *power to ſin*, that you accuſe them for aſſerting?

C. "*They cannot* believe *without ſpecial* Grace: *But they cannot chooſe* "*but believe if they have it.*

B. It's true: Becauſe it is not that which we call ſpecial Grace, if it cauſe them not to believe: And ſo it were a contradiction to ſay, That *they have Faith, and they have not Faith.* But this [*cannot chooſe*] is not an impotency [for to believe is an act of *power*]: But it is meerly the name of a logical impoſſibility that theſe two ſhould conſiſt, [He believeth and he believeth not.] He that by Grace believeth, hath that *natural power* which of it ſelf is able not to believe (if you will call it *ability*): But it is *power determined to believe*; and ſo Faith is become neceſſary, when a man hath it *neceſſitate exiſtentiæ.* But the aſſerting *power to ſin*, and to be an *Unbeliever*, I will never charge on the *Arminians*, when I would blame them for advancing man.

C. "*But it is a power to overcome Gods Grace, which they aſſert.*

B. Read but Dr. *Twiſſe* his judgment of *Reſiſtance*, and you will call it no more an *overcoming*; any otherwiſe than a weight overcometh my ſtrength, which I can lift up, and will not. But I tell you, I will not be cheated with ambiguous words. 1. Either you mean an *active* or *paſſive* overcoming. 2. And either you mean an overcoming of Gods utmoſt exerted *Power* by a greater *Power*; or you mean an *overcoming* of Gods *Will*, and his *Power* exerted with an abſolute *Will* of efficiency; or you mean the non-efficiency or non-prevalency of ſuch an Act of God, as cometh without any Decree or abſolute Will of prevailing, but with a Will of leaving the ſucceſs to mans free Will: (as in *Adam's* caſe.)

1. Speaking improperly, you may ſay that all men that are not ſoftened, convinced, converted by the means which God thereto appointeth, overcome God, in that they overcome the *means.*

2. Thus in not-repenting, not-believing, not-loving, *&c.* the *leſs power* any man hath, the more he *paſſively* overcometh: (as a hard ſtone overcometh the Hammer that breaketh it not.)

3. No

3. No *Arminian* holdeth that man is *ſtronger* than God, and overcometh his Power by a greater Power: Out of *Bedlam* none have ſuch thoughts that are awake.

4. None of them think that any Act of Gods Power is overcome, or is unſucceſsful, which is exerciſed with his abſolute Will or Decree of prevailing, or of the effect.

5. But they think that in ſome caſes, yea ordinarily *Gods Will* is freely to exert no more of his *power* towards the cauſing of a commanded act, than what ſhall give man a *power* to obey, with ſome aſſiſting motives, and leave the ſucceſs or effect to his free Will. That God doth ſo ſometimes, is proved by the caſe of *Adam*. Now whether you will call this overcoming or not, and whether you will ſay, *Adam* overcame Gods Grace, or Gods Grace overcame not *Adam's* Will, is but a Logomachy. The thing in queſtion, is nothing but *ſinning* againſt that degree of Grace, which enabled man to have done better. But all this belongeth to the controverſie of *Grace*, and not of *mans power*: unleſs you think ſin a powerful honourable act.

C. "*At leaſt in this they over-value mans power, in that they hold, That* "mans Will hath power to determine the influx of God, *and ſo man ſhall* "*rule his Maker: when Gods influx or premotion ſhall but leave it to the* "*Will of man, what ſhall be the ſucceſs.*

B. This toucheth phyſical predetermination; and needeth no other anſwer than is oft given. 1. You wrong them: They hold not all (properly) that mans Will *determineth* Gods Will, either as to the *eſſence* of the Divine Will, or as to the Act, connoting the meer Object: But only that it can determine of a *common effect*, which *Gods and mans Free-Will* would produce if both concur. 2. They do not think that mans Will hath any the leaſt operation cauſally on Gods Will in it ſelf; but only that variations are made by variety of recipient diſpoſitions, where the influx of the Agent is univerſal and equal: And ſo that mans receptive indiſpoſition may be a cauſe that Gods Influx work not the ſame effect on him which it would do on a diſpoſed ſubject. 3. And they ſay not this of Gods abſolute Will and Power, but of his *power* operating reſtrainedly by his own free Will; when he will exert no more, than what ſhall be ſucceſsful only on a free concurring and diſpoſed Subject, and not on a reſiſting undiſpoſed one.

It pleaſeth God that the Sun ſhall operate but with a common Operation, variable in the effects, by the various diſpoſition of Recipients. The Flowers ſpring and are ſweet, and Weeds ſtink, Trees grow, and Stones grow not; humanity is acted by it in men, and not in Fruits. God could have made the Influx of this Sun to have been *cauſa ſpecialis*, and to have turned a Weed into a Roſe, or a Stone into a Tree, if he had pleaſed: but he doth not. Now will you ſay that we are erroneous, and over magnifie the recipient, if we ſay that *its diſpoſition* is the cauſe of much of this diverſity? and that the ſtone is ſtronger than the Sun and overcometh it? No: the Sun did all that was properly intended: Its beams came down on the Stone, as well as on the Animals and Plants. It warmed it, though it did not quicken it. So God doth his work on the Will of Sinners: His Influx is terminated on their Will, and had he ſent it with a reſolution to convert him, it ſhould have done it. But ſeeing he ſent it limitedly, only to *enable* a man to *Will*, and to concur ſo far as ſhall prevail, if he do what his own Will is able to do by ſelf-excitation, its no overcoming God, if the man ſin. Once more, I ſay, that men that fear God ſhould be very cautelous what they ſay in all

Con-

Controverſies which are reſolved into the nature of Divine Volitions, and their way of efficiency; Seeing, 1. Will in God is not the ſame thing as in man; an Appetite. 2. Its own determination, and the way of its determining us are confeſſed by the ſubtileſt to be utterly unſearchable: Saith *Vaſquez* (in Thom. q. 19. diſp. 80. p. 503.) *Quo autem pacto Deus ſeipſum determinet ad hoc potius quam ad illud, ineffabile ſane eſt; niſi quod noſtro modo intelligendi intelligimus eſſentiam Dei, quæ eſt ejus voluntas, habere circa futura peculiarem rationem voluntatis cum reſpectu illo rationis: Et ideo dixi, in hac controverſia intelligi poſſe certa ratiocinatione Quid non ſit: Quid tamen ſit, & quo pacto voluntas determinetur, explicari non poſſe:* So that what Gods Act of *willing* or *working* is, beſides his *eſſence* and the *effect*, they all confeſs that they are ignorant. And yet ſhall the more ignorant contend?

The third Crimination.

C. "*They hold free-will to good: that unregenate men have free-will* "*without Gods ſpecial Grace; and regenerate men have free-will to do good* "*and forbear evil, even when Grace effecteth not the event.*

B. This is an Engliſh Objection. What men that write in *Greek* or *Latin* deny *Free-will?* Did not all the ancient Fathers and *Churches* hold it till *Auguſtine's* time, of whom we have any notice? And are you coming to turn Chriſt's Body into a Hereſie, or the members of an Harlot by your charge? Did not *Auguſtine*, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius* hold it? Who denied it for above a thouſand or thirteen hundred years after Chriſt? And do you deny all free-will your ſelf?

C. "*No; but it is* free-will *to* ſpiritual good.

B. What need I tire you with the ſame things again. 1. Read but what I ſaid to *A.* of Free-will. 2. And ſee the Table of it in the Second Book. 3. And peruſe what I have juſt now ſaid of the *power* of the Will, and you will ſee that here is no more neceſſary. Make not *new words* to ſeem a new Controverſie. Put but *Liberty* for *Power*, and and the anſwer to the laſt *Crimination* ſerveth to this.

C. "*The tenth Article of the Church of* England *ſaith*, [*The condition* "*of man, after the Fall of Adam, is ſuch, that he cannot turn and pre-* "*pare himſelf by his own natural ſtrength and good works, to Faith and* "*calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleaſant* "*and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Chriſt preventing* "*us, that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that* "*good Will.*

B. I had rather you dealt plainly, and kept cloſe to the word of God, and evidence of Truth, than ſeek ſhelter from the words of thoſe in power. But what *Jeſuite* or *Arminian* will not ſubſcribe to this? Who doubteth of it? How oft do they all maintain the neceſſity of this preventing and co-operating Grace? But by the words [*no Power*] you muſt not underſtand no natural power or faculty, but no *moral power:* For 1. Elſe man is no man. 2. It is a moral Subject which they ſpeak of, and muſt accordingly be underſtood.

But what *Free-will* is it that you deny? Tell me what you mean by Free-will?

C. "*If you know what* Will *is, and what* Free *is, you need no expoſition:* "*the words are plain enough of themſelves.*

Auſtin li. 1. de Gen. Contr. Manich. c. 3. profeſſeth, That all men may believe if they will; and juſtifieth it in his *Retractations*: But if the Will of man be corrupt and averſe from believing, we juſtly ſay, ſuch a man cannot believe, yet this is an impotency, moral only, which is to be diſtinguiſhed from impotency natural. For notwithſtanding this, it may be truly ſaid, that all men may believe if they will: And herein conſiſts the natural Liberty of the Will: The moral Liberty conſiſteth rather in a ſanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of Sin and Satan, *&c.* But I never find that *Arminians* do diſtinguiſh theſe. *Twiſſ againſt Hoord. li. p.*

B. Thus do men ſtrive about words that profit not, to ſubvert the hearers, and increaſe to more ungodlineſs. Anſwer me theſe Queſtions.

Queſt. 1. Hath not the Will more than a Liberty Political, or by Gods Law to forbear ſin, and to do all good? Doth God forbid it?

C. "*No; he commandeth it, which is more than leave or licence.*

B. Queſt. 2. Do you think that the Will is forced? Is it not a contradiction to Will unwillingly *eodem reſpectu?*

C. "*Yes: we all hold freedom from compulſion.*

B. Queſt. 3. Is not mans Will a ſelf-determining faculty or principle naturally; ſo as to be *Domina ſuorum actuum* under God?

C. "*Yes, under God; the underſtanding directing it.*

B. Queſt. 4. Hath not the Will power and liberty to chooſe evil, or to ſin, without Gods predetermining premotion?

C. "*I dare not deny it, though many do.*

B. Queſt. 5. Hath not the Will a certain command over the inferior faculties reſpectively, and can move or not move them?

C. "*Yes: ſuppoſing it moved accordingly it ſelf.*

B. Queſt. 6. Can Angels or Devils neceſſitate the Will by any efficient predetermining premotion?

C. "*No: I think not; for its commonly thought ſo.*

B. Queſt. 7. Can any man by force or flattery neceſſitate another man to will any thing evil or good efficiently?

C. "*No: They may ſtrongly tempt, but not neceſſitate.*

B. Queſt. 8. Can meer *Objects* as ſuch neceſſitate the VVill to a comparative act, that is, to chooſe this rather than that, (*de mediis*)?

C. "*To good they cannot; but I doubt of it as to* evil, *whether Objects* "*do not neceſſitate ſome men, ſo that they cannot forbear.*

B. Who made theſe Objects, and cauſeth their nature and exiſtence?

C. *God made all things: Meat, Drink, Pulchritude, Money,* &c.

B. Doth God then *neceſſitate men efficiently* to Sin by Objects.

C. "*I ſay not ſo: For Objects are not efficient.*

B. True; as Objects they are not: Therefore they effect not: Therefore they do not neceſſitate properly, which is an efficiency: Indeed they are but *cauſæ quaſi materiales actus in ſpecie ſeu individuo*, and conſtitute it, and no act is *without* its Object: But they effect it not.

C. "*Doth not the Sun effect our ſight by its light?*

B. Yes: but not as a meer *Object*, for ſo it only terminateth and conſtituteth it as the matter: But it cauſeth it efficiently as an *Agent.*

C. "*Well! I will ſuppoſe that ſo far as a wicked man is neceſſitated to* "*ſin, it is his* pravity *that doth it* circa objectum (ut ſine quo non) *and* "*not the Object it ſelf efficiently and in proper ſpeech.*

The Opinion of *Ægidius Romanus*, how the Will is actuated & determined I will ſet down, though not wholly approving it, *Quodlib.* 3. *qu.* 15. *p.* 177, 178. *A fine, & ab eo quod apprehenditur ſub omni ratione boni, voluntas Allivatur & Neceſſitatur. Ab his autem quæ ſunt ad finem & ab his quæ non apprehenduntur ſub ratione omni boni, poteſt Actuari, ſed non neceſſitari: A nullo autem poteſt violentari.--Ad finem nec allivando nec determinando ſemovet: Ad ea autem quæ ſunt ad finem, facta in actu per finem poteſt ſe determinare, ſed non allivare: Quantum ergo ad actuationem nihil ſeipſum ſecundum ſeipſum movere poteſt: aliter idem ſecundum idem eſſet actus & potentia.—— Nunquam voluntas per ſe & directe actuat ſeipſum: ſed bonum apprehenſum eſt quod cauſat Volitionem in voluntate: & quod actuat eam.--Sed ſuper hujuſmodi Volitiunt voluntas habet dominium quia in poteſtate voluntatis eſt ſiſtere vel non ſiſtere in tali Volitione.—Libera eſt quia cum intellectus offert ei, e. g fornicationem ſub utraq; ratione, ſub mala & ſub bona oportet quod utraq; conſideratio ſit Volita: Quamdiu enim ſtat in utraq; tamdiu vult de utraq; conſiderare determinat autem ſe hoc modo: Quia eſt domina ſui actus poteſt totaliter deſiſtere a conſideratione unius, & totaliter inſiſtere in conſideratione alterius: Vel poteſt non totaliter deſiſtere ab uno, nec totaliter intendere aliud: ſed magis eſſe intenta ad unum quam ad aliud. Si autem totaliter deſiſtat velit conſiderare de inordinatione, vel notabiliter ſit attenta ad conſiderandum de delectatione, modicum autem attendat ad inordinationem, tunc fornicatio ſic apprehenſa allivabit eam & cauſabit in ea volitionem*] So that he thinketh that the free omiſſion of the Wills command of neceſſary thoughts is the beginning of Sin: But what he ſaith of the Wills being actuated *per finem & non per ſeipſam* needeth better explication. Objects actuate but morally, that is, are occaſions, and *quaſi materia diſpoſita ad actus terminationem*; but it is the faculty or form that actuateth by proper vital agency

Et poſtea Qu. 16. pag. 183. *Etſi entitas effectus reducatur in entitatem cauſæ, non tamen defectus reducitur in defectum ejuſdem cauſæ. Non deficit cauſa, ſed effectus ille deficit a cauſa. Etſi non ſit voluntas in actu niſi prius ſit in actu intellectus, non ſequitur quod non poſſit voluntas deficere niſi prius deficiat intellectus: Abſq; enim eo quod intellectus mala proponat voluntati, poteſt ſe voluntas determinare male---viz. ſi ſit intenta circa delectationem, non circa inordinationem.*

B.

B. Queſt. 9. Is the Will efficiently neceſſitated by the ſenſes or phantaſie?

C. *No otherwiſe than as by the Objects which they do preſent?*

B. Queſt. 10. Is it ſo neceſſitated by the Paſſions?

C. "*I know not whether I may ſay the* Paſſions *do it, or its own pravity,* "*when the paſſions do diſturb and tempt it.*

B. Queſt. 11. Is it ſo neceſſitated by the Intellect?

C. "*So* Camero *and ſeveral others thought, and conſequently by the* "*Objects: But I have many reaſons againſt that Opinion* quoad media, *in* "*comparate elections. But the Intellect may neceſſitate it* circa finem; "2. *And* quoad media, in ſpecificatione, etſi non quoad exercitium "actus.

B. 1. *Quoad finem*, it is not the *Intellect* that neceſſitateth, but the *natural inclination* of the *Will*; Intellection is but a previous *act ſine quo non.* 2. Where there is no *exercitium actus*, there is no *ſpecification.* Therefore you can only ſay, *Non ſpecificatur ſine ductu intellectus*; but the Will can prevent that *ductum intellectus*, if not ſuſpend its act alſo after it.

Queſt. 12. Can any one but God, by force, impreſs ill habits on the Will.

C. "*No: we were miſerable if any could make us wicked.*

B. Queſt. 13. Will God ever make any ſuch evil habits in the Will.

C. "*As a* habit *he may cauſe it, but not as* evil.

B. Queſt. 14. Do you think that a Sinner is *neceſſitated* to every ſin that he committeth, or to every Duty which he omitteth, ſo that he could not do otherwiſe?

C. "*I think he is under a neceſſity of ſinning: but I cannot ſay it of every ſin which he committeth.*

B. You before granted many things to be in the *power* of the *Will*: And can you deny that *power* to be free, that the ſame things are in its liberty: I will tire you no more; but deſire you, 1. To peruſe all your former conceſſions about mans *power.* And 2. To peruſe all the twenty Conceſſions of *A. Confer.* 5. *Criminat.* 1. where he denieth Free-will in all thoſe ſenſes, and then tell me, where is the difference?

C. "*They think that our* freedom *is inconſiſtent with* neceſſity; *but* "*ſo do not we, who think that Decree and Predetermination do neceſſi-* "*tate.*

B. I have forced you before to confeſs your concord here. A Logical *neceſſitas conſequentiæ in ordine probationis*, *Arminius* and almoſt all men confeſs doth reſult from meer *preſcience.* And Dr. *Twiſſe* profeſſeth, that neither the *Proteſtants* or the School-men hold any other neceſſity to reſult from Decree or Predetermination.

C. "*But the pravity of the wicked neceſſitateth their Wills to evil.*

B. 1. Not to all evil: For 1. Men commit not all: 2. And you before confeſſed, that men can do more good and leſs evil than they do. 2. The truth is, as I diſtinguiſhed *power* before into Phyſical and Moral, ſo muſt we do *Liberty* and *Neceſsity.* The Will hath its phyſical Liberty, and is free from *phyſical neceſsitation*, in all the ſin that men commit, and in all the good they do (I think) though not from all Divine predetermining neceſſitation to good: Men do not good and evil as Bruits do their acts. But the *Will* hath a kind of moral neceſſity of doing evil, by radicated habits, and hath no further moral *Liberty*, than it is freed from the *power* of thoſe evil inclinations. But theſe habits neceſſitate not phyſically, but morally, and that only to *ſome ſin*, but not to

all. A man can act contrary to a good or evil habit, as common experience proveth. But becauſe mens Volitions and Actions are *ordinarily* or much agreeable to their fixed inclining habits, therefore we uſe to ſay that morally ſuch *can* do no better; meaning that they will not.

C. "*But ſure you would not have me believe that there is no difference* "*betwein us and the* Arminians *in the point of Free-Will?*

B. If there be any, either you know it, and can name it your ſelf, or you know it not, and then may be aſhamed to contend about it. *Queſt.* 1. Tell me plainly, Is not all the Liberty which you deny a moral *Liberty a malo*, from *ſinful diſpoſitions* of the Soul?

C. "*There is much diſpute about Liberty from Divine predetermination;* "*But I will not meddle any further with that. I never contended againſt* "*any* Free-will, *but* freedom *from ſinful habits, as ſuppoſed to be in men* "*more than it is.*

B. *Queſt.* 2. Do you not hold then that all men have Free-will ſo far as they have effectual Grace, and Sanctification.

C. "*Yes, in that degree: For* voluntas per gratiam liberata eſt li- "bera.

B. *Queſt.* 3. Do the *Arminians* hold that the VVills of the graceleſs and unſanctified are freed from *ſinful habits?* and ſo are *morally free* to holy acts.

C. *No, I confeſs they do not:* Corvinus *and others oft ſay, that it is* "*Grace that giveth us the* vires credendi *which we had not before; But ſome* "*of them deny any habits to be in the Will: But theſe ſay the Underſtanding* "*muſt be enlightned before we are able to chooſe aright.*

B. *Queſt.* 4. Doth not *common Grace* give men a *moral Liberty* to *common good*, from all neceſſitating inclinations to the contrary?

C. *I granted it before as to* Power, *and therefore muſt as to Liberty.*

B. Where then is the difference between you?

C. "*I take it to be here, that the* Arminians *and* Jeſuites *ſay that the* "Wills *of the Unregenerate are not only free to common preparatory good* "*acts, but to the* ſpecial acts of Faith and true Repentance *and Conver-* "*ſion unto God, which we deny.*

B. Either you mean this of *all unregenerate men*, or but of ſome: 1. Of all they ſay it not: For the Synod of *Dort* chargeth them but with ſaying that men can uſe their naturals, ſo as by degrees to come up to Faith. They commonly hold, that ordinarily the Will muſt be prepared by commoner Grace, before it (morally) *can* believe, though ſuch are freely Unbelievers, having a natural liberty or power to the contrary, though undiſpoſed, and have a moral power and liberty to ſome preparatory acts. 2. But if you mean it of thoſe that are come up to the higheſt preparatory acts, and alſo have Gods Grace *ad poſſe credere*, where there is the *poſſe morale*, there is *moral Liberty* ſo far. But whether this be really any mans caſe, or how many, to *have Grace to enable them to believe* who yet never *do* believe, is a Controverſie which I find not *Proteſtants* apt to meddle with; And it is too hard for us to decide.

C. "*That is the very heart of the Controverſie, whether ever God* "*give immediate Power and Liberty to believe to any one, who never believeth* "*and uſeth it.*

B. Where do you find this Controverſie much meddled with, unleſs by the School-men, who aſſert ſufficient uneffectual Grace to believe? But this belongeth to the next Article (of Grace) though here you anticipate it. But if this muſt be it, I ſhall briefly diſpatch it. 1. *Adam's*

inſtance

inſtance hath already made you confeſs, that ſuch a thing there hath been, as Grace *ad poſſe & non ad agere*, called *ſufficient* but uneffectual Grace? And your confeſſion of all the foreſaid *powers* that men have by common Grace (to do more good and forbear more evil than they do) yieldeth that yet ſuch a *ſort* of ſufficient Grace *ad aliquid* there is.

2. The courſe of Gods Adminiſtrations, maketh it ſeem moſt probable, that ſome and many have ſuch a meer ſufficient Grace to believe and repent: For if *Adam* had ſuch a Grace enabling him to have fulfilled the whole Law of Innocency, it ſeemeth proportionable that the Rector of the World give *ſome* ſuch a Grace to fulfil the mediate Law of believing and repenting, who uſe it not.

3. It's common with Dr. *Twiſſe* to cite *Auguſtine* with approbation as ſaying, *Poſſe credere eſt omnium, credere vero fidelium*, and to make this the great difference of *effectual* Grace from that which is more common, that it giveth not only the *Poſſe velle & credere*, but the Act.

4. But yet becauſe we can know no more of Gods ſecret workings than he diſcovereth, I take it to be dark and dubious: But that this is certain, that whoever wanteth the *power* or liberty of Will (moral) to repent and believe, they are penally denied it, for not uſing that *power* and *liberty* which they had, to inferior preparatory Acts. And you can carry this Controverſie of Free-will no further.

And is it not then a horrid ſhame, to hear honeſt people ſo ſeduced into Love-killing factious ſidings by their Teachers, as that Boys and Women ſpeak of wiſer and better perſons with diſaffection and reproach, ſaying, O he is a *Free-willer*, or he *holdeth Free-will*, when they know not what they talk of: but are made believe that it is ſome monſtrous impious Opinion, making a man almoſt an Heretick? VVhen even you that lead them are unable to ſhew me any proved (at leaſt conſiderable) difference at all.

C. *Are there ſo many Books written* de libero arbitrio *between* Jeſuites "*and* Arminians, *and us, and yet is there no difference?*

B. 1. I do not ſay that no man that ever wrote of it, hath wrangled himſelf into any words of ill ſignification, or taking up any more than is defenſible. 2. But if the main Controverſie be not Logomachy, why do not you tell me what the real difference is? It is not fair-dealing to make me ridicuous for calling to you to name the difference, and yet your ſelf refuſe to name it, and make it good. VVill you aſſert what you know not, and accuſe men without proof?

The fourth Crimination.

C. "*They hold that the Unregenerate are not dead in ſin, and void of all* "*ſpiritual good.* *

B. Do you think that they differ from you herein? This was ſpoken to before. 1. They hold that the Unregenerate have natural life, and ſo do you. 2. They hold that their faculties are *bonum naturale*, and ſo do you. 3. They hold that *common Grace* is *bonum morale*, at leaſt Analogically ſo called, and ſo do you. Indeed as *bonum* is *ex cauſis integris* none on Earth is morally good, no nor doth any thing that is *bonum morale*, becauſe it is imperfect; and ſo our defective holineſs is not *bonum morale* in that ſenſe: But as *good* is ſo called from the *predominant Will*, the godly have *bonum morale*: And as it is denominated from

* Of this read *Melanthon*'s Anſwer to all their Objections, *in Loc. com. de liber. arb. c.* 7. and *Strigelius* on him.

from that which is *not predominant*, yet real in the VVill, the Unregenerate in their common Grace have *bonum morale*. For *common Grace* is not meerly *quid physicum*, nor meerly sin. 4. *De nomine*, whether we shall call this *spiritual good* or not, when we have a Grammar written from Heaven, or by Apostles, we shall have more mind to dispute with you. But I told you once already, that 1. As to the efficient, it is *spiritual*, that is, common Grace is wrought by Gods Spirit. 2. As to the end slightly and uneffectually wished it is spiritual; But as to the truest end (the pleasing and glorifying of God) predominantly and effectually willed and intended, it is not spiritual. 3. Nor as to the manner, if the exercise of such an intention be called the manner. Tell not men that we differ, because you can bring forth ambiguous words, and there dream of a difference; but plainly tell me, Are not you and they thus far agreed? and is not this all that's in your charge?

The fifth Crimination.

C. "*They hold that* man *is not meerly* passive *in his first Conversion to* "*God, which is contrary to us and to the Truth.*

B. VVhen will the Lord give his Ministers as much skill to heal, as to wound? to find out real concord as to make differences in their Dreams and Fictions? Do you think indeed that you differ in this point? *

C. "*Or else I must think that we may be ashamed to shew our faces to the* "*people, if we make them believe that we differ when we do not, and there-* "*by stir up their distast of others.*

B. The question may have three several senses of passiveness, as man is considered, 1. In his Nature. 2. In his Action. And therein, 1. In the reception of the Divine Influx. 2. In the acting thereupon. And so the questions are, 1. VVhether mans Soul be an active nature, or passive matter only? 2. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in the reception of the Divine Influx *ad agendum?* 3. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in its own first act of Faith or Repentance? Tell me, Are not these three distinct questions? And are they not all that you can devise? (unless you will make another, whether we are merly passive in the preparatory part?) And are you not now ashamed to confess that you need any answer to any one of these three questions.

I. All the world is agreed save the *Hobbists*, and *Somatists*, and *Sadducees*, that mans Soul is not meer *passive nature*, but is an *active nature*, inclined to Action, as passive Elements are to non-action: And that when God moveth it, he moveth not Earth, Water or Air, but a Spirit, whose nature is self-moving (as fire) under the first mover.

II. All the world is agreed, that the Soul and all Spirits are not, so purely and meerly active as God is, but are partly and first passive; and that they do and needs must be receptive of the Divine Influx before they can act: For all Creatures depend on the first Cause, and both *Being*, *Nature* and *Action* would cease, if Gods emanation to it ceased. And all the world agreeth, that no man before Conversion or after doth any act of Faith, Love, *&c.* no nor eating, and drinking, and going *&c.* but he is in the first instant *passive* as influenced by God, before he is active. Who ever doubted whether *physice recipere* be *pati?* Did you ever know such a man?

III.

* The *Jesuites* with the other School-men commonly distinguish with *Augustine* the Grace which *sine nobis in nobis operatur*, from that which after *cum nobis operatur*; The first they call *Operantem*, the second *Co-operantem*: The first preventing, the second con-comitant; the first infused, the second governing; the first exciting, the second Adjuvant: Of which see *Vasquez in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *disp.* 88. *c.* 9, *&c.* Alvar. l. 12. disp. 116. p. 473. *In omni libero arbitrio creato, qua ratione creatum est, reperitur aliqua indifferentia seu potentia passiva secundum aliquam rationem. Nam* 1. *Lib. arb. creatum non est purus actus, nec lib. per essentiam ut Deus*——. 2. *Ex sua natura est peccabile*—— 3. *Non est implicite primum se movens, sed movet se libere, motum tamen a Deo prius rationc.* Here a *Jesuite*, *Vasqu.* 1. *Tho. disp.* 12. *n.* 4 *Prima gratia non datur bene laborantibus, neq; expectantibus, neq; quarentibus ut definitur*, Concil. Arausic. 2. Can. 4. 5. & 6. *sed sedentibus in tenebris & umbra mortis.*

III. All the world is agreed, that man is not *meerly passive* when he *acteth.* An Act is an Act sure! And to *believe, repent* and *love* is an Act, and an act of mans Soul. And *Scotus* who thinketh that immanent *Acts* are qualities (as we think of habits) yet thinketh that the Soul is truly active antecedently to that quality. Where now is there any room for a Controversie?

C. "*You would make me believe that we are very ignorant Wranglers,* "*that make a noise in our dream, and will not suffer others to rest! Do not* "*the* Arminians *say, that man concurreth with God to the first act of his own* "*Faith? yea that he maketh Gods Grace effectual.*

B. You shall not again tempt me to anticipate the question of *effectual Grace,* though enough is said before to it as far as this Objection is concerned in it. Gods Influx on the Soul is one thing: mans natural faculty receiving that Influx passively is another: And mans Act is another. To thrust in here a general word [*man concurreth*] and so to run away from clear and necessary distinction, is not the part of a man of knowledge. Did ever man yet deny that man herein concurreth as aforesaid? 1. Man concurreth not to make his Soul, nor to continue it in being or power. 2. Man concurreth not as any efficient of Gods Influx on his Soul *ad agendum.* 3. But man receptively or passively concurreth as a Receiver of that Influx. 4. And man actively thereupon concurreth to believe and repent. Is not all this true?

But you would tempt the *Arminians* to say, that it is you and not they that are herein to be accused? For what mean you else, by confining the Controversie to the first act of Faith, or to our first Conversion? Would you make men believe, that a converted man is not as truly passive in believing, loving God, *&c.* as the unconverted is? Must not the holiest person be passive in receiving the Divine Influx on his Soul, before he do any holy Act? You seem to deny this? and then you are the person that err, by ascribing too much to man. If not, shew the difference.

C. "*There is a* habit of Faith *goeth before the first Act: And it is in* "*respect to that habit that the* Arminians *say we are active procurers of it;* "*which we deny. But the godly operate from a habit.*

B. You speak a private Opinion of your own brain, against the sense of the Concordant Churches. Where doth Scripture say, that a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act? Mr. *Pemble* * saith so indeed: yet he sometime calleth that but a *Seed,* which at other times he calleth a habit. Dr. *Ames* in his *Medulla* contradicteth it. Bishop *Downame* * hath written a large Confutation of Mr. *Pemble.* The generality of *Protestant* Divines contradict it, and thus (with *Rollock de Vocat.*) distinguish Vocation from Sanctification, that they suppose Vocation to cause the first act of Faith and Repentance, and Sanctification to give us the fixed habit, the act intervening. Mr. *Tho. Hooker* is large upon it, in his *Souls Vocation.* Will you start one mans Opinion, which *Calvinists* and *Arminians* are against, and feign this to be a difference between *Calvinists* and *Arminians?* And perhaps Mr. *Pemble* himself, by his first *semen* or *habit,* meaneth no more, than the Divine Influx *ad actum* received. I have before told you how unsearchable the nature of that Influx is, and how hard it is to know the true nature of an Habit.

C. "*But Mr.* Pemble *saith, It is the* Spirit *that is given before we* "*believe.*

B. Away

* *Vind. Grat.*

* In the end of his Treatise *Of Perseverance.* *Le Blanc. de diff. Grat. 2. Thes.* 22. speaking of our being passive as to operating Grace, saith truly, [*Non videtur hac in parte Reformati a fautoribus inter Scholasticos dissentire, licet aliis verbis mentem suam exprimant*] The School-men and *Protestants* little differ in the method of operations of Grace, and all are drawn by Controversies too near curiosity, beyond their reach.

B. Away with Ambiguity. By the *Spirit* is meant either the meer received Influx of the Spirit *ad agendum*; and ſo it is granted: Bad men receive the Spirits Influx to ſuch acts as he moveth them to. Or elſe you mean, the foreſaid fixed *Habits* and Diſpoſitions, to a ready and facile ordinary Operation. Or elſe you mean, the Spirit given relatively by Covenant, undertaking to be the Sanctifier and Preſerver of the Soul. In both theſe latter ſenſes, the Spirit is not given before the firſt act of Faith, to Infidels. They have not the fixed habits of Holineſs, Love, Hope, Obedience, *&c.* Otherwiſe they were holy Infidels. No Scripture ſpeaketh it: nay contrarily it promiſeth the Spirit as to Believers, and affirmeth it given after Faith, *Eph.* 1. 13. *Joh.* 14. 17. *&* 15. 26. *Gal.* 3. 14. *&* 4. 6. *Joh.* 7. 39. And that the Holy Ghoſt is not given in Covenant to Infidels I need not prove, to them that will not baptize Infidels.

The ſixth Crimination.

* Yes, *Vaſqu.* and other *Jeſuites* hold, that Infants that have no remedy, are excluded from Glory only for Original Sin.

C. "*They hold that none are damned only for* Adam's *ſin imputed.* *

B. And I think ſo do all Chriſtians, or ſhould do. 1. Of all the Adult there is no queſtion. Is there any that hath no ſin of his own? Or doth God forgive all their own ſin to the damned? And as to Infants, 1. Wiſe men ſhould not vex Gods Church with matters no more revealed. 2. All the Scripture maketh them members, as it were, of their nearer Parents as well as of *Adam*, and as I have proved to you, threatneth them for nearer Parents ſins (even in the Second Commandment, and *Exod.* 34.) as well as for *Adam's*. And all the world being, *Gen.* 3. 15. brought under a Covenant or Law of Grace, which conditionally pardoneth all ſin, the not-believing of the Parent, is the cauſe of the non-liberation or not-pardoning of himſelf and his Infant. How can you ſay then that they ſuffer only for *Adam's* ſin? 3. And ſure their natural pollution is their *own ſin:* And the Church of *England*, *Art.* 9. thus deſcribeth Original Sin: ["Original Sin ſtandeth not in "the following of *Adam* (as the *Pelagians* do vainly talk) but it is the "fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is "ingendred of the Off-ſpring of *Adam*, whereby man is very far gone "from Original Righteouſneſs, and is of his own nature inclined to "evil: So that the Fleſh luſteth always contrary to the Spirit: and "therefore in every perſon born into this world, it deſerveth Gods "Wrath and Damnation. And this infection of Nature doth remain, "yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the luſt of the Fleſh, cal-"led in Greek φρόνημα σαρκὸς, which ſome do expound, the Wiſdom, ſome "Senſuality, ſome the Affection, ſome the Deſire of the Fleſh, is not "ſubject to the Law of God.] (Though I think that Text, *Rom.* 8. ſpeak not of the Regenerate.)

C. "*I include this* Corruption *when I ſpeak of* Adam's *ſin imputed;* "*And though the Article mention not this Imputation, I ſuppoſe it was but* "*through forgetfulneſs, and not that they denied it, as no part of Ori-*"*ginal Sin.*

B.

B. * I have nothing to do with that, and am no judge of other mens thoughts that are dead. All that I desire you to observe is, that all understanding *Protestants* agree, that the *sole Law of Innocency* [*Obey perfectly and live*] is not the Law that God governeth the World, or any in it, by, since the Covenant of Grace was made, but all are under a *Law of Mercy:* And therefore Parents and Children, in and out of the Church, are judged by *that Law* which they were *under*, and not by the Law of Innocency alone, without any remedying Law of Mercy.

* *Vid. Chamier Paustr. at To. 3. l. 1. c. 2, 7, 8. Contr Pigh. & Salmeron. & Pet. Mart. in* Rom. 5. *& Placæum in Thes. Salmuriens. Vol. 1. & in Tractat. peccat. defens. de Imputat. peccati Adæ*: who are less for the imput. of *Adam*'s sin than others, *e contra vid.* And *Rivet*'s enumeration of Writers for that imputation, *Defens. Concil.* &c.

A

S THE

THE Seventh Days Conference

Between *A.* and *B.*

Of SUFFICIENT *and* EFFECTUAL GRACE.

A. "*You have made us hitherto believe that the Controverſies about* "*Predeſtination and Redemption, are all reſolved into thoſe of* "Free-will *and* Grace, *and if there be no difference here, there can* "*be none there. Let us now then come to the core of the Controverſie, which* "*is all.*

The firſt Crimination.

"1. *The* Calviniſts *deny* ſufficient Grace, * *and ſo make all men that* "*are damned to ſuffer for meer Impoſſibilities, having no Grace to enable* "*them to eſcape Sin or Miſery; And conſequently that* Adam's *ſin only* "*was avoidable, for which all the World is caſt into a neceſſity of ſinning,* "*and none but a few elect ones have ever had ſo much as the poſſibility* "*of any true remedy. Yea many of them deny that* Adam *himſelf had ſuffi-* "*cient Grace.*

B. 1. The word [*Sufficient*] is ſometimes taken, for *all that is any way needful*, and ſo it is that they commonly deny *ſufficiency* of uneffectual Grace. More Grace might have certainly produced the Effect. A man is commonly ſaid to have *enough* who needeth no more. Now more is here uſeful, needful, deſirable to the *facilitating* and *aſcertaining* the event. If you are not agreed with them in this, why do you *pray* for more Grace, and *labour* for more, and take it to be a ſign of ſincerity to deſire more. For if the Regenerate have not *Grace enough*, ſurely the Unregenerate have not.

2. But in this Controverſie the *Dominicans* and *Jeſuites*, by *ſufficient*, mean that which giveth the *poſſe agere*, that is, ſo much as is of abſolute *neceſſity to the act, without which it cannot be done, and with which alone it can or may be done.* And in this ſenſe the *Proteſtants* generally, and the Synod of *Dort* particularly deny not that there is ſuch a thing

* By *ſufficient Grace* is meant that by which a man *may* be ſaved, and without which he cannot, in *q. Vaſqu. in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *diſp.* 97. *c.* 1.

1. Some ſay that to ſome men for former ſin, God penally denieth Grace ſufficient for Faith and Repentance: So *Toſtat. in Mal. q.* 12. *Greg. Armin.* 1. *d.* 46. *qu. unica Cajet. in Joh. c.* 19. *Roffenſ. Contr. Luther. ar.* 26. *Tapper. in art.* 7. *pag.* 254. *Henric. quodl.* 8. *q.* 5.

2. Others ſay, that *auxilium ſufficiens* is offered to all, and denied to no man in this life, how obdurate ſoever, which *Vaſq. in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *d.* 98. *c.* 3. ſaith is the commoner Opinion of the Schools: *Ita Adrian. in* 4. *q.* 1. *de pœnit. Sotus de nat. & gra. c.* 18. *Driedo de Red. c.* 3. & 5. *Vega in Conc. Trid. l.* 13. *c.* 13, &c.

But *Vaſquez* ſaith, *cap.* 5. That *ad pœnitentiam & ad fidem*, it is *non omnibus momentis, ſed certis temporibus datum.* They commonly agree to *Auguſtines* words, though none know juſt how God changeth Wills, *Certum eſt nos velle cum volumus ſed ille facit ut velimus bonum.*—*Et certum eſt nos facere cum facimus, ſed ille facit ut faciamus, præbendo vires efficaciſſimas*—De Grat. & lib. arb. l. c. 16. & c. 17. *ut velimus ſine nobis operatur.* Theſe words put his Expoſitors hard to it. And *Vaſquez* ſaith, That *ut* is here put *finally*, and the meaning is that to make us willing, he giveth us (without us) his preventing or operating Grace, or as *Greg.* his impulſe: And if it mean any more it cannot be true: For doubtleſs man is the Agent or Willer when he willeth.

So *li.* 1. *ad Simplician. q.* 2. *Aliter Deus præſtat ut velimus, aliter præſtat quod voluerimus. ut velimus enim & ſuum eſſe voluit & noſtrum: Suum vocando, noſtrum ſequendo quod autem voluerimus ſolus præſtat; id eſt, poſſe bene agere & ſemper beate vivere,* where the words alſo are obſcure: but *Vaſquez* noteth, that here the [*ut*] is not final as before; and that [*Voluerimus*] is not preterperfect tenſe, but the future tenſe: as the following words explain it: elſe he ſhould contradict himſelf.

Et de Eccleſ. dogm. c. 21. *Manet ad quærendam ſalutem arbitrii libertas; ſed admonente prius Deo, & invitante ad ſalutem, ut vel eligat, vel ſequatur: Et initium ſalutis noſtræ Deo miſerante habemus: ut acquieſcamus ſaluti-feræ inſpirationi noſtræ poteſtatis eſt.*

as *ſufficient Grace.* I have oft told you, that 1. They confeſs it in the inſtance of *Adam.* 2. They confeſs it in the caſe of common Grace, enabling men to common preparatory duty, which many are *able* to do, and do not; as I have evinced before in many inſtances, and the Synod, and ſpecially the *Britiſh* and *Breme* Divines aſſert. 3. And as to the point of *Faith it ſelf*, whether any unregenerate man have ſufficient Grace to believe, which is not effectual, I find few medling much with it. 4. But they commonly (I think) agree, that all *regenerate* men themſelves have *ſufficient Grace* for many an act of Faith, Love, Obedience which they never do. Is it not one of the Opinions which at *Dort* and frequently theſe Divines reject, as falſly imputed to them, that a *man can do no more good, and forbear no more evil than he doth?* And if he *can do more*, he hath *power* to do more: And *power to act*, is that which is called *ſufficient Grace.*

Therefore I need not trouble you any more with this Controverſie, ſeeing under both the *notions* of *Power* and *Liberty*, it is decided, and confeſſed by you to be ſo before.

Remember that all *ſufficient Grace* is *effectual*; but not *effectual* to the *act*: It doth *efficere potentiam*, *enableth* men to act: but doth not *cauſe* the act it ſelf, unleſs it be *efficax ad actum*, as well as *ad potentiam.* How ordinarily do they *profeſs the poſſibility* of doing more than is done, by *godly* and *ungodly*, and that all the *power* that men have is not reduced into act. Yea when ſome aſſert Predetermination it ſelf, they ſay that it doth not deſtroy *Liberty* or *Power ad contrarium*, but only determine it.

A. "*It is bad enough that they deny all* ſufficient Grace *to believe that it* "*not effectual, though not to other acts,*

B. You wrong them: They do not ſo: Have I not told you now, that they commonly grant that even the godly themſelves have *ſufficient Grace* to *believe*, which is not effectual as to many an act of Faith? And as to Unbelievers, 1. They ſay that all have not Grace ſufficient or neceſſary to believe: And ſo ſay the *Arminians.* 2. But whether *any* one have or no, who believe not, they rather leave it to the Searcher of hearts as an unknown thing to them, than deny it. But they ſeem to infer that it is moſt likely to be ſo, in that, 1. It is ſo with the godly themſelves. 2. And with all other men, as to other acts of common Grace. And they all agree (as I ſaid before) that no man is denied power to believe ſavingly, but for not uſing as he could his antecedent commoner Grace. And I think neither Party knoweth more than this, and in this both are agreed. And he that will aſſert his uncertain Conjectures, and then pretend that this is a Church-Controverſie, is the *maker* but not the *ender* of *Controverſies.*

A. "*Some of them ſtick not to ſay that* Adam *himſelf had not Grace* "*ſufficient to ſtand, or forbear ſinning: and if ſo, then there is none* "*ſuch.*

B. We have nothing to do with any odd perſons words. Who is it that never ſpeaketh amiſs? I confeſs Dr. *Twiſſe*, *Vind. Grat. l. 1. par. 3. de Reprob. ſect. 2. pag. (Vol. minor)* 306. ſaith, *Gratiam ad peccatum vitandum neceſſariam duplicem eſſe dicimus; aliam ad poſſe vitare peccatum; aliam ad pecatum actu vitandum: illa eſt Gratia Regenerationis----Altera non in eſt homini per modum habitus, ſed per modum paſſionis; & eſt motio quædam gratioſa in voluntatem influens, & ad omnem ſanctam actionem extimulans.---* And ſo one or two ſay that *Adam* had Grace neceſſary *ad poſſe ſtare, non autem ad actum.* But this is but a few mens odd

Opinion, contrary to plain truth. I mean, If by *neceſſary ad actum* be meant in the proper School-ſenſe (not all that is conducible to aſcertain it, but) that *ſine quo eſſe non poteſt*, it is a contradiction to ſay that *men have the power to Act*, and yet want that which is neceſſary to the Act, that is, that without which they *cannot* Act. It is plainly, [*They Can*] and [*They Cannot*] (For we talk not *de potentia paſſiva* which a Stone, Tree, or a Beaſt, or a mad Man have). This diſtinguiſhing of things that differ not, muſt be detected, as well as confuſion avoided. To ſay a man can *believe*, or hath *power* to believe, and yet wants that without which he *cannot believe*, is palpable contradiction.

And where he maketh Regeneration to give the *poſſe*, before the Act, he ſpeaketh obſcurely or unſoundly. Gods active Influx on the *Will*, exciting it to Act, is (at leaſt) part of his Regenerating Grace. A man is not Regenerate before he ever actually believed or repented; though he firſt receive the Divine Influx *ad agendum*: Nor can he prove that any proper habit goeth before the firſt act. And whether it do or not, moſt certainly the *nature*, *faculty*, and the *habit*, and all together, is truly and *formally* no *power ad hoc*, to believe or love God, or do any good, without Gods neceſſary Influx, Concurſe or exciting Grace: No more than a Plant hath a power to fructifie without the Sun or Earth: Of Gods help *ad bene eſſe* we ſpeak not: But to ſay that Gods *exciting Grace* is *neceſſary ad actum*, without which the Act cannot be, and yet that we have a *power* to do that Act without that Grace, is ſtill a contradiction. This is *potentia hypothetica & æquivoca*, a term fit to play with: But it is true *power*, where nothing of abſolute neceſſity *ſine quo non eſſe poteſt* is wanting, which our Divines do commonly confeſs that *Adam* had, and that all men good and bad have to more good than they do. Therefore I find not that you are in that diſagreed.

And Dr. *Twiſſe*, as I told you, oft and vehemently profeſſeth, *Vindic. Grat. de Amiſ. Grat. Cont. Bellar. pag. (Vol. Minor)* 230. *c.* 2. & 232. that man hath no neceſſity of ſinning *ex decreto*, but logical *conſequentia*: But if it were true that we wanted that Grace which is abſolutely neceſſary to *avoid ſin*, it muſt needs follow that ſuch are under an abſolute preſent neceſſity *conſequentis* alſo of *ſinning*; as much as of *dying*, when God ceaſeth to continue life. And if he mean that the Decree neceſſitateth not ſin, but the *denying of neceſſary Grace* doth, he ſhould have ſaid ſo.

Andr. Rivet Diſput. 7. *de Grat. Univerſ. p.* 113. ſaith, [*Sed non quemadmodum Pontificii & alii qui eorum ſententiam vel ſequuntur vel interpolant, nobis imponunt, ita ut plane negemus* ſufficientis Gratiæ *phraſin poſſe uſurpari, aut dicamus nullam eſſe ſufficientem ullo modo, quæ efficax non ſit, vel nullam eſſe efficacem quæ ad converſionem & ſalutem non ſit efficax---Id tantum dicimus, non dari omnibus talem* Gratiam ſufficientem, *quæ ita moveat omnium hominum voluntates, ut ſit in poteſtate electionis motioni aut obtemperare, aut refragari: adeoq; nullum eſſe qui per talem gratiam non poſſit ad ſalutem pervenire, Deumq; id velle omnibus & intendere.*] You ſee that he will own no more, but the denial of a univerſal ſufficient Grace for Salvation, intended of God, to all men. And you your ſelves confeſs, 1. That God intendeth not Salvation for all men, unleſs conditionally, if they believe and repent, which from eternity he knew before he made them, that they would not. 2. And that *all men* have not *ſufficient Grace* to Salvation, no nor to believe, but only

only to make them better, and bring them nearer it, and prepare them for it; (which some call Grace *mediately sufficient* to Salvation; but that's an improper Speech, as long as for want of their Obedience, they never attain to much that is *absolutely necessary.*)

For my part I doubt not to assert, 1. That *no man in the World hath Grace sufficient for Salvation*, that is, *Glorification*, an hour before he dieth: For he *cannot be saved* without *more*; that is, without the Grace of perseverance to the end. But every believing Penitent hath Grace sufficient and effectual to give him a *present Right to Salvation.* And 2. I add, that there is no such thing as *Grace sufficient to Salvation* which is *not effectual*, and doth not save. Seeing all that persevere in holiness are saved; and they that do not, have not Grace sufficient (that is, necessary) to Salvation. 3. And I add, that no man hath Grace *sufficient* to give him a *Right to Christ*, and *Pardon* and *Salvation*, which is not *effectual*, and doth not procure it. For every penitent true Believer hath that Right to Christ, Pardon and Life: And he that is not a penitent Believer, hath not Grace sufficient to obtain that Right.

A. "*Yes, if he have* sufficient *to help him to believe.*

B. Not so: unless he *actually believe*: For is not *Faith in act*, somewhat more than *power to believe?* When you confess that men are damned that have the Power, but not that have the Act.

A. "*Yes; but man causeth the Act oft, when God hath given only the* "*Power, and necessary concurse to the production of the Act.*

B. *Corvinus* and others of you ordinarily confess, that *Faith* it self is the Gift of God, and that *Faith* is more than a *power* to believe. And we denominate Gods Grace by the various effects: Therefore I may say that a man that hath *Grace sufficient to believe*, yet hath not *Grace sufficient to Justification*, till he have, 1. The Grace of *Faith.* 2. And so the Grace of the *moral donation* of the Covenant, which is the justifying, pardoning Instrument.

A. "*You seem then to deny* sufficient Grace *your self.*

B. I assert, 1. That godly men have *power* or sufficient Grace to many acts of *Faith*, *Love* and *Duty* which they never do. 2. And that all men by common Grace, or sufficient, are able to do better than they do, in preparation for special Grace. 3. And that they are bound so to do, in order to their Salvation. And so that all men have some helps and Grace in its kind sufficient to enable them to seek Salvation, and that God will not forsake them till they forsake him. *

A. "*But doth not your Church of* England, Art. 13. *say*, [*Works done* "*before the Grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not plea-* "*sant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of Faith in Jesu Christ; neither* "*do they make men meet to receive Grace, or (as the School Authors say)* "*deserve Grace of congruity: yea rather, for that they are not done as God* "*hath willed, and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have* "*the nature of sin.*]

B. This Article is intended against *merit* of *congruity* in the works of wicked men. And it is certain, that all their works are *sin*, in that they are in *defectiveness* of *ends* and *manner*, and in *perverseness*, the violations of the Law of God, (as to pray to God only to be saved from Hell, without love to God, and Holiness, or hatred of Sin; to give Alms for the same ends, *&c.*) where the love of God, the true end is left out, the action must needs be sin. But we say not that it is *only sin*, or *totally sin.* It is good and pleasing to God *secundum quid*, though not *simpliciter*: And such Actions as are sin by deficiency, may have a tendency to

* But I am not able to prove what *Vasqu.* asserteth in 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *disp.* 98. *c.* 4. *Nunquam occurrere nobis obligationem præcepti, aut tentationem sine sufficienti cogitatione qua & hanc vincere, & illud observare possimus. Loquor de præcepto affirmativo, cui non solum tempus adest quo solet obligare, sed etiam cujus obligatio memoriæ occurrit.* And he addeth a great untruth, [*Nam si nulla illius in mentem subiret cogitatio, nulla nobis ejus obligatio incumberet,*] unless by [sufficient Grace] he meant meer natural power, and by cogitation the natural power of cogitation, this is odious. As if a man were bound by no Law of God or Man, if he could but make himself ignorant, contemptuous and wicked enough, never so much as to think of it.

to better Actions, and so to Salvation, by that good that is in them. He that in meer love to his own Soul, will pray, hear, meditate, avoid sin, *&c.* is in a likelier way to Grace and Life, than he that will do none of this.

And 2. The Authors of the Article, by *merit of congruity*, meant somewhat more than preparation for Conversion; For no *English* Divines, I think, have denied that.

3. And by [*Works done*] they meant such as the *Papists* taught men too much to trust in, as giving Alms, building Hospitals, going on Pilgrimages, *&c.* which went under the notion of Sacrifices and Oblations under the old Law, when God said, *He abhor'd the Sacrifice of the Wicked, and bid them be readier to hear, than to offer the Sacrifice of Fools.* But it is not, I think, Soul-humbling Repentance, Confession, begging for Grace, considering their Ways, hearing the Word, *&c.* though but such as preparatory Grace may do, which they meant by *Works.*

4. And that is not done without Grace and the Spirit of Christ, which is done but by his common Grace; And yet I could wish the Article had been better worded.

But if you will see the consent of an hundred and twenty ancient Writers, and sixty three *Protestant* Synods, Churches and Divines, for Universal Grace, read *Dallæi, Apolog.* part. 4.

A. "*I am sure God saith*, That he would not the death of a Sinner, but "rather that he repent and live, and that he would have all men to be "saved, and come to the knowledge of the Truth, *which they deny.*

B. No man denieth it, who denieth not the Scripture. And I can hardly believe that really you differ about the meaning of the words.

Quest. 1. Do you believe that God is absolutely unwilling that any perish? and absolutely willeth that all shall be saved?

A. "*No: but conditionally he is.*

B. Quest. 2. Do you think that he absolutely willeth the performance of that condition?

A. "*I know you will say, If* absolutely, *it must come to pass, or God* "*must be* overcome. *If conditionally, how doth he will that condition?* "*and so* in infinitum? *But I will say, that he willeth it absolutely, and yet* "*is not overcome or frustrate by a greater Power. For he willeth it only* "voluntate inefficaci, *or with a* velleity, *which is not a* willing *to do it all* "*himself, but that it be done by man.*

B. If he *will* that man repent eventually, with an absolute Will, the Impenitent then frustrate his Will or Desire. And it is a note of infelicity to have absolute Desires not obtained: If Gods *Will* be not done, is it not for want of Power or Wisdom to accomplish it?

A. "*No: it is because he willeth not to effect the thing, but that man* "*effect it.*

B. If you had said, that he conditionally willeth that man effect it, the failure had been no frustration: But that had been but to say, that he willeth that man shall *will* if he *will*; or at least, if he excite his own Will; and so the question would recur, How he willeth that excitation. But seeing you say, that God absolutely willeth that man shall *will* or *excite* his own Will, you must needs mean that God desireth that which he cannot obtain, and so is *imperfect?*

A. "*No: I only say, that he desireth that which he cannot obtain by* "*mans free agency, without exerting more of his own efficient power*

to

"*to obtain it. He could obtain it, if he would do all that he* "*can.*

* *B.* This is no more than to say, that either properly he doth *not will* that man *excite* his own Will to the *act* (in that he *will not do* that without which he knoweth it will not be done); or that he willeth it but conditionally, [If so much help will procure it.] And for want of plain opening the case as it is, you do but entangle your self in unintelligible words, when you talk of *uneffectual velleities* of the event which yet are *absolute.*

* *Hoc vult Deus ut omnes ejus vitæ participes fiat, circumstantiæ vero pœnarum non ipsius voluntate fiunt: sed pro meritis eorum qui peccaverunt inferuntur: Vitam Deus tuis propria voluntate tribuit; iram vero sibi quisque thesaurizat.* Basil. in Psal. 26.

A. "*How will you explain it better?*

B. As is sufficiently done before. 1. God absolutely willeth that it shall be mans *duty* to repent and believe. Duty is the thing antecedently willed with an absolute Will. 2. God willeth that Heaven shall be his due, if he perform that condition. 3. But if he will not perform it, that Hell be his due. This Will is conditional as to the thing willed. 4. These Volitions of God belong to him as *Rector*, (supposing him a Benefactor) giving out his benefits by a Law. And this Will is expressed by Gods Law, which actually constituteth the *absolute Debitum obedientiæ*, and the *conditional debitum premii vel pœnæ.* 5. The condition being past, Gods consequent Will is absolute *de premiando vel puniendo:* He willeth the death of the Impenitent consequently. And this is but Gods Will, *qua judex*, expressed by his Judgment actually. 6. Though in strict sense, the thing that God antecedently willeth is not the *event*, but the *debitum vel jus*, man's *duty*, and his *due* thereupon; yet because it belongeth not to a *Legislator* as such to do *any more* towards the event, than *command it* (supposing *necessary power* and *helps*) therefore after the manner of men, it is said, that *God willeth the event* (*Repentance* and *Salvation*) because he *willeth* to do so much towards it, even all that concerneth him to do as a meer Rector, (besides the donation of necessary power or help as a Benefactor.) And this is all that you mean, in which both sides are really agreed.

A. "*I confess we use to explain it by his* Antecedent Will, *and saying that* "quantum in se, *he would have all repent and live. But by* quantum in se, "*we do not mean that God doth as much as he is able to it: Therefore your* "*explication seemeth true, as well as conciliatory, that he doth* quantum in "se *as* Rector per leges, *supposing also his necessary help.*

B. So God delighteth not in the death of Sinners, because it is not his *Antecedent Will* that they die, but only his *consequent*, on supposition of *impenitency* which he willeth not: And also because it is the *good of justice*, and not our *death* and *hurt* as such, or for it self that God *loveth* and *delighteth* in. But when men *return and live*, they fulfil his *antecedent Will*, and do that which he *loveth* as *good in it self.*

And he would *have all men come to the knowledge of the Truth, and be saved*; that is, *He obligeth both Ministers to preach to them, and others to pray for them and help them, and themselves to obey and receive his Grace*; And he giveth them *means*, and giveth Christ and Life by free donation to all, on condition they will but accept the Gift. And he that strictly willeth this much, may be said after the manner of men, to will the event. And this is all that both sides mean, if they understood themselves.

The

The ſecond Crimination.

A. "*The great difference between us, is, that they hold Gods Grace to be* "*unreſiſtible*; * *As if it did move man as a ſtone, or a dead body, and did* "*neceſſitate or force the Will of man: Whereas we hold, that God worketh by* "*ſuch moral, internal and external ſwaſion on the Will, as taketh not away* "*the power of reſiſting and doing the contrary.*

B. I confeſs this is the Point that maketh the greateſt noiſe. But let us enquire how far indeed you differ.

1. *Reſiſtance* is Paſſive (as a hard block reſiſteth the wedge) or Active (as Fighters do reſiſt each other.)

2. *Reſiſtance* is *effectual* (when the Reſiſter overcometh) or *uneffectual* (when it is overcome.)

3. The *Act* of Reſiſtance, muſt be diſtinguiſhed from the *power* of Reſiſtance: And to overcome *actual Reſiſtance*, from the deſtroying of the Power.

4. *Phyſical* and *moral Power* of reſiſting muſt be diſtinguiſhed as is afore-ſaid.

5. *Real and Logical* Power of Reſiſtance alſo muſt be diſtinguiſhed as afore.

A. *Well: How do you apply theſe diſtinctions?*

B. 1. All the *gracious Operations* of *God* on the Soul of a Sinner, are not only *reſiſtible*, but *ever reſiſted*, both *paſſively* and *Actively*, in ſome degree. 1. *Materia paſſiva qua talis*, is ſaid to *reſiſt* the motion of the *active nature*, in that its own nature is *averſe* to *Action*, and the *motus* muſt be *violentus*. And though mans Soul be not *material*, yet as under *God* it is *ſubſtantia paſſiva*, and ſo *paſſively* may be ſaid to *reſiſt*, in a lower ſort, that is, to require the exerting of the Power of the Agent to its motion: Though this putteth *God* to no difficulty. 2. But *ſinful Privations* and *Indiſpoſitions* make the name of *paſſive reſiſtance* to the Grace of *God*, yet more apt. 3. And the *contrary operations* and *renitence* of a vitious Mind and Will, are an *active reſiſtance*. Though it be above our reach to know in what ſenſe it may or may not be called a *Reſiſtance* as to *Gods Act in it ſelf* (*God* being not paſſive); yet that it may be called a *Reſiſtance*, as to the *effect*, is paſt doubt; (As I reſiſt a mans Work, if I *undo what he doth*, though I touch not *him*.) All penitent mens conſciences tell them that they reſiſt *God* in all the good that he perſwadeth them to, and doth them.

2. No man *actively reſiſteth God*, but by his *own power*: That is, 1. *God* as the *Author of Nature*, keepeth up *natural Power*, and concurreth with it. 2. Man vitiateth and perverteth this, in morals. 3. *God* by outward and inward motion doth Operate towards the rectifying of it. 4. Man uſing his natural power viciouſly againſt thoſe rectifying Operations, ſtriveth by it againſt *Gods* gracious Work, and ſo reſiſteth him by his own ſtrength.

3. When ever Grace *effecteth* the *Faith*, *Repentance*, *Obedience* which it *moveth* us to, it *overcometh* all our actual reſiſtance. Grace is not always *overcome*, when it is reſiſted. To ſay that effectual Grace overcometh reſiſtance, is but to ſay that it is effectual.

4. All *Grace* which is *ſufficient*, that is, which giveth all that is *abſolutely neceſſary* to the effect, is not *victorious* or *effectual*; and ſo it is *reſiſtible*, as that ſignifieth *ſuperable*, and that *uneffectual*; that is, all *neceſſary ſufficient Grace* is not effectual.

5. It

* *Okam*, *Gabriel*, and *Catherinus* do hold, that there are three ranks of men in Gods Decree: 1. One of perſons eminently predeſtinated, to whom God will give ſuch extraordinary Grace as ſhall *ex ſe* aſcertain their Converſion and Salvation: 2. Another of the the ordinary Elect, who are fore-ſeen to uſe well ſufficient Grace, and ſo elected to Glory upon that fore-ſight. 3. The Reprobates who are decreed to Hell for their fore-ſeen ſin. *Vide Okam in* 1. *d.* 41. *q.* 1. *Gabr. ibid. q.* 1. *a.* 2. *& de hiſce Vaſquez in* 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *diſq.* 90. *c.* 1. who contradicteth them, *cap.* 2. *&* 23. Yet denieth that in man there is any cauſe condition, or occaſion of his predeſtination, *diſp.* 91. *Tilenus* againſt *Camero* layeth all upon the *reſiſtibility* of Grace, but never ſufficiently explaineth the word. The *Arminians* Synod, *p.* 15. aſſert, *Etiam ſupernaturalem potentiam voluntati conferri, & hac ratione Deum immediate in voluntatem agere; modo illa actio voluntatem non neceſſitet, antecedenter, & libertatem potentiamq; non volendi tollat.* Hear a *Jeſuite*, *Ruiz de Prædeſ. d.* 6. *ſect.* 4. *p.* 91. *Vocatio efficax ſuum effectum infallibiliter ſortitur, quoniam ſuam efficacitatem accipit ex præſcientia & propoſito Dei, movente noſtram voluntatem ut conſentiat:* —— *Nam inſuperabilis virtus Vocationis ſecundum propoſitum eſt.* *Bradwardine*, *l.* 3. *c.* 27, 28. aſſerting the neceſſitation of all that cometh to paſs, would prove that yet Sinners deſerve damnation, though they could not ſin leſs than they did, becauſe Chriſt merited Glory that could not ſin.] But it's a deceit from the ambiguity of the words, [Can and Cannot]. It was not for want of Power that Chriſt could not ſin, but by perfection of holineſs: But it is for want of natural power to overcome God, that he feigneth men to be Sinners and damned.

5. It is an improper phraſe to ſay that *Gods Power* is *overcome*: For it is not done by a *greater Power*. But when God will put forth but a *certain degree of Power* in his *gracious motions*; the *motions* of *natural power* perverted by *Vice*, may be greater than them: And when they bring forth a *contrary effect*, are ſaid to *overcome* them.

6. Therefore whether Grace be *de facto reſiſted* or not *reſiſted*, *overcome* or not *overcome*, is no matter of controverſie, ſeeing the event doth decide the queſtion.

7. Grace where it overcomes, is not properly ſaid to overcome the meer *phyſical Power* or *Act* as *ſuch*, but as *perverted*, and *viciouſly* uſed againſt God.

8. The *power of ſinning* may be ſaid to be overcome, when it doth not perform the preſently-endeavoured act, but the contrary.

9. The *Power* may be ſaid to be *overcome*, when it is deſtroyed, and is no longer a *Power ad hoc*. And ſo the *natural power* is never properly ſaid to be *overcome* by *Grace*, but to be *determined*.

10. The *vicious moral Power*, which is but the *evil habit* or *diſpoſition*, is always overcome by *effectual Grace*, as to *that act* where Grace prevaileth. But not always thereby overcome in it ſelf as a *habit*, and deſtroyed; till the contrary *habitual Grace* deſtroy it.

All this is paſt all Controverſie on both ſides: And if ſo, tell me what difference about the *irreſiſtibility* of Grace remaineth.

A. "*It will put a mans brains hard to it to follow you, as you mince the* "*matter by ſo many diſtinctions and propoſitions.*

B. And you put mens Conſciences hard to it, to fire Gods Church, by contending where you differ not, or can ſhew no difference.

Queſt. 1. When you ſay that Grace is *reſiſtible*, do you mean that *de facto*, it is never *effectual* and overcometh our reſiſtance?

A. "*No: then no man ſhould be ſaved.*

B. Queſt. 2. Do you mean that *mans Will* is more powerful than *God*?

A. "*You need not ask me ſuch a queſtion.*

B. Queſt. 3. Do you mean that *God* never *putteth forth* ſo *much power* in his work of Grace as man doth in reſiſting it?

"A. *Here I muſt diſtinguiſh alſo:* 1. Power *is ſo called either as* in ſe, "in *the* virtue, *or in the* effect. 2. *Power in* man *is ſo called either as* "*meerly* mans, *or as* Gods *that worketh in man. And ſo I anſwer,* 1. *Gods* "*Power in it ſelf which way ever it worketh (in man or out of him) is the* "*ſame, neither greater nor leſs than it ſelf, for it is God.* 2. Power *in* "*it ſelf as* Gods *is* infinitely *greater than* mans *as ſuch.* 3. *As* power *is* "*ſo called from the* effect, *it is no Controverſie: For the event ſtill telleth* "*which is the greater, or prevalent therein.*

B. You have anſwered well. *Queſt.* 4. You do not mean I know that in the inſtant of acting, the Soul that *willeth can nill* the ſame thing at the ſame time, in the ſame reſpect, much leſs after the act is paſt, that it hath a contrary power *'ad præteritum?* It is, I ſuppoſe, only in the inſtant, antecedent to the act that you ſay Grace is reſiſtible?

A. "*You may eaſily be ſure of that.*

B. Queſt. 5. If you mean only that the *natural faculty* was *potentia libera activa ad utrumlibet*, till Grace procured it to determine it ſelf: And ſo that Grace deſtroyed not the *natural Power* or Liberty; do you know any that differ from you in that?

A. "*No, if they may take freedom in their own ſenſe.*

B. Enough of that, I hope, before. *Queſt.* 6. If you mean that the *moral Pravity* of this natural faculty, was ſuch as *could* have prevailed againſt

Grace, though it did not; do you not ſpeak unintelligibly? For either you ſpeak of a *Logical poſſibility only*, or of a *real ſtrength* or *power*; If of the former, you equivocate; and you differ not from others: For you oft confeſs, that *Gods* meer *Preſcience* that it *will* not be, doth inſer a Logical neceſſity *conſequentiæ*, and ſo a Logical impoſſibility of the contrary. But if by [*Could*] you mean a *real ſtrength* or *oppoſite power*, you miſtake the matter. *Moral pravity* is not *ſtrength* or *power* at all; But the *perverſion* or *diſeaſe* of ſtrength or power.

So that the caſe is not unſearchable: when a man is converted, what hath your queſtion reſpect to, in the word [*Reſiſt*] but the *Act*, the *vicious habit* and *privation*, and the *natural faculty*? Is there any thing elſe to be conſidered?

A. "*Not that I remember; what then?*

B. The Act you confeſs is procured, and therefore not reſiſted (effectually.) 2. The *privation* reſiſteth but *paſſively*, and ſo hath no active power. And to ſay that the *privation* of *Faith* could have reſiſted the Grace that wrought Faith, implyeth a falſhood, if you mean it of active power or reſiſtance. 3. The contrary *habit* is not a *power*, but the ill *diſpoſition* of a *power*. Therefore if it be *de facto*, *overcome* as to the act by actual Grace, or in it ſelf by habitual Grace, it is on a falſe ſuppoſition to ſay, that it *had power* to have reſiſted, when as it hath no *power*, nor is a power. But if you ſpeak of Logical poſſibility, its impertinent equivocation. 4. All that remaineth then is, that the *natural faculty* in the antecedent inſtant wanted not power or freedom to the contrary act; which is true, and none of them that are intelligent deny. For *God* by determining a free power, doth not *deſtroy* it, but *uſe* it, and determine it. And *Gods* change of the Mind and Will, is not by any diminution or fraction of the *power* of it, but by a *ſapiential* and *loving* efficacy, acting it aright, and more advancing it. Even in our after lives, he doth not take away our natural power to *will and do evil*, but he taketh away the vicious diſpoſition of it, that we may certainly *will* and *do well*. Tell me yet then where is the difference?

A. "*Though you over-whelm me by diſtinctions, you cannot ſo blind me,* "*but I know a difference between theſe two Opinions,* [*when* Paul *firſt be-*"*lieved, he could have reſiſted and not believed,*] *and* [He could not "reſiſt, and not believe.]

B. That is, you have learnt of the Maſters of Confuſion and Diſſention to ſtrive about words, which you underſtand not; and having the Foot-Ball before you, you will drive it on. But little know you whither? nor how little thanks the great Shepherd of the Flock will give you at the laſt. Either ſhew us the difference, or be aſhamed to pretend a difference.

A. "*I perceive that the Controverſie about Reſiſtance is reſolved into that* "*of power:* [Can and Cannot reſiſt], *which was opened before.*

THE

Eighth Days Conference

Between *B.* and *C.*

Of SUFFICIENT *and* EFFECTUAL GRACE.

B. I now expect your sharpest Charge against your Adversaries about the nature, efficacy and extent of Grace.

The first Crimination.

C. 1. "*They assert an Universality of Grace to all men, sufficient to* "*their Salvation.* *

B. I hope you have no malignant desire to extenuate *Gods* Grace, but are willing to acknowledge it to be as great and large as indeed it is, if you can discern the proof.

C. "*God best knoweth how to honour himself.*

B. *Quest.* 1. Do you think that all the World, or all that shall perish, yea or any part of the World is under the meer Curse of the Law of Innocency, as violated by *Adam*, without any remedy or mercy.

C. "*I think they are without real Remedy, though not without all Mercy*; "*for a delay of punishment is mercy.*

B. *Quest.* 2. Do you think that they are only under the Curse of that Law as the Devils are, without any possibility or offers of a remedy; or that they are also still under the Covenant-Offers of Life, upon condition of Innocency.

C. "*I cannot suppose God now to offer a man Life, on condition he be no* "*Sinner, whom he knoweth to be a Sinner: For such an Offer is equivalent* "*to a sentence of Death, or denial of Life. Nor can I say that they are as* "*desperate as the Devils, because they know not the desperateness of their* "*case.*

* *Malderus*, in 1. 2. *Tho. q.* 109. *a.* 10. *dub.* 1. *pag.* 464. mentioneth five degrees of sufficient Grace: 1. That most imperfect degree by which Sinners may forbear a particular mortal sin. 2. That of the Regenerate by which they are able to forbear *all* mortal sin: but being infirm will not. 3. *Adam* in Innocency, who could *easily* have persevered, but did not; when some Angels did by the same degree which others had that fell. 4. That of the Predestinate, who have Gods special custody, before they are confirmed in Grace. 5. The Grace of Confirmation, of which there are five Opinions, (of which after.)

Some *Lutherans* seem to go further in this than the *Jesuites* or *Arminians*, and to deny the distinction of sufficient and effectual Grace, saying that it is the same Grace that is effectual in one and not in another: but I think they differ but in words: So *Gerhard. de lib. arb. c. 6. sect.* 1. *Concedimus sane spiritui sancto conversionis opus aggredienti multos resistere, consilium Dei adversus seipsos spernere——& hac ratione sua culpa gratiam conversionis a se repellere: sed propterea ipsam Gratiam in sufficientem & efficacem dividendam esse negamus, siquidem una eademq; Dei Gratia est, quæ in credentibus operatur, & quæ ab incredulis repellitur.*

And he supposeth all mens Wills to be bad, and without power to convert themselves, and that God giveth them such Grace as doth not physically constrain or necessitate them or determine them; but such a suitable operation as they can resist: And so that the efficacy of Grace is not from the Will, but from Grace it self: but the inefficacy is from man: and the reason why any are converted, is from Grace: but the reason why any are not converted, is from their resisting that Grace; and so the Will of the Wicked is the differencing cause.

Le Blanc *de dist. Grat. in suffic.* &c. 68, 69. *Remonstrantes non ideo Gratiam distinguunt in sufficientem & efficacem, quod potent gratiam quam accipiunt illi qui increduli manent & in peccatis perseverant non habere vim & efficaciam necessariam & prærequisitam ad hoc, &c. sed ideo solum gratiæ cujus sunt participes denegant efficacis nomen quod effectum ad quem destinatur in iis reapse non producat propter impedimentum quod illi ponunt——utriq; ergo docent gratiam hanc satis virium habere ad ipsos convertendos——nihil ergo prius but in parte sentiunt Remonstrantes illis qui* Lutherani *dicuntur: Ac proinde cum Reformati horum communionem non refugiunt, sed ultro eis ad patem, &c.*

* *Magna est bonitas Dei in dandis bonis corporis & animæ: major est bonitas Dei in remittentis peccata magna & multa: maxima in patientia, &c.* Strigel. Loc. 60. pag. 301.

Carbo Compend. Tho. 1. q. 21. a. 4. Opus divinæ justitiæ semper præsupponit opus misericordiæ, & in ea fundatur tanquam in prima radice quia ne procedatur in infinitum devenitendum est ad aliquid quod ex sola bonitate divinæ voluntatis dependat.

B. Queſt. 3. Do you think all the difference between them and Devils lieth in *delay* and *ignorance* of their miſery? Then the moſt ignorant and preſumptuous of them is the leaſt miſerable, though the moſt ſinful; which cannot be?

Queſt. 4. But do you think that no Mercy is to be offered to ſuch?

C. "*Yes: becauſe we know not who are Elect, and who not.*

B. Queſt. 5. Are we to offer men mercy only as *Elect?* or rather as *Sinners* and *miſerable*, under a Law of Grace? and as Subjects of *God* obliged by that Law to accept it?

C. "*We offer it to all Sinners, that the Elect may receive it.*

B. Queſt. 6. Are none but the Elect under a Law of Grace, as the rule of their *Duty*, their expectation and of Judgment?

C. "*Others may be under the Obligations of it, but not under the Grace* "*of it.*

B. Remember then, 1. That they are not lawleſs. 2. That they are not under that meer violated Law of Innocency, [Be innocent and live.] 3. That they are under the Obligations of the Law of Grace.

Queſt. 7. Is there any of them that are not bound to uſe certain means appointed of *God*, in order towards their own Salvation?

C. "*They are bound to intend their own Salvation, and with that inten-* "*tion to uſe ſome means: But God intends it not.*

B. Queſt. 8. Doth God command men on pain of damnation to any vain endeavours, or uſe of means?

C. 1. "*He commandeth it not in vain: for it ſhall make them unexcuſe-* "*able.* 2. *They are not to judge their endeavours vain, becauſe they know* "*it not.* 3. *But in the iſſue all will be in vain to them.*

B. Queſt. 9. Would it be in vain to them, if they really did the utmoſt that common Grace enableth any men to do?

C. 1. "*It is not properly Grace to them, and ſo not common.* 2. "*It would be in vain to them.*

B. Queſt. 10. Is that vain which bringeth a man into the neareſt preparation for ſpecial Grace, and neareſt to the Kingdom of God?

C. "*To the Elect it is not vain: Nor to others for their ſakes: Nor to* "*others, as to the leſſening of their pains in Hell: But as to their Salvation* "*it is.*

B. Queſt. 11. Who would it be long of (or be reputed the Cauſe) if it be in vain.

C. "*Of themſelves, who are born in ſin from* Adam, *and are Unbe-* "*lievers.*

B. You ſuppoſe it impoſſible for them to believe, and impoſſible for them not to be the Children of *Adam.* They made not themſelves, and you ſuppoſe that for want of Grace they cannot believe.

Queſt. 12. When Death ſhall acquaint them with the impoſſibility that they were under, do you think, 1. That it will be the way of glorifying the Juſtice of God in Judgment, to have the World know that he condemneth Sinners meerly becauſe he will condemn them, for that which they never had any more true power to avoid, than to make a World? 2. Or will their Conſciences in Hell accuſe them or torment them for that which they then know was naturally impoſſible, and cauſed by God.

C. "*We know not how God will glorifie his Juſtice, or how their Conſci-* "*ences will torment them. It may be they ſhall then be as ignorant of the* "*neceſſitating cauſe as now.*

B. 1. Do *you know it now*, and shall not *they know it then?* 2. God telleth us the contrary, That *all hidden things shall be brought to light*, and that God will justifie his own proceedings, by proving that mens destruction is of themselves, that *every mouth may be stopped, and all the world be guilty before God*: And he calleth it his Righteousness in judging, to give *to every man according to his Works*: and that mens Consciences shall then *excuse them or accuse them, when God shall judge the secrets of their hearts*, (and not when he shall torment them, by deceiving them,) *Rom.* 2. 2 *Thess.* 1. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. *Matth.* 25. & 7. 23, 24. 2 *Tim.* 4. 8, 9. *Rom.* 14. 10. *Gen.* 18. 24, 25.

Quest. 13. Do you believe that none but the Elect have now any real mercy, besides a *delay* of their future misery, and hopes of its abatement.

C. "*I do: For all things are to be judged of by the end: And that is* "*really no mercy, which is not intended to a mans happiness, but his mi-* "*sery. As Afflictions are no evils to the Elect, because they are intended and* "*work together for their good.*

B. Is the offer of Christ and Life no mercy? Is all Gods patience and forbearance, as a means to lead them to repentance, no mercy? Is all the teaching, perswading, intreating condescension of Christ, no mercy? See what error here you run into, and how contrary to Scripture, and to nature it self?

1. You contradict Gods Word, which frequently calleth them *mercies*, *Psal.* 145. 9. & 106. 7. 45. *Neh.* 9. 19, 27, 28, 31. *Jon.* 4. 2. *Rom.* 2. 4. *Matth.* 18. 33. *Isa.* 63. 9. *Ezek.* 16.

2. You deny the chiefest part of mens duty; even to accept of mercy, to improve mercy, to be thankful for mercy, to be led by Gods goodness to Repentance, to use mercies as Gods Talents to his Glory, *&c.* If you say, They know not but they are mercies; you feign God to bind men to duty, but by deceit: It is as *mercies*, and not as that which for ought they know may be mercies, that they are to be valued, used, *&c.*

3. You excuse men from the greatest aggravation of their sin: even sinning against Mercies: How can they sin against them that have none.

4. You feign Gods Justice to be strangely glorified, by damning men in Hell for ever, for sinning against mercy, who never had any to sin against.

5. You will make Conscience justifie the Wicked, and condemn Gods Judgments in Hell, instead of justifying God, and accusing themselves.

6. You must accordingly conclude that you never shewed mercy to Child, Neighbour, or any but the Elect your self, (because it was all to end in misery) or else that you were to them more merciful than God.

7. When man is made in Gods Image, and we must be holy and merciful as our heavenly Father is, you set all men such a pattern of mercy and justice, as you would be loth your Prince or Parent should imitate.

8. You expose Christ's most compassionate tears to reproach, when, *Luke* 19. he lookt on *Jerusalem* and wept over it, as having had a day of mercy; and when *Matth.* 23. he saith, *How oft would I have gathered thee as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not,...*

9. You

9. You teach all Gods Children in the World, to acknowledge no mercy, nor be thankful for any, till they are sure that they are Elect. And how few have that assurance?

10. You injure the Lord Jesus and his Covenant of Grace, while you say, that a conditional Gift of Christ and Life, Pardon and Salvation, even if they will but accept it, is no mercy to any that refuse it; nor yet the blood that purchased it as such.

11. You measure and denominate Gods great Mercies, according to mans vile abuse: As if it were no mercy, what tendency soever in it self it had to their Salvation, unless they accept it, and use it well, or if they reject it.

12. You are singular from almost all the Churches of Christ in the World: Contrary to the judgment of the ancient Churches, and of all present Churches of *Greeks*, *Abassines*, *Arminians*, *Papists*, or *Protestants*: expressly contrary to the Synod of *Dort*, and the particular suffrages of our *British* Divines there: except a very few men that by the heat of perverse Disputings against *Amyraldus*, the *Arminians*, &c. have been carried into such extreams.

C. "*What mercy is it to a man to have Pleasure here a while, and Torment* "*in Hell for ever? yea to have Christ and Life offered him to make him* "*more unexcusable and miserable.*

B. In all this Discourse, it is not the nature of the mercy in it self that you deny, but *Gods* merciful Intents: It is your mis-apprehensions about Predestination, which you are vending all this while, and there is the Core of your mistake, which we have sufficiently spoken to already. You talk as if *God* decreed men to Sin, to reject Christ, to abuse Mercies, to Impenitency, and consequently to Hell for so doing; which is all false. *God* decreed no man to these, or any other sin, nor to any punishment, but as for sin by them committed against his holy Law, which he *foresaw, but willed not.* Yea *God* decreed to set open the door of Grace to Sinners, and to tender them mercy when they deserved misery, and to bring Life to the acceptance or refusal of their own Wills, and to intreat and importune them to accept it: His end in giving them mercy, is not to make them miserable, though consequently he will their misery for their sin. Now you feign in your own erronious Imagination, that *God* first decreeth mens sin and damnation, and then giveth them all which we call Mercies as a means thereto, and then denominate them as bad as you have feigned them to be by such an imagination. And you conceive of *Gods* Decree as that which doth *transire* in *præteritum*, is past and gone, when to *God* all time is nothing, but eternity is one everlasting instant.

C. "*When you have talkt all that you can for such kind of Mercy, it* "*will not satisfie a mans understanding, who believeth that most of the world* "*shall be damned, and that God fore-knew this from eternity, and would* "*not prevent it when he easily could. Mercy that ends in Hell is sad mercy:* "He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy.

B. Even under the terrible Law at Mount *Sinai*, *God* proclaimeth his Name and Nature, *As gracious and abundant in Mercy.* This Glory of his which he shewed to *Moses*, is more gloriously shewed to the World in Christ. And this you study perversly to obscure. And when you have contracted Salvation it self out of our own brain, into a narrower compass than *God* in Scripture doth, (who in every Nation accepteth them that fear him, and work Righteousness,) then you devise false Decrees and Intents, and father them on *God* to obscure the rest. And what

what do you by this, but seek to render God as little comely to his Creatures as you can. And if the love of God be *Holiness* and *Happiness*; If his Amiableness be his Goodness, even Himself; If it be Christ's great Work to reveal God in his Goodness, and by Faith to kindle holy Love. And if it be the Devils malignity and work in the World to counterwork Christ, and represent God as unlovely, judge whether you serve Christ or Satan, and whether it be not his chief work of enmity against God that you carry on?

But that you may have the true prospect of Gods goodness in all this, you must remember that Gods *Work as Creator* goeth before his Work of *Government*, and his Work of *Government* in *general* before his Work of our *Redemption*; and his Work of *Redemption* and the *Law of Grace* before *mens sin* and *Judgment*. And 1. If God that hath diversified all lower Creatures as we see, did please in the Creation to make a rank of *free-intellectual Creatures* here on Earth, with power and help sufficient to attain to an Angelical Glory, if they would not wilfully prefer the way of misery, is there any want of goodness in making such a World? Are they not nobler than Bruits that have no such hope, though not than Angels that are confirmed.

2. And if he take pleasure having made such an Intellectual free Agent, to rule him *morally* by Laws, according to his nature, and to take it for his own great work to be his King or Rector in this sapiential way: That which much deludeth men in this, and wrongeth God, is that these foundations in Nature are not well considered. The issue of all the Atheists and discontented Unbelievers Accusations of God, is but this, That *he made man but man*, and nothing higher. A man is a mutable Intellectual free Agent, whose duty and happiness is left much to his own choosing or refusing. And being so *made*, he is accordingly to be governed; And as God sheweth his greatness of Power as Creator and Actor of the universal frame of Nature, so he hath chosen eminently to shew his Regent Wisdom, in his * moral Government of Men and Angels; And his wondrous *Love*, as the special Benefactor to the Vessels of Mercy. *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Love* (or Goodness) are never separated; But each hath its eminent demonstration. And the Omnipotent Father is most eminently glorified in his Power in the Creation, and sustentation and motion of the Universe; so the *Son* who is the *Wisdom* and *Word* of the Father (and the Father in him) is eminently glorified in his *Wisdom* in the Regency of the Intellectual World, by a *sapiential* way of Government by *Laws* and *Judgment*. And then steps up the physical Disputer, and prophanely blasphemeth this honourable Work of God, and calleth it *moral Operation* in contempt, and thinks that unless God move man to every Volition, as he doth the appetite of a Beast, if not as we move a stone, or shoot an Arrow, he doth nothing, and it is his reproach. And to say that he *can* or *did* make a Creature that *can freely will* or *not comparatively*, even by the Power and general Concurse of God, they say is to feign him to make a God. And so both the Honour of God as *Creator* is denied him, and his Honour of *sapiential Government* is vilified.

It is an excellent Work of the *Creator* to make a *free Agent* in his own *Image*. And it is a suitable and excellent Work as his *King*, to appoint him his *end*, and *means*, and *work*, and rule him by perfect *Laws* and *Judgments*. In all which also he acteth as a *Benefactor*, while he freely offereth him so glorious a *Reward*, to which as *Rector* he would lead him. And in *that Relation* will not be wanting unto him in any thing, which perfect *Regiment* requireth.

* 3. Con-

* *Cusp. Petcer Hist. Carcerum* against the *Lutherans*, pag. 719. *An in homine otioso, nihil agente, habenteq; se pure passive; aut sicut truncus ad coactionem necessitatis stoicæ, afflatusve anabaptistici, sicut Flaciani somniarunt; aut velut brutum mutatione & conversione hominis physica aut hyperphysica, qualem fieri fingit Chimera* (that is, the *Liber Concordiæ*) *non sine sensu quidem, sed sine motu, ut subjectum patiens & convertibile, tousq; donec tantas accepit facultatis & virium quibus agere possit.*

* 3. Conſider alſo that *Divine Love* (the third *Principle*) as it hath its common demonſtration and glory in the Works of the *Omnipotent Creation*, and in the Works of *ſapiential Regiment*, ſo hath it alſo its *peculiar eminent* demonſtration on the *Elect* in their *Grace* and *Glory*, or in their *Holineſs* and *Glory* begun and perfected. And it doth not follow that becauſe this *Love* is *eminently* glorified on a *peculiar treaſure*, therefore there is no Glory in Gods other Works, or no reaſon for them. O that men had the wit to be *humble*, and confeſs that God is *wiſer* and *better than they*, till they can come to more Wiſdom to *underſtand* the Methods and Reaſon of his Works.

As God hath his Honour in making *Stars* as well as the *Sun*, and *Earth*, as well as *Stars*, and *Beaſts*, as well as *Men*, and *Serpents* and *Toads* as well as *Birds*, and *Clay* as well as *Gold*; ſo hath he his *Honour* in making a World of *mutable defectible Intellectual free Agents* (*Men*) as well as in making the confirmed Angels; and in gracious ſapiential Government of them all, as well as in his extraordinary *Beneficence* and *Love* to his *Elect*.

4. And you muſt not feign the damnation of the Wicked themſelves to be any ſuch ſtate as is inconſiſtent with the goodneſs of *God* to caſt a Sinner into: We know not *perfectly* what *Hell* is: But as we know that it is the extreameſt humane miſery, ſo we know that it is not at all worſe than mens ſins deſerve; And that when we come to Heaven, we ſhall be perfectly ſatisfied of the Juſtice of *God* in mens damnation.

And though I ſay not *melius eſt peccatori miſerum eſſe quam non eſſe*; yet I will ſo far accord with worthy Dr. *Twiſſe*, as to ſay that *melius eſt peccatores miſeros eſſe quam non eſſe*: Becauſe elſe God would rather have annihilated them. For God doth that which is beſt: And his Wiſdom, and Will, and Glory are fitter Rules of *Meliority*, than the Will or Intereſt of Sinners.

And it ſeemeth by the Devils Kingdom, and Converſation in the Air and on the Earth (while yet they are in *Hell*, and reſerved in Chains of Darkneſs) that *their Hell* is a ſtate conſiſtent with all that voluntary miſchievous negotiation which they do. And it's like that though they have no *Joy*, yet their Wills have ſome *pleaſedneſs* in the miſchief which they do, as an *angry* and *malicious* man hath in *revenge*.

And we have no reaſon to believe that the Hell of the damned is any worſe or more violent or irrational than the Hell of the Devils, when they muſt go to that which was prepared for the Devils, *Matth.* 25.

But if I ſhould but open to you the plain evidence of this truth, how much of Hell conſiſteth in *their ſin it ſelf*, in which undoubtedly they are *voluntary* (though neceſſarily ſo, by their own doing and deſert,) it might tend yet more to the abatement of all diſparaging and unbelieving thoughts, of the Glory of Gods gracious ſapiential Regiment of the World.

And to ſay that God could have made man better, and given him more Grace, is but as to ſay that *he could* have made Toads to be Larks, and Beaſts to be Men, and Men to be Angels: And what if he did not?

5. And I again repeat what I have oft ſaid, that all this Earth is but a *point* next inconſiderable in the vaſt Univerſe; And immeaſurable ſpaces of thoſe ſuperior parts of the Creation are like to have proportionable Inhabitants for glory and number: And we know that we are come to *an innumerable Company of Angels*, Heb. 12. 23, 24. And for ought we know God may have millions of bleſſed Spirits, for one miſerable wicked Soul. Therefore we muſt not talk againſt that which we do not underſtand.

And

* Of all this, if the Reader pleaſe to peruſe a very ſmall book which I have written, called *A Vindication of Gods Love*, he may ſee more than I muſt here ſay.
But contrarily ſaith *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 3. p. 614. [*Quam facile poſſet Deus ſi vellet, tollere obicem ſive actum? Hujuſmodi quoq; obex ponitur a Deo antecedenter: Quomodo ergo vult Deus conferre hanc gratiam in quo parat obicem gratiam repellentem? Vel ſi Deus non dat gratiam propter obicem reſiſtentem, & ipſe Deus ſcienter & præcedenter cauſat hunc obicem quomodo ipſe Deus non eſt cauſa non acceptionis gratiæ ſalutaris?*] I can hardly believe that they that thus take Sin and Hell to be nothing but the fruits of Gods good will, do believe that either of them are ſo bad as Scripture doth deſcribe them, or ſo much to be hated or feared.

And if the Saints ſhall judge (wicked) *Angels*, and the *World*, (*judging* being uſually put for *ruling* and *puniſhing*) we know not what hand we ſhall have *our ſelves* in the *execution* of Gods Wrath upon them, and how far they ſhall be as *Slaves to Saints.*

C. "*You have ſaid that (I confeſs) that tendeth to reconcile us all to* "*Gods Providence*; *But whether it will reconcile our own differences I* "*doubt. How is that Grace ſufficient to all men for Salvation, which never* "*telleth moſt of a Chriſt, or of Salvation at all?*

* *B.* You miſtake your Adverſaries. They hold not that all men have ſufficient Grace to Salvation: But ſufficient to help them *nearer* to Salvation. I tell you again, no Saint hath Grace ſufficient to his full Salvation, till he is fully ſaved: Otherwiſe what need he any more? Some indeed call it *mediately* ſufficient to Salvation, but that's but *lis de nomine.*

* Janſen. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 2. c. 17. *Non quævis Gratia ad quoſvis effectus inferendos ſufficit: ut quidam imaginati ſunt ſed poteſtates operationum difficultati attemperandæ ſunt.*

C. "*If it be* ſufficient, *what need they any more to that which it is ſaid* "ſufficient *for? And yet more would do that which is not done. But no* "*man ſhould deſire more than is* ſufficient.

B. All this is a Game at *words*: * By [*Sufficient*] they mean only *neceſſary help*, without which the act cannot be done, and with which it can and may be done: They do not mean all that is needful *ad certè eſſe*, or *ad melius eſſe.* Therefore I uſe rather to call it *All neceſſary help* or Grace *ad eſſe.*

* Blank de diſt. Grat. &c. Theſ. 77. *Quod Thomiſtæ recentiores affirmant illos in quibus gratia non eſt efficax ad converſionem nihilo minus gratiam ſufficientem ad eam habere; id vero Reformati cum Janſenio negant mera logomachia eſt ſiquidem*, &c.

C. "*I pray you yet make it plainer to me, what that* neceſſary *or* ſufficient Grace is, *that we may judge of it.*

B. Grace is taken either for the *Favour* of *God*, or for his *Gifts.* And ſo either for *free Gifts* without merit in point of commutative Juſtice: And ſo all that God giveth to any Creature, muſt needs be Grace. Or elſe for that which is given *contrary* to *commerit* (of evil). And ſo all is Grace which is given to *Sinners.*

Grace is either, 1. *Efficient-principal.* 2. *Efficient leſs-principal.* 3. *Objective.* 4. Or *ſubjective*, which is the effect.

I. Grace as the *principal efficient*, is either Gods meer Benevolence or Will to give. 2. Or his Act of Collation, as *ex parte agentis.* Both theſe are really one, and God himſelf, though differently denominated, and diverſly conceived of by us. God operateth *per eſſentiam.*

II. Grace as the leſs *principal efficient*, is all thoſe *means* which have an *Aptitude* to effect (and ſo are apt to be *efficients*) or *actually do ſo*; As Chriſt, the Goſpel, the Miniſtry, outward Mercies, Afflictions, *&c.*

III. *Objective Grace* is thoſe means which as *Objects* are appointed for *man himſelf* to *act upon* towards his own Salvation. As a *Chriſt* to be *believed* in and *accepted*, An *offered Glory*, a *certain Promiſe*, &c.

IV. * Subjective Grace is that effect which is wrought on mans Soul,

* The School-men have ſo many ſorts of Grace as confoundeth themſelves: when they have agreed, partly, 1. Of exciting Grace. 2. And of infuſed habits. 3. And of Concurſe. 4. They are all to pieces about *Gratia adjuvans per modum principii*, what it is. *Maldrus* tells us of four Opinions (*in* 12. *q*, 111. *a.*3. *dub.*2.) 1. That it is nothing but the infuſed Habit it ſelf. 2. That it is but *gracia excitans*: 3. That it is *quædam qualitas infuſa tranſiens cum ipſo actu.* 4. That God himſelf immediately ſupplieth the ablence of a habit and defect of power to acts ſupernatural. He accounteth the caſe too difficult to be confident in: but inclineth to this, that this concomitant Grace giving power to ſupernatural acts before the habits, called by them *Adjuvant Grace*, *is quaſi formalis terminus ſeu effectus gratiæ excitantis & prævenientis & ſecundum rem non differre*: Yet excitation is it ſelf taken for an effect, and this effecteth this power in queſtion. But in the juſtified he ſaith, the Holy Ghoſt, beſides habits and powers, dwelleth. Will you lay any great ſtreſs on ſuch nicities as theſe, paſt humane reach, and ſo confeſſed by the ſubtileſt Contenders?

Per peccatum non minuitur inclinatio naturalis ad bonum per ſubtractionem, ſed per oppoſitionem impedimenti quod neq; tollit neq; minuit radicem inclinationis: cum enim peccatum non diminuat ipſam naturam rationalem, minuere non poteſt radicem naturalis inclinationis ad bonum quæ identificatur cum natura: ſolum ergo minuitur hujuſmodi inclinatio ex parte termini quatenus, viz. *per peccatum ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum unde quamtumvis in infinitum multiplicantur peccata non poteſt totaliter deſtrui inclinatio naturalis ad bonum rationis*, Alvar. de Aux. li. 6. diſp. 45. p. 210. Ita Aquin. 12. q. 85. a. 2. ad 1. & 1. p. q. 48. ar. 4. ad. 3.

Peucer Hiſtor. Carcer. reproveth the *Lutherans, Concordia* 2. *quod non diſtinguunt inter vocationem generalem ſeu univerſalem, communem omnibus, & vocationem efficacem*, pag. 724.

as the beginning of his recovery or healing, and having a tendency to more.

C. "*Now tell us which of these it is that is* sufficient.

B. I. Undoubtedly there is no insufficiency in *God*. All that he willeth to do, he doth: And if he will no more, his Will is not to be called insufficient as to more, but *null* as to that Object: And we affirm no other *proper Will* of *God*, but such as *is fulfilled*.

II. *Gods* means which wicked men enjoy are the same that the godly enjoy, and are sufficient *ex parte sui*, but not *ex omni parte*, that is, for as much as concerneth their own Office. So Christ's antecedent Preparations, his Satisfaction and Merits are sufficient. The Covenant of Grace is sufficient: The preaching of the Gospel is sufficient in its kind, *&c.*

III. The *objective Grace* is *sufficient*; that is, *God* as he is to be *believed in* and *loved*, *revealed* in the Word and in his Works: *Christ* to be *believed* in; the *Precepts* to be *obeyed*, the *Promise* to be *trusted*, &c. And though it be doubtful to many whether *Amyraldus* and his Fellows were in the right, that thought that the [illegible], and other objective Grace be *qua objective*, *sufficient* to all Heathens for Salvation; yet none can doubt but it is *in suo genere*, *sufficient* to all those good and holy acts which those persons may immediately exercise about them. And indeed he that *loveth God* but as the light of Nature, hath taught Heathens, or may teach men that he should be loved, if he be damned, must be a *damned Saint in the love of God*. But *who do so love him*, is another question.

IV. Subjective Grace is either *Power*, *Act*, or Disposition or Habit.

1. This *Power* is the very thing precisely which they meant by *necessary* or *sufficient Grace*. All men have true *power* to draw nearer Salvation, and do better than they do, though not *immediately to do all* that is necessary to Salvation. And he that *can do it if he will*, and *also hath power to will it*, is said to have *sufficient Grace*, which if he use not, the fault lieth in his wilfulness.

2. The *Act*, nor the just Disposition or Habit they have not. But that is their own fault, who had *those Means*, *those Objects*, and that *Power* by which they could and might have attained them.

C. "*Is any one ever converted by this* sufficient Grace, *or not? If not*, "frustra sit potentia, *&c. If yea, then it is* effectual Grace.

B. Now you have brought the Controversie to the parting point, where the two Parties use to part: (As you may see in Dr. *Sanderson* and Dr. *Hamond*'s Letters.

I will first answer your Consequences. 1. *Non frustra sit talis potentia*, though it never act. For 1. It attaineth other good ends, though it attain not their Salvation. 2. If one of a thousand should not use their power, or if a thousand to one do use it, that varieth not the case: For it is still as much vain to that one man, as if no one used it. But 2. So far as it is *vain*, that is, to their own Salvation, they make it vain themselves, and must blame themselves.

3. I ask you *whether* you think not your self, that 1. All wicked men by common Grace; 2. And all godly men by special Grace, have power to do more good and forbear more evil than they do? If so, Do you hold that all that power which they never use to any of those omitted acts is vain? If not, why should this in question be accounted vain?

But to the great difficulty it self, I answer, 1. You must not forestall the Truth by any of these false suppositions.

1. That

1. That there is any man to whom God giveth a meer *Power*, neither *diſpoſed*, nor *provoked* to the Act. For 1. Mans natural faculty it ſelf, beſides natural power, hath all theſe aptitudes to the Act. 1. Man hath ſelf-love, and a deſire of felicity, and an unwillingneſs and fear of Hell and Miſery, and of all that he knoweth doth tend to it as ſuch. He can ſeek for Glory, Honour and Immortality, *Rom.* 2. And therefore God thus argueth with men, *Ezek.* 33. *Turn ye, why will ye die?* And 1 *Pet.* 3. 10. *He that loveth life, and would ſee good days*, &c. as making uſe of a common principle.

2. Man hath reaſon to underſtand what is told him of Good and Evil in ſome ſort, and Nature containeth a Law written in the heart, *Rom.* 3. by which the Heathens did much of that which was written in the Scripture.

3. Man hath a Conſcience to accuſe and excuſe.

4. He hath *miſery* and *neceſſity* to move him: which may be known to him by common light and experience.

5. Sin, as ſin is in common diſgrace in the World: And Nature teacheth Mankind to diſtinguiſh moral Good and Evil; ſo that the worſt do not love and own ſin as ſin: And did not Satan hide it with ſome vail of goodneſs, he could not draw them to it. Even thoſe that murdered Chriſt, did it on a falſe pretence that he was a Sinner.

6. Mans nature hath an *enmity to Devils*, and a *fear* of them. And therefore will fly from evil ſo far as they perceive the Devil in it (for the moſt part.) For he is their known Enemy.

7. Laſtly, All do known that they muſt die, and that this World will ſerve them but a little while; And they have great experience of its vanity and vexation: And Nature teacheth moſt, and the Goſpel much more, that mans Soul is immortal, and therefore that there is a Reward for the Good, and Puniſhment for the Bad hereafter.

2. And as depraved Nature it ſelf hath certainly all theſe advantages for good; ſo God addeth by his Works and Word many vehement Motives, Perſwaſions, and urgent Exhortations, Examples, Mercies and Corrections: And all theſe may give the Soul much more than a bare *power* to many good acts: For many ſuch are really done by bad men; And to others they are almoſt perſwaded, when they diſobey.

2. You muſt not ſuppoſe, that juſt the ſame degree of means or help is neceſſary to one man as to another; or to the ſame man ever at ſeveral times. For one mans Soul may be more undiſpoſed and ill diſpoſed than anothers: And the ſame mans more at one time than at another. And temptations and impediments may be greater at one time, and to one man than another. Experience aſſureth us, that leſs teaching will inform one mans underſtanding than anothers.

C. "*Have not all men the ſame degree of Original Sin? What can be ſaid* "*more of any than is ſaid of all, that they are dead in ſin?*

B. 1. The ſame word [*Dead*] may be uſed of all, if it were words only that you plead for. But that *word* proveth not that all are equally either *guilty* or *corrupted*. For though *Adam*'s ſin be the ſame to all, yet I have before told you (and ſhewed you beſides Scripture, *Auguſtine*'s judgment for it) that there is alſo a participation of *Guilt* of *nearer Parents* ſins by Infants; And conſequently of Pravity: Were it but the ill *temper of body* which many Drunkards and Adulterers convey to their Children, experience telleth us that it doth much in hindering the Soul. And all are not equal in this derivation of Original Sin.

2. And *Adam*'s ſin, with all other being pardoned to faithful Parents, is in them pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God; And we have reaſon to think that where the *Guilt* is pardoned, the *Vice* is not *equally tranſmitted* as to *others* that are *not pardoned* in their infancy.

3. And it is not only *Original Sin*, but much additional Pravity, and particular habits of ſin, contracted by practice, which is the impediment of Converſion.

4. Yea, and actual ſin it ſelf, which temptations ſtir up, as well as thoſe habits.

5. And alſo the great guilt which all thoſe acts and habits do contract, by which Gods Grace is yet more forfeited. All theſe are a great diſparity, and ſhew that more Grace is neceſſary to ſome than others.

C. "*Well! Go on with your Anſwer to the main Queſtion?*

B. My Anſwer is, that if you will not turn *Vorſtians*, but will receive the common metaphyſical School Divinity about God, (to deny which, is commonly called *Blaſphemy* by all Parties) I do not yet ſee any place for a diſagreement. For the Queſtion, [*Whether the ſame meaſure of Grace which we call meerly ſufficient, is ever effectual?*] is meant either, 1. Of *Gods Agency* or *Influx* as it is *Agentis*. 2. Or of the *Means*. 3. Or of the *Objects*. 4. Or of *Effects* in the Soul. *

* Malderus in 1.2.q.111. a. 3. d. 8. *Omnis gratia excitans eſt efficax & rata reſpectu ſui effectus formalis quo homo excitatur, & quem ſine conſenſu libero in homine ponit: non enim poteſt gratia pulſare, quin homo pulſetur.* And that exciting Grace is always *ſufficient Grace*, to the Act to which it exciteth, ſee his Reaſons, *ibid. pag.* 462.

And 1. It is plainly the firſt that the moſt Contenders mean, upon a falſe ſuppoſition. They think that God puts forth one degree of ſtrength to one effect, and another degree to another effect; and ſo that *ex parte Dei operantis*, there is a different Operation (in kind or degree) to the producing of different effects: which is blaſphemy in the Judgment of the Philoſophical Divines: For though we are fain to uſe the name of *Act* and *Influx*, yet it is nothing but Gods own *Eſſence* (in *Power, Wiſdom and Will*) by which he produceth all effects. And (to ſay) that Gods Eſſence is divers in *kind* or *degrees*, is contrary to his Simplicity and Immutability. And if all Gods Operation (from the creation of the World to the moving of a Feather, and from the converting of *Saul* to the leaſt gracious action of a Saint,) be done by the ſame kind and degree of power, and there be no difference at all in God or his Agency, but only as in *paſſo* in the effect, then the very ſuppoſition of your diſpute, and the Subject being nothing, you may ſee how wiſely you have long troubled the World.

C. "*But it is unconceiveable that there ſhould be variety in the* Effects, "*when the* Cauſe *hath* no difference at all *in its agency* ex parte ſui.

B. * How now! Did the *Calviniſts* ſo much ſtir up King *James* againſt *Vorſtius*, and condemn him in the Synod of *Dort*; and now muſt we plead againſt you as *Vorſtians?* Did not one God, without any diverſity in himſelf, make all the variety of Creatures in the World? Can he not *unica volitione velle plurima?* And ſo *unica actione plurima efficere?* All multitude proceedeth from perfect Unity.

* *Aureolus* in his *Quodl. lib.2. art.2. pag.*13. (who hath many ſingularities) confidently maintaineth that there is ſome cauſal Action of God (*e.g.* in creation) between his eſſence and the effect: becauſe *poſita cauſa ponitur effectus*: but God did not create from, *&c.* and ſaith, This Action is not God, and yet no part of the Univerſe. But 1. It is utterly unintelligible what that ſhould be: For Action is *virtutis alicujus actio*; and that *virtus* is *ſubſtantiæ virtus*: *Vis* or *Actio creata* ſubſiſt not of themſelves: Therefore an Action that is neither God, nor yet a Creatures Action is unintelligible. 2. And the difficulty will recur upon his own way: For either that middle Action is *one* or *many*, *eternal* or *in time*: If *one* and *eternal*, his own Arguments aſſault it: why then is the Effect temporary and multifarious: If it be *many* Actions and *temporary*, it is all one for *one eternal* God to cauſe many temporary Creatures, as to cauſe *many temporary Actions*. Therefore when all is done, we muſt ſay that *Omnia ſunt ab uno*: Though *how* we cannot comprehend. 3. And Gods Eſſence is an infinite power in Act, intimately preſent with every effect: no other intermediate action need to be imagined.

C. "*Actions*

C. "*Action is not* Res, *but* modus agentis. *And ſo it may be in* "*God.*

B. Some indeed make the three Perſons to be *three Modes* in God, which yet others deny: But otherwiſe it is commonly taken for blaſphemy, to ſay that God who is moſt *ſimple* and *immutable*, hath any true *mode* diſtinct from his ſimple Eſſence, much more that his Eſſence hath diverſity of *modes*. And if you will deny this, we muſt make a whole new method of Divinity, and ſuch as will moſt accommodate the *Arminians*.

C. "*But to ſay that God doth* Influere vel agere, *and to ſay that he is* "God, *are not words of the ſame ſignification.*

B. True: For they are *different Conceptions* that narrow-minded man muſt have about God in whom there is no difference. We have our general conception of Eſſence, and Perfections, and Relation, which we expreſs by the Name G O D; And we have one more *particular*, yea our *modal* conceptions and expreſſions: And to expreſs the *one*, is not to expreſs the other. But that proveth no diverſity in God.

C. "*If* Actio *be in* Paſſo, *then it is not God, but a Creature.*

B. That old ſaying is but *de nomine actionis*. Doubtleſs there is of *created Agents* a certain *modus* by which in *Action* they differ from themſelves; *not-agent* and *agere* ſignifieth ſomewhat diſtinct from the *effect*, which is it that is in *Paſſo*, and is called *Paſſion*. And if it be only *quid creatum*, or the *effect* that you mean, we will after ſpeak of that: But now the queſtion is of the *efficient Cauſality*.

C. "*By this rule we muſt ſay that* ex parte Dei, *to will* Peter's *Salva-* "*tion and* Judas *his Damnation, are all one.*

B. So all Philoſophical Divines affirm: ſave only that the ſame Will unvaried in it ſelf, is variouſly related and denominated *ab extra* from the diverſity of *Objects* and *Effects*.

C. "*At leaſt then we may here* denominate *Gods Operations on ſeveral* "*Souls, as various from the variety of* Effects.

B. You may and muſt do ſo: But then remember that the queſtion is but *de nomine*, and that you confeſs that there is no real diverſity in all Gods Operations on mens Souls *on his part*, no not in *degrees*.

II. And then as to the *means*, though for my part I think that a great diverſity is cauſed by their diverſity, yet you your ſelves will not conſent, that the queſtion about *ſufficiency* and *efficacy* be there laid. 1. Becauſe it is a *moral* operation: and you think that ſome other phyſical operation cauſeth the difference. 2. Becauſe many that live under the moſt excellent means are not converted, when ſome are that had far leſs. 3. Becauſe you ſuppoſe no means *ſufficient* of it ſelf: and no means inſufficient when God will work by it.

But if this muſt be the queſtion, it muſt be remembred that you grant, 1. That *means* are but ſufficient for their own part, and not *ad omnia:* and therefore ſuppoſe ſomewhat in the perſon (diſpoſition or uſe) to make them effectual. 2. And that God is the Author of means: and that in themſelves they are the ſame oft to good and bad. But 3. That the diverſity of mens diſpoſitions maketh the ſame leſs ſuitable to one, which is now ſuitable and conſequently more effectual to another. So that here is the ſame Grace oft times as in the means, made various by variety of Reception. And ſo that which you are to ſay of God herein is this, that when ſome wicked Parents have more vitiated their Poſterity than others, and when ſome wicked men by their practices have more vitiated themſelves, yet God doth not always

give

give them a greater proportion of gracious means * and helps than to others, but leaveth them under the common helps which convert the more prepared Souls. Not that God *always* doth so: For oft times to his Elect he doth as he did by *Paul*, or the *Eunuch*, vouchsafe them extraordinary means. For as a Benefactor he is free, and may do with his own as he list, and may make Vessels of Mercy and Honour of them that deserved worst. And the case of the *Tyrians* and *Sidonians*, compared with theirs of *Capernaum* and *Bethsaida*, doth prove, that *less means* are proportionable to some as being less ill-disposed, when greater to others may be uneffectual.

III. And then as to *objective Grace*, it being the same God, the same Heaven, the same Christ, and the same Promise which is set before all that have the Gospel, this cannot be the Controversie. Though the revealing means be divers with many, so is not the Object, nor the Means to all.

IV. All that remaineth then to be questioned, is the *Effect* which is *subjective Grace*: whether that Grace in one *man* which is but *sufficient*, be *efficient* in another? or in the same man at several times. And here by this *subjective Grace* is meant either, 1. The *vis impressa*. 2. Or the Power. 3. Or the Act produced. 4. Or the Disposition or Habit.

The two latter are shut out of the question; which is not whether the Act or Habit be sufficient and effectual, but whether the *Grace* be so that is to cause them.

Whether this *vis impressa* be always caused by *means* with Gods *Power* set home (as the impress of a Signature by the *Arm* and *Seal*) or be caused immediately by God, without any proper means, the word being but a Concomitant, and not mediate Operator, is made a Controversie by some: But he that well considereth the Scripture here abouts, and the experience of man, will be likelier to think that it is God by *means* that ordinarily maketh the impress on the Soul, and that the same impress is the effect of both, though extraordinarily God can do without means. For 1. It is most likely that God should work on man most agreeably to his nature, and to his subject state under God his Governor. 2. And Christ himself as our Teacher and Example, and all his Gospel, are appointed to this use. 3. The Ministry and Ordinances are appointed to the same end; And Ministers commanded to fit their teaching to that end. 4. No man can prove that ever any came to actual Knowledge, Faith or Love, but by some means. Experience telleth Gods Servants that he worketh by them. 5. The most apt and powerful usually have best success; and those prosper most in Grace that use means best, and those speed worst that use them least. 6. God strictly commandeth the use of the *means* as *means* for that end, that his Grace may be wrought by them. 7. God promiseth his blessing on the means: *Act.* 26. 17, 18. *I send thee to open their eyes*, &c. *Rom.* 1. 16. *The Gospel is the Power of God to Salvation.* 2 Tim. 4. 16. *Thou shalt save thy self and them that hear thee.* Jam. 6. last. *He that converteth a Sinner, saveth a Soul from death*, &c. 8. When God forsaketh a Nation, by taking away the means, he usually forsaketh them as to further Grace. 9. The Devil seemeth to know this by his earnest opposition to a holy powerful Ministry, and other means throughout the World; so that we may say with *Cyprian, Epist.* 69. *ad Pupian. Ut etiam qui non credebant Deo Episcopum Constituenti, vel Diabolo credebant Episcopum proscribenti.*

But

* *Protestant* Divines do commonly conjoyn the operation of the *Spirit* and *Word* as well as *Papists*, and in some cases more.

Thom. *docet* q. 22. de Ver. a. 8. *Deum inclinare Voluntatem ad aliquid appetendum, eam efficaciter & physice prædeterminando, non solum immediate, sed etiam mediate aliqua entitate, recepta in voluntate: & ex mente* D. Tho. *Deus movet omnes causas secundas, & eas ad suas operationes, ita ut etiam quando applicat voluntatem, aliquid operatur in illam per modum transeuntis.*] Alvarez de Aux. disp. 23. p. 114.

But whether it be by *means* or *not*, it must be somewhat different from *Gods* own Essence, which is imprinted or communicated. And to get a formal conception of it, what it is, if it be not the *Power*, *Disposition*, *Act* or *Habit*, is past mans reach. Whatsoever it is, this is certain, 1. That God doth not *give an Act* as a thing pre-existent; but giving Faith is but causing us to believe, or do that act our selves, which was none till we performed it. 2. That *quoad effectum disposed Power* and *Act* also, are more than *Power* and *Disposition* without the act. 3. Undoubtedly the same degree of impress, or influx, or force, which causeth one man to believe or act, is not sufficient to cause any other worse disposed man to believe or act: nor the same man when he is more ill disposed and hindered. 4. If we put the case of men equally disposed, it is impossibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally disposed; Nay it is most probable that they are not: Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cause a difference, than their countenances have of particles, making the wonderful diversity which we see. Nor is the same man long equally disposed. 5. Men equally disposed (if such there were) may have unequal impediments without, and in their bodies, and temptations, which may cause them to need unequal help of Grace. 6. The same individual Impress which causeth no more than a *Power*, causeth not the Act also; For that is a contradiction; to cause the Act and not to cause it. 7. But a *less degree* of *impulse* or help may cause the act in one, when a greater degree causeth it not in another. 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in all other diversities in the World, by the diverse *receptive dispositions* of the Patient. Which made *Johan. Sarisberiensis (in Nugis Curial.)* and many School-men to liken God (with some acknowledged difference) in his Operations to the Sun, which by one invaried efflux of motive, *illuminative* and *calefactive power*, causeth innumerable varieties of effects, as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Dispositions. 9. But all *good disposition* or preparation is of God; But by such ways of operation as we are searching after. But all ill disposition is from our selves. 10. To conclude, God giveth men sometimes as much *power* to *Will* or *Act*, when they *do not*, as they have when they do. But (usually) not an *equal prediisposition*, some having more indisposed themselves; which is to be changed by contrary acts. But whether *de facto* men equally *enabled*, *prediisposed*, *helped* and *hindered*, do yet without any cause but their own *free-will it self* act or will variously, is a question that these Controversies need not come to: That such (were there such in the World) *could do it*, I take for granted, what-ever they do.

The Controversie is well known which *Hobbes* hath raised in the World, who saith, That to be *free* and to be *willing* is all one; and that every act of the Will is as truly necessitated by physical premotion, as the motions of any Engine are; And that we talk of liberty and contingency

Dr. *Fairfax*, *Of the Bulk*, &c. *of the World*, pag. 5, 6, 7, *&c.* [Though God be the Maker of every *Being* that is physicaly so, it follows not that he is so of every Being that is morally so: It is enough that God is the Maker of the Power to do evil (which being good, may spring from him,) *&c.* [All that God doth towards sin, is to leave us to our selves, to bring it forth if we will: and instead of driving on to it, as a fellow-helper or procatarktick cause, he draws from it, and towards the good, with unspeakable endearments of wooing, and drives from it by forbidding the Evil with all that earnestness of threatning, which may beget in man the utmostness of dread: Nor is he any nearer the physical cause of it, than to give that good power which is not the cause at all, as it looks towards him: for by giving this power he is at the same time the evil is done, as much the cause of the good that is not done: therefore he is not the cause at all.

Besides, this power is not only good, but also needful: For though the the perfection of the Will in the next life, will not be in a wavering alike towards Good and Evil, but only in a self-willingness to Good; yet in this life I think it mainly does and must. For this is a life of doing or believing, as it looks on to reward in that to come: and that is a life of rewarding as it looks back to doing or believing here, *&c.*]

[Hence we may answer the old πόθεν τὸ κακόν? For as sin is a moral thing, *&c.* unbounded Wisdom and Goodness having laid out endless happiness as a reward for Obedience, and endless wretchedness as punishment for sin; without this Obedience there could be no Heaven: without Sin no Hell. And without a power, not to do in both, there could be neither: So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holiness, man must needs have power to make himself wretched for sin: That evil should always flow from evil in a chain of Breeders is a great misunderstanding.]

Object. Then man may thank himself too for all the good he does that Being, as much of him as the other, *&c.* *Answ.* It follows not: For 1. Of all the good that man doth, God is still the moral Cause, egging on to it by all, *&c.* 2. And the same Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done, doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind, renewing the Will, healing the spring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it; and in a word, making it every way more it self, God must be more an Owner than man; And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will, because it flowed from Divine Goodness. [That which is good in man by way of Off-spring, being so in God by way of Well-spring.] *Ibid. p.* 10.

tingency in the dark, not that there is any such thing indeed, but when we know not the train of Causes, we use those names, which signifie but our ignorance: And that the first Cause and other superior Causes do by premotion as much necessitate each *Volition*, as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow. And the *Dominicans predetermination*, and *Camero's necessitation* by a *train of second Causes* is the same I think. But I think God hath made a very good use (by his over-ruling ordination) of the Doctrine of *Hobbes*, (learnedly and timerously, or cautelously seconded by *Gassendus*, and improved by *Benedictus Spinosa*, an Apostate Jew in his *Tractatus Politico-theologicus.*) For the *goodness* and *learning* of such worthy men as were *Alvarez*, *Twisse*, *Camero*, (in all other points moderate and admirably judicious) hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine, which *Hobbes* and *Spinosa* having plainly and nakedly propounded, is now detested by almost all good men. For from thence they have plainly inferred the subversion of all morality as distinct from physical motion, and consequently of all true Religion.

I deny not that I find my self the Controversie in it self exceeding difficult; and that I have not been without *temptations* to their Opinion, nor *yet am:* And that indeed, all pretended middle ways between *Hobbes*, his *Necessitation Physical*, and *true Free-will*, are but fancies as far as I can perceive.

And if I leave true *Free-will*, I must turn to their necessitation. I confess their arguing is very plausible; that there is no Effect without a Cause; and that when ever the Will chooseth one thing, and refuseth another, there is some antecedent Cause in the power, disposition, or external things: and that the same Cause in the same state and mode, having no difference in it self, doth always produce the same effect: Otherwise the diversity should have no cause: And that the Will being in the same disposition, and having all the same objects, helps, impediments and other circumstances, will have the same acts.

All this is plausible: But 1. If I receive it, I must let go almost all Religion (as well as Christianity); of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion. And we must not reduce certainties to the obscurest unsearchable uncertainties.

2. And in God himself their foundation is confuted: For he that is the first Cause *eodem modo se habens sine ulla diversitate, unicus plurima, immo omnia causat.* Therefore their Principle is false.

3. And finding man made after the Image of God, not only as holy, but as *man*, (*Gen.* 6.) I have great reason to think that *Free-will* is part of his *natural Image*, and that as God is a *causa unica plurimorum*, so may *Free-will* be: And that as a God is *causa prima entium*, so *Free-will* may be a kind of *causa prima* (not *actionis qua talis*, but) of the *comparative moral species* of its own acts, (as choosing *this thing* rather than that) which is no addition to real entity, but a wonderful *mode* of it, which man cannot tell whether he should call *something* or *nothing*.

4. I say therefore that here is no Effect without a Cause: *Free-will* may be the cause of various Effects, without a various prædisposition.

C. "*Doth not the Will act as it is disposed to act?*

B. That it acteth not always according to *Habits*, which are more than dispositions, is certain by experience. For objects oft prevail against habits; and habits do not necessitate.

C. "*That*

C. "*That is becauſe the* Will *is* otherwiſe diſpoſed *by ſome* contrary "ſtronger habits: *As either by the habit of* ſenſuality, *or the natural* incli- "nation *to* felicity *as ſuch: which may bear down weaker particular habits* "*or inclinations.*

B. No doubt but the Will is *quædam natura*, and hath its natural inclination to good and felicity, which is its *pondus* and radical diſpoſition to its acts; from which every act is cauſed that is done. But I ſay not that ever it goeth contrary to theſe radical neceſſitating inclinations to goodneſs. But *de mediis* it may have inferior particular habits which it oft goeth againſt.

C. "*That is becauſe the* Underſtanding *conceiveth that another thing is* "*beſt; and ſo it is neceſſitated by the Underſtanding.*

B. The Underſtanding *guideth*, but doth not *neceſſitate*. That we *Will rightly* is cauſed by the Underſtanding (as that I hit the way is by my *eye-ſight*) but not that I exerciſe the Act it ſelf. Though we *Will not without* or *againſt* the laſt ſtrongeſt dictate of the practical Intellect; yet 1. Note that the Intellect hath divers perceptions at once (which is not commonly noted). It doth at once act a deep ſimple apprehenſion that *e.g. bonum ſenſible* is pleaſant, and good, and amiable; and that *bonum ſpirituale* which cometh into competition, is yet better, may be at the ſame time perceived, with ſo low, dull and weak an apprehenſion, as that the Will may tenaciouſly ſo adhere to the firſt ſimple apprehenſion by a ſtrong ſimple Volition, as that the ſecond weak comparate apprehenſion may not move it to Election. 2. For we find that it is not the objective truth of an apprehenſion which turneth the Will, without ſome anſwerable *clearneſs* and *livelineſs*: And as a Preacher that dreamingly ſpeaketh of great things uncontroulably, but coldly, moveth not the hearers, ſo is it with the Intellect it ſelf. And 3. The Will being *principium exercitii can hinder the Underſtanding* from perceiving truth, by hindering it from *thinking* of the evidence. 4. And the Will it ſelf can ſuſpend its own act, contrary to the underſtandings ſluggiſh dictate. And *not acting* when it can (towards *God*, and true goodneſs,) is the beginning of all the diſorders of the Soul.

C. "*But ſaith* Camero, *&c. the* Will *is* appetitus rationalis: *And if* "*it act againſt reaſon, it acteth not as a Will: And ſo alſo if it act* without "reaſon: *Therefore it* cannot *forbid the Intellect to think (by nolition)* "*unleſs the Intellect firſt ſay*, Non cogitandum eſt. *Nor can it chooſe but* "velle cogitare *if the Intellect ſay* cogitandum eſt: *Otherwiſe the Will were* "*a bruitiſh, and not a rational appetite.*

B. 1. The Will acteth by reaſon, when it cleaveth to that good which is ſimply apprehended by the Intellect. The ſimple apprehenſion goeth firſt; *e. g.* [That this Fruit offered *Eve* is good and deſirable]: This is true, and here the *Will* adhereth to it as good. Then ſhould the underſtanding think *comparatively* of a *greater Good*, and ſay [This is evil as forbidden and as it hindereth a greater Good:] And this it performeth not, becauſe the Will is here the beginner of the Sin: not perhaps by a poſitive nolition or forbidding the Intellect the *comparing Thought*; (for that it doth not without ſhew of reaſon) but by neglecting or omitting to excite the Underſtanding *ad exercitium*; which it is brought to in *Adam* and *Eve*, 1. By diverſion, being before taken up with the Creature. 2. By voluntary neglect or ſloth. For the Will can *omit* its act without reaſon, and yet be a rational appetite. And the beginning of the Sin may be this omiſſion of the Will, or its over tenacious adhering to ſenſible good, apprehended truly by the Intellect.

2. And we have not ſo much acquaintance with the faculties of our

own Souls, as to be ſure that *ſenſe*, and *paſſion*, and *phantaſie* can do nothing immediately on the *Will* to help or hinder it. We find that the Will eaſily followeth Paſſion, and very hardly goeth againſt it.

3. Nay we are not certain, but there may be more bruitiſhneſs and leſs reaſon in many Sins, than moſt imagine; and that the violence of the ſenſitive appetite and paſſion, may not prevail both with the *Will* to forbear the excitation of the Intellect, and with the Intellect to omit its oppoſite Judgment, though neither *Will* or *Reaſon* in the firſt inſtant give conſent. There are ſome alſo that think that we are ſcarce ſure that the *Will* and the ſenſitive Appetite are two ſeveral faculties, rather than *one* between two guides. I ſay not as they: But this I will ſay, that I grow daily more confident, that they that make the rational and ſenſitive Soul in man to be two, and their Brethren, that without all ſhew of proof, magiſterially face us down, that the Soul at death puts off all ſenſe (becauſe it exerciſeth it not by the ſame Organs which were adapted to the Bodies uſe), do both of them hainouſly wrong the Church, and darken many Truths, and open the way to Infidelity.

C. "*But you cannot lay the beginning of ſin on the* Wills *omiſſion, to put* "*the Intellect on the comparing thoughts; for the Intellect can underſtand* "againſt our Wills *(as many know that which they had rather be ignorant* "*of): And therefore needs not the Will* ad exercitium.

B. The Intellect *may be forced:* But *it is not ſo always:* Things *ſenſible*, and *near at hand*, may *force* the Intellect: But things *unſeen* and *diſtant* muſt be voluntarily thought on, and ſtudied, or elſe they will not be underſtood.

C. "*If* e. g. *Eves Will had ſaid to the Intellect*, [Cogita Compara-"tive] *either the Intellect muſt firſt have ſaid to the Will*, [Comparative "cogitandum eſt] *or not: If not, then that* Will *would have been no* "rational Will. *If yea, then the* Will *muſt have* conſented, *or elſe been* "*unwilling againſt reaſon, and ſo be bruitiſh ſtill. Therefore Sin muſt be-*"*gin at the Intellect.*

B. 1. The Intellect did not ſay [*Comparative cogitandum eſt*] not only becauſe it was not *commanded* ſo to ſay by the Will; but becauſe the *Will* was ſo *entangled* before by the *ſimple Love* of the Creature, as diverted the thoughts from the Creator. 2. Suppoſe the Intellect did ſay coldly [*Comparative cogitandum eſt*] the Will did neglect it; being not *neceſſitated* thereby, and ſo the Intellect went no further.

C. "*If the Will do* velle bonum qua bonum neceſſario, *it muſt needs* "*neceſſarily* velle bonum cognitum, *and ſo muſt follow the Intellect.*

B. It doth neceſſarily *velle bonum quando vult*, i. e. *non malum*; but it doth not neceſſarily *velle hoc, vel illud bonum inter plurima:* Nay though the Intellect ſay nothing againſt it, yea ſomething for it, the pre-engaged Will may neglect it. And yet poſſibly *Eves* Intellect did perform one comparative act which occaſioned her further ſin, *viz.* [If thou turn thy thoughts towards Gods prohibition, thou wilt loſe the pleaſant good before thee]. And this was true.

C. "*But if* Eve's Will *firſt over tenaciouſly ſtuck to the forbidden* "*Creature, when the Underſtanding never ſaid, It muſt do ſo; In ſo doing* "*it was not a Will, but bruitiſh Appetite.*

B. The Underſtanding ſaid truly, [*It is pleaſant and Appetible*] and ſo the *Will* in its initial deſire ſinned not. But that it looked *no further*, and *excited not* the Intellect to *remember*, and it ſelf to deſire more to *pleaſe God*, was by an abuſe of its power and liberty of ſelf-determining, and ſo the ſenſible good prevailed, becauſe the ſuperior good was forgotten and neglected. And the Will may thus ſuſpend its act after an intel-

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lectual perception, without being bruitish, though it so far disobey Reason its guide.

C. "*These things are exceeding intricate and difficult, for all that you* "*say.*

B. They are so: * But forget not, that the great difficulty is between us and the *Hobbists* or *Infidels*, and *Fatists*, and not between the true *Christians* among themselves, as to our present Controversies. I confess that the confuting of their Opinion, that [all Volitions are necessitated unavoidably by Gods Operation] is a far harder work than the reconciling of the *Lutherans* and *Calvinists*, who go upon no such Principles.

Tell me, Is this it that you would come to or not? If you once perswade me that God causeth all sinful Volitions as necessarily as he causeth a Tree to grow, and that man can no more avoid them, and that *liberty of Will* signifieth no more than *velle*, or not *nolens velle*, and so that God is the prime irresistible cause of all Sin, as much as of all Good, so far as it is capable of a Cause.] I must needs next believe, 1. That God hateth not his own Work: yea that he loveth it. 2. That he hateth no man for it. 3. That moral Good and Evil is nothing in man, but such as obeying or disobeying (proportionably) in a Horse or Dog. 4. Yea far less; because man doth but as my pen which writeth as I move it, in respect to God: But so is not my Horse or Dog to me. 5. And how then to judge of all the Scripture, the Ministry, of the Incarnation and Death of Christ, of the Duties of a Christian life, of Hell, *&c.* it's easie to perceive, *viz.* That as God differenceth Men and Toads meerly because he *will* do so; even so doth he the good and the bad in the World: and that Sin is no evil any way but to our selves: and that God is as much the cause of it as of Sickness; and is as well pleased with the Worlds Infidelity and Impiety, as with the Churches Sanctity; And that he will no otherwise damn men for Sin, than arbitarily to make such baser than others, as Dogs are than men; *Benedictus Spinosa* hath given you the Consectaries more at large.

O how heartlesly should I preach and pray, how carelesly should I live, if once you brought me to this Opinion, that all sin is the unresistible Work of God (so far as it is a work) as much as holiness is?

C. "*If there be no middle between* Free-will *and this Impiety (as I con-* "*fess I cannot disprove your Consectaries) it's time for us to turn our studies* "*against the common Enemies of all Religion and Morality, instead of con-* "*tending with one another: specially when they have so much to say.*

B. And do you think they do well, and friendly by the Church, who take these mens part, and own their Cause in the foundation; and entangle poor Souls in such intricate difficulties; when we that know not the least of Gods Creatures, or the mysteries of any of his Works, do little know all the quick and intricate actions of our own Souls.

In a word, man hath more power to good than he useth, and that power is called sufficient or necessary Grace to the act; though there be many difficulties which no one of either side can resolve.

* The same I say of objective and intellectual necessitation of the Will: saith *H. Kipping* truly, *Inst. Philos. Nat. li. 9. c. 10. pag. 416. Errant Scholæ reformatæ doctores qui asserunt voluntatem ad actum suum determinari a judicio intellectus, ita ut voluntatis libertas nulla sit, constricta vero sit ad intellectus ductum a quo semper determinatur,* Joh. Camero, Marr. Schogkius, Hornbeck. Maccovius, Heerbord, *Hos prolixe & bene refellit Episcopius.*

The ſecond Crimination.

So Dr. *Twiſſe* frequently repeateth that meer *poſſe credere* is but Nature and not Grace, becauſe it is equally a *poſſe non credere*. But 1. A natural power reprieved by Grace, and preſerved and given for gracious ends. 2. And many and great helps of Grace to excite and rectifie it, may be called an effect of Grace.

C. " *But I fear many of them with* Pelagius *by* GRACE *do mean no-* " *thing but* Nature it ſelf, *at leaſt when they ſpeak of the* Heathens, *who* " *they ſay have ſome kind of Grace.*

B. Turn your eyes a little from the name of *Pelagius*, and every thing elſe that uſeth to blind Diſputers with prejudice and partiality, and then anſwer me theſe following queſtions.

Queſt. 1. Do you think that Mercy contrary to ſinful Commerit is not properly Grace?

C. " *I confeſs it is?*

B. Queſt. 2. Is not the whole frame of *Humane Nature* (and our Utenſils) put into the hand and power of Chriſt the Redeemer, to be managed by him to his Mediatory ends, *Joh.* 17. 2. *Math.* 28. 19, 20. *Joh.* 13. 3. *Epheſ.* 1. 22, 23. *Phil.* 2. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. *For this end he died, roſe and revived, that he might be Lord both of the Dead and Living.* Rom. 14. 9. Joh. 5. 22, 23, 24. *The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all Judgment to the Son*, &c. And is not the very reprieval of the World from deſerved ruine and miſery ſo many thouſand years an Act of Grace? and *Nature* now *continued, uſed and improved by Grace*, and ſo far may be ſaid to be of Grace?

C. " *This is plain truth, and muſt not be denied.*

B. Queſt. 3. Is it not undeſerved Mercy to all Mankind, that ever ſince *Adam*'s Sentence, *Gen.* 3. 15. they are all ruled by a Law of Grace, and not the Law of Innocency alone, and by that Law of Grace muſt all be judged?

C. " *If you before evinced that* any thing *is truly mercy to the Reprobate,* " *I muſt confeſs it. But I have not before ſo much thought of this, what* " *Law the World is under, as the caſe deſerveth: But I remember* Camero " *in the fragments of his diſpute with* Courcellæus *taken by* Teſtardus, " *though he deny not that the Covenant of Grace was made with all mankind* " *in* Adam *and* Noah, *yet ſaith, That by or for their* nearer Parents ſins the " Infants of Infidels are out of that Covenant.

Vid. *Pet.* Martyr in *Rom.* 5. confeſſing *Auguſtine*'s judgment.

B. 1. It's well you note, that it is not only *Auguſtine* (*Enchir. ad Laurent.*) and I that are for the Imputation of nearer Parents ſin, in ſome ſort, as well as *Adam*'s. 2. He ſpeaketh there of the *Covenant as mutual*, and not as a *Law*, or an *offered Covenant*, or Divine Diſpoſition, *Actio*, (of which *Grotius* ſpeaketh at large in his *Preface* to *Annotat.* in *Evang.*) And ſo I ſay the ſame as *Camero*: which is but this, that though it be a Law or offered Covenant of Grace, and not the ſole Law of Innocency, which the whole World are now under as Subjects to be ruled and judged by it. Yet no Parent that conſenteth not, hath any right to the promiſed benefits, nor is in it as a mutual Covenant (unleſs as any counterfeiting conſent may oblige themſelves) nor are the Children of ſuch Parents any true Heirs of the ſaid promiſed benefits for the ſake of remote Anceſtors, as long as their neareſt Parents are Infidels. This is all that *Camero* there maintaineth.

* *Le Blank* tells you that *Polanus* diſtinguiſheth Grace into natural and ſupernatural, *Theſ.* 27. *diſt. Grat.* 2.

Queſt. 3. Are not all the teachings, helps, means, time, and innumerable Mercies which *Heathens* and *Infields* have contrary to their Commerits, and conſequently truly Grace? *

C. " *They are at beſt but common Grace. But I am loth to grant that* " *Nature is ſo much, if I could deny it.*

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B. I am ſorry that unwillingneſs and willingneſs can do ſo much with you about theſe matters. But I pray tell me, *Queſt.* 4. What is it that you mean by *Nature?*

C. "*I mean that fixed order of being and operation which God put all* "*things in at their Creation at the beginning.*

B. You have done as the Incendiaries of the Church have done from the beginning of contentious Diſputes: you have choſen a word unexplained to make a matter of reproach of, which hath ſo many ſignifications, and is ſo uncertainly uſed, that Philoſophers themſelves, even in their greateſt accurateneſs, know not what to fix upon; though there are few words which they are more concerned to be agreed in, if they could. But where the *thing* is unknown, no wonder if there be diſcord about the *Name*. *Fortun. Licetus* alone *de natura primo movente* may ſuffice to evince this. But I perceive you take not *Nature* for *Principium motus et quietis*, &c. nor for the *eſſence* of things, *matter* or *form*, or *both*: nor with *Scotus de potentia* for the *paſſive power*, nor in other ſenſes uſually intended by various Writers: But for the *created ſtatus & ordo rerum*, and the *motus thereby alone cauſed*. And if this be NATURE with you, you caſt your ſelf into inextricable difficulties to know what you ſay. For 1. We are very much ignorant of ſecond Cauſes, and their concatenation and co-operations; who ever took in pieces this great Engine of the Univerſe (as men do a Clock or Watch) to find out the form and compagination of each part? or ever underſtood it. 2. Who can tell certainly what is done by this compagination of Cauſes and co-operation according to its primitive ſtate, who knoweth not the whole Engine, but ſome parts alone (not ſo much as one ſand is to the whole Earth) ſeeing that it is the whole that co-operateth to the fore-deſcribed motions? And 3. Who knoweth how far God hath *fixed* the ſtate and operation of ſecond Cauſes? and how far he is pleaſed to alter them from their firſt ſtate and courſe of motion, or daily doth it? 4. And who is ſo well acquainted with the ſtate of the Univerſe in the Creation, and the ſtate of it now, as to be able to make an accurate compariſon, and tell whether or how much it is ſince then altered? or whether all things continue juſt as in the beginning. 5. Yea it is certain, that a great alteration was made both on mans Soul and Body, and on the Earth by the ſin of *Adam*, and the Curſe. 6. And it is certain, that God maketh much uſe of the Miniſtry of *free Agents* in the affairs of the World, even of Angels, Devils and Men, whoſe voluntary contingent acts (and conſequently their effects) go not as a Watch or Clock in one conſtant natural courſe of motion. How then can you tell here what is *natural* as to a great part of the changes upon man?

Media autem deſtinata & propria & vivida ſunt verbum et ſpiritus. Quibus etiam jungi poſſunt bona & mala hujus animalis vitæ, quibus Deus ad eundem finem utitur. Armin. Diſput. Privat. Theſ. 41. Sect. 8.

Author fidei eſt ſpiritus ſanctus quem filius mittit a patre tanquam advocatum & vicarium ſuum, qui ipſius cauſam in mundo & contra mundum agat. Inſtrumentum eſt evangelium ſeu verbum fidei, continens ſenſum de Deo & Chriſto quem ſpiritus intellectui proponit & perſuadet. Arminius Diſput. Privat. Theſ. 44. Sect. 6.

C. "*You would make me believe that* WORDS *are ſo defective as to* "*delude us and befool us all, and that nothing men ſay can be underſtood.* "*Doth not all the World diſtinguiſh between* Nature *and* Grace?

B. The vanity of ſpeculative Sciences, and the miſery of Mankind thereby, and the reaſon of *Paul's* contempt of the Philoſophy then predicated, and the cauſe of all our love-killing Contentions, cannot be

Sine hoc ſpeciali auxilio Gratiæ nihil boni poſſe ab ulla creatura rationali

ſeri eſt certiſſimum. Sed an hoc auxilium Gratiæ ſit voluntatis Divinæ volentis illud abſolute communicare, & per illud communicatum abſolute bonum operari, eſt in controverſia poſitum Theologis: nec immerito, cum vox abſolute in Scripturis non ſuo ſtet. &c. Armin. exam Perkinſ. de prædeſt. Sect. 6. pag. 501.

Among many others, read but *Vaſquez in* 1 *Tho. & Pet. a S. Joſeph de Auxil. divin.* (*in Theſ. univerſ. & ſpec. & mor.*) *& Ruiz, & Bellarmin. de Auxil.* And you may ſee how much ſupernaturality the *Papiſts* ſtand for: Indeed for more than the *Proteſtants* in ſome caſes, as in aſſerting the ſupernaturality of *Adam's* firſt Righteouſneſs, &c. And many of the Schoolmen ſpeak higher of Infuſion than moſt *Proteſtants*, ſo that this notion will not prove the difference.

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readilier aſſigned than by charging them on the lamentable defectiveneſs and ambiguity of *words* next to the darkneſs of Humane Intellect. But the diſtinguiſhing of *Nature* and *Grace* is needful; but muſt be rightly underſtood. 1. Principally as *Nature* ſignifieth the *conſtitution* of *man* and *all things as made by their Creator*, and GRACE the *medela* or medicinal Operation of God, by which he recovereth the lapſed ſinful and curſed World. 2. And as any *Motus*, *Action* or Change, can be ſaid to be from the firſt *natural Principles* of *Action*, ſo far they may be called natural: If from Nature alone, they are only natural. But as they come from *recovering Grace* they are gracious: If from Grace alone, without Nature, they are only gracious (whether there be any ſuch, or any but Miracles, I paſs by.) But as they are by and from Nature, either ſanctified, or ordered and over-ruled by Grace, ſo they are both *natural* and *gracious* in ſeveral reſpects.

C. "*This ſeemeth plain and true: and what do you hence infer.*

B. 1. All degrees of the *medela* or *recovery* of *Nature* are ſo many degrees of Grace.

2. *Ex parte Dei efficientis*, the *operations* of *Grace* and *Nature* really are all one, and differ not: That is, God doth *per eſſentiam operate* in both, and his operating Eſſence is the ſame. But as the *nature* of a thing in its original or conſtitutive Principles are one thing, and the recovery of it from its vitiated ſtate another; ſo relatively the ſame God, and his Will and Operations are to be variouſly denominated; even as he is the God and Fountain of Nature, and as he is the God and Giver of Grace.

3. I think it is paſt mans ſkill to prove that moſt Miracles themſelves have no part of natural Operation in them. It is ſufficient if God interpoſe and over-rule the matter by any other immediate Operation of his own: yea or that he put natural Operations themſelves out of that courſe, in which they would have gone if he had not ſo altered it.

4. By this you may plainly ſee that though all *natural Operations* are not *gracious*; *All gracious Operations are alſo natural*, except the higheſt ſort of Miracles: that is, they are the Actions of ſome natural Principles, ordered by Gods gracious Will to a gracious end, in a gracious manner. I alſo except ſuch Operations of God alone, in which he uſeth no ſecond Cauſe, but himſelf immediately without any inſtrument produceth the effect. But note, 1. That this is only in the Reception of the Divine immediate influx it ſelf on the Soul, antecedent to our very firſt Acts: For our firſt Act (*e. g.* of Faith) is from Gods Influx on our own *natural faculties*, and ſo from thoſe faculties themſelves as ſuſcitated by God. 2. Note that this is no diſtinction between *natural* and *gracious* Operations, to be ſo *immediate*: For God doth as immediately operate in the natural: As in the Creation he made all the World by ſuch immediate efflux, ſo he ſtill operateth immediately on the firſt created Cauſe (whatever that is), and ſay almoſt all Divines) even when he uſeth ſecond Cauſes, he himſelf is as near the Recipient and Effect, *& immediatione ſuppoſiti & virtutis*, as if he had uſed no ſecond Cauſe at all: The difference being not in his *diſtance* or *proximity*, but in his *uſing or not uſing* a ſecond Cauſe together with himſelf.

5. Moreover it is utterly unknown to us how far God operateth without any ſecond Cauſe, even on the Soul it ſelf. As we know that Devils

Vocatio ad communionem Chriſti & beneficiorum ejus, eſt gratioſa actio Dei qua homines peccatores reos condemnationis & ſub dominio peccati conſtitutos, ex animalis vitæ conditione, ex mundi hujus inquinamentis & corruptelis, novat per verbum & ſpiritum ſuum ad vitam ſupernaturalem in Chriſto per pœnitentiam & fidem conſequendam, ut in illo tanquam capite ſuo adeo diſtinato & ordinato uniri, & beneficiorum ejus communione frui queant, ad gloriam Dei, & ipſorum ſalutem. Armin. Diſput. Privat. Theſ. 42. Sect. 1.

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do much on the wicked, ſo we know not how far he uſeth the Angels or ſuperior Intelligences in operating on the Elect: And yet we will not go ſo far as *Ariſtotle* did, in aſcribing to the *primum mobile*. But as God is ſaid to write with his own Finger the Law on the two Tables, and yet that Law was delivered by Angels; and as God is ſaid to appear and ſpeak to *Adam* and many others, when yet it muſt needs be *quid creatum*, which Humane ſenſes could *ſee* and *hear*; Even ſo we know not when God operateth on the Soul, what ſpiritual Miniſtry he may uſe.

And now tell me again, what it is that you accuſe them of, that you think turn *Nature* into *Grace*?

C. "*According to your explication I muſt mean nothing elſe, but that the* "name *of* Grace *is given by them to* Nature alone, *when the* natural *opera-* "*tion is not gracious.*

B. Wherein is it that they *thus* err? Inſtance in particulars.

C. 1. "*When they make Gods common Providences to be Grace: 2. When* "*they make the preaching of the Goſpel to be Grace. 3. When they make* "*Reaſon and Free-will to be Grace.*

B. I. Do you not believe that all Gods *merciful Providences* are acts of *Grace*? Are they not *mercy contrary* to *merit*, which is the definition of Grace in the general? And have they not an aptitude and tendency *in medelam animarum to mans Recovery*, which is the *ſpecification* of Evangelical *Grace*?

C. "*Yes, I grant all this: But we take* Grace *for the inward ſaving* "*work of Gods ſanctifying Spirit on the Soul.*

B. 1. You do not only ſtrive about *words*; but perverſly abuſe words, that you may have matter of ſtrife. Will you confine the general name of Grace, not only to a *Species*, but to *one inferior Species*, and then accuſe your Brethren for giving the name to other Species? As if you would accuſe them for calling any beſides a Philoſopher or a Souldier a man? And 2. Do you know either *Jeſuite*, *Lutherane* or *Arminian*, that holdeth that outward common Providences are inward Sanctification?

C. "*Let that paſs, and go to the ſecond.*

B. II. Do you doubt whether the preaching of the Goſpel be Grace? either as to the general or ſpecial definition?

C. "*I deny not that the definitions agree to it; but I doubt whether it be* "*a fit name, when uſe hath appropriated it to the inward Sanctification.*

B. 1. Here again you are convinced of ſtriving about *words*: 2. And till you are forced, you confeſs it not, but make it ſeem a material difference. 3. You confeſs that your Adverſaries name agreeth with the definition. 4. When you have abuſed the name your ſelves by erroneous confinement of it to one ſpecies of Grace, you then plead your own ſinful *uſe* as a reaſon ſufficient againſt Etymology, Definition, the cuſtom of all the Chriſtian Churches from the beginning to this day; yea and againſt Scripture it ſelf. 5. For the Scripture ſo uſeth the word, as you may ſee (ſometimes for merciful Providences, ſometimes for the Goſpel, ſometimes for Church-Priviledges, for Gifts, ſometimes for Favour, and oft for recovering mercy in the general) *Ezra* 9. 8. *Zech.* 4. 7. *Job.* 1. 16, 17. *Act.* 4. 33. & 14. 3. & 20. 24, 32. *Rom.* 1. 5. & 5. 2. & 20. & 6. 14. 15. & 11. 5, 7. & 12. 3. 6. & 15. 15. 1 *Cor.* 10. 30. 2 *Cor.* 8. 19. *Gal.* 1. 6. 15. & 5. 4. *Eph.* 3. 8. & 4. 8. & 4. 7. *Phil.* 1. 7. *Jud.* 4. 1 *Pet.* 4. 10. & 5. 12. *Tit.* 2, 11. *Eph.* 3. 2, 7. *Col.* 1. 6. 2 *Cor.* 6. 1.

C. "*Go on to the third inſtance.*

B. 1.

B. 1. Who do you know that calleth *Reaſon* and *natural Free-will* in it ſelf conſidered, by the name of Grace: I know not any ſuch? 2. But 1. Reaſon as *reprieved* in order to *recovery*, and Reaſon as *illuminated* by *common Grace*, (and ſo *Free-will*) are certainly a ſort of common Grace. 2. And *Reaſon* as *ſpecially illuminated*, and the *Will* as *freed* from *Sin*, are *ſpecial Grace*.

But now you ſee the injury of your Charge, will you ſearch and fear, leſt even by contending, it's you that have run into worſer than the Error which you declaim againſt as other mens. Is it not you that call a great deal of Gods *Grace* by the name of *Nature*, yea ſometimes of *Wrath*; and as I before evinced, deny much common Grace to be any Grace at all? And who wrongeth God more? He that honoureth his Works of *Nature* with an undue title (of Grace)? or he that utterly diſhonoureth his Grace, and ſaith that it is no Grace?

The third Crimination.

C. "*They make Grace to be but a* moral Operation *or ſwaſion, and ſeem* "*to deny that phyſical operation which is eminently Grace: or at leaſt take* "*it to be but a phyſical uſe of moral means; And indeed I doubt whether* "*ſome of them confeſs any other Grace than the Goſpel and other means of* "*Grace? And ſo the Spirit muſt work only on the Preacher, or on the ſound* "*of words, if he work not immediately and phyſically on the heart.* *

B. Still I fear that you are guilty of ſtriving about words to no profit, but ſubverſion of the peoples Charity.

1. *Moral* hath uſually three different ſenſes. 1. *Moral* is as much as *Reputative*; As he that concealeth or encourageth a Traytor or Murderer, or defendeth not the aſſaulted, is, *ex lege morum*, reputed and judged as guilty of the Treaſon or Murder. And thus *cauſa moralis* is uſually but *cauſa ex lege morum reputata*.

2. *Moral* is oft taken for *Ethical*, or that which is *ex genere moris*, either Good or Evil, *Virtue or Vice*, which contain all morality.

3. Moral is oft oppoſed to *meerly natural* (forced, bruitiſh, *&c.*) and meaneth the action of a *free Agent* as ſuch. In which of theſe ſenſes, or what other do you take it.

C. "*I mean the firſt, that God doth but operate* ut cauſa moralis per modum proponentis objectum; *which Dr.* Twiſſe *ſaith is but* in genere cauſæ finalis, *and ſo is but* operatio metaphorica.

B. It's pity that Chriſt's Diſciples muſt be troubled with ſuch uncertain arbitrary notions, without neceſſity. But what remedy: 1. I know no Law that forbiddeth me to diſſent from Dr. *Twiſſe*, or you in Logick or Phyſicks. I do not believe that *objectum qua tale* is *cauſa finalis*: And no wonder; For 2. I hold that to be no *proper cauſe* which you call commonly *cauſa finalis*; And inſtead of advancing each Object to the dignity of a *final cauſe*, I take down the *final cauſe* to the order or rank of the prime Object of Volition or Intention. To be *optimum* is the *Ratio objectiva primaria*, it being moſt ſuitable to the Will. To be *medium ad optimum* is the *Ratio objectiva ſecundaria*. *Bonum qua tale non agit in voluntatem, ſed voluntas in bonum cognitum:* Though the *cognitio boni* doth *dirigere voluntatem*. When it is commonly ſaid, [*Ob finem amatum volo medium*, the propoſition deceiveth us, as if the *cauſalitas finis* were upon the *Will:* But it meaneth no more but that the *Aptitude* of

* The untruth of this common Charge appeareth in the following citations.

Vocatio iſta tum externa eſt tum interna: externa per miniſterium hominum verbum proponentium: Interna per operationem ſpiritus ſancti illuminantis & cor afficientis ut attendatur iis quæ dicuntur, fideſq; verbo adhibeatur: ex utriuſq; concurſu efficacitas vocationis exiſtit. Iſta diſtributio non eſt generis in ſpecies, ſed totius in partes, hoc eſt totalis vocationis in partiales actiones, &c. Armin Diſput. Privat. Theſ. 42. Sect. 10, 11.

Remonſt. Synod. art. 3. 4. p. 15, &c. Si quæratur ex nobis an Dei convertentis actio tantum moralis ſit, ſuadendo, proponendo, invitando, Reſpondemus, Pluſquam moralem eſſe, & ſi excitantem ſpectemus gratiam dicimus in ipſam voluntatem quoq; potentiam ſupernaturalem infundi diſtinctam ab illuminatione: ſi vero co-operantem, dicimus tam phyſicam vocari poſſe, & realem ac propriam habere efficientiam.] Note here their plain profeſſion of phyſical and infuſed Grace.

[*Si quæratur an præter mentis illuſtrationem & affectuum excitationem, & voluntatis invitationem nihil faciat Gratia per modum principii vel antecedenter ad converſionem, Reſpondemus facere*, Id. ibid.

of the *means*, *ad finem*, is the *Ratio bonitatis*, and ſo the *Ratio objectiva medii*: I will or chooſe it, becauſe it is *apt* or *conducible* to the *end* or chief object; that is, That it is *Goodneſs* for which I will it. Which ſpeaketh no more but *Rationem objectivam*. 3. And all *objects* of the intellect and will are *cauſes* indeed of the act in *ſpecie*; but what cauſes, *Receptive* and *Terminative*, ſuch as we muſt call *Material* (ſo far as an act may be ſaid to have matter) of which more anon.

And if the object be no other than a material or receptive cauſe, conſtituting the act *in ſpecie*, then the *propoſer* of the *object*, who operateth but in ſubſervience to it, can be no other than a preparer and offerer of the *matter*. But how great a hand this receptive cauſe hath in the mutations and diverſities in the world, is little conſidered by the moſt.

2. But I pray you tell me, How many, and whom do you find that hold that God doth no more but *proponere objectum*? I remember none.

C. "*What ſay they leſs when they call it* Moral ſuaſion, *when* ſuadere *is* "*but* proponere objectum?

B. So then, your accuſations are your own *Inferences*, and not their words. But do they not commonly tell you of an *inward ſuaſion* by the *Spirit* (and Conſcience) as well as an outward by the word?

C. "*Yes they do ſo; but that inward is but* ſuaſion *ſtill.*

B. But are you ſure that by *ſuaſion* they mean nothing but *propoſing* the Object to the Intellect, and by it the Will.

C. "*What elſe can they mean, if they ſpeak congruouſly?*

B. As far as I can underſtand them they moſtly differ not from the Synodiſts at all, in their meaning; (much leſs do the School-men and *Lutherans*, who uſe not the word [*ſuaſion*] ſo much as they.) For the thing that they mean is 1. That Gods Spirit worketh on the Intellect by objective means, (though not only propounding that object, but alſo aſſiſting and exciting the mind.) 2 That by the apprehenſion of the Intellect, the *wills object* is offered to it: And as *Camero* copiouſly pleadeth the act of the will is ever excited by the act of the Intellect. (Or indeed the object is ſo aptly preſented, as that the *will* ſhall or may either by *Natural* or *Gracious Inclination* excite it ſelf, ſuppoſing Gods aſſiſtance.) But that the will is not moved, to any but an *Apprehended Good*. 3. And that God doth this work on the will in a ſweet connatural manner; like as an *effectual perſwader* doth, not forcing the Will, but preſerving its liberty: and as the *Arminians* ſpeak, *not irreſiſtibly*, or by *neceſſitation*, leaving the act to be contingent. 4. But withal, it is moſt certain, that God operateth on the *Mind and Will* it ſelf, and not on the Preacher of the Word only. 5. But no mortal man knoweth how; nor is able to comprehend his way of operation.

11. But next tell me what you mean by *Phyſical*, which is the other branch of your diſtinction?

C. "*What ſhould I mean but* Natural, *by* Real Contact, *attingency or* "*influx on the Recipient?*

B. 1. God is above Nature, and not included in your Phyſicks: How then do you call his operations *Phyſical*, *ex parte agentis*. No Phyſicks pretend to treat of God.

2. Contact and proper attingency belongeth to *Bodies*: But God is not a Body; and therefore the *Contact* or *Influx* by which he operateth, is utterly unknown to mortal man, any farther than that it is by his Eſſence.

3. God is immenſe and eſſentially every where; and therefore ſuch a Metaphyſical Attingency or Contact, as may be ſpoken of him, he hath

to all things in the world; and therefore must do all that he any way doth in such attingency.

C. "*Explain it and resolve it your self, if you like not my Explica-*
"*tion.*

B. Gods operations are called *Physical* or *Moral*, 1. In regard of God the Agent. 2. In regard of the means or second causes. 3. Or in respect of the *effect*.

The Papists who are most for meer moral operations in this Controversie, yet have such strange opinions about the physical operations of Sacraments (*e. g.* Baptism on Infants) as that they make them to be instruments of Miracles, the Miracle being first wrought upon them (*e.g.* the water, and then on the receiver. Yea they seem to make God to operate miraculously with every Sacrament.

I. In respect of *God* the Agent they are not properly either *Physical* or *Moral*, but transcendently they are above both; for they are his *Essence* and *Will*, which is the transcendent Head of all operations and causes, Physical and Moral.

II. As to the *Means* or *second Causes*, those acts of God that have no such means or causes are not here concerned: And as for all those that have such means, no doubt but they are to be called both *Physical* and *Moral*: for *Morality* is but *Modality* or *Relation*, *ex rerum ordine*. And all Order, Mode and Relation, is *Alicujus entis ordo*, *Modus & Relatio*. And *e. g.* preaching the Gospel, is such an act of a *Physical* and *Moral Agent*, as is it self both *Physical* and *Moral*. Man is *quædam natura*, and yet Intellectual and *Free*: And his act is *quid physicum in genere entis*; and yet *quid morale in genere moris*, *& imputanda juxta legem morum*.

III. And as to the *Effect*, it is no doubt, both *quid physicum* (for Faith is *actus realis*) and *quid morale*: For it is *morale bonum*, *& ita reputanda*. And will any *Arminian* deny any of this, that understandeth words? Where then is your difference in this?

C. "*But when you dispute about* Pre-determination, *you can say it is*
"*not Physical: what mean you by it then?*

B. We marvail that men should say that God *physically pre-determineth* the *Will to all acts of sin* in the specifying circumstances, when as he pre-determineth it not really to them at all, either physically or morally. So that it is here a *Real efficient motion of God* to the evil act, which we deny.

C. "*And it is a* Real efficient motion of God, *to the act of Faith*
"*and Repentance which we assert, and mean by the word* Physical.

B. And this your Adversaries will not deny: and so you are in this agreed.

The fourth Crimination.

Arminius professeth Faith and Repentance *Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse*. Exam. Perk. pag. 57. and that both of them are denied to the Reprobates by the Decree of Reprobation. See his own words, *At Deus statuit Decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem, & pœnitentiam non dare, concedo lubens illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam.* Twisse against Hord, p. 70. l. 1.

C. "*I doubt they hold not Faith to be infused, but acquired: whereas*
"*Dr.* Twisse *sheweth the difference to be so great, that an unjustified person*
"*may have an* Acquired Faith *about the same objects, when yet only an In-*
"*fused Faith will justifie.*

B. 1. Tell not me what you *Doubt*, but what you *Prove*, unless you mean no more, than to tell me of your injustice and uncharitableness: I find the Jesuites and Lutherans commonly asserting an Infused Faith, and I have met with few Arminians if any that deny it; though the *word* be not so much in use with them.

2. But because you that are the Accuser are supposed to understand what you speak against, I pray help me to understand it.

Quest. 1. What mean you by *Acquired Faith?*

C. "*That which we our selves get by our use of means and consideration.*

B. Quest. 2. Is there any man in his wits that denieth *Faith* to be the effect of consideration? Do you not think what and why you must be-

lieve,

lieve, and even believe in and by Thinking or Considering. Do you believe, and not think what or why?

C. "*No, but it is by Infusion that we have those thoughts.*

B. Infused Faith then is by *Infused Thoughts:* Be it so; but then it is not *without Thoughts* or *Consideration.* But further;

Quest. 3. Is there any Christian that denieth that *Faith cometh by hearing*, and the use of the means which God hath appointed us? I pray you hear Dr. *Twisse* against *Hord*, pag. 169. ["God in his Cove-"nant of Grace requireth obedience to salvation; but of his Free "Grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience: "But how? agreeable to their rational natures; that is, by admoniti-"on, instruction, exhortation; that is, to work Faith and Repentance "by exhorting and perswading them to repentance. All this he per-"forms by his Ministers.] Do you not believe that the Apostles were sent "to open mens eyes, and *turn them from darkness to light*, and *from the* "*power of Satan unto God*,---Acts 26. 17, 18. And that Ministers must save themselves, and those that hear them, 1 *Tim.* 4. 16. And that he that converts a sinner doth save a soul from death: *James 6. ult.* And that the word is the immortal incorruptible seed by which we are begotten again, and which remaineth in us: Are you now in doubt of this?

C. "*It is one thing for God to work with the Word, and another thing* "to work by the Word: *The first we confess; But if God work* by the "Word, *then he must operate first on the* Word, *which is the Preachers* "*act; and so* by that Word *on the soul, and not immediately: There-*"*fore I rather think that the word is a* concomitant *than an instrumental* "*cause.*

B. 1. You wrong your self and Christ in that you will not believe him, *John* 3. that we mortals know not the way and manner of the Spirits accesses and operations on the soul, any more than the cause of the wind whose sound we hear. Do you *not know*, that you do not know how Gods Spirit moveth our intellect and wills, and how he maketh use of instruments; except *secundum quid* in some particles revealed.

2. An hundred Texts of Scripture (which I omit lest I be tedious) tell us that the Word is a *means* or *subordinate* cause (to God) of his informing and reforming operations on mens souls. And it's dangerous to dream of any second cause that is so *concomitant* as to be but *co-ordinate* with the first cause, and not *subordinate* to it. And the word is not only subordinate to God as *Instituter* by Legislation and Declaration, but also to God as *efficient operator.*

3. God can work two ways by the Word, which are within our reach (besides others) 1. As it is the act of the speaker, by exciting and illuminating him. 2. As it is the species (as they call it) received by

The Schoolmen-men and even the Jesuites ordinarily profess the necessity of infused Grace; yea many of them in a higher sense than many Protestants dare own. Even *Molina* himself asserteth the supernaturality of Grace thus, [*ut consensus liberi arbitrii Deo excitanti & vocanti per gratiam prævenientem nihil in re sit qd. non supernaturale, & quod non simul a Deo manet, non solum tanquam ab illicente excitante, & invitante ad id arbitrium, sed etiam tanquam a cooperante per auxilium gratiæ.* And he pronounceth Anathema on them that affirm [*Consensum arbitrii nostri Deo excitanti & vocanti per auxilium Gratiæ prævenientis esse actum naturalem, aut posse elici sine auxilio & co-operatione ejusdem prævenientis Gratiæ.*]

And the sum of his opinion about the nature and cause of our holy actions is, 1. That Gods universal influx or causation is necessary on our will to make them acts. 2. That Free-Will is the cause that they are these particular acts about this object rather than another. 3. That Gods particular or special influx of Grace is the cause that they are supernatural acts. And that preventing Grace doth give men good thoughts, and the first motion of the affections, before deliberation, and choice or liberty (as *Vasquez* also saith) which seemeth the same with the Doctrine of *Ockam*, *Buridan*, and the rest of the Nominals, who call it Complacency, as antecedent to Election, yea and Intention. To be pleased with the thing simply on the first apprehension they call a necessary natural act. Though the *Socinists* say that *quod exercitium actus vel libertatem contradictionis* even that is free.) And it seems the same which *Augustine* and *Jansenius* call *primam delectationem.* But converting Grace it self *Molina* takes to be a habit wrought by Gods special help in and with the word or means. His words are of men that are hearing Gods Word or thinking on it, [*Influit Deus in easdem notitias influxu quodam particulari ac supernaturali quo cognitionem illam adjuvat, tum ut res melius & dilucidius expendatur, & ponatur, tum etiam ut notitia illa jam limites notitiæ supernaturalis, & ad finem supernaturalem in suo ordine attingat. Inde oritur in voluntate motus affectionis, &c.* Yet no Jesuite is supposed to go further from the *Calvinists* than this man. In truth I cannot perceive but that Jesuites, Arminians, Lutherans, and all such are willing to ascribe as much to Gods Grace, as they think consistent with mans Free-will and Gods not being the cause of sin: which is the same thing that the Calvinists also endeavour, though they seem not to hit on the same names and notions to do the thing desired.

the ſenſes and imagination, which God can by his power ſet home to the attainment of the due effect.

4. And yet I know not any, or many of your Adverſaries that deny that beſides this Divine operation by the VVord, God hath another immediately on the ſoul, exciting it to operate upon the VVord, as the *vis plaſtica vitalis materna operatur in ſemen jam receptum.* But I will here forbear to trouble you with the phyſical difficulties, whether the VVord heard be only *objectum intellectus*, or alſo *cauſa efficiens* (as light is both to the eye.) And whether it be operative on the intellect, or only terminative, with other ſuch like.

C. "*Well I muſt grant you that all* Infuſed Faith (*as to the act*) *is Ac-*
"*quired: But all* Acquired *Faith not* Infuſed: *but infuſion is added to*
"*our own endeavours, like the creation of the humane ſoul.*

B. I am glad that we are got ſo far on towards peace. But

Queſt. 4. What mean you by Infuſion? Is it not a Metaphor?

C. "*Yes, and we mean that immediate perſwaſion of God which you*
"*even confeſs to be beſides his operation by* the Word, *and by our* Cogi-
"tations. *Even a* Creation *of an act or habit.*

B. Queſt. 5. Is it the *name* [*Infuſion*] or the thing that you plead for?

C. "*The name (though I confeſs Metaphors muſt not be uſed unneceſſarily*
"*in Diſputes) is yet convenient: but that I leave indifferent.*

B. Queſt. 6. Do you not think that the act of Faith is the act of mans own *Intellect*, and *Will*, or *Soul*, and that immediately.

C. "*Yes, that cannot be denied.*

B. If ſo, then when you ſay that our *act is Infuſed*, I hope you will confeſs the term to be none of the plaineſt; and you only mean that Gods Grace doth ſo operate on the faculty as to excite it ſo to act; and conſequently that the thing firſt and properly infuſed is not the act of Faith it ſelf, but the *vis impreſſa facultatem*, before deſcribed, by which the act is cauſed: And ſo in a ſecondary ſenſe the act may be called Infuſed, but not moſt immediately.

C. "*I confeſs it is the habit which we commonly take to be Infuſed; and*
"*therefore we uſe to diſtinguiſh* habitus infuſos ab habitibus acquiſitis, *ra-*
"*ther than* actus infuſos ab actibus acquiſitis.

B. Is that *Habit* before the *Act* or after it?

C. "*You know that it is a Controverſie among our ſelves. Mr.* Pemble
"*ſaith it is before, and the common opinion is, that it is after the firſt*
"*ſpecial Act.*

B. 1. I once received that from Mr. *Pemble* (ignorantly.) But that cometh to us by not diſtinguiſhing the *vis impreſſa* or firſt received influx of the ſpirit from a Habit: when as *Ameſius* well ſaith, it is fitter called *ſemen fidei vel diſpoſitio quædam*, than a *Habit of Faith.* For 1. no man can *prove ſuch* an antecedent habit; and therefore none ſhould aſſert it. 2. The true nature of a Habit conſiſteth in a *promptitude to perform that ſpecial act with facility.* But that we ſhould have ſuch a promptitude and facility not only while we are Infant Chriſtians, but no Chriſtians; as having not yet believed in Chriſt, is not probable according to our commoneſt obſervation. 3. All other Habits follow the Acts, and therefore we have little reaſon to ſay it is otherwiſe here.

C. "*Doth the Soul believe before it is inclined or diſpoſed to it?*

B. Inclination is a hard word, and belongeth both to *Natural Inclination* (ſuch as we have to *Felicity*) and to *Habits*, and to meer *Diſpoſitions.* And a *pre-diſpoſition* we grant: As when you ſpur your Horſe, you make him firſt the *patient* of your act, and by ſuſcitating his

his natural faculty, you diſpoſe him to a ſpeedy motion: though the ſimilitude doth not *quadrare per omnia*, becauſe Gods influx is on the whole Soul it ſelf. But this Diſpoſition to the preſent act, is far leſs than a proper Habit; or it's another thing.

C. "*When I ſpur my Horſe, or whip my Dog, I do but ſtir up a former "faculty, or ſlothful power: But God giveth a new life and power to them "that were dead in ſin.*

B. Yet, I cannot take *words* for *matter*. 1. It's nothing but the natural *faculty* or *power* which you ſuſcitate in the beaſt: And hath not an unbeliever the *Natural faculties* or power? Is he not a man? Why do you not bury him, if he be not alive? 2. *Death in ſin* is *relative*, or *real*: The *Relative* is *Reatus mortis*, which denominateth men *filios mortis*, and is done away by pardon. The *real* is the Privation of a holy *diſpoſition* to the *act of Faith and Repentance*, &c. or of the *Act it ſelf*, or of the *Habit*. You can name no other. Now 1. the *death* which conſiſteth in the privation of the firſt *diſpoſition* to act (ſuppoſing all natural diſpoſitions) is taken away by the firſt influx or ſuſcitation of the Holy Ghoſt. 2. And by the ſame *in ſecunda inſtanti* is cauſed the Act, and the death gone that lay in its privation. 3. And (in the third inſtant, or afterward by degrees) is taken away the death which lieth in the privation of the Habit. And this giving the Habit, is called in Scripture and by Divines *Sanctification* as following *Vocation*, and it is wrought in us by degrees and not all at once, and that by the Spirits power, with and by our exerciſed Acts. In my youth I was ſo prematurely confident of the contrary, that the firſt Controverſie that ever I wrote on (was a Confutation of Biſhop *Downam*, *Ameſius*, *Medall. de Vocat*) Mr. *Tho. Hooker*, &c. in Defence of *Pemble* herein; but riper thoughts made me burn that Script.

C. "*But the ſpur or rod putteth no new power at all into your Horſe; but "Gods Spirit putteth a new* Power *into us.*

B. I have talkt long enough to you about *Power* before, and therefore would not turn back needleſly to ſay it over again. Gods Spirit putteth no ſuch thing into us, as we call a *faculty* or *natural power*: For that is the *form* or *eſſence* of the Soul; and our *Species* is not chang'd by Grace. But he giveth us that which is called a *Moral Power*, which conſiſteth conjunctly in the concurrence of means and objects, and the *diſpoſition* of our *faculties* to the act. Hear Dr. *Twiſſe* againſt *Hord*, *pag.* 12. *lib.* 2. *He ſecretly maintaineth that every man hath ſuch a power by Grace, by which he may repent if he will: Concerning which Tenet of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath ſuch a power: but we ſay it is nature rather.*

Page 18. *Truly I ſee no cauſe to deny this, that even the wicked could do good if they would: We may ſafely ſay with* Auſtin, *Omnes poſſunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad Divina præcepta ſervanda ſe convertere, ſi velint.* (Here is *poſſe ſe convertere, id eſt, velle, ſi velit.*)

But ſaith *Twiſſe*, pag. 170. l. 1. [*But ſuch is the ſhameful iſſue of them that confound impotency moral with impotence natural, as if there were no difference*] which he oft ſheweth is but the want of *actual and diſpoſitive willingneſs*. Now the rod or ſpur may cauſe both a preſent *diſpoſition*, and an *act of will*.

C. "*But is this all the new Life and Spirit, and* Divine Nature *that is "given us? Sure it is much more?*

B. No doubt but it is much more. But that Spirit, Life, and Nature is promiſed and given to *Believers*, and is promiſed on condition of our accepting Chriſt, in whom is our life: And therefore it is that habi-

tual

tual Grace which followeth the first act of Faith, and is a nobler disposition to the following acts.

C. "*Will one act of ours cause a Habit?*

B. Not as ours only: But when the Spirit will work by it, it will. But even that Habit I told you is weak at first, and increased by degrees.

But proceed and tell me, *Quest.* 7. Are you sure that in the *Acquisition of Habits* there is no *immediate* operation of God on the Soul that causeth them?

C. "*We all hold an immediate Influx necessary to the Being and Action* "*of every Creature, natural and free: but not an immediate Infusion.*

B. What's the difference between Influx and Infusion?

C. "*The first is an universal operation, the other a particular.*

B. Do you mean that the difference of the acts or operations is at all *ex parte agentis, seu actus ut est agentis*, antecedent to the effect, or only in the effect it self.

C. "*I dare not say that there is any difference in God, for it is against* "*his simplicity; and his very* will and act *as in himself is his Essence,* "*though variously related and denominated by connotation: Therefore I* "*must needs confess that the diversity is only in the effect.*

B. Do you not see then what a delusory and troublesome stir men make for and about meer words? What's the Crimination come to then about *Acquired and Infused Habits?* when the difference is only in the effects? You confess that all *proper Habits Infused* are by our cogitation and use of means, and so are also acquired. And you confes that all *Acquired Aabits* are wrought besides our cogitation and use of means by an immediate influx of God; so that as to the *Causes* you can name no difference: And yet the *words Acquired and Infused* signifie a difference in the Causes, and their operation, and not in the *Effect*, by their notation. Is not this deceit then?

C. "*Tell me what you take to be the difference your self?*

B. 1. I suppose that *ab uno omnia*, God without diversity causeth all diversity, which is only in the Creatures, and not in him. 2. I suppose that God hath appointed *natural means* and second causes for common natural effects; and his *Will* is, that they shall operate according to their aptitude: And that he hath appointed extraordinary means, even Christ, and supernatural Revelation, for the production of saving Faith: And it is his *will* that they shall work usually according to their aptitude. 3. It is his command that we use these several means (natural and supernatural) accordingly. 4. As these *means* are *special, extraordinary*, and for a special end (the production *of Faith and Holiness.*) So it is the will of God that they shall have answerable, noble, special effects; which effects besides his operation on and by the means, the said *Volition* of God it self produceth immediately operating on the Soul; not as a meer volition alone, but as conjunct with his *Wisdom* and *Vital Power* or *Activity* by which he operateth all in all.

I could here say that God doth concur with these supernatural means on his Elect, with a stronger, greater, special *energy*, *force*, or influx. But I am loth to deceive you with bare words: for this *force*, *energy*, or *efflux* is either *God* or *something* created. God operateth by that *Wisdom*, *Will*, and *Power* or *Activity* which are his Essence: therefore there are here no degrees in any operation: And in the effects the degrees are not denied. The sum of all is then but this, natural effects are natural effects, and Faith is Faith: the difference we partly perceive; the means also are various: but in God the operator there is no diversity. And so you may see what the stir about *Infusing* and *Acquiring* is come to.

C. "*I*

C. "*I dare not deny this, because it is agreed on by all Philosophical Di-*
"*vines, and I should be called a Blasphemer, if I affirmed any real diversity*
"*in God, at least besides the Trinity of Persons, called by the School-men*
"*Real Relations, and by some* real modes *of being. But it surpasseth mans*
"*understanding to conceive, that the same cause no way differing,* ex parte
"*sui, should produce variety of effects. By which it seemeth, that when*
"*there was nothing but God, his love to* Jacob *and his hatred to* Esau, *his*
"*decree to save and to damn, his will to make the world, and to destroy*
"*it, his fore-knowledge of good and evil, had no real difference at all.*
"*And is it not somewhat of a lye then in us, to call those acts different, or*
"*by different names, which really have not the least difference at all.* (*But*
"*of this before.*)

B. God were not God, if mans shallow wit could comprehend him. All this must be confest, unless you will be a Vorstian: But if our conceptions be not false, our diversity of names here is no lye; because we intend but to denominate Gods knowledge and decrees or will, but by the relative connotation of the things known and willed. And though those things were *nothing* before the Creation, and so the difference between Gods Decrees, *&c.* was really none at all, and the *esse cognitum* was nothing but Gods simple Essence: Yet as *Greg. Armin.* hath disputed, there be some kind of Relations (which are nothing themselves) and consequently denominations which may be terminated on nothing (as *præteritu & futura* are.) But if your understanding rest not here, do as I do, rest in a necessary and willing ignorance; and be but so wise as not to trouble the Church with that which you know not, nor imitate them that can shew the valour of their raging zeal, by Writing or Preaching against them as *the enemies of the Grace of God*, which dote not as confidently as themselves.

C. "*But what say you to Dr.* Twisse's *words against* Hord, (l. 1. p. 156.)
"*Albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe* fide infusa, *yet is it in*
"*the power of nature to believe the Gospel* fide acquisita *which depends*
"*partly on a mans Education, and partly on Reasons considering the cre-*
"*dibility of the Christian way, by light of natural observations above all*
"*other ways in the world.*

B. 1. * Not only he, but all the School-men distinguish acquired and infused Faith: But though the names sound otherwise, the difference meant by them is in the *effects* only (and the means) and not in God. He meaneth that a *slight ineffectual* belief may be performed by that disposition or moral power which is found before special Grace, as excited by good Education and helps: But an effectual saving Faith must be the product of a special impress of Gods Spirit on the Soul; which is a special *disposition and moral power* to that act. And this is true: And no more can be truly meant or said.

2. But I will tell you a mystery added oft by Dr. *Twisse*, which may much moderate your judgment about the cause of mens condemnation, if it be true. He holdeth that no man is condemned for want of an infused Faith.

* *Pet. a S. Joseph. Thes. univers. de Grat. habit. p. 86. Datur aliquod donum Gratiæ Divinitus infusum quod post operationem in anima nostra habitualiter permanet: Deri gratiam habitualem jam videtur esse de fide, post Concil. Tridentin: antea tamen non erat habitus gratiæ sanctificantis realiter a charitate distinguitur* (which others deny) *Gratia habitualis constituit hominem in statu supernaturali*, &c.

The Reader that will peruse *Casp. Peucer's Hist. Carcer. pag.* 691, 693, &c. may see that the Lutherans were more for Infusion and miraculous operations of Grace, and may see a handsom explication of Conversion, and the operation of the Word and Sacraments: and *pag.* 698. *De viribus humanis in renascentibus & renatis dum fit conversio & deinceps ad finem. Credo quod gratuiti beneficii ac meriti Christi salvatoris applicatio & naturæ mortuæ vivificatio in regeneratione non fit actione physica & brutâ aut raptu Enthusiastico, aut Stoica coactione, aut Magico afflatu verbi, Sacramentorum & sp. sancti. Nec mutatione Physica aut Magica, hyperphysica substantiæ, temperamenti & virium seu facultatem hominis seu-tientis quidem, nec moventis se nec quicquam agentis, sed sustinentis tantum impressionem, ut subjectum patiens, sicut ranæ reviviscunt a tepore solis, &c.* By this you may see what this excellent man, *Melanthons* Son-in-law suffered his ten years cruel imprisonment for, by the instigation of *Schmidelinus* and other Lutherans, to their perpetual shame; and who was then (as the Papists still are) most for Physical infusions *ex opere operato* in Word and Sacraments.

C. *How?*

C. "*How? why no man is condemned (at leaſt that hath the Goſpel) but* "*for want of it: For if it be only an infuſed Faith that juſtifieth, then it* "*is the want of an infuſed Faith by which men are unjuſtified: And if as* "*you ſay,* Infuſed and effectual or ſpecial Faith, *be all one, ſure men are* "*condemned for want of ſpecial effectual Faith.*

B. His words are theſe againſt *Hord, l.* 1. *p.* 156. ["Neither have I "*ever read or heard it taught by any, that men ſhall be damned for not be-* "*lieving* fide infuſa; which is as much as to ſay, becauſe God hath not "regenerated them; but either becauſe they refuſed to believe, or elſe "if they have embraced the Goſpel, for not living anſwerable thereun-"to; which alſo is in their power, *quoad exteriorem vitæ emendationem,* "though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change "their hearts, any more than it is to illuminate their minds: Yet I never "read that any mans damnation was any whit the more increaſed for "not performing theſe acts.] And again, *page* 170. [It is true there is a "Faith infuſed by the Spirit of God in regeneration: But who ever "ſaid that any man was damned becauſe he doth not believe with ſuch a "Faith? As much as to ſay, that non-regeneration is the meritorious "cauſe of damnation.

C. "*I am amazed at this, eſpecially his ſuppoſing that no man ever ſaid* "*that, which I thought no man of us had denied.*

B. I would think that his meaning is, that men are not condemned for want of Gods infuſing act, but their own believing act; or for the privation of Infuſion, but for the privation of Faith; or of Faith, not *quatenus* infuſed, but as they ought to have believed without infuſion. But he was not ſo wanting in accurateneſs, but that he knew how to have expreſt himſelf, had that been his meaning: And then I know not how his words will conſiſt with this ſenſe, [*I never read that any mans damnation was the more increaſed for not performing theſe acts*] where changing their own hearts is one. [*And whoever ſaid that any man was damned becauſe he did not believe with ſuch a Faith.*] Here it is the *Faith as ſuch* which is ſuppoſed ſpoken of; the privation whereof is not the meritorious cauſe of damnation. And indeed though the *power* of this *Faith* would have been in us, had there been no Sin or Saviour, yet there would have been *no obligation* to believe in Chriſt as Mediator: And therefore if the Law of Innocency had ſtood alone, even the want of an acquired Faith in Chriſt would have been no ſin.

But this is the unhappineſs of ſuch as muſt read Controverſial Writings: There is no end of ſearching after the Writers meaning. But the thing it ſelf I think is plain, *&c.* that only an effectual ſpecial Faith will ſave us: and it is ſuch a Faith of which Chriſt ſpeaketh, *Mat.* 16. 16. *He that believeth and is baptized ſhall be ſaved, and he that believeth not ſhall be damned,* (though he believe with any other Faith whatſoever, which he calleth acquired.)

Perhaps this his opinion hath ſome dependance on what he ſaith before (*ibid.*) "He puniſheth the diſobedient with eternal death. True: but "according to what Covenant? Not according to the Covenant of "Grace: that is only a Covenant for Salvation: but according to the "Covenant of the Law, the Covenant of Works.] Woful error and confuſion. The Covenant of the Law is almoſt as bad a phraſe, as [the Covenant of the Covenant.] 1. Gods Law of Innocency was a Law and Covenant in ſeveral reſpects. 2. So was the Jewiſh Law, which *Paul* meaneth by the Law of Works. 3. So is the Chriſtian Law of Chriſt, and of Grace. No man is now condemned by the Jewiſh Law of Works as ſuch, it being ceaſed; and never did it bind the Gentile world: The

Law

Law of Nature and of Innocency indeed condemneth the disobedient; but the Law or Covenant of Christ or of Grace doth condemn them to much sorer punishment, *Luke* 19. 27. *Those mine enemies that would not I should reign*, &c. Mark 16. 16. *He that believeth not shall be damned*, Heb. 10. 29. Mat. 25. throughout. But this confounding of the Covenants I must not here rectifie.

But yet I hope he meant only that men suffer not for want of Gods Regenerating, Infusing Act, but for want of their own act of Faith.

The fifth Crimination.

C. "*I find Dr.* Twisse (ibid. & alibi sæpe) *charging it on them, as "holding that Grace is given according* to Works *(which is Pelagianism:) "For they think that God looketh at some preparation in the Receiver, and "giveth it to some because they are prepared for it, and denieth it to others "because they are unprepared: whereas it is not in him that willeth nor in "him that runneth, but in him that (of his meer good pleasure) sheweth "mercy.*

B. There is enough said of this after, about differencing and *effectual* Grace. But if we must say more, I ask you,

Quest. 1. Do you by this phrase [*according to Works*] mean to urge the Scripture that speaketh in that phrase, in its proper sense, or do you only use the phrase in some other sense of your own.

C. "*I use Scripture phrase in Scripture sense, because I rest on its Authority.*

B. *Quest.* 2. Are we not also saved without *Works* in Scripture sense? And would it be contrary to *Paul* to say we that we are saved by Works; yea, or according to them in that sense that he speaketh of them. See *James* 2. 14, &c. *Tit.* 3. 5. *Ephes.* 2. 5, 8, 9. *Gal.* 3. 2. 5. 10. *Acts* 15. 11. &c. and 16. 31. *Rom.* 5. 10, And yet saved according to Works in another sense, *James* 2. 14, &c. *Phil.* 2. 12. *Gal.* 6. 4. *Rom.* 20. 12, 13. 2 *Cor.* 5. 10.

C. "*In several senses of* Works *we deny it not.*

B. *Quest.* 3. At least you will grant that we are not justified by Works, and yet that we are justified by *Faith*: yea in another sense by Works.

Quest. 4. Is not believing and repenting in order to Justification, and all holy obedience in order to Salvation; as truly *opus* a *work*, and in a far nobler sense than preparation for Faith is?

C. "*That cannot be denied.*

B. Then you cannot affirm that the phrase [*not according to Works*] which excludeth not *Faith*, *Repentance*, *holy Obedience* to justification and salvation, doth intend the exclusion of all preparation in order to Conversion or Faith in Christ; when by Works excluded, it meaneth the same thing, or sort, in all.

C. "*But saith Dr.* Twisse, *ibid. page* 154. [Pardon and Salvation "God doth confirm only on condition of Faith and Repentance: *But as "for Faith and Repentance, doth God confer them conditionally also? If "so, whatsoever be the condition let them look to it how they can avoid the "making of Grace, to wit, the Grace of Faith and Repentance, to be given "according to Works.*]

B. I know he frequently saith the same. But 1. I speak now only of the sense of that Scripture, and say, that this goeth upon a most false and dangerous supposition, that Justification, and Salvation are given accord-

Vulgatum illud faciunt quod in sese Deus non denegat Gratiam intelligitur de faciente in gratia auxilio, Pet. a S. Joseph. Thes. Univers. de auxil. pag. 83.

Idem. pag. 90. *Nequidem ipsum Christi opus fuerunt alias meritoria citra promissionem Dei nisi ex se tissent valoris infiniti* (which needeth explication.)

according to Works, though Faith and Repentance be not: whereas in the ſenſe of Works there meant by *Paul*, no man can be juſtified by Works. And though Chriſt ſaith, *This is the work of God, that ye believe in him whom the Father hath ſent*; yet it is not that which *Paul* meaneth: Let not therefore Scripture words be abuſed to miſlead mens underſtandings.

2. But as to the *matter* of the Controverſie, I ſpoke to it enough before. No man can deny but that God uſually prepareth the Soul for Converſion by a common ſort of Grace: And though he may do what he liſt with his own, and extraordinarily may in an inſtant convert the moſt unprepared malignant obdurate perſon; yet that is not his uſual way: (And ſome that think otherwiſe are led into the miſtake by thinking that a man is converted, when he hath ſuddenly ſome terrifying humbling preparation, which endeth in converſion.) Whether he convert all that are brought to the very higheſt and neareſt degree of preparation, I know not, nor perhaps you neither: But that uſually he converteth all ſuch we have very great reaſon to think probable: And that he hath not commanded men to ſeek his ſpecial Grace in vain. So that whether it be a proper promiſe on Gods part, or only an encouragement ſhort of proper promiſe, I told you before is a hard queſtion. But we maintain that it is not that proper mutual Covenant which maketh a Chriſtian, and is celebrated in Baptiſm, and giveth Salvation.

If one of old *John Rogers's*, *Thomas Hooker's*, or *Robert Bolton's* hearers, when they were vehemently urging preparatory humiliation, deſire, endeavour, *&c.* ſhould have ſaid to them, Sir, you play the Arminian, and contradict St. *Paul*, who ſaith that Grace is not given according to *Works*: Therefore God will give it me never the more for ſuch preparations; what would you have ſaid to him. The truth is, practical Preachers in theſe practical caſes, are carried with full ſail into that truth which Diſputers would wrangle out of Doors.

But as for any works *meritorious* in point of commutative Juſtice, yea, or of any full and proper Covenant of God, giving a proper *Right* to the Sinner, upon which he may claim ſpecial Grace as his due, I know of none ſuch before true Converſion; though Gods commands and general promiſes give men ſufficient encouragement.

C. "*But what ſay you to* Rom. 9. It is not in him that willeth or run-"neth, *&c.*

B. I do not love to expound hard Texts unſatisfactorily by ſcraps: I will give you, God willing, a Paraphraſe of the Chapter together by it ſelf. I ſuppoſe you have read *John Goodwin's* and Dr. *Hammonds* Paraphraſe. At preſent it may ſuffice to ſay, 1. That the meaning is not, that he that would have Chriſt, and Grace, and Holineſs is no fitter for it, than he that would not have them: nor that he that ſeeketh them is no fitter for them than he that rejecteth them: nor that he that believeth is no fitter for Juſtification than an Infidel; nor he that is holy any fitter for Heaven than the unholy: nor yet that he that heareth, meditateth, prayeth, as he can, and attaineth the higheſt degree of common Grace, is no fitter or likelier for *Faith* or ſpecial Grace than he that deſpiſeth it and the means of it. 2. But the meaning is, that God of his free mercy called the Gentiles that were further from him than the Jews, and may give (both) the Goſpel, (and the Grace of the Goſpel) to one, and take it from, or not give it to another, when both of them are equally unworthy of it by their ſin. So that the firſt and principal cauſe that differenceth a *Jacob* from an *Eſau*, is not that *Jacob* before Gods Grace did *will and run*, deſire and ſeek Grace; but that Mercy begun with him, and gave

Ita judicat omnia Deus deſtinat propter vel ſecundum merita ipſius, ſed ex pura puta Gratia: Nemini etiam denegat niſi juſte propter præcedentia peccata, Armin. Diſp. Privat. Theſ. 41. Sect. 10.

Adrian VI. Quodl. 3. q. 1. ſol. 21. expoundeth *Habenti dabitur* thus, *Qui habet verbi Dei amorem ut illuc mentis intuitum dirigat dabitur ei ſenſus intelligendi: & qui non habet verbi Dei amorem auferetur ab eo naturalis capacitas intelligendi, &c*

gave him, though as unworthy as *Esau*, both commonner and ſpecial Grace, which cauſed him to *will* and *run*. And yet for all that both are ſuppoſed to have forfeited mercy by ſinning againſt it; and it is in him that *willeth not, and runneth not*, that the cauſe of his miſery, and privation of mercy is to be found. Yea in many an inſtance where mercy and helps are given by an equality, a wicked man may make himſelf to differ by his ſin, and wilfully become worſe than others.

C. "*At leaſt you muſt here confeſs, that* de facto *we do really differ from* "*each other in this point.*

B. All they that hold all that Doctrine of Preparation for Converſion, which you find in the ſuffrages of the Britiſh Divines in the Synod of *Dort* do not (that I know of) differ from many of the Lutherans, and Jeſuites, nor from many of the Arminians herein; while by the name of *merit of Congruity*, uſed by ſome, and *Preparation* by the other, no more is meant than they there aſſert: And as to the queſtion of *a promiſe or no promiſe*, I ſhew'd you before how ſmall the difference is; yea with ſome it is but *de nomine*, while one calleth that a *Promiſe*, which another calleth but a *half promiſe* (with Mr. *Cotton*) or a precept to uſe means with ſufficient encouragement; when perhaps in the deſcription of the thing they agree: So that among the moſt and ſober practical Preachers, I yet ſee no real difference in ſenſe at all, about the neceſſity of preparatory Grace.

The ſixth Crimination.

C. "*For ought I can underſtand, ſome of them acknowledge no* Cor- "ruption *nor* Grace *in the* Will, *as having no Habits, but meer Indiffe-* "*rency or Liberty; but think that the illuminating of the underſtanding is* "*enough to change the will.* *

B. 1. Theſe are a few odd perſons, that differ from the generality of your Adverſaries: and I am not to juſtifie all that every man writeth.

2. But even of theſe I ſuppoſe the meaning of the moſt is, but this, that ſin began in the Intellect, and there Grace muſt begin: and that God worketh on the will but *mediante Intellectu*. And theſe *Camero* held as well as they; and ſo do many more. And theſe ſeem to differ, not about the neceſſity of Grace, but the manner of its conveyance to the will; whether it be only by the intellect.

3. And as the wind bloweth where it liſteth, and we hear its ſound, but know not whence it cometh, or whither it goeth; ſo is every one that is born of the Spirit. We know that the *will* is vitiated as ill as the underſtanding, and needeth Grace as much as it: and that God is as near to the one in his operations as to the other, and giveth real Grace to both. But becauſe the intellect is in the natural order, the *firſt* in acting, and the will but ſecond; and becauſe the act is commonly (and reaſonably) ſuppoſed to go before the Habit (though not before all Divine Influx *ad actum*;) therefore men are uncertain whether God who firſt acteth the Intellect, do not by its act, firſt operate on the will. But this dependeth much on the Phyſical Controverſie, whether the Intellect determine the *will ad ſpeciem actus*, or at leaſt *really* and efficiently move it; or rather only preſent the object to it, and ſo work but in ſubſerviency to the *material* cauſe, which is conſtitutive indeed of the act in *ſpecie*, but not efficient: and the perception of it goeth to the *conditio objectiva*, without which it is no object to the will. This I in-

* The Remonſtrants ſay, *Synod. circ. art.* 3. & 4, *p.* 15. [*Voluntatem inſuper Deus in obſequium ſuum ſtatuit, & ad actum fidei & obedientiæ ita inclinat per ſpiritum ſuum ſanctum verbo utentem, ut voluntas per illam operationem non ſolum poſſit obedire, ſed & obediat quotiès obedit; non ex ſe, aut per ſe, aut a ſe.*

cline to with *Scotus*, and ſuppoſe that the Intellect moveth not the will *per modum naturæ*, by neceſſitation. But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own ſouls, how ſhall we know the unſearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghoſt.

The ſeventh Crimination.

C. "*They make Gods Grace a reſiſtible thing, which man can fruſtrate;* "*and ſo God worketh at uncertainties.* *

B. I have ſaid ſo much of this before, that I need not tire you with much more. *Queſt.* 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of ſucceſs, if Grace be reſiſtible.

C. "*I will not ſay ſo: I know what you have ſaid to this before.*

B. Why then do you ſpeak that which is not valid in your own judgment? *Queſt.* 2. Dare you undertake to juſtifie all the world againſt the accuſation, of having reſiſted the Grace of God.

C. "*No; I diſpute not on ſuch hard terms.*

B. *Queſt.* 3. Did you never repent your ſelf for reſiſting Grace?

C. "*Yes, in ſome ſenſe; but not as I now mean it.*

B. How is that?

C. "*To reſiſt the Goſpel and Miniſtry is a reſiſting of Grace, and the Ho-* "*ly Ghoſt*, Acts 7. *and ſo I have done. But I ſpeak of immediate reſiſt-* "*ing God.*

B. 1. Remember that here you confeſs that the Goſpel is Grace, even to them that reſiſt it. 2. God himſelf cannot be reſiſted immediately, where he worketh not immediately. 3. But where he doth ſo, he is ſaid to be reſiſted; 1. Not by any repelling of his ſtrength. 2. Much leſs by oppoſing a greater ſtrength. 3. Nor by acting by any ſtrength but what he giveth. 4. Not by cauſing any difficulty to him. 5. Not by fruſtrating any abſolute will of his: But 1. *Paſſively*, by being ill diſpoſed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth, and that operation which elſe might effect it. 2. And *actively*, by doing that which rendereth us yet more *ill-diſpoſed* both *naturally* and *morally* by *commerit.* 3. As alſo in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect. When he moveth us to hear, read, meditate, pray, love, truſt, *&c.* and we do the contrary; this may be called a reſiſtance.

C. "*If God intend the effect, it will be done: but if he intend it not,* "*how is he reſiſted in that which he never intended to do?*

B. You know the Scripture ſpeaketh not at theſe rates; but when men will ſet their ſilly wits againſt Gods Word, thus they will ſeem ſubtiler than he: But it's but a dream. 1. God may be reſiſted when he intendeth not the effect: in that his Law is reſiſted, and with it that neceſſary meaſure of Grace, by which the effect might have been wrought. Though his Decree be not reſiſted, yet his *Law* and his *Grace* and help (which had a tendency to the effect, and a ſufficiency on its part) may be reſiſted. 2. And he is ordinarily reſiſted in that which he doth both *intend* and do: For he ſeldom doth us any good without reſiſtance, though he overcome. But he that overcometh reſiſtance is reſiſted.

C. "*But I mean by* Reſiſting, Overcoming.

B. Why then did you not ſpeak as you meant. None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater ſtrength; much leſs by the derived

* Mans ignorance of the way of Gods operation on ſecond cauſes, told us by Chriſt himſelf, *Joh.* 3. ſhould end ſuch quarrels and teach us all with judicious *Davenant* to profeſs uncertainty; and with judicious *Joſ. Placeus de lib. arb. p.* 174. (ſpeaking of the dependance of the ſecond cauſe on the firſt, and the Papiſts digladiations about concurſe and predetermination) to ſay, *Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majeſtatem ducimur, non audemus definire quanta ſit dependentia cauſæ ſecundæ a prima: Nobis ſufficit, modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum noſtrorum vel minimam labem aſpergat, non poſſe ni-miam ſtatui.* To which alſo the very judicious *Le Blanc* ſubſcribeth, *Theſ.* 51. *de concurſu, &c.* The Remonſtrants *Syn. ar.* 3, 4. p. 15. &c. do profeſs that Gods operation of the *Intellect, Affection*, and *Will*, do thus differ, that the converting work on the will is more reſiſtible than the other.

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ved power of us worms. But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook.

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B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able. His Wisdome hath diversified Creatures; and his Wisdome hath appointed (even in the works of Grace) a stablished order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect. And his Wisdome and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse, suitable, 1. To the nature of man; 2. And to the nature and use of all those means; 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished: Even as in nature, he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their stablished nature and use. Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome, yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity, and Gods suitable concourse (*e.g.* to a healthful body which hath strong appetites), and also a congruous proportion of Gracious *means*, and *concurse* and helps of Grace, by which he can rule the foresaid appetite, may yet by neglect of that *help*, and by wilful indulging of that appetite, make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help, and so overcome the Grace of God, though he overcome not Gods Omnipotence or Decrees. But there is yet another thing of great moment commonly overlooked.

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B. The great importance of that common saying *Recipitur ad modum recipientis*; on which, had I time, I would write a Book of Instances. *Causa Receptiva* is not well understood. *Aristotle* maketh *Privatio* to be one of his three Principles in Physicks. By *Privation* must be meant, not *Absentia formæ, sed Dispositio materiæ*: And whether you will call it a third Principle, or only the due qualification of the first (*Matter*) to make it *immediately Receptive* of the form, the matter being *de nomine & numero* is small. But it is most certain, that the wonderful diversity of alterations, or effects of motion in the world, is very much to be ascribed to the diversity of *Receptive Dispositions*. And accordingly as in Physicks the three Active Natures (*Intellective, Sensitive, and Vegetative*, (which its like is *Ignis*) are to be defined *per virtutes suas Activas*; so the *Passive* Elements (*Earth, Water*, and *Air*) are to be defined by their several contextures or constitutions, which make up *Dispositionem Receptivam Influxus Activorum, unicuique propriam*; which is their very form.

In Physical cases, God doth first as *Creator* make all things in wonderful variety of natures, quantities, figures, and contextures. And secondly, he causeth an Universal Cause to Influence them generally; such as is the *Sun* for one (what other we know not well); whose triple Influx *Motion, Light*, and *Heat*, affecteth all things according to their several *Natures* and *Receptivities*. The *special Active principle* in every living thing, is both cherished, and suscitated by this *universal solar influx*. But the *diversity* of effects is not from the Sun, but from the diversity of *Recipients*. The Sun by its influx is the cause that all things *live*, and *move*: But that one thing hath a *life* and *motion Intellective*, and another *Sensitive*, and another *Vegetative*, that by the Suns influx an Acorn brings forth an Oak, and every Seed its own kind of Plant; that a Horse acteth as a Horse, a Dog as a Dog, a Sheep as a Sheep, &c. that the Rose hath one smell, colour, shape; the Carnation another; the Tulip another, &c. that the Dunghill stinketh, that the Clay is hardened, the Wax softened, &c. the innumerable different effects in the inferior creatures, are all caused by the Sun, as to their general nature (the received Influx of a

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cline to with *Scotus*, and ſuppoſe that the Intellect moveth not the will *per modum naturæ*, by neceſſitation. But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own ſouls, how ſhall we know the unſearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghoſt.

The ſeventh Crimination.

C. "*They make Gods Grace a reſiſtible thing, which man can fruſtrate;* "*and ſo God worketh at uncertainties.* *

B. I have ſaid ſo much of this before, that I need not tire you with much more. *Queſt.* 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of ſucceſs, if Grace be reſiſtible.

C. "*I will not ſay ſo: I know what you have ſaid to this before.*

B. Why then do you ſpeak that which is not valid in your own judgment? *Queſt.* 2. Dare you undertake to juſtifie all the world againſt the accuſation, of having reſiſted the Grace of God.

C. "*No; I diſpute not on ſuch hard terms.*

B. *Queſt.* 3. Did you never repent your ſelf for reſiſting Grace?

C. "*Yes, in ſome ſenſe; but not as I now mean it.*

B. How is that?

C. "*To reſiſt the Goſpel and Miniſtry is a reſiſting of Grace, and the Ho-* "*ly Ghoſt*, Acts 7. *and ſo I have done. But I ſpeak of immediate reſiſt-* "*ing God.*

B. 1. Remember that here you confeſs that the Goſpel is Grace, even to them that reſiſt it. 2. God himſelf cannot be reſiſted immediately, where he worketh not immediately. 3. But where he doth ſo, he is ſaid to be reſiſted; 1. Not by any repelling of his ſtrength. 2. Much leſs by oppoſing a greater ſtrength. 3. Nor by acting by any ſtrength but what he giveth. 4. Not by cauſing any difficulty to him. 5. Not by fruſtrating any abſolute will of his: But 1. *Paſſively*, by being ill diſpoſed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth, and that operation which elſe might effect it. 2. And *actively*, by doing that which rendereth us yet more *ill-diſpoſed* both *naturally* and *morally* by *commerit.* 3. As alſo in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect. When he moveth us to hear, read, meditate, pray, love, truſt, *&c.* and we do the contrary; this may be called a reſiſtance.

C. "*If God intend the effect, it will be done: but if he intend it not,* "*how is he reſiſted in that which he never intended to do?*

B. You know the Scripture ſpeaketh not at theſe rates; but when men will ſet their ſilly wits againſt Gods Word, thus they will ſeem ſubtiler than he: But it's but a dream. 1. God may be reſiſted when he intendeth not the effect: in that his Law is reſiſted, and with it that neceſſary meaſure of Grace, by which the effect might have been wrought. Though his Decree be not reſiſted, yet his *Law* and his *Grace* and help (which had a tendency to the effect, and a ſufficiency on its part) may be reſiſted. 2. And he is ordinarily reſiſted in that which he doth both *intend* and do: For he ſeldom doth us any good without reſiſtance, though he overcome. But he that overcometh reſiſtance is reſiſted.

C. "*But I mean by* Reſiſting, Overcoming.

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Motive, *Illuminative* and *Calefactive Virtue*) but they are none of them *in ſpecie vel gradu unde differentia qua talis oritur* cauſed by the Sun alone, but alſo by the variety of the ſuſcitated vital forms in animals: And in things inanimate though not the Recipient, but the ſolar Influx be the efficient cauſe of the variety of alterations and effects, yet the *Ratio diverſitatis* is more in the *Diſpoſition* of the *Recipient*: The Suns Influx is the ſame in it ſelf without any difference, on the clay and wax, on the dunghill and the roſe: Let the queſtion then be what cauſeth the different effects? *Anſw.* 1. The *Suns influx* cauſeth all the *Motion*, *Light*, and *Heat* (which they all receive) as the *Efficient cauſe*. 2. The *Material Recipients* are the ſeveral things named, as *Material*. 3. The ſaid Recipients being of divers *Natures and Shapes*, *&c.* have their variety of *Receptive Diſpoſitions*. 4. The *forma Recepta a ſole*, is nothing but its *triplex influxus*, *Motus*, *Lux*, *Calor*. 5. Theſe are variouſly *Received according to the various Diſpoſitions* of the *Recipients*. 6. Hence follow the Variety of the *ſecond effects*; By the *motive Influx* ſome things are moved, when ſtones and houſes ſtir not. By the *Lucide Influx* the eye ſeeth, when the hand doth not: the *flowers* appear in various colours according to their various Receptivities; and ſome things give little reflective appearance of their Reception of it. The Calid Influx cheriſheth the living, and burneth by a burning-glaſs, when the dead ſtir not by it, and ſome unapt recipients are little altered by it. I call theſe the *ſecond effects* which are thus various; For the firſt effects are ſtill the ſame, *viz.* the *Motive*, *Illuminative*, and *Calefactive efflux* of the Sun is ſtill ſent forth, and ſome how or other reacheth every capable recipient in general: But the Alterations which are thereby made are diverſified according to the diverſity of Receptivities.

I have marvelled oft why *Eliſha* called for a Minſtrel, when the ſpirit of Prophecy was to come upon him: And ſo Muſick help'd *Saul*. I am ſure that Satan worketh on the minds of Melancholy, Cholerick, &c. perſons, by and according to the temper of the ſpirits and humors, and cannot do the ſame things without them. And perhaps the ſpirit of God, who can work as he liſt, will do it *ad modum recipientis*; and ſo *Eliſha*'s ſpirits muſt be brought up into an harmonious elevated preparation, that the mind may be made fit to receive the ſpirits extraordinary work.

But yet theſe Receptive Diſpoſitions are no *efficient Cauſes* of this difference, or of any of the alterations. But they are the *Receptive Material Cauſes*, *without which* the *efficient* doth not make them, and *according to which* he *doth* make them.

So that the Sun, though but *Cauſa Univerſalis*, yet is alſo the Univerſal *Cauſe* (and *ſole efficient*) of all theſe *Particular* motions and alterations; And yet the *Ratio differendi* is not to be given from it, but from the different *Receptivities*, according to which it ſtill produceth them.

So the Rain falleth equally on the ſtones, on the earth, on veſſels of various ſhapes and ſizes: The ſtone retaineth none: The veſſels variouſly retain it: As they are round, ſquare, long, great, or ſmall, ſo are they variouſly filled. The efficient cauſe of the *difference*, is the deſcent of the rain. The material conſtitutive cauſe, is the different quantities and ſhapes of the water. But yet the *Ratio differendi* is to be aſſigned from the diverſity of *Receptive diſpoſitions* in the veſſels.

And that you may ſee that theſe *Receptivities* are no efficients, and yet contain the chief *Rationem differendi*, note that the Reaſon to be given from them is, *ex altera differentium parte*, ſtill *Negative* or *Privative*, as on the other it is *Poſitive*: *E. g.* Why doth the Sun make the Roſe ſmell ſweet, and not the ſtone or dunghill? Becauſe the ſtone or dunghill have not thoſe odoriferous particles to be ſuſcitated by it as the Roſe had. Why doth the Sun move the Flies and not the Stones? Becauſe the Stones had not that vital principle to be ſuſcitated, as the Flies had. Why did not the rain fill the Stones as it did the Ciſterns? and this Veſſel as that? Becauſe they had not the ſame *Receptive* and *Retentive ſhapes*.

C. "*Well*

C. *Well! but what is all this physical Discourse to our present Controversie?*

B. 1. The constancy of God in operating according to an established *Order* in the world, doth shew us, that the God of *Order* delighteth so to do.

2. Therefore we have reason to conceive that he doth some such thing in the methods of Grace, as he doth in nature, *viz.* That he hath instituted a frame of *means*, which are the established way in and with which he will convey his Grace: And that he hath decreed to concur with a certain congruous *universal* influx which shall afford to all such a degree of *suscitating*, *illuminating*, and *converting attractive* force, as his wisdom seeth meet to be the established measure for the redeemed World. And this universal Influx is the sole efficient of all the good that is found in the redeemed: But 1. It is but a certain convenient proportion, and therefore will not do all that God can do; nor do the same on one man as on another; nor at one time as at another, on the same man. 2. And *recipitur ad modum recipientis*: The diversity of second effects may oft be most assigned to the diversity of *receptive Dispositions*.

It is a wonder to see how the same causes variously work on mens minds that are dispositively diversified but by some preconceived opinion. You may see two men learned, sober, pious, in doubt whether the Arminians or Calvinists, the Conformists or Non-conformists; yea perhaps the Papists or Protestants, be in the right. One is before hand more inclined one way, and the other the other way; yea perhaps not inclined in will, but have received in judgment a great apprehension that some one Principle is right, which more induceth to one side than the other. They both pray, and meditate, and resolve to read and search the Scripture and Controversal Writings with all possible diligence nnd impartiality: They set upon it; and one seeth all along as he goeth, the fullest evidence, as he thinketh for the one side and the other, seeth all go on the other side, through the difference of *Receptive disposition*.

I have had sufficient notice of two *Non-Conformist Ministers*, that had favoured in mind, the late cause of the Parliament in the Civil War, and by the face of the dreadfulness and heynousness of the guilt, if it should prove that their cause was bad, were brought to resolve to do all that possibly they could to be resolved. They both set themselves to Fast and Pray, they searched the whole Scripture, read over the Statute-Book, and all the Common Law-Books and Cases, that they could get, and all the History of our ancient Government, and of our late Transactions; they read what was said on both sides, and one saw all as clear as the light go for the King against the Parliament, wondering that any should make a doubt of it; and the other, though still not fully certain, was more confirmed in his old apprehensions the other way; yet both learned, able, judicious, godly, and truly desirous to know the truth, and many and many years begged it of God, and unweariedly followed on the search; and no carnal interest I am fully perswaded made the difference: And what then, shall we ascribe it all to *immediate operations* of God, without any more ado? No; as far as I could perceive the difference arose from hence: One of them was first deeply possessed with the sense of *Gods late Judgments* Spiritual and Corporal on the Religious party which adhered to the Parliament; and thought these Judgments indicated their sin: Their *Scandal*, *Divisions*, *Confusions*, *Mutual Censures*, and *Errors* were still before his eyes; and the Laws of *Order* and *Government*, and *Obedience*, and *Patience*, lay in greatest power on his heart. The other lookt all abroad the world, to *Infidel*, *Heathen*, *Mahometan*,

Remonstr. Declar. p. 17. *Huic suæ conversioni homo ex insita sibi pravitate & in res mundanas affectu, obicem & impedimentum liberum opponere potest, & ponit sæpe; sive voluntas prædicationem Evangelii externam neglegat, & suspendat, habeat, tum quum ejus audiendi copia fit homini: aut auditum verbum perfunctorie tractet, magis rebus mundanis intentus; aut alio modo impediat quo minus ipsâ doctrinæ Evangelicæ veritas, necessitas, utilitas a spiritu S. persuadeatur & verbo assentiatur sed voluntatem, &c. & laxatis carni habenis spiritum extinguat, spiritui resistat, & bona desideria cogitationesque sæpius calitus infusas & oblatas voluntatis tædat & exturmint.*

Mahometan, and *Popiſh Kingdoms*, and thought that tyranny was the grand ſin on the earth, which kept out the Goſpel, and conſequently, Godlineſs and Salvation from the generality of mankind; that kept up Popery, and kept out Reformation; that ſilenced powerful Preachers, and kept up Ignorance; that moſt ſerved Satan, and fed the jaws of Hell. He thought of all the inhumane conſequents of unreſtrained Tyranny: He read Politicks more than the other, and read more of the Greek and Roman Hiſtory, and regarded more the Judgment of the ſeveral Parties and Religions among mankind: and he fell upon *Bilſon* and *Hooker* the chief Prelatiſts; and he thought that Gods Judgments conſequential to thoſe Wars had been incomparably leſs than the mercies and benefits, and that there were now proportionably multitudes more of Godly Miniſters and People than there were before the Wars: And theſe different pre-conceptions and pre-poſſeſſions, made them have quite different Interpretations of all the Scriptures, the Statutes, the Law Books, *&c.* which they read. And as the Proverb is, *As the Fool thinketh, ſo the Bell tinketh:* So it is wonderful to ſee in all things, how much the divers diſpoſition of the *Recipients*, doth occaſion diverſity of effects from the ſame cauſe.

Suffrag. Theol. Britt. in Synod. Dord. art. 3. & 4. *Sunt quædam effecta interna ad converſionem prævia quæ virtute verbi ſpirituſque in nondum juſtificatorum cordibus excitantur; qualia ſunt notitia voluntatis divinæ, ſenſus peccati, timor pœnæ, cogitatio de liberatione, ſpes aliqua veniæ. Quos Deus mediante verbo per ſpiritum ſuum hunc in modum afficit, eos ad fidem, converſionemque vere & ſerio vocat & invitat. Quos ita afficit Deus non deſerit, nec deſiſtit, in vera ad converſionem via præmovere, priuſquam ab illis per neglectionem voluntariam aut hujus gratiæ initialis repulſam, deſeratur.*

C. "*But I hope you would not make us believe that all diverſification is* "*from man: Though the Sun be but an univerſal cauſe, yet God is alſo a* par "ticular cauſe, *and a* ſpecifying; *and who is it elſe that cauſed that* diver- "ſity *in the Creatures, which turneth the Suns univerſal Influx into various* "*effects. As God created the variety of* Recipients, *ſo he doth by Grace* "*diverſifie mans* Receptive diſpoſitions.

B. "Theſe are weighty matters, and deeply to be conſidered, with many thoughts and cautelous ſobriety. We have two queſtions fallen before us: 1. How far Gods *Grace is reſiſtible.* 2. How God or man do cauſe *diverſities.* Though I have been drawn on to ſpeak much to the laſt, it is here but in order to the reſolving of the firſt. The laſt is to be ſpoke to by it ſelf anon. Before we come to that, theſe things I here conclude of.

1. That the *Diverſity of Nature*, or *Receptive Diſpoſitions*, being preſuppoſed, God hath an *eſtabliſhed order of means*, and a *congruous eſtabliſhed univerſal Concurſe*, which *quantum in ſe*, as far as belongeth to it to do, worketh equally on all.

2. That this *eſtabliſhed meaſure of aid*, or *concurſe*, *recipitur ad modum recipientis*, and operateth variouſly as to the effects, according to the various diſpoſition of the Recipients: from whom the *ratio diverſatis* is to be fetcht, and not from it.

3. That this *eſtabliſhed meaſure of Concurſe* or *aid* may by the greatneſs of the *Paſſive* and *Active Indiſpoſition* and *Illdiſpoſition* of the *Recipient*, be both *reſiſted*, and *overcome* or fruſtrate.

Hi præcedanei effectus virtute verbi ſpirituſque in hominum mentibus producti, rebellis voluntatis vitio, ſuffocari & penitus extingui poſſunt, & in multis ſolent: adeo ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi ſpirituſque impreſſa fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinæ, &c. mutentur plane in contrarium, &c.

4. That as *Adam* did reſiſt and overcome ſuch Grace, ſo do all wicked men in ſome caſes now. And ſo do all godly men, in moſt of the ſins (if not all) which they commit.

5. As God *rarely* worketh *Miracles*, (and we hardly know when he *violateth* his eſtabliſhed courſe of nature, though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any ſecond cauſe known to us, and when he leaveth his ordinary way) but ordinarily keepeth to his *eſtabliſhed courſe* and uſe of the ſecond cauſes (even in his wonders.) So it is ve-

And even *Alvarez*. Diſp. 18. n. 20. ſaith, *Si non operatur actione qui eſt in præcepto imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod ſua culpa ſe impedivit, ne daretur illi auxilium efficax quod neceſſarium erat, ut actualiter operaretur: ſicut ſi Deus imponeret homini præceptum volandi, & quantum eſt ex parte ſua offerret illi alas & adjutorium neceſſarium ut volaret, ipſe autem reſponderet, Domine nec volo alas accipere nec volare, merito reputaretur reus, etiamſi non poſſit abſque alis, volare, quia ſua culpa ſe impedivit ne illi darentur a Deo.*

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ry probable, that in the Works of Grace, Recovery and Salvation, he ordinarily keepeth to his *eſtabliſhed order*, his Ordinances, and fixed degree of Concurſe.

6. Yet as God is ſtill *above all his Works*, and a *free Agent*, and is no further tied to one conſtant order and meaſure of Concurſe, than he tieth himſelf by his *Wiſdom* and *Free-will*; ſo God is free in the conveyance of his Grace, and can when he pleaſe, forſake that order, and work Miracles by Grace, as well as on natural things above nature. He can ſtrike down *Saul*, and convert him by a voice from Heaven; and in a word, can do what he will.

7. And as in moſt wonders, its paſt our power to know whether and *when* God doth indeed forſake his eſtabliſhed order, and work contrary to it, or without ſuch ſecond cauſes, as are unknown to us; though we can tell when he acteth *unuſually*: So is it in this caſe, about his works of Grace. A Comet, or Blazing Star is an *unuſual* thing, whoſe neceſſary antecedent cauſe we know not: And yet it is but a *natural effect* of *ſecond cauſes*, operating in their *eſtabliſhed courſe*; ſo are eccliples (better known) and unuſual Tempeſts, and terrible Lightnings, *&c.* So great and ſudden, unuſual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on ſinners: and yet all in Gods eſtabliſhed courſe of working, and by thoſe ſecond cauſes which are to us unknown.

C. "*But God is not a* natural *but a* voluntary Agent; *and Grace is his* "*immediate work or off-ſpring.*

B. 1. He is a *voluntary Agent* in *Creation*, *Preſervation*, and in all the works and changes of nature: and yet he operateth *conſtantly* in his appointed courſe.

2. Its unknown to us, what *means* he uſeth, out of our reach, in his operations upon ſouls, as well as in nature.

3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature: yea as *morality* is but the *modality* of things *natural*, ſo we may conceive that God may poſſibly work it, by the *modifying* of phyſical Agents and their actions, and the recipients.

4. Immutability and conſtancy is one of Gods perfections; and the expreſſion of it in the conſtant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world: Though our *mutable Free-wills* are better than the fixed or neceſſitated appetite of Bruits, that is not, as they are *mutable*, and the acts contingent, but as they have a higher object. But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified (Angels and Saints) are far better than ours. And why ſhould we think unſetled mutability of efficiency, to be the beſt diſcovery of Gods Immutability.

5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he pleaſe.

C. "*But it is by* fixed ſecond cauſes *that God keepeth a fixed order of* "natural *productions and alterations in the world. But you can name no* "*ſuch* univerſal ſecond cauſe *of Grace*, *affording under God a* reſiſtible "Influx *as the Sun doth in Nature.*

B. What will you ſay, if I name you ſuch a *ſecond univerſal cauſe*; (though if I could not, it followeth not that therefore there is none ſuch.) I think I can name you one that all Chriſtians ſhould know; and yet it ſeems is not well by Divines themſelves conſidered. JESUS CHRIST as MAN, and MEDIATOR is Gods Adminiſtrator General of the humane world; and is compared to the *Riſing Sun*, which illuminateth all the world, with a light ſuitable to *it* and *them*. So Chriſt is the light *of the world*, the Sun of Righteouſneſs, that ariſeth with *healing Grace*, and *enlightneth* every man that cometh into the world: (or as *Grotius* and *Hammond* render it [*which coming into the world enlightneth every*

man] ſuppoſing ὃ γέγονεν to be the Nominative Caſe and Neuter Gender, and not the Accuſative Maſculine) *In him was Life, and the Life was the light of men* (not only to the ſanctified who received, but uneffectually though *quoad ſe* ſufficiently) *the light ſhined in darkneſs*, and the *darkneſs comprehended it not*: *The world* that was made by him knew him not: *He came to his own, and his own received him not* (yet he *came* to them) But *as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the ſons of God*, John 1. 3, 10, 11. It is apparent in Scripture that *all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Chriſt*, Matth. 28. 19, 20. that *all things are delivered into his hands*, John 13. 3. and *God hath given him power over all fleſh*, John 17. 2. and *he is head over all things to the Church*, Epheſ. 1. 22, 23.

C. "*We all grant that Chriſt is an* univerſal light and *Saviour*: 1. Ob-"*jectively*: 2. *And as to his Doctrine, Covenant, and Example*: *But* "*what's that to* internal efficient Grace, *which is* immediately *from God?*

B. Great is this *myſtery of Godlineſs*: there is more in Chriſt than you take notice of, even the *Spirit* which muſt work Grace in mens ſouls, is two ways given firſt to Chriſt: 1. In that as Adminiſtrator general, the power of giving out the Spirit to mankind is now given to *Him*, even in his humane Nature. And he giveth it out in manner and meaſure ſuitable 1. To himſelf: 2. To us. 3. To his eſtabliſhed means and Ordinances, by which he worketh. So that now the *Spirit* with its aid (common or ſpecial) is not given to any ſinner immediately from God, as Creator; and as it was given to *Adam* before his fall, but by the Mediation of Chriſt the Redeemer. I mean not only the *meritorious* and *procuring* mediation, but alſo the *powerful conveying mediation*. Though God the Holy Ghoſt be ſtill proximately the cauſe of Grace, yet Chriſt as Mediator is made by office, the *Mediator and authorized giver of that Spirit and all its Grace*; and ſo the meaſurer and orderer of his helps, and appointer of the conditions.

2. And Chriſt is firſt filled with this Spirit *perſonally* himſelf, that he may be a fit Head of vital Influence to all his Members, who by the previous operations of his Spirit are drawn and united to him.

C. "*How prove you all this univerſal power in Chriſt?*

B. You have heard the expreſs proof: And ſtudy further, 1 *John* 5. 11, 12. *And this is the record that God hath given us eternal life; and this life is in his Son: He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son hath not life.*

Rom. 8, 9. *If any man have not the Spirit of Chriſt, the ſame is none of his.* Mark that it is, *The Spirit of Chriſt.*

John 15. 26. *The Comforter* (or Advocate) *whom I will ſend to you from the Father.*

John 16. 7. *If I depart I will ſend him to you.*

John 14. 26. *The Comforter whom the Father will ſend in my name.*

Gal. 4. 6. *And becauſe ye are Sons God hath ſent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father.*

Gal. 2. 20. *I live, yet not I, but Chriſt liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the fleſh, I live by the Faith of the Son of God who loved me.*

John 5. 21, 22. *The Son quickneth whom he will; for the Father judgeth no man but hath committed all judgment to the Son.*—26. *For as the Father hath life in himſelf, ſo hath he given the Son to have life in himſelf.* And that you may ſee that he giveth the Spirit with and by means, he ſaith, *Verſe* 24. *Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that ſent me, hath everlaſting life.*

That Grace habitual is *participatio naturæ divinæ*, and how, and in what ſenſe. *Vide* Caceres *ſum. Theol.* 2. 2. *cap.* 1. And abundance of Jeſuites and other Schoolmen go as far in aſſerting its ſupernaturality, and ſome in aſcribing it to Chriſt, as Proteſtants do: But *Vaſquez* and many go farther than many Proteſtants in ſuppoſing Chriſt the cauſe not only of Grace but of our Election to Grace. And yet even there the difference is moſt, if not only in words.

The *Thomiſts* maintain even that Chriſts humanity is the Inſtrument of the Deity in operating Grace in us, which the cauſe of the Euchariſt leadeth them to.

John 6. 27, 32, 33. *Labour for that meat which endureth to everlasting life, which the Son of man will give you: For him hath God the Father sealed*; that is, openly owned as appointed to this Office.

He giveth life unto the world---Whoso eateth my Flesh and drinketh my Blood hath eternal Life---Dwelleth in me and I in him.---My Flesh is meat indeed---As the living Father hath sent me, and *I live by the Father*; *so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me.*---Verse 63. *It is the Spirit that quickneth, the Flesh profiteth nothing.*

John 3. 34. *God giveth not the Spirit to him by measure.*

John 7. 39. *This he spake of the Spirit, which they that believe in him should receive.*

John 1.5. 4, 5. *Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of it self, except it abide in the vine*; *no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit*; *for without me* (or out of me) *ye can do nothing.*

Matth. 28. 20. *I am with you always to the end.*

1 Cor. 6. 17. *He that is joyned to the Lord is one Spirit.*

2 Cor. 3. 17. *The Lord is that Spirit*: and *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.*

Phil. 1. 19. *Through the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ.*

Col. 3. 3, 4. *For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God: when Christ who is our life shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory.*

Ephes. 1. 22, 23. *And gave him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.*

Do you need more to prove this great Office of Christ?

C. "*Here is more than I have well thought on. But I find more to prove* "*Christ the vital Head to his Church, than to prove him the universal dis-* "*penser of all Grace whatever is given to the world.*

E. Read them over again; what would you have more, than all *Power, all things, all Judgment given or committed to him*: And to be by Office the Redeemer, Saviour, and *light of the world, coming as such even to them that neither comprehend him, know him, or receive him.* I add another Text, *Prov.* 1. 20. to the end.---*Wisdom crieth without, she uttereth her voice.---How long ye simple ones will you love simplicity*, and *the scorners delight in their scorning*, and *fools hate knowledge? Turn you at my reproof: behold I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you.---Because I have called and ye refused*, (see the rest.) Ver. 32. *For the turning away of the simple shall slay them.*

And two things more I offer for your conviction. 1. That to shew both his *Power*, and that he will exercise it *orderly* by *means*, Christ *impowred* his *Apostles and Ministers under him* to give the Spirit. And if the *extraordinary* Gifts were given by the *laying on of their hands*, no wonder if the *ordinary* were given by *their Doctrine.*

2. That on this ground Christ shall be the *universal Judge* of all the *world*, as he was the universal *Law-giver* and *light* to all.

But what need I more, when it is his very *Office* as *Christ*: as *Prophet to be the* universal *Teacher*, by *Spirit* and Word; and as *Priest* to sanctifie by *Spirit* and *Word*; and as King to rule by *Spirit* and *Word.*

C. "*I am amazed to think how little we well understand of our very* "*Fundamentals and Catechism which we teach the ignorant: Methinks in* "*this* universal Light *I see more than ever I before observed, that God in-* "*deed hath set up a* Sun, *an* universal medium, *a* Christ, *who in our* na-"ture *is a* Creature, *to* be the Donor and Conveyor of all Recovering

"Grace to man, *and* to give out the Spirit *in that* ſtated order *and* "meaſure as is ſuitable to his deſign *and* Subjects. *And as on earth he* "*gave out much light and help which was reſiſted and rejected, I now leſs* "*wonder that it is ſo now he is in heaven; even as to his Spirit as well as* "*his Word: When I conſider, that though God be* Infinite, *his Grace is gi-* "*ven out to mankind* finitely, *by a* finite Creature, Chriſt *as* man; *even* "*as God ſhineth to us, not* immediately, *but by* the Sun. *I will no* "*more then account it an injury to God, that he ſhould be ſaid to give li-* "*mited and* reſiſtible *degrees of Grace by Chriſt, but repent that I have* "*ſo much grieved and reſiſted the Spirit of Chriſt my ſelf.*

B. Proceed now to your other accuſation.

The eighth Crimination.

C. "They make mans Free-will, and not Gods differencing Grace to "be the cauſe that one man by Faith doth differ from another that hath "no Faith. Contrary to *Paul's* ſuppoſition, who made thee to differ? "*Tilenus* could not anſwer *Camero* to this charge.

B. I doubt here again is a Controverſie about words. I will ſpeak to you as to one that would know the truth. 1. *De re*, as to the Controverſie. 2. As to the meaning of the Text.

I. Let us here conſider, 1. What it is to *Differ* 2. What are the cauſes of ſuch difference?

I. To DIFFER is nothing but to be *diſſimile*, unlike. *Diſſimilitude* or *Difference* is a *Relation*. This *Relation* (as *Ockam* truly and largely ſheweth) is nothing *extra intellectum*, beſides its *fundamentum*, *ſubjectum* & *terminus*, the *Abſoluta*.

II. Difference then being a *Relation* is the *diſſimilitude of divers perſons compared*. Here the natural numerical difference of perſons, and abundance of other differences are preſuppoſed. And it is the Difference between a *Believer* and an *Unbeliever*, the *Penitent* and *Impenitent* as ſuch, that we have to conſider of. Now here are two *Subjects* differing, and in each one, if not *two differences* from the other: So that here are two, if not four ſeveral Relations of diſſimilitude between them. 1. *Paul* is a *Believer*; by which he differeth 1. From *Nero* as a *Privative Unbeliever*. 2. As a Poſitive Unbeliever. On the other ſide *Nero* 1. as a privative Unbeliever: 2. and a poſitive, differeth from *Paul*. Now every one of theſe *Differences* or diſſimilitudes have a ſeveral cauſe. 1. The *fundamentum* of both *Paul's* differences from *Nero* are his own *Faith*; and the *Termini* are *Nero's Privative* and *Poſitive* unbelief. 2. The *fundamenta* of *Nero's* difference from *Paul* are his *Privative* and *Poſitive* unbelief, and the *Termini* are *Paul's Faith* to both.

Now if the queſtion be, what doth *Conſtitutive* make *Paul* differ from *Nero*, it muſt be anſwered *Paul's Faith* and *Nero's* unbelief. For diſſimilitude reſulteth from the *one* compared with the other. And if both had been Believers there had been no difference. And ſo were this the queſtion, there were no difficulty in it at all.

But the meaning of the queſtion is not of the conſtitutive cauſe of the diſſimilitude, or the *fundamentum*, but of the *efficient cauſe* of that *fundamentum*, or elſe of the diverſifying *Diſpoſitio Receptiva*. Now ſuppoſing that *Faith* and *Unbelief* are the conſtitutive differencing cauſes; the *efficient cauſes* of *both* muſt be ſought as the *Ratio diſcriminis*, and not of *one only*.

Remonſtr. Synod. ubi ſupra. [*Si quæratur quæ ſit cauſa cur hic convertitur, non autem ille? Reſpondemus, hic convertitur quia Deus hunc non appo-* [illegible] *novam contumaciam convertit: Ille non convertitur quia novam contumaciam opponit: Quæres, cur hic opponit novam contumaciam, alter non? Reſpondemus, Hic opponit quia opponere vult: Ille non opponit quia a gratia movetur ne opponere velit: Quæres, annon ille qui non opponit novam contumaciam & per conſequens convertitur, majorem habebat gratiam, quam qui opponit, & per conſequens non convertitur? Reſpondemus, Antecedentem & prævenientem gratiam æqualem eſſe poſſe: ſed coopelantem habet prior, & non poſterior.*

Queſt. 1. What is the cauſe (efficient) of *Nero's* unbelief? *Anſ.* His own will or wicked heart.

Queſt. 2. What is the efficient cauſe of *Paul's* Faith? *Anſ.* 1. The Principal efficient is God by his Spirit. 2. The meritorious cauſe is Chriſt. 3. The chief miniſterial efficient is Chriſt as giving the Spirit to work it. 4. The Inſtrumental efficient is the Goſpel. 5. The Immediate efficient is *Paul:* For it is he that believeth, and not God. Is there any one that denieth any of this?

C. "*I doubt they think that mans will is more the cauſe than the Spirit;* "*becauſe they ſuſpend the Spirits ſucceſs upon mans will.*

B. Accuſe not men by *ſuſpicions* and *doubts* without proof; yea contrary to their *own profeſſions.* Your crime of *uncharitableneſs* is not *theirs*; nor doth it follow that *they are faulty* becauſe *you are ſuſpicious.** You may read *Corvinus* to *Tilenus* expreſly aſſigning the efficiency of all that Grace that maketh us to differ, principally unto God. Some of them only ſay [*man cannot* effect, (or convert himſelf) but he *can reſiſt*: and ſo require no more of man to his converſion but *not to reſiſt:* yea not to reſiſt in an *obſtinacy* and *high degree.* Others of them require of man alſo an *actual concurſe* of his *will* by his power received, with the concurſe of God: But they make God here incomparably the chief efficient; not only as to Priority of operation, but as to his cauſation of the effect. And they uſe to illuſtrate it ſome time as *Scotus* by the ſimilitude of two drawing at a Ship, ſometime by a Father, that ſhould bid his Son lift at a heavy weight, and reſolveth to put to 900 degrees of the force himſelf if his Son will but endeavour, and put forth one degree. In this caſe, if the Son will not put forth that one which he can do, and ſo the event fail; it is not by the Impotency nor abſolute unwillingneſs of the Father. And if the child do put forth that one degree, will you ſay that he doth more to the effect than the Father that doth 900 parts; and that only becauſe that the Father would not do all himſelf? But this carrieth us from the matter in hand, and is after to be ſpoken to.

* Alliac. Camer. m. 1. q. 12. B. *Deus nullum prædeſtinavit aut prædeſtinat (accipiendo prædeſtinationem ſecundo modo) propter aliquod bonum aut aliquam cauſam præviſam in prædeſtinato quia non ſtat aliquem noviter aliquod bonum habere, quin Deus prius voluerit & ab æterno, &c.*

C. "*But if you make ſo many things go to make the difference, the que-* "*ſtion,* who made thee to differ? *muſt have a long anſwer.*

B. Not as *Paul* meant it, but as our troubleſome Contenders uſe it, in another ſenſe, the anſwer muſt be ſuited to the queſtion. And here note that really it is the ſtate of both parties compared, and not of one of them that conſtituteth the diſſimilitude as is ſaid: And the efficient cauſes of *both ſtates,* are the cauſes of the difference. And ſo truly the cauſe of *Nero's* unbelief, and the cauſes of *Paul's* Faith (which are many as aforeſaid) all ſet together are the cauſes of the differences; or rather all make up one cauſe of it. This no Logician can deny. But yet in vulgar ſpeech we uſe to ſay that that perſon or thing is the cauſe of the difference, 1. Which is the cauſe of the ſingularity. 2. Or which cauſeth the ſtate of the ſecond perſon compared, ſuppoſing the ſtate of the firſt perſon to be already exiſtent. And ſo you will find yet ſeveral ſenſes of the queſtion.

Even thoſe that found the infallibility on *ſcientia medii*, make congrous Grace *ex propoſito convertendi* to be the cauſe of the difference. So *Malderus* 1, 2. *q.* 111. *a.* 3. *p.* 517. *Quod hic credat præ alio, indubie venit de miſericordia Dei, ipſum ſic vocantis ut accomodet aſſenſum; miſericordia inquam qua nos in Chriſto elegit, Totum eſt miſerentis Dei ipſe vocat, ipſe facit ut vocatus veniat; ipſe ut currat; ipſe nolentem prævenit, ut velit; volentem ſubſequitur ut fru-*

ſtra velit, vi ſua Gratia ita ſibi optat liberum arbitrium, ut a nullo duro corde reſpuatur, quod dicimus provenire ex eo quod meris, ineffabilibus & occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis movere ſenſum ut accomodet aſſenſum --- Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam & Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum, manifeſtari in gratiæ efficatia.--- Et conſenſus hominis eſt donum Dei; deſcendens a Patre luminum; illumque conſenſum Deus vult & facit, quia facit hominem viribus gratiæ facere. Yea he yieldeth to *Bradwardines* Doctrine, ſuppoſing him only to intend *neceſſitatem quandam conſequentiæ, neceſſarium eſſe hominem libere velle illud ipſum quod Deus cujus omnipotentiæ, quæcunque voluit facit) prævoluit ipſum velle libere. Item, gratiam efficacem dari intuitu meritorum Chriſti, non tantum quatenus eſt, ſufficiens; ſed etiam quatenus eſt efficax dum ſecundum propoſitum vocat.--- Item cura Dei non eſt æqualis de omnibus.*

C. "EA-

C. "*Explain it by ſome inſtances.*

B. 1. As to the cauſe of *ſingularity*. If one man be born an Ideot or a Monſter, when we ask, what made him differ from other men, though really the cauſes of the diſſimilitude be to be aſſigned on *both parts*; yet we mean only on *his part*, why is he not like *others*. So if *one Child* be unlike to all his brethren, or *one Scholar* in the School be much *better* or much *worſe* than all the reſt; or if one in a Family be ſick, he that asketh, what maketh him differ? doth mean, what made him ſick? *&c.*

2. And ſo as to *Poſteriority* of *State*, if you ſuppoſe one of the *diſſimiliar* parts *pre-exiſtent*, and ask *what maketh the other to differ from it?* as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy? why the Son is ſo unlike to the *Father?* why this age is ſo unlike the laſt? *&c.* We mean only what cauſeth the difference *ex parte ſubſequente.*

C. "*Apply it to the caſe in hand.*

B. If you ask, what made the difference between the Devils and the perſevering Angels? In the *full* and *proper* anſwer you muſt aſſign the reaſon on *both parts*: But according to the uſual ſenſe of the queſtion, you muſt ſay [*The wilful ſin of the Devils made the difference.*] For the equal ſtate of uprightneſs *went before* the difference.

So if you ask, what made the difference between the world *after the fall*, and *before it?* vulgarly, we muſt ſay, *ſin*; becauſe that came laſt.

So if you ask, what made the difference between *Noah* and the *world?* between *Lot* and *Sodom? Anſ.* Indeed, that which made one part ſinful and the other righteous. But according to the vulgar ſenſe of the queſtion, it was the *Righteouſneſs* of *Noah* and *Lot*, and the *cauſes* of that righteouſneſs.

So what made the *difference between Judas* and the eleven Apoſtles? *Anſ. Judas* his wilful ſin and Wickedneſs, (though indeed the cauſe is on both ſides.)

So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world? Really, the unbelief of the world, and the Faith of Chriſtians with their cauſes: But it's like the ſpeaker meaneth only *ex parte credentium*: And then the cauſe of *their Believing* is the cauſe of their *differing.*

But now, if it hold true that God giveth a ſufficiency of Grace *ut cauſa univerſalis ex parte donantis* (antecedently to mens accepting or rejecting) equally, then if one ask, *what maketh the difference?* you would underſtand him (*why* have not unbelievers *Faith*, as well as others? And then the anſwer would be, *wilful reſiſting*, or *refuſing Grace*, or the *moral ſpecial* indiſpoſition of the Recipients makes the difference; or elſe all would be alike believers.

But note, that we ask not [*What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers?*] but do *particularize* the ſubject, and ask, [*what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever?*] or *what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer?*] It is then ſuppoſed that we mean only *ex parte nominata.* And thus in the vulgar ſenſe the queſtions, [*what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel?*] and [*what maketh* the Infidel differ from the believer] muſt have various anſwers.

C. "*I underſtand you thus in brief:* 1. *You ſay that conſtitutively it is* "*Faith that is the difference on* Paul's *part, and unbelief on* Nero's. 2. *The cauſes of the ſaid* Faith *and* unbelief, *are the cauſes of the difference:* (*As* "*the cauſes of the whiteneſs of one wall; and of the blackneſs of the other cauſe their difference.*) 3. That to ask (why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever?) is but to ask [*why he is a Believer when the other is not?*] 4. Here you ſay the two Relations of diſſimilitude in two ubbjects make the queſtions two in one, *viz.* 1. *Why or whence is* Paul *a Believer?*]

2. *Whence*

2. *Whence is it that* Nero *is an Unbeliever?*] 5. You say that *Nero* is an Unbeliever through his own *wilfulness*, and *illdisposition* resisting Grace (Satans temptations concurring.) And that *Paul* is a Believer from many conjunct causes: 1. Gods Grace by his Spirit. 2. Christs Merits. 3. Christs donation of that Spirit. 4. The means by which he worketh. 5. The concurse of *Pauls* will. To which efficients you add in most a competent Receptive disposition in *genere causæ materialis*, both passive and active. 6. You say that in all this Gods Grace is incomparably the greater cause than man's will. 7. But yet not the sole cause, and that some free-not-necessitated concurse of mans will, in the use of such Power as he hath, is a condition *sine qua non ut dispositio Gratiæ receptiva*, ordinarily. 8. But that God is not tied to this, but may extraordinarily do otherwise. 9. But that this* pre-requisite disposition, and the concurse of mans will is only the use of a power freely before given of God, with all necessary helps to use it. 10. And therefore that God is from first to last the first cause of all that's good in man, though not the only cause; and that of himself man can do nothing. Have I not taken your meaning right.

B. Yes, so far as you have recited it?

C. "*But methinks yet you answer not the great question, which* Camero "*baffled* Tilenus *with. It is not why* Paul *believeth?* Nor why Nero be- "lieveth not? *as singly considered: But comparatively*, why Paul belie- "veth rather than Nero? *Speak to that.*

B. *Camero* and *Tilenus* were great and excellent wits. But if you can forgive the Truth, I must add that which they said nothing to, which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteness, might have shortned or better ended their dispute.

It is the *Comparatio personarum* that is now the subject of that Controversie: why this man rather than that as compared? Here then we are to consider, 1. The *Comparabilitas*. 2. The *Ipsa Comparatio*.

I. The question as to the first is, either 1. Whether there was antecedently any such *ratio comparandi* in them, as might be a reason or motive to God himself, *quoad actum ex parte agentis*, why he should decree to give, or actually give *Faith* to one man rather than to another? 2. Or else whether there were any such difference antecedent as might be *Ratio discriminis ineffectis*, the reason why one *received* or *had Faith*, and the *other not*.

II. And then *quoad actum comparandi*, the question is, whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the persons antecedently, and say (not only [*I will cause this man to believe*] and say [I will not cause that man to believe] or, not say [I will.] But also said [I will cause this man to believe rather than that.]

To these several questions then I answer. 1. Negatively to the first: For Gods acts *ex parte agentis* are his essence; and as he hath no cause, but is the cause of all things, so thus far nothing in the world is a causal reason or motive to God. He willeth because he willeth, or rather without cause.

II. To the second, There are in the Creatures *different capacities*, for *terminating Gods will and action objectively*, and accordingly *denominating* his *Volitions* and *Actions* variously: And so this question must be divided into three. 1. Whether *always*. 2. Whether *ordinarily*. 3. Whether *sometimes* there be an *objective ratio comparabilitatis* and of preferring one before another, as to the *effect of believing*? or why Gods operation should effect Faith rather in this man than in that? To which I answer.

* Ruiz. de prædif. tr. 3. d. 18. p. 232. *Resp. dispositiones proximas & proportionatas ad gratiam nihil ob esse quidditati gratiæ, quoniam ex prima radice nascuntur ex prima gratia, quæ absque ulla dispositione quasi creata est a Deo sine materia: At pugnabit cum quidditate gratiæ qualibet dispositio etiam remota, si ob illa sumit initium gratia ita ut prima gratia detur intuitu talis dispositionis.* Is not this enough?]

As

Ad primum, 1. There are *neareſt Reaſons* in the *immediate* aptitude of the receiver. Such as is the higheſt degree of preparing Grace in one, which another hath not. And there are *remote reaſons* or aptitudes. As *e. g.* A man of great learning, wit, and zeal, or ſome other remote aptitude, will be a fitter perſon for Gods work than another, when he believeth. 2. It is not known to any mortal man, what different aptitudes in both theſe kinds, God the only heart-ſearcher ſeeth, which no man can ſee: And therefore this queſtion cannot certainly be anſwered as to both ſorts.

3. But as far as our blind eyes can reach, it ſeemeth moſt probable to us, that God doth *not always* effect Faith according to the degrees of receptive aptitude of either ſort. Becauſe we ſee that ſometimes he ſuddenly calleth very great ſinners, and alſo ſome that are ſilly and little ſerviceable in the world. But yet what ſpecial aptitudes God may ſee in them we know not.

Ad ſecundum, *Qu.* I anſwer, That it is Gods *ordinary way* to *give Faith* according to the *firſt ſort of prediſpoſition* alone (were there no difference in the laſt) that is, To thoſe that have the higheſt degrees of *moral preparation*, or *Common Grace*, I take to be a certain truth. 1. Becauſe in all Gods Works we ſee that he operateth by degrees in order, and, on prediſpoſed matter, and that *efficit juxta diſpoſitionem recipientis*. 2. But ſpecially becauſe he hath himſelf appointed a courſe of means for the obtaining of his ſpecial Grace, to be uſed by all men: And he cannot be thought to do all this in vain; nor to ſet men on doing their part in vain. And all practical Divines who preach ſo much for the ſouls preparation, are of this mind, that ſuch preparation is the ordinary prediſpoſition.

Ad Qu. 3. I anſwer, That at *leaſt ſometimes* it is ſo, is paſt queſtion with any ſober man. For it is a contradiction, to call it *preparing Grace*, or *Diſpoſition*; and yet to ſay that by it no man is made ever the more receptive or nearlier capable of Faith or ſpecial Grace. So much to the two queſtions de *Comparabilitate*. *

III. But as to the third queſtion, Whether God *Actually* in his mind thus *Compare men*, and *prefer one before another*, and ſay, *I will cauſe this man to believe rather than that?* I anſwer, 1. There is no Act in God but his Eſſence, which is invariable, and indiviſible. 2. But becauſe his operations as *terminated* and productive *ad extra* are various, and have objective material cauſes of their diverſity in the recipients; therefore we uſually thence denominate Gods volitions as various. And ſo when we ſee that one man hath Grace given him to believe, when another hath not, we hence ſay that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other: when the difference is not at all in God, nor his Act *ex parte agentis*, but only of *and by God* in the Recipients.

C. "*But come yet nearer the heart of the caſe, and tell me plainly,* "1. *Whether the difference of* Effects *be more from the will and action of* "*God, or from mens different Receptive diſpoſitions. And* 2. *Whether all* "*theſe different Receptivities be not of God.*

B. Order bids me begin with the latter. 1. The different Diſpoſitions are of two ſorts, Good and Bad. God is not the cauſe of the Indiſpo-

ſition

* Mark what *Bannes* himſelf ſaith of Common Grace, in q. 23. pag. 274. [*Pie credi poteſt quod omnibus venientibus ad uſum rationis Deus opem. aliquam ferat ſupernaturali quodam auxilio ſecreto inſtigante ad operandum bonum. 2. Si vera eſt opinio Thomæ, &c. neceſſe eſt dicere quod omnis qui juſtificatur, receperit gratiam præparantem ſaltem prius natura quam præceptum naturale adimpleverit. 3. Quotieſcunque aliquis peccat ſpeciale peccatum contra ſupernaturale præceptum, vel fidei vel pœnitentiæ, &c. neceſſe eſt ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inſpirationem illuminantis Dei aut vocantis aut incitantis ad fidem, &c. Immo neceſſe eſt hominem tangi aliqua ſupernaturali inſpiratione ut nullam habeat excuſationem. Poſſibile eſt ſecundum legem ordinariam quemlibet dum eſt in hac vita ſalvari. Deus paratus eſt dare omnibus quamdiu ſunt in hac vita auxilium quo fiant potentes converti, immo & auxilium ſpecialius quo convertantur ſi velint.* I cite this, becauſe for his Doctrine of Predetermination, Proteſtants much value *Bannes* (a boaſting Author, who thanketh God that their King burneth Proteſtants.) Indeed the Dominicans commonly confeſs ſufficient Grace which is not effectual.

ſition or illdiſpoſition of any. And as to the good diſpoſition or Preparation of Souls, no doubt but he is the principal Cauſe of it all: but not the ſole Cauſe, nor (always at leaſt) the neceſſitating Cauſe; but oft giveth men that neceſſary help by which they might have been prepared for more, when yet they are not through their wilful reſiſtance or neglect. For few men will deny that men have ſufficient uneffectual Grace for ſome preparatory acts, though not for faith.

Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects, reſulteth from the Cauſes in both Subjects, and not in one only: That which maketh one a believer, and the other an unbeliever, maketh them differ. And I have told you what theſe Cauſes are. But further; I ſuppoſe as aforeſaid, a certain eſtabliſhed order and degree of univerſal help, external and internal, by Chriſt to the Soul, as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies: This ſtabliſhed order of Grace, univerſally affordeth ſuch a degree of Divine Influx and help, as will cauſe faith in a prepared Soul, and will not cauſe it in ſome much unprepared Souls: (For if as little help would ſerve the unprepared as the prepared, to what uſe is preparation, *& quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis*;) In this caſe now the efficient of Grace is God, and not Man; but * the *Ratio proxima* of the difference in the event and effects is the *Diverſe diſpoſition* of the Recipients. But here, mark well, that it is not the good diſpoſition or preparation of one party, that is, the only, and I think, not the chief reaſon of the difference; but the Privative and Poſitive indiſpoſition of the other party, is as much, if not, the chiefeſt reaſon. If one man ſhut his eyes againſt the light, when another doth not, the *Ratio diſcriminis* why one man differeth from another in ſeeing and not ſeeing, is on both parts, but principally on his part that ſhutteth his eyes; becauſe the other doth but what he was made to do, and all living creatures ſhould do: But the other abſurdly croſſeth nature. So that under an univerſal Influx and help, the ſaid Influx is the efficient of the action or effect; but the diſpoſition of the Recipients are the *Occaſions* and *Reaſons* to be aſſigned of the various effects; but eſpecially the incapacity of the defective party. As the reaſon why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit, and not a dead ſtock, is becauſe the *Tree* is an apt recipient of its influx, but the ſtock or ſtone is not.

2. But, (Note) that in caſe that God operate not by ſuch an *univerſal Influx only*, but alſo by ſuperadded *ſpecial or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace*, which by a difference from the univerſal Influx or degree, is peculiarly apt to procure the effects, here the *ratio diſcriminis* is principally to be aſcribed to that *ſpecial Grace*, and not to the preparations on the Soul.

C. "*Tell me then, what you think, whether God works by ſuch an univerſal Grace, or by ſuch a ſpecial Grace.* 1. *How far doth he work by* "*univerſal Grace?* 2. *Is that univerſal Grace ever effectual of it ſelf, on* "*prepared Souls?* 3. *How far doth he alſo uſe the ſpecial particular Grace* "*which you mentioned?*

B. 1. To your firſt Qu. I anſwer, 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in *Adam* and *Eve*, and made no difference as to the preſent caſe.

2. *Eve* having firſt ſinned, did make a difference between her ſelf and *Adam*, which God made not, nor altered firſt his univerſal Grace.

3. *Adam* next (without Gods alteration) by Sin did difference himſelf from himſelf (as he was before).

4. God then ſet up a new univerſal Grace; even Chriſt with the new Covenant, and Recovering means, to give out univerſal help ſuited to

* That even Jeſuits confeſs in their way of *ſcientia media* that the *Ratio diſcriminis* why one perſon rather than another hath Grace is from God, initially and principally, and not from any beginning in man. See *Ruiz* proving it at large in all his Tract. 3. Diſp. 18. 19. *De Prædeſt. exordio.* So that this is no difference between us. Yea, more he maintaineth that *ante fidem nihil eſt diſpoſitionis, meriti aut impetrationis.* Sect. 3. Diſp. 19. 24. And one would think that this ſhould ſatisfie even the Antinomians. But he meaneth only that this diſpoſition is not always neceſſary. He that will in brief ſee what the Schoolmen ſay of preparative *Grace*, may find abundance of them cited by *Ruiz* ibid. d. 21. *per totam*, and what nature can do in preparation. *Greg. Armin.* in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. ſpeaketh moſt like the Reformed.

Aug. *de bono perſever.* c. 8. *Sed cur Gratia Dei non ſecundum merita hominum datur? Reſp. Quia Deus miſereetur eſt. Cur ergo non omnibus? Et hic reſpondeo, Quoniam Deus juſtus Judex eſt.*

his Covenant and means; to be the Giver of the Spirit, and the Light of the world (we cannot have time now to open the difference, between Christ's administrations before and after his Incarnation). There was at first an universal sufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace.

5. *Cain* (that could have done otherwise) wilfully sinned against this universal Grace and Covenant: and so made a difference between him and the rest of mankind, when God made none.

6. Whether *Abel* did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this same universal Help alone, or by any special extraordinary Grace *ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti*, is a thing unknown to us, because unrevealed.

7. The Posterity of *Cain* (as of *Adam* at first) because Seminally in him, and personally from his very guilty essence, were justly deprived of some of that Grace, both *Subjective* and *Objective* which *Cain* had deprived himself of. Their natures were more vitiated, and so they were made less *Receptive* and more *disposed* as to the *universal means* and *Influx*. And by his secession from the holy seed, he was deprived of much *outward means*: And having forfeited the Spirit, he had less also of its helping Influx: And thus he and his posterity made themselves to differ, as if a Generation of Sinners should be born blind, while the Sun shineth as it did before.

8. The Holy seed that's not yet Apostate, have great subjective and objective Grace.

9. The seed of *Cain* are still under the same Law of Grace, and universal conditional promise, that If they will believe and repent, they shall be saved: And they have some *Means* and some *Help* of Grace yet left them, which have an aptitude by degrees to bring them back again to God: And if they will not use that lower degree of Grace, by returning as they can, they forfeit that and further help.

10. But yet God hath besides this Universal Grace, some special and extraordinary *ways* and *degrees* of Grace for some, according to his Good pleasure. But this with the answer to your other two questions, will come in better anon, under the next head.

C. "*Having spoke to the matter, now speak of the sense of the Text,* "1 Cor. 4. 7. and Rom. 12. 6. *For who maketh thee to differ from ano-* "*ther? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? Now if thou didst* "*receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it.*

B. It is most evident, that *Paul* speaketh of the Gifts or Excellencies themselves primarily and of *Differing* from others, but as a resultancy from those Gifts: And he medleth not here with the question, why others have not those Gifts as well as they? and so why others differ from them. *q. d.* Are not all those things of which you glory, the free gifts of God? And is it not by those free gifts that you differ as more excellent than others? And should you boast of that which is Gods free Gift, of which you are but Receivers? To pass by the common answer that *Paul* speaketh of Ministerial Gifts, and not of special Grace, what Arminian can deny any of this, about the Grace of faith it self. 1. He must confess that we have no Grace to cause *faith*, but what we have received; (For the Act which we performed is no otherwise to be said to be received, but as we receive the gracious operation which causeth it). 2. He cannot deny that by this Received Grace and Faith, the believer in excellency differeth from unbelievers. 3. Nor that such a Receiver hath no cause of boasting, as if he had not received it. Who will deny this?

C. "*But*

C. "*But they leave him to boast, that by his better preparation and dis-*
"*position, he was a fitter Recipient than another. And so all boasting is*
"*not excluded.*

B. 1. In *Paul's* Case (of extraordinary Ministerial gifts) there is less room for that much; because they are not given so much according to preparations, as saving Grace is: For even ungodly men may have them.

2. The boasting which is excluded, is a boasting of our selves as against or without the glory of Grace, as if we had some excellency which we had not received. But our very Receptive disposition was received by Gods Grace, even from his common preparing Grace: And that common Grace was freely given.

3. If by *boasting*, you would mean, an acknowledgment of Gods grace, then all thanksgiving is boasting. Or if a Rejoycing in the effects of that Grace as Received and improved by us, then *Paul* so boasted often, yea and to the death rejoyced in this testimony of his Conscience, that in simplicity and Godly sincerity, and not in fleshly wisdom he had had his conversation in the world, 2 *Cor.* 1. 12. And that he tamed his body, and that he suffered for Christ, and that he had fought a good fight, 2 *Tim.* 4. 7, 8. If *praising* Gods grace in his Servants, and that holy use of it, in wisdom, faith, love, obedience and patience, be boasting, God so boasteth of them and praiseth them, even at judgment, *Math.* 25. Well done good and faithful Servant. And Scripture throughout so boasteth of them. And we that must honour those that fear the Lord, *Psal.* 15. 4. must so boast of them also. But this is not the forbidden boasting.

And as to *Rom.* 12. 6. 1 *Cor.* 12. *Eph.* 1. 6, 7, 8. and such like its past question that God freely diversifyeth Offices and such Gifts as he pleaseth; and we know of no prædispositon to which, even ordinarily, he tyeth himself, as to many of them. But saving Grace is given more under a Law, and stablished course of means, in the use of which we must be fit Recipients.

The ninth Crimination.

C. "*They make the* Grace *of God to be* Effectual, *not from the Will*
"*of the Giver, nor from the proper force of the Grace it self, so much as*
"*from the will of man concurring: For they think that Gods Grace is but*
"*universal and indifferent, and leaveth it to mans will whether it shall pro-*
"*duce the act of faith or not: so that the* posse Credere & velle *is of God,*
"*but the* actu credere & velle *is of our selves. This is the grand difference*
"*which I have reserved to the last; and as Dr.* Twisse *oft noteth the question,*
"Unde Gratia sit Efficax? *is it which they are loath to be brought to*
"*answer.*

B. I know that this is cryed up as the great difference; And wherever things are mysterious and hard, there will be variety of Conceptions and words; from whence it will be easie to pretend real differences, and make them seem great. But because order befriendeth Truth, we must be agreed first of the subject of the question, *what Grace it is whose Efficacy* you dispute of? I take it for granted, that it is such as is to work, *in genere Causæ Efficientis.* But tell me first, whether you con-

Arminius confesseth Gods infallible operation, thus, *Nihil mali committi potest nisi Deo impediente certum est; Sed de modo impediendi disputatur: an ille sit ex Omnipotente Dei actione in voluntatem hominis agente secundum modum naturæ, unde impeditionis existit Necessitas; an vero ex tali actione quæ agit in Voluntatem, secundum modum voluntatis quæ libera est, unde impeditionis infallibilitas.* Armin. Exam. *Perkins* pag 501. Note, by Necessity *Arminius* doth mean Necessity *consequentiæ, vel effectûs*, and confesseth necessity *Consequentiæ*, (which here he calleth the *ands* that he maketh

nfallibility). And Dr. *Twisse* professeth that he and all the Schoolmen hold no other. And note he Infallibility to result from the operation of God, and not from his fore-knowledge only.

feſs or not, that there is ſuch a thing as *Univerſal Grace*, or *Help* of the *Spirit*, fixedly or ordinarily accompanying or working by the means of Grace, which operateth as the Sun, *ad modum recipientis*, and will not produce the ſame effect on one receiver as on another.

C. "*I cannot anſwer what you have ſaid for it: And when I read* "Dallæus Apolog. *and in him almoſt all ancient Writers, and late Churches for it, I dare not be ſo ſingular as* Spanhemius *and a few more of late in denying this Grace of God. Though I once thought that it had been* Objective *only, and with* Amyrald *I noted little more in the Controverſie, than between the* Objective *and* Subjective grace, *as if there had been no other Efficient grace to come in queſtion. But I am convinced, 1. that* de facto *there is a degree of Grace* ad poſſe *that leaveth men inexcuſable, which is not effectual in the event: For I dare not ſay that I could never have ſinned leſs, or done better than I did. 2. And that the ſame degree of the Spirits help is not ſufficient to an utterly unprepared Soul, as to the prepared; or to cauſe a man to believe and love God above all, as may cauſe him to forbear ſome ſin, or to uſe ſome means for further Grace: Therefore ſuch a thing as is called* ſufficient *and* univerſal *Grace or help I do confeſs. But (by the way) if Chriſt be the univerſal Diſpenſer of this Grace, how reacheth it to thoſe that know not Chriſt.*

B. 1. I have ſhewed you in *Cain's* inſtance and his poſterity, that it reacheth not *Equally to all*, no more than the Sun to the Southern and the Northern Nations.

2. I have proved to you that Chriſt was after the fall made the Head of the new Covenant, and that this Covenant was made with all Mankind. And that he is the Adminiſtrator General to all Mankind, and all things, Power and Judgment is committed to him: that he is now the Owner, Ruler, and Judge of all.

3. Therefore all the Light, Means and Mercies that are in any parts of the world, are as truly from Chriſt as the univerſal Mediator, as all light is from the Sun. (Even in Dungeons and Caverns, and where there is leaſt) And as the Sun ſends forth ſome light before it ariſeth, and ſome after it is ſet, and ſome in the night, even by the Moon, *&c.* ſo doth Chriſt enlighten all the world, ſo far as they have light though in very various degrees.

4. You will not ſay that Chriſt by his Incarnation, did put all the reſt of the world into a worſe condition than they were in before his coming; and to take away from them any of the mercies of the Law of Grace, which God had made with them in *Adam* and *Noah*.

C. "*I am afraid you go about to confound the* world *and the* Church, "*while you make all to be the Kingdom of Chriſt; and to be under the* "*Law and Covenant of Grace.*

B. I muſt ſtill call you to difference the queſtion *de re* from that *de nomine*. Whether all *ſhould* be *called* the *Church* is one queſtion? And how really they ſtand related to Chriſt, is another. To that *de re* I ſay, 1. It is paſt doubt that Chriſt the Mediator, is the *Owner* and Ruler of all the world *de jure*, even *jure Redemptionis*, as all are given to him of the Father.

2. It is doubtleſs that all are under his foreſaid Law of Grace, as that which is in force to oblige them, and to puniſh them if they break it, and to reward them if they keep it. For they are not Lawleſs nor hopeleſs.

3. It is doubtleſs that all are poſſeſſed of many and great Mercies, as well as obliged to many duties, as tending to their recovery and ſalvation.

* *Non poſſunt initia illa accendi, aut fides inchoata retineri, dum voluntas omnino repugnat: Non enim Efficax eſt Spiritus Sanctus in eo, qui ne vult quidem audire Evangelium, & excuteretur ſi voluntas ſuccumberet dubitationibus.* Loc. Com. de lib. art. c. 7.

tion. And thus they are ſo far the Kingdoms of Chriſt. But yet *de nomine* they are not to be called the *Church*; becauſe the *Church* is *Regnum peculiaritatis*. As the *Iſraelites* had the *fœdus peculiaritatis*, and were *Regnum peculiare* before Chriſts coming, and yet not the only people in the world that were under a Law of Grace (for that was univerſal). So is it now with the Chriſtian Churches and much more.

Briefly, Chriſt hath three ſorts of Subjects in the world; 1. Subjects *quoad obligationem*; and ſo all the world are his Subjects (becauſe firſt his beneficiaries). 2. Subjects by *profeſſed Conſent*, which is, 1. A half conſent, as many without the Church. 2. A full conſent by Baptiſm: and theſe are the Church viſible. 3. By ſincere *Heart-conſent*; and this is the Church myſtical or regenerate that ſhall be ſaved. In this I think we are agreed.

C. "*Well*; *Suppoſing an* univerſal *help of Grace*, *how anſwer you the* "*queſtion?* Unde fit Efficax?

B. Do you grant me then that this univerſal Grace is ever effectual?

C. "*Stay there. You told me that's the turning point where Dr.* Sander- "ſon *and Dr.* Hammond *came to a* ne plus. *But*, 1. *As to preparatory* "*Acts we ſhall not deny it. I find not that our Divines do aſſert the neceſſity* "*of a ſpecial Grace for every preparatory Act. But of the reſt I doubt.*

B. And then, 2. Sure you cannot deny it as to well prepared Souls. 1. Becauſe you granted that the ſame degree of help may be effectual to a diſpoſed Soul. 2. And ſo the Help though univerſal, will to a prepared Soul be proportionable to the deſired effect; and is nevertheleſs *Grace* or powerful to ſuch, for being univerſal, or uneffectual to others. 3. And it ſeems that ſuch a kind of degree of Grace was effectual on *Adam* before his fall, and uneffectual in his fall. 4. And it ſeemeth congruous to Gods other works, that he give Grace ſuitable to his Law and Promiſe, which ſhall not be always uneffectual.

So that it is moſt probable that to prepared Souls, that ordinary eſtabliſhed degree of the Spirits Influx from Chriſt, which is univerſal, but uneffectual to the unprepared, is not only ſometimes, but ordinarily effectual. I think none can prove the contrary. And the ſame Grace you confeſs to be effectual to preparation.

But to unprepared Souls whom God will ſuddenly convert out of the ordinary way, a ſpecial extraordinary operation ſeemeth neceſſary. But wherein the extraordinarineſs of it conſiſteth, antecedent to faith the ſecond effect (beſides the extraordinary means) I think it paſt mans reach to know.

C. "*Well, now tell us*, Unde Gratia fit Efficax.

B. Any ordinary Logician will tell you, that the effect is from all the cauſes, and not from any one alone. It is *effectual* in that it produceth the

Vaſq. in 1. *Tho. q.* 23. *Diſp.* 88. Reciteth various opinions of the Schoolmen of the nature of operating and co-operating Grace: 1 *Vega's* in Conc. Trid. l. 6. c. 8. That operating Grace is each holy cogitation and firſt motion of the will, in which God acteth Phyſically, and Man is but Paſſive. And ſo the Nominals who make God only Active, and Man Paſſive in the efficience of Intellection and Volition (as he ſaith) And ſome Thomiſts.

2. The way of *Aquin. Conrad, Cajet. Dur. Anton. Sot. Dried. Topper.* Who ſay that *Gratia* operans is in the firſt free motion of the will, *circa finem*, whence the will is moved *ad media*, &c.

3. Greg. Armine's which many follow, ſuppoſing it *Auguſtines*, *Omne opus intellectus & voluntatis non ſolum a Deo fieri, ſed etiam a nobis tanquam a cauſa ſecunda efficienti*

Phyſice produci: *Deum tamen ſola ſua virtute primo voluntatem applicare ad libere volendum, non ſolum tam præveniendo prævia Cogitatione ex parte intellectus, & primo motu non deliberato timoris aut ſpei, ſed etiam tam impellendo ad conſenſum liberum. Hunc impulſum putat Gregor. eſſe medium quid inter ipſum conſenſum liberum ad quem cooperatur voluntas, & primum motum non deliberatum voluntatis, ſeu cogitationem intellectus; & appellari ab Auguſtino Initium boni operis.*

4. This *Vaſquez* confuteth, and aſſereth, that *Gratia operans* (*quam ſine nobis in nobis Deus operatur*) according to *Auguſtine* is no ſuch middle impulſe, but *Ipſam Sanctam cogitationem, quæ eſt ante conſenſum, & motum voluntatis ſubitum ſine noſtra libertate ex pia illa cogitatione ortum, quo deterremur a malo* (he meaneth ſome paſſion) *& ad bonum provocamur.* And that co-operating Grace is *Ipſe conſenſus, liber in quo meritum reperitur, Etiam circa finem.*

Now either there is ſuch a middle impulſe or not: If not, then beſides Gods eſſence, there is no effect on us antecedent to our conſent, but the ſaid cogitation and paſſion; And 1. Theſe are commonly ſaid not to neceſſitate the will. 2. And if they do, it muſt be but Morally, which is commonly held to be no way of neceſſitating though it may be of aſcertaining the event. And ſo conſent or our Volition it ſelf would be but of co-operating Grace. And if there be ſuch a middle Impulſe, as *Gregory* holdeth, it is confeſſed by him and the Dominican *prædeterminants*, to determine the will only to act freely, and therefore not to neceſſitate it to conſent, but only to aſcertain it, and ſo the Volition will be as free as but by co-operating Grace, though the Impulſe would be neceſſary which tendeth to it.

the

the effect: To which each cause doth its proper part; and one is not all. The effect in question now is Faith. Faith is caused as is said, 1. By Gods will as the Original. 2. By Christ as sending the Spirit (and meriting Grace first). 3. By the Spirit as the Operator. 4. By the Gospel as the Instrument. 5. By the Preacher as a Sub-Instrument. 6. But all this effecteth *ordinarily* in *materia dispoſita*, and no other. (Having before wrought that preparation). 7. But extraordinarily in *materia indiſpoſita*, working diſpoſition and all at once.

Now here, 1. *Gods Will* doth its part without any cauſe; *Velle ex parte Dei (ſicut & agere)* is his eſſence; and the termination of it *in rem Volitatam* hath no efficient, but only an Objective Cauſe. 2. This prime Cauſe is the prime reaſon of all the efficacy of Inferior Cauſes: Not *qua voluntas* ſimply moving them, but *qua voluntas cum potentia executiva* moving them; and *qua volitio* inferreth the *neceſſitatem conſequentiæ* of the effect. So that plainly, I think that *no Good cometh to paſs in the world, but what God forewilled, and nothing which he abſolutely willeth, cometh not to paſs*; what he *fore-knoweth* is neceſſary, *neceſſitate Infallibilitatis*, and what he *abſolutely willeth*, *neceſſitate Imutabilitatis*; and what he *worketh* from ſuch a *will* is neceſſary *neceſſitate invincibilitatis*. 3. Though all the other Cauſes are the reaſon of the effect, and not only the firſt, yet none of them operate on the firſt Cauſe, and put any force into it for the act. So that its force is from it ſelf, but theirs from it.

And having ſaid this much preparatorily, I thus reſolve your great queſtion.

Here are three things before us, whoſe cauſe may be enquired of; 1. The *neceſſitas Logica conſequentiæ, ex quo in ordine probandi neceſſario ſequitur eventum futurum eſſe*: And this is the Decree or *Will* of God, (yea, and his fore *knowledge*) This is preſuppoſed.

2. The *prime effect* of Gods *Will* and *Active power* operating: And this *prime effect* is not our *Faith*, or *Act*, but the *Impreſſion* or *Received Influx* of God on the Soul. For the Soul receiveth (its like) ſome Impreſſion by the Divine Influx by which it *believeth* or acteth it ſelf: It doth not Receive its own Act, as if that act had been firſt pre-exiſtent in the Donor; but it *performeth* that Act becauſe it is premoved to it. Now if the queſtion be of this firſt effect, *Unde operatio Gratioſa ſit efficax*, I anſwer, 1. The whole *efficient reaſon* is in the operator and operation it ſelf. It is effectual *ad impreſſionem ex natura rei*, becauſe it is an Act: If it did nothing, it were no Act tranſient. 2. And the ſpecification and individuation is from the terminating object. It is *denominatively* and *Relatively*, *one Act* which is on a *Stone*, and *another* on a *Soul*, *de ſpecie*: And it is *numerically* one which is on *Peter*, and another on *John*. If the Sun did ſhine *in vacuo*, there being no other creature to be objective or paſſive, it would ſtill *agere*, but it would *nihil efficere: quia nihil afficere*; So God is one Infinite act, and *ex parte ſui* never begineth to act, nor ever ceaſeth, nor is divided; But *tranſiently* he doth *nihil afficere vel efficere*, but firſt by *making objects*, and then *acting on them*. So that were there no *mobile* Gods act would not *movere*. This firſt effect then of *Impreſs* hath an *Effective* and an *Objective Cauſe*. The *Effective Cauſe* is Gods Eſſence; that is, his Active Power, Intellect and Will, and nothing elſe: (Suppoſing now that it be not Gods operation on the Inſtrument or *medium* that we ſpeak of, but immediately on the Soul it ſelf). But Man's Soul is the *Objective Recipient Cauſe* of this *firſt effect*, which is, *the Impreſs*, or *Influx received*.

3. The Secondary effect is, *Mans Act*, *Faith* and *Repentance* it ſelf. If the queſtion, *Unde Gratia ſit efficax*, mean this, (as with moſt it doth) then

then it is all one as to ask, *Unde hic Effectus?* For that Gods Influx on the Soul immediately, is the *sole Cause* is false. Therefore the answer is, that this effect is from *all the Causes* conjunct: From Gods *Will*, or *Law*, and *Power* and *Wisdom*; from *Christs mission* of the Spirit (before merited); from the Spirits *Impress* or *Influx*; from the *Gospel*; from the *Ministry* (usually) and from the *Agent Believer*; all these as the efficient Causes. And it is from or *on* the *prepared Soul* (ordinarily) as the *Materia disposita, vel Causa Receptiva, Objectiva* of the Divine operation: And from or on God Christ, the promise, Glory, as the *materia objectiva actus humani*; where I conclude the *Causa finalis* as the chief object.

Thus I have shewed you truly and plainly *unde fit fides*, as that is all one as *unde hic effectus*; and that is all one, as *unde Gratia fit efficax*, as to this secondary effect.

C. "*But I conceive that the sense of the question rather is*, which of all "these *is the* chief cause *or* reason *of the existence of the effect?*

B. Pardon my impatience of Confusion. The *chief cause*, and the *chief reason* are not always the same. There is no question but God is the *only* and *total Causa prima*, from whom all the rest have all their power and force. But by the *Reason* of the existence is often meant, that which in discourse must be assigned proportionately in answer to the question, *Why is one converted rather than another?* supposing Gods Influx on them both: And this is oft the *Receptive disposition* as is said; for *Reciptur ad modum recipientes.*

C. "*Well; But the question recurreth what is the chief Cause and Rea-*"*son that one, not another, hath that preparatory Receptivity.*

B. The chief Cause is God why one hath it: The chief Cause why another hath it not, is himself, that is, the Moral deficient cause. The *Ratio differendi* I opened to you before. The most notable, if we suppose Gods Influx to be of it self universal and equal, is the Indisposition of the Sinner, whence he doth difference himself from those that God causeth to receive even preparing Grace. But the true *Ratio effectus* is from all the Causes conjunct.

C. "*But you must come at last, to some prime difference. And if you* "*will say that the reason of our Preparatory effect or degree of Grace, is,* "*because I used a former well, or did not refuse it, or was prepared for it,* "*what will you say of the first degree.*

B. I say that the first preparatory Grace or help was given to *Adam*, and all in him: as the first natural goodness was.

C. "*But where came in the first difference?*

B. By *Cain's* wilful Sin, against God and his Grace.

C. "*But though you do with* Augustine *hold a communicated guilt of the* "*sins of other Parents than our first, and so a difference between persons (yea* "*and Kingdoms) thence arising, yet some Children as* Esau *and* Jacob, *born* "*of the same Parents, must have in them some other cause of difference,* "*even as to preparatory Grace.*

B. Suppose Gods fixed equal Influx universal, there are two Causes of difference herein. 1. One is the meer sinful wilfulness of one party, that doth not do what that Grace enabled him to do, by which a difference is made.

C. "*You mean that* Jacob *better used his help than* Esau.

B. Not so: but that *Esau* more abused it than *Jacob*. Suppose *Jacob* had slept out his youth, or done no good, and *Esau* had rebelled against God also, and done much mischief; *Esau* had hereby made a difference, which is assignable without commending *Jacob.*

C. "*Well, what is the other Cause?*

B. 2. Gods own free differencing Will and Grace, who is a free Benefactor, and may do with his own as he liſt: and therefore freely loveth *Jacob* with the electing ſpecial love and decree which he hath not to *Eſau*. For though I have all this while diſcourſed with you of the *Ratio Efficaciæ* of an *Univerſal Grace*, I ſay not that there is no other.

C. *O:* "*Now you come to the matter indeed.*

B. II. The Queſtion *Unde ſit Gratia efficax*, * being put of *Gods ſpecial Grace*, by which he arbitrarily maketh a difference, and is more than his *Univerſal Grace*, muſt be thus reſolved, That though other Cauſes concur to the effect, the *Great*, *over-ruling*, *differencing*, and *aſcertaining Cauſe*, is the very quality and aptitude of Gods operation it ſelf, as proceeding from an abſolute volition of the effect, and in the Means and Influx fitted to aſcertain the effect.

C. "*Wherein conſiſteth this differencing ſpecial Grace?*

B. Deceive not your ſelf: No mortal man can know in what it ordinarily, conſtantly, or chiefly conſiſteth. We know, 1. That though God as *Rector per Leges*, keeps one even and conſtant courſe, yet as *Proprietor* and *Benefactor* he may vary as he pleaſe: And that a Benefactor may give unequally to men of equal merits: And that God really doth ſo *de facto:* And that his Will hath no Cauſe. 2. We know that God hath innumerable ways to fulfil his Will, and make a difference between man and man, which are beyond the ſearch of Mortals. 3. And though we can name divers which he can take, we know not *de facto*, *which* he *doth take*, hic & nunc.

C. "*What differencing free acts of Grace do you obſerve.*

B. None which violate Gods eſtabliſhed order, or diminiſh his univerſal Grace. But ſuch as are ſuperadded ſpecially to ſome. As, 1. To Children of the ſame Parents, he giveth to divers a temperament of Body, as in one much more conduceth to thoughtfulneſs, tenderneſs, meekneſs, ſobriety, chaſtity, zeal, honeſty, *&c.* than in the other. He is a ſtranger to man that knoweth not this.

2. He ſometime giveth them various Education: One is piouſly educated. Another is ſnatch'd away and made a Janizary. A third the Parents dying, leave to ſuch as educate them vitiouſly. And ſome the Parents apoſtatizing educate in Hereſie or unpiety themſelves.

3. He oft caſteth their lot under different *means* for their Edification. One is ſet Apprentice to a Godly Maſter, and another to an ungodly one. One is caſt under a Holy able Miniſter, and another under an ignorant Seducer: One is caſt among Godly Companions, and another among lewd Seducers, idle, wanton, voluptuous, unclean, malignant, ſcornful, or other ſuch tempting perſons, as that a great deal more grace or help is neceſſary to their preſervation.

4. One (for ought we ſee of equal commerit) is impelled or occaſioned to go to Church, juſt when an apt Sermon is prepared for him: and another occaſioned to be abſent. A Miniſter or Friend is ſent (as *Philip* to the Eunuch, though by ordinary means) to meet with one, and ſpeak ſuitably to his caſe; and not to the other.

5. One falleth under ſome great affliction, which taketh him down, and awakeneth him to ſeriouſneſs; and another ſwimmeth down the violent and dangerous ſtream of proſperity and conſtant health.

6. One ſeeth ſome notable *Judgments* on others, or ſome convincing *Providences*, or hath ſome ſtrange *deliverance* himſelf; which another never hath.

7. One

* Blank de Diſt. Grat. Theſ. 79. *Naturam Gratiæ efficacis Thomiſtæ ponunt in motione quadam virtuoſa quæ eſt in voluntate, per modum quo impetus in re quæ impellitur:* Janſenius *in affectibus Amoris & deſiderii boni cœleſtis & ſpiritualis, quibus ſuaviter ſurſum rapitur animus humanus:* Diſcipuli Cameronis *in potentiſſima mentis illuminatione & perſuaſione quæ voluntatem & effectus ſecum rapit. Alii in omnipotenti & efficaciſſima Dei operatione qua novum principium ſpiritualis vitæ Cordi hominis vocati inditur & homo ſimul excitatur ad actus eliciendos quæ hic plerique viri docti proferunt componenda potius quam opponenda videntur.*

Even they that are for Phyſical prædetermination, are not agreed what it is: ſome make it a tranſient quality paſſing with the act. Some ſay it is only mans Act it ſelf as from God the firſt cauſe. Some with *Alvarez* ſay, It is *Aliquid quod habet eſſe incompletum* as colours in the air, that is, They know not what, and yet venture on hot contentions about it.

And *Janſenius* who maketh it to be *Delectatio* or *Complacentia*, ſaith it is *Actus vitalis & indeliberatus animo, & quidem amoris & deſiderii præcedentis conſenſum ac delectationem illam quæ & quies animi & gaudium dicitur. De Grat. Chriſti l.* 4. *c.* 11. Much like to *Vaſquez*, ſave that *Vaſq.* calls it but an indeliberate prime motion of the affection and *Janſenius* calls it Indeliberate Delectation or Complacency; which certainly is an Act of man; and the Scotiſts ſay that all the Wills Acts are free, though not all its inclinations. But thus we ſtrive about that which none of us underſtand, *viz.* How God moveth his Creatures and our Wills in ſpecial.

7. One Nation or Kingdom of equal ill desert, hath the Gospel and powerful Preachers sent to them; while others are left as the most of the world without it; yea, as the poor Islanders, Laplanders, Brasilians, Soldanians, and Canibals.

A thousand ways God hath to fulfil his Will which we know not of. But besides all these in point of *Means*, we see that under the same *Means*, or *Sermon*, or Family helps, there is not the same success: Not only because the *unbelievers* make the difference by sinning against sufficient universal Grace; but because *God* doth especially touch the hearts of some, by such Grace as he giveth not to others. Thus did he *open the heart* of *Lidia*, Act. 16.

C. "*Methinks you should lay all on this Internal changing Grace, and* "*not on the difference of means.*

B. Certain Experience telleth us, that most usually God giveth extraordinary differing *means* where his Grace shall work different effects.

Christ himself who was to bestow extraordinary Grace after his Incarnation, was himself to be an extraordinary means: He must work Miracles, raise the Dead, rise from the Dead, *&c.* as the Means.

The Apostles that were to do extraordinary things, in calling the unbelieving world to Christ, were to do it by miracles and extraordinary means. The 3000 *Act.* 2. must have the Apostles miraculous gift of tongues to be the means of their Conversion. *Cornelius* must have both an Angel and *Peter*. *Paul* must be strucken down and blind, and hear Christ speak from Heaven, and after have *Ananias*'s Ministry. The Eunuch must have *Philip*. The Jaylor, *Act.* 16. must have an Earthquake; and so of others.

And to this day we see how little God doth where there is no Ministry or Means. And how much the success of able, holy, skilful Ministers, doth differ from that of wicked, or Ignorant sots: And how usually in all the world, the success goeth according to the means; and that the instances of the contrary are unusual rarities: Therefore separate not what the wisdom of God hath conjoyned.

C. "*But do you think that God ever ascertaineth the Effect, meerly by such* "*Moral Differencing helps or means, annexed to his universal Gracious Ef-* "*flux or aid, without a special degree of that Immediate Efflux it self on* "*the Soul.*

B. 1. We little know when God worketh Immediately, and how far His Efflux or Action *ex parte agentis* I oft tell you hath no degrees being himself: The degrees are in the Received Impress on the Soul. And it's like this special differencing Grace consisteth in a special degree of *Impress*: But *when* that Impress is made by the *Spirit without the Instrumentality* of Means, we know not. God can make our own Imagination, and spirit,, and inward temperament a means undiscernably to us.

2. If I have proved to you that even the universal Grace it self with common means, may attain the effect, and doth in many, who dare question, whether *All*, yea *One* extraordinary or special *Means* added by God to that Common Influx, (with a will of success) may ascertain the effect. It were Blasphemy to say that God hath not Wisdom enough thus to attain his ends, by a series of adapted means, in conjunction with that Grace.

C. "*But methinks you spin too fine a thred, when you talk of an* Impress "*of the Spirit on the Soul, as the first Effect, (of God alone, or God and the* "*Means) antecedent to* faith *or the* Act *of* man *as the* second *effect (of God* "*and Man together). I find not that our Curiousest School Wits do talk much* "*of such an Impress.*

B. 1. You will find the ſame ſence in the Thomiſts and many of the Schoolmen: And methinks it is clear in it ſelf. The Act of Faith is done by us: Our Souls have need of ſome Grace to be the *Cauſe* of it. The Cauſe goeth before the Effect. This Cauſe muſt not be out of us, but within us: Grace therefore muſt be firſt within us as a *Cauſe*, before it is within us as the effect of it. Yea, Action being nothing but *Modus Agentis*, is not a fit recipient it ſelf immediately of a *vis impreſſa*: It is the *Soul* or *faculty* that muſt Act; and to ſay that Gods Influx is not on the *Soul* or *faculty* as the recipient, but on the Act of that *faculty* alone, ſeemeth to be unintelligible, if not abſurd. Is it *our Act*, or *our Soul* that *needeth* help or Grace? If not the *Soul*, but the *Act*, then we have need of none at all: For the Act is yet future, that is, is no act, and nothing, and ſo hath no need.

2. But if really you will hold to the opinion that our Act it ſelf is the firſt Effect of Gods Influx or Will, then take notice, that all our controverſie here between you and the Arminians, what Grace is ſufficient, and what effectual, is at an end; And it is *on your part*, and *for the truth* that I ſpin that thred which you account too fine.

C. "*How do you manifeſt that?*

B. Moſt plainly: For if we have nothing to enquire after between Gods *agency ex parte ſui* and the *Act of Faith*, it is a ridiculous queſtion to ask, *what Grace is ſufficient, and what effectual?* and what *difference between the one and the other?* and what is that which maketh efficiently the difference? For either your Queſtion is of the *Cauſe* or the *Effect*: If of the Cauſe, it is (beſides the ſecond Cauſes) nothing but *Gods Eſſence*, even his eſſential Activity, Wiſdom, and Will: And do you think that Gods eſſence is diverſifyed, as little and great, more or leſs, ſufficient and effectual? Do you enquire for *Diverſity* in *ſimple unity?* That which worketh all effects in the world, is *one Cauſe*, that hath in it ſelf no real difference of parts, kinds or degrees.

II. But if your queſtion be of the *Effect*, it is ridiculous or paſt queſtion. Do you ask *what Grace in us it is that maketh the Difference*, between a Believer and an Infidel? Why, your queſtion anſwereth it ſelf. It is Faith, and that maketh the difference in one, as Infidelity doth in the other. Do you ask what is *ſufficient?* To what? If to Salvation it is perſeverance in Faith and Holineſs: If to Juſtification, it is Faith; if to *Faith* and *Converſion*; nothing pre-exiſtent in us. Do you ask what maketh *Grace effectual?* what Grace mean you? If Faith, it's none of the doubt or Controverſie: It is (improperly) effectual to Juſtification (being no efficient of it, but a Condition, which is a Receptive diſpoſition) *ex ordinatione divina, & virtute fœderis.* You muſt recur then and ask, what maketh Gods Eſſence or Spirit effectual? As if Gods eſſence had a Cauſe, or ſuffered from the Creature. But if you mean no more but what are the Cauſes *of Faith?* that's another queſtion oft anſwered.

Chooſe now whether you will lay all our Controverſies on that *fine thred*, of Gods *various Impreſs* on the faculties in order of Nature antecedent to Faith (in *act* or true *habit*); or elſe confeſs that we have *no difference*, nor ſhew of any, but have many ages abhominably abuſed the world.

C. "*But ſeeing you maintain that God as a* free Lord *and* Benefactor "*doth* vary *his* gifts *of* Grace *as he doth of* Nature, *though we know not* "*when he doth it* Morally, *and by means, and when by* Immediate dif- "fering Impreſs; *yet methinks you ſhould hold that by one of the two he* "*always doth it: And that equal Grace hath never unequal effects* "*by*

"*by the unequal free reception, rejection, or other difference made* "*by man.*

B. To conclude this whole diſpute, 1.* That equal univerſal Grace *can* end in different effects, in the ſame Man, and in divers men, by man's own free various *concourſe* or *neglect*, I have fully proved to you.

2. And when we have proved that ſuch a Grace there is, and ſo it *can do*, we have great reaſon to think that *ſometimes* it *doth ſo*: And no man can prove that it *never* doth ſo.

3. And *de facto* I have proved, that ſometimes it doth ſo: in *Adam's* caſe, and in *Cain's* making a difference, before God denyed him ſufficient Grace. And in all bad men and good men in the world, who ſometimes ſinfully omit to do that which by the ſame Grace they could have done and did another time.

4. But *de facto*: How *oft*, and *when*, and in *how many*, God converteth men by the one way or the other, no Mortal man can tell.

And therefore forget not that when I call *univerſal Grace*, *ordinary*, and the *ſpecial different Grace extraordinary*; I intend not to tell you which *God* moſt uſually doth the work by as diſtinct from the other. But I call one *Ordinary* becauſe it is *common to all*, or *more*, in it ſelf, and alſo concurreth always with the other in its work, and ſo is never left out: And I call the other *Extraordinary*, becauſe it is above the *univerſal degree* and *way*, and proper to ſome, as ſuperadded.

C. "*You did well to remember that: For I was offended that you called* "*that* Different Grace, Extraordinary.

B. I ſay again, to conclude, I will earneſtly intreat you to take heed of theſe few errors in your foundation here, that they miſlead not your underſtanding in all the controverſie.

I. Do not think that God muſt needs act *ad ultimum poſſe* in all his operations: It's certain that as to many poſſible effects, he doth *omnino non agere* (as to make more Suns, more Men, more Worlds) And if he can therein totally not act, he can act limitedly or *in tantum* only as he freely will.

II. Do not think theſe degrees of Operation as various *ex parte Dei*, for they are but his moſt ſimple eſſence. Nor do not Imagine that there is a certain *Vis media* called Grace, which is ſomewhat Cauſal between the Creator and the Creature. I doubt ſuch a wrong conceit lyeth at the bottom of all theſe diſputes; and men think that beſides Gods eſſence, and the effects on the Soul, there is ſome middle force or cauſe called Grace, which is neither God, nor a Creature; whoſe kind and degree they enquire after.*

III. Do not overlook the Glory that *God* deſigneth to himſelf in his SAPIENTIAL Kingdom, Government, and operations. I doubt ſome think ſo much of *Strength* and *Power* alone, as if they thought God were Glorified by nothing elſe, or more in an Oxe, or Horſe than in a Man. And whatever is aſcribed to Gods *Sapiential* operation, they contemptuouſly call, A *Moral Cauſing*, and not a Phyſical: As if God muſt move men as he doth the air, the water, or a ſtone. Remember that though Gods Omnipotent Activity, his *Wiſdom* and his *Will*, do ſtill inſeparably co-operate, yet they have each its eminent Impreſs, Effect and Glory. And ſo the frame of *Nature* is the Glorious Impreſs of Omnipotency, with *Wiſdom* and *Love*: The Kingdom of God on earth, eſpecially of Grace, is the Glorious work of the *Wiſdom* of God, directly governing Man as a Moral agent by Moral means: And the Kingdom of Glory, as foretaſted on Earth, and perfect in Heaven, is

* By Grace here I mean not with *Bradwardine* Gods *Will*, as denominated from various objects: Gods Will in it ſelf is but One, and the Effects are many: and the Will is variouſly denominated virtually *ex connotatione terminorum vel effectuum*. If he could prove more diverſity in Gods Will, or that no man can do any thing but what he doth, I ſhould be of his mind.

* As *Aureolus* maintaineth.

the glorious work of Divine Love. Separate not these, nor undervalue or dishonour any one of them; But study the Glory of *Gods Sapiential* Kingdom and works. And remember that Moral Means, and Moral Operations of God, are not unsuitable to the *Government* of *Moral Agents*, in *Moral works*.

IV. Forget not the great difference between the way of operation suitable to such a *Moral Rector* as *such*, and to a meer *Proprietor* or *Actor*, and *Benefactor*. And then you will see, that *standing Laws* are the *Rectors Instruments*; and *Judgments*, and *Executions* equal according to those Laws. And that *Life Eternal* and *Gods Glory* and *pleasure* being the ends of Government, it cannot be doubted but Gods Laws to all the world, have some aptitude and suitableness on their part to that end. And therefore that the frame of *Moral means* and annexed help hath a certain universal equality, antecedent to man's sinful will, which by forfeiture and rejection maketh an inequality: And therefore it is one of the noblest parts of your study here, to find out what Acts *God* doth as *Legislator*, (for those are *first* and *equal*) and as *Judge* (which man maketh unequal) and what he doth as *Owner* and *free-Benefactor*; For so he may make what difference he pleases: And the wonderful varieties through all the world tell us, that he pleaseth to make very much.

V. Forget not that the *Humane Nature* of *Christ Glorified* is made of God, the *Universal Sun*, or *Cistern* of all *Grace*, by whom it is to be given out to all mankind; to draw them to God, and to rule and Sanctifie them further when converted. And do not think of any *Recovering Influx* of God but by the *Holy Ghost*; nor of the Spirit given any way but *by and from Christ*, who first draweth men to him, by the same Spirit which dwelleth in them as a *Divine Nature* when they are united to him.

VI. And as Christ is the Healing Sun of righteousness, and the universal Medium or Mediator and Administrator both of *Rule* and *Influx*, so forget not that he giveth out this Spirit and Recovering Grace, much by a Law or Conditional promise, which hath its terms which must be observed. And as the measures of Christs Influx are oft resistible, so it is specially, by all wise Christians to be noted, that the *Giving* or *Denying* of the Grace or operations of the Spirit, are the grand *Rewards* and Punishments in this world, above all Corporal ones, and those which all Christians should daily and principally respect in their *Hopes* and *Fears*; Marking when the Spirits operations are denyed them, that they may find out the Cause, and with *David* cry (betimes) *Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me*, Ps. 51.

VII. Lastly, forget not, that as man is not moved as a stone but governed as a Moral agent, * and as the wonderful changes by motion in the world, are made *recipiendo ad modum recipientium*, by the diversity of Receptive *dispositions*, which are no efficient causes of what they receive; so Man *can* and *must* do *somewhat*, yea *much* under God to the due *Receptivity* of Divine Influx; not *without God*, nor by any *Power* which is not freely given him of God; But by a *Power* which he may or may not use. And that the neglect of *what we can do*, and

* Melanct. Loc. Com. de Lib. arb. c. 7. Joh. 6. *Nemo venit ad me Resp.* Cyrillus l. 4. *Non vi quadam cogi trahique credentes putandum est; sed monitione, doctrina, revelatione: Omnis qui audit & discit a patre venit ad me: ubi auditus, disciplina, doctrina adest, ibi fides non vi, sed persuasione oritur. Non enim possum secundum Ecclesiæ veritatisq; dogmata liberam potestatem hominis, quod lib. arb. vocamus ullo modo negare. Ita* Aug. tr. in Joh. 26. *Non traheris? Orant traheris. Addit* Strigel. p. 389. *Sicut non placent hæc* Cyrilli & Auguſt. *ts amet sua somnia quoad volet.*

Utrumq; & credere & Velle est Dei quia ipse præparat Voluntatem & nostri, quia non fit nisi nobis volentibus. Aug. Retract. li. 23.

doing

doing the evil which we could *avoid*, is much at leaſt of the daily ſin of good and bad in all the world. And that though the faithful Servant be *laudable*, he is yet *unprofitable*, and hath nothing to boaſt of. And even the young Birds muſt open their mouths if they will be fed: which man muſt do *freely*, as they do *neceſſarily*. And when God giveth Man not only the Gold if he will open his hand, and the Meat if he will open his mouth, or not turn away and ſpit it out, and alſo giveth him all his Vital power by which he can do this if he will, and alſo *can will it*, and giveth him both *Freedom* to uſe this power, and manifold perſwaſions and helps to uſe it, All this muſt not be reproached as no Grace, nor the world inſtructed in Ingratitude, by them that ſhould Preach that Goſpel of Chriſt, which maketh Gratitude the univerſal complexion of all our duties, which muſt give life and beauty to them all.

And to take off your prejudice againſt Diſſenters, remember that I have after told you, and oft in the Margin, that even many Jeſuits, and Monks, and Friars profeſs, that the *Efficacy of Grace* is in and from the *Nature* or *Power of it*, and the *Will of God*, and not from the free will and co-operation of man. See *Bellarm. de Grat. & lib. arb. c.* 12. *Vaſquez* oft cited. *Pet. a Sancto Joſeph. in Suat. Concord.* elſewhere cited, and *Idea Specul. Theol. l.* 4. *c.* 7. *Ruiz* elſewhere cited, and abundance of Schoolmen. And what ſay any Calviniſts herein more?

THE

THE

Ninth Days Conference

Between *A.* and *B.*

OF

PERSEVERANCE.

B. We are now come to that point, where I confeſs that the difference between you is real: But I maintain it to be ſo ſmall, as that no breach of Chriſtian Love or Communion ſhould be made for it; but it ſhould be taken for a tolerable difference among Brethren. If you think it greater, ſay your worſt of it.

The firſt Crimination.

A. "*By making it impoſſible to fall from Grace, they make fear,* "*and care, and endeavour to be folly; or unneceſſary at leaſt: For what* "*uſe is there of* fearing *an impoſſible hurt? or of care and endeavour to* "*prevent it? And ſo all religious Duties and diligence, as means, are made* "*to be but vain.*

B. 1. You wrong them in your ſuppoſition: Except a few ignorant men that underſtand not the ſtate of the Controverſie, I meet with few or none that ſay, It is *impoſſible* to ſin or fall away; but only *de eventu* that it will never come to paſs. For they ſay (as I remember I heard Mr. *Vines* once preach) that our falling away is not only poſſible, but too eaſie in reſpect to us, and the habits of Grace which we have received: But they lay the certainty of our perſeverance on Gods *Decree* and *Promiſe*. Now, ſay they, God did not decree that it ſhould be *non-poſſibile*, but only that it ſhould be *non-futurum*. And ſo that he hath *promiſed* the *non-futurity*, but not an *impoſſibility* of falling away.

2. And yet they ſometimes uſe the term *impoſſible* here: But how? 1. Say they, *There is a logical impoſſibilitas conſequentiæ*; And ſo there is on ſuppoſition of meer *preſcience* and prediction. For do but make this one of the premiſes [God fore-knoweth that *Paul* will perſevere] and it is impoſſible this concluſion ſhould be true: [*Paul* will not perſevere.] But yet this may be nevertheleſs true, [It is poſſible for *Paul* to fall away.] But this *impoſſibility* of conſequence in order of arguing, is nothing to the *impoſſibilitas rei*, in reſpect to the Cauſes.

2. And alſo they ſay, that there is *impoſſibilitas hypothetica*; ſuppoſing that *man* willfully reject not Grace, Gods Power it ſelf is ſo engaged

Ægid: Colum. Rom. Quodlib. 3. qu. 3. p. 135. *Verum eſt quod ita erit ſicut Deus prævidit: ſed non eſt quod non poſſit aliter eſſe: Propter quod ſi prædeſtinavit & videt me ſalvandum; verum eſt quod ego ſalvabor: ſed hoc non eſt verum, quod non poſſet aliter eſſe: poteſt ergo prædeſtinatus finaliter peccare, & poteſt damnari: Quia infallibilitas divinæ præſcientiæ non imponit ei neceſſitatem: Attamen finaliter non peccabit nec damnabitur: Nulla eſt autem neceſſitas ſimpliciter, niſi conditionis, ſicut omne quod eſt quando eſt neceſſe eſſe: Ita & futura quæ ſunt præſentia præſcientiæ divinæ; Neceſſe eſt evenire, quæ Deus prævidit: non neceſſitate ſimpliciter, ſed quia jam ſunt præſentia Divinæ præſcientiæ.*

Ita Malderus in 12. Tho. q. 103. a. 10. dub. 3, *Juſtus qui habet donum perſeverantiæ, excidere finaliter poteſt: ſed nunquam excidet.* Yet ſaith that *quodammodo* it may be ſaid, *Eum qui habet perſeverantiæ donum excidere non poſſe: enm autem qui non habet non poſſe non excidere.* So Aug. de correp. & grat. c. 12. *dicit, eos qui perſeverantiæ donum non habet non poſſe perſeverare.* So that this is but a ſtrife about equivocal words.

gaged to defend him againſt Satan and all Enemies, that it is *impoſſible* for them to overcome God, and deſtroy him: But here *impoſſible* is reſined to the *power* of *Enemies* only: It is a thing that Satan hath not Power to do, to conquer Grace.

3. But when the queſtion is of the *Power* of the Perſon himſelf, they ſay, It is unfit to ſay that he is *unable* to fall away, or that it is *impoſſible* in reſpect to his own Power. 1. Becauſe that to fall away is an effect of *Impotency* and not of *Power*. 2. Becauſe God will not ſo operate by his Grace, as to make a man *unable to ſin*, but *unwilling*, and actually to keep him from it. So that Grace doth not make us *impotent* to reſiſt it, and make it really impoſſible to us to fall away; but maketh us *able* and *willing* to *ſtand*, and cauſeth us freely *de facto* to perſevere.

3. And I muſt tell you, that your Crimination is grounded on a lame and faulty recitation of their Opinion; you name but half of it, inſtead of the whole: which is, [That the ſanctified never fall away from the due fear, and care, and endeavour of perſevering, and conſequently not from Sanctification or Juſtification]. And will you infer that [a man needeth not fear, care or live holily, if certainly he ſhall do ſo?]

A. "*Yes! what need I take care of that which I ſhall certainly do?*

B. That is, what need you take care if you certainly ſhall take care!

A. "*What need I trouble my own head about that which God will do, "what-ever I do? If he undertake to aſcertain it, I may leave it to "him.*

B. You talk contradictions! God doth not undertake to ſecure your Salvation whether you will or not, or care or not, or labour or not: But to cauſe you to *will*, to *care* and *labour*. And you ſay, If God will make me *willing* I need not be *willing*: If God will make me *think* of it, and *care* and *labour* for it, I *need not think* of it, or care or labour for it. The Sun need not ſhine if God will make it ſhine! You need not eat if God decree that you ſhall eat. Are not theſe weak Contradictions?

A. "*But as weak as you make it, the Contradiction is their own: For "they firſt make God to make their falling away to be impoſſible or certainly* non-futurum, *and yet ſay, that he will make them* fear *it: that is, to "perform an Act without the proper Object: As if God decreed that they "ſhould fear Good as Good, or love Evil as Evil: No man can* fear *that "which neither is, nor is taken to be* fearful: *An impoſſible (or cer-"tainty non-future) hurt is not* fearful, *or an Object of fear, unleſs to a mad "man.*

B. There were much weight in what you ſay, but for that which you leave out: 1. That *objective certainty* may be ſeparated from *ſubjective certainty*: that is, men may be *uncertain* of that which is certain in it ſelf. 2. Yea few of the Godly have a ſtrong aſſurance of their *ſincerity* and Juſtification. 3. And no man in this life hath a *perfect aſſurance*, no more than other perfect Graces. 4. And every mans *faith* it ſelf in Gods Promiſes and fidelity is imperfect. Therefore while all theſe are imperfect, and not only ſo, but liable to ſad aſſaults, and interruptions, and decays. 5. Yea and the perſon liable to ſuch hainous ſins, as look terribly towards Apoſtacy, you cannot ſay that fear is needleſs. For though God decree the certainty of their perſeverance, that proveth not that they are perfectly certain of it.

A. "*But God will not found our Duty on our Sin, nor command men to "fear, becauſe through ſinful weakneſs they do fear.*

B. God

B. God will not make our *Sin* to be our Duty, (*in ſenſu conjuncto*). 1. But God will make *Duty* on ſuppoſition that Sin maketh it neceſſary. If you ſin, God will make *ſorrow* and confeſſion your Duty, which would elſe be none.. 2. Yea more, the ſame Act may be a *Duty* and a *Sin* in *ſeveral* reſpects. And ſo may fear of Hell be.

A. "*Stay there! Do you not then make God the Author of Sin? For* "*if he cauſe the Act as a Duty, when it is cauſed it will prove a Sin* "*too.*

B. You miſtake: Two Cauſes may cauſe two Modes and Relations of the ſame Act, and one not at all cauſe that which the other cauſeth. God cauſeth every Act in *genere actus* which is ſinful, and yet cauſeth not the deficiency or exorbitancy of it: As the Rider maketh the Horſe go, but not to go lamely. God knowing our uncertainty of our own Election and Sincerity, may make it our *Duty*, by a wiſe and careful fear to avoid our own danger: And yet that *fear* may not only come alſo from ſome ignorance and unbelief in our ſelves, but have ſinful degrees, and ſo have that in it which God is not the cauſe of.

The ſecond Crimination.

A. "*Their Doctrine tendeth to the indulgence of all ſin:* * *For if a man* "*cannot fall away however he live, he may give up himſelf to lewd carnality,* "*and ſay, I cannot fall away.*

B. This is the ſame ſhameleſs ſelf-contradicting Accuſation, and needs no other Anſwer. As if you ſaid, [If a man cannot fall away, he may fall away.] To give up himſelf to carnality is to *fall away*; And you ſay that he may do this, becauſe he cannot. The Doctrine of your Adverſaries is, That *God* will certainly keep the godly from turning from him to an ungodly fleſhly life: And how doth this conduce to ungodlineſs?

A. "*The conceit of ſafety will make them careleſs.*

B. Not if they conceive that their ſafety and their carefulneſs are equally decreed. The bad and ignorant will abuſe any thing. But I am perſwaded that very many live the more holily for this belief: 1. Becauſe as Prophecies conduce to their own accompliſhment, in that what men believe will certainly come to paſs, they all promote, and will not oppoſe: So it is in part in this caſe. 2. And when they believe that *God* will have it be, it greatly animateth their endeavours by hope, and taketh off their diſcouragements. 3. And when they find that *God* hath in his Decree conjoyned their care and labour to the end, and hath no more decreed their perſeverance, than that they ſhall carefully avoid ſin and temptations, it maketh them fear that they are not Elect, when they find theſe ſigns of Election to be doubtful, and ſo preſerveth them from preſumption and ſecurity.

* One would think that the Doctrine aſſerting the loſs of Juſtification by mortal ſin were ſtricter than the *Calviniſts*: But judge by the *Jeſuites* Doctrine, who teach that a man in mortal ſin or unconverted may *de congruo* merit Juſtification, *Ruiz de prædeſt. exad. d.* 19. *ſect.* 4. *p.* 242. *Ad meritum congrui non requiritur perſonam eſſe ſimpliciter Deo gratam; quin potius propter peccatum mortale ſit inimica Dei; nihilominus actus fidei & alii qui ex fide procedunt ſecundum ſe, grati ſunt, quantum ſufficit, ut juſtificationem de congruo mereantur opera nampe fraternæ charitatis*, Heb. 13. *& miſericordiæ ſunt ut ſacrificia, quibus Deum per mortale peccatum amiſſum promeremur reconciliatum accipere*: & 1 Joh. 1. *ſi confiteamur*, &c. So that Gods Juſtice is bound to be reconciled to, and Juſtifie a wicked enemy, for an Alms or for Confeſſion: Is not this an eaſie cure of enmity? But the promiſe is made only *cæteris paribus*, to true Believers, already juſt, but needing a particular remiſſion.

The third Crimination.

A. "*Their Doctrine is uncomfortable; in two reſpects,* 1. *In that it al-* "*loweth no man to be ſure of his preſent Juſtification, Pardon and Adoption,* "*who*

"who is not ſure that he goeth further, yea that he is not quite in another "ſtate, than any man that ever fell away: which it is not poſſible that "many, if any one at all ſhould be. 2. In that it alloweth no man to be "ſure of his Juſtification and Adoption, till he have ſo much Grace, as that "no Temptation, how great ſoever, would turn him from Chriſt if he were "tried by it.

B. Wherein is the uncomfortableneſs of theſe?

A. I. "I have known my ſelf ſome fall to Socinianiſm, Arrianiſm, yea "Infidelity, denying Chriſt, or his Godhead, (which is his chief Eſſence) "and the Scriptures, (and therefore ſure had no ſaving Grace then, and "died ſo) who had forty years lived in as eminent Piety, Humility, diligence "in all religious Duties, charity to others, neglect of the World, and patient "ſuffering for their Religion oft times, as almoſt any men that ever I knew. "And that they did not diſſemble, not only their conſtancy, ſuffering and "whole Converſation ſhewed, but my own intimacy with them aſſured me, by "which I knew the very thoughts of their hearts. Some of them were not of "judgments clear and ſtrong enough to diſcern the fallacies of Deceivers: "Others of them were naturally too haſty in judging; And ſome were carried "away by the advantages of the conſtant company of extraordinary able and "inſinuating Seducers. But divers of them, even after they apoſtatized, "did continue ſo much ſtrictneſs of life and charity to all men, and religious-"neſs in their Theiſm, and Infidel way, and neglect of the World, as con-"vinced me, that it was more the inſufficiency of their judgments, than the "hypocriſie of their hearts, which was the cauſe of their Apoſtacy. Now by "the Calviniſts Doctrine, none of theſe men were ever in a ſtate of Grace: "And of the ſtricteſt Profeſſors round about us, there is not one of many "hundreds that goeth ſo far as they did. And all theſe muſt be left uncertain "of their Juſtification, till they are certain that they went beyond them all? "yea and certain that they are unjuſtified, while they are certain that they "came ſhort of any one of them.

B. The caſe that you deſcribe I have known, and it is ſad: But we know not the hearts of other men: There might be more ſin and hypocriſie in them than we know of.

A. "Though God only be the ſearcher of hearts, yet long intimacy and "near experience may make us ſo confident of ſome mens thoughts, as that "I confeſs to you, you will never change my mind, if you plead againſt ſo "great experience. I know their judgments were inſufficient. But I will "never believe that their hearts were falſe, as to what they knew.

B. God hath made his Word, and not other mens hearts, the rule for us to judge our ſelves by.

A. "But if you think that his Word tells us that we are the Children of "the Devil, till we go beyond any that ever fell away, we muſt look both to "that Word, and to ſuch Apoſtates.

B. The truth is, aſſurance of Juſtification and Salvation is not eaſily nor commonly attained: And it is not Opinions alone that will procure it: And while we have that ſin and weakneſs, which is the cauſe of doubts, which Opinion ſoever we hold, we ſhall find occaſion for our doubtings: But let us hear your ſecond part of the Accuſation.

A. II. "They hold that if any man fall away, by what temptation ſoever, "it is becauſe he was never ſincere: And conſequently that he is not ſincere, "that would fall away by the ſtrongeſt temptation that poſſibly may aſſault "him. So that every poor weak Chriſtian, whoſe Infant-ſtrength is not "proportioned to the greateſt temptations, muſt needs take himſelf to be ſtill "but an Hypocrite.

B. We ſtand not by our own ſtrength of habitual Grace, but by the upholding Love and Will of God. *

Carbo *ex* Aquin. 1. 2. q. 137. a. 4. *Si perſeverantia ſumatur pro ipſo habitu, indiget dono habitualis gratiæ, ut cæteræ virtutes infuſæ; ſi autem accipiatur pro actu perſeverantiæ durante uſq; ad mortem, non ſolum indiget habituali gratia, ſed etiam gratuito Dei auxilio conſervante hominem in bono —— prædeſtinatis per gratiam Chriſti, non ſolum datur ut perſeverare poſſint, ſed ut perſeverent, ut* Auguſtin. *Per ſe poteſt perſeverare in malo, non autem in bono.*

Bradwardine who holdeth that no temptation can be overcome without ſpecial help, that is, a divine Volition or Decree, doth yet hold that the ſame Will of God which ſaveth one man by overcoming his temptations, ſaveth others by keeping temptations from them.

A. 1. "*When we diſpute againſt their Doctrine, it is from the immortal* "*quality of the ſeed of God abiding in them, that they plead for certainty* "*of perſeverance.* 2. *Who findeth not by conſtant experience, that God* "*worketh on all things according to their Natures: And ſo on man as man,* "*and ſo on Saints as Saints, and on the weak as weak, and on the ſtrong as* "*ſtrong. Do we not ſee that he giveth men wiſdom and all Intellectual abi-* "*lities, before they ſpeak and do as ſuch abilities muſt fit them to do:* "*When did you ſee Gods Grace make ignorant, injudicious, fools, or weak* "*perſons, judge, ſpeak and live, in equality with the wiſe? Do we not ſee* "that as man is, ſo is his ſtrength and work, operari ſequitur eſſe: *The* "*ſtrong do as the ſtrong, and the weak judge and do as the weak. Why* "*elſe doth God give men ſtrength of Grace? ſure they that think the habit* "*of Grace muſt needs be before any act, will not hold that all our lives after,* "*the Acts (from immediate divine production) go beyond the degree of the* "*habits. We know that God is the chief cauſe of our perſeverance, and all* "*our works that are good: But he cauſeth them by diſpoſing and quickening,* "*ſtrengthening, illuminating and ſanctifying our faculties to do them;* "*which is habitual Grace.*

B. What is your own judgment in this point?

A. "*Our judgment is,* 1. *That he that truly at the preſent preferreth the* "*pleaſing of God, and his Salvation, before all this World, is ſincere, and* "*juſtified.* 2. *That of theſe ſome have well ſetled apprehenſions and reſo-* "*lutions; but others have ſuch ſhallow Conceptions, and weak Reſolutions,* "*as that a very ſtrong Temptation would change their minds, and overcome* "*them.* 3. *But if they eſcape ſuch Temptation and be not overcome, they* "*ſhall be ſaved: For God will not damn men for* poſſible *Sin and Apoſtacy,* "*which they were never guilty of, but only for that which they did commit.* "4. *And that it is no certain ſign of hypocriſie, that they would have fallen* "*away, had their Temptations been great, but only a proof that they were* "weak: 5. *Elſe to pray* [Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us "from evil,] *ſhould be rather* [*diſcover not our ſincerity or hypocriſie by* "*temptation*]. 6. *Therefore God uſeth to proportion mens trials to their* "*ſtrength: And that young and weak Believers may perſevere, he expoſeth* "*them not (antecedently to their provocation) to great Temptations as he* "*doth the ſtrong. Even as while a young Tree hath little rooting, it hath* "*alſo but a little top: elſe had it the top of a great Tree, and but the roots* "*of a Plant, the firſt great Wind would overturn it.* 7. *Even* ſtrong "*Chriſtians might poſſibly have ſome Temptations, which would over-* "*match their ſtrength, and turn them from Chriſt, if God ſhould not keep* "*them from ſuch Temptations.* 8. *Therefore there are ſome Temptations ſo* "*far above the very nature of man, by ſuch Grace as is not a meer Miracle,* "*to be overcome, as that God doth not ſuffer Mankind to be tried with* "*them: As to be moſt exquiſitely tormented many moneths, or a longer* "*time. And in that unuſual trial of the poor* Chriſtians *in* Japon, "*though many endured thoſe torments many weeks, yet nature could not* "*ſuſtain them to the laſt; but when they had ſuffered as much as many* "Smithfield *burnings to death, at laſt almoſt all denied Chriſt, ſo that* "*Chriſtianity is now there extirpated. Now if* Rogers, Bradford, "Hooper, *ſhewed ſincerity by ſuffering death, why ſhould we not think* "*that theſe did ſo that ſuffered far more than they, though afterward the* "*degree was greater than their ſtrength.* 9. *We hold that Gods* Puniſh-"ments *and* Mercies *to men in this World, are very much exer-* "*ciſed in either* permitting *or not permitting great Temptations.*

* *And*

"* *And that for great ſin, he oft delivereth men up to Satan, and giveth "him the greater power over them. Yea that the* nature *of ſin it ſelf is "ſuch as giveth greater advantage to the Tempter: As he that will with "* Achan *look on the wedge of Gold, or that will pleaſe his taſt with deli-"cious Drinks and Meats, or that will permit his eye the modeſt Spectacles, "hath thereby let in the Devil into his Imagination, and will not eaſily "thence caſt him out: And on the other ſide, he that pleaſeth God, and "conquereth one Temptation, obtaineth that Grace by which he is much "ſaved from the next, and the Tempter is the more diſadvantaged and re-"ſtrained. 10. Laſtly, We therefore hold, That ſeeing Temptations do not "only* try *our ſincerity or hypocriſie, (elſe we ſhould deſire them, for ſelf-"examination) but alſo tend to* change *mens minds, and make them worſe, "the way to perſevere is to* pray againſt and avoid Temptations, *and reſiſt "thoſe that cannot be avoided.*

* The ſame *Bradwardine*, *l.* 2. *c.* 16. holdeth that the cauſe of the damneds obſtinacy in ſin, is not only themſelves, and Gods not-willing to cure and ſave them, but alſo Gods poſitive Will by which their obſtinate wills are for ever continued in the act. But I ſee not why we ſhould aſſert Gods poſitive Will of Sin in Hell or Earth, when his not-effectual willing to cure it is enough.

"*This is our judgment: In which you ſee that we hold that all weak Chriſti-"ans that are ſincere, may have aſſurance of their preſent Juſtification, "though they are not ſtrong enough to ſtand the greateſt trials. And "that they may well hope that God will ſave them from over ſtrong Tempta-"tions, while they ſincerely do his Will.*

B. But Chriſt ſaith, That he that forſaketh not all that he hath, and hateth not his own life, cannot be his Diſciple. And what greater trial can there be, than the loſs of life it ſelf?

A. "*Though ſome taking it to be hard that none are true Chriſtians, "that would not be Martyrs were they tried, have ſaid that this Text ſpeak-"eth* de neceſſitate præcepti, non medii, *[You muſt grow up to this "at laſt, if you will be my Diſciples]; yet I will not ſo force the Text, "but ſay as you do. But* 1. *There are far ſtronger Temptations than the "love of Life: Though not from* Intereſt, *yet from* falſe reaſonings, *which "may deceive the judgment: And one that would die for Chriſt while he "believeth in him, may poſſibly have ſo ſtrong Temptations to* unbelief *as "ſhall exceed in danger, his fear of death.* 2. *And all men that at the "preſent would forſake Life and all for Chriſt, yet have not the ſame* fix-"edneſs *of Reſolution, nor the ſame degree of Faith and Love. No doubt "but the Martyrs in the ſame flames had various degrees of Grace. Now a "leſs firm and fixed meaſure may be looſened by degrees, or ſhaken by Sedu-"cers, and mutable man may after be overcome by that ſame Temptation "which once he could have overcome.*

"*So that I accuſe their Doctrine, as utterly inconſiſtent with true Chriſti-"an Comfort, on both theſe accounts. And ſuch is the ſucceſs of thoſe "men that will overdo, and deviſe means of their own, for extraordi-"nary comforts, which God never gave them.*

B. The comfort of poor Chriſtians it ſeems ſtandeth but on ſlippery terms in the Opinion of both ſides, while each Party thinks that there is no true comfort in the others way. * But doth not experience confute you? Do you not ſee that many have true Chriſtian comfort that are not of your mind?

* Whether we may be morally ſure of our preſent Juſtification, the *Papiſts* Doctors agree not among themſelves, *Bellarmine* and many others affirm it, and others deny it: as *Arriolus* (cited by *Brianſon*, *in* 4. *q.* 4. *fol.* 36.) and others that ſay, no man can know whether his Habits are infuſed?

A. "*That is becauſe of ſome* better Principles *which they hold, and be-"cauſe they ſee not the contradiction and inconſiſtence.*

B. You come near to *this truth*; Indeed there are *Principles better* than either of your controverted Opinions, common to both ſides, which may afford us great Conſolation, and which ſound Chriſtians live upon. And I doubt your Diſputes on both ſides do more diſturb than comfort moſt. But this muſt be granted, that Opinions are not *true*, becauſe they are *comfortable*, nor all falſe that have any thing in them apt to trouble men, who have the ſinful matter of trouble in

themſelves: no more than Phyſick is naught that maketh men ſick. We muſt take our Comforts on Gods terms. The truth is, your Doctrine ſeemeth more comfortable in the reſpects which you have named, as to the *aſſurance of preſent Juſtification*, and theirs more comfortable in another reſpect; *viz.* as to the *continuance* of it when they have it. But if this Doctrine were to be choſen by the *comfortableneſs*, yea and *uſefulneſs* of it, there is a middle way (of ſome Schoolmen) which would be preferred before both. That is, that neither any of *the Elect*, nor any that have attained to *confirmation* or a *fixed degree of Grace*, do ever fall away: But that there are ſome *not-Elect*, who are *ſincere and juſtified*, but *weak* and *mutable* (as *Adam* in Innocency) and *not confirmed*, who fall away and periſh: And this *Voſſius* thinketh was *Auguſtine*'s Opinion. And *Grotius* in his excellent Epiſtle againſt *Molin*: lately tranſlated into *Engliſh* by Mr. *Barkſdale*, affirmeth it to be the common judgment of the Fathers: which will be no ſmall advantage to it with me. And 1. This avoideth the uncomfortable Doctrine which you charge *on them*; For this holdeth that a weak Chriſtian may have the comfort of *preſent Juſtification*, that is not certain to perſevere, nor that he is any better than ſome that fall away. 2. And it avoideth the uncomfortableneſs which *they* charge *on you*, *viz.* that no man can be aſſured of his Perſeverance and Salvation: For theſe hold that all the *confirmed* may be aſſured of it; And that all *weak* Chriſtians may poſſibly attain to *confirmation*. 3. And it only leaveth *weak unconfirmed Chriſtians* uncertain of Salvation, which both ſides are agreed in. For *they* confeſs that *weak Chriſtians* are ſeldom if ever ſure of their *preſent ſincerity* and *Juſtification*: And *you hold* that they are uncertain to *perſevere*: And ſo both of you hold them to be uncertain of Salvation. But proceed.

The fourth Crimination.

A. "*They do reproach the Holineſs of Gods people, and his Image,* "*and encourage moſt horrid wickedneſs, while they make all the ſin* "*that ever was committed by any man after his Regeneration, to be* "*conſiſtent with Holineſs and Juſtification: not only* Noah's *Drunkenneſs,* "Lot's *being Drunk and Inceſtuous two nights together,* David's *horrid* "*Murder and Adultery,* Peter's *denying and forſwearing his Lord; but* "*(for inſtance)* Solomon *they ſay was a Saint, and juſtified, when he gave* "*up himſelf to all manner of pleaſure, and denied himſelf nothing,* (and "Paul *ſaith,* The carnal mind is enmity to God, and if ye live after "the fleſh ye ſhall die,) when he clave in love to many Idolatrous "women; having ſeven hundred Wives, and three hundred Concu- "bins, and his Wives turned away his Heart after other gods, and his "Heart was not perfect with the Lord---but he went after *Aſhtoreth*, the "Goddeſs of the *Sidonians*, and after *Milcom*, the abomination of "the *Amorites*, and built an High Place for *Chemoth*, the abomination "of *Moab*, and for *Molech* the abomination of *Ammon*; and likewiſe did "he for all his ſtrange Wives, which burnt Incenſe and ſacrificed to their "gods: his Heart was turned from the Lord that appeared to him "twice, 1 *King.* 11. 1, to 12. *All this ſay the* Calviniſts *you may do, and* "*yet be Saints, and juſtified and ſaved.* * *All this may ſtand with Gods* "*Image, and true Holineſs.*

B. As to all the reſt, except *Solomon*, the ſin being one or two particular Acts contrary to the main bent and ſcope of their lives (which were holy)

* *Bradwardine, li.3.c.27.* having maintained that all things come to paſs by neceſſity, and *cap.29. p.* 734. anſwering the Objection that this will make men caſt all their ſin on God, and be ungodly, anſwereth that it will do ſo by none but the Reprobate, and confeſſeth that ſo one of his Monaſtery did argue, and turned thereupon to a wicked life; but that he cannot help that, for he cannot predeſtinate men that are reprobated.

holy) you ſeem, 1. To deny an evident truth, *viz.* that the habitual love of God was not extirpated by thoſe Sins: Can you think that *habitually* (though the act was hindred) *Noah*, *Lot*, *David*, *Peter*, did not then love God and Holineſs better than ſinful Pleaſures? And the *Papiſts* confeſs, that Sin is not mortal (that is, an evidence of ſpiritual death) till it conquer the *habit of the love of God.*

2. You ſeem to take your offence at the Mercy of God himſelf, becauſe he will not diſown men for ſuch a particular ſin, contrary to their general will and life. As if you provoked him to deal hardlier alſo with your ſelf, leſt he deal too eaſily or mercifully with others.

3. But they are *in theſe* reſolved that no man hath true Grace, that loveth not God and Holineſs above the World and ſinful Pleaſure: And they and you are agreed in this: And in the *hypotheſis*, if you can make them believe that any of theſe loſt that predominant habitual love, they would grant that they fell from ſaving Grace. So that thus far you agree.

4. And as for *Solomon*'s caſe, it is too hard for us all: Some think that he had but common Grace, till that Repentance which he publiſhed in *Eccleſ.* And that ſo much might produce his *Proverbs*, which ſay they were but ſpoken by him, and written long after by others (as ſome by *Hezekiah*'s men). Others think that he did but tolerate his Wives Idolatry, and that he aggravated his own ſenſuality in hyperbolical words, and ſo that his ſin did ſtand with true Grace: Others think that he fell into a ſtate of damnation (in which had he died he had been damned) but yet neither totally (from all ſeminal Grace) nor finally; and that others may do the like. In a word, the caſe is too hard for us: But our comfort lieth not in being ſure what condition *Solomon* was in, either firſt or laſt.

And alſo, as Means and Grace are greater under the Goſpel than they were to *Solomon*, and Life and Immortality more brought to light, ſo more ſpirituality and heavenlineſs is now required of us than was then of them. As long as Chriſt hath fullier deſcribed to us the title-conditions of Salvation, we have better means to judge of our ſtates, than the deciding of theſe Difficulties about *Solomon* would be.

A. "*This is true, but nothing to the purpoſe: we prove by* Solomon *that* "*a man may fall from Grace.*

B. How will you prove it againſt them that think *Solomon* had but common Grace, till he wrote *Eccleſiaſtes*, or repented of his Fall?

A. "*He was a pen-man of the Scripture* (*the* Proverbs) *before*; *And* "*he was beloved of God, and excelled all others in Wiſdom.*

B. 1. Whether he *wrote*, or only ſpake the *Proverbs*, you prove not? 2. You cannot prove that *writing part* of the Scripture, is a more certain ſign of a Saint, than *ſpeaking* part of it. And *Balaam* ſpake part of it (what *Job*'s Friends were, I know not.) And if many Workers of Iniquity did by the Spirit propheſie and caſt out Devils, in Chriſt's Name, how prove you that they may not *write* part of the Scriptures? (To paſs by that, *Pilate*, *Feſtus*, *Claudius*, *Lyſias*, and other ſuch, wrote part of it.) And an ungodly Preacher may now ſpeak and write excellent things. 3. His Wiſdom which he begged, and is magnified for, is deſcribed objectively to be political, phyſical and ethical; but how far *ſpiritual* the Text doth not ſpeak. 4. God might be ſaid to love him, as Chriſt did that man that *was* not far from the Kingdom of God: *Complacencially*, according to the good that was in him; And *benevolently*, as he purpoſed his future Sanctification and Salvation.

I write not this as my own Opinion, but to tell you that you cannot prove ſo much as you think you can.

The

The fifth Crimination.

* A. "*They shew exceeding much immodesty,* 1. *In holding an Opinion* "*which is contrary to the Doctrine of the universal Church, from the Apo-* "*stles till of late times: neither Orthodox nor Heretick, being ever known* "*to hold it, unless perhaps* Jovinian *alone, till above a thousand years after* "*Christ. No not* Augustine *and his Disciples, who were thought by many* "*to run towards an extream in over-pleading for Grace; so that they were* "*called by some* Predestinarian Hereticks. 2. *And yet they have the face* "*(instead of being ashamed of their own singularity) to revile others as hete-* "*rodox, if not heretical, who will not be as singular as they, and set as light* "*by the judgment of Christs Church.*

B. I am not one of them that will cite any scraps of the Fathers, contrary to their current expressions, to contradict you: *Vossius* hath copiously related their judgments in his *Pelagian* History, and that as favourably for perseverance as there was cause; And Dr. *Twisse*, who frequently speaketh his distast of him, saith nothing to prove his History false. Which in this, he that readeth the Fathers must confess to be true. But this should somewhat moderate you in your censure, 1. That the Writers of the first three hundred years are *few*, and their Writings (except *Tertullians*, *Origine* and *Cyprian*) very short; (even *Clements*, *Alexand.* and *Justins* not long). And few of them very learned and accurate Writers; who are the common Managers of Controversies: nor was this Controversie started in their times, and therefore not accurately searcht into. 2. And if you say that this is the more for your cause, if it were not so much as made a Controversie; I add that the *Platonick* Philosophy which then most prevailed, might do somewhat to dispose them that way: For as *Grotius de fato* hath copiously proved (out of above thirty Philosophers and philosophical Christians) most of all the Philosophers, especially *Platonists* were for *Free-will*, and most learned Christian Doctors came out of *Plato's* School, (and most of the learned Hereticks too). 3. And yet *Laertius* in *Zenone* tells us, That the *Stoicks* were against falling away, and taught that no truly virtuous man did ever cease to be such.

2. But above all, I would have you consider, 1. That this Point was not held by these consenting Doctors for an Article of Faith, and necessary to Church-Concord and Salvation; but as one of those many Opinions which were left free. 2. And that many or most of these Fathers did agree in some Opinions that are not true. 3. Yea that the greater part of them are by the *Papists* themselves charged with several Errors, and some and not a few with Heresies. 4. And that therefore the holy Scriptures being the only and sufficient Rule of Faith, we need not be so much ashamed as you intimate, in some things to differ from the generality of those Fathers, if the Scripture be more for us than them. There is many a Text of Scripture which *Papists* themselves interpret contrary to most of the Fathers, notwithstanding their *Trent* Oath to the contrary. Therefore your heavy Accusation of immodest singularity is too keen. But as for their Cross-Accusation of you as heterodox, I now meddle not with the truth, nor excuse any uncharitableness therein.

* Even *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 15. who goeth as high against *Free-will* as *Hobs*, or any man doth, yet confidently holdeth the Apostacy of Saints, though not of the Elect; and questioning what causeth perseverance in Glory, he confuteth all that lay it on any thing as sufficient but Gods Will, which he calleth his Love, and the Holy Ghost. 1. Them that lay it on the nature of Grace. 2. Or the degree of Grace. 3. Or the sight of God. 4. Or the intenseness of that sight. 5. Or the delight in God. 6. Or the degree of that Delight. 7. Or on uniting *adhesion* to God. 8. Or the degree of that adhesion. 9. Or on our not seeing any good which we want. 10. Or the fear of misery by sinning. 11. Or that the joy taketh away *Free-will*. 12. Or on a perfect beatitude in all these. All which he saith are insufficient, and Gods Will is the cause, though using these. And so in this life, men stand or fall, not because God giveth some his inward Grace (for that may be lost) and others not, but because God willeth the persevering and obedience of one, and willeth it not to another]. This is over-doing of the Champion of Grace against *Free-will*.

The ſixth Crimination.

A. "*They contradict abundance of expreſs Scripture, which aſſerteth that* "*the godly may fall finally from true Grace.*

B. And they think that you rather contradict abundance of Texts that ſpeak expreſly for the contrary. It is none of my work now to defend either them or you: I have long ago written a peculiar Tractate of my own Opinion herein: Who is in the right I am not now determining: But that you over-magnifie the difference on both ſides uſually, I ſhall ſhew you in the end. No doubt but the Scripture is of it ſelf ſufficient to decide all Controverſies, as a Rule of ſound Doctrine, ſo far as God would have them clearly decided. But yet he that denieth that ſome things in Scripture are hard to be underſtood, will contradict not only *Peter's* words, but his own and all mens experience. For as it pleaſed God to make up the World of variety of Creatures, ſo alſo to make up the Scripture of Truths of various degrees of *neceſſity* and *evidence*. And in this Point there are ſo many Texts, that both Sides think do favour their Opinions, that we have not the ſame certainty as in many other Points, and therefore not the ſame conſent and concord among the learnedeſt Divines, and the godlieſt Chriſtians: And in my Obſervations moſt on each ſide are more moved to their Opinion in this, from the congruity that they think it hath with other Verities or the Analogy of Faith, than from the proper plain ſenſe of the Texts which they themſelves alledge. So that though no doubt the Truth is to be found in the Scriptures, yet not with ſuch eaſe and certainty as will allow us to make the deciſion of this Point, any part of the terms of our neceſſary Concord.

THE

THE

Tenth Days Conference

Between *B.* and *C.*

OF

PERSEVERANCE.

See *Ruiz de Prædef.* d. b. Sect. 4, 5, 6. Proving that Faith and certain Perseverance of all the Elect proceed from Gods decrees or predefinition; and that all things work for their good, &c. This the Jesuites acknowledge.

B. You have now some advantage for your censure of Dissenters where the difference is real: But I am loth you should make it greater than it is, or make as hot and contentious work about it as *Marbachius* and *Zanchy* did. How odious soever *Thompson* and *Bertius* have been made by our side, and *Jovinian*, *Calvin*, and his followers by the other (though I wish there were no difference at all) I undertake to prove that the difference is not of so great moment as is commonly on both sides pretended; And no greater than should consist with true Love and Communion, even between the Members, yea the Pastors of the same Church, who are therein of differing opinions: But first let me hear what you have to aggravate it.

The first Crimination.

C. "*Their Crime is that they overthrow the comfort of Believers, by denying them any certainty of Salvation.* *

* *Pareus* himself maketh such an Intercision of Justification in Believers as I cannot own (in *Bellarm. de Amiss. Grat. l.* 1. *c.* 7.) *Fides tunc dicitur Justificare quum actum proprium accipiendi remissionem peccatorum exercet. Hinc vero actum non exercet neque exercere potest fides ægra, saucia, sordibus carnis oppressa, peccatorum compedibus quasi ligata:—Justificat is lapsis Deus non imputat peccata; nempe resipiscentibus: Ante resipiscentiam certe imputat, infligendo pœnas temporales, & imputaret etiam infligendo pœnas æternas nisi resipiscerent.—Tunc igitur fides in lapsis habitualiter tantum maneus proprie Justificans dici, aut eos Justificare non potest.*] But his reason is bad: For faith is not called Justifying for the Reason which he giveth.

B. To be absolutely certain of Salvation, no doubt would be a very great comfort. But let us enquire, I. What number will be by this Doctrine hindered from this certainty. II. In what degree this tendeth to their discomfort.

1. And by the first enquiry, I doubt we shall find that you also hold Doctrines that hinder most men from concluding themselves *certain* of Salvation: and yet perhaps be very true.

These Questions therefore, I crave your answer to.

The like say the *Polonian* Protestants in *Colloq. Thorun. de Grat.* Sect. 2. n. 11. *Falso accusamur quasi statuamus semel justificatos Dei Gratiam ejusq; certitudinem & ipsum Spiritum Sanctum non posse amittere, quamvis in peccatis, pro lubitu, volutentur. Cum contra potius doceamus ipsos etiam renatos quoties in peccata contra conscientiam recidunt, in iisq; aliquandam perseverent, nec fidem veram, nec Dei gratiam justificantem, nedum ejus certitudinem aut Spiritum Sanctum pro tempore retinere: sed novam iræ ac mortis æternæ reatum incurrere: Ac propterea nisi Speciali Dei gratia excitante (quod in electis fieri non dubitamus) ad resipiscentiam iterum renoventur, reipsa etiam damnandos esse.*] This is the same with the Doctrine of *Augustine* and *Musculus*, or near it.

Yea, both *Ursine* and *Pareus* seem to come as far: *Catech. de Peccat. actuali* [*Peccatum regnans est cui peccans non repugnat ideoq; sit obnoxius æternæ morti nisi*, &c. *Propter quod non tantum ex ordine Justitiæ Dei, sed ex reipsa, æternarum pœnarum reus est qui illud habet. Talia sunt omnia peccata in non renatis, quædam etiam in renatis: ut error in fundamento fidei, & lapsus contra conscientiam; cum quibus fiducia remissionis peccatorum, & consolatio vera non consistit; donec resipiscant. Quod enim etiam renati possint cadere in peccatum regnans, satis ostendunt tristissimi lapsus Sanctissimorum hominum, ut Aaronis, Davidis, &c.* Rob. Baronius in his excellent little Treat. *de Pec. Mort. & veniali*, saith that by Mortal Sins the regenerate may, 1. Be excluded from that Grace and favour of God, by which he before loved them, yea he incurreth Gods hatred and displeasure, so far, &c. 2. Their Prayers, Thanks, Obedience, yea nothing that proceedeth from them, is then acceptable to God. 3. In that state God cannot forgive them, and give them peace of Conscience and joy.

Q. 1. Do

Q. 1. Do not you grant that we muſt take no comfort but what God giveth us, and on his terms; and that the falſe comforts of preſumption are worſe than none, or not deſirable? And that all Doctrine is not true that were it true were comfortable?

C. "*Yes, none will deny it you.*

B. Q. 2. Do you not find by experience (being a Paſtor who hath diſcourſed with your Flock man by man about their ſtate) that of thoſe that you account truly Godly perſons, there is not one of fifty, yea of an hundred, yea of many hundreds, that will ſay that they are *certain* of their *Salvation*; *properly* and *fully certain.*

C. "*I ſuppoſe your queſtion implyeth your own obſervation, which I* "*contradict not.*

B. Q. 3. And as for the multitude of more careleſs and looſe Chriſtians, do not you think that (whatever they ſay) their certainty is leſs than theſe *Godly perſons?*

C. "*Yes, no doubt: for their evidence is leſs or none.*

B. Q. 4. Do you not think that it muſt needs be ſo (that certainty of Salvation muſt be exceeding rare) conſidering that all theſe things muſt go to it?

1. There muſt be a *certainty* that Gods *promiſes* are *true:* whereas the *faith* of moſt is *weak.*

2. There muſt be a *certain underſtanding* both of the meaning of the promiſe, and what are the *true Conditions* of it, and the difference between true *ſaving Grace*, and all that is but *counterfeit* or *common.* Whereas moſt are uncertain and dark herein, if not miſtaken.

3. There muſt be theſe *Evidences* in the perſon himſelf; not only in *reality*, but in *aſcertaining-diſcernableneſs:* which cannot be unleſs it be 1. *Much* and *ſtrong*: for that which is *ſmall*, is ſo like to the common and counterfeit, that it is ſeldom *certainly* diſcerned. 2. It muſt be in *Activity:* For Grace out of Act is not diſcernable. 3. It muſt be *powerfully operative without*, and in *the life*, to conquer temptation, and keep us in clear and ſure obedience, in a Holy fruitful life: or elſe it will not be certainly diſcerned from dead opinion. 4. It muſt not be clouded and blotted by great and powerful habits of ſin within, or acts of ſin without. For theſe will many ways hinder aſſurance: And how few have all theſe Neceſſaries to make up an aſcertaining evidence.

4. And it muſt be one that knoweth how by ſelf examination to diſcern all this, to be certainly in themſelves: That frequently and skilfully thinketh on the matter.

5. And it muſt be one that is not under the power either of Melancholy, or other diſtracting paſſions, or Temptations.

6. And one that knoweth the true difference between a Mortal ſin (inconſiſtent with Juſtification) and a meer infirmity.

7. And one that knoweth the true nature of that Repentance which is neceſſary after ſinning. And alas! how few be they that have all theſe qualifications.

C. "*The Spirit of God can give them* certainty *without all this ado.*

B. What he *can do* is little to our caſe, but what *he will do.* If you once take that courſe, to teach men to look for aſſurance of their *Salvation* or *Sanctification*, without *certain finding* that *Sanctification* in *themſelves*, you will make ſad work in the Church of God. For nothing is more certain, than that without Regeneration, Converſion and Holineſs, none ſhall ſee God. And that if any man have not the Spirit of Chriſt, which muſt be known by his fruits, he is none of his, *Joh.* 3.3.5. *Matth.* 18.3. *Heb.* 12.14. *Rom.* 8. 9, 13. *Gal.* 5.21. And that it is he

that repenteth and believeth that ſhall be ſaved. And to be ſure that a man is ſanctified, and not to be ſure that he hath the Graces of Sanctification, is a contradiction; to be ſure and not ſure of the ſame thing. And to ſay you are ſure of Heaven without Holineſs, is to ſay that you are ſure that Gods Word is falſe.

C. "*But the witneſs of the Spirit certifieth us of all.*

B. True: And what is that? As your Reaſon witneſſeth or evidenceth that you are a man, and your Life witneſſeth that you are an Animal, ſo the Spirit witneſſeth that you are one of Chriſts; that is, the ſanctifying, illuminating, quickening work of the Spirit: For the *Having* of the Spirit is your witneſs: And to *have the Spirit* is to *have Holineſs*, which is *his work*; which alſo the Spirit, to compleat his witneſs, helpeth us both to *Act*, *increaſe*, *diſcern*, and *take comfort in.*

Q. 5. And I next then ask you, whether he that will have certainty of Salvation, muſt not alſo have (beyond a ſtrong opinion) a *certainty* that this *Doctrine* of certain perſeverance is true?

C. "*Yes: No doubt of it.*

B. And are the generality of Profeſſors certain of it, when not only the *Greeks* and *Romans*, but alſo all the *Lutherans* and *Arminians*, and moſt *Anabaptiſts* utterly deny it? I grant that men may be confident in the opinion which they are educated or faln into. But are the *unlearned certain*, when *moſt of the Learned* are confident of the contrary? Following our Leaders eagerly is not certainty.

C. "*It's granted you.*

B. Q. 6. I ask then, ſeeing ſo exceeding few of your own ſide are truly *certain* of their Salvation, who never receive the *Arminians* opinion, whether that be *it* that hindereth their certainty?

II. And now let us try in what *Meaſure* their Doctrine hindreth comfort?

Q. 1. Do you not think that many of thoſe of your *own ſide* have much comfort though they attain not to aſſurance.

C. *Yes: Experience tells it us.*

B. Q. 2. Do you not think that ſome, yea many of the old Chriſtians for a thouſand years after Chriſt, had comfort, who yet were not of your opinion of Perſeverance? All the Martyrs and great Sufferers for Chriſt, and the excellent Paſtors, were not comfortleſs.

C. "*That cannot be denyed.*

B. Q. 3. Do you think that none of the Nations of *Greeks*, *Armineans*, *Lutherans*, nor any of the *Anabaptiſts* of their mind, do live in the comfortable hopes of Heaven?

C. *Yes, No doubt but many do.*

B. Why then you ſee that comfort may be had without certainty of Salvation. But I proceed to the Nature of the Caſe it ſelf.

Q. 4. Would not your life be uncomfortable if you fore-knew that you ſhould commit Murther, Adultery, Inceſt, deny Chriſt, *&c.* kill your own Father, Mother, Wife or Child; and lye as long as *David* did in your Sin; (much more to ſin as *Solomon* did)?

C. "*Yes; I muſt needs be leſs comfortable in ſuch a proſpect.*

B. Q. 5. Would it not much grieve you if you knew that you ſhould fall from the Degree of Grace received, to the very leaſt that is conſiſtent with ſincerity.

C. "*It muſt needs be my grief; but yet ſuch as would conſiſt with greater* "*comfort, becauſe it conſiſteth with Salvation.*

B. Q. 6. Are you certain that theſe two laſt Caſes to commit ſuch heinous ſins, and to fall ſo far from Grace, may not be your Caſe?

C. "*No: I cannot be ſure of it; becauſe it may ſtand with Grace.*

B. Q. 7.

B. Q. 7. Tell me then, what is it that now keepeth you from thoſe ſorrows which would befall you, if ſuch a thing ſhould be?

C. "*The great hope that I have that it will never be.*

B. What are the Reaſons of thoſe your hopes?

C. 1. "*Becauſe I know that God is Good and merciful in himſelf.* 2. *And* "*he dealeth with man upon terms of Grace.* 3. *And he hath given me expe-* "*rience of his mercy to my ſelf.* 4. *And I have his general promiſes that* "*He will not fail me nor forſake me: which though they aſſure me not that* "*I ſhall not ſo fall, yet they aſſure me that he will not ſo far forſake me,* "*without ſome heinous neglect of his Grace.* 5. *And I feel in my ſelf a* "*preſent deteſtation of ſuch heinous ſins, and a fixed Judgment and Reſolu-* "*tion againſt them: And though I have not power of my ſelf to avoid* "*mutation, and back-ſliding, yet I have reaſon to truſt him for the keeping* "*of this Grace, who freely gave it me. And the truth is, though man be* "*mutable, he is not apt to fear the change of his own mind, when he is* "*conſcious that it is reſolved on ſound and unqueſtionable reaſon.* 6. *And* "*it is not nothing, that I have been kept from all ſuch ſin till now.* 7. *And* "*that it is a rare thing for any faithful perſon, ſo to fall: And why ſhould I* "*fear that which not one of a multitude ever falleth into.*

B. And why may not all theſe reaſons comfort others, that are uncertain of their Perſeverance in a ſtate of Grace (Allowing but the difference of the degrees of the dangers.)

Q. 8. Do you think that your Wife or Children are certain that you will not Murther them.

C. "*No: they cannot be certain.*

B. Q. 9. Would it not make their lives ſorrowful if they knew that you would do it?

C. *Yes, no doubt.*

B. Q. 10. What keepeth them from ever taſting of ſuch ſorrows at all?

C. "*Such reaſons as I before named to you. They know that I am a Hus-* "*band and father, and have natural affections, not mad, nor wicked, but* "*abhor ſuch a thing, and they know that my love daily cauſeth me to do* "*them all the good I can; and they ſee nothing to make them fear the con-* "*trary; and ſuch a Villany is not heard of in many Kingdoms in an* "*Age.*

B. But they are as uncertain that they ſhall not by ſome heinous crime (even the ſeeking of your death) provoke you.

C. "*Men fear not that which their Judgments and Wills are ſo averſe to* "*and reſolved againſt, as that there is no probability of a Change.*

B. You ſee then upon what terms the ancient Fathers, (even *Auguſtine* himſelf that denyed certainly of Salvation) and the Martyrs and other Chriſtians of their times, and the moſt of the Chriſtians now in the world, do hold their comforts: And that *uncertainty* of Perſeverance overthroweth not all ſolid peace.

Q. 11. But doth not the excluſion of *Certainty of preſent ſincerity* and *Juſtification*, much more exclude *Comfort*, than doth the excluſion of Perſeverance alone.

C. "*Yes, no doubt: For to be ſure that I am at preſent in a ſtate of* "*life, and to have very ſtrong probabilities that I ſhall ſo live and dye, muſt* "*be much more comfortable than to be uncertain whether I now am or ever* "*was in a ſtate of life.*

Lig. Jo. Gerhardi To. 2. Tract. 13. de Peccat. act. c. 19. n. 92, 93, 94, &c. *De differentia peccat. Mort. & Ven.*

B. If therefore not one of many ſcore or hundreds have a *certain* knowledge of their ſincerity and Juſtification, who are of your *own* opinions, are you fit to cry out of others as the deſtroyers of Chriſtian comfort, on the foreſaid account?

C. "*They deſtroy it by their* Doctrine, *and ſo do not we: It is with* "*us, but mens own ſin and infirmity that hindereth it.*

B. Q. 12. What ſay you to your Doctrines before objected againſt you? 1. That no man can be certain of Salvation, who is not certain that if he had the ſtrongeſt Temptations in the world, he ſhould not be overcome by them to fall away. Do not theſe put the comforts of the weak as hard to it, as *their* Doctrine doth?

C. "*Theſe are* True Doctrines, but *Theirs* are *falſe.*

B. That is the controverſie, which I am not determining: I only anſwer your aggravation of *uncomfortableneſs* of their Doctrine.

The ſecond Crimination.

Per: Alliac. Camer. n. 1. q. 12. C. *Quælibet rationalis Creatura a Deo prædeſtinata poteſt damnari, & quælibet Reprobata poteſt Salvari: Quia cuicunq; Deus dabit gratiam & gloriam libere dabit: & per conſequens poſſet non dare: ergo,* &c. *Sed licet hæc concluſio de virtute Sermonis ſit vera tamen in ſenſu Compoſito intellecta eſt falſa.* Thus all the quarrel is about words.

C. "*Their Doctrine maketh God to be* Mutable, *and his gifts and calling* "*to be liable to repentance; and that one day he loveth a man, and* "*the next day hateth him, one day Juſtifieth and another condemneth* "*him.*

B. This charge is injurious, upon groſs miſtake; and on the like grounds may be laid againſt your ſelves. For,

Q. 1. Do you not hold that God hateth all the workers of iniquity?

C. "*Yes: as ſuch.*

B. Q. 2. And that he that believeth not is condemned already, and that all Infidels and Heathens are unjuſtified?

C. "*Yes; though God may decree to juſtifie them hereafter.*

B. Q. 3. But doth not God after Love and Juſtifie ſuch as are converted?

C. "*Yes; none doth deny it.*

B. Q. 4. If then this prove not God to be mutable, to Juſtifie and Love ſuch as he *condemned* and *hated*, why ſhould it prove him mutable to *condemn* and *hate* ſuch as he *Juſtified* and *Loved?* I do not ſay that he *doth ſo*; but if he did, or do, it will not prove any change in God. For as he that is *One* cauſeth all *Diverſity* and *Multiplicity* of *Beings*; ſo he that is *Immutable*, cauſeth innumerable Mutations: The change is in the Creature, and not in God.

C. "*Is it not a change to* Hate *where he* Loved? *Theſe are immanent acts.*

B. No more than to *Love* where he *Hated*; In Man ſuch words ſignifie a change, but not in God: For it is not Gods Immanent acts as Immanent that are changed, *viz.* His *Activity, underſtanding or Will* in it ſelf: But only that Immanent Act as *Objectively Tranſient* (if not *effectively*); ſo that it is only, 1. The *termination* of the eſſential eternal Act on this or that *Object.* 2. The *Relation* of it to that object; 3. The *Extrinſick Denomination* of it, from that *Relation*, by *Connotation*, which are *changed* and *diverſifyed*; and this inferreth no change in God.

The third Crimination.

C. "*At leaſt they make his Covenant changeable, as condemning a man* "*one day whom it juſtified the day before.*

B. Not at all. The Covenants Action is phyſically *none*, but only ſuch as ſome call a Reputative Act; that is, *per modum ſigni*; and as the

the *Fundamentum* cauſeth the *Relation.* Gods Legiſlation was a real Action: But the *Law made* doth not Act, at all; But improperly, morally, or metaphorically is ſaid to Act, when it doth not; what Action doth the ſign poſt perform? or the poſt and hand at a croſs way? or all the Letters in all your Library which teach you the greateſt myſteries? none at all? It is you that are Active on them. What Action do millions of Eggs at the *Indies* perform every time your Hen layeth? And yet they then have a new Relation of Similitude. So Gods Law (nor Mans neither) is not at all changed, while *ut inſtrumentum morale per modum ſigni & fundamenti*, it condemneth the Infidel, and juſtifieth the Believer, no more than when it juſtifieth him at converſion whom it condemned before. The change is only (really) in the perſon.

The fourth Crimination.

C. "*They make Gods Covenant to be but Conditional, and deny that ab-*
"*ſolute promiſe, I will put my fear in their hearts, and they ſhall not depart*
"*from me.*

B. I find this Controverſie (whether this promiſe, and that of taking away the hard heart, *&c.* was Conditional or Abſolute, to be harder than ſometime I thought it had been. And the determining which of you doth rightlieſt expound the Scripture is not my buſineſs. But, 1. The Jeſuites and *Lutherans* and many *Arminians* confeſs, that God *hath foretold* that certain Individual perſons ſhall perſevere and be infallibly ſaved. 2. That this prediction may well be called a Promiſe in ſeveral reſpects; 1. In that it is *de bono futuro.* 2. As it is made to *Chriſt*, that he ſhall ſee of the travail of his Soul, and that none ſhall take thoſe that are given him by the Father, out of his hands. 3. As it is made to Mankind in general; that there ſhall be certain (*innominate*) perſons of them infallibly ſaved. 4. As it was made to the *Iſraelites* in ſpecial, that there ſhould be more Grace given them, ſo that they ſhould not depart from God to Idolatry at their return from Captivity, as they had done (which is the true meaning, I think, of the Text). But I ask of you,

Q. 1. Doth the promiſe called Abſolute (of taking away the heart of ſtone, *&c.*) give any perſon a Right before-hand to the benefit?

C. "*Not ſuch a* Right *as that any one can claim it as his own due, or*
"*know that he is the perſon to whom it belongeth: But ſuch a right as that*
"*he is really the man to whom it ſhall be given.*

B. So you may ſay of Gods meer ſecret Decree, or of a meer Prophecy.

Q. 2. What comfort then can any man have by that promiſe, before it is performed, when he knoweth not that he is one that it belongs to?

C. "*No more than that which you ſay before they grant.*

Q. 3. Is not this cited by you of the ſame ſort?

C. "*In reſpect to the firſt part it is,* [*I will put my fear into their hearts*];
"*but not as to the ſecond part* [*They ſhall not depart from me*]. *For men that*
"*have Gods* fear, *may know that it belongs to them.*

B. It is ſtrange that all the ancient Doctors and Churches for a thouſand years, were ignorant of this plain Promiſe, if it mean that *none* that have *Gods fear* ſhall *depart from* him. But if one ſay that it ſpeaketh only of the *Jews* after the Captivity, not turning from God to Idols; and another ſay, that it conjoyneth two diſtinct benefits promiſed to certain perſons, (whoſoever) but doth not make them *as receivers of the firſt*, to be *formally the Subjects* of the ſecond; and ſo doth not promiſe

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to all that have Gods *fear*, but to thoſe meant in the Text only, that they ſhall not depart: and if a third ſay that the promiſe is conditional; I am not now to decide this controverſie: *Auguſtine* thought that it was ſpoken only of the Elect, and not of all that truly feared God. And as Gods promiſe to the *Iſraelites*, that they ſhould be brought out of *Egypt*, and brought to the Land of *Canaan*, did not mean that *every man* that had the firſt ſhould have the ſecond; As the promiſe to the Apoſtles that they ſhould have the Spirit of *Miracles* or *Tongues*, and ſhould be ſaved, did not mean that every one that had that Spirit ſhould be ſaved; ſo doth *Auſtin* expound, *Rom.* 8. 30. limiting all the following ſayings to thoſe that Verſe 28. are ſaid to be *Called according to his purpoſe*. But to decide this is not my preſent work.

The fifth Crimination.

C. "*They make a* ſecond Regeneration *neceſſary, unleſs with the Nova-*
"*tians, they will deny pardon to thoſe that fall after the firſt.*

B. Do they ſay ſo expreſly; or is it only a conſequent of their Doctrine?

C. "*It followeth plainly, though they ſay it not.*

B. 1. There will be no end of odious accuſations, if the Adverſaries ſhall chooſe what Doctrine men ſhall be ſaid to hold, as he ſpineth out conſequences; what if they think that your Doctrine unavoidably brings in *Anabaptiſts* (the denyal of Infant Baptiſm, I mean).

C. "*That were ſtrange indeed: Some men can draw* quid vis ex quo vis.

B. Anſwer this ſeries of connexed Theſes.

1. No one falleth away from a ſtate of Juſtification (that's your Ground).

2. Many Baptized in Infancy prove wicked at Age.

3. Therefore none of thoſe were juſtified in or before Baptiſm.

4. Therefore the *Juſtifying Covenant* was not ſealed to them as to conſenting perſons (by themſelves or Parents) who have a preſent right to this benefit (elſe Gods Covenant ſhould be falſe or fail.)

5. Therefore they received not Chriſtian Baptiſm: For, 1. Chriſt never inſtituted a Baptiſm, to ſeal *any other Covenant*, but that which giveth pardon and Juſtification. 2. Chriſt never inſtituted Baptiſm, to give only a *future pardon* to *future conſenters*; but only to *inveſt* Sacramently preſent Conſenters (or Covenanters, by themſelves or Parents) with preſent pardon. Theſe two are certain verities, eaſily proved, whatever ſome talk of future pardon by Baptiſm.

6. Therefore they are to be rebaptized.

I think I can looſe the links of this chain, or confute the laſt concluſion: But I leave you to your proper work. *Davenant* and *Ward* thought it muſt be done by denying your firſt Theſis. I aſſure you the trifling diſtinctions, of an *outward* and an *inward* Covenant, and of the benefit of *Church Priviledges* ſealed *to all*, and *Salvation* only to the Elect, or of *preſent* and *future* Juſtification ſealed] will not do this difficult buſineſs. You muſt do *better*, or *be Anabaptiſts*.

2. Either it is *quoad Nomen* or *quoad rem* that they infer a ſecond Regeneration, not as to the *Name*: For they ſo deny it. As to the *Thing*, 1. Some hold that men indeed may totally fall from ſpecial Grace; but that no ſuch are ever recovered: Though other Groſſe Sins, which are not ſuch a total Apoſtacy may be pardoned. Theſe cannot be ſaid

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to hold two Regenerations. 2. The reſt ſay that the word *Regeneration* (like *Generation* and *Creation*) doth not only ſignifie the cauſing of Holineſs in the Soul, but the *Order* of doing it, that it be *Now firſt done*, and *not before*. As Chriſt's raiſing *Lazarus* was neither *Creation* nor *Generation*. So ſay they, Grace indeed is after infuſed *de novo*; but not *firſt*: Therefore it is to be called *Repentance*, and not *Regeneration*. So that the change they confeſs, but the Name of *Regeneration* they reject as incongruous.

The ſixth Crimination.

C. "*They go againſt the Doctrine of* Auguſtine, Proſper *and* Fulgentius.

B. This is the raſheſt charge of all the reſt. Beyond all controverſie theſe three Fathers, held that all the Elect perſevered; but that ſome were Juſtified, Sanctified, Loved God, were in ſuch a ſtate that had they dyed in, they had been ſaved, who yet are not Elect, but fall finally away and periſh, and that none can ordinarily be certain of perſeverance and Salvation, at leaſt but ſtrong confirmed Chriſtians (which *Voſſius* thinketh he excepted, but I cannot prove it).

If you cannot have leiſure to read *Auſtin* himſelf, read but, 1. What I have ſaid *lib.* 1. 2. What I ſaid in my Treatiſe of Perſeverance. 3. What *Voſſius* ſaith *Hiſt. Pelag. de Perſever.* 4. And the very words in the *Janſeniſts*, *Paulus Eryn.* in his *Trias Patrum*. In a viſible matter of fact, which all the world may ſee, that man who will deny this (as yet many have done, and even Dr. *Kendall* till Biſhop *Uſher* in my hearing and at my motion ſatisfied him) doth but tell us how men otherwiſe pious abuſe Gods Church, by truſting to their Leaders, and miſ-reporting viſible and copious Writings, and founding bitter cenſures and invectives upon ſuch dreams, and yet thinking that all this is the Work of God. The Lord pardon and heal his Servants *haſty partial judging* of things and perſons, and the bitterneſs, uncharitableneſs, injuries, contentions and diviſions that have followed thereupon.

The juſt Extenuation of this laſt Controverſie.

IN all theſe things following, the parties are agreed (for the moſt conſiderable).

1. That *Adam* fell from true Righteouſneſs and Holineſs, and loſt the Spirit.

2. That therefore we cannot argue from the Nature of Holineſs alone to prove that it cannot be loſt.

3. That as the word *Poſſible* relateth to man's Power to do evil and omit good, it is not only *Poſſible* to fall away, but too eaſie: yea, it is not *opus potentiæ ſed Impotentiæ*, except as *Natural Power* is exerciſed in the *meer Act*, with *Moral Impotency*.

4. Yea, without Gods preſerving Grace, it is not *poſſible* to *perſevere*.

5. God hath appointed us much duty to be done that we may not fall away: And among the reſt, to diſcern, and fear the danger of falling away; and in that fear to depart from evil and temptations.

6. God hath promiſed us Salvation, on *Condition* that we perſevere.

7. God oft threatneth the faithful with damnation, if they fall away, and deſcribeth to us the ſin and miſery of Apoſtates. 8. The

8. The Juſtified may loſe many *degrees* of true Grace, and dye with far leſs than once they had, and ſo become uncapable of that Greater Glory, which they were morally capable of before.

9. It's too poſſible for them to fall into heinous ſin: They are not certain that they ſhall never commit Adultery, Inceſt, the Murther of Parents, Wife or Children, *&c.* nor certain juſt how oft they may ſo fall, or not.

See the *Britiſh* Divines Suffrages at *Dort*, of perſeverance.

10. Such Sins make them ſo far morally uncapable of Glory, as that a ſound Repentance for them, and from them, and a renewal of Faith, are neceſſary to full right or moral capacity.

11. God doth not decree any man's perſeverance, let him live never ſo ſecurely, negligently or vitiouſly: For thoſe that do ſo are faln already: It is a contradiction, to perſevere in holineſs, and to live unholily. But Gods Decree is ever entire, that ſuch a one ſhall fear danger, fly temptations, live holily in the uſe of means, and therein perſevere unto the end: He never ſeparated theſe in his Decrees.

Lege Voſſi, *Hiſtor. Pelag. de Perſeverant.*

12. Except *Hierome* truly accuſe *Jovinian* with it, there is not (that I know of) any Father, Chriſtian, or Heretick, that hath written that no truly Juſtifyed perſons fall finally away from Grace and *periſh*, for above a thouſand years after Chriſt: And it's commonly granted that generally they held the contrary: Even *Auguſtine*, *Proſper* and *Fulgentius* not excepted.

13. It is confeſſed to be a ſad clog to the contrary opinion, that it is held againſt the Judgment of the Univerſal Church for above a thouſand years, and ſo ſeemeth to bear the imputation of novelty and ſingularity: Though that be not a ſufficient confutation of it.

14. It is confeſſed that the *Greek* and *Roman* Church the *Lutherans* and *Arminians*, and moſt *Anabaptiſts*, are againſt this Doctrine.

15. It is confeſſed that all theſe Fathers, and Churches of old, and all theſe Churches and Chriſtians of late, are not void of the Chriſtian comforts of the Goſpel, even of *faith* and *hope* of Glory.

16. It is confeſſed that the Scripture hath many paſſages, ſo much ſeeming to favour both the opinions, as hath made the controverſie thus difficult to ſo many Learned Godly Men: And what the Scripture is, it will be, to the worlds end.

17. It is confeſſed that none can be ſure of Salvation or perſeverance, who are not firſt ſure of their Sincerity, and Juſtification.

18. And to be uncertain whether one be a true believer, and juſtified, is more uncomfortable than to be ſure of that, and uncertain of his perſeverance.

19. No man can ordinarily be *certain* that he is Sanctified and Juſtified, that is not *certain* of the truth of the Goſpel, and hath Grace ſomewhat ſtrong and active, not clouded by great Soul-wounding Sins, nor frightful or melancholy paſſions; nor any that through Ignorance is uncertain of the true Nature of the conditions of the Covenant of Grace.

20. Certain experience of the defect of theſe qualifications, and of mens own Confeſſions, aſſureth us, that not one of a multitude of the ſtrict Religious ſort, have that which we call proper *certainty* of their Sincerity, Juſtification and Salvation: though they hold againſt the *Arminians* that certainty of perſeverance muſt be aſſerted, as that which may be attained by them that are firſt certain that they are in a ſtate of life.

21. Yet the fore-mentioned knowledge of Gods Mercy, Chriſt's Love and Covenant, with experience and many evidences of great probability may cauſe even ſuch as are *uncertain* of their Juſtification, to live in ſome

ſome good meaſure of true Chriſtian peace, though mixed with ſome doubts and fears: Becauſe their Probability is much *greater* than their cauſe of fear. And much more may they do ſo, that doubt only of their perſeverance.

22. It muſt be confeſſed that the Doctrine that none fall from Juſtification, hath its temptation alſo to diſcomfort, as in the two or three fore-mentioned particulars (which I'll not repeat.)

23. It is confeſſed that if God ſhould condemn thoſe whom he before Juſtified, it would argue no change in Him or his Word; but in them alone.

24. It is confeſt that ſome Juſtified perſons (who live in as much ſin, as will ſtand with ſincerity) are at preſent unfit for aſſurance of perſeverance and ſalvation: For it would not ſtand with that humbling correction which they are then moſt fit for.

25. Laſtly, it is confeſt that this point is no Article of our Creed, nor is an agreement in it neceſſary to Church-communion or Chriſtian Love, but difference in it muſt be accounted tolerable.

In all this the moderate are commonly agreed. On the other ſide,

1. It is commonly granted that all that are elected to ſalvation ſhall perſevere (though how far that election is upon foreſight they quarrel.)

2. It's granted by all that not only ſuch *election*, but *fore-knowledge* of ſalvation and perſeverance, maketh it *Logically Impoſſible*, *quoad conſequentiam*, not to perſevere: that is, It Neceſſarily followeth, [God foreknoweth it: Therefore it will come to paſs.]

3. It is commonly granted that God forſaketh none till they forſake him.

4. And that ſo great is his Goodneſs that no willing ſoul, that ſolidly underſtandeth the Grounds of the Chriſtian faith and hope, and is in Love with God and Holineſs, and willing to uſe means and avoid temptations, hath any reaſon to vex himſelf with any ſuch fears, as conſiſt not with a life of greater hope and peace and comfort. And that living by faith on Chriſt and his Spirit and General promiſe, they ſhould comfortably Truſt him with their ſouls.

5. It's granted that the more Faith, Love, Holineſs and obedience any hath, the nearer they may come to full aſſurance of perſevering: and may live the more confident and joyful lives.

6. Many with *Auſtin* hold an Antecedent abſolute ſpecial Election to *faith* and *perſeverance*: and that no ſuch elect ones fall away.

7. Many hold that beſides *Election*, a degree of Grace called *Confirmation*, doth ſettle ſome in a *certainty* of perſeverance: and neither the *Elect* nor *Confirmed* fall away: And that the *confirmed* may be *certain* of their own *election*, *perſeverance* and *ſalvation*. And this ſeemeth to be the opinion of *Origen*, *Macarius* and divers Antients: Even that God doth with Believers as he did with the Angels, and *Adam*, to whom he would have given confirming Grace, had he at firſt overcome.

And where *faith* hath *kindled* ſo much LOVE to God and Heaven and Holineſs, as that it is become a *Divine nature* in the ſoul, and operateth as the Love of Children to Parents, above meer Reaſon, as a fixed Habit, like a nature, then Grace ſeemeth to ſome Confirmed and not loſeable.

Cur ergo id quod Apoſtolis tunc fecit Chriſtus non concidimus pro omnibus prædeſtinatis feciſſe, ut peculiari modo ſua merita illis applicaret & perſeverantiam eis obtineret? nam ſi multi ſancti pro aliis orantes converſionem eorum & perſeverantiam impetrarunt, cur dicimus Chriſtum pro omnibus prædeſtinatis non oraſſe, & peculiari ſua oratione tantam gloriam & gratiam illis obtinuiſſe? Vaſquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 94. c. 3.

All theſe Conceſſions laid together (and more which I could fetch from the moſt learned Schoolmen,) do ſhew, that though here the difference be real, it is in a *point* and a *degree*, where humane frailty, and the difficulty, and the non-neceſſity of a fuller underſtanding it, do fully prove to all ſober, ſelf-knowing, loving believers, that it is their duty to bear with one another, without the quenching of brotherly Love, or denying Chriſtian-communion to each other: But the wicked will do wickedly, and none of the wicked will underſtand: but the wiſe ſhall underſtand, *Dan.* 12.10.

THE

The Eleventh Dayes
CONFERENCE.

Of Christs Righteousness imputed: of Faith, Justification, and mans duty; their several parts, to a Christians Comfort.

Speakers: *Saul*, *Paul*, a *Libertine* Teacher.

CHAP. I.

" S. *SIR, I am now come to you in a greater straight than I was* " *in before: I have met with a Teacher that tells me you are* " *a deceiver, and have all this while misled me, and have* " *taught me to build upon the sand of my own Righteousness,* " *and set me on doing to my own undoing; and that I have not built on* " *the Righteousness of Christ, and therefore all will end in my overthrow* " *and ruine: I was not able to answer him; And I have prevailed with* " *him to come to you, that I may hear you speak together.*

P. Did not I tell you before-hand of such temptations? and give you instructions for your preservation against them?

" S. *I confess you did: But I find my self insufficient to use them* " *without help when it comes to tryal.*

P. The truth is, Infant Christians will still need the help of their Elders, and of Christs Ministers, when they have been never so well forearmed; as you need a Physicion in your sickness, after all the preventing directions which he can give you. And you have done well to bring him, and to hear both sides together. Had you trusted to your own understanding, and only disputed it out privately with himself, you might have been ensnared to your danger. I shall willingly conferr with him on these two conditions: 1. That you remember that it is *You* and not *Him* that I am to satisfie: and therefore when I have satified *you*, I have done: For to follow him as long as he will talk, will waste more time, than we have to spare. 2. That when you are delivered from this snare, you will remember that you must meet with many more such in the world: The Anabaptist will say as much to you for his way, and the Papist much more for his way; And most of them will affright you with the danger of damnation, if you turn not to them: Therefore when ever you are assaulted by any of them, bring them to me, and hear us together, as you now do.

Lib. *I am sorry to see how you abuse poor souls, and build them not on Christ, but on themselves! What a deal have you said to this man of* Doing *and of* Working, *and how little of Believing? You have set him on tasks of* Duty, *and he thinketh now to* Do this *and* Live, *and to be saved in his own doings; his repenting, his praying, his keeping the Lords day,* &c. *while the poor man knoweth not Jesus Christ, and submitteth not to the Righteousness of God. You will needs be a Teacher of the Law, and bring back poor souls to bondage, that Christ may profit them nothing; but trusting to their own works and righteousness for life, they may fall from grace, and be found in their nakedness and sin.*

P. Sir, these General exclamations do but tell us, that there is something that you differ from us in, but tell us not what. If you are a lover of truth, and will speak to edification, tell us distinctly what are the points of our doctrine which you dislike: and let us debate them one by one.

Lib. *Among many others the chief are these,* I. *That you must not have men come to Christ till they are prepared.* II. *That you set men on Repenting, and Doing, and Working for salvation, and so teach them to trust in a Righteousness of their own; and do not tell them that All Christs Righteousness is ours being imputed to us, and that Believing is our Conversion, to which you are to call men: If they* Believe, *they have a perfect Righteousness in Christ.* III. *That you overthrow the Gospel, in making it a Law.* IV. *And you make the new Covenant to be made with us, when Christ is the only party in Covenant with God.* V. *And you make the new Covenant to have* Conditions, *and so to be the same with the old.* VI. *You make Justifying faith to be a believing in Christ as a Teacher and Lawgiver, that you may lead in works: and not a meer Believing in him for Righteousness.* VII. *You make Faith to justifie as a condition of our performance, and not meerly an Instrument of our Justification, or apprehending Christ.* VIII. *You make faith in it self to be imputed to us for Righteousness, and not Christ only the object of faith.* IX. *That God is made Mutable by you, and forgiveth and justifieth them when they believe, whom he did not justifie from eternity.* X. *That a justified man must be afraid lest his sin should unjustifie him again.* XI. *You make men think that they are able to believe of themselves.* XII. *You call men to Duties, and to Mortification, before they believe and are regenerate.* XIII. *Instead of the Witness of the Spirit, you comfort men by the Evidence of their own holiness and righteousness. These with abundance more, are the errors, by which you corrupt and deceive poor souls.*

P. Because Christ would have his Servants as Teachable as Children, and not to strive by needless disputes, I pray you be you the Teacher, and I will be the Learner, and tell me what you would have us believe in these particulars which you have named. And first of the first.

The first Charge.

Lib. I. *Men must be taught to come presently to Christ without staying for Preparations, and not discouraged, delayed or kept off.*

P. By [*Coming*] I suppose you mean [*Believing* and *Accepting.*] I pray you teach me further then: *Quest.* 1. Must men *believe in* Christ before they Hear of him?

Lib. *No: How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard?*

P. Quest. 2. Must they *Believe* that he is the *Mediator* between God and man, before they have learned that there is a God? and that this God is True, and Just? *Quest.* 3. Or before they have learnt that man is a sinner? and deserveth death? and what sin is? *Quest.* 4. Or before they have learnt that we cannot redeem and save our selves?

Lib.

Lib. *No: That were a contradiction.*

P. Queſt. 5. Muſt men Believe that Chriſt is the Son of God, and the Saviour of his Church, before they have learnt what it is to be the Son of God? or what a Saviour is? and what is the ſalvation which he hath wrought, and will vouchſafe us? before they underſtand the Articles of the Chriſtian faith; that he was conceived, born, ſuffered, was buried, roſe, aſcended, is glorified, and the like?

Lib. *No man can* Believe *that which he doth not Underſtand.*

P. Queſt. 6. Muſt men take Chriſt for their Saviour, before they heartily perceive that they want a Saviour, through ſin and miſery? and that they are loſt for ever if he ſave them not? and that no other can do it?

Lib. *No: this is an impoſſibility and contradiction.*

P. Queſt. 7. Muſt a man take Chriſt for his Saviour, before he is *willing* to be ſaved?

Lib. *Yes: He muſt* come *to* Chriſt *to make him willing, and not think that he muſt bring* willingneſs with him: *This is your Legal doctrine.*

P. Queſt. 8. Is not *Accepting Chriſt*, an Act of the *will*? a *willingneſs* that *he ſhall be my Saviour?* And do you ſay, that a man muſt be *willing to have Chriſt before he is willing?* and not *ſtay till he is willing?*

Lib. *You would make me ridiculous: I ſay not, that he muſt* take Chriſt before he is willing; *But he muſt* come *to Chriſt for a will.*

P. In deſpight of edification you will ſtick in the Metaphor [*Come to Chriſt*]: What mean you by *coming?*

Lib. *Poor blind ſoul! If you had been taught of God you would have known what it is to Come to Chriſt! But you will not come to him.*

P. With ſuch exclamations you cheat the ignorant! Cannot you tell your own meaning? What mean you by [*Coming to Chriſt*]?

Lib. *I mean* Believing in him, *and* caſting my ſelf wholly on him.

P. Still you ſtick in Metaphors: Can you *caſt your ſelf upon him* for *a will*, before you are *willing?* Is not that *caſting your ſelf*, the act of your *will*, which we call Truſt or Affiance?

Lib. *You would hide your Lyes with words! You teach that men muſt have* good deſires before they come to Chriſt; *as if they muſt bring with them* good deſires *of their own, or by Preparatory Grace!*

P. Queſt. 9. Can a man *Accept* of *Chriſt* as a *Saviour* to ſave him from ſin and puniſhment and Gods diſpleaſure, and to juſtifie, ſanctifie and glorifie him, before he hath any *deſire* to be ſaved from ſin or puniſhment, or Gods diſpleaſure, or to be juſtified, ſanctified or glorified?

Lib. *He that hath no ſuch Deſires, muſt* come *to* Chriſt *for them, and* believe.

P. Still [*Coming*] muſt hide your ſenſe: Doth Chriſt give theſe *Deſires* to *be ſaved*, before *we Take him for our Saviour by Conſent?* or after?

Lib. *You are catching me by craft. If I ſay* [*Before,*] *you will ſay, Then it is Preparatory to our Conſent. If I ſay* [*After,*] *you will ſay, that it is impoſſible to conſent to the Means till a man deſires the end; and to Accept a Saviour before he is willing to be ſaved. But beſides this, you tell men that they muſt not come to Chriſt, till they are broken-hearted, and ſorrow for their ſins: You heat the Wine of the Goſpel ſo hot, that it ſhall burn mens lips, and then invite them to it.*

P. Queſt. 10. Is it poſſible for a man Heartily to perceive that he is a heinous ſinner, and hath diſpleaſed God, abuſed mercy, killed Chriſt, undone his ſoul, and wronged others, and not be *ſorrowful* for it? nor be *vile in his own eyes*, or feel that he is a loſt ſinner?

Lib.

Lib. *No: but all this he must* come to Christ for, *or* Believe for.

P. Do you mean that he must first *Believe that the Gospel is True*, and that *Christ is an Offered Saviour*; or else, do you mean that he must first *Accept him as offered for a Saviour*; or do you mean that he must first *Believe* that *he is his Saviour accepted?* or do you mean that he must first *Trust in him* as his *Saviour?* All these are different acts.

Lib. *You would confound us with your distinctions to keep out the light: This is the trick of such carnal Sophisters.*

P. Saul, You hear what this man hath to say against us. You hear that when he hath cryed out against *Preparations* to Believing, that here are ten several Preparations which he cannot deny. I will now tell you what is our Doctrine and the truth, about Preparations.

We hold that Christ is the True Light who lighteth every man that cometh to God; but in various degrees, by various means: He is the Lord of Nature as its Restorer, *Rom.* 14.9. All power in Heaven and Earth is given to him, and all things put into his hand, *Matth.* 28.18, 19. *John* 17.2, 3. *John* 5.22. He teacheth those that have not the Gospel, (and those that have it, first) by the Light of Nature, many Natural Truths, as that there is a God who is Almighty, Wise and Good, that we owe him our Love and duty, that he is Just, *&c.* As the Sun enlightneth the earth at its rising before it appear it self, so doth Christ the world. By the *Gospel,* he teacheth us *more*, even *supernatural* truths, about *himself* and our *Redemption, &c. Some* commoner co-operation of his Spirit goeth along with the Gospel, convincing and moving many that are not yet (or at all) converted: Those that Christ converteth savingly, are first in order brought to *understand* the *Meaning* of the *word*, and next to *Believe* the *Truth* of it, and so to Believe what Christ is, and what he hath done and suffered for us, and what need we have of him by sin and misery, and how freely he is offered to our salvation: And they are moved so seriously to *consider* all this, till it prevail with their wills, first to desire not only their own deliverance from Hell and misery, as all men may do, but also from a state of sin; and then to desire Christ as a Saviour to effect it, and bring them home to God: And believing that he is freely offered to them, they next thankfully *Accept* him by consent, and Trust him and give themselves to him. And all this is Christs own work upon them: but in this order and by these degrees. So that *coming* to Christ signifieth divers acts, of which one is preparatory to the other.

And whereas he tells you, that we *keep men off from Christ till they are prepared,* judge you whether he speak truth or falshood. Do we use to call to sinners and say [Do not believe that Christ Reconcileth God and man till you first believe that there is a God. Do not make haste and believe that Christ will save you from misery before you believe that you are miserable: Or that he will wash away and pardon your sin, before you believe that you *are sinners* and need a *pardon*: Do not consent that Christ shall be your Saviour before you are *willing* to be saved; or before you believe that he hath dyed, rose, *&c.* and is offered you.] What need we perswade men *from Impossibilities?* Is it *we*, or their *own necessity* that keepeth them from *Consenting before* they *Believe*, and from *believing* before they *Understand?* We do as it were intreat poor sinners who love their dungeon, to *open the windows that the Light may come in:* And these men rail at us, and say, that we *perswade men not to let in the light till they have first opened the windows!* What *need* we do that, when it is impossible to do *otherwise?* We perswade men to believe that they are sick, that they may go to the Physicion: And they rail at us for perswading

perſwading men to delay going to the Phyſicion till they think they are ſick. We exhort ſinners that are aſleep in ſin, to awake and run the Chriſtian race: And they rail at us, as if we perſwaded them not to *run* it till they are *awake*.

So that the preaching of theſe men according to their Doctrine muſt be thus: [Come preſently to Chriſt, ſtay not to hear the Goſpel, or to conſider of it, or to underſtand the meaning of it, before you Truſt Chriſt as your Saviour: Preſently caſt your ſelves upon him before you know who he is, or what he hath done for you; and truſt him for the pardon of your ſin before you perceive that you are ſinners, or feel any need of pardon: Stay not for a *will*, but Take him or Accept him for your Saviour before you are willing of him, or willing to be ſaved.] Do you think this is the only Goſpel-preaching?

I pray you Sir, tell me your ſelf, How would you preach to the *Indians* if you were Mr. *Eliots* aſſiſtant? or to any other Heathens? Would you at the firſt word call them *to caſt themſelves upon Chriſt for ſalvation?* before you taught them to know that there is a God, or a Law, or ſin, or puniſhment, *&c?*

Lib. *The Apoſtle called men preſently to Believe in the Lord Jeſus without delay*, Acts 2. *and* Acts 16. *and* Acts 8. *&c. And ſo ſhould we.*

P. 1. What talk you of *Delay?* Are we for *Delay*, any more than you? The Angel, *Acts* 12. that ſmote *Peter* and bid him ariſe and go forth, was not for his *delay*, becauſe he bid him not go forth before he aroſe, and before his fetters were off. 2. And you forget that the Apoſtles ſpake to *Jews* who had the Preparatory belief of a God, and of the Law, and of the promiſe of the Meſſiah before. 3. And yet they firſt humbled them for ſin, *Acts* 2. 37. till they were pricked at the heart; And the Jaylor firſt trembleth, and both ſay, What muſt we do? Is this your kind of proof? And why did all the antient Churches from the Apoſtles dayes teach men the Creed or Chriſtian Doctrine, and Catechiſe them long before they baptized them? And I think the Anabaptiſts will do ſo now: And I think you would be loth your ſelves to gather your Churches from among Heathens, Mahometans or Infidels, till you had taught and prepared them as much (at leaſt) as we require. But let us hear whether in the ſecond point you have any better or wiſer Doctrine to teach us?

CHAP. II.

Lib. II. *YOu ſhould teach men to believe that all our own Righteouſneſs is as filthy rags, abominable to God, and to be caſt away with our ſins: And that we are neither to truſt to, nor to look at any thing in our ſelves, for juſtification, or acceptance with God, or to procure eternal life: But that Chriſt hath both ſatisfied for our ſins, and fulfilled the Law of Innocency for us. God imputed our ſins to him, and he was by Imputation the greateſt ſinner in all the world; the greateſt murderer, thief, fornicator, perjured perſon, rebell and ungodly man: For the ſins of all the Elect did meet upon him, and were his: Therefore he was forſaken of God, and ſuffered the ſame Hell that we deſerved. And God imputeth all his ſatisfaction and righteouſneſs ſo to us, as that in Gods account all the Elect (or at leaſt All believers) did ſatisfie and fulfill all the Law in and by Chriſt: For he was our ſurety, and our Legal Perſon,*

though

though not our Natural person. So that what Christ was we were, and what Christ did we did, and what Christ suffered we suffered, in Gods account or imputation: And so we are as righteous as Christ himself, because all Christs righteousness is ours. And we have no other, nor need no other Righteousness, at least in order to our Justification: This Righteousness of Christ is it by which we are Justified by the Law of works, which saith, [*Obey perfectly, or Do this and Live;*] *For we Did all that is required in and by Christ: In this Righteousness only God accepteth us: We have Right to it from eternity by Gods Decree of Election: and our Consciences perceive our right upon our Believing; And to set men on* Doing *themselves* for Life, *when they should only* Do from Life, *is to deceive them and undo them.*

P. If these words did offer me any Light which we had not before received, I should gladly learn, and give you thanks. But if such talk as this, be all that must shew you to be wiser than your neighbours, and warrant you to rail at them as Legal Preachers, and such as teach Justification by works, my soul must pitty you, and all such poor sinners as are troubled or seduced by you. But because this Head containeth many particular doctrines, I pray you let us speak to them in order.

I. And first about our *own Righteousness*. And seeing I am the Learner, I must crave your answer as fitted to my own doubts. And *Quest.* 1. Do you know how many times the words *Just, Righteous* and *Righteousness* are used in the Bible?

Lib. *No; I have not taken such an account as to tell you.*

P. Let us see the Concordance. Here you find it about six hundred and twelve times used, besides the words [*Justifie, Justifying* and *Justification.*] *Quest.* 2. Shew me how many of these six hundred Texts do not speak of such *Inherent* or *Performed* personal Righteousness, as is distinct from such as you describe in your sense of Imputation.

Try whether one of twenty or forty or an hundred have such a sence.

Lib. *Not if such false teachers as you must be the expositor of them.*

That personal Righteousness is necessary.

P. Let us try some of them, and be you the expositor. 1 Joh. 2. 29. *every one which doth Righteousness is born of God.* 1 Joh. 3. 7, 10. *he that doth Righteousness is righteous. Whosoever doth not righteousness is not of God.*

Lib. *You choose out those texts which countenance your own ends.*

P. My question is but, Whether Gods word talk of any Righteousness, which consisteth in any thing that is *in* or *of* our selves?

Lib. *Yes: that cannot be denyed: But not in order to our Justification.*

P. Of the use we must speak anon. *Quest.* 3. I next ask you then Whether all these texts be not *True?* and whether we may not speak as they do?

Lib. *Yes: We question not the Truth, but the meaning of them.*

P. Quest. 4. Is this Righteousness as such (in that measure that we have it) abominable to God? Doth not God command it, and require us to obey his Laws sincerely? And doth he hate the obedience of his Laws? Is not *Holiness* his Nature and Image in us? And doth he hate his Image and the Divine Nature? Is it not the mark of a Malignant to be a Hater of Holiness? yea of the Devil himself? And can you think that God is a Hater of Holiness? What! he that hath said, Be holy, for I am Holy, and Without Holiness none shall see God!

Lib. *If you were not an unholy deceiver, you would not intimate by such questions, as if I took God to be a Hater of Holiness.*

P. Is it not *Holiness* which the Scripture and we mean by *Inherent Righteousness?*

Lib. *But*

Lib. *But God hateth it not as* Holineſs, *but as mixt with ſin.*

P. Do you Believe, and Love God ſincerely, and Love the Godly, or not?

Lib. *Better than ſuch as you do, or elſe woe to me.*

P. And doth God Hate all your *Faith* and *Love* becauſe it is mixt with ſin? If he do, What difference between it and wickedneſs? or between you and a wicked man? God can but hate what they do: and doth he ſo by all that you do alſo? Why then may not your Neighbours imitate God, and hate all that you do? why may they not then deride and perſecute you, for that which is hateful to God? For ſhame never more blame then your ſcorners or perſecutors.

Lib. *I do not ſay that God hateth my* Faith, Love, Humility *and* patience *as ſuch, but as mixt with ſin. Therefore properly it is* ſin *that God hateth, and not my Faith and Love it ſelf.*

P. And is all come to this? What mean you then to rail at us that ſay the ſame? We all ſay that God hateth our ſin, and the faulty imperfection of our holineſs and obedience: and what ſay you more?

Lib. *But you ſay not that God hateth your* Righteouſneſs for the ſin *that cleaveth to it, though not for it ſelf; as we do. Your Goodneſs is like an Apple faln into the dirt or poyſoned; and you are for wiping it, and keeping it: but God and wiſe men abhor it for the filth, and caſt it away.*

P. Then it ſeems you caſt away all Love to God and man, all faith, all honeſty and obedience, chaſtity and temperance, becauſe ſin cleaveth to it.

Lib. *By* caſting it away, *I do not mean, giving over to Love God and obey him, and turning wickedly to the contrary: but I mean that I count it dung in order to my Juſtification.*

P. I perceive by *Teaching me*, you are but *Learning to ſpeak* your ſelf. I further ask you, Doth not God *Love* the Faith, Love, Obedience and Holineſs of his ſervants, notwithſtanding all their faults and imperfections? Joh. 16. 27. *The Father himſelf loveth you, becauſe you have Loved me and believed,* &c. 2 Cor. 9. 7. *God loveth a cheerful giver.* Pſal. 11. 7. *The righteous Lord Loveth righteouſneſs*; with many the like paſſages. Doth he not Love his Image?

Lib. *That is, becauſe we are in Chriſt; and our perſons and graces and duties are accepted all in him, being perfumed with his righteouſneſs, and all our ſins and imperfections pardoned and covered thereby: And as our Graces are the works of the holy Ghoſt, and not primarily as ours.*

P. Are you come ſo far already? All this is held not only by us, but by the Papiſts alſo. You confeſs then that for the merits of Chriſts Righteouſneſs, our ſins are pardoned, and not only our perſons, but our faith, Love and obedience, accepted and loved though culpably imperfect and mixt with ſin. And ſo all your noiſe is come to nothing, and you ſay as we.

Of Reward and Worthineſs or Merit.

II. But having found that we muſt have Inherent Righteouſneſs, let us next conſider What uſe we may make of it, and how far it may and muſt be valued and truſted to. And *Queſt.* 1. Tell me whether God hath made any promiſe of a Reward to it, or not? Turn to the word [*Reward*] in your Concordance, if you remember not the Texts, and ſee.

Lib. *Your Legal principles and ſpirits makes the Scripture a ſnare and a ſtumbling block to you, as Chriſt himſelf is? When God talketh of* Reward *metaphorically, you take it properly, as if we could merit any thing of God.*

P. I only ask you, Whether God hath promiſed us a Reward?

Lib. *Yes: But it is a Reward properly to Chriſt, by whoſe grace we live, and not to our ſelves.*

P. When Chriſt ſaith, [*Great is your Reward in Heaven:* and *your father ſhall reward you openly,*] Matth. 5. 12. & 6. 4, 6. and [*you ſhall not loſe your reward;*] and Heb. 11. 26. [*he had an eye to the recompence of reward;*] and Heb. 11. 6. [*God is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him,* &c.] is the meaning, [Great is Chriſts Reward in Heaven, and God will reward Chriſt openly, and *is a Rewarder of Chriſt only as diligently ſeeking him?* &c.]

Lib. *You would make me ridiculous. I mean that it is for Chriſts Merits or Righteouſneſs which he did himſelf, and not for any thing in us or done by us, that we are rewarded.*

P. Say you ſo? Doth *diligent ſeeking him,* Heb. 11. 6. and *praying* and *giving alms in ſecret,* Matth. 6. 1, 2, 3, 4. and *ſuffering for Chriſt,* Matth. 5. 11, 12. and *feeding, viſiting,* &c. *Chriſt in his members,* Matth. 25. &c. mean only *that which Chriſt did,* and not *we?* Is it *Chriſts prayers,* and *almes,* and *charity* and *ſufferings* that the text meaneth? Look over many ſuch texts and judge.

Lib. *Still you would make my words contemptible. It is* our duties *that are rewarded, but it is not* for themſelves *or any worth that is in them, but for the* merits *of Chriſt only.*

P. If God have no reſpect to any thing in our duties in his reward, tell me, 1. Why are they ſaid ſo oft to *Pleaſe* him? and we are commanded to *do thoſe things that Pleaſe him?* and 1 Joh. *he heareth us becauſe we do thoſe things that Pleaſe him.* 2. And why then doth he not as well, for Chriſts merits or Righteouſneſs, reward our ſinning, our folly and vanity, our idleneſs, our dreams, or all our natural indifferent actions, as our Love, and holineſs? 3. And why do you and all men regard or reward a loving thankful obedient child, more than one that will ſcorn you and ſpit in your face? And why do all Princes and Rulers make any difference between the righteous and the wicked, a rogue and an honeſt man? And why do Churches ſo ſtrictly try the Godlineſs of their members? Why do you make any difference in your Communion? What meaneth Church diſcipline? And why are you your ſelves ſo deſirous to be eſteemed Godly perſons, and differenced from others, if God himſelf do make no difference? And how is the righteous more excellent than his neighbour? and called Gods jewels and the apple of his eye, his peculiar people, a holy Nation, and his treaſure? And why is it made the mark of a faithful man, *Pſal.* 15. 4. that a vile perſon is contemned in his eyes, but he honoureth them that fear the Lord, if there be nothing in holineſs and obedience any more than in ſin, for God to reward?

Lib. *You delight to make me ſeem fooliſh, by your Cavilling! You might eaſily underſtand that I did not mean that good works are no more Rewardable than Idleneſs or Evil: But that they are not rewarded for their proper worthineſs, as being faulty and ſo unjuſtifiable with God; but it is for the merits of the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt, imputed to believers.*

P. When you underſtand what you ſhould ſay, you will ſpeak intelligibly: But be not angry that your confuſion is laid open to you. About *Merit* and *Imputation* we muſt ſpeak diſtinctly afterwards. That no works of *ours* are *Rewardable* till *their faultineſs is pardoned*, nor *Rewardable* according to the *Law of Innocency*, nor upon any terms but thoſe of the *Covenant of Grace*, which *freely giveth* ſalvation to penitent believing accepters, which *free gift*, and *acceptance* of our duties, is purchaſed by the *meritorious* righteouſneſs of Chriſt; all this we hold as faſt as you do. We dream not of any acceſs to God but by a Mediator, nor of any acceptance of our ſelves or our duties, works or righteouſneſs, but on the account

account of Chriſts merits and interceſſion, by which the ſins of our beſt works are pardoned, and life eternal freely given to obedient believers. Of the *worthineſs* of our works we muſt ſpeak more anon.

Lib. *I ſmell whereabout you are: You make us hear the Pope that is in your belly: You mean as the Papiſts, that Chriſt hath merited that your works ſhall be meritorious.*

P. Hath not Chriſt Merited that our holy Love and obedience be Rewarded?

Lib. *Yes: but what's that to Merit?*

P. Hath he not by his Merit made them Rewardable?

Lib. *Yes, or elſe how can they be Rewarded?*

P. Do you not know that by *Merit* the Papiſts themſelves profeſs that they mean nothing but *Rewardableneſs?* At leaſt do we Proteſtants mean any thing elſe by it?

Lib. *What the Papiſts or you* mean, *you beſt know your ſelves; but I know what you ſay: And you both talk like the ignorant enemies of Grace.*

P. Do you include the *Janſeniſts* who ſay that all Chriſts Grace now is nothing but his irreſtible efficient operation of Holy Love in the ſoul: and that God moveth us to it neceſſarily or inſuperably? and that he now giveth no Grace meerly ſufficient, which is not effectual? or meerly effectual to make us *Able*, but alſo to make us *Act*? and that now he leaveth nothing to our *Free-will* in Chriſts gracious operations, but giveth in act all the Will and all the merit that men have? and that Fear and obedience of a Law written, is our own Legal Righteouſneſs, (though it reſpect the new Law;) but Chriſts Righteouſneſs which he giveth us as diſtinct from our Legal Righteouſneſs, is only his Spirit, or Love put into the heart?

Lib. *I do not believe that any Papiſt is ſo much for free grace.*

P. But if you deny it, and the book be opened, and it found there written, is it nothing to you to be found in falſhood?

Lib. *But I ſay not as* Janſenius, *that it is the Law written in us, but Chriſts Righteouſneſs imputed to us, which is our Righteouſneſs.*

P. Did you not even now confeſs an Inherent Righteouſneſs?

Lib. *Yes; but not to our Juſtification.*

P. Of that more anon: By Juſtification, they mean Making us holy.

Lib. *But* Janſenius *is not a common Papiſt: why tell you me of him?*

P. My buſineſs here is not to juſtifie the Papiſts, but to underſtand your mind: I do not think you know what the Papiſts hold in it.

Lib. *I am not aſhamed to be a ſtranger to their Books: But I will bring one when you will, that ſhall open the abomination of their doctrine of merit; Till then it's you to whom I ſpeak.*

P. Content: we will make another dayes work of that. Tell me then whether it be *Names* or *Things* that you make ſo much ado about?

Lib. *Both: we like not ill names: and worſe* falſe *doctrine.*

P. What are the *Names* that diſpleaſe you? Is *Reward* or *Rewardableneſs* one?

Lib. *No: if you will underſtand them well: For they are Scripture words.*

P. Is *worthineſs* one of them?

Lib. *Yes; if you will ſay that we are* worthy *of the Reward or of ſalvation.*

P. Do you not know that the Scripture uſually ſo ſpeaketh? *Rev.* 3. 4: They ſhall walk with me in white; for they are worthy: 2 *Theſſ.* 1. 5, 11. Worthy of the Kingdom of God: 1 *Theſſ.* 2. 12. Walk worthy of God:

Luke 20. 35. That are accounted worthy to obtain that world——— 21. 36. That you may be counted worthy to ſcape all theſe things, and to ſtand, *&c. Matth.* 10. 11. Enquire who in it is worthy——13. If the houſe be worthy, let your peace remain. If it be not worthy, let your peace return———37. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me, is not worthy of me. *Matth.* 22. 8. They which were bidden were not worthy. *Acts* 13. 46. Ye judge your ſelves unworthy of everlaſting life— Is not this Scripture?

Lib. *By* [Worthy] *the Text meaneth not* merit, *but* fitneſs *to receive.*

P. Our queſtion is not now of the *Meaning*, but the *Name* you know.

Lib. *I am not againſt the Scripture names, if well underſtood.*

P. Merit is a name I perceive that you are againſt. And we make ſo ſmall a matter of *words*, that you ſhall chooſe any other name of the ſame ſignification, and we will forbear this, rather than offend you: But yet tell me, *Q.* 1. What if the words ἀξιῶ and ἀξία were tranſlated *Deſerving* and *Merit*, would it not be as true a tranſlation as *Worthy* and *Worthineſs*, when it is the very ſame thing that is meant? Nay, when *Merit* of *Condignity* is the higheſt *kind*, which the Papiſts themſelves mention and are reproved for, do you not hereby imply that *Condignity* is a bigger word than bare *Merit?*

Queſt. 2. And I ask you, Whether all the antient Teachers of the Churches ſince the Apoſtles, whoſe Writings are come down to us, do not familiarly apply theſe names ἀξία and *Meritum* to believers? And if you perſwade men that all theſe Teachers and Churches were Papiſts, you will perſwade moſt that believe you to be Papiſts too. But ſuch is the ſucceſs of over-doing!

Queſt. 3. And I would know, Whether in common ſpeech, *Reward* and *Merit* or *Deſert* be not Relatives, as *Maſter* and *Servant*, *Husband* and *Wife* are? Is there any *Reward* which is not *Meriti Præmium*, the *Reward* of *Merit?* What mean you your ſelf elſe by the word *Reward?*

Lib. *I mean* Gods free Gift *without reſpect to merit or deſert.*

P. Doth not the uſage of the World diſtinguiſh between a *meer Gift* and a *Reward?* What if you give money to the next man you meet without reſpect to any thing in him, will you call it a *Reward?* Review all the Scripture Texts that ſpeak of a *Reward*, and ſee whether they have no relation to any foregoing act in man. God gave Chriſt himſelf to the lapſed world: Was this Gift of Chriſt a Reward? God gave ſome Prophets, ſome Apoſtles, *&c.* and giveth the Goſpel to Infidel Nations: Is this Gift a Reward? or ever ſo called? Your humane nature is Gods Gift: but is it a Reward? Nay, will you ſay, that the *firſt Grace* is a *Reward*; which is ſaid to be *Pelagianiſm?*

Lib. *Well: but Rewards are* Gods ſecond Gifts *as they follow the former, without reſpect to Worthineſs or Merit.*

P. That cannot be neither: If God firſt Give the world a *Saviour*, and then give them the *Covenant of Grace* and *Pardon* through him, is this a Reward? If Chriſt firſt heal the ſick man, and then cauſe him to walk, or if *Peter* and *John* firſt heal the lame man, and then cauſe him joyfully to leap, *&c.* is the ſecond a Reward? If an Infidels Life be firſt preſerved, and then the Goſpel given him, is this a Reward?

Lib. *No: but a Reward ſuppoſeth only our* Fitneſs *to receive a free gift, which is called our* worthineſs, *and not our Merit.*

P. Do

P. Do you mean our *Natural fitneſs* or our *Moral?* A man is *Naturally* fit for his food, when he is hungry: Will you ſay therefore that his food is his *Reward* for being hungry?

Lib. *Well*; *Let it be then his* Moral, *or rather his* Spiritual fitneſs.

P. Your explications are but darkning: *Spiritual* is either *Natural* or *Moral* as well as corporal. The ſoul as a *Spirit* is in its nature fit to underſtand common things here in the body; Is this *underſtanding* its *Reward* for being a Spirit? But *Heaven* is a *Reward.*

Lib. *Well: Call it a* Moral fitneſs *if you will: but what is that to* Merit?

P. It is ſo much to it, as to tell the world that ſuch as you, do revile others for holding the ſame which you are forced to profeſs your ſelf, and wrangle about meer words, and know it not. For by [*Merit*] is meant nothing elſe but [*A moral aptitude for Reward*] or that *Rewardableneſs* which conſiſteth in *Moral Good* or *Evil*, as *freely done* and had, and ſo acceptable to God as our Governour.

But tell me next what word will you chooſe to ſerve inſtead of *Merit*, that we may agree in it?

Lib. *I know not what words to uſe that pleaſe you, when we are not agreed about the thing ſignified: I hold not any* Reward *in proper ſenſe, but only* free gift, *and therefore how can I tell you what word to uſe inſtead of merit? I think the word* Reward *is uſed but figuratively.*

P. Chriſt ſaith, [*Matth.* 6. 4, 6. Your Father which ſeeth in ſecret ſhall Reward you openly: *Col.* 3. 24. Ye ſhall receive the reward of the inheritance: *Heb.* 10. 35. Caſt not away your confidence which hath great recompence of reward: *Heb.* 11. 26. He had reſpect to the recompence of reward: *v.* 6. He that cometh to God muſt believe that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him: *Mat.* 16. 27. He ſhall reward every man according to his works.] I ask you again, What is meant here by *Rewarding?*

Lib. *I tell you again, the meaning is, that as men ſhew their liking of a thing that pleaſeth them, by a proper Reward, ſo God ſheweth his liking of our* duty *by a* free gift *of ſome greater good, which therefore after the manner of men he calleth a* Reward.

P. If it be a Metaphor, I ask you but the *Meaning* and *Reaſon* of the name. If it be becauſe it *followeth* our duty, then every gift that *followeth* our duty, is a reward, without any further reſpect to that duty, but the order of time: but that you denyed before; Elſe Chriſts Incarnation, and the Apoſtles, and the Goſpel, and all that ever followeth our duty, ſhould be a Reward. But if you mean, that it is called a *Reward*, as it is a *ſign of Gods approbation* of our *duty* only, then if God ſhould tell men that he *Approveth of their duty*, it would be a reward, though he immediately annihilate them, or ſhould never do them any good: which I think you will not ſay. If you ſay, that all three muſt concurr, *viz.* that it be 1. A Benefit or Gift, 2. Following duty, 3. Signifying an Approbation of it, you come almoſt up to all that is aſſerted by them that you quarrell with: If God ſhould by ſome *benefit* to one man ſignifie that he approved the duty of another, or of a thouſand more, and ſhould annihilate them all; this were no *reward* to them. Therefore when you have talkt all that you can deviſe to ſay, you muſt ſay, that there is ſome *Fitneſs* in the duty for that *approbation* and *benefit*, and that the Relation of the *Gift* to that *Fitneſs*, is it that denominateth it a Reward: And that though there be no Cauſe in man of any Acts of God *ex parte agentis*, yet are there Cauſes in man of our *Reception* and of the effects, *ex*

parte

parte recipientis; And ſo that mans Rewardable duties are his *Moral aptitude*, *cauſe* or *condition*, why he rather than one that doth otherwiſe receiveth that Gift, which is called the Reward.

But we are gone from our queſtion *de nomine*, and have already diſpatched alſo that *de re*: Have you any more to ſay of any *Matter* beſides words (in which you confeſs we ſpeak as the Scripture doth) in which we differ?

Lib. *Seeing you like not my explications, tell me fully what you hold your ſelves, and then I ſhall better know whether we differ in ſenſe or words only.*

P. It's great pity for the Churches ſake, but you would have underſtood that firſt, before you reviled us as Legal, and not have ſpoken evil of what you underſtand not. But it's better now, than not at all. Our judgement is as followeth:

I. That God hath three Eſſential Attributes, which he expreſſeth and glorifieth in his works; His *Vital Power* or Activity, his *Wiſdom*, and his *Will* or *Love*: That all theſe are and operate conjunctly; but yet each appeareth in eminency in its ſpecial effects: That Gods *Power* eminently appeareth in the *Being* and *Motion* of things; and his *Wiſdom* eminently in the ORDER of things; and his LOVE in the *Goodneſs* and *Perfection* of things: That accordingly he is, 1. The firſt *Efficient*, 2. The chief *Dirigent*, 3. The ultimate *Final Cauſe* of all.

II. That as to *man*, he is Related to us, 1. As our *Creator*, the Cauſe of our *Being*, *Nature* and *natural Motion*, as the Fountain of *Nature*: where *Power* is moſt *Eminent*. 2. As our *Governour*, and the God of ORDER, and the Dirigent Cauſe; where (all Attributes concurr, but) *Wiſdom* is *moſt Eminent*: 3. As our moſt Bounteous Benefactor, and moſt *Amiable Good* and *End*, where *Goodneſs* or *Love* is moſt eminent.

III. That accordingly God is the Author of *Nature*, *Grace* and *Glory*; and ſince the fall, of *Natura*, *Medela*, *Sanitas*, of our Nature, our ORDER and Gracious Government, and of our *Holineſs* and *Happineſs*; and ſo is our Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier.

IV. That neither Man, Angel or any Creature can poſſibly have any good, but by Gods gift, any more than they can make themſelves or a World: And this Gift muſt needs be free, ſeeing the Creature hath nothing that is good, but what it hath of God, and nothing to give him that can add to him, or but what is abſolutely his own.

V. God is to us 1. Our OWNER, 2. Our RULER, 3. Our BENEFACTOR antecedently. And no man can *Merit* of God as he is an *Owner* or a meer *Benefactor*; for ſo he freely diſpoſeth as he pleaſeth of his own: But only of God as a *Ruler*, as is after opened.

VI. Therefore it is blaſphemy to *hold* that man or Angel can Merit of God in point of proper *Commutative Juſtice*, which giveth in exchange one thing for another, to the benefit of the receiver: For as is ſaid, God cannot Receive any addition to his perfection, nor have we any thing but his own to give him. *Luke* 17. 10. we are thus *unprofitable ſervants* as to a Proprietor in point of Commutation; though the unprofitable ſervant be damned, *Matth.* 25. 30. in another ſenſe; that is, who improveth not his Maſters ſtock to the benefit of himſelf and others, and the pleaſing of his Ruler.

VII. Mans Duty therefore meriteth only in point of *Governing* diſtributive Juſtice: And not every way neither in reſpect of that; For *Governing Juſtice* is diſtinguiſhed according to the Law that governeth us:

which

which is either 1. The Law of Innocency, or 2. The Law of Grace: And no man ſince the fall can *Merit* of God according to the Juſtice of the Law of Innocency, which exacteth perſonal perfection.

VIII. The Law of Grace is in its firſt notion, a free gift of Chriſt, Pardon and Right to Life Eternal by Adoption, to all that will Accept it believingly as it is offered, that is, according to the nature of the Gift. And this Gift or Conditional promiſe and pardon no man *can merit*: For Chriſts perfect Righteouſneſs and Sacrifice hath already merited it for us; and ſo hath left us no ſuch work to do: Nor is there the leaſt place for any humane Merit or Rewardableneſs from God, but on ſuppoſition of 1. Chriſts Merits and Meritorious Righteouſneſs, 2. And of this *free gift* or Act of Oblivion and Life, already made to us without our deſert.

IX. But yet this is not a meer *Gift*, but alſo a *true Law*: God is ſtill our God and Governour, and Chriſt is Lord of all, *Rom.* 14. 9. He that is a King and Ruler hath his Laws and Judgement: That which is a Gift in the firſt reſpect, hath 1. Its condition, 2. Many commanded duties, and ſo is a Law of Grace in other reſpects. And it is only in reſpect to this Law of Grace that man is Rewardable, or can Merit.

X. The *Gift* is from God as *Benefactor*, conſidered as Good and in it ſelf. But it is from God as *Sapiential Rector quoad ordinem conferendi*, as to the *Order* and Reaſon why one man rather than another receiveth it. So that we *Merit not* of God as *Benefactor* nor as *Rector by the Law of Innocency* or *Works*; nor yet as to the *Value or Goodneſs of the Benefit*, which is a *free Gift*: But only of *God as Rector* by the *Law of Grace*, which regulateth the Reception of his free gifts, merited by the perfect Righteouſneſs of Chriſt, and ſo only as to the *Order* and *Reaſon* why one more than another receiveth that free gift.

As if a Father hath many Sons, One living obediently, Others playing the prodigals, and upon his freely-offered pardon and grace one receiveth it thankfully, and the other refuſeth it ſcornfully: Here both the *obedient* and the *penitent ſon*, have all upon free gift, as to Commutative Juſtice; but on various terms: And yet both *merit* in point of *paternal* Governing Juſtice; but very differently: One meriteth of ſtrict Fatherly Juſtice; The other only of a forgiving Father, quite on other terms: And it is a Comparative Merit, by which he is *fitter* for pardon than the Sons that deſpiſe it, and ſpit in the Fathers face.

XI. God as a Benefactor and a Governour, giveth ſome benefits *Antecedently* to any duty of man: And theſe are never a *Reward* to us, (but of Chriſt perhaps, in ſome inſtances.) As Legiſlation, ſo the benefits of it, and that attend it, are before Reward and Judgement. But other benefits are given by God both as Benefactor and Legiſlator, upon condition of ſome duty of ours in the Antecedent gift, and ſo in the Judicial ſentence and execution that duty is rendered as the reaſon of our actual Right to them: And theſe are a Reward.

XII. Our firſt Grace is no Reward, nor merited, becauſe it antecedeth all conditional duty of ours.

XIII. Our firſt Reception of Right to Chriſt, Pardon and Life, being given on the condition of penitent Acceptance in faith, may be called a *Reward*, becauſe they are conſequent gifts on condition: But becauſe the condition is ſo ſlender a thing as the thankful Acceptance of a free gift, Divines agree not of the fitneſs of the name [Reward and Merit] while they wholly agree about the thing. But our *after-mercies* and *final Glory*, being promiſed on the condition of ſuch a *faith as worketh by Love*, *obedience* and improvement of Gods mercies in good works, and patience, perſe-

perſeverance and conqueſt of the Fleſh, the World and the Devil; therefore they have more unanimouſly agreed not only *de re*, but that the names of *Reward* and *Rewardableneſs* or *Merit* and Worthineſs are here fit; but uſed only in the fore explained ſenſe.

XIV. And though the Scripture oftest uſe the word μισθὸς which moſt properly ſignifieth *wages*, which ſounds as more than *præmium* a Reward, yet we wholly grant you that this is figuratively uſed, and that no man deſerveth *wages* or any thing commutatively of God: But every Scripture Metaphor hath its reaſon; And the reaſon of this is evident. Though God cannot be *Profited*, he can be *Pleaſed*. And his Will or Pleaſure is the End of all his Government and Works: And he is Pleaſed moſt in that which doth the World, the Church and our ſelves the moſt good, for in that he is moſt glorified: Now he ſo maketh his Laws and Promiſes, as if our own and other mens good were his, and his Reward for our Pleaſing by Order, Juſtice and Goodneſs, he calleth *wages* metaphorically, being inſtead of profiting him.

XV. By all which it is moſt obvious that we are not at all the leſs, but the more beholden to God, for the Merit or Rewardableneſs of our actions: For as all the Benefit is free Gift, ſo it is of his Grace that we do any thing that is good, and that he accepteth it as Rewardable: And if it be any honour to a man to be good rather than bad, and the Righteous be more excellent than his neighbour, it is an addition of mercy, that God will honour thoſe that honour him, and commandeth others ſo to do, *Pſal.* 15. 4.

XVI. And now the caſe is very plain, both that Reward and Rewardableneſs (called *Merit*) there is, and why it is and muſt be ſo.

1. How can God be a Governour, and have a Law, and be a Judge, and Righteous in all this, if faith and godlineſs be not Rewardable? It is the ſecond Article in our faith, and next believing that There is a God, that He is the Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him, *Heb.* 11. 6. And when you would extirpate all faith and godlineſs on pretence of crying down *Merit*, you may ſee what *over-doing* tends to.

2. The very nature of all Gods Laws and Promiſes evidently inferr a Reward: Without it there were no ſuch thing as *Faith*, *Hope*, *Deſire*, *Joy*, *Content*, forſaking all: Pſal. 19. 11. *In keeping them there is great reward.* 58. 11. *Verily there is a Reward for the righteous.*——

3. There is notoriouſly a Reward even in *this life*, *Matth.* 19. 29. Who would change the profit and pleaſure of a holy life here, for that of the unholy?

4. Reward and Rewardableneſs are found in the very Law of Nature it ſelf: In that we are made for God as our end, and it is God himſelf who is our Reward: And holineſs hath a natural tendency to happineſs, yea, is the beginning of it it ſelf: And as God is ſaid in Nature to make ſin puniſhable, in that he hath ſo formed Nature, that ſin ſhall bring ſuffering in and with it (as poyſon brings pain and death); ſo in Nature he hath made our duty and holineſs Rewardable, in forming man ſo, that health, peace and happineſs ſhall be in and after it. *Prov.* 9. 12. If thou be wiſe, thou art wiſe for thy ſelf.

5. The Light of Nature teacheth Parents, Maſters, Princes and all Governours to take Goodneſs to be Rewardable, and Crimes to be puniſhable: And nothing is more univerſally approved by the common notices of humane nature than Juſtice, or abhorred than Injuſtice. Nature ſaith as 2 *Sam.* 23. 31. He that ruleth over men muſt be juſt: And as *Iſa.* 10. 1. Wo to them that decree unrighteous decrees: And as *Prov.* 17. 13. Who-

ſo

ſo rewardeth evil for good, evil ſhall not depart from his houſe: Conſcience will rebuke him that rewardeth evil to him that deſerved it not, *Pſal.* 7. 4. The better any man is, the more he is for Juſtice, and abhorreth the unjuſt, (and *Alexander Severus*, and *Antonine*, and ſuch Juſt Princes and Judges, are honoured by all Subjects and Hiſtorians.) And as all Power is of God, and Rulers are but his Officers, (*Rom.* 13. 4, 5, 6.) ſo their Righteous Government is but the inferiour part of Gods own Government, (as the King governeth by his Judges and Juſtices): And therefore it is God that Rewardeth and Puniſheth by them. And indeed by the ſame reaſon that men deny a Reward to duty (the faultineſs being pardoned through Chriſt) they would inferr, that there is no Puniſhment for ſin: But God ſaith, *Iſa.* 3. 10, 11. Say to the Righteous It ſhall be well with him, and ſay to the wicked It ſhall be ill with him. He will plentifully reward the proud doers, *Pſal.* 31. 23. Yea, they reward evil to themſelves, *Iſa.* 3. 9.

6. Holineſs is Gods Image, and the product of the Holy Ghoſt; and the Devil and Malignants labour to diſhonour it: And contrarily God honoureth it, and by his Rewards will honour it openly before the world, *Matth.* 6. 4, 6. And Chriſt will come in glory to be glorified in his Saints, and admired in all them that believe, even becauſe they have believed, 2 *Theſſ.* 1. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

7. God will Govern man according to mans nature and capacity; elſe what need of Scripture, Miniſtry, *&c.* And man is naturally a Lover of himſelf, and God will make him know that he hath no need of him, but it is himſelf that ſhall be the gainer if he obey, and the loſer if he ſin: even to *Cain* after his firſt ſin God ſaith, If thou do well, ſhalt thou not be accepted? but if thou do evil, ſin lyeth at the door. Man is an Intellectual and free agent: and therefore God will ſet before him life and death, good and evil, *Deut.* 30. 15. and whether they will hear or not hear, he will ſend his word, *Ezek.* 2. 5. and they ſhall be told of ſuch Motives as ſhould ſuffice to prevail with men of reaſon.

8. Man hath many and great Temptations to overcome; And as they work morally toward his deceit and ruine, ſo God will ſuitably give him ſuch Moral motives as are fitteſt to move him to reſiſt them: And therefore he will offer man ſo full and ſure and glorious a Reward, as is fit to diſgrace all the offers of the Devil, and will make men know that his Rewards are ſuch, as no pleaſure or profit of ſin ſhould ſtand in any competition with. Yea, he himſelf who is God Allſufficient will be our exceeding great Reward, *Gen.* 15. 1. No wonder if *Moſes* (like other believers) deſpiſed the honours of *Pharaoh*'s Court, and choſe rather to ſuffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleaſures of ſin for a ſeaſon, becauſe he had reſpect to the recompence of reward, *Heb.* 11. 25, 26. And *Paul* went towards death rejoycing in theſe hopes, that having fought a good fight, and finiſhed his courſe, henceforth a Crown of Righteouſneſs was laid up for him by God the Righteous Judge, 2 *Tim.* 4. 8. who is not unrighteous to forget his ſervants work and labour of Love. And all believers are therefore ſtedfaſt and unmoveable, alwayes abounding in the work of the Lord, as knowing that their labour is not in vain in the Lord, 1 *Cor.* 15. 58. And they work out their ſalvation with fear and trembling, laying up a treaſure in Heaven, *Matth.* 6. 20. and laying up a good foundation for the time to come, and preſſing forward for the prize, *Phil.* 3. 8, 9. and laying hold upon eternal life.

Lib. *All this leadeth us to our own works, and ſets up the* Law, *and taketh down Chriſt and his righteouſneſs, and is meer Popery, for humane Merits.*

P. If this be Gods Word, and Chriſts own Law and Doctrine, then you inferr that Chriſt taketh down himſelf, and his own righteouſneſs, and ſets up man and humane merits. But give me leave to tell you, that if you deny [*the Reward of Evangelical duty, and the Rewardableneſs or Worthineſs (or Merit) of ſuch duty, as it is but our Merit or Worthineſs of the free Gift of Chriſt and Life, given by Paternal Love and Juſtice, to believing Penitent accepters, according to the tenour of the Covenant of Grace,*] 1. You do contradict ſo much of the moſt expreſs Texts of Scripture, as alloweth us to ſuſpect that really you believe not the Scripture to be true, or that it is not it, but your own contradicting fancy, that is the meaſure of your belief; and you may on ſuch terms hold the vileſt abſurdities, even what you liſt, as in deſpight of Scripture, while you pretend that it is for you.

2. You will deny the honour of Gods Image on man, and the work of the Holy Ghoſt, and the deſign of Chriſt, who came to deſtroy the works of the Devil, and ſave his people from their ſins, and purifie to himſelf a peculiar people zealous of good works.

3. You will diſgrace the Church of God, which Chriſt waſheth and ſanctifieth, and render it too like to the unſanctified world.

4. You will leave man no ground for true aſſurance of Juſtification or Salvation, while the difference between the worthy and unworthy is taken away.

5. You will harden the wicked in their falſe preſumptuous hopes, and teach them to ſay, We are but unworthy, and ſo are all.

6. You will deſtroy the comfort of well doing, by denying the reward, and making it ſeem to be in vain.

7. Hereby you will take down all holy diligence in our Chriſtian race and warfare, while you deny the prize, and recompence of reward, *Heb.* 11.26. We run for an incorruptible Crown, 1 *Cor.* 9. 25. *Phil.* 3. 14.

8. You will ſtrengthen all Temptations, while you take down that which ſhould be ſet againſt them. See *Luke* 12. 4. *Heb.* 4. 1. *&* 12. 28, 29. *Matth.* 6. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, *&c. Matth.* 5. 10, 11, 12.

9. You will diſgrace the Word and Miniſtry and all Means, if after all we are never the more accepted.

10. In a word, you deny Gods Government, in denying his Governing Juſtice and Judgements, and that is to deny God to be our God: Yea, you deny all Religion, all the Kingdom of Chriſt, all Law, all Judgement, all Retribution, Heaven and Hell, all the true difference between Good and Evil, Holineſs and Sin, all Praiſe and Diſpraiſe, while you deny the Reward and Rewardableneſs of holy obedience by the Paternal Government of the Law of Grace: and that glory, honour and peace is to every one that doth good, both Jew and Gentile, *Rom.* 2. 7, 10.

Lib. *You would perſwade us that holineſs is good for nothing, if it be not Rewardable; as if you knew of no other uſe of it; ſo ignorant are natural men of the things of God which are ſpiritually diſcerned: I will tell you that which your carnal mind cannot underſtand; 1. Holineſs, Faith, Love, Obedience,* &c. *are Gods free Gifts, excellent in themſelves without a Reward: 2. They are Fruits of the Spirit, and marks and ſigns of our future felicity, though they deſerve it not. 3. I told you that they are Rewards to Chriſt, and Gifts to us.*

P. 1. That

P. 1. That they are Gods Gifts we doubt not: But are not Faith, Love and Obedience alſo the Acts of man by that Grace which is the gift of God?

Lib. *Yes, they are mans acts; but it is God that worketh them in us.*

P. And tell me if you can, 1. Why God cannot Reward thoſe acts which are done by his own Grace? Cannot God make the Promiſe of a Reward to be a fit Moral Means for his Spirit to work by? Nay, doth not the ſcope of the Scripture tell you that he doth ſo?

2. Is there ever the leſs worthineſs in it, becauſe God cauſeth it? Tell me without ſhifting, Is an honeſt man no more worthy of a Princes favour than a Thief? If you are no more worthy of liberty, and protection, and life, than Atheiſts and Rebels, why do you call men Perſecutors for uſing you as if you were ſuch? Why call you men Malignants for hating, deriding and oppoſing godly men, if they deſerve no better than the worſt?

Lib. *They deſerve better from men, but not from God.*

P. Do you deny Rulers to be Gods Officers, and that they are to make this difference by his appointment, and therefore it is done by God? 3. But without ſhifting tell me, Doth not every good action or inclination deſerve praiſe from God and man? Doth it not deſerve to be accounted and called juſt as it is?

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Lib. *All this leadeth us to our own works, and ſets up the* Law, *and taketh down Chriſt and his righteouſneſs, and is meer Popery, for humane Merits.*

P. If this be Gods Word, and Chriſts own Law and Doctrine, then you inferr that Chriſt taketh down himſelf, and his own righteouſneſs, and ſets up man and humane merits. But give me leave to tell you, that if you deny [*the Reward of Evangelical duty, and the Rewardableneſs or Worthineſs (or Merit) of ſuch duty, as it is but our Merit or Worthineſs of the free Gift of Chriſt and Life, given by Paternal Love and Juſtice, to believing Penitent accepters, according to the tenour of the Covenant of Grace,*] 1. You do contradict ſo much of the moſt expreſs Texts of Scripture, as alloweth us to ſuſpect that really you believe not the Scripture to be true, or that it is not it, but your own contradicting fancy, that is the meaſure of your belief; and you may on ſuch terms hold the vileſt abſurdities, even what you liſt, as in deſpight of Scripture, while you pretend that it is for you.

2. You will deny the honour of Gods Image on man, and the work of the Holy Ghoſt, and the deſign of Chriſt, who came to deſtroy the works of the Devil, and ſave his people from their ſins, and purifie to himſelf a peculiar people zealous of good works.

3. You will diſgrace the Church of God, which Chriſt waſheth and ſanctifieth, and render it too like to the unſanctified world.

4. You will leave man no ground for true aſſurance of Juſtification or Salvation, while the difference between the worthy and unworthy is taken away.

5. You will harden the wicked in their falſe preſumptuous hopes, and teach them to ſay, We are but unworthy, and ſo are all.

6. You will deſtroy the comfort of well doing, by denying the reward, and making it ſeem to be in vain.

7. Hereby you will take down all holy diligence in our Chriſtian race and warfare, while you deny the prize, and recompence of reward, *Heb.* 11.26. We run for an incorruptible Crown, 1 *Cor.* 9.25. *Phil.* 3.14.

8. You will ſtrengthen all Temptations, while you take down that which ſhould be ſet againſt them. See *Luke* 12.4. *Heb.* 4.1. *&* 12.28,29. *Matth.* 6.1,2,3,4,5,6,19,20, *&c. Matth.* 5.10,11,12.

9. You will diſgrace the Word and Miniſtry and all Means, if after all we are never the more accepted.

10. In a word, you deny Gods Government, in denying his Governing Juſtice and Judgements, and that is to deny God to be our God: Yea, you deny all Religion, all the Kingdom of Chriſt, all Law, all Judgement, all Retribution, Heaven and Hell, all the true difference between Good and Evil, Holineſs and Sin, all Praiſe and Diſpraiſe, while you deny the Reward and Rewardableneſs of holy obedience by the Paternal Government of the Law of Grace: and that glory, honour and peace is to every one that doth good, both Jew and Gentile, *Rom.* 2.7,10.

Lib. *You would perſwade us that holineſs is good for nothing, if it be not Rewardable; as if you knew of no other uſe of it; ſo ignorant are natural men of the things of God which are ſpiritually diſcerned: I will tell you that which your carnal mind cannot underſtand; 1. Holineſs, Faith, Love, Obedience,* &c. *are Gods free Gifts, excellent in themſelves without a Reward: 2. They are Fruits of the Spirit, and marks and ſigns of our future felicity, though they deſerve it not. 3. I told you that they are Rewards to Chriſt, and Gifts to us.*

P. 1. That

P. 1. That they are Gods Gifts we doubt not: But are not Faith, Love and Obedience alſo the Acts of man by that Grace which is the gift of God?

Lib. *Yes, they are mans acts; but it is God that worketh them in us.*

P. And tell me if you can, 1. Why God cannot Reward thoſe acts which are done by his own Grace? Cannot God make the Promiſe of a Reward to be a fit Moral Means for his Spirit to work by? Nay, doth not the ſcope of the Scripture tell you that he doth ſo?

2. Is there ever the leſs worthineſs in it, becauſe God cauſeth it? Tell me without ſhifting, Is an honeſt man no more worthy of a Princes favour than a Thief? If you are no more worthy of liberty, and protection, and life, than Atheiſts and Rebels, why do you call men Perſecutors for uſing you as if you were ſuch? Why call you men Malignants for hating, deriding and oppoſing godly men, if they deſerve no better than the worſt?

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ſence; but we ſee him here in a glaſs; and that is, in his Works and Image; in which it is that his glory ſhineth: And to ſay that Gods Works and holy Image are not *worthy* (or *Morally* fit) to be praiſed, is to deny God his praiſe and glory on earth: He that deſpiſeth you, deſpiſeth me (ſaith Chriſt) and conſequently *him that ſent me*, Luke 10. 10.

Lib. *Faith, Love, Holineſs, Obedience, Patience are worthy that God ſhould be* praiſed *for them, but not* Man: *for they are worthy as Gods works, but not as ours.*

P. 1. They are none of our works as the chief agents, but only ſecond cauſes under God: And are not ſecond cauſes to be praiſed in their places and degree? Will you not praiſe Sun and Moon and Stars, and all Gods works, that he may be praiſed for them? Do you not praiſe a good Servant, a good Horſe or Dog, a good Houſe or Land? yea, and your Friend or Teacher? Do you not praiſe your own party, when you ſay that they are wiſer and better than others?

2. Believe and regard the Word of God. Do none of theſe Texts following ſpeak of Praiſe as due to men, in ſubordination to God? *Deut.* 26. 18, 19. The Lord hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people, and to make thee high above all Nations, in Praiſe, and in Name, and in Honour, and that thou maiſt be an holy people to the Lord thy God. *Prov.* 27. 21. As is the fining pot for Silver, and the furnace for Gold, ſo is a man to his praiſe. *Iſa.* 62. 7. Give him no reſt till he make *Jeruſalem* a praiſe in the earth. *Zeph.* 3. 19, 20. I will get them praiſe in every land, *&c.* I will make you a name and a praiſe among all people of the earth. *Rom.* 2. 29. Whoſe praiſe is not of men, but of God. *John* 12. 43. They loved the praiſe of men more than the praiſe of God. 1 *Cor.* 4. 5. Then ſhall every man have praiſe of God. 2 *Cor.* 8. 18. The brother whoſe praiſe is in the Goſpel, *&c.* *Phil.* 4. 8. If there be any praiſe, think of theſe things. 1 *Pet.* 2. 14. Governours are ſent by him for the praiſe of them that do well. See *Prov.* 27. 2. *&* 28. 4. *&* 31. 30, 31. 1 *Cor.* 11. 2. *Prov.* 29. 23. Honour ſhall uphold the humble in ſpirit. *&* 21. 21. He findeth life, righteouſneſs and honour. *Pſal.* 149. 4. This honour have all his Saints. *Prov.* 3. 16. *&* 4. 8. *&* 8. 18. *&* 15. 33. *&* 20. 3. *&* 22. 4. *Eccleſ.* 10. 1. *John* 5. 44. *Rom.* 2. 7, 10. They that by well doing, ſeek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life: Glory, honour and peace to every man that worketh good. *&* 9. 21. *&* 12. 10. *&* 13. 7. 1 *Tim.* 5. 17. The Elders that rule well are accounted worthy of double honour. *&* 1 *Tim.* 6. 1. 1 *Sam.* 2. 30. Them that honour me, I will honour. *Pſal.* 91. 15. *John* 12. 26. If any man ſerve me, him will my Father honour. 1 *Pet.* 2. 17. *Prov.* 13. 18. Do you believe and regard no one of all theſe words of God?

Lib. *I grant that God will praiſe the good, but not becauſe we are worthy of it.*

P. 1. Have I told you that he himſelf calleth his ſervants *worthy*? and will you contradict Gods Word? 2. Dare you yet deny any thing to be worthy to be called what it indeed is? Is not a Chriſtian worthy to be called a Chriſtian? and a ſober man to be called a ſober man, and an honeſt man to be called an honeſt man? Muſt humility make us lyars? Tell me, Are you worthy your ſelf to be accounted and called an Infidel, a Heathen, an Apoſtate, a Heretick, a wicked ungodly man, that never repented, nor did good?

Lib. *That were to lye or ſlander, to call one what he is not.*

P. Are you not *worthy* then to be called contrarily, that is, what you are?

Lib. *I ought ſo to be called, but not for my worthineſs.*

P. Muſt

P. Muſt God and man account you ſuch as you are not fit or worthy to be accounted? And will you go on to accuſe and contradict Gods Word? Your fancy hath got ſome harſh conceit of the ſenſe of the word [*Worthy*] and that cometh ſtill into your mind, as if it meant a worthineſs which ſuppoſed not that all that we have is of mercy and grace: when the Scripture meaneth no ſuch worthineſs, but ſuch as is that of a loving, dutiful, thankful Child, of the inheritance; A moral fitneſs.

Lib. *Well, ſuppoſe that our actions and we are worthy of Praiſe, that is, to be called as they are; yet they are worthy alſo of diſpraiſe, that is, to be accounted as menſtruous rags, defiled with ſin, and deſerving Hell; and is not this a pittiful praiſe?*

P. Did you ever hear us deny any of this? Why talk you of that which we are all agreed in? But 1. It is not holineſs, but the faulty imperfections of it, and the ſin that is contrary to it, which deſerveth Hell. 2. And the faults of ſincere believers deſerve not Hell according to the Law of Grace, by which we are to be judged, ſo as to be lyable to it, but only ſo as to be accounted condemnable, had we not been pardoned.

Lib. *But if our faith and holineſs deſerve ſome praiſe, what's that to the deſerving of ſalvation? or being worthy of Heaven?*

P. All theſe words your obſtinacy hath put me to uſe, to convince you that Faith and Holineſs is worthy of any thing at all, and that the word [*Worthy*] which God himſelf uſeth of them, is not abuſed by God, nor falſe. But what it is that God will account the righteous worthy of, the Scripture muſt determine; where I have ſhewed you before that the words are plain. They are counted worthy of God, 1 *Theſſ.* 2. 12. and of his Kingdom, 2 *Theſſ.* 1. 5. Worthy to obtain that world, and the reſurrection, *Luke* 20. 35. They ſhall walk with Chriſt in white, for they are worthy.

Lib. *Still I grant it in the Scripture ſenſe, but not in yours.*

P. To end this tedious talk with one that ſeemeth loth to underſtand, ſay Yea or Nay to theſe two queſtions. 1. Do you allow of the uſe of the word [*Worthy*]?

Lib. *Yes: becauſe it is in Scripture.*

P. 2. Do you deny it to be true in the ſenſe I have opened, that is, that we have that *worthineſs* which is nothing but a *Moral aptitude* for that promiſed Reward, which as to the worth of it is but Gods free gift, merited for us by Chriſt, and is only a Fathers Reward as to the ordering of it as our Governour, even a Reward of grateful Children.

Lib. *No: I cannot deny this ſenſe to be ſound.*

P. Then you grant both *Name* and *Thing*: And are not you aſhamed then to have ſo long traduced and reviled ſuch as hold and ſay but that which you are forced to juſtifie? and to make poor ſouls believe that *works* are cryed up, and Chriſt is injured, and mens ſalvation hazarded by it, when yet you confeſs that all is *true*, in *word* and *ſenſe*.

Lib. *But when the Papiſts abuſe ſuch phraſes to error, though the Scripture uſe them, we muſt do it ſparingly and with caution.*

P. 1. But is that a good reaſon for you to revile thoſe that uſe them in the Scripture ſenſe? 2. And if you will forſake Scripture words as oft as men miſuſe them, it will be in the power of any Hereticks to drive you from all Scripture phraſe, by abuſing all. 3. And how can you more effectually promote Popery, than by forſaking Scripture language, and leaving it to their poſſeſſion and uſe? Will not men think then, that the Scripture *ſenſe* is liker to be with them, than with you? Were it not better for you to hold to the Word of God, and only detect and diſclaim mens ill expoſitions of it?

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Whether our own Righteouſneſs be any way neceſſary and conducible to our Juſtification before God? Or whether we are any way juſtified by it? and how far?

Lib. *But if I grant you, that ſalvation is the Reward of our own faith and holineſs, I ſhall never grant you that we are Righteous by it before God, or that it is any part of that Righteouſneſs by which we are juſtified: for that is only the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt.*

P. I hope you are not willing to wrangle about words not underſtood. *Queſt.* 1. Do you think that the words [*Righteous, Righteouſneſs* and *Juſtification*] have but one ſenſe in Scriptures, and in our common uſe?

Lib. *No: you proved more before.*

P. Queſt. 2. If the Devil, or Men, or a miſtaking Conſcience, ſhould ſay that you (or any Saint) is an Infidel, or hath no faith, how muſt you be juſtified againſt that charge?

Lib. *By denying it, and by maintaining that I do believe.*

P. Very good: Then faith it ſelf as faith doth ſo far juſtifie you.

And *Queſt.* 3. If you be charged to be Impenitent and never to have truly Repented, how muſt you be juſtified againſt that charge?

Lib. *By denying it, and averring that I did Repent.*

P. So then, your Repentance it ſelf muſt ſo far juſtifie you. And *Queſt.* 4. If you are charged to have been an *ungodly perſon* to the laſt, or not to have loved God, or your neighbour, not to have called on God, nor conſeſſed Chriſt before men, nor to have fed, clothed and viſited him (as you could) in his members, or not to have mortified your fleſhly luſts, but to have lived after the fleſh, in murder, theft, whoredom, drunkenneſs, *&c.* What is your righteouſneſs againſt this accuſation?

Lib. *I muſt defend my ſelf againſt a lye by denying it to be true: I muſt be ſo far juſtified, that is, vindicated againſt Calumny by my innocency in thoſe points.*

P. Very good: ſo far then you muſt be juſtified by your godlineſs, love, obedience, mortification, innocency and works. And what if you be charged as an Hypocrite to have done all that you did in meer diſſimulation, how muſt you be therein juſtified?

Lib. *By denying the charge, and appeal to God that I was ſincere.*

P. So then, your *ſincerity* is ſo *far* your *juſtifying righteouſneſs.* And what if you are charged with Apoſtaſie, that you fell from Grace, muſt you not be juſtified by pleading your Perſeverance?

Lib. *Theſe are none of the* Juſtification *which the Scripture ſpeaketh of: which is only* againſt true accuſations, *and not againſt* falſe ones.

P. Say you ſo? What if one be *truly accuſed,* that he hath no part in Chriſt? and that his ſin is unpardoned? or that he is under the guilt of damnation by the obligation both of the Old Covenant and the New? or that he never truly repented or believed? or that he is unſanctified, and never ſincerely obeyed Chriſt, *&c.* Is this man juſtifiable?

Lib. *No: I ſay not that all men are juſtifyable: But who ever is* Juſtified *in Scripture ſenſe, is juſtified only from a true Accuſation.*

P. What is that true Accuſation?

Lib. *That*

Lib. *That he is a ſinner, and deſerveth damnation according to the Law, and that he hath no righteouſneſs of his own.*

P. Muſt he not *confeſs* all this to be *True*, if it be *True*? And is not confeſſing the *Guilt* which he is accuſed of, contrary to *juſtifying* him? Do you not ſee here what Confuſion you caſt your ſelf into for want of noting the various ſenſes of *Juſtification*? If by *Juſtifying* we mean *Making an unjuſt man juſt*, then it is true that he is *juſtified* from his *Guilt*, that is, he is pardoned; and he is juſtified *from the Laws condemnation*, that is, a man condemned by the Law is pardoned; and he is *juſtified* from his reigning ſin, that is, he is ſanctified: But this Juſtification is not oppoſite to *Accuſation*, but to *Being unjuſt*. But if you ſpeak of *Juſtification* by *Plea* or *Sentence*, it is contrary to *Accuſation* of *Guilt*: And ſo no man is juſtified that is not Juſt, or Guiltleſs in the point of which he is accuſed. God will by no means clear the guilty, or juſtifie the unjuſt, *Exod.* 34. 7, 8. nor ſay of the wicked, Thou art Righteous, *Prov.* 24. 24. 1 *Pet.* 1. 17. & 2. 23. *Jer.* 11. 20. *Rom.* 1. 32. & 2. 2.

But that you are quite miſtaken in ſaying, that Scripture never mentioneth *Juſtifying* man from a *falſe accuſation*, theſe and many ſuch Texts ſhew, *Rom.* 8. 33. *Iſa.* 50. 8. *Prov.* 17. 15. 1 *Kings* 8. 32. *James* 2. 21, 24, 25. *Rom.* 2. 13. *Luke* 7. 29. *Matth.* 11. 19. & 12. 37. *Iſa.* 43. 9. 26. *Luke* 10. 29. & 16. 15. *Deut.* 25. 1. *Exod.* 23. 7, &c.

And how widely differ you from moſt Proteſtant Divines, who ſay that Juſtification is a *Judicial Sentence* of God as Judge? Though indeed it is of divers ſorts.

Lib. *But it is not Scripture Juſtification, unleſs it be* perfect: *And all that we do is Imperfect. To juſtifie him in ſome one thing, is not Juſtification by faith, but another thing.*

P. 1. No doubt but Scripture mentioneth both *particular Juſtification* as to ſome particular cauſes, and a more large Juſtification from all things that would damn him in Hell. And this latter is the Great Juſtification by *faith*, mentioned ſo oft in Scripture, that is, Upon and by believing we are firſt *made juſt*, by free-given pardon and right to life, (and true ſanctification with it); and we are *ſentenced juſt*, becauſe ſo firſt made juſt. But this is not without our *Faith* and *Repentance*. 2. And that *Faith* and *Repentance* are a Righteouſneſs Evangelical, that is, a performance of the conditions on which the Covenant of Grace doth freely give us right to Chriſt, pardon and life; and ſo are the Conſtitutive cauſes of that ſubordinate Juſtification.

Lib. *But your* ſubordinate Righteouſneſs *hath no hand in our Juſtification.*

P. This is but ſinging over the old Song, by one that will not conſider what is anſwered. Have you thought on all the Texts even now cited? Hath *faith* no hand in our Juſtification? Hath the performance of a Condition, and the Moral Diſpoſition of the Receiver, no hand in the Reception of a Gift? What think you is the meaning of Chriſts words, Matth. 12. *By thy words thou ſhalt be juſtified, and by thy words thou ſhalt be condemned?* What meaneth St. *James*, that *a man is juſtified by works, and not by faith only?* Are men juſtified by that which hath no hand in their Juſtification?

Lib. *Chriſt meaneth* [before men] *and ſo doth* James, *and not* before God.

P. This is notoriouſly falſe, as contrary to the plain Text: Chriſt ſpeaketh of the *Account to be given of our words in the day of Judgement*,

ment, verſ. 36. And *James* ſpeaketh of that which men are *ſaved* by, verſ. 14. and that Juſtification which *Abraham* had, and that in an inſtance where Man did not juſtifie him, and of that which was *faiths life* and *perfection*, verſ. 17, 22. and of Gods imputing faith for righteouſneſs, as to a *friend of God*, verſ. 23. And is this nothing but Juſtification before men?

Lib. *This is not the juſtifying of the* man, *but of his faith?*

P. 1. You contradict the Text which ſaith [*Abraham, Rahab, A man is juſtified by works*]. 2. You contradict your ſelf; For if the *faith* be juſtified, the *man* is *juſtified to be* a true believer: For how could a man that fulfilled the Law, as Chriſt (and Angels) did, be juſtified, but by juſtifying his actions? And how can he that fulfilleth the Goſpel conditions, be juſtified in that point, but by juſtifying that he fulfilled them?

Lib. *At leaſt I may ſay, that this is not the great and notable Juſtification, which is only by Chriſts Righteouſneſs.*

P. We are not contending for its preheminence, but its truth and neceſſity in a ſubordinate place. Indeed we have *one Juſtification* by our Judges ſentence, which hath many parts and cauſes: God as Donor is one cauſe, and God as Judge another; And Chriſt as meriting is the only meritorious cauſe of the Juſtifying Gift and Covenant, and Chriſt as Interceſſor another cauſe, and Chriſt as Judge another; And our Righteouſneſs as it is our Right to Impunity and life another, and our faith and Repentance are conditions: All this is ſure.

Lib. *But the Juſtification by faith is our Univerſal Juſtification; and that can be only by Chriſts Righteouſneſs: And we are not to truſt to a Righteouſneſs mixt of Chriſts and ours; nor doth Chriſts Righteouſneſs need to be patcht up with our menſtruous rags.*

P. 1. No queſtion but *Chriſts Righteouſneſs* is perfect, and ours imperfect, and ours is no patch or ſupplement to Chriſts: He is not made righteous by our righteouſneſs, but we by his.

2. But that which is *perfect* in him, is not made *perfectly ours*; nor *formally ours* in *it ſelf*, as diſtinct from its *merited effects*. It is not *ours* as it is *Chriſts*. Chriſt that is our *Righteouſneſs*, is alſo made of God to *us wiſdom* and *ſanctification*: And will you ſay therefore, that we are not to be *Wiſe* or *Holy*, by any *wiſdom* or *Holineſs* of our own, for fear of adding our patch to Chriſts?

3. You uſe to ſay that Chriſts Righteouſneſs is *ours* as *Adams ſin is ours*; and ſay ſome, as *Adams* Righteouſneſs would have been, had he perſevered. But 1. *Adams* Righteouſneſs would have indeed made an Infant initially juſt by propagation, that is, the innocent Child of an innocent Parent: But as ſoon as that Infant had the uſe of Reaſon and Choice, he muſt alſo have a Righteouſneſs of his own, or periſh: And this is no patch to *Adams* righteouſneſs. And indeed in his Infancy he muſt have a ſeminal *Holineſs* of his own to juſtifie him, as well as the relation of a Son of *Adam*.

2. So alſo, though we are guilty of *Adams* ſin by propagation, yet we have with that guilt, 1. An inherent pravity of our own, 2. And at age our actual ſin: And both theſe are our unrighteouſneſs, as well as *Adams* ſin imputed to us.

Even ſo Chriſt the ſecond *Adam* is a *Root* of a righteous ſeed: Our *Contract* by *faith* is as to him, what our *Natural propagation* is as to *Adam*; that is, the *Condition* of our *Intereſt* in his merits: We have as *believers* an initial righteouſneſs in our relation to Chriſt; But we have alſo

also from him, 1. Inherent habitual righteousness; 2. The actual righteousness of faith, and true obedience and love. And these have their proper use and office, without which we must perish.

4. And I must tell you, that the word *Universal* is too big to be properly given to any mans justification or righteousness, but Christs: Properly he only is *Universally* justified or righteous, who hath no *unrighteousness* at all imputable to him, and is justifyable in all things: But the best believer, 1. Was once a sinner originally, 2. Did oft sin actually, 3. Hath still sin in him, 4. And for some sin may be punished by the Magistrate, 5. And for sin is judged and punished by chastisements and death by God, 6. And the earth still cursed for our sake: 7. Yea, which is worst of all, we are still under the penalty of some privations (alas! how great) of Gods Spirit and its Grace, and our Communion with God. And all this must be *confessed*; And such a one is not *Universally* justified or just.

Lib. *But still our own Righteousness doth but make us such as thankful persons must be for their Justification by Christ, and is no part of that Justification by faith: For if faith it self be that Righteousness, we have not faith by faith, and faith is not imputed to faith, but Christs Righteousness is it that is imputed.*

P. Of Imputation in due place; 1. What need you talk against that which none of us assert? Do we not all hold, that our personal Gospel-Righteousness is subordinate to Christs, and is by his Gift, as our *Wisdom* and *Sanctification* is? Who dreameth that our faith is any part of Christs Righteousness? But why do you waste time in vain cavilling against plain certain truth? Is there any thing in *Name* or *Thing* asserted by us that you can deny or question?

Quest. 1. Do you deny that Scripture commandeth us to *Believe* that we may be justified?

Lib. *No.*

P. Quest. 2. Or that we are commanded not only Thankfully to Accept, but Thankfully to obey our Lord, Redeemer and Saviour?

Lib. *No.*

P. Quest. 3. Dare you deny, that life or death eternal dependeth on this as a Condition or Moral means? and that we shall be judged according to it?

Lib. *No: I deny it not.*

P. Quest. 4. Is it not a Law that thus commandeth us, and by which we must be judged?

Lib. *Yes, If it were no Law, there were no duty and sin in belief and unbelief.*

P. Quest. 5. Is not a man so far just and justifyable by that Law, as he keepeth it? and justifyable against the charge of being one that must be Damned, by producing the Condition of pardon and life performed?

Lib. *Yes, I deny it not.*

P. Quest. 6. And doth not the same Law *virtually* justifie the performer now, whom it will justifie as the Rule of Judgement at last?

Lib. *Yes, no doubt.*

P. Quest. 7. And is not the Name of Righteousness many score times given in Scripture to our own actions done by Grace, and measured by the New Covenant?

Lib. *Yes, I cannot deny it.*

P. Why then while you deny neither *Name* nor *Thing*, what wrangle you about?

And let me plainly tell you, that such men as you by indiscreet *over-doing* are not the least of Satans instruments to bring the Gospel under scandal, and harden the world in Infidelity and the scorn of Christ; while you would so describe the Christian Religion, as if this were the very heart and summ of it [Believe that all the Elect have fulfilled perfectly all Gods Law by another, and that Christ did it as personating each of them, and therefore no crime of their own is imputable to them, nor any kind or degree of Goodness or Righteousness in and of themselves, is at least required of God, as any means or condition, of their present or future justification by their Judge, or as having any hand therein.] As if God were become indifferent *what we all are*, so that Christ be but Righteous for us: when as it was Christs grand design to restore lapsed man to God, which he doth not only by Relative benefits, but by Renewing them to his Image in love and holy obedience.

Lib. *Have you not lately and oft been told, that holiness and obedience are necessary now; but it is to other* Ends *than to justifie us; (as for Gratitude,* &c.)

P. 1. We easily grant it is for other *Ends* than Christs Merits were, and not to justifie us as they do; nor in that Causality. They are not to purchase for us a free gift of pardon and life, nor the Holy Ghost, *&c.* as Christ did. 2. But again tell me, Hath not Christ a Law that commandeth our obedience to those ends (as Gratitude) which you mention? And is not the keeping that Law a thing that the same Law will so far justifie us for? Yea, a Condition that life dependeth on? And if the Cause in Judgement be, *Have you kept it* or *not?* must you not in that be accordingly Justified or Condemned? Give over cavilling against plain necessary truth.

Lib. *By this you will fall in with the Papists, who take Justification to be partly by Christs Righteousness, and partly by our own: and partly in pardon, and partly in faith and holiness.*

P. Tell not me of the *Names* of *Papists* or any, to frighten me from plain Scripture truth. 1. Why may not I rather say, Why go you from all the antient Writers and Churches, even *Augustine* himself, by your new and contrary opinion? Was true Justification unknown for so many hundred years after the Apostles? 2. The most zealous *Antipapists* do confess that some Texts of Scripture do so take the word Justification: And multitudes of Texts so take the words Righteous and Righteousness. And he that will impartially consider them may find, that more Texts than are by us so confessed, do by *Justifying* mean [*Making* us *Just*, and so *Accounting* us] on all these causes conjunct, 1. As being Redeemed by Christs Merits, 2. And freely pardoned, 3. And having Right to life, 4. And renewed to Gods love and Image, 5. And so justifyable at the Bar of Grace by the Law of faith and liberty.

3. And the reality of all the Matter of this Doctrine is past doubt, if the Controversie *de nomine Justificationis* were not so decided.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Whether the Goſpel be a Law of Chriſt?

Lib. III. *YOu bring in your doctrine of perſonal Righteouſneſs to Juſtification, by feigning Chriſt to have made a new Law; whereas the Goſpel is but a Doctrine, Hiſtory and Promiſe, and not a Law, and ſo no Rule of Righteouſneſs and Judgement; And this many Proteſtants have aſſerted.*

P. I have read ſome ſuch ſayings in ſome men: And ſome I think meant no more, but that Chriſt did only expound, and not add to the Law of Nature, called by them the Moral Law: And theſe I have excuſed for their unhappy kind of expreſſion. But for the reſt, that mean as the words ſound univerſally, they ſubvert Chriſtianity, and as the *Arrians* denyed Chriſts Godhead, ſo do they his *Office* and Government, and are ſomewhat worſe than the *Quakers*, who ſay, that the *Spirit within us*, is the Law and Rule of Chriſt; which is better than none: I pray anſwer me,

Queſt. 1. Is Chriſt the King and Ruler of the Church?

Lib. *Yes.*

P. Queſt. 2. Is not Legiſlation the firſt and principal part of Government?

Lib. *Yes.*

P. Queſt. 3. Do not they then that deny Chriſts Legiſlation, deny his Government?

Lib. *Yes.*

P. Queſt. 4. Is it not eſſential to Chriſt as Chriſt (the name ſignifying Relatively his Office) to be King?

Lib. *Yes.*

P. Queſt. 5. Do they not then by this deny Chriſt to be Chriſt?

Lib. *No: for they confeſs that he hath a Law, but not that he made any ſince his birth.*

P. We grant 1. That the Law of Nature now is His Law: 2. And that the firſt Edition of the Law of Grace to *Adam* after the fall, was his Law: 3. And *Moſes* Law was partly his. But you will not ſay that we are under this laſt, nor I hope that he hath no other than the two firſt.

Lib. *Why, what other can you prove?*

P. It is the *Name* or the *Thing* that you deny; (for you uſe to confound the caſes:) 1. Whether the *name* be fit, judge by theſe Texts.

Gal. 6. 2. Bear ye one anothers burdens, and ſo fulfil the Law of Chriſt.

James 1. 25. *The perfect Law* of *Liberty.*

Rom. 8. 2. The Law of the Spirit of life in Chriſt Jeſus, *&c.*

Rom. 3. 27. Boaſting is excluded: By what Law? Of Works? Nay, but by the *Law* of faith.

Mic. 4. 2. For the Law ſhall go out of *Zion*, *&c.*

So *Iſa.* 2. 3. *&* 8. 16, 20. *&* 42. 41. The Iſles ſhall wait for his Law.

1 *Cor.* 9. 21. We are under the Law to Chriſt.

Heb. 8. 10, 16. I will put my Laws into their minds——and hearts.

James 4. 12. There is one Law-giver, *&c. Iſa.* 33. 22.

2. For *Name* and *Thing* note the terms of Equivalence and Connotation:

1. All the Texts where Christ is called a *King*, and his *Kingdom* named, (why should I needlesly recite them?)

2. All the Texts that mention his *Commanding* and *Commandments*, the same which we mean by *a Law*. *Matth.* 28. 20. Teaching them to observe all things whatever I have commanded you.

Acts 10. 42. & 13. 47. *Acts* 10. 33. 1 *Cor.* 7. 10. *John* 15. 14. If ye do whatsoever I command you. 17. These things I command you.

So *John* 15. 12. & 14. 21, 31. 1 *Tim.* 1. 1. *Titus* 1. 3. 1 *John.* 3. 23. & 4. 6. *John* 13. 34. 1 *John* 5. 3. & 2. 4. & 3. 24. 1 *Cor.* 14. 37. *Acts* 1. 2. *Acts* 17. 30. Blessed are they that do his Commandments, &c. *Rev.* 22. 14.

3. All the Texts that mention his Covenant, (διαθήκη being a Legal institution.) *Heb.* 8. 6. He is the Mediator of a better Covenant, & 8. 13. & 8. 10. & 10. 16. & 12. 24. *Gal.* 4. 24.

4. All those Texts that not only call him *Lord* of all, but say that *All power* in *Heaven* and *Earth* is given to him (therefore Legislative power) *Matth.* 28. 18. and all Judgement committed to him, *John* 5. 22. The Government is laid upon his shoulders, and of the increase of his Government there shall be no end, *Isa.* 9. 6, 7.

5. *De re*, how can that man be a Christian, that denyeth that Christ hath made us any Law, and so denyeth his Kingdom and our obedience?

I argue from the definition: That which hath the essential parts of a *Law* is a *Law*: But Christ hath made that which hath the essential parts of a *Law*: Therefore he hath made a *Law*.

The Major is past dispute; The Minor I prove: That which hath a Precept making Duty, and a Promise and Threatning, instituting the Retribution by Rewards and Punishments, as an Instrument of Government, hath all the Essentials of a Law: But such is made by Christ: *Ergo*——

The Minor (which only needs proof) I prove by parts and instances. 1. There is a Command to believe in God as our Reconciled Father by Christ: 2. To believe in Christ as Incarnate, and the Mediator, conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin *Mary*, fulfilling all righteousness, dying, buried, for us, justifying us by his blood, rising, ascending, glorified, interceding, that will raise the dead, and judge the world, &c. We are commanded to believe all the Gospel: And to give up our selves to Christ in the Covenant of Baptism, to trust in him, to pray in his name, &c. We are commanded to believe in the Holy Ghost as the Spirit of Christ, and to live in Communion with the Christian Church, to observe the Lords day (the first of the Week,) to preach and hear the Gospel, to receive the Lords Supper, to imitate Christ, to receive his Apostles and Ministers, to relieve his members as such, to take *Moses* Law as abrogated or ceased; And do you that are so strict in condemning all humane impositions as bold additions, believe that Christ himself hath made no Laws for Ordination, Sacraments, Preaching, Worship? and why fear you adding then? can one add to Nothing? And what a lawless sort of persons are you, if you will neither have *Christ nor Man* to make Laws for you?

2. And as to *Promises* and *Threats* or Penalties (of a far forer punishment, *Heb.* 10.) I am ashamed to stand to prove them to you. [He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned] is sure a Law. How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?

tion? See that ye reject not him that ſpeaketh———*Heb.* 4. & 10. Theſe mine enemies that would not that I ſhould reign over them, bring them hither and ſlay them before me, *Luke* 19. 27. with abundance ſuch.

Pardon here that my indignation ſuffereth me not to be longer or colder, but ſhortly to tell you further, that to deny Chriſts Law is, 1. To deny him to be a King, and to be Chriſt, 2. To deny his Kingdom, 3. And his Government, 4. And his Goſpel, 5. And his Officers power, both Kings and Paſtors, 6. And your own ſubjection, 7. And all duty and obedience to him, 8. And the being of all ſin as againſt his Laws. 9. And all Judgement according to his Laws, 10. And all reward for keeping his Laws, 11. And all puniſhment for breaking them, 12. And all duty to preach, learn or meditate on them, 13. And all blame on ſuch as ſilence ſuch preaching, 14. And indeed the very *being* of all *Law* and Government in the world: For ſince the Promiſe *Gen.* 3. (or at leaſt now) there is no Law of God in the world, but what is the Redeemers Law: Even the Law of Nature now is in his hand, and is the Law of the Redeemer to lapſed Nature. And all the world had a new Law of Grace made to *Adam* in the firſt Edition; and the Church hath it now in the ſecond Edition. And now what part of Chriſtianity do you not deſtroy?

Chooſe you now whether you will come off by confeſſing that you erred and differed from us but in a *word* not underſtood, or whether you will allow us to take you for downright Hereticks? And bethink you whether thoſe raſh and ſelf-conceited Divines that have reviled *Papiſts* and *Arminians* for ſaying that Chriſts *Goſpel was a Law*, or that he *made a new Law*, have done good ſervice to the Chriſtian or the Proteſtant Cauſe? or have rather done much to harden the *Papiſts* into a more confident conceit that Proteſtants are Hereticks?

CHAP. V.

whether Chriſt be the only Party in Covenant with God? and not Believers, or lapſed man?

Lib. IV. *MY next Charge is, that you feign the Covenant to be made with us, which is made only with Chriſt. Do you not remember that even the* Weſtminſter *Aſſembly ſay in their larger Catechiſm, that* [The Covenant of Grace was made with Chriſt as the ſecond *Adam*, and in him with all the Elect as his ſeed?] *But you feign it to be made with the Elect, nay, to others immediately, and not only as Chriſts ſeed, in him, nor to Chriſt at all.*

P. I will not waſte time in expounding or cenſuring other mens words: but as to the matter, is it not a moſt ſhameful thing, that a man of your profeſſion and pretenſions to knowledge, ſhould confound thoſe two Covenants which children ſhould be taught in their Catechiſm to diſtinguiſh?

By [a *Covenant*] here we mean, 1. A *Covenant offered* and *impoſed*, which is alſo a *Law*: 2. A *Covenant conſented* to and *mutual*. And now tell me,

Queſt. 1. Was it not a diſtinct *Law* that was made to us, from that which Chriſt was obliged by? I mean the *Law of Grace* and *Faith*? Was Chriſt

Chriſt commanded to Repent of his ſin? or accept a Saviour? or pray for pardon? or mortifie his luſts? or truſt another to reconcile him to God? or be Thankful for ſuch mercies? or any ſuch like Remedying means and duties for himſelf?

Lib. *No: that muſt not be imagined.*

P. Queſt. 2. Is not all this commanded by the Law of Grace?

Lib. *Yes: If it be a Law.*

P. Queſt. 3. Was not Chriſt under a Law, which bound him, 1. To obey all the precepts of nature perfectly without ſin? 2. To obey all the Moſaical Law as far as he was capable? 3. To do all this as Mediator to reconcile God and man, And to dye for ſinners, to work Miracles, to ſend out Apoſtles, to gather a Church, to intercede for us, and to preſent us Juſtified and perfect to his father? And are we obliged to do ſo too?

Lib. *No one ſo imagineth.*

P. Queſt. 4. Did not Chriſt as a Covenanter undertake all this? And do we do ſo too? And do not we in Baptiſm our ſelves, conſent and promiſe, to take God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, for our Father, Saviour and Sanctifier, and to forſake the fleſh, the world and the devil? Is it Chriſt only that is Baptized? Nay did Chriſt ever receive ſuch a Baptiſm as this, to waſh away his ſins, and deliver him a pardon? Is it Chriſt or we that at Baptiſm make theſe promiſes to God? Is it to Chriſt or us that Chriſt himſelf ſaith, If thou believe and repent thou ſhalt be ſaved? Doth Chriſt as King make Laws and Covenants to bind himſelf only? Who ſeeth not, that hath any ſenſe of Scripture matters, that The Mediators caſe, office and work is *one*, and *ours* another: that It is one Law that was given him, and another to us: yea, that which ſeemeth the *ſame* was another, being not *formally* but *materially* only the ſame (and *forma denominat:*) For he was to fulfil the Law of *Moſes* and of *Innocency*, to ſuch *ends* (as a *Redeemer*) and with ſuch difference from our caſe, that it was not *formally* but *materially* (and that but in *part*) the ſame Law: and ſo his *Baptiſm* was *formally* another thing from any ones Baptiſm elſe in the World. It was *one thing* that *Chriſt* promiſed and undertook in his Covenant with the Father, and it's another thing that we undertake and promiſe. It's one thing that God promiſeth to Chriſt upon his Merits (that he ſhall ſee of the travail of his ſoul and be ſatisfied) and another thing that he promiſeth us (that our perſons ſhall be Juſtified, ſanctified and ſaved.) In a word, by the Law given to Chriſt, Chriſt himſelf is Governed as a Subject, and Juſtified and Rewarded by God as his Judge for fulfilling it. By the Law given to us, we are the ſubjects and Chriſt is the Governour, Lawgiver and our Judge, who will Juſtifie, reward, or condemn and puniſh us.

I know not how that man can preach the Goſpel that knoweth not the difference between the Law and Covenant made to and with Chriſt as Mediatour, and the Law and Covenant made to and with us, and in Baptiſm ſolemnly profeſſed! *Children* ſhould not be ignorant of it.

Lib. *But it is the ſame thing which is promiſed to Chriſt and us*, viz. *that we ſhall be juſtified and ſaved; and this is promiſed firſt to Chriſt, and therefore the words cited may be juſtified: Chriſt is the ſeed of the woman who is firſt to break the Serpents head*, Gen. 3. 15.

P. 1. The ſame thing may be promiſed to different perſons, in different Covenants: To promiſe to Chriſt that his elect ſhall be ſaved, and to promiſe Believers that they ſhall be ſaved, are two promiſes.

2. What one word do you find in *Gen.* 3. of a Covenant or promiſe made to Chriſt? It's true that he is the principal *Seed* there meant (though not

not the only:) But he is the *Promised Seed*: It's one thing for a promise to be made to Christ, and another thing that Christ as the victorious seed be promised to man. There is no promise in *Gen.* 3. to Christ mentioned, (and what can be meant by a Promise of God to God himself?) but a prophecy and promise of a Saviour to man: But if there had, that would not have proved these two to be one.

Understand the tenour and difference of these several Laws and Covenants of God, or pretend not to understand the Scripture: *viz.* 1. The Law and Covenant of Innocency made to *Adam*. 2. The Law and Covenant made to and with the Mediatour for our Redemption. 3. The promise, Law or Covenant of Grace of the first Edition, made to *Adam* and all in him, and renewed with *Noe* and mankind in him. 4. The Law and Covenant both of Common Grace and of Peculiarity, at once given to *Abraham*, and perfected in the Law and Covenant of Works made by *Moses* with the Jews. 5. The Law and Covenant of Grace made by the Incarnate Mediatour (and the Father by him) in the second perfect Edition, with eminent peculiarity.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the New Covenant of Grace have any Conditions?

Lib. *By feigning the Covenant of Grace to have Conditions, you make it to be a Covenant of works.*

P. Either by *works* you mean [*any humane acts*;] And so all Gods Covenants with man (and his Laws) are of *works*; that is, It is some *act* of man that they require: For what else can be commanded? Or you mean as *Paul* doth, when he calls the *Jews Law*, a Law of *works*: And if so, you falsifie his doctrine or ours. Prove if you can that by *works* he meaneth every humane Act, and that *Faith* it self is either no *Act* of man, or the *works* meant by him.

Lib. *Faith is a work, but it is not put in the Covenant as a work required of us, but as a gift to be given to us freely.*

P. Judge whether it be required of us, and that formally as a condition, by such texts as these: (yea whether obedience be not required as a Condition of our salvation, which is promised thereupon?) 1 *Tim.* 4. 8. Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. *Mark* 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned. *Rom.* 10. 8, 9, 10, 13. If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead (*N. B.* this is an act distinct from accepting his Righteousness) thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto Righteousness, and with the mouth Confession is made unto salvation. —— For whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. *Matth.* 6. 14, 15. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your Heavenly Father will also forgive you: But if *&c.* *Rev.* 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have Right to the tree of life, *&c.* See *Isa.* 1. 16, 17, 18. & 55. 6, 7. *Luk.* 13. 3, 5. 1 *Joh.* 1. 9. *Act.* 3. 19. *Heb.* 5. 9, *&c.*

Lib. *God promiseth a Reward to our Actions, not as ours, but as his own gifts.*

P. 1. Enough is said of Rewards before: We shall not by such talk as

this

this believe either that God *Rewardeth himself*, or that he *Rewardeth* not us. But we easily grant that he rewardeth us for nothing which cometh not from his free bounty: For no creature can have any other good.

2. But if *Faith*, and *Love*, and *Obedience* be not *commanded to us*, but only given us, then they are no *Duties*, but Gifts only; and unbelief, hatred of God, and disobedience is no sin, nor brings no punishment.

Lib. *At least they are no Conditions of the Covenant.*

P. Do you think that they are any *proper Means* of our *Justification* and *Salvation* as their End? or not?

Lib. *Yes: I dare not say, that they are no means at all; Faith and Repentance are Means of our Pardon, and Holiness and Perseverance of our Glorification.*

P. What *sort of means* do you take them to be?

Lib. *They are such Gifts of God as in order must go before Salvation.*

P. Going before, signifieth only *Antecedency*, and not any *Means.*

Lib. *One Gift maketh us fit for a thankful improvement of another.*

P. This speaketh them only to be a *Means* to our *Thankful* improvement, and not to our *Right* to the things to be improved.

Lib. *I do not think that they are a means of our Right or title.*

P. Rev. 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his Commandments, that they may *have Right to the tree of life*, &c.

Lib. *It may be translated* [that wash their garments] *and* [that they may have power upon] as Dr. *Hammond* noteth.

P. 1. The *Alexandrian* Copy which giveth him this occasion, is singular, and not be set against all other (though the Vulgar *Latin* go the same way). *Beza* who yet thinks that a transposition of two Verses hath darkned these Texts, *this Book being negligently used, because many for a time took it not for an Apostolical Writing*, (or Canonical,) yet saith, that it is *contra omnium Græcorum codicum fidem*, that the Vulgar goeth.

2. But all's one in sense: For [*to wash their Garments*] is [*to be sanctified* or *purified from sin*] and not only from guilt of punishment: And ἐξουσία signifieth such a *Power* as we call *Authority* or *Right* (usually.)

But what maketh you deny *Conditions* on mans part?

Lib. *Because*, 1. *It is supposed that a condition is profitable to him that requireth it.* 2. *It is some* Cause *of the benefit.* 3. *It is to be done by the performers own strength: whereas God giving us* Faith, *that can be no condition on our part which is first a Gift from him that requireth it: For to give it first, maketh it no condition of ours.*

P. Here we see what it is to quarrell about *ambiguous words*: No one of these is true that you say, of the *common nature* of a *condition*; or at least as we mean by that word.

1. *Civilians* define a *Condition* to be *Lex addita negotio, quæ donec præstetur eventum suspendit.* As it is *Required* it is only *Modus promissionis, donationis vel contractus*: as *Performed* it is only a Removal of an Impediment, and a Disposition of the Receiver. So that as the *Non-performance* is but the suspension of a Cautation, so the performance of a *Condition* as such, is no *Cause efficient*: But it is *dispositio subjecti*, which you may call a necessary *Modus* of a *Material Cause*, as the Recipient may improperly be called; Dr. *Twisse* therefore calleth faith *Causa justificationis dispositiva.*

2. So

2. So it be an act of our own, it is no way neceſſary that it be done without the Commanders help or gift: For he that *giveth us* to *believe*, doth give it by this *means*, even by *commanding it*, and making it a Condition of his further benefits, that ſo he may induce us as *rational free agents*, to perform it *ex intuitu mercedis*, or by the *motive* of the end or benefit. For he *cauſeth* it by ſuitable means. And no doubt, but faith, and the reſt, are free acts of ours, though cauſed by Gods grace.

3. And it is accidental to a Condition, that it be any way commodious to the Impoſer. What profit is it to a Father that his Child put off his Hat and ſay, I thank you? And yet he may make that a condition of his gift. What profit is it to a free Phyſicion, that the Patient obſerve his order in taking his Medicines? And yet he may give them on that condition.

But yet I will add, that as *uſually* men make that the *condition* of a Gift or Contract, which the perſon obliged is backward elſe to perform, and that which is ſomewhat either for the Donor or Contracters *Intereſt*, or the *Ends* of his contract: ſo God who taketh his *Glory* and *Pleaſure* in his Childrens Good, to be as his *Intereſt*, and the *End* of his *Gifts*, and knoweth how *backward* we are to our duty, doth on theſe accounts impoſe on us our *duty* and *conditions*, his Pleaſure and Glory being *inſtead* of his Commodity.

But if [*If*] be a conditional Particle, and if Gods *ſuſpending* by the tenour of his Donation, our *Right* to *Juſtification* upon our free *believing*, and our *Right* to *Salvation* on our *free obedience*, do prove *Conditionality* (as it doth all that *we mean*) then you ſee that the new Covenant hath conditions.

Lib. *Doth not God promiſe us the* firſt Grace, *even to take the hard heart out of our bodies, and give us hearts of fleſh, and new hearts*, &c. *And I pray, what condition can the firſt grace have, unleſs you will run* in infinitum, *to ſeek Conditions of Conditions?*

P. 1. This is a Cauſe of great moment, of which I have my ſelf had darker thoughts than now I have. 1. If one *Benefit* of the Covenant have no Condition (*viz. the firſt,*) will it follow, that none of the reſt are given upon condition? May not God in *Baptiſm* give us a Right of ſpecial Relation to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, his Love, Grace and Communion, Pardon, Adoption and Glory, on condition of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and yet himſelf give us that *Faith* and *Repentance* which is the condition of the reſt?

2. But upon fuller conſideration it will appear, that It is not the *firſt Grace* that thoſe promiſes mean, by a *new* and *ſoft* heart: For who ever will examine them, ſhall find that the Texts mention *Conditions* and alſo antecedent Grace: And indeed, [*A new and ſoft heart*] is but the ſame thing which the New Teſtament calleth *Sanctification*. And yet that *Sanctification* is promiſed as conſequent to *Faith* as its condition: And our ordinary Divines do accordingly diſtinguiſh of *Vocation* and *Sanctification*; holding that in Vocation the Act of *Faith* and *Repentance* are cauſed by Gods Grace, before proper Habits; and that Sanctification is the Habits (ſpecially of Love and Holineſs) following them, (*vid. Ameſ. Medull. de Vocat. Rolloc. de Vocat. Hookers Souls Vocat. & Humil. Rogers* of *Faith, &c.*) And this is the *new* and *fleſhy heart*.

But what need we more to prove that Covenant Conditional which I mean, when it is nothing but the *Baptiſmal Covenant?* where ſure the condition is notorious, and every Baptizing Miniſter prerequireth the profeſſion of it.

CHAP. VII.

Whether Juſtifying Faith be a Believing in Chriſt as a Teacher, Lord, &c. or only a Receiving of his Righteouſneſs?

P. VI. AS to this your ſixth Charge, I have ſaid ſo much elſewhere, in my *Diſputations* of *Juſtification*, and in other Books, that I cannot juſtifie the tiring of Readers by repeating it: And will ſay now but this little following:

1. That *Paul* doth not diſtinguiſh between *juſtifying faith*, and *ſaving faith*, but excludeth the Works excluded by him, from being the cauſes either of Juſtification or Salvation.

2. That if [*Receiving Chriſts Righteouſneſs*] be meant by them *properly* and *phyſically*, it is no ſort of *faith* at all; but only [the effect of the donation,] which they call [*Juſtificari*,] or paſſive Juſtification: But if it mean a *moral metonymical* Reception, that is nothing but [*Conſent to have the offered gift*]; And if only *Conſent* to *have* Chriſts Righteouſneſs be Juſtifying faith, then all the *Aſſenting* part is excluded (in which Scripture much placeth it, and moſt Divines in part, and many in whole, beſides *Camero* and his followers). And ſo alſo all the Affiance or Fiducial *acts* are excluded, which almoſt all include; even that which they call *Recumbency* being diſtinct from Conſent.

3. All theſe acts following are eſſential to Juſtifying faith, as well as this Conſent to be Juſtified:

1. An Aſſenting belief in God, in the baptiſmal ſenſe. 2. An Aſſent to the truth of Chriſts Perſon, Office and Doctrine. 3. A belief in the Holy Ghoſt. 4. A belief of Pardon, Sanctification and Glory as poſſible, purchaſed and offered by Chriſt. 5. A Conſent that God be our God in Chriſt. 6. And a Conſent that Chriſt be our Teacher. 7. And our King, and Ruler. 8. And our Interceſſor. 9. And our Judge and Juſtifier by ſentence (and as our Advocate). 10. A belief of his Reſurrection, Power and Glory. 11. A *Truſting* to the Father and the Son according to theſe forementioned Offices. 12. A Conſent to be Sanctified by the Holy Ghoſt.

4. Plainly our Juſtifying and Saving Faith in *Pauls* ſenſe is the ſame thing with our *Chriſtianity*, or becoming *Chriſtians*: And the ſame thing with our Baptiſmal faith and conſent.

5. To believe in Chriſt as Chriſt is in Scripture Juſtifying faith: But to accept his *righteouſneſs only*, and not to believe in him as our Lord, and our Teacher and Interceſſor, *&c.* as aforeſaid, is not to believe in him as Chriſt.

6. In my Anſwer (*ubi ſup.*) to Mr. *Warner*, and elſewhere, I have detected the fraud of their quibling diſtinction, who ſay, that All this is in faith *quæ juſtificat*, but not *quâ juſtificat*, as ſuppoſing a falſhood, that any act of *faith quâ talis* juſtifieth.

7. They that ſay that only our *Acceptance* of *Chriſts Imputed Righteouſneſs* is the Juſtifying act of faith, and that to expect to be Juſtified by any other (*viz.* by Believing in God the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt, and believing a Heaven hereafter, and believing the Truth of the Goſpel, and of Chriſts Reſurrection, Aſcenſion, Glory, *&c.* and by taking him for our Teacher, Ruler, Interceſſor, *&c.*) is to expect *Juſtification* by *works* in *Pauls* diſclaimed ſenſe, and ſo to fall from Grace; I ſay, they that thus teach,

do

do go ſo far towards the ſubverting of the Goſpel, and making a Goſpel or Religion of their own, as that (I muſt tell them, to move them to repentance) not only the adding of *Ceremonies* is a ſmall corruption in compariſon of this, but many that in *Epiphanius* are numbred with Hereticks, had far leſſer errors than this is.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Faiths Juſtifying as an Inſtrument.

P. VII. AND I have ſaid ſo much in the foreſaid *Diſputations of Juſtification* and other Books, of Faiths Inſtrumentality and the reaſon of its Juſtifying intereſt, that I cannot perſwade my ſelf now to talk it out with you all over again; but only to ſay,

1. That I have fully oft proved from many plain Scriptures, that pardon and ſalvation are given (with Chriſt) in the Covenant of Grace, on *Condition* of a penitent believing fiducial acceptance. And therefore that it is moſt certain that *faith* is a *Condition* of our Juſtification; and ſo to be profeſt in Baptiſm.

2. The name of *An Inſtrument* given to faith, and its *Juſtifying as an Inſtrument*, are of mens deviſing, and not in Gods Word.

3. But as to the ſenſe, It is certain that faith is no Inſtrument of our Juſtification (Gods or Mans,) if it be meant properly of an Inſtrumental efficient cauſe.

4. But if it be taken *Metaphorically*, for an Act whoſe Nature or eſſence is *An Acceptance* of a free *Gift*, and ſo by *Inſtrumentality* be meant the τὸ *credere*, that is, *Faiths very Eſſence in ſpecie*, then no doubt it is what it is.

5. Or if by an *Inſtrument* be meant, *A Moral aptitude* or *Diſpoſition of the perſon to be juſtified* (anſwerable to the *Diſpoſitio Recipientis vel materiæ* in Phyſicks) then it is ſuch an Inſtrument. But how well this is worded, and what cauſe there is to contend for a *word* both of *humane invention* and *metaphorical*, and this as if it were a weighty Doctrine, I leave to ſober judgements.

6. But it is certain that the *Accepting Act* of faith is but its *Aptitude* to be the condition of the Gift, and therefore that its being made by Chriſt the Condition is its Moral neareſt intereſt in our Juſtification.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Faith it ſelf be imputed for Righteouſneſs?

VIII. Lib. *WHat do you but ſubvert the Goſpel, when you put faith inſtead of Chriſt or of his Righteouſneſs? when the Scripture ſaith that we are juſtified by Chriſts Righteouſneſs Imputed to us, you ſay it is by faith imputed.*

P. Do you think any ſober Chriſtians here *really* differ? or is it only about the *Names* and *Notions?* Which ever it be; 1. Of the *name*, Is it not oft ſaid that *Faith* is and *ſhall be imputed for Righteouſneſs*, Rom. 4. 22, 23, 24. James 2. 23.

Lib. *Yes: I muſt grant the* words, *but not your* meaning.

P. Where doth the Scripture ſay, that *Chriſts Righteouſneſs* is *Imputed to us?* Remember that it is only the *Name* that I ask you of.

Lib. *It ſaith that* Righteouſneſs is Imputed: *and what Righteouſneſs can it be but Chriſts?*

P. I tell you ſtill, it is only the *phraſe* or *words* that we are firſt trying. Are theſe the ſame words [*Righteouſneſs is Imputed*] and [*Chriſts Righteouſneſs is Imputed?*] If not, where are theſe latter words in Scripture?

Lib. *Grant that the* words *are not, and your words are.*

P. Then the queſtion is, Whether Scripture phraſe or mans invented phraſe be the better and ſafer in a controvertible caſe? And next Whether you ſhould deny or quarrel at the Scripture ſaying, that [*faith is imputed to us for righteouſneſs*] and not rather confute our miſexpounding it, if we do ſo?

Lib. *Well, Let us examine the ſenſe then: What Righteouſneſs is it but Chriſts that is ſaid to be imputed to us?*

P. It is none but what we have from Chriſt: But the phraſe of *Imputing* ſuppoſeth it *ours:* And the meaning is no more, but that [*we are reputed Righteous*]: And the cauſes are not included in the phraſe of [*Imputing righteouſneſs to us*], but in the words before and after. As *Imputing ſin to us*, (and not *Imputing* it) is but to *Repute, reckon* or *judge us ſinners*, or by ſin guilty of puniſhment (or not guilty), ſo is it here. So that it is ſuppoſed, 1. That *Righteouſneſs*, that is, This Relation of being Righteous, is the thing imputed: 2. Chriſts Righteouſneſs is the meritorious cauſe: 3. The Goſpel Donation is the inſtrumental Cauſe: 4. Our Faith in Chriſt is the condition, and as ſuch the ſubordinate matter neceſſary on our parts. And that *faith* is imputed for Righteouſneſs, plainly meaneth but this, that Chriſt having merited and ſatisfied for us, all that is now required on our part to denominate (or primarily conſtitute) us Righteous, is to be true Believers in him, or true Chriſtians.

And I further ask you, Do you thus paraphraſe the words [*Faith*, that is, *Chriſts Righteouſneſs, is imputed to us for righteouſneſs?*]

Lib. *Yes: I do ſo: becauſe the act is put for the object.*

P. Were it ſo ſaid but once, and otherwiſe oft, you had ſome colour for this: But when it is never ſaid [*Chriſts Righteouſneſs is imputed to us*] and ſo oft ſaid [*Faith is imputed for righteouſneſs,*] how ſhall ever the Scripture be underſtood at this rate, if ſtill by [*faith*] it mean not

faith

faith at all, but *Chriſts righteouſneſs?* And why muſt not all other places that mention faith, be ſo underſtood alſo?

But read the Texts, and ſet all together, and ſee what ſenſe thus will be made of it.

Rom. 4. 3. [What ſaith the Scripture? *Abraham believed God, and it*, that is, not his believing, but Chriſts Righteouſneſs, *was Imputed to him for righteouſneſs.*] Is this a ſober and modeſt paraphraſe, or a ſhameleſs violence? Doth not [*it*] refer to [*believing God*] before mentioned?

Verſ. 4, 5. [*To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned* (or imputed) *of Grace, but of debt: But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that juſtifieth the ungodly, his faith* (that is, *not his faith*, but *Chriſts righteouſneſs*) *is counted for righteouſneſs.*] Is this a modeſt Expoſition?

Verſ. 10, 11. [*We ſay that Faith* (that is, not faith, but Chriſts righteouſneſs) *was reckoned to* Abraham *for righteouſneſs: How then was it*, (that is, not his *faith*, but Chriſts righteouſneſs) *reckoned?*——*In uncircumciſion: And he received the ſign of circumciſion, a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of the faith*, (that is, *not of the faith*, but of the *righteouſneſs of Chriſts righteouſneſs*) *which he had being uncircumciſed, that he might be the Father of them that believe, that righteouſneſs* (that is, *Chriſts*) *might be imputed to them alſo*——*who walk in the ſteps of that faith which* Abraham *had*, &c. (doth *faith* here alſo ſignifie *no faith?*)

Verſ. 13. When the *promiſe* is ſaid to be [*through the righteouſneſs of faith*] and Verſ. 14. [*faith made void*] is it no *faith* that is here alſo meant by *faith?*

And Verſ. 16. [*It is of faith—to that ſeed, which is of the faith of Abraham*] is not *faith* indeed here meant by the word *faith?*

So Verſ. 18, 19, 20, 21. [*Who againſt hope believed—And being not weak in faith—he ſtaggered not at the promiſe of God through unbelief, but was ſtrong in faith—And being fully perſwaded that what he had promiſed he was able to perform*] is it no *faith* that is meant in all theſe words? yea, or no act of *faith*, but *accepting* the *righteouſneſs of Chriſt?*

So next Verſ. 22. [*And therefore it was imputed to him for Righteouſneſs*] that is, *Not his faith*; but by [*It*] is meant only *Chriſts Righteouſneſs*, though it was *faith* that was over and over *mentioned* as the antecedent.)

So Verſ. 23, 24. [*It was not written for his ſake only that it* (that is, *not faith*, but Chriſts righteouſneſs) *was imputed to him; But for us alſo to whom it* (that is, not faith) *ſhall be imputed if we believe* (is not that *faith* neither?) *on him* (that is, *God the Father*) *that raiſed up Jeſus our Lord from the dead* (which is a diſtinct act from Conſenting to have *his* righteouſneſs:) *who was delivered to death for our offences, and was raiſed again for our Juſtification*;] Is the meaning that *we are juſtified* by the *Imputation of Chriſts Reſurrection* ſo to us, as that in Law ſenſe we roſe *again in him*, and by *Riſing* fulfilled the Law of Innocency?

I will not for ſhame and wearineſs thus go over other ſuch Texts: but I muſt be ſo faithful as to ſay, that if *good men*, and *wiſe men*, and men that cry down the *Papiſts* and others for *adding* to *Gods Word*, and *corrupting* it, and calling it a *Noſe* of *wax*, and introducing new Articles of faith, will yet own ſuch Expoſitions as theſe, and accuſe thoſe that own them

them not, they are as great Inſtances as moſt I remember, except the defenders of Tranſubſtantiation, how far education, or cuſtom, or humane dependance, or faction and partiality and prejudice, may blind the reaſon of profeſſed Chriſtians and godly men. And that man that dare lay his comforts and hopes of juſtification and life upon ſuch expoſitions of Gods Word, ſhould be modeſt in crying down the falſe hopes of others, and reproving them that build upon the ſand.

Lib. *You have made a long diſcourſe to make us odious upon a falſe ſuppoſition: We do not ſay, that in* all *or* any *of thoſe Texts, by* faith *is not meant* faith: *but only that it is not* faith *as* faith, *or as an act of ours, but as* connoting *its* object, the *Righteouſneſs of Chriſt.*

P. 1. Alas! a great number of better men than you, have too oft and plainly ſaid without diſtinction that [*Faith is not imputed to us for righteouſneſs*]. I hope they meant better than they ſpake; but I would it could be hid from the world, that theſe words are not only in the *Independents Savoy Confeſſion*, but even in the Confeſſion of the *Weſtminſter Aſſembly*, cap. 11. [" *Not by imputing faith it ſelf, the act of believing* " *or any other Evangelical obedience to them as their Righteouſneſs: but* " *by imputing the obedience and ſatisfaction of Chriſt to them.*—] So alſo in the larger Catechiſm [*Not as if the Grace of faith or any act thereof were imputed to him for his Juſtification.*] How well ſoever they may mean, Gods oft repeated Word ſhould rather have been *expounded*, than *denyed.*

2. But what mean your cloudy words, [*It is not faith as faith, but as connoting the object?*] They that cannot ſpeak clearly, ſeldom clearly underſtand what to ſpeak. The Queſtion is, Whether it be *really* and properly *Faith*, that is meant in all theſe Texts? or whether it be only *Chriſts righteouſneſs?* If you ſay, that *It is both in ſeveral reſpects*, you grant then that it is *faith it ſelf* in one reſpect, that is imputed to us for righteouſneſs. If it be only the *object* and not *faith*, why is it ſo often called [*faith, believing, being perſwaded*, &c.]

Will you ſay, that *It is not faith as an act of ours only?* Whoever dreamt it was? For *à quatenus ad omne:* If as *an act*, then every act (even plowing, and walking, and ſinning) would juſtifie us.

Will you ſay, that *It is not Faith as a Moral Virtue or Good act only?* Who ſaith it is? For then every *moral good act* would juſtifie men.

Do you ſay, that It is not by *faith* as *faith in genere?* It is granted you: For elſe (*à quatenus ad omne*) any act of *faith* would juſtifie, even believing that there is a Hell.

Will you ſay, that it is not any other *ſpecies* of faith, beſides our baptiſmal faith? We grant it you.

But if you will alſo ſay, that It is not *this ſpecies*, *even the Chriſtian faith neither* that is meant, but only the object of it, then, 1. Why ſay you, that it is *Faith as connoting* the *object*; contradicting your ſelf: for if be not *faith at all*, it is not *faith* as *connoting*; that which is not, doth not connote. 2. And why ſay you, that it is not *faith* it ſelf eſſentially? Is not the *object* eſſential as an object to the act *in ſpecie?* Is it not eſſential to our Chriſtian faith to be a Believing in Chriſt?

3. But what ſober unprejudiced Chriſtian that readeth the Text throughout, and hath not been inſtructed to pervert it, can chooſe but ſee that it is *Faith it ſelf* that the Apoſtle ſpeaketh of? and that it is our perſonal Relation of *Righteouſneſs* that it is ſaid to be imputed for? And who can believe that this is the ſenſe [*Abrahams faith was imputed to him for Chriſts*

Christs Righteousness?] or this either [*His faith, that is, Christs Righteousness and not his faith, was imputed to him for Christs Righteousness?*] *Undoubtedly* by *faith* is meant *faith*, and by *Righteousness* is meant our own *Relation*. But it is most easie to discern, that the plain sense is [*Christ being presupposed the Meriter of our Justification and Salvation, which he hath given the world conditionally by a Law of Grace*, (or *Covenant Donation*,) *by which now he ruleth and judgeth us, all that this Covenant, Gift or Law requireth on our part to make us* Righteous, and entitle us to the Spirit, *and everlasting life, is that as Penitent Believers we accept Christ and life according to the nature, ends and uses of the gift*; *(and this also by his grace)*.]

Reader, hold close to this plain Doctrine, which most of the lower sort of Christians know (who have not fain into perverters hands) and you will have more *solid and practical and peaceable truth about this point*, than either Dr. *Thomas Tullie*, or *Maccovius*, or Mr. *Crandon*, or Dr. *Crisp*, or the *Marrow* of *Modern Divinity* *, or *Paul Hobson*, or Mr. *Saltmarsh*, or any such Writers do teach you in their learned Net-work Treatises, by which (being Wise or Orthodox overmuch, being themselves entangled and confounded by incongruous notions of mans invention) they are liker to entangle and confound you, than to shew you the best method and grounds for the peace of an understanding dying man.

* (Written by an honest Barber Mr. *Fisher* (as is said) and applauded by divers *Independent* Divines.)

Christs Righteousness is Imputed or Reckoned to be as it is, the total sole Meritorious Cause of all that Grace and Glory given us in and by the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace, and of our Grace for performance of the Conditions; and it needeth nothing at all of *ours* to make it perfect to this use; nor hath our *faith* any such supplemental Office. But this *condition* of our part in Christ, and of our Right to his Covenant-gifts, must be performed: and the sentence of Absolution or Condemnation, life or death, must be passed on us accordingly; it being not *Christ*, but we by this very *Law*, that are to be Judged, Justified or Condemned. And this is the Condemnation that light is come into the World, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil: But to as many as Received him, he gave Right to become the Sons of God, even to them that believe in his name: And there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit: For being perfected, he is become the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him: And it is not they that cry Lord, Lord, that shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doth the will of our heavenly Father: *For Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that to come.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Whether Gods justifying those to day that were yesterday unjustified, signifie any change in God?

P. IX. OF this also I have said so much in my *Apologie* to Dr. *Kendall*, and in the two first parts of this Book before, that I shall now put you off with this short notice:

1. There is nothing changed, or new in God: That which *on his part* is in God the Cause of our Justification, is his eternal simple essence.

2. But Gods Essence, Understanding, or Will considered simply in it self is not to be called, *Mans Justification*: But the *effect* produced by it; And partly the extrinsick object as terminating Gods act, and so by extrinsick denomination or connotation, Gods Essential Intellect and Will is said, *de novo* to justifie. But it is only man that is really changed.

3. The New effect in man from which God is said *de novo* to *justifie him*, is 1. A new *Right* or *Relation* to Christ, pardon and life, and to the Father and the Holy Ghost: 2. A new *objective termination* of Gods *estimation*, *acceptance* and *complacency*: And 3. A new heart hereupon at the same instant given us. I think none of this is from eternity: And that as God did *de novo* make the *world*, and judge it *existent*, and love and order it as existent, without any change in him, (as also millions of creatures proceed from his simple Unity) so is it here. And this needeth no more words with knowing or teachable men: And to others there is no end.

CHAP. XI.

Whether a Justified man should be afraid of becoming unjustified?

Lib. *THis fear of losing our justification, which you teach men, is most injurious to Gods free grace and immutability, and a rack for Conscience to destroy mens peace.*

P. I have said so much of this before about *Perseverance* and *Assurance*, as forbiddeth me tedious repetitions. Here needeth no more but this explication of the matter which you confound:

1. Fear is either *Causeful* or *Causeless*.

2. Fear is either such as hindereth comfort, or such as helpeth it.

3. Fear is either a Duty, or an unavoidable natural passion, or a sin of unavoidable infirmity, or a more deadly or heinous sin.

4. It's one thing to cause and cherish *Fear*, and another thing to teach men that cannot avoid it, how to deal by it. And now I assert,

1. Too many are confident that they are justified, who ought not only to *Fear* that they *are not*, but to *know* it.

2. Too many that are Justified fall into such decayes of Grace, and heinous sin, as that it becometh thereupon their *duty* to *fear* lest their hearts should

ſhould deceive them, and they prove unjuſtified, till they riſe by repentance and revived Faith. The *uncertainty* becoming *unavoidable*, ſome *Fear* in an *uncertain perſon* is a duty, without which he would ſhew a contempt of God and his ſalvation.

3. Too many Juſtified perſons have Grace ſo *weak* and *unactive*, and ſin ſo *ſtrong*, as that in that caſe, both *uncertainty* and *fears* are unavoidable to them: A *Certainty beyond fear*, ſuppoſeth a very high proportionable degree of all other Graces; (For the new creature in the chief parts uſeth to increaſe or decreaſe together:) But few have ſuch high degrees of Grace.

4. A *fear* of *particular great and heinous ſins* (which muſt be Repented of, if you will be ſaved) muſt be moderately feared by all Chriſtians; none being *certain* that they ſhall eſcape them.

5. A believing lively apprehenſion of the dreadfulneſs of Gods Judgement, as he is a conſuming fire, and one that can caſt ſoul and body into Hell, with ſo much as is neceſſary to vigilancy and labour for prevention, is all mens duty, *Luke* 12. 4, 5. *Heb.* 12. 28, 29. And on this conſideration if we *will ſerve God acceptably, it muſt be with reverence and godly fear.* And we muſt keep under our bodies (with *Paul*) and bring them into ſubjection, leſt having preached or profeſſed, we ſhould yet be *caſtawayes.*

6. Needful *cleanſing, repenting* and *preventing fear*, doth ſecure and further our comforts, by removing the ſin and danger that would hinder them.

7. All our enemies and dangers are not overcome till the end. And *danger* muſt be eſcaped by moderate *fear.* God who brings his ſervants over all their dangers, will ſave them by a ſober *fear* and *vigilancy*, and not by *fearleſneſs* of the evil.

8. But all that *fear* which includeth *error* or *unbelief*, or *diſtruſt* of *Chriſt*, is ſinful, and to be reſiſted with all our care; And the more diſtruſt, the greater is the ſin.

9. All Fear that driveth *from Chriſt*, and faith, and hope, and love, and true conſolation we cry down daily, as injurious to God and man.

10. We teach all Chriſtians to contend with utmoſt diligence, to get up to the higheſt Truſt, Love, Joy, Thanksgiving and Praiſe, as the proper Evangelical excellency, neareſt Heaven: and to get as faſt as they can above that fear which hath torment, which is caſt out as love groweth perfect: and to pray and ſeek for the Spirit of Adoption, of Power, and Love, and a ſound mind, inſtead of the Spirit of fear and bondage: And not to place too much of their Religion in that very fear which in its ſeaſon is a duty, much leſs in hurtful ſinful fear: But alwayes and in all things to Rejoyce in the Lord, with Love and Gratitude, and confidently to caſt all their cares on him.

11. But as all men here are imperfect in Holineſs, Faith and Aſſurance, and in their doubts, ſome *fear* of the event (beſides meer reverence of God) is their duty, ſo we teach men how ſo to live in an uncertain fearing ſtate, as ſafelieſt to get above it.

12. And we know that ſin, wickedneſs, preſumption, ſelf-deceit and pride are ſo common in the world, that Fear is very needful to the moſt; and we have cauſe to call with *Paul* to many proud Profeſſors, *Be not high minded, but fear* (even leſt God ſhould cut them off as he did the Jews); and Having a promiſe of entring into his reſt, let us fear leſt any of us come ſhort of it, *Heb.* 4. 1. And Chriſt thrice over reciteth his urgent exhortatory words, Luke 12, 4, 5. *I ſay to you my friends——I will tell*

you whom you shall fear———Fear him who when he hath killed, hath power to cast into Hell; yea, I say unto you (the third time) *fear him:* Is not this authority full, and these words plain and very earnest, even to his *friends?*

13. And it is not fit to make such a Doctrine a fundamental certainty, which we find none of all the Churches of Christ held from the Apostles dayes for many and many hundred years (that ever I could read or hear of,) I mean that [*all the Justified persevere*]. Be it never so clear to you, that which now is, and so long was thought so far from clear and sure to the Churches of Christ, as it is no fit foundation for the Churches Concord, so neither for a Christians everlasting hopes, to be so much laid on it, as by some they are.

CHAP. XII.

Of Mans Power to believe; and of calling the unregenerate to Duty.

P. X. & XI. OF the first of these I have said so much before, that I will here pass it by. And as to the second, you are a man of pernicious principles, and downright heretical and damnable, if indeed you would have us call no unregenerate persons to any *duty* whatsoever. Answer me these Questions:

Quest. 1. Would you not have your Wife, Children and Servants taught, that it is their duty to love, honour and obey you? and your neighbours to deal justly with you? and the Rulers to protect you, and the Judges to do you Justice?

Lib. *I speak only of* Religious *and not Civil duties.*

P. You are indifferent it seemeth as to the Interest of Gods honour and mens salvation: Let those alone, so be it your *own* interest be secured. Duty *to you,* must be preached, but not to God. But would you not have them taught to do you service as to the Lord, and as such as from him shall have punishment or reward? and to submit themselves to the Higher Powers for conscience sake as to the Ministers of God? and to Honour Father and Mother in obedience to God, and that by his reward their dayes may be long? Should not all be done to the Glory of God?

Lib. *Yes, it should be; but the wicked cannot do it: Therefore they must be first made Godly, and the Heart renewed, that the life may be amended.*

P. We are as much and more for Heart-work, and for beginning there, than you are: we know that God accepteth not the hypocrite, that draweth near him, and honoureth him with the lips, when the heart is far from him: The outward actions are no further Good or Bad, than they are *Voluntary* or from the *will.* The Divine Nature, and Image of God, and life of the new creature, is the *new heart* by the Love of God shed abroad upon it by the Holy Ghost. But,

Quest. 2. Are we to call men to no duty at all, to the getting of a new heart? Should we not perswade them to *hear* Gods Word?

Lib. *Yes: How shall they believe unless they hear?*

P. Queſt. 3. Muſt we call them from the Tavern, Ale-houſe, Gaming-houſe, Play-houſe, Whore-houſe, yea, from their lawfuller imployments that they may hear in ſeaſon? and call *Martha* to chooſe *Maries* part, and thoſe that ſay, They cannot come becauſe of their Oxen, Farms and Buſineſs, to change that mind?

Lib. *Yes, no doubt of it:* Zaccheus *muſt be in Chriſts way.*

P. Queſt. 4. Muſt we not perſwade them to take heed how and what they hear? and to ſet their hearts to all Gods Words, and to ſee that they deſpiſe not him that ſpeaketh? but he that hath ears to hear, let him hear; and to conſider of the *truth* and *weight* of all, and to ſearch the Scriptures to ſee whether the things be ſo?

Lib. *I deny none of this.*

P. Queſt. 5. May we not perſwade them to come and talk and reaſon the caſe with Friends or Miniſters, that we may convince them?

Lib. *Yes no doubt, as well as to hear in publick.*

P. Queſt. 6. May we not Catechiſe them, and teach them the Principles of Chriſtianity, that they may underſtand them?

Lib. *Yes, as to the Matter; but to teach them your* forms *of Queſtions and Anſwers, is but formality and deceit.*

P. What? May we not teach them the words of Chriſt and Scripture? How ſhall the *matter* be underſtood without words? And what better words, than the words of Scripture?

Lib. *But a* Form *of the ſame words is but formality.*

P. Hath God forbid us to uſe the ſame? Are Children and ignorant people fit to underſtand the myſteries of God, if you ſpeak them every time in new or other words? or can they ſo remember them? And when the uſe of *words* is to ſignifie *Things*, and the *Matter* is one and the ſame (for we have but one God, and Chriſt, and Goſpel) what wild work will you make of it, if you ſpeak the ſame things every time in other words? Are all thoſe words equally fit to ſignifie the ſame Things? Certainly ſome particular words are more fitted to each matter than other: And ſhould not the fitteſt be moſt uſed? Doth not Chriſt deliver us a *form* of Baptiſm, and a form of the adminiſtration of his laſt Supper, and a form of Prayer? Are there not forms preſcribed in Gods Word, of the Prieſts Benediction, and what the people ſhall ſay when they offer Sacrifice? Are not all the Pſalms forms of Prayer and Praiſe (and were indeed the Liturgie of the Jews)? Doth not *Joel* put a form of prayer into the mouths of Penitents? Doth not *Paul* teach us to uſe Pſalms and Hymns and Spiritual Songs, ſinging and making melody in our hearts to the Lord? *Eph.* 5. 19. Doubtleſs it is not only *Davids* Pſalms that are meant by theſe three words; but Hymns and Songs fitted to Goſpel Worſhip: And if you would have none of them premeditated, nor be twice the ſame words, you would ſoon make your ſelf ridiculous to the world. If you ſay that this Precept was for them that could do ſo being *filled with the Spirit*, I anſwer, 1. It's true that they had their extraordinary endowments, which made a difference in the manner (as alſo in Praying and Preaching): But ſhall we dream that therefore the ſame duties belong not to us to be performed in the beſt manner that we can? 2. A man may from the Spirit pour out his ſoul to God in forms of Prayer and Praiſe, though the words were premeditated.

In a word, if you would have all forms of Creeds, Prayer, Praiſe and adminiſtration of Sacraments, and Catechiſms caſt away, you are an enemy to Gods true Worſhip, and the ſafety and edification of the Church; yea, you muſt caſt away all the Scriptures, which are Gods form of inſtruction, recorded for the Churches uſe to the end of the World.

Queſt. 6. But I further ask you, May we not perſwade bad men to examine themſelves, and to find, know and confeſs that they are bad and ungodly? and to lament it?

Lib. *Yes, that cannot be denyed.*

P. Queſt. 7. And may we not perſwade them to *believe* that there is a God, and that the Scripture is his Word, and true? and that Chriſt is the Meſſias?

Lib. *Yes; the Devils believe all this.*

P. Queſt. 8. And may we not exhort them to Repent, and Turn to God, and ſo to believe in Chriſt as to receive him, and give up themſelves unto him?

Lib. *Yes, you may exhort them: but they cannot do it of themſelves.*

P. Muſt we exhort them to nothing but what they can do of themſelves?

Queſt. 9. Is not Exhortation Gods means to bring them to Repentance and Faith in Chriſt?

Lib. *Yes; I deny none of this; But that which you abuſe men by,* 1. *Is bidding the ungodly* pray, *when the prayers of the wicked are abominable to God.* And 2. *In that you do not firſt call them to believe and come to Chriſt, before they do any other duty.*

P. 1. You granted me before that hearing and conſidering and ſearching the Scripture, and other things named, are to be done before Believing in Chriſt, by thoſe that are yet unbelievers. He that believeth that there is a God, muſt behave himſelf accordingly in obeying God. 2. Men that believe in Chriſt but by Aſſent, that he is truly the Chriſt, and the Goſpel true, and that there is a life to come, ſurely, if they love themſelves, muſt do ſomewhat in order to a fuller Juſtifying Belief. 3. And are you ſo much againſt the very Law of Nature, worſe than the Seamen that bid *Jonas* call upon his God, worſe than the *Ninevites*, and than almoſt all mankind, as that you would have no men pray but godly men? Did not *Peter* bid *Simon Magus* repent and pray, *Acts* 8. And doth not God command the wicked, *Iſa.* 55. to ſeek the Lord while he may be found, and call upon him while he is near? Should no graceleſs man ask *Wiſdom* of God, *who giveth liberally to all men, and upbraideth not*, James 1. and giveth his Spirit to them that ask it? Muſt they not pray for Grace, Faith and Repentance, that want them? 4. But yet let me remember you, that we uſe not to exhort men to draw nigh to God with the lips alone; nor to pray without *Deſire*. For *Praying* is but *Deſiring*, and preſenting that *Deſire* to God. And when we bid men pray for Grace, we bid them deſire it. And ſo bid them *Repent* and *Pray*, Believe and Pray; for *Praying* is a *Returning* act; And if we may not call them to *pray*, we may not call them to Turn to God. Mr. *Eliot* in *New England* teacheth the *Indians* another leſſon, whoſe great work is to call them to pray, and the title that his Converts have, is the *Praying Indians*.

Lib. *But without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God, or do any thing which is not abominable to him.*

P. 1. But it is not impoſſible for one to have a common and temporary faith, and another a ſaving faith. 2. And one that *believeth that God is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him*, and this not ſavingly, may yet *leſs diſpleaſe God*, and be *leſs abominable* than he was before without it: and alſo may do ſomething that tendeth as a means, to that *Faith* by which he may pleaſe him.

1. A total unbeliever, and a wicked man as wicked, whoſe prayers are animated with wicked principles and ends, utterly diſpleaſeth God, and his prayers and all ſuch actions are abominable.

2. A

2. A convinced wicked man that doth ſomewhat from ſelf-love for his own ſalvation, and ſpecially one that is *not far from the Kingdom of God*, in the uſe of common grace, is leſs abominable, and pleaſeth God *ſecundum quid*, or leſs diſpleaſeth him, or ſeeketh that grace with which he may pleaſe him: And Chriſt is ſaid to love ſuch a man; *Mark* 10.21.

3. But only the true Penitent believer ſo pleaſeth him as to be an Adopted heir of life.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Witneſs of the Spirit, and Evidences of Juſtification.

P. XII. I Will ſpend no more time with you on this, than briefly to open your error, and then to tell you what we hold as certain truth.

I. It is your groſs Error to oppoſe *Evidences* to the *Witneſs of the Spirit*; for in the principal reſpect they are the ſame: as you may find by ſtudying theſe Texts well: *Rom.* 8. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 23. 1 *Cor.* 6. 17. & 12. 4, 12, 13. 2 *Cor.* 3. 3. & 4. 13. & 12. 18. *Gal.* 4. 6. & 5. 5, 16, 17, 18, 25. 2 *Tim.* 1. 7. *John* 3. 3, 5, 6. *Eph.* 1. 18. & 2. 18, 22. & 4. 3, 4, 16, 23. & 5. 9, 18. 2 *Theſſ.* 2. 13. 1 *Pet.* 1. 2, 22. 1 *John* 3. 24. & 4. 13. *Zech.* 12. 10. *Rom.* 7. 6. *Ezek.* 11. 19. & 18. 31. & 36. 26. *Eph.* 1. 13, *&c.*

Our *having* the *Spirit*, and our being ſanctified by the Spirit, are the Witneſs, Seal, Pledge, Earneſt, and Firſt Fruits, and the *Evidence* of our Adoption and Right to life. It is not chiefly *An inward voice* or *perſwaſion* that we *are* Gods Children, that is the *Witneſs*.

But II. As a *mans Rational ſoul* doth *witneſs* that he is a *Man*, ſo the Spirit of holineſs witneſſeth that we are Chriſtians; and adopted 1. Conſtitutively, making us ſuch. 2. And thereby differencing us from all that are not ſuch. 3. And then helping us to *diſcern* that we are ſuch: As the Reaſonable ſoul perceiveth it ſelf. 4. And helping us to *exerciſe* our *Grace* that it may be the more diſcernable. 5. And laſtly, *Comforting* us by ſuch *Exerciſe* and *diſcerning*: As Life and the Intellectual Nature are pleaſing to themſelves.

The Concluſion.

P. AND now *Saul* what think you of the Cavils that have puzled and troubled you? Have you heard any thing that ſhould change your mind?

S. "*I have heard that from you that confirmeth and ſatisfieth me: But "I have heard that from* L. *which grieveth my very ſoul,* 1. *To think "what temptations and perplexing tryals poor ignorant Religious people "are aſſaulted by, and how hard a thing it muſt needs be for ſuch to "eſcape deceit and ſin, and great diſtractions.* 2. *To think in how ſad "a condition the Church of God is, that beſides what they ſuffer from men*

"*of*

"*of Violence, and the flatteries of the World, muſt be thus troubled and*
"*enſnared by men of high profeſſions of Religion, and even drawn to*
"*corrupt the Word of God, and almoſt to preach another Goſpel.* 3. *And*
"*that ever men of ſuch profeſſions ſhould be guilty of ſo much evil: Wo*
"*to the World becauſe of offences, and wo to them by whom they come.*

P. Alas! it is no new thing: Do you not remember that *Paul* had ſuch and worſe to deal with. Read *Gal.* 1. & 3 & 4. Read *Rev.* 2. & 3. *Jude*, & 2 *Pet.* 2. & *James* 2. & 3. & *Acts* 15, *&c.* and you will ſee, that even thoſe pureſt times when they had Apoſtolical Gifts and Authority to reſtrain and ſettle them, were yet thus tryed and troubled by men of high pretenſions, ſo that *Paul* wiſheth that they were cut off that trouble them; and Chriſt proclaimeth the hatred of his ſoul againſt the Doctrine of the *Nicolaitans*; and *Paul* tells the *Corinthians*, that *Hereſies muſt be among them*, that thoſe which are approved may be manifeſted among them; and the *Epheſians*, *Acts* 20. 30. that of their own ſelves ſhould men ariſe, ſpeaking perverſe things, to draw away Diſciples after them. And ever ſince in all Ages to this day, the Church hath been as Chriſt on the Croſs, between two Thieves, between the Tyrannical and the Superſtitious Heretical dividing ſort of profeſſed Chriſtians. But hold faſt plain primitive SIMPLICITY and ſerious PRACTICE of a ſober, righteous, godly and peaceable life, and you will get ſafe through all ſuch ſnares.

The

The Twelfth Dayes CONFERENCE.

L. A *Lutheran*: R. A *Reconciler*.

Whether the Difference between *Papists*, *Arminians*, *Lutherans* and *Calvinists* about *Mans Merits*, be as Great as many think it?

L. *I Am greatly scandalized by a Sermon that you lately preached in* London, *in which you said (as many good people assure me) that the difference between the* Protestants *and the* Papists *was little more than in meer words: The City ringeth of it, and it is a common scandal, and offence.*

R. Seeing you heard it not, you are unfit to receive satisfaction about it, save only by telling you that the *Report is false*, and that which I said of some particular Controversies only, they feign to be spoken of *all*, or *most*, or *others*: But of this when you bring one that heard it, I will give you a further account.

L. *However I perceive by your words and writings, that you extenuate our difference about* Mans Merits: *And what is there that we more differ from the* Papists *about, than* Merits; *and from the* Arminians, *than their placing our* Righteousness *in our own* Believing *and* Repenting? *Is there any thing that more evacuateth the Righteousness of Christ? and destroyeth the honour of* free grace, *and justly entitleth them to the name of Antichristian?*

R. Forget not that before I further discourse with you, I premise, that I speak not a word to justifie or excuse the *Papists* in general, or any one of them in particular, for any unsound *word* about this subject, nor to abate your just dislike of any of their errors: And before we proceed, I desire your promise that you will hear and speak with as little partiality, passion, and unrighteousness as you can, (for to lay by all, I cannot expect,) and that you will be true to what evidence of truth shall appear to you.

L. *Do you think that I love not* Truth *and Sobriety? why do you so suspect me?*

R. Alas, how strange are our hearts oft to themselves! and how much of our own ignorance, temerity, passion and unjust partiality is there, in many a cause which we (sinfully) father upon God, and his Truth and Grace! But in order to our better understanding, I ask your answer to these Questions.

Quest. 1. Had you rather it did truly appear to you, that the *Papists* and *Arminians* do *less differ* from us, than most conceive, or not?

L. *I had rather they did* differ leſs, *and if it be ſo, I had rather know it than not; But I would not hear that it is ſo, when it is not.*

R. Take heed that your heart deceive you not, and that you be not averſe to know the truth, leſt it ſhould croſs your own and other mens former cenſures.

Queſt. 2. If it prove true, that the difference is leſs than moſt take it to be, is he that falſly aggravateth it to the procuring of unjuſt odium, or he that truly openeth and extenuateth it, the more to be commended or approved?

L. *If you have the Truth on your ſide, no doubt but you do well, becauſe* Love *and* Peace *alſo are on your ſide, and our fault is great that quarrel with you.*

R. Queſt. 3. Do you think it is juſtice in any *Papiſts* to charge the crude unſound expreſſions of particular Writers, on the *Proteſtant* party as their Doctrine? (as Mr. *Parker*, Mr. *Patrick*, Mr. *Sherlock* are blamed for doing by the *Non-conformiſts:*) or for us to do the ſame by them?

L. *No: but where their Doctors agree, we may go further.*

R. Queſt. 4. Do you think that the bare name of *Merit*, is cauſe enough to accuſe any of falſe Doctrine, who meaneth by it nothing that is unſound? or that the *name* is reaſon enough for ſharp accuſations of ſuch men?

L. *I am willing to difference the controverſie* de nomine *from that* de re, *and not to make a greater matter of a* name *than there is cauſe: But yet* ill names *do tend to introduce* ill Doctrines.

R. Queſt. 5. Do you hold that *well-doing* hath any *Reward* from God?

L. *It is not vain: It hath that bleſſing freely given which is improperly called a Reward.*

R. It is figuratively called *Wages*: And yet this is the commoneſt Scripture title, (and cannot you bear with Gods Word?) But it is not improperly called *Præmium* a *Reward*: that is, A benefit given to one for well doing. Indeed if with the new Atheiſtical Philoſophers, you take God but for a *Phyſical Motor*, and his Government, and Laws, and Judgement to be all but *Motion*, improperly and popularly ſo named, then you may ſay the ſame of his *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*.

L. *Well: you know that* Proteſtants *deny not* Reward.

R. Queſt. 6. Is not *Reward* formally Related to ſome *well-doing* as the *moral aptitude* of the *Receiver?*

L. *Yes: it is ſuch a Relation formally.*

R. Queſt. 7. Are not they then of your judgement as to the *Matter*, who hold *Merit* in no other ſenſe, than as it is [*Rewardable well-doing*] or [*a Moral aptitude for Reward?*]

L. *I deny not that with ſuch I differ but in the* Name.

R. Queſt. 8. Do not you know that it is the common uſage of the word, in Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Writers, to take *Meritum* and *Præmium* ſo far for Relatives, as that *omne Præmium eſt meriti præmium*; though *omne meritum* be not *Præmii meritum*. Reward and Rewardableneſs are thus meant as related.

It's true that *Meritum* is ſometime taken leſs properly for any *Dueneſs*; as a man is ſaid to *Merit* his Fathers Legacie, that is, hath right to it: ſometimes it is taken for any Moral Congruity: ſometimes in *malam partem* for *Commerit* of *puniſhment*: and ſometimes for a fault it ſelf. As *Calvin* noteth on the word. But ſtill every *Reward* is formally related to *Merit* or Rewardableneſs.

L. *But*

L. *But (not only our late Lectures against Popery, but) many* Protestants *say, that It is not* Merit, *unless there be* an Equality *of it in worth to the* Reward; *And therefore their Arguments against Merit are (as there)* 1. *The Reward is meerly of Mercy and Grace: therefore not of Merit.* 2. *It is Gods Gift: therefore not deserved.* 3. *It is by Inheritance.* 4. *We owe all to God; and therefore cannot Merit.* 5. *Our works are imperfect.* 6. *We need pardon.* 7. *Our works are not equal in Goodness and Value to eternal life.* 8. *We cannot recompence God for what we have.* 9. *We cannot profit God.* 10 *Grace and debt are opposite.* 11. *We may not Trust our works (faith or love) therefore they merit not. So that the question is but of such a* Merit *as by* equal worth maketh the Reward due in point *of Justice.*

R. All these reasons sufficiently confute Merit in point of *Commutative Justice*: But they go upon a meer mistake, as if this were the state of the controversie between us and the *Roman* Church, or they took *Merit* in any such sense; unless it be some rare ignorant fellow (such as *Romanus* seemeth by some words, and some few others): But do you grant that you *differ* but *de nomine* and not *de re* with those that take not *Merit* in any such sense, but mean as you do *de re ipsa?*

L. *That I must needs grant.*

R. Before we proceed then, let me briefly and plainly open the case.

1. God standeth related to Man, 1. As the *Owner of us* and all things: 2. As our *Rector* by Laws: 3. As our *Benefactor.*

2. To *Merit*, 1. Of a *Proprietor* or Owner, must be giving him somewhat to his *gain* or *pleasure*, for the worth of which he is bound by *Commutative Justice*, to requite us. 2. To Merit of a *Ruler* is to do that which he is bound to Reward in *Distributive Justice*, to perform his Rewarding promises, or at least for the *Ends* of Government. 3. To *merit* of a *meer Benefactor* is no more than not to be uncapable of his *Gift*, which is improperly called *Merit.*

3. All our controversie is about the second: God as our Governour ruleth us 1. At first by the Law of Innocency, 2. By the Law of Grace; and that 1. As delivered to the World in *Adam* and *Noe*, 2. Or to the *Jews* with the addition of the Mosaical Law of Works, 3. Or as delivered in the Gospel by Christ and his Spirit.

4. To dream of that *Merit* from God as a proprietor in point of *Commutative* Justice, which our Arguments militate against, is *tantum non madness*: and is not the Doctrine of the Church of *Rome* (that I know of.)

5. To assert our *Meriting* of God as Rector by the Law of Innocency is dotage. And I know none that hold that we do so (by our selves, though some hold that we do so *per alium.*)

6. Nor do any but *Jews* that I know of assert Merit after the *Jewish* Law of Works.

7. But they that hold that Christ hath *Merited* and *freely Given* a Conditional *pardon* and *right* to *life* to all mankind, even on condition of a penitent believing acceptance of the free gift, and this by a Law of Grace, which we must now be Ruled and Judged by, do hold that this Law hath its Reward, and mans acts accordingly their worth or *Merit.*

8. This *Merit* in point of *Distributive Justice*, is to be conceived of and defined according to the Regiment which it respecteth, which is *Gods Paternal Government* of *freely Redeemed sinners*, by a *Law of Grace* freely pardoning and saving them if they will believe and accept the gift. So that it is only *Meriting* under a Law made by a Governing *Owner* and *Benefactor,*

nefactor, for the *ſapiential orderly diſpoſal of a free Gift.* As a Father will teach a Child *Obedience* by telling him that he will give him Gold or Meat, if he will thankfully accept it.

9. It is not true therefore that it is *only a free Gift:* For as it is a free Gift in regard of the *Value* and *quoad rem*, ſo that *Gift* is a *Reward* in regard of the *Order* of Conveyance, and tenour of the *Donation*, and the moral *capacity* of the *Receiver*, which men call *Merit.*

10. That we cannot (*per impotentiam voluntariam moralem*) perform the Condition, without Divine Grace, is nothing againſt the Tenour of the Donation, nor the nature of the Relation of a Reward.

11. But *Reward* and *Merit* in this caſe are furtheſt from that of Commutation, and leaveth leaſt to man to boaſt of.

12. Yet may he truly glory in the effects of Grace with thankfulneſs to God, as *Paul* did, 2 Cor. 1. 11, 12. that in ſimplicity and godly ſincerity, *&c.* and 2 *Tim.* 4. 8. that he had fought a good fight, *&c.* And he may juſtifie his ſincerity with *Job, chap.* 13. 15, 16. And Chriſt will ſay, *well done good and faithful ſervant, &c.* Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he knoweth me, (ſaith the Lord,) *&c.* And *Paul* would rather dye, than any ſhould make his glorying void, as to his free preaching the Goſpel.

13. And it is very falſe that in this ſenſe a Chriſtian is not bound to truſt to his *Faith, Repentance, Love, Obedience*, only in their own place and office aſſigned them by God; but no further: As we may truſt to the Bible, Preacher, Parents, ſo to hearing, reading, praying, *&c.* for their *proper part:* elſe we ſhall take them all to be in vain. Are they *Means*, or no *Means?* If *Means*, they muſt be judged and truſted as they are, and no further: And people are not to be frightned from neceſſary truth, by putting an ill ſenſe upon words.

14. And though here be nothing of Commutative Juſtice, yet there is that which Juſtifieth the name of *Wages* uſed analogically in the Scriptures: Becauſe Love in a Father maketh a Childs intereſt to be partly his own; and the *Pleaſure of his Will*, is that to God who is Love it ſelf and delighteth in his *Childrens good*, which *Profit* is to a humane proprietor.

And now I will proceed with you in my Queſtions.

Queſt. 9. Do you think that *Papiſts* or *Arminians* do believe, that either Man, or Angel, or Chriſt can merit of God by *Profiting* him, in Commutative Juſtice? Or that it is poſſible for any creature to have any Good which is not the free gift of God? ſuppoſing man a free agent in his duty.

L. *I have hitherto thought that they ſo judge: Why elſe talk they of* Merit *of* Congruity *and* Condignity, *and that ſay ſome*, ex dignitate, *yea, and* ex proportione operum?

R. It ſeemeth you think not that you hold all this your ſelf. Let us try.

1. By *Merit*, they ſtill mean a *ſubordinate Merit*, which ſuppoſeth the Benefit 1. To be *Gods Gift*, 2. *Merited* by *Chriſt.*

L. *How prove you that?*

R. It is the expreſs words of the *Trent* Council *de Juſtif. Can.* 8. "We are ſaid to be Juſtified *gratis*, *becauſe nothing* that *goeth before Ju-*
"*ſtification*, whether it be Faith or Works, doth merit the Grace it ſelf
"of Juſtification: For if it be Grace, it is no more of Works; elſe
"Grace is not Grace.

"*Can.* 16. Though ſo much be given in Scripture to Good Works,
"that Chriſt promiſeth him that giveth but a Cup of cold Water to one
of

"of the least, that he shall not lose his reward, ——— yet far be it "from a Christian to *trust* or *glory* in himself, and not in the Lord, "whose *Goodness* is so great to all men, that he wills those things to be "*Their Merits*, which are *His Gifts*.

And *Anath. C.* 26, they thus open their Doctrine of *Merit*: "If any "say, that the *Righteous* ought not to *expect* eternal retribution from God "by his *Mercy* and Christs Merits, for the good works done in God, if "by well doing and keeping God Commandments they persevere to the "end, let him be *Anathema*.

"*C.* 31, 32. If any say, that a Justified mans good works are so Gods "Gifts, that they be not also the Justified mans good merits, or that the "Justified do not truly merit increase of grace and life eternal by the "good works which are done by Gods Grace and Christs Merit (of whom "he is a living member) *&c. Anath. sit.*

"*C.* 16. To them therefore that do well to the end, and hope in God, "Life eternal is to be proposed, both as Grace mercifully *promised* "to the *Sons* of God through Jesus Christ, and as a Reward faithfully to "be given by Gods own promise to their Works and Merits.

L. *Yes, this ridiculous Doctrine of our* Meriting *by Gods Grace and Christs Merits I have often read and heard of in them.*

R. It is somewhat bold to deride that which *Scripture*, *Reason* and all the *antient Churches* do accord in. That Christ *merited* that we should subordinately merit, that is, *be Rewardable*, as before explained, hath no less consent. And *Contra Rationem nemo sobrius: Contra Scripturam nemo Christianus: Contra Ecclesiam nemo Catholicus.*

L. *But if the Council of* Trent *deny that Justification is at all merited, what is meant by the* Papists Merit *of* Congruity?

R. II. I think you hold not only as much of that as they, but (do you think it?) somewhat more.

1. As much: For 1. *De nomine* some of them deny that this is any *merit* at all, as well as you. And their Council asserteth it not (that I see.) 2. *De re:* They mean the same *thing* by *Merit* of Congruity, which Mr. *Rogers*, *Bolton*, *Hooker* and the rest call *Preparation* for *Christ* or for *Conversion*; And so the Council of *Trent* calls it: Which maketh a man a more Congruous Receiver of Grace than the unprepared, but doth not prove God obliged to give it him as a Reward. And do not you hold all this *de re?*

2. Yea and more: For the Council of *Trent* taketh *Justification* for Remission of sin and sanctification together, as after Faith: And so hold that *Faith it self* doth not *merit* Justification. But do not you hold more, *de re*, that *Faith hath a flat promise* of *Justification* (which is true)? And so God hath as it were obliged his *fidelity* to give it? which is *it* they mean by *Merit*.

L. *But what is their* Merit *of* Condignity *then? Is not that abominable?*

R. III. 1. You know that the words [*worthy*] and [*Worthiness*] are used in the Scripture? Bear therefore with Scripture words. 2. And *de re*, they mean not all one thing, or use not the same expressions at least: Some (and many) with *Scotus* say, that it is *ex pacto*, from Gods *Promise* that the *Merit* and dueness do result; or from Gods Decree and free acceptation.

L. *I am sure your own friends say, that* [These are few, and too modest, and indeed half Hereticks for their pains.]

R. I love not to perswade the World that men mean worse than they speak: What you mean by [*too modest*] I know not; but it is not true either

either that *they are few*, or taken by their Church for *half hereticks*. And truth is well ſerved by nothing but truth. But the author you mean, doth well in not oppoſing thoſe that are of this mind, nor thoſe that deny all merit of congruity; and in acknowledging that ſuch there are. He is a ſtranger to the Popiſh Doctors who either taketh the *Scotiſts* themſelves to be few (or judged half hereticks) or elſe that it is they only that are of that opinion: of which more anon.

L. *But what mean they that ſay it is* ex Dignitate, *if not as profiting God?*

R. 1. I tell you they almoſt all conclude againſt commutative merit, and who is ſo mad as to think that we profit God? 2. I tell you that you may alſo ask what the Scripture meaneth by *worthineſs*; And how elſe will you tranſlate ἀξιος but *worthy* or *deſerving*? And what is ἀξια but *Merit*? 3. They mean [the *Moral aptitude of well-doing for the promiſed Reward*:] And do you deny that?

L. *But ſome of them ſay plainly that it is of* Debt?

R. Yes: they oft ſay with *Auguſtine* that God by his promiſe hath made himſelf as a Debtor.

L. *But ſome ſay that Merit of condignity is* ex proportione operum *to the reward.*

R. It's impoſſible to know what every man meaneth, and impoſſible to make all men ſpeak congruouſly: But as far as I can diſcern, moſt of them that ſo ſpeak, mean, that the moſt wiſe God doth all things in order and harmony, and as he ſuiteth natural cauſes and effects, ſo he doth *gracious* ones: And that his free grace puttethinto mans holineſs, a ſuitableneſs to the Reward, which is but a ſuitableneſs of the habit and act to the object: And that he that *Loved God much* ſhall be much happy in that Love, and be much beloved by him: And ſo every Saint enjoy God according to the proportion of his Love or holineſs, and Glory be varyed according to the degrees of Grace.

L. *This we all hold: But you make them ſounder and wiſer than they are.*

R. Many of them and us want skill to ſpeak very clearly: Confuſion and darkneſs is found in all our conceptions and expreſſions ſo far as we know but in part: Thoſe that you can *prove* to me are worſe, prove it by them. I take this to be the common ſenſe of thoſe few that talk of *Meritum ex proportione*: For they moſt commonly diſclaim the word *equality*, and all diſclaim it as to *commutation*: And what elſe can they mean?

And here I offer you an argument for Reward even in this ſenſe of proportion which all the world cannot anſwer: ſuppoſing that God will freely continue man in life and immortality. If the Reward be eſſential to or neceſſarily inſeparable from true love and obedience, then true love and obedience have certainly a Reward (and a moral aptitude for that Reward, or a Rewardableneſs, called *Merit*:) But the former is certain. For 1. To *Love God* is the ſouls *health*, *pleaſure* and *felicity* it ſelf (including the Knowledge of him;) And perfect Knowledge and love is perfect happineſs. 2. To *obey God* is formally to do that which Pleaſeth him pleaſedly becauſe it pleaſeth him: And to Pleaſe God is mans ultimate End and Reward. 3. It is impoſſible but that God, by *his perfection*, ſhould *Love and be pleaſed* with every thing that is *Good* according to the *proportion* of its *goodneſs*; and therefore with the *Love* and *obedience* of his Children. So that all thoſe arguments of Proteſtants which well prove *Holineſs* to be *Happineſs* it ſelf, prove the Reward to be eſſential or inſeparable.

L. *If*

L. *If this be all that those few highest Papists mean, then they are but more zealous in commending holiness than the looser sort, as the Religious Preachers with us are: And if this be indeed their meaning, they are unhappy in expressing themselves, or we in understanding them, and our hearers unhappy that upon such misunderstanding are taught to abhorr them.*

R. You know 1. That by *Justification* they mean *Remission* of *sin* and *Holiness*: 2. And that they hold that no works merit, but those that are done by the members of Christ and by his spirit, in love and holiness: 3. And that they merit nothing but what is primarily Gods Gift: 4. Nor any thing but what is *merited* by Christ by another sort of merit, to which ours is but subordinate; 5. And that they commonly say that even faith it self doth not *merit Justification* (or *Holiness*;) because though it have a *Promise* of it, and so *ex pacto* it is due; yet there is in the *nature* of the *things* no necessary connexion between them: And now what can they mean after all this by *condignity ex proportione operis ad præmium*, but this which I have described? Holiness is happiness and connexed to happiness, in its various degrees.

L. *But some say that they are so* Impudent *as to say that* from *the* intrinsick worth *of the* work, setting aside *the* consideration of the promise, it is meritorious.

R. 1. Their commonest opinion is that the *natural Aptitude* of *Holiness* and *obedience*, and the *Promise of God* set together make them rewardable (or meritorious as they call it:) which is most certain. God promiseth not his blessings and happiness to men for things evil, or worthless and indifferent. But 2. Some among their Doctors say that *Were* there no promise Holiness would be Rewardable; that is, that Gods perfection proveth that he is Pleased with it and Loveth the holy: 2. And that it is happiness it self as is aforesaid: And as this doth but speak the suitableness of Gods Image to be the object of his Love, and of *obedience* to be the Pleasing of his will; so it seemeth to me only to mean that *were there* no *Positive supernatural promise*, yet the very Law *of nature* (which is Gods first Law) containeth such a signification of his will [that he will love, and bless those that love him and obey him] as is indeed a kind of natural promise.

And it is to be noted that all the Heathen World, who know not the written promise do agree in this as a natural Verity, that God loveth and is pleased with Goodness, love and obedience, and that it shall go well with them that are so qualified. And if we should forget the Papists, and preach to religious people with us, that there is no Goodness in the Divine Nature and Image of God, and in Holy love and obedient fruitful lives, for which God would love or be pleased with such as have them (supposing Redemption and the merits of Christ) any more than with the wicked, if it were not that he hath promised, (as if he had been surprized into a promise, not suited to the nature of the thing,) this would be abhorred by the same professours, who in other words, as it seemeth to be against Popery, will applaud it.

But in all this you must remember, that it is presupposed that *mans* soul is before made Immortal by God as Creator, and that he might annihilate the most holy Creature if he will: But he hath declared that he will not, partly by the Nature of his soul, and partly by his natural and positive revelations: so that it is presupposed that God will continue us men, and then *Holiness* will be a proportionable Happiness.

L. *But I pray you give me further proof that the Papists mean so well and near us as you describe the case. Cite me the Authors.*

R. 1. You

R. 1. You must take nothing for their Religion but what is in their Councils: And you must charge no errour on them but what you can prove: For the Accuser is the prover. And I before cited to you the words of the *Trent* Council.

But I justifie not all that they there say: And one passage as it soundeth I greatly abhorr; which is, that a *Just man doth not venially sin, much less deserve hell in every good work*, Can. 11. de Justif. whereas I doubt not but the very culpable defect of *Love* to *God* and other holy qualifications defileth our best works with sin: and every sin deserveth some degree of a hell, according to the Law of Innocency: But if they mean, 1. That Good works as such are not sin, 2. Or that our infirmities are not such as to which the Law of Grace threatneth hell and will condemn us; we are then of their mind, but we much mislike their words: For were there not an antecedent desert of hell, and a sinfulness so deserving (though not by an unremediable guilt) there would be no need of pardon. But to speak freely, the Council Doctors seemed not well studied in the doctrine of the Covenants (even *Suarez de Legibus*, one of the best, is herein short,) and so to speak confusedly of these matters: But they seem mostly to take notice only of the Law of Grace, and because that accepteth sincerity, and condemneth none for meer Infirmities, therefore they thence measure both *fault* and *guilt* (which they should not do:) For I find that they still presuppose Redemption and Pardon of sin, in the present case.

But to proceed to their Doctors: *Vega q.* 4. defineth Merit thus, [*Meritum est actio libera, acceptata ad aliquod præmium.*] And *de re*, do you deny this?

Davenport thus amendeth it [*Meritum de condigno est actio libera ab homine in gratia elicita, qua ex Justitia acceptatur ad præmium, &c.*] (meaning *Justitia promissoris.*)

Scotus 1. *d.* 17. *q.* 1. *&c.* will not have it meritorious because it is done by grace, but by Divine decree, promise and acceptance. And this he calleth Justice, *ex suppositione decreti & promissi: Non igitur ex natura actus oritur obligatio ad præmium*, saith S. *Clara*: *facta autem pactione est debitum ex justitia*: And thus say the generality of the *Scotists*.

Yet some will not yield that God is so much as a *Promiser* lest he be obliged, but only an Assertor: as *S. Clara* noteth.

Tho. Waldensis and some others deny all *merit* fitly so called. *De Sacram. tit.* 1.

Eckius, *Marsilius* and *Bellarmine* saith *S. Clara* deny all merit of congruity.

Greg. Arim. 1. *d.* 17. *q.* 1. *a* 2. saith that there is no merit of blessedness by condignity.

Durandus 1. *d.* 27. *q.* 2. saith there is no merit of condignity with God, *nisi largo modo.*

So *Marsilius in* 2 *d.* 27. *Brugensis in Psal.* 35. *Eckius in Cent. de Prædest. Cusanus*, *Stapleton* and others, of whom *S. Clara* referreth you to *Suarez in* 3 *Tho. disp.* 10. *sect.* 7. *q.* 3.

Bradwardine c. 39. *fol.* 338. laboureth to prove that the increase of Grace or Glory is not merited *de condigno*, but *de congruo*, and that all Catholicks so hold. And next denyeth *merit de congruo*, and all by reasons which *S. Clara* taketh to be valid.

Soto a *Thomist* denyeth all merit *de congruo*, and saith the Fathers held it not. 4. *d.* 14. *q.* 2. *a.* 5. *& l.* 2. *de nat. & Grat. c.* 4.

Bonaventure 2. *d.* 28. *a.* 2. saith *Pelagius* erred 1. In holding that the first grace

grace was merited; 2. That by the ſtrength of Free-will we can diſpoſe or prepare our ſelves for grace.

S. Clara ſaith, *Æſtimo eſſe omnium Scholaſticorum, non dari ex parte peccatoris ullam cauſam meritoriam, diſpoſitionem, aut conditionem ad primam gratiam.* For which he citeth *Auguſt. P. Innoc. 1. ad Concil. Carth. Concil. Arauſic. 2. can. 3, 4, 5. Concil. Trident. Seſſ. 6. c. 5.* concluding, *Et ſine dubio hoc eſt de fide apud omnes Catholicos Doctores, nec ullus unquam oppoſitum tenuit. Et Bradward. optimus divinæ Gratiæ propugnator dicit expreſſè——eſſe Pelagianiſmum, licet intelligeretur ſolùm de merito de congruo.*

Yea *Aquinas* denyeth all merit *de congruo* as to Juſtifying grace, *1. 2. q. 14. a. 7. & in Rom. c. 4.*

Vega's judgement is commonly known. See *Carthuſian in Jac. 2. &c.* I may conclude then with *S. Clara*, that *Caſſander* ſpake not unreaſonably when he ſaid, [*Quo ſenſu hoc vocabulo* Meriti *&* Merendi *uſi ſunt Patres & Catholici, obſcurum non eſt, nempe ut per illud gratiæ Dei ex qua merita omnia oriuntur, nihil detrahatur. Quare nil eſt cur aut Eccleſiaſtici à loquendi forma & ſententia in Eccleſia jam olim uſitata diſcedant, aut Proteſtantes eam tam odioſè repudient aut condemnent.*]

And that *Bucer* ſaid well, *colloq. Ratisb.* [*Si ſancti patres aut alii intelligunt Promereri, facere ex fide gratiæ dei bona opera quibus Deus mercedem promiſit; hoc ſenſu uſurpare illud verbum minimè damnabimus.*]

L. *Thus you ſeem to like the very word* merit; *which in your confeſſion you do not.*

R. 1. I like the Scripture word ἀξιος. And they that tranſlate it worthy, and account condignity the higheſt notion of *merit*, ſeem to allow that it may be tranſlated [*Meriting.*]

2. I would fain find a word to ſerve inſtead of merit, anſwering Reward, and I cannot: What word can you find? Premiability and *Rewardableneſs* are long and unhandſome, and I remember no other, without uſing many words.

3. Yet I wiſh it diſuſed, to avoid abuſe and offence.

L. *But when* Caſſander *ſaith, It is uſed as not encroaching on grace, I take all merit to encroach upon it and injure it.*

R. I ask you, *Queſt.* 1. If you preach that [a Holy Lover of God is fitter for Heaven and Happineſs in Gods love, than a wicked man, and hath a promiſe of it] and another preach, that [the Saints are no fitter for Gods love and happineſs than the wicked, but only it's promiſed them without any fitneſs;] which would good men more diſlike? I think that the firſt is but the very thing that moſt of the School Doctors mean: And that we at once abhorr their words, and abhorr the contrary, as they are variouſly preſented to men.

Queſt. 2. And I ask you, Whether do you think it a greater Grace or Gift of God, to give a man that Holineſs which ſhall fit him for Heaven (or as they call it *Merit* it,) or to give him Heaven without ſuch Holy fitneſs (or merit?)

L. *Heaven without Holineſs is a contradiction. But if God could make a beaſt or bad man Happy without it, doubtleſs yet* both *is more than one. I had rather God would make me here fit for Heaven by holineſs, than not, and ſo all Chriſtians. But we all take* Merit *to ſignifie ſomewhat which profiteth God and which is our own, and not of his gift and grace: In which I ſee we are miſtaken.*

R. Doubtleſs, as that God who can relieve your poor or ſick friend without you, ſheweth you a double favour if he will make you his inſtrument in

in relieving him; ſo if he cauſe you to work out your own ſalvation, it is a greater mercy than if he would carry you aſleep to Heaven: And it's ſtrange that men that know that all that we have is of God, ſhould think his grace diſhonoured by giving us the greater mercy.

But to return to my account of the Papiſts. I will mention *Aquinas* farther, becauſe you know who numbreth him with the groſſer ſort.

1. 2. *q.* 114. *a.* 1. He concludeth that man meriteth not at all of God according to abſolute or ſimple Juſtice, which goeth by equality; *ſed ſecundum divinæ ordinationis quandam præſuppoſitionem*, as man obtaineth that as a reward by his operation for which God gave him the operative virtue. And ſo that here is but *modus quidam Juſtitiæ*, as a Father hath to a Child, and merit only *ſecundum quid*, *at non ſimpliciter*. And he addeth, that our voluntary doing our duty is our merit, not as profiting God, but manifeſting his glory, and pleaſing his will; and ſo God is not a Debtor to us, but to his own will or to himſelf.

And *a.* 2. he concludeth that without Grace even man in innocency, much leſs in ſin could thus merit life eternal. When after therefore he ſpeaks for merit of *condignity* as the acts are from the Holy Ghoſt, it is ſuch a merit as aforeſaid that he meaneth. But the firſt Grace he ſaith none meriteth.

But I deſire you for the underſtanding of *Aquinas* and ſuch others to take notice, that the foundation of many confuſed ſpeeches of theirs, is their confuſed notions of Gods Laws or Covenants. For *Aquin. q.* 106. *a.* 1. doth go the way of Mr. *Sterry* and Sr. *H. Vane* and the Quakers, and conclude that the *New Law* (of Grace) is not written but *in the heart*, that is, that *Lex nova principaliter eſt ipſa gratia ſpiritus ſancti in corde fidelium ſcripta*; becauſe *unaquæq; illud videtur eſſe quod in ea eſt potiſſimum*: and ſo that *Lex ſcripta* is called a Law ſecondarily as a means to the former: Now this is groſs abuſe of an equivocal word by a vain pretence: For the word *Law* doth not firſt ſignifie another thing becauſe that other is moſt excellent; but leſs excellent things (as *media ad finem*) have their proper notions: And the world knoweth that the *famoſius ſignificatum* here is a Law *ut ſignum voluntatis imperantis conſtituens debitum*, as an inſtrument of Government; And that Sanctity of heart is the effect of the doctrine, and a diſpoſition to obey; and is called a Law but in tropical ſenſe.

But indeed *Paul* oft deſcribeth the Goſpel as in the heart, and the Law as a thing; But that contradicts not what I ſay: but it was becauſe the New Teſtament was not then much of it, if any, written and received in the Churches as Gods Law: But Baptiſm expounded by word of mouth (in the three Articles) was the Chriſtianity which *Paul* bid *Timothy* keep and commit to faithful men that might teach it. The Chriſtian Religion was by word committed to mens *memory* firſt, and ſo to their hearts before it was put in writing: But yet it was primarily and properly a Law, *ut ſignum obligans*, and but metonymically as the ſoul was holy by it. The Law was one thing, even in the mind and memory, and the *Love* of God and it another, though called a Law.

But from this notion (that the old Law was a writing, and the new Law was the ſpirit in us) no wonder if *Aquinas* gathered, that the word *Juſtifie* chiefly ſignified to make us Good and holy perſons; and that our Holineſs being our real aptitude for our Glorifying and pleaſing God, and ſo for our Happineſs therein, was to be called our *merit*; meaning thereby but that ſame *fitneſs* for the End or Reward, which Scripture calleth worthineſs, and all religious Preachers and people among us zealouſly

lously defend in other notions, where the Papists are forgotten.

L. *It can never enter into my thoughts that so many Godly Learned Protestants would make odious the Papists, if some of them at least meant no worse.*

R. Know you not that judicious *George Major* was made the head of Hereticks, by *Gallus*, *Amsdorfius*, &c. for but saying, *Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem*: Read your *Schlusselburgius* of his heresie, and judge as you see cause.

But whereas our Divines in confuting merit, do still describe it as of commutative justice, and not as of *paternal Governing distributive Justice according to the Law of Grace*, I will yet tell you what is said by *Vasquez* the Jesuite in 1 *Thom. qu.* 21. *disp.* 83. *c.* 1. *&* 2. *& sequent.* Which when you have read, I will appeal to common Reason and Christianity, 1. Whether it be not a sinful thing for ignorant Protestants to take it upon one anothers reports that the Papists hold that doctrine of merits, which they do not, and so to make them unjustly more erroneous and odious than they are? 2. Whether it be not a very sinful serving of the Devil, for unlearned Divines that have read little of the Papists writings, to backbite and calumniate those of us who truly state the Controversie, and narrow the differences, as if we made the Papists better than they are, and took their parts, meerly because we would have no good men belye them? 3. Whether it be not the way to harden and increase the Papists, to find such false dealing among their adversaries?

Cap. 1. *Vasquez* falls upon some late Doctors who say that [Commutative Justice is properly and formally in God:] yet they say that it is not in God as it is in men, nor as including any imperfection: In the second Chapter he maintaineth, that *Commutative Justice is not* in God, *according* to *propriety* of *speech*: and that this is the judgement of all the former School Doctors to a man; He citeth many whom I recite to shew that he is not singular: [*Alex. Alensi.* 1. *p. q.* 39. *m.* 1. *Scot. in* 1. *d.* 46. *q.* 1. *in solut. arg. Richard. art.* 1. *qu.* 1. *Durand. q.* 1. *Palud. q.* 1. *art.* 1. *Capreol. in* 1. *d.* 45. *q.* 1. *art.* 1. *Concl.* 14. *& art.* 3. *ad arg. S. Thom.* 1. *contra g. c.* 39. *& ibid. Ferrariens. Hosius in Confess. Polon. c.* 73. *Ruard. art.* 11. *Sot.* 3. *de nat. & grat. c.* 7. *&* 3. *de Justit. q.* 5. *art. ult. ad.* 1. *Cajet. in hunc art. Joh. Bunder. in Compend. Concert. tit.* 6. *art.* 7. *Gabr. Biel supplem. in* 4. *d.* 49. *q.* 4. *art.* 4. *dub.* 3. *Bonavent. in* 4. *d.* 46. *art.* 2. *q.* 1. *ad* 2. *S. Thom.* 1. 2. *q.* 114. *art.* 1. *Conrad. ibid. Durand. iterum in* 2. *d.* 27. *q.* 2. *Perrar. cont. Gent.* 3. *c.* 179.] Then because some words of *Medina* and *Cajet.* and *Romanus* seem for Commutative Justice, he sheweth that it was not their meaning: Next he vindicateth *Scotus* and *Gabriel* as having no such meaning in some words of theirs: Then he cometh to the case of Christs own Merits, and saith, that some say [*Christ satisfied for us in rigour of Justice.*] "But that *Aquin.* "*Bonavent.* and such ancients use not that form of speech; but only teach, "that Christs satisfaction was perfect, that is, needed no Acceptilation: "but to this it is not necessary that it be according to Justice properly, but "that it was of equal condignity by way of Merit. And other Schoolmen "that speak as aforesaid mean not that in Christ there was proper Justice "towards God; but that the equality which he kept by the way and si-"militude of Justice in his satisfaction, was according to rigour: that is, "needed not Gods liberal acceptation, but was altogether of equal con-"dignity; which is true: I except but some late ones, who contend that in "that satisfaction there was proper justice; (whom he opposeth;) But "they speak only of Imperfect Justice, such as is found in Creatures, "which is not in God.

In *Cap.* 3. he layeth down ſeveral foundations againſt Commutative Juſtice, and confuteth *Cajetan* and *Medina* who ſaid that indeed between God and man there was no Commutative Juſtice, but *inter res*, that is, *inter meritum & præmium* there is; which he ſheweth is a contradiction of the former.

In *Cap.* 4. he diſputeth againſt commutative Juſtice in God to man, and that 1. Becauſe there is not *æqualitas dati & accepti*; and to be ſhort, he brings againſt it the very ſame arguments as Proteſtants urge againſt Merit, which ſheweth that both ſides mean and oppoſe the very ſame thing: And he is ſo much againſt any Merit of ours from God in Commutative Juſtice, that he labours to prove that Chriſts ſatisfaction was not ſuch, nor can any Creature ſo merit of God; much leſs is mans penance or ſatisfaction ſuch: yea indeed he goeth too far in his reaſons, as I think: For he argueth that where there is no *Damnum* (damage) in the ſin againſt God, there is no proper injuſtice, but a common ſort of it: and therefore there can no merit in proper juſtice by ſatisfaction (by Chriſt or us;) and that our ſin bringeth no damage to God, *ergo*, *&c.* But I deny his Major: There may be *injury* where there is no *Damage*; and conſequently injuſtice: Suppoſe a King or Father ſo far above his ſubject or ſon, as that all his diſobedience would no way hurt or damnifie him: yet it would *injure* him; becauſe the father hath Right to the ſons obedience (and love,) and *Juris denegatio eſt injuria.* So that I confeſs that God cannot poſſibly give us any thing by Commutative Juſtice, in a ſtrict and proper ſence; becauſe we can ſo give him nothing in commutation: But I ſee not but that by *ſin*, man ſinneth againſt proper Juſtice, in not giving God his *Own* or *Due*, to his *Injury*, though not to his damage. But I confeſs the term *Commutative* noting mutual Right, is improper; and their diſtinction of *Commutative* and *diſtributive Juſtice* is narrow, ambiguous, inep, and therefore feedeth and not endeth Controverſies: The true diſtribution of Juſtice is from the three Grand Moral Relations, *Dominii, Imperii & Beneficii vel Amicitiæ.* 1. God hath the true proper Right of Propriety in us, and to our ſervice: 2. He hath a proper Right of *Imperium Rule*, and ſo to our obedience: 3. By his Goodneſs, Love and Benefits, he hath a proper Right to our greateſt Love and Gratitude. And he that ſinneth denyeth God all theſe, and ſo doth violate proper Juſtice, denying him that to which he hath Right.

But to return to *Vaſquez*, having ſaid, "That our Merit and Satisfacti-
"on can be no benefit to God, nor our ſin his damage, *nec ulla inæqualitas*
"*inter ipſum & nos conſtituta eſt, quæ ſit objectum injuſtitiæ propriæ*, he
"addeth that his puniſhments are no parts of commutative juſtice *in re-*
"*ſarciendis & vindicandis injuriis*, becauſe here is no reparation of
"damage, as *Thom.* 2. 2. *q.* 108. *art.* 2.

And *Cap.* 5. he proceedeth to prove his doctrine, from the Condition of God and the Creature, we being as Children and ſlaves, abſolutely his own; therefore there can be no *proper juſtice* between us: And he cometh to the great objection, that "*As free*, our Actions are our own, and ſo may
"merit of Juſtice: and anſwereth No: becauſe the Value of our works
"to which the Reward is given dependeth on Gods grace, which he freely
"giveth and conſerveth to us, though *as free* the actions are of us as
"Cauſes: And becauſe that Liberty is only a *fundamentum* of merit,
"but giveth not the work its Value (or worth;) therefore we cannot
"make God our Debtor, by any meritorious work of which he himſelf is
"the author and Cauſe.

"And hence he is ſo much againſt this merit of Juſtice, as to inferr,
"that [*Chriſt himſelf could not ſatisfie God* according to ſtrict Juſtice
"properly, *by the works of his Humane nature; becauſe the whole Value*
"*came*

" *came from the Godhead it self, sanctifying the humanity and making his* " *works worthy.*

Cap. 6. he proceedeth to shew that though it be not true that some say, that full equal satisfaction may be refused, it being not the *ipsum debitum*, and that he proveth that a full equal satisfaction to proper justice cannot in justice be refused, and if it be refuseable, it is unequal; (though it may be equal *condignitate meriti quæ ad justitiam propriè non pertinet*;) Yet even from *Gods promise it self, it is no obligation of proper justice*, that is on God to us. Confuting *Sotus* that saith that Gods *Fidelity is not to be referred to the virtue of verity, but properly belongeth to commutative Justice.*

If this be not enough, *Disput.* 86. he cometh to the other branch, Whether God have distributive Justice to us? and denyeth this also in proper sence. And proveth it by the authority of *Bonavent. in* 4. *d.* 46. *art.* 2. *q.* 1. *ad* 1. *Scotus qu.* 1. *Durand. ib. q.* 1. *& in* 2. *d.* 23. *q.* 2. *num.* 5. *Palud. in* 4. *d.* 45. *q.* 1. *a.* 1. *Gabriel supplem. in* 4. *d.* 49. *q.* 4. *a.* 3. *dub.* 3: *Alex.* 1. *p. q.* 39. *in* 1. *& Thom. &c. & ex Anselm. & Aristot.*

Cap. 3. he proveth it by many Reasons. Yet *Cap.* 4. granteth that Justice distributive is in God, *secundum quandam rationem generalem, non autem secundum propriam*; concluding, *Distinguendum est*; *Aut enim* Propriè *opponitur* Metaphoricè, *aut opponitur* Communiter: *si priori modo, Deo Propriè convenit Justitia distributiva*; *si posteriori, non convenit.*

If in all this you can justifie this Jesuite and all the Schoolmen who he saith agree with him, from giving too little to *humane* merit, and Gods Justice, I suppose few Protestants will accuse him of giving *too much.*

L. *But yet this Jesuite elsewhere is one of the greatest defenders of merit, for all that he saith in the words recited.*

R. Do you mean the *Name* or *Thing?* If the Name 1. Sure you will not make that a matter of much quarrel: 2. If you do, you must quarrel also with all the ancient Fathers; even with *Augustine* who (as *Melanchthon* saith, *Loc. com. de Lib. arb.* of his use of the word *free-will*) doth use it throughout all his Volumes. 3. And if ἀξία be well translated *Worthiness* or *Merit*, you must quarrel with Christ and his Apostles also, (of which before.)

L. *But* Aquinas' *his followers use the word* Merits *in a worser sense, and many a volume they have written partly to assert it and defend it.*

R. I hope you your self would write to defend Gods retributive Judgement, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, *Heb.* 11. 6. If you would let an Infidel carry it, that pleadeth that obedience and patience have no Reward, the Christian cause is little beholden to you. *Justice, Reward* and *Merit* are Relatives in their sence; and you must deny *All* or *none*: For nothing can be *Rewarded* but a *Rewardable act*, which they mean by meritorious, (as nothing can be *Punished*, but a real or *imputed fault*; *Pœna* and *Culpa* being so related also:) Though as *Affliction* may be without the commerit of culpability, so a meer *Gift* may be without *Laudable merit.* And Judicial Justice is the virtue of equal Judicial retribution, according to laudable or culpable actions.

But what *Aquinas* and his followers hold, it's easie to see in himself, in *Cajetan*, in *Ferrariensis* and abundance such: I will now turn you but to such an *Epitomizer* as *Carbo*, (or *Vignerius*,) where it's soonest found. *Carbo* 1. 2. *q.* 21. *art.* 4. saith [*Actus humani habent rationem meriti & demeriti per comparationem ad Deum; Quia omnes actus sunt referribiles in Deum ut est ultimus finis, & ut regit communitatem universi, & ità debet eis pro justitia retribuere; aliàs non haberet universi procurationem.*

2. *Homo quantum in se est, aliquid subtrahit vel exhibet Deo, cum servat, vel non servat ordinem à Deo constitutum.* 3. *Homo sic movetur à Deo ut Instrumentum, ut etiam moveat seipsum; & ideo meretur & demeretur.* 4. *Homo non ordinat se totum ad rempublicam, secundum omnia sua; & ideo non omnes ejus Actus sunt meritorii respectu reipublicæ: sed totus ordinatur ad Deum, respectu cujus omnis actus est meritorius vel demeritorius.*

So that here is a meriting of God in the same sense as there is a demeriting and a meriting of God as the Rector of the Universe: not for any real profit to God, but for a free referring all our actions to him as the end, and keeping the order he hath constituted in the World, *& quantum in nobis* with a loving and honouring mind returning to him that which is his own. And do you deny any of all this?

L. *No, not the Matter, but this is not to be called Merit.*

R. If you will needs be the Master of Language, openly profess then that it is the Name that you contend about.

Indeed *Aquinas* defendeth that which *Vasquez* seemeth to deny, that in God there is *Distributive*, though not *Commutative Justice (quia à nullo accipit.)* And that though God do all according to the good pleasure of his will, yet he doth all things Righteously, because his Will is the Rule of Justice, and he *willeth* what his Wisdom dictateth. And that he giveth himself his Due, in that he doth all to the glorifying of his goodness: and he giveth the creatures their due, in that he ordereth one for another, as its end, and the parts for the whole: yet he is not called a Debtor to any, because all are ordinated to Him: which Justice is called, The Condecency of his Goodness. And is there any thing to be blamed in all this? I am sure that *English* ears are so used to hear that God is Just, yea, that the Glory of his Justice is a great End of his Government, that good men will hardly endure you to deny it: Though yet through prejudice they hardly digest the name of that *Merit* or Rewardableness which is the object of that Justice; because of other mens abuse of the word, and some mens hard interpretation of it. But God the Righteous Judge will give the Crown of Righteousness (*2 Tim.* 4. 8.) not according to Names and Logical Notions, but mens works.

L. *But are other* Jesuits *of* Vasquez's *mind, or many other Schoolmen of* Aquinas *his opinion? We commonly suppose them to give more to Merit.*

R. There are many School Doctors so strict herein, that they will not grant that there is any such thing properly as Legal or Governing Justice in God. *Ruiz* citeth for this *Argentin. 4. d. 46. q. 1. a. 1. Bassolis ibi q. 1. a. 1. Suarez* (a Jesuite) *de Just. Dei sect. 4. n. 8. Pesant. 1. p. q. 21. a. 1. disp. 1. concl. 2.* But he thinketh that they differ but in words from others that assert Gods Legal Justice (*videlicet Scotus, Sotus, Rubellus, Lorca, Navarret.*) Yet all agree, that God is (in some sense) Just. And *Ruiz* saith that *Suarez* (*passim*) maintaineth that *Gods Promises are but naked assertions, by which he declareth his will to give the benefit.* And *Durandus* 2. *d.* 27. *q.* 2. *n.* 15. saith that *Gods promises signifie not any obligation, but the meer disposition of Gods liberality.* And *Greg. Arim.* 1. *d.* 17. *q.* 1. *a.* 2. saith, *that the Crown of Righteousness is not a debt, but only of Gods free ordination.* And *Marsil.* 2. *q.* 18. *a.* 4. absolutely denyeth, that *God is a Debtor, or doth any otherwise accept mens deserts, than by the free disposition of a gift.* *Scotus* holdeth our acts are called Merit as relating to Gods free Covenant or Promise to reward them, and not otherwise, but he absolutely denyeth yet that God is thereby made

Brianson in 4. q. 8. cor. 3. fol. 152. saith [*Nullus fidelium fuit ita fatuus quod quæreret si peccator possit dare aliquid condignum, vel æquivalens gratiæ Dei*] (speaking of Commutative Justice; But Ordinative Justice (which is that which we call Governing) only he defendeth in the case

made our Debtor, 4. *d.* 46. *Major.* 2. *d.* 27. not only followeth him, but ſaith, God may deny Glory to good works, (but he meaneth as the reſt.) *Richard.* 2. *d.* 27. *q.* 3. *a.* 2. *ad* 3. ſeemeth to deny even Debt upon the title of promiſe. *Bonavent.* 2. *d.* 27. *a.* 2. *q.* 3. ſaith but that *God is* quodammodo, *in ſome ſort obliged to glorifie them that love him.* *Ruiz* who is againſt all this, and maketh Gods *Promiſes* to be proper promiſes and *Covenants*, and *more than bare aſſertions*, and that God is become a kind of Debtor by his Promiſe (and ſo it is not his Veracity only that is our ſecurity, as *Suarez* thinketh) yet holdeth, that *It is but the Things promiſed that are Due or obliged* to us, and that Gods obligation is properly to Himſelf: that he hath indeed true Governing or Legal Juſtice, but *tanquam objectum Formale & primarium reſpicit univerſaliſſimum bonum & præſtantiſſimum quod eſt Ipſe: & tanquam Materiale & ſecundarium objectum reſpicit univerſale bonum totius mundi conſtantem ex omnibus creaturis, quod præponit particularibus bonis ſingularum creaturarum.* Indeed he ſaith, that this Juſtice in God, is that [*Quæ ſolo naturæ lumine demonſtrari poteſt: ac proinde nullam ſupponit liberam Dei promiſſionem aut pactum, nullumque ſupernaturalem concurſum aut gratiam.*] But this is meer confuſion by ambiguous words. Theſe men talk as if they conſidered not, that *Creation* was a *free* act of God, and made man a Law in the *Nature* of himſelf and the circumſtant creatures; And in this Law of Nature is a ſignification of Gods will to do good to the good, and reward the obedient, and this is a Natural promiſe. There could be no obedience, and ſo no merits, were there no Law: And if there be a Law of Nature, (and ſo God even by making us Rational free Governable Creatures was himſelf our Governour), theſe things ſuppoſed to be done by the very act of Creating, it is a contradiction to ſay that God is our Governour, and not a Juſt Governour, (being perfect as he is God) or to be Juſt, and yet not Reſolved to uſe the obedient better than the diſobedient. To be Governour, is to be the Orderer of Moral Agents: And what Moral Order is there, where the good and bad are not differenced in retributions? But the *Papiſts* conceits of all Promiſes to *Adam* and his merits being meerly ſupernatural, confound them in many ſuch diſputations.

L. *But do they not hold that a man may merit the remiſſion of his own ſins? (yea, and of the ſins of others?) and juſtification alſo?*

R. Let *Medina* anſwer you in 12. *q.* 113. *a.* 8. *p.* 651. [*Ad authoritates ſonantes quod non meremur Remiſſionem peccatorum nec vero juſtificationem, non oportet ſatisfacere: Nam omnes convenimus, in hanc ſententiam Catholicam & irrefragabilem, quod non meremur remiſſionem peccatorum.*——*ut* Auguſtin. *Nullane ſunt merita juſtorum? Sunt plane quia juſti ſunt: ſed ut juſti fierent, merita non fuere.*] None merit Remiſſion or Juſtification, with them.

L. *Not by merit of* Condignity; *but they ſay, that by merit of* Congruity *a man may merit Remiſſion and Converſion and Juſtification.*

R. Medina ibid. p. 652. [*Sed cum Meritum de Congruo non innitatur Juſtitiæ, ſed Congruentiæ, proprie appellationem meriti non meretur.*] And ſo ſay many others of them.

L. *But at leaſt they hold that we may* prepare *our ſelves for Juſtification or Converſion without Grace, or ſpecial Grace.*

R. Preparatory Grace is not the ſame that the Grace to which it prepareth us: But let the ſame *Medina* anſwer you, q. 109. p. 592. *Deus expectat noſtrum conſenſum* (*inquit* Pelagius) *ut nos convertat: ergo ex parte voluntatis noſtræ eſt præparatio ad gratiam ſuſcipiendam. Sed hæc*

ſententia

ſententia eſt hæretica & contra Scripturas & Concilia; Veritas Catholica eſt quod Gratia Juſtificans datur ſine meritis, & quod nemo ſe valet ad eam præparare ſine auxilio ſpeciali. Et p. 593. *Ultima diſpoſitio ad gratiam ad quam infallibiliter ſequitur Gratia, non habetur ex facultate naturæ, ſed tantum dono Dei ſpeciali.* Do you ſay any more againſt Preparation for Grace without Grace, or againſt mans power to prepare himſelf? or againſt merit than all this?

L. *But ſure* Luther *and his fellow Reformers had never ſo much inveighed againſt the* Papiſts *in the point of works, Merits and Juſtification, if they had all taught no worſe than theſe which you have cited; There are ſure many others that ſay worſe.*

R. No queſtion but the Ignorance of the Prieſts was ſo great, and the carnal ends ſo powerful with covetous proud men, which were ſerved by the abuſe of the Doctrine of Merits and Good Works, that multitudes of ſuch did ordinarily abuſe it: If all *Proteſtants* taught the *Proteſtant* Doctrine uncorruptly, we ſhould not have had ſo many differences and diviſions as we have had; nor would one condemn another as you do us.

L. *But though the* old Schoolmen *might mean better, thoſe that* Luther *had to do with, did ſure ſpeak much worſe.*

R. I tell you, the Carnal and Ignorant ſort of Prieſts and Fryers did each man talk according to his model, and ſo do all Sects: Few had the Wit and Skill to open aright the common Doctrine: But 1. Our Dr. *Field* (of the Church) undertaketh to prove, that (excepting the *tyrannical Papal* faction, and the *carnal* and ignorant that ſerved their ends, and by violence bore down the reſt) the chief of the Doctors in the Church of *Rome* it ſelf, did hold the great Doctrines which the *Proteſtants* againſt the *Papiſts* do aſſert. 2. To tire you now with no more, I will cite but two of *Luthers* own adverſaries in his dayes. 1. The firſt is the Learned *Cardinal Contacenus* who lived in the time of *Luthers* Reformation: Read but his *Notes* on *Luthers Articles*, and his *Tract.* of *Juſtification, Free-will* and *Predeſtination*, and you will ſee that he ſaith almoſt as much for what you plead, as you would do your ſelf. I am loth to tire the Reader with the citation of his words at large; Turn to them and read them, and ſee where he differeth from us. I confeſs the man was moderate; but never accuſed as differing herein from the Church of *Rome*, as in an Article determined of by their Councils: But their Doctors variouſly expreſs themſelves.

The other is *Fiſher* Biſhop of *Rocheſter* one of the chief Martyrs of the *Roman* Cauſe, beheaded by *Henry* the Eighth for denying his Supremacy in Cauſes Eccleſiaſtical: who in *Opuſcul. de fiducia & miſericordia Dei* (Printed *Colon.* 1556.) ſpeaketh as much and plainly for the intereſt of *Faith* and *Mercy* and Chriſts Redemption as *Proteſtants* uſe to do. fol. F. *Fide in Chriſtum ſola quis etiam citra quævis opera juſtificatur. Nam ſi propriis operibus quis juſtificatus fuerit, is habet unde glorietur apud ſe: gloriari enim poteſt de operibus ſuis quibus juſtificatus eſt: Cæterum qui non ſuis operibus, ſed fide juſtus effectus eſt, huic de ſe neutiquam eſt gloriandum, ſed de Deo qui fidem ei dedit qua juſtificatur.——Introducit itaque Scripturam Paulus quæ non per opera, ſed per fidem Abrahæ juſtificationem imputat; nimirum ut ita non ſibi ſed Deo totam referat gloriam——Ecce quia credidit Abraham, ideo per fidem juſtificatus eſt: Nam ſi per opera ſua juſtitiam fuiſſet conſecutus, jam non gratis ei Juſtitia fuiſſet data, ſed magis operum reſpectu.——Si juſtificatio propter opera conferatur, jam ex debito confertur potius quam gratis, hoc eſt, quam per gratiam & ex gratuita Dei liberalitate.——Cæterum è diverſo*

quando

quando citra opera quis ob id tantum quod credat in Christum qui justificat impium, justificationem adeptus est, jam sola fides sua illi ad justificationem imputatur. Ecce jam hic audis cui jam fides ad justitiam imputatur; ei viz. *qui non operatur sed credit in eum qui justificat impium solâ fide.*

Et fol. G. passim. & H. *Per fidem in illum sic expurgaremur, ut ille nostra peccata ferret, nos ejus justitiam assequeremur:*——— *Non dicit factum fuisse illum Peccatorem, & nos justos per illum, sed illum Peccatum, & nos Justitiam Dei:* See the rest——— *Nec est ut quisquam secum hæsitet num pro suis peccatis Christus seipsum tradiderit: Immo credat, & securus sit ad eorum se catalogum pertinere pro quorum peccatis Christus semetipsum donavit: Nam si istud non crediderit, plane sejunctus est ab eorum consortio: fides enim ea res est, qua nos agglutinamur ita Christo, ut meritorum ejus facti simus participes: & per hanc constituti sumus una cum eo filii Dei pariter & cohæredes*———fol. I. *Hoc tu quisquis es peccator persuasissimum habeas, quod si resipueris ac in Christum constanter credideris, jam Christum induisti, jam ejus spiritu donatus es, jam denique communem cum illo patrem nactus es*——— See the rest. Et fol. I. 5. *Nam satisfaciente pro nobis hoc potentissimo sanguine, quotquot in Christum credimus à peccatis omnibus abluimur & justificamur, insiti Christo, atque in unum cum ipso ferruminati, sic ut omnia mala nostra per ipsum deleta sint, bona vero ipsius cuncta nobis effecta sint communia:* Is not this high enough?

Fol. K. L. *Is corde accedit quem veteris vita pœnitet*——— *Quare fides in Christum una cum resipiscentia te justificat ab omni peccato.*

Fol. M. *Gratis confertur nobis ista redemptio; non ullis meritis nostris*———*Namque ante quodvis Meritum justi constituimur, nimirum ut inde prodeant opera nostra justa: fiunt utique opera nostra justa per justitiam fidei*———*Quisquis igitur peccator fueris (nihil moror quot quantaque & quam gravia peccata tua fuerint) si teipsum vere converteris ad Deum, teque ipsum in ejus misericordiam totum projeceris, credens Jesum Christum pro te mortuum, jam haud dubie primam istam Justificationem adeptus es. Sed cave te fallas, te conversum simulans quum non integre convertaris. Is quidem integre convertitur, qui toto corde peccatis renunciat, fiduciam plene suam collocans in Deo*———What think you of all this? Do you differ from it?

L. *I will not be so malignant as to disown the* truth, *because a* Papist *speaketh it: But still you shall give me leave to believe that so many* Protestants *would never have said so much against their Doctrine in this point, if they had indeed held what these words import, which are as much as any* Protestant *herein saith. And you your self in your* Confession *cite abundance of them speaking for mans Merits.*

R. 1. I cited them as using commonly the term [*Merit*] which I told you I had rather (because of mens misunderstanding) were disused, so we could agree of some fitter safer word. 2. And I told you that one *Romanus* foolishly pleadeth for *Merit in point of Commutative Justice*, which the most reject. 3. And I told you, that the paltry phrase of Merit [*ex proportione operum*] is used by some, and rejected by others: And some that use it, it's like, have an unsound meaning in it, and others mean but that different degrees of Glory or Reward shall be given according to different degrees of holiness, which *Protestants* approve.

But as I justifie those *Protestants* who reprehend the *unsound* assertions

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ons of any *Papiſts* Writers, ſo I muſt adviſe you to charge nothing on any Sect or party of men, upon the words of *particular men*, but what that *party owneth*: nor to charge men with opinions, becauſe others have ſo done before you, without finding what you charge them with in their own words.

L. *Would you have me ſo uncharitable as to ſuſpect ſo many* Proteſtant *Writers of Calumny?*

R. 1. It is no Calumny to charge that on *ſome Papiſts*, which thoſe *ſome* do hold. 2. It is perverſe charity to receive unproved accuſations of others, for fear of ſuſpecting the accuſers of calumny. By that rule all the falſe reports that now fly about in *London* ſhould be received, if a good man or woman (ſpecially many) have once ſpoken them. 3. And tell me whether you would have others obſerve the ſame rule towards you? For inſtance, you may ſee in *Tolet* (a Cardinal *Jeſuit*) on the *Romans*, that he chargeth the Hereticks (as he calleth us) with holding that God doth only *Hide* or *forget* our ſins, and not impute them to us, but doth not *mortifie* them. Whereas we all hold, that he Remitteth actual ſins paſt by Pardoning them as to the puniſhment; but that he mortifieth the preſent habits of ſin, and preventeth the Reign of future ſin (called *Mortal ſin* by them) in ſuch as ſhall be ſaved. Which is the ſame in ſenſe as they hold themſelves. So he chargeth us as holding, that we have no Inherent Righteouſneſs after Juſtification (no not Imperfect) but only Chriſts Righteouſneſs imputed; and that we hold obedience unneceſſary as to our final or continued Juſtification: All which are falſe. And ſhall all the unlearned *Papiſts* believe this of us, for fear of an uncharitable ſuſpicion of their Teachers? Multitudes of their Writers falſly charge us with theſe ſame errors.

L. *The* Papiſts *are* Lyars, *and therefore to be ſuſpected, but ſo are not our Divines.*

R. If once you fall upon ſuch Rules as thoſe (as that *Accuſations againſt adverſaries are to be believed without proof, on one ſide and not on the other*) Gods Rule againſt receiving evil reports will be caſt out; and Charity and Juſtice will be caſt away; and meer ſiding and faction will poſſeſs the place: And then all the queſtion will be, *Who are thoſe Accuſers that are to be believed?* And if you think that it is your Teachers, the *Papiſts* that have many more, will think that they have more reaſon to believe them: And ſo the *Anabaptiſts* will believe theirs, and the *Separatiſts* theirs, and the *Quakers* theirs: and what falſhood and evil will not then be believed againſt all parties? and how odious will they appear to one another, and conſequently all (Chriſtians) to Infidels and Heathens?

L. *A man that is ſet upon a ſodering deſign, may palliate any Hereſie in the world, and put a fair ſenſe on the fouleſt words; but God hateth ſuch cloaking of ſin, and complyance with it.*

R. May not *Papiſts*, *Familiſts*, *Seekers*, *Quakers* and all Sects ſay the ſame againſt Concord and Complyance with you?

I pray you tell me what you think of theſe following words, before you know who wrote them; and take heed what you ſay of them, leſt you ſtrike you know not whom.

[*Queſt.* "How is Juſtification free, ſeeing faith and repentance are re-"quired to it? *Anſw.* There are two anſwers given; One is from *Au-"guſtines* doctrine *Epiſt.*105. the ſumm is, As Juſtification is taken in-"cluſively, taking in Faith and Repentance as its beginning, it is free, be-"cauſe faith is free: But as it is taken narrowly for Juſtification follow-"ing

"ing faith that is, for Remission of sin, and Reconciliation with God, it is me-
"rited by faith. But the other solution I more approve, and it seemeth
"more agreeable to Scripture: to wit, that even Remission of sin it self
"and Reconciliation with God, are given freely, no Merit of ours going
"before, and that neither by faith nor repentance we do merit the gift
"of this grace: For understanding of which, Note, that Faith hath not
"of it self any efficacy as it is our act, to Remit or Reconcile; but all
"the Vertue proceedeth from the object it self, that is, Christ; whose
"Vertue and Merit God hath determined to apply to a sinner for his ju-
"stification by faith in him: And what I say of Faith, I say of Repen-
"tance, and other dispositions, as in the example of them that looked
"to the Brazen Serpent, who were healed by looking: not that looking
"as it was an act of the eye had such a healing force, but the efficacy
"was from the Serpent, which God had appointed for the cure. So
"we say of Faith, which hath not in its nature and from its entity any power
"to Remit and Reconcile, but as the Vertue of Christ doth this in be-
"lievers: And so I answer, that If Faith justified as an act and of it self,
"Justification were not free; But so it doth not, but is a *Medium* by
"Gods good pleasure, by which the Vertue of Christ Justifieth believers:
"therefore faith (or repentance): make it not less free. *E.g.* I give a
"Beggar a gift: He puts forth his hand and taketh it: If one tell me,
"Thou gavest it not freely, because he took it, or else had not had it, it
"were a ridiculous objection: For putting forth the hand doth not of
"it self bring him a gift: else every time that he puts forth his hand it
"would bring in a gift: But it is from the vertue and bounty of the giver.
"So is it as to faith and the dispositions by which the vertue of Christ,
"and the free mercy of God do give Remission and Reconciliation to be-
"lievers and disposed persons: so that it taketh not away Christs Merit,
"nor maketh Grace less free, that *faith* or these dispositions are asserted.

L. *I know not how much men may mean worse than they speak: but these words are such as the best* Protestants *use.*

R. They are the words (translated) of the aforesaid *Fr. Tolet* a *Jesuit* and Cardinal on *Rom.* 3. *pag.* 157, 158, 159.

But still remember, that by *Justification* they mean *the holy effect of the Spirit on the soul*; and indeed by Remission of sin, they most commonly mean the *destroying* or mortifying sin within us, and ceasing to commit the act: And they are dark and confused in these matters.

L. *But do not* Papists *hold forgiveness of deserved punishment?*

R. Yes: but they bring it in disorderly, and on other occasions: But if they did not, how could they hold, that any sin past from our childhood till Conversion is *Remitted* or *pardoned?* For the Act is past as soon as done, *& factum infectum fieri non potest*: and so such past sins can have no remission, but forgiving the penalty, and healing the effects. And wrangling *Papists* consider not that this is *the Remission that Protestants mean*, who call *their kind of Remission* by the name of *mortification*: And so we endlesly quarrel about words, through our unhappy imperfection in the art of speaking, and words being arbitrary signs, the world is come to no agreement of their sense.

L. *You confess then their confused Doctrine, and you cannot excuse many of their Doctors from gross error herein.*

R. No, nor many honest pious persons that go for *Protestants*: What *Papists* have more plainly subverted the Gospel by their Doctrine on these subjects, than many of those called *Antinomians* have done by the contrary extream? And who can justifie all the sentences and phrases of ma-

ny eminent Divines among us? yea, or of many of the moſt wiſe and accurate? For when all are much ignorant, who can ſay, I do not err?

L. *But undoubtedly you will be as bitterly cenſured for theſe your favourable interpretations of the* Papiſts *in the point of* Merit, *as if you were half a* Papiſt *your ſelf, and were but ſuch a Mongrel as* Eraſmus, Wicelius, Caſſander, *or* Grotius, *or as if your Conciliatory deſigns would carry you as far at laſt as* Grotius, Mileterius, Baldwin, *or at leaſt, as* Mountague, Guil. Forbes, *and ſuch others went. And others will then ſay, that you are juſtly ſerved for writing ſo much againſt* Grotius *and his followers on this account as you have done, of which Biſhop* Bramhall *and his* Epiſtoler *have already told you.*

R. Truth, honeſty and *Gods approbation* change not as mens intereſts, minds or tongues do: Time will come, that Truth will be more regarded, when Love and Peace are to be revived; unleſs God will forſake this contentious and unrighteous World. And I am ſo near, ſo very near that World, where there is nothing but Truth, Love and Righteouſneſs, and where God is All, and the Fulneſs and felicitating object of holy ſouls, and where the cenſures of men are of no ſignification, that I am utterly unexcuſable, if I ſhould betray the Cauſe of Truth, Love and Concord, to avoid the obloquy of men, who ſpeak evil of the things which they never underſtood.

The

The Thirteenth Dayes CONFERENCE.

Of the great errours, ſin and danger which many Ignorant Profeſſours fall into, on the pretence of avoiding and abhorring Popery.

Between *S.* A *Sectary*, and *P.* A *Peacemaker*.

P. NEighbour, I underſtand that you are one of thoſe that divulge your defamatory Lamentations of me as *inclining to Popery*, for ſome paſſages which I lately Preached in the City: I pray you ſpeak that to my face which you ſo freely ſpeak behind my back.

S. Sir, the City ringeth of you as one that greatly wrongeth the cauſe of God, And my own ears heard you ſay that the difference between us and the Papiſts is little more than in ambiguous words, and points unſearchable.

P. And this I hear you are one that have divulged, and ſo it is by ſuch as you that the City is made to ring of it. But if this be *an untruth* of *great aggravation*, do you then deſerve the title you aſſume, or are you a fit defender of the truth? or can your Conſcience tolerate you herein? That which I ſaid was this: I diſtinguiſhed the *Controverſies between "us and the Papiſts into ſuch as depend on a Carnal Intereſt and Mind, "and ſuch as do not, but ariſe from the meer difficulty of the ſubject: "In the former ſort I ſaid our difference is very great, and like to be ſo; "and ſuch are the differences about their Papal power and Church ſtate, "their Government, and worſhip as fitted hereunto; and many doctrines, "as that of Purgatory, Indulgences, Auricular Confeſſion abuſed by them, "Tranſubſtantiation, &c. But the other ſort of doctrinals are made by "many the matter of greater difference than there is cauſe; ſuch as I "named, Predeſtination, Providence, the cauſe of ſin, mans power, and "fre-will, Grace, certainty of ſalvation, and I might have added, Juſtifi-"cation and Merit as held by their Church and moſt of the Schoolmen: not "that here is no difference indeed; but that long ſtudy hath made me cer-"tain that it is more in words than is commonly conceived: And this "Truth is fit to be ſpoken though the miſtaken be offended by it. Yea in "theſe matters the Papiſts differ among themſelves as much as with us.*

Dare you deny that theſe were my words? If you do you are a falſifier.

S. *when you ſpeak ſo clowdily, who can remember every word you ſay?*

P. Is not this plain Engliſh? Peruſe it and conſider. And dare you carry falſe reports abroad on pretence of pious zeal, and then ſay, *You cannot remember?* Why would you report that which you cannot remember? Why would you not ſtay till you had helpt your memory, by ſpeaking with me or ſome one that could have informed you? But are not we in a hard caſe with ſuch hearers as you, when we muſt look to be as oft belyed as your *underſtanding* or your *memory faileth*: becauſe your looſe *Conſcience faileth* with them: which is very oft.

S. *I am not alone in judging thus of you*; City *and* Countrey ring *of it: what company can one come into where you are not talkt of? I daily hear good people lament you: and the beſt they ſay is, that God uſeth to let thoſe men fall fouly in ſome things who have been extraordinarily ſerviceable, that men may not idolize them.*

P. They that know me but half as well as I know my ſelf, will know that I have enough to abaſe me before God and man: But will that warrant a courſe of lying and backbiting in others? Do you partly *receive*, and partly *make* and propagate falſe reports, and then plead the Commonneſs for your excuſe? He that ſet *London* on fire might ſo have excuſed himſelf becauſe the flame was common when he had cauſed it. The effect and proſpering of your ſin ſhould humble you, and not ſeem to juſtifie you. But yet I muſt tell you that *Backbiting Sectaries* are not the greater part of *London*: There are many *ſober* people that are aſhamed of your ſin and folly.

I will make this friendly motion to you: Inſtead of backbiting, Let us here to one anothers faces, ſo friendly admoniſh each other of that which we take to be ſin, as may help to bring each other to repentance: And do you begin, Tell me of all the evil that you know by me.

S. *I have nothing to accuſe you of, but that your Principles are too large, and you vent them too freely, and thereby you harden Papiſts, and diſhonour the Proteſtant cauſe, and wrong free grace, and the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt, by your doctrine of Juſtification and mans Righteouſneſs; And by coming ſo near Conformity, you grieve the hearts of good people, and may bring perſecution on thoſe that cannot do as you can.*

P. 1. About Conformity, forbear me here, for I muſt deal with you of that by it ſelf elſewhere.

2. As to my doctrine of Juſtification, if I have not fully juſtified it elſewhere, I ſhall not now on this occaſion.

3. But whether you or I be righter about Popery, let us now debate. Have you read my *Safe Relig.* and my *Key for Catholicks*, and my *Treatiſe* of the *Certainty* of *Chriſtianity without Popery*, and my late *Dialogue*, and my *Treat. againſt* Johnſon *of the Viſibility of the Church*? and others againſt Popery?

S. *I have ſomewhat elſe to do than read all your writings.*

P. Why have you not then ſomewhat elſe to do than hear me, and backbite me, and judge of things which you have not leiſure to underſtand? Do we not ſtill deal on hard terms with ſuch men as you? that neither ſpeaking nor writing can make them know our minds? Have all your party that revile me, done more each one againſt Popery than I have done?

But if this be all that you have to call me to repentance for, I have a great deal more to ſay againſt my ſelf; And now I will deal faithfully with you:

Ibe-

I beseech you try, whether it be not necessary that you speedily repent of all these following sins:

1. What a shame is it for one that would be taken for a Religious man to be so *Ignorant* as you are, and no better know the truth of Christ, from the errors of *Popery*, than (it appeareth) you do?

2. What a sin for one so *Ignorant* to be so *rash* and *bold* in venturing to judge of that which he understandeth not?

3. What a sin is it for one so *Ignorant* to be so *proud* of his pretended knowledge, as to venture to defame his Teachers for contradicting him in his erroneous conceits? Have you studied these things as long and hard as I have done? or are you sure that you have done it more impartially, and that God hath illuminated you so much more, as your confidence would import?

4. What an unchristian crime is it, to make *lyes* and carry them abroad *of your Teachers*, and then be forced to confess, that it was the failing of your memory as to what you heard?

5. What a sin is it to be a *backbiter*? Neither you, nor any one of your quality did ever come to my face either to know my meaning, or to hear what I had to say, nor to reprove my sin, or convince me of my error.

6. Is not *unrighteousness* a sin, in your judging and reports, as it is in publick Judgements? Should not a man be *heard* before he be condemned? especially a Minister of Christ?

7. What a sin is it to *receive false reports* from others, and encourage backbiters whom you should rebuke and frown away?

8. What a heinous sin is it thus to destroy the Hearers souls, and as those that have the Plague, to carry your infection from house to house, and *kill* mens *Love*, and breed in them false conceits and bitter injurious thoughts of others?

9. What a sin is it with such unthankfulness to *requite* Christs servants that spend their dayes, and strength, and estates in labouring for mens good? When I take none of your money, when I have these twelve years preached (as I had liberty) freely without hire; when I had been put on to plead the *Non-conformists* Cause in the costliest circumstances, and to bear the greatest *odium* for it; when I was I think the first that was silenced on such accounts; when I have been twelve or fourteen years deprived of all Ecclesiastical maintenance; when I refused a Bishoprick, when I have laboured in Writings and other duties to the consuming of my flesh in daily and hourly pain and weakness, and now look every Sermon for my last, and am ready to appear before my Judge: to be to the very last thus calumniated and reviled by pievish *Sectaries*, would be a sad reward, were your favour my reward! But is this just or grateful? or shall the unrighteous and unthankful be accounted the best men? I know I could have been one of the highest in your favour and applause, if I would have humoured and followed you: But I had rather that God should keep me from your honour, than buy it at so dear a rate.

10. And is it no sin thus to hinder the success of our labours, by *making* us *odious* or *suspected* by them that should profit by us?

11. Is it not hypocrisie, to cry out of the Bishops for silencing us, when you shew that you would fain do it your selves? Would not you *silence* me now if it were in your power? Yea, I doubt not but when I die, some of you will rejoyce and say, that God did it in judgement on me.

12. And

12. And thus to *make divisions* among Christians, that should hold the Unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace, will one day be known to be a sin.

13. And so it is hereby to *harden* the enemies of Religion, by your clamours and the divisions which you cause; and tempt them to hate both you and us.

14. And it is worst of all to *father all this on God*, and Truth and Godliness, and use such holy Names for so bad a Cause.

15. And it aggravateth your sin, that you take no more notice of all those plain and terrible Scriptures, which as openly condemn your sin, as the sin of Drunkards or Swearers is condemned: were it but *James* 3. it would leave you utterly without excuse.

16. Yea, and that you can see the sins of such Drunkards and Swearers, yea, and see the Mote in the eyes of one that doth but use a Form or Ceremony which you dislike, and cannot see these Beams in your own. For all these sins I admonish you presently to repent.

S. *Who is it that is censorious? you or I? It is sin with you to open your sin.*

P. I desired you to open it: But see now how *hard* a work Repentance is, when in a Professor such sins as these will not be *confessed*.

S. *Well, come to the* cause it self: *Is it I or you that comply with* Papists?

P. I make that the business of this Conference with you: It is not you only, but some wiser men than you, that look so much at the evil of *Popery*, that they forget the evil of an *unrighteous opposition*, and of the *other extream*: And they do as one that by labouring to cure another of a Dead Palsie, casteth himself into a Phrensie or a Feaver: or like one that to avoid a Carrion that stinketh in the Ditch, doth run himself into the Ditch on the other side the way. Gods Truth must be vindicated only by Truth; and Wisdom is best justified of her own children by Wisdom. God hath no pleasure in fools, nor doth his Glory need our lye. There is a time when the Devil will seem to be against error and sin (and so against *Popery*): but it is in a way which shall promote it: which commonly is by ill-doing and over-doing. I tell you plainly, the Cause of Truth and Reformation gets nothing by some men that seem most zealous for it. For an unstudied half-wise honest Minister or private man to believe false reports of the *Papists*, and to mis-state Controversies, and to rail on them on such suppositions, and to mix many errors of his own in his opposition, and to backbite those that know more of the matter, as symbolizing with the *Papists*, this is certainly serving the Devil, how honest soever the instruments in the main may be.

S. *I perceive that you have an aking tooth at the* Protestant Divines *as well as at me: Are you wiser than all they? or are you not warping to* Grotianism *which you have written against?*

P. Among the *Protestant* Divines there are well studied, *knowing*, *solid* men, that understand what they say, (such as Bishop *Usher*, Dr. *Chaloner*, Dr. *Field*, Dr. *White*, *Chillingworth*, *Morton*, *Davenant*, *Andrews*, and many such; and abroad, *Camero*, *Dallaus*, *Blondell*, *Drelincourt*, *Amyraldus*, *Placæus*, *Vossius*, *Junius*, *Martinius*, *Crocius*, *Bergius*, *Bucer*, *Musculus*, *Melanchthon* and many others:) and there are *ignorant*, *hot-headed*, self-conceited men, that rave in extreams, (as *Gallus*, *Amsdorfius* and their companions did against *Georg. Major*, for saying [*Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem*]). And it is no wonder, that the best Churches have many such; and if such are the forwardest to *judge* and *cry down* all

all that are not as ignorant as they. And in our times, the World is more beholden to the fewneſs of buyers, and the wit of Bookſellers refuſing to Print them, than to the humility or modeſty of ſuch men, that the Shops do not abound with ſuch furious Writings, as Mr. *Brownes Antichriſtomachus*, Mr. *Danvers*, Mr. *Bagſhaw*, &c. and that *Antichriſt, Antithriſt*, is not made in Print the Univerſal Confutation of ſober truth, as commonly as it is bawled out in words.

S. *Is it not ſafeſt to get far enough from* Antichriſt *and* Popery? *Your ſtudy is to teach men* how near they may come to ſin without ſin; *and how to dance about the brink of Hell: For my part, I will be one of them that ſhall* come out of *Babylon*, and partake not of her ſins, nor touch the unclean thing, *and that* keep their garments undefiled; *and not one that like you is grown Lukewarm by being over-fond of Unity and Peace: You will follow* Grotius *it's doubt at laſt.*

P. Uncleanneſs muſt not be touched, nor ſin partaked of, nor lukewarm indifferency to ſin entertained; we muſt go as far from ſin as we can. But, poor deceived ſouls run into it, under the conceit of going far enough from it, and ſometimes into greater than they avoid.

S. *What ſin have ſuch* Proteſtants *run into in their oppoſition to* Popery?

P. I will tell you ſome, I. In Doctrine: and II. In the conſequents and practice.

I. It is more than one injudicious *Proteſtant* Divine that hath printed ſuch unſound Opinions as theſe in oppoſition to Popery for want of judgement.

1. While they plead againſt the *Romiſh* falſe Tradition, they have weakned faith, by denying that neceſſary uſe of *Hiſtorical Tradition* of Scripture which Chriſtianity doth ſuppoſe: (As others have denyed the neceſſary uſe of Reaſon unto faith.)

2. They have wronged the Church by undervaluing the *Tradition* of the *Creed* and the Eſſentials of Chriſtianity, by many means beſides the Scriptures.

3. They have much wronged the *Proteſtant* Cauſe by denying the *perpetual Viſibility* of the Church, and almoſt given it away, as I have ſhewed againſt *Johnſon*.

4. And their denyal of its *Univerſality*, and confining it long to the *Waldenſes* and ſuch others, is an exceeding injury to the Church and Truth.

5. And ſo is ſome mens over-doing as for the Scripture, who teach men that they can be no ſurer of Chriſtianity, (as delivered many years in Baptiſm before any of the New Teſtament was written,) than they are that there is no one *error* in all the Bible, by the careleſneſs of the Scribes and Printers, nor any *humane frailty* in the phraſe.

6. And alſo their feigning the Scripture perfection to conſiſt, in its being a *particular determiner* of all thoſe circumſtances of which it is only a general rule.

7. And thoſe that make every *form* of prayer, or *Ceremony* to be Antichriſtian.

8. And thoſe that make *Juſtifying faith* to be a *certainty* or *full perſwaſion* that we are elected and pardoned and ſhall be ſaved.

9. And thoſe that ſay, that To believe that I am juſtified is to believe Gods Word, or *fides divina*; either (as moſt ſay) becauſe one of the premiſes is in Scripture, or (as excellent *Chamier* ſaith) becauſe the Witneſs of the Spirit is *Gods Word*.

10. And

10. And those that say All that *have* true faith, are *sure* they have such: (as *Keckerman* and too many others.)

11. Those that deny Christ to have made any *Law*.

12. And those also that assert *Imputation* of Christs Righteousness in that sense which I have proved to subvert the Gospel.

13. And those that deny *Faith it self* to be Imputed for righteousness.

14. And those that deny that there is any *personal* Evangelical Righteousness in our selves that is any way necessary to our Justification.

15. And those that lay all the stress of *Faiths Justifying* us on the notion of Instrumental efficiency.

16. And those that say we are Justified by no act of faith, but its *receiving* Christs Righteousness; and all other acts of faith are the *works* by which none is justified.

17. And those that say, that Evangelical obedience is not meritorious as it signifieth only *Rewardable* in point of *Paternal Evangelical Governing* Justice, and as all the antient Fathers used that *word*; because we merit not by *Commutation*.

18. And those that say, that man hath no *free-will* (at all, of any sort) to spiritual good.

19. And those that say, that Christ was in Gods reputation, the *greatest sinner*, or wicked man, Adulterer, Murderer, hater of God in all the world.

20. And those that say, that he suffered in soul Pain altogether of the same kind with those that the damned suffer in Hell.

21. And those that in opposition to the Popish Government, Confession, Austerities, and several acts of Worship, do run into the contrary extream, against due Government, Confession, Austerities, &c. And those that from dark uncertainty or *à minus notis* do gather many conclusions against known truth.

I pass by such as the *Antinomians*, who as I have proved, subvert the Gospel it self, by running into the contrary extream from Popery.

S. *You are as bad as* Parker, *or the* Debate-maker, *that thus lay scandal on the* Reformers *themselves. If these were their faults, you should cover them, and not open them. This had been enough for a* Romish Rabshakeh.

P. You know not what it is that you say. This is to abhorr repentance, and to preferr the honour of man before the honour of God: yea, to let the shame be cast on Gods Word and Religion, lest the errors of men be shamed. But all men are lyars (that is, fallible) and God is true. He that confesseth and forsaketh his sin shall have mercy, but he that hideth it, shall not prosper. Are there not with you, even with you also (saith the Prophet) sins against the Lord our God? Why hath God recorded in Scripture the faults of so many of his servants, and forced them to such open Confessions? Did *Paul* wrong *Peter* and *Barnabas*, *Gal.* 2? or the Ministry when he said, *All seek their own things, and none the things of Jesus Christ?* or did the Evangelists wrong all the Disciples, by saying, that *They all forsook him and fled?* or *James* all Christians, saying *In many things we offend all?* I think the *Proud Impenitence* of many Professors, that will not confess sin, nor endure to be called to it, lest Religion be dishonoured, is that great dishonour to Religion which God hath been long punishing us for. When such evils have been *held* and *done* as our age hath known, either it must be said that they are not *evil*, or that they are. If we deny it, and say they are *Gods Truth and mans duty*, we feign God, and Scripture, and Religion to be for all that evil, (which is to blaspheme). If we say It is evil, we must say that

we

we are the guilty causes of it. God will teach Ministers and Professors instead of Pharisaical self-justification, to take open shame to themselves that he and Religion may be vindicated, before he will deliver us from shame and sorrow: And he that will save his honour against this shame shall lose it, and he that will thus lose it and cast it away shall most effectually recover it.

S. *I think you would fain perswade us, that* Protestants *are as bad as* Papists, *and perswade us into the* Roman *Tents.*

P. That is but your pievish inference: But little do you know how much of *Popery* it self you have, while you think that you hate it more than I.

S. *You would make me believe any thing, if you make me think that I have more of* Popery *than you.*

P. 1. Do not you agree with them in *confining* the Catholick Church to one Sect or Party? only They to their Sect, and You to yours.

2. Do you not agree with them in your vehement *condemnation of dissenters?* only they excommunicate and burn them, and you deny them your communion and reproach them: But their charity extendeth much further than yours, and you condemn more dissenters than they do.

3. Do you not agree with them in being *superstitious*, by a great deal of self-made Duty and Sin? only theirs and yours are not in the same things: They say, Touch not, taste not, handle not some things, and you other things, while you say that God hath forbidden forms of prayer, and many lawful circumstances of Worship, and other such like.

And I now intreat you and all the servants of Christ soberly to consider, whether a wild injudicious calling sound Doctrine and Practices *Antichristian*, and using that name as a bugbear for want of solid argument, and an injudicious running from *Papists* into the *contrary errors* and extreams, hath not brought on many the guilt and misery which in all the following particulars I shall open to you.

1. Such men have *corrupted* the *Gospel* of Christ, by bringing in many doctrinal errors, and opening a door to the heretical to bring in more. Almost all the Libertine *Antinomian* errors, have come in by an injudicious oppositon to Popery, as if they were the Vindication of *Election*, *Free Grace*, *Christs Righteousness*, *Justification by faith*, *Perseverance*, against mans *works* and *Merits*: And it is not to be denyed, that the said *Libertine* Doctrines do more contradict the Doctrine of the Gospel, even Christianity it self, than the Doctrine of the *Papists* about the same subjects do. I know this to be true, who ever is offended at it: *Aquinas*, *Scotus*, *Gabriel*, *Bellarmine*, *Pererius*, *Tolet*, yea, *Vasquez*, *Suarez* and *Molina* are not near so erroneous about Justification, Grace, Faith and good works, as *Richardson*, *Randal*, *Sympson*, *Towne*, *Crispe*, *Saltmarsh*, and many such others are. Yet how many Religious people have I known, that have gloried in these errors as the sweet discoveries of free grace!

2. Such erroneous extreams in opposition to *Popery* have greatly *dishonoured the Reformers*, and Reformation. When it cannot be denyed but such and such errors are found among them, it maketh all the Reformation suspected: as *Illyricus* his Doctrine of the substantiality of sin, and the non-necessity of Good works to salvation, and as *Andr. Osianders* Doctrine of Justification by Gods essential righteousness did, and as many harsh passages in *Piscator* and *Maccovius* do, to name no more besides those before named. What a stir have our later Divines still with the *Papists* in defending some few harsh sayings of *Luther*, *Calvin* and *Beza* about the *Cause of sin*, and some such subjects? But downright errors cannot be defended.

3. Your injudicious oppoſition greatly *hardneth* the Papiſts, and hindereth their *conviction*: When they find ſome errours in your writings, (as that all are bound to believe that they are elected and juſtified; that this is the ſenſe of the Article, I believe the forgiveneſs of ſin; that this is *fides divina*, that we are Reputed of God to have fulfilled all the Law of Innocency habitually and actually in and by Chriſt, *&c.*) and then when they read that ſuch men lay the great *ſtreſs* of the Reformation upon theſe, as the very cauſe of our rejecting *Rome*, and the *articuli ſtantis aut cadentis Eccleſiæ*, what can more harden them to a confidence that we are hereticks and that they are in the right? As I have known the perſons that had been in danger of turning Papiſts, if the errour of *Tranſubſtantiation* and ſome few more, had not been ſo palpable, as to reſolve them, Theſe men cannot be in the right; even ſo many Papiſts were like to have turned Proteſtants, had they not met with ſome notorious errours in ſuch injudicious adverſaries.

4. Yea we too very well know that your extremities have *occaſioned* divers Proteſtants to *turn Papiſts*: Yea ſome Learned men, and ſuch as have zealouſly run through many Sects in oppoſition to Popery themſelves; (And ſome of my acquaintance that went as far in the profeſſion of Godlineſs as moſt that I have known.) They have been ſo confounded to find partly palpable errours taken for ſound doctrine, and ſound doctrine railed at as Popery, and partly to ſee the ſhameful diverſity and contentions of all the Sects among themſelves, that it hath drawn them to think that there is no proſperity of the Church and Godlineſs to be expected but where there is *unity*, and Concord; and no Unity and Concord to be hoped for among Proteſtants; And therefore they muſt return for it to *Rome*: And *Grotius* profeſſeth that it was this that moved him, to go ſo far towards them as he did. And I muſt needs ſay, that I believe from my very heart, that the ſhameful diviſions, contentions, backbitings, revilings, cenſurings, perſecutions, errours and ſcandals of Proteſtants among themſelves, is a far ſtronger temptation to turn men to Popery, than any thing that is to be found among the Papiſts to invite men to it: and that many are thus *driven* to it, that would not have been *drawn*.

5. And by calling good and *lawful* if not neceſſary things, *Antichriſtian* and Popiſh, you have made Religious people *ridiculous* and a ſcorn to many that have more wit than Conſcience; as if we were all ſuch humorous Novices, as would run mad by being frightned with the name of Antichriſt: And as they deride you for it as Fanatical, ſo they the leſs fear Popery it ſelf.

6. And by theſe extremities you corrupt the peoples minds with a wrathful and contentious kind of Religion; which is eaſily taken up in compariſon of a holy and heavenly mind. When you ſhould kindle in them a zeal for Love, and Good Works, the mark of Gods peculiar people, you are killing Love and kindling wrath: Gunpowder may be ſet on fire without ſo much blowing of the coal: Long experience aſſureth us that a ſiding angry contentious zeal is eaſily kindled, but a lively faith, a confirmed hope of Glory, a Love to God and man, needs more ado.

S. *Stay a little in the midſt of your reproofs; Would you perſwade us to a Union with Antichriſt, and to live in Love and Concord with the members of the Devil? Are not the Papiſts ſuch? Have you no way to reconcile us to* Rome, *but by pleading for Love and peace? Muſt we not contend earneſtly for the faith once delivered to the Saints, and not be Lukewarm to the doctrines of* Jezabel *that ſeduceth the people of God to Idolatry?*

P. 1. Were you perſwadable I would perſwade you, not ignorantly to contradict the *truth* of God, and call it Popery; nor to ſet up certain falſe or incongruous notions, and pretend them great and neceſſary verities; nor to make a ſtir for ſome odd unſound opinions, received upon truſt from thoſe that you thought beſt of, and to buzz abroad ſuſpicions of Popery, againſt thoſe that have more underſtanding and conſcience than to imitate you; nor to fly in the faces of Gods faithfulleſt ſervants (much leſs to uſe your tongues to backbite them) as if they were Antichriſtian, becauſe they are not as ſhamefully ignorant and deceived as you are: And I would perſwade you to ſtudy and digeſt well what you take the boldneſs to ſpeak againſt; and not to talk confidently and furiouſly againſt that which you never underſtood: for it is the *fool* that *rageth* and *is confident*, Prov. 14. 16. I ſhould think I had not a greater work than to build twenty ſuch Cities as *London* or to conquer all the Turks dominions, if I could but perſwade all that ſeem Religious to *bridle their Tongues, leſt their Religion be in vain*, and inſtead of raſh and buſie talking of things that they underſtand not, and of raſh judging and reviling men wiſer than themſelves, but to SUSPEND their JUDGEMENTS, and ſtay till they have taken time to hear, read or conſider what is neceſſary to the true underſtanding of the caſe, and not to ſhame themſelves, and abuſe their brethren, and God himſelf, and wrong and corrupt the hearers minds, by railing at that to day, which if they ſtudy hard and grow wiſer, they will afterwards believe themſelves.

2. And I would not have you think it good or lawful to *bely* a Papiſt, and ſay that he holdeth what he doth not; nor to pretend that they differ in the ſenſe and matter, when the difference is but in the words: and then to think that all your injuſtice and falſe-dealing is excuſeable, if you do but ſay that ſome Godly Divines, or Religious people, ſaid ſo before you, and you can prove out of their writings that you are not the firſt that did the wrong: Nor would I have you charge the unmeet or unſound expreſſions, of every ignorant, railing Papiſt, on all that are called Papiſts, no nor on all their Church: And therefore I would have you well read and underſtand their writings before you venture too far in your accuſations. You would not be otherwiſe dealt with your ſelf; nor have the Proteſtant Religion (or the Non-conformiſts) charged with every unſeaſoned or unwarrantable ſentence, of the many weak Writers that have ſelf-eſteem enough to obtrude their ſentiments upon the world. The Papiſts have too many errours, and too great: you need not feign them to be more or greater than they are.

3. And I would perſwade you not to take all that live under the Roman power and are called Papiſts to be of the ſame mind or rank, nor to damn any more than you are ſure Chriſt will damn: but to conſider what the Judicious Dr. *Field* undertaketh (and B. *Morton* in his *Apologie* hath performed) even to prove that there are no conſiderable doctrines which conſtitute the Proteſtant Religion as different from Popery, which were not before *Luthers* Reformation defended by the greateſt Doctors in the Church of Rome, though the defenders of them were diſcountenanced and born down by the Papal faction by power and violence.

4. And I would perſwade you to believe that the name of *Antichriſt* will not warrant you to lay by that Love and meekneſs and Juſtice which is due to mankind, yea and which heathens uſed to each other, and which you would have all men uſe to you: The ſervant of the Lord muſt not ſtrive, but be gentle to all men, apt to teach, patient (or forbearing,) in meekneſs inſtructing oppoſers, 2 *Tim.* 2. 24, 25. and if it be poſſible, as much as in you lyeth, you muſt live peaceably with all men, *Rom.* 12. 18. and there-

fore follow peace with all, *Heb.* 10. 14. At leaſt make Conſcience of raſh calumniating and ſlandering the worſt.

5. And as to the texts that you referr to, I wiſh you better to ſtudy them, and you will find that they were not ſpoken of the Papiſts then, but of the Hereticks or Sectaries of that age: It was the *Nicolaitans* and ſuch others that are likened to *Jezebel*, as the text ſheweth you: And it was ſuch as they, called *Carpocratians*, and *Gnoſticks* that denyed or ſubverted the faith which Chriſtians were earneſtly to contend for: And we would have you zealouſly defend Chriſtianity, without Lukewarmneſs: but not to abuſe the world ſo much, as to feign all your dreams or opinions to be Chriſtianity or the faith.

And ſo I ſtill ſay that though Popery muſt be faithfully rejected, yet your over-doing and miſtaking way of oppoſition to it, endangereth the peoples ſouls, by tempting them into factious wrath and unrighteous calumny, and deſtroying that Love and common juſtice which is due to *Papiſts* themſelves, and much more to thoſe *Proteſtants* whom you ignorantly calumniate.

7. Yea I add, that hereby you make falſe glaſſes for the people to ſee their own faces in, and *cheat* poor ſouls, with a *carnal ſort of Religion and zeal*, as if it were that which is true and ſaving. Men are loth to know that they are indeed unholy: and therefore will be pretending to ſome kind of Religion to cheriſh their preſumption, for want of ſounder comfort: And O how many thouſands are there that think that they are Godly perſons, becauſe they can riſe up in the dark with confident reproach againſt this or that opinion or practice as coming too near to Popery! O that they hated all that cometh too near to a fleſhly, worldly mind and life! or to ſelfiſhneſs and pride and overvaluing an ignorant underſtanding! It's pittiful to hear how many learned Preachers in *Germany* among the *Lutherans*, live in drunkenneſs, and worldlineſs, and how little of the ſpirit of holineſs appeareth in their Sermons or lives, and how they make up all by a fervent preaching againſt the Papiſts and the Calviniſts. Were it as eaſie to get *faith, hope* and *Love*, as to talk againſt *other mens opinions*, or to call that Popery which is contrary to your raw conceits, how happy were it for ſuch men! But you little think that they that have a Religious zeal for forms and ceremonies, and they that are as zealous againſt them, may be of the ſame ſpirit and temper of Religions, being both but Formaliſts, though ones formality work for, and the others againſt ſuch kind of things. And you are not aware that if you are wiſer than thoſe that you talk againſt, you muſt ſhew it by your works and meekneſs of wiſdom, and that the envious wiſdom and zeal which is not from above, but is earthly, ſenſual and diabolical, may work as well by crying down other mens opinions as Popiſh and Antichriſtian as in other wayes.

8. And under pretence of zeal againſt Popery, you *turn* the peoples minds from the *great matters* of their ſalvation, which need their daily and moſt diligent ſtudy, and their moſt intenſe affections and regard: And ſo you ſtarve out and deſtroy true piety, by calling off the peoples minds to Controverſie: And when they ſhould be edifying one another in the comfortable hopes of another world, they are backbiting one another with accuſations of Popery.

9. Yea *Preaching* it ſelf is thus corrupted: And that which is appointed of God to be the means of mens edification in Love and holineſs, (*Eph.* 4. 14, 15, 16.) is turned to be the bellows of keeping hot the furnace of wrath and injury.

10. Yea

10. Yea *Prayer* which ſhould be moſt holy is thus alſo corrupted and prophaned by too many; while they boldly beſpeak the holy and dreadful God againſt one another, and againſt thoſe things, which their ignorance miſrepreſenteth to themſelves.

And ſo Gods ordinances are made a ſnare to ſouls, which are appointed for their ſalvation: and the man that can kindle in his hearers a tranſporting paſſion againſt this or that opinion or form as Popiſh, is cryed up for an excellent preacher, and ſeemeth to edifie the people while he deſtroyeth them.

11. And by this means you ſeem to *juſtifie* the Papiſts *lyes* and calumnies againſt the Proteſtants, by doing as they do: They belye *Luther*, *Zuinglius*, *Calvin*, *Beza*, &c. with juſt ſuch intentions and ſuch a kind of zeal, as ſome over-doing Sectaries belye them. And is it bad in them and good in you?

12. You teach the people a dangerous and perverſe way of reaſoning *à minùs notis*, which will let in almoſt any errours: From a dark text in the *Revelations*, or *Daniel*, or from the ſuppoſition that the Pope is the Antichriſt, and all Papiſts have received the mark of the beaſt, you gather concluſions againſt the notorious duties of Love and peace, which the light of nature doth commend to all: Not that I am perſwading you that the Pope is not Antichriſt; but that all things be received but according to their proper degree of evidence.

S. *Now you open your ſelf indeed: All that revolt to Popery begin there, with queſtioning whether the* Pope *be the* Antichriſt, *and telling men of the darkneſs of the Book of* Revelations.

P. I tell you I will abate no certainty that you have, but increaſe my own and yours if I could: but I would not have any falſly to pretend that they are certainer of any thing than they are: And no certainty can go beyond the aſcertaining evidence: And if all Scriptures be equally plain, St. *Peter* was deceived, that tells us of many things hard to be underſtood, which the unlearned wreſt as other Scriptures to their own deſtruction. And if the *Revelations* be not one of the hardeſt, I crave your anſwer to theſe queſtions: 1. Why are five Expoſitors uſually of four opinions in the expounding of it? when it is thoſe that have ſpent much of their lives in ſtudying it (as *Napier*, *Brightman*, *&c.*) who are the Expoſitors? 2. Why will none of you that find it ſo eaſie at laſt write one certain Commentary which may aſſure which of all the former (if any one of them) was in the right? 3. Why did *Calvin* take it to be too hard for him, and durſt not venture to expound it? 4. And if you take it to be ſo neceſſary as you pretend, tell me whether it was ſo neceſſary, and ſo taken, by all thoſe Churches, that for a long time received it not as Canonical Scripture? Surely they were ſaved without believing it. Though no doubt but the book of *Revelation* is a great mercy to the Church, and all men ſhould underſtand as much of it as they can. But all that I blame you for here, is the perverting of the *order of proof*, in arguing *à minùs notis*.

13. And theſe over-doers that run things into the contrary extreams, do moſt injuriouſly *weaken* the *Proteſtant cauſe*, by diſabling themſelves and all men of their principles to defend it, and arming the Papiſts againſt it by their errors. When it cometh to an open diſpute by Word or Writing, one of theſe mens errors is like a wound that lets out blood and ſpirits, and puts words of triumph into the adverſaries mouth: A cunning Papiſt will preſently drive the ignorant diſputant to reſolve his cauſe into his miſtake, and then will open the falſhood of that, and thence infer the falſhood of all the reſt: And what an injury is that to the ſouls of the auditors, who may be betrayed by it, and to the cauſe it ſelf? For inſtance, If one of our over-doers hold that we are reputed to have kept all the Law of Innocency and

merited ſalvation our ſelves by Chriſt, or that no act of faith is Juſtifying but the accepting of his righteouſneſs, or that faith Juſtifieth only as the efficient inſtrumental cauſe, or that we have no righteouſneſs which hath any thing to do in our Juſtification, but only Chriſts imputed Merits, or that mans faith, Love or obedience are not rewardable, *&c.* how eaſily will a Papiſt open the falſhood of ſuch an opinion to the hearers, and then tell them that they may ſee by this who is in the right. And, alas, what work would one Learned Papiſt make in *London* by publick diſputing, if we had no wiſer men to deal with him than theſe over-doers? They may call Truth and Sobriety Antichriſtian, and talk nonſence as againſt Popery ſucceſsfully to their own party; but I hope never to ſee the cauſe managed by their publick diſputes, leſt half the Congregation turn Papiſts on it at once. If *Chillingworth* had not been abler to confute a Papiſt than thoſe that uſed to calumniate him as Popiſh or *Socinian*, he had done leſs ſervice of that kind than he did.

14. And it is an odious injury that theſe Over-doers do to the *ancient* and the *univerſal Church*, while in many caſes, they (ignorantly or wilfully) reproach and condemn them, as if they were all the *favourers of Popery*, and call their ancient doctrine and practice Antichriſtian. Some of them ignorantly falſifie the Fathers doctrine, and upon truſt from their Leaders averr that they held that which they plainly contradict: and that which they held indeed, they cry out againſt as Popery. Such an inſtance we have newly in a Souldier, Major *Danvers*, an *Anabaptiſt*, which I have derected. And will Chriſt take it well to have almoſt all his Church condemned as Antichriſtian?

15. And hereby what an honour is done to Popery, and what a diſhonour to the Reformed Churches, when it ſhall be concluded that all the Churches heretofore, even next after the age of the Apoſtles, and almoſt all the preſent Churches, were and are againſt the doctrine of the Proteſtants, and on the Papiſts ſide? And yet how many do us this injury, and the Roman Church this honour? About the nature of Juſtifying faith, and its office to Juſtification, and about the nature of Juſtification it ſelf, and Imputation of Righteouſneſs, and free-will, and mans Works and Merits, and about aſſurance of ſalvation and perſeverance, how many do call that Popery, which the whole current of Greek and Latine Fathers do aſſert, and all the ancient Churches owned, and moſt of all the preſent Churches in the world? And thoſe that call all forms of prayer, *Popery*, or the Engliſh *Liturgie* at leaſt, when almoſt all the Chriſtian world have forms, and moſt ſuch as are much worſe, do but tell men that the Chriſtian world is on the ſide that they oppoſe, and againſt their way.

16. And it is a crime of infamy to be taken for *Separatiſts* from the *univerſal Church*; And in doctrines and forms of Worſhip, not only to avoid what we take to have been a common weakneſs, but alſo to condemn them as Antichriſtian, or as holding pernicious errours, is but to perſwade men that we are not of the ſame body, and to own a ſinful diſhonourable ſeparation.

17. And by all theſe means theſe Over-doers do greatly increaſe *Atheiſm* and Infidelity and prophaneneſs among us, while their zeal againſt Truth and reproaches of ſound doctrine, do make men think that our Religion is nothing but proud humour and ſelf-conceit; and while they ſee us ſo boldly condemn almoſt all the world except our ſelves, they will think that ſo few as we deſerve not to be excepted.

18. By this injurious extremity againſt the Papiſts, we do but kindle in them a bitterer enmity to us, and hatred of them breedeth hatred in them of

us,

us, and so we set them on plotting revenge against us, as implacable injurious enemies; when we should deal soberly and righteously with all men, and seek to win them by truth and gentleness.

19. And such dealings with them do draw *Persecution* on the Protestants that live under their Dominions; and if we refuse to use them here as *Christians*, no wonder if abroad they use not the Protestants as *Men*.

20. And by such great abuses of Reformation, men *hinder* Reformation *for the time to come*, and do their part to make it hopeless, while they discourage such attempts, by dishonouring the Reformation which is past. Even as *David George*, and *Muntzer*, and the *Munster* Dotages and Rebellions, do hinder the reviving of *Anabaptistry* in the world, and the shame of their old practices and successes, is as a Grave-stone upon the Sepulcher of their Cause; so do these men do their part to make it with the whole Reformation, that none hereafter may date to own or meddle with such work.

These that I have opened briefly to you, are the real fruits of false, injurious and ignorant zeal and *over-doing* against the *Papists*: And if Popery revive, it's like to be by such men.

S. *But* Popery *is an* heinous evil; *and corrupt nature is so prone to evil, that you need not thus dissuade men from going too far from it, or from over-doing against it, no more than from being overmuch religious.*

P. You may say the same as truly of the errors on the *contrary extream*: All of them are *evil*, and men are *prone to evil*: But 1. Little know you how common it is in the world to spend mens zeal against the real or supposed evil of *other mens Opinions*, and thereby to strengthen the mortal evil of their *own carnal affections* and passions, and *worldly lives*, and to take a zeal for Truth and Orthodoxness for real Holiness, while usually such miss of Truth it self. 2. And you know not the wiles of Satan, how ordinarily he betrayeth a good Cause by the ill management of its most zealous friends, and doth *undo* by *over-doing*. When he will play the Devil indeed with *Eve*, he will seem to be more than God himself for *Knowledge* of *Good* and *Evil*, and for the *advancement* of mankind to be like God, and God shall be accused by him as if he were untrue, and envyed our perfection. When he will play the Devil indeed with *Christ*, he will seem to be more for valiantness and *trusting God* than Christ was, and pleadeth Scripture for tempting God. When he will play the Devil indeed in the *Pharisees*, he will be stricter for the *Sabbath*, and for *Discipline* in avoiding the company of the Publicans and sinners, and stricter in fastings and dyet and other observations than Christ himself; And he will be a zealous enemy to Blasphemy, and a zealous *Royalist* for *Cæsar*, and a zealous honourer of the Temple and the Law, when Christ, or *Paul*, or other Apostles are to be destroyed by it. And when he will play the Devil in the *Nicolaitans*, *Simonians*, and *Gnostick* Hereticks, he will seem to be for *higher knowledge*, and *greater liberty* than the Apostles were. And so when he would sow discord among Christians, and would kill their Love, and divide Christs Church, and set them in a mental and oral War against each other, he will aggravate the errors and faults of others, and he will seem a more zealous friend of Truth, and enemy to Popery, Heresie, Error, Superstition, false Worship, or other faults than Christ is: But he knoweth why.

S. *But God telleth us himself, that he is jealous about his worship, and hath in Scripture more severely executed his Justice upon the corrupters of his worship, than almost any other crime.*

P. No

P. No doubt but God is jealous against Idolatry. He that knoweth not the true God from Idols, cannot honour him. And he that worshippeth him not as a most Great and Holy God, dishonoureth or blasphemeth him on pretence of worshipping him. And to worship him by an Image, is to perswade men that God is like that which that Image doth represent; which is to deny him to be God. And no doubt but the *Jews* great temptations to Idolatry from the Nations about them, were to be oppugned by great severities of God. And no doubt but *Moses* Law was to be honoured by Gods severe executions on the breakers of it.

But when you come to Christs preaching, you find how oft he teacheth the Pharisees to go learn what that meaneth, *I will have Mercy, and not Sacrifice.* When he conferreth with the Woman of *Samaria, John* 4. she presently turneth from the doctrine of faith (as *Sectaries* do among us) to the Controversies of the *times*, [Our Fathers say, In this Mountain, and you say At *Jerusalem*, men ought to worship.] But Christ calleth her off such low discourse, and teacheth her to worship God as a Spirit, in spirit and truth, if ever she would be accepted of him.

S. *But it is a time now when* Popery *is striving to rise again, and how unseasonably would you abate mens zeal against it?*

P. No more than he was against his Lawyers Zeal, who grew hoarse with senseless bawling for him, saying, I am glad he hath lost his voice, or else I might have lost my Cause. I am so much against *Popery*, that I wish it wiser and abler adversaries, than self-conceited unstudied Zealots, who will honour *Popery*, by entitling it to the Truths of God, and the Consent of the Antient or Universal Church; or would make people believe, that it consisteth in some good or indifferent things, as in some Doctrines, Forms or Government, which others can see no harm in; And so teach men to say, If this be *Popery*, we will rather be *Papists*, than of them that rave as in their sleep, against they know not what. Could these men be perswaded to lay out their Zeal and diligence, in propagating the practical knowledge of Christianity it self, and let things alone which they understand not, and SUSPEND TILL THEY HAVE THROUGHLY STUDIED, or at least to forbear hindering wiser men, and calumniating and backbiting those that would by wisdom defend that truth which by folly and rashness they go about to betray, they might be meet for their share of that honour which now they forfeit.

S. *You strive against Gods Judgements by which he hath oft times disowned* Popery *among us; and would make that less odious, which God by wonders hath oft called us to abhorr.*

P. You still mistake: It is only your strengthening them, or sinning against God by false and ignorant accusations, and calumniating wiser men as favouring them, that I speak against. God hath oft marvellously preserved us from their attempts. But if you will use untruths against them, they will repay you two for one, and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you. Little know you how odious they render us by lyes abroad where they are believed: and I would have no honest man to imitate them. I will instance to you in a few of their Stories.

Saith *Thom. Waldensis* (a Learned man) against *Wickliffe, citante Tympio, pag.* 104. ["I will tell you a Story which I saw with my own eyes "in the Cathedral of St. *Paul* in *London*: where *Tho. Arundel* a Venerable "Prelate of happy memory, a Son, and Brother of Earls (the Bishop of "*Norwich* and others assisting him) sitting in judgement, proposed some "questions of the Eucharist to a certain Taylor of *Worcestershire* taken in "Heresie; and when he could not be moved, and would call the most

"Sacred

"Sacred Hoſt nothing but *Bleſſed Bread*, at laſt being commanded to do re-
"verence to the Hoſt, he blaſphemouſly anſwered, *A Spider is worthier*
"*of Reverence*. And preſently a great and horrid Spider deſcending from
"the top of the room by his thread, made directly to the Blaſphemers
"mouth, and laboured to get in while he ſpake. The Illuſtrious Prince
"*Thomas* Duke of *Oxford* then Chancellor of the Kingdom, ſaw the pro-
"digie: which ſo confirmed them of Gods revenge, that they burnt the
"man]

Saith the ſame *Tympius Theatr. p.* 148. ["*Oecolampadius* an Apoſtate
"married Monk *an.* 1528. was ſtrangled by the Devil in *Baſil*, (as *Lu-*
"*ther* reporteth in his Book of the private Maſs): a death worthy his
"life. *Luther* writeth that he had proved it (*exploratiſſimum eſſe*) that
"*Oecolampadius* was killed by the fiery weapons of the Devil.]

"*Caroloſtadius an.* 1530. ſtrangled by the *Calvinian* God went quickly
"to Hell, as *Eraſmus Albertus* reporteth.

"*John Calvin* was conſumed of the lowſie diſeaſe, the Worms eating
"through all his body, with blaſpheming words, curſed God and called
"on the Devil, and committed his ſoul to him, *an.* 1567. ſaith *Bolſec in*
"*vit. Calv. c.* 22. *Beza* writeth, that *Calvin* tormented four years miſe-
"rably at laſt eaten with ſwarming Lice dyed unhappily and filthily.
"*Pag.* 154. *Luther* having ſupped daintily and gone merry to bed, was
"ſtrangled in the night. *Th. Bozius de ſig. Eccl. l.* 23. *ſig.* 98. *c.* 3. ſaith
"that he was certified by a Boy that ſerved *Luther* and turned to them,
"that *Luther* hang'd himſelf, but they ſwore all the houſe to conceal it.
Ibid. id. ["They ſay (ſaith *Bozius*) that when *Bucer* was dying, a
"horrid Devil ſtood by and almoſt frightned all preſent to death, of whom
"he (*Bucer*) was ſtricken that he might carry away his ſoul; for being
"pull'd out of the bed, his bowels being ſcattered all about the Bed-chamber,
"and he killed with many torments, did expire.]

How like you ſuch work as this? ſuch horrid lyes, of things fully known? Should not the deteſtation of them make us afraid of coming near them by any imitation, and to take heed what we believe or ſay of others? Abundance more ſuch Stories, Miracles and Progidies you may find in *Tympius* and *Cæſarius* beſides many others. Read but thoſe two Books and you will ſee who be the great pretenders to Prodigies and Miracles, and readieſt to proclaim Gods Judgements on others, when they that think they do it for the honour of God, alas, are unawares moved to it by the intereſt of that Cauſe and Party which is ſo much their own, as that it may be called Their own Intereſt.

S. *well, for all this, I take it to be Gods Mercy to poſſeſs the unlearned Profeſſors themſelves, with ſo great a zeal againſt all that ſavoureth of* Popery; *ſo that were it not for them, the Miniſters themſelves would comply further than they do: But when they ſee that it is the* ſenſus communis fidelium, *and they muſt loſe all the good people if they comply, it holds them in. Many that cannot diſpute againſt* Popiſh *errors and practices, can hate them.*

P. No doubt, but the *habit* of *Divine Love*, doth hold many good Chriſtians much faſter to God and the certain Eſſentials of Chriſtianity and Piety, than the *ſtrongeſt diſputing Reaſon* would do without it. But if you will ſay the ſame of doubtful diſputations, you will much miſtake. In many ſuch things the ſtricter profeſſors go with the ſtream of their party, and follow them that carry it for the reputation of moſt godlineſs, or thoſe leaders or friends that have moſt advantage on them. And do they not uſe the very ſame argument as you in different Countreys for different

and

and contrary causes? In *Germany* the *Communis sensus fidelium* is one thing, and in *England* another, and in *France* another in such matters. Yea, in the same Countrey in several times. I can remember since among the Religious stricter party, it was abominable to wear long hair, even to cover the ears, and now these twenty years they many of them exceed those that then were accounted Ruffians. It was then a crime with them to take Tobacco, and now it is none: and thus custome changes the matter with them. And now in some Congregations they will not sing Psalms, in others they will not read the Scripture; In others these can be endured, but not the use of the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue: In others that much, but no Forms of Prayer of mans devising: In others, the Ministers own self-imposed Form, but none imposed by Superiours: In one Congregation they are commonly for Universal Redemption and Free-will, and in another commonly against it: And why then would you perswade us, that in such things as these, the *common sense* of the faithful goeth all *one way*, when they usually are carryed down the stream of pious reputation where they live?

And indeed you have small reason to be glad, that Ministers have the temptation of popular esteem or censure to conflict with, or that so many are conquered by it. Is it a lovely thing to hear silly women (ever *learning*, or rather *hearing*, but never coming to a competent *knowledge* of such matters) to cant out against their Teachers [*Antichristian*] and [*Popery*] upon words or actions not understood, which suit not with their vain conceits?

S. *It is one of the artifices of the* Papists *which you have learned: when they would draw men to set light by the purity of Religion and the Worship of God, to cry up Love and Concord and Peace instead of it, and so to tye all mens tongues and hands from resisting their wicked Church-pollutions, by the fear of Schism, or being uncharitable to the polluters. And so you will draw men to an indifferency in Religion on pretence of Peace and Charity.*

P. I am certain that the Wisdom from above is first pure, and then peaceable, and gentle, *&c. James* 3. 17. and it ever takes in both. And I am sure that Christ first and his Apostles after him make Love the summ of our Religion. I think it not amiss to tell you, of this, what an old *Non-conformist* saith in a *Latin* Treatise called *De vera & genuina Jesu Christi Religione, Authore Ministro Anglo, p.* 36, 37, 38, 39. The words are too large to recite, but in short he laboureth to prove, that next Faith in God and the Redeemer, Love is the Christian Religion it self, and set up instead of Ceremonies and penal Jewish Laws, as the Great Law of Christ, and the fulfilling of all Laws, answering his own Office, and so his new and great Commandment and the Character of his people, and so the Communion of the Saints is our faith and life. And that to *believe* in God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and *Love* him and one another, is the Gospel, and our true Religion: And that when it cometh to Ceremonies, Rituals and externals, this still is Christs voice, [*Go learn what this meaneth, I will have Mercy and not Sacrifice.*]

But know you not that you come up to the worser part of *Popery*, when you imitate the bloodiest men among them in your degree, by pleading for *Sacrifice against Mercy?* A cruel Religion, and burning and destroying men, and setting Kingdoms on fire, on pretence of keeping out Heresie and Schism, and preserving the right Faith, and Government, and Worship, is the malignity of Popery. When either They or You grow wrathfully zealous against your Brethren on pretence of purity of Faith or

Worship

Worſhip, and to make you a Religion which quencheth Love, you know not what manner of Spirit you are of.

S. *Is not the Church of* Epheſus *commended*, Rev. 2. 3. *that* could not bear them that were evil, *and that tryed falſe Apoſtles and found them lyars; and are they not blamed that did bear with the woman* Jezabel *and the doctrine of the* Nicolaitans? *And if God hate ſuch doctrine, ſo muſt we.*

P. All this is true and good; but do not you miſapply it to defend your uncharitableneſs, or error? I am not perſwading you to Indifferency as to truth and falſhood, good and evil, nor to abate your hatred of Idolatry or ſuch doctrine of wickedneſs and uncleanneſs as the *Nicolaitan*'s was; nor yet to corrupt the Churches by neglecting Diſcipline. We would have a man that is an Heretick rejected after the firſt and ſecond admonition: Bear not with any ſuch evil in your Church Communion which ſhould be caſt out, and maketh men uncapable of Communion, (ſo far as it is in your power regularly to caſt out ſuch.) But as you muſt not take ſuch for enemies, but ſtill afford them a common ſort of Charity, ſo you muſt not on this pretence, in your ignorance and raſhneſs rave againſt truth or harmleſs things, or your Brethren that think not in all things as you do; nor call that *Popery* which ſober wiſer men than you, (yea, almoſt all Chriſts Church on earth) do take to be ſound doctrine, or laudable practice. It is the ſhame of the party among us that moſt inclineth to ſeparation, when ſober underſtanding men ſhall hear an ignorant fellow or woman with confident boldneſs, rail at a controverted Doctrine, or a Form of Prayer, or Ceremony as *Popery*, and admoniſh their Teachers not to receive the Mark of the Beaſt, when they do but ſhew their pride and ignorance, in overvaluing their own conceptions and unfurniſhed underſtandings, and vilifying the knowledge of others in their dark preſumption. If you would bring ſuch leſſer errors under Church Diſcipline or Separation, on pretence of *not bearing with them that are evil*, it is you your ſelves that would ſooneſt be found worthy to be ſeparated from or caſt out, who credit *Popery* by placing it in ſound, good, decent or harmleſs things, and corrupt Doctrine and Worſhip by your Errors and Superſtitions, which you run into on the contrary extream.

S. *Your laxe and looſe principles would caſt out all* Diſcipline *out of the Church.*

P. You know not how much in your pretences to *over-much ſtrictneſs of Diſcipline*, you agree with thoſe *Papiſts* and *Prelatiſts* whom you ſeem to be moſt averſe from. How hath the Pope ſubdued Emperours and Princes to himſelf, and captivated the World, but by the pretence of Diſcipline, by his *Excommunications* and *Abſolutions*? How elſe have his Prelates diſturbed this Kingdom in former Ages? And I my ſelf had lately to do with one of the greateſt Clergie-men that hath had a hand in our ejection, ſilencing and preſent Church-ſtate, againſt whom I am fain to defend, that Kings and Chief Magiſtrates are not to be excommunicated: And I find the aforeſaid *Engliſh Non-conformiſt* in the ſaid *Latin Tract. de Vera & Genuina Relig. pag.* 280, 281. put upon the ſame task, and performing it by the ſame arguments which I uſed. I confeſs, the Papiſts and Worldly Tyrannical Clergie do corrupt Diſcipline, and caſt out the true cleanſing uſeful exerciſe of it; but for ſo much and ſuch uſe as is conducible to maintain the intereſt of their Sect and Party and Carnality, no men are more hot: and is it not ſo with you?

FINIS.